In Re: Disciplinary Action Against Atty.

Wenceslao Laureta and Contempt

Preoceedings Against Eva Maravilla Illustre GR No 68635 12 March 1987
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R.
Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino
P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using
contemptuous language claimed that members of the court
rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla
Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the
Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit
himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the
defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the
Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no
reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself
from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First
Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was
issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to
Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing
the case to another forum of justice, to which she made true by
filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on
16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated
copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed
petitioner’s Complaint
Issue:
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and
Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional
misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until
further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court,
whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are
entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation
or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of
enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme
Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental
principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under
a republican form of government such that the three co-equal
branches of government are each supreme and independent
within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere
with the performance of the duties of the other

DEMETRIA V ALBA
G.R. No. 71977 | February 27, 1987 | J. Fernan
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)—as
concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties
with general interest common to all people of the Philippines,
and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44
infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal
transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of
legislative powers and allowing the President to override the
safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the
legal standing of the petitioners and held that one branch of the
government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in
its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It
also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic
after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the
provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof),
which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.”
Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive
act
Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege
granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the
Executive Department to any program of any department
included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard
as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually
savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the
expenditure of public funds to naught. Such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope
of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary
to declare what the other branches of the government has
assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred
judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power is
superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority,
the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the
administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

COCOFED VS REPUBLIC
Case Digest GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012
Facts:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company
(CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund, a fund to be
sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or
ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed
at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of
coconut producers having the largest membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees
were issued to improve the coconut industry through the
collection and use of the coconut levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
(CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust
fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based
products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF)
to finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority
(PCA) to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut
and palm oil industry.
Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its
Section 1 the policy to provide readily available credit facilities
to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving
this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF
and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and
deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the
deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain
level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed that all
levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as
special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general
funds of the government.
Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall
not be construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund, the
stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund
shall pertain to coconut farmers in their private capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had
already bought from Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of the
outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it
was also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall receive equity
in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as
consideration for PCA’s buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco
claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB
shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the
purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later reimbursed itself from
the coconut levy fund.
While the 64.98% (72.2 % – 7.22%) portion of the option shares
ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the corresponding stock
certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in
the name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares
forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands
of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock
were not covered by any of the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly
or indirectly to various projects and/or was converted into
different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this
was their use to acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition by
UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large
block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.
Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and
1468 that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a
special and/or trust fund is valid
No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special
purpose and the balance thereof should revert back to the
general fund.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all
money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall
be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose
only, and if the purpose for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. Here, the
CCSF were sourced from forced exactions with the end-goal of
developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore, the
subsequent reclassification of the CCSF as a private fund to be
owned by private individuals in their private capacities under
P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is unconstitutional.
Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the
purpose or policy for which the coco levy fund was created.
Issue 2:
W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers
in their private capacities
No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can
only be used for public purpose. They cannot be used to
purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private
individuals. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose
and raised by special means, it is still public in character.
Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the
PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it
acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and
regulations the PCA may promulgate is unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated
legislative power to the PCA, and second, it allowed the use of
the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and
unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB
shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined
“coconut farmers”, which negated or circumvented the national
policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755.
Hence, the so-called Farmers’ shares do not belong to the
coconut farmers in their private capacities, but to the
Government. The coconut levy funds are special public funds
and any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds
should likewise be treated as public funds or public property,
subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such
property.
BOCEA VS. TEVES CASE DIGEST
Facts:
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on
February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The
law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials
and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months
of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has the
duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and
procedures for removing from the service officials
and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target;
(3) terminate personnel in accordance with
the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for
performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including
the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual
report to Congress.
Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA)
directly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional.
Petitioner contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder
because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of
officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the
fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the
penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their
revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of hearing;
and that the removal from service is immediately executory.
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under
Section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential
to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a
group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of
attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a
judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for
the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and
provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes
are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned
employee are amply protected. BOCEA vs. Teves, G.R. No.
181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589

CASE DIGEST: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK),

REPRESENTED BY ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO,PETITIONER,V.
ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the

name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six
months later, Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK,
which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of
Tobias that resulted in negative findings. The property consisted
of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila.

His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after
two months, he again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was
foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the
lone bidder.

When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the

Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original copy
of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault.
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF)
concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations
submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the
filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa through
falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of
Article 315, in relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the
Revised Penal Code.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged

Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents.
Tobias filed a motion for reinvestigation, which was granted.
Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of
Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and
recommended his being charged with estafa through falsification
of public document. Tobias appealed to the DOJ and then Acting
Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a
resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed
against Tobias. On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice
Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, METROBANK challenged the adverse
resolutions. METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of
Justice did was to determine the innocence of the accused,
which should not be done during the preliminary investigation;
and that the CA disregarded such lapse.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in dismissing METROBANK's petition?

HELD: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
courts have no right to directly decide matters over which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Executive Branch of the Government

The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the
executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of
filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the

purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not
part of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the investigating
prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. There is no
definitive standard by which probable cause is determined
except to consider the attendant conditions; the existence of
probable cause depends upon the finding of the public
prosecutor conducting the examination, who is called upon not
to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding
should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason.

We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a

commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to
observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of
the realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents
bearing on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of
dispatching its competent and experienced representatives to the
realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of
investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that
METROBANK did not diligently perform a thorough check on
Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had
offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself.
Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and prudence
than others in their dealings because their business is impressed
with public interest. Their failure to do so constitutes negligence
on its part.

DENIED

DIMAPORO V MITRA
FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative

for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the
1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner
filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon
being informed of this development by the COMELEC,
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section
67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a

letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention
"to resume performing my duties and functions as elected
Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose
his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being
contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present
members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of

office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as
the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be
shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2,
Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992,"
while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House
of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts
that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these
constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of
a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in
the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his
seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or
employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of
candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or
employment.

ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881

OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE
RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT',
EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING
HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS
AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are
holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of
facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily
because under our Constitution, we have this …chapter on
accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987
constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability
of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and

employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the

elective public officers must serve their principal, the people,
not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that
rather than cut short the term of office of elective public
officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire
term of office by discouraging them from running for another
public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it
clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go
back to their former position. This is consonant with the
constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people
with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they
have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official

covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another
office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the
elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have
voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is)
automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and
act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat
is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not
make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies,
unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of
shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does
not preclude its application to present members of Congress.
Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment … All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided
by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression
clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI
of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may
be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a
vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other
grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor

of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House
Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their
duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the
unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881.
When the COMELEC communicated to the House of
Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of
candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao,
respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty.
The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office

is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the
people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations
and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain
of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
office.

NOTES:
- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short
the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to
confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office
prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened
by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an
officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all.
These situations will not change the duration of the term of
office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the

tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any

other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for
disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of
the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly
repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus
Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except
for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14
repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act
No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act
No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals
with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices,
while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar
limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. –
Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of
Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the
one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy.
Elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position.
On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still
considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in
its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The
law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and
void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act
shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been
repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court
in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
“Accountability of Public Officers:”

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and

employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of
the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not
considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in
the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso
facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective
certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall
take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which
require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles
of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the
title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each
and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep.
Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of
the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials
who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has
held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the
title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be
done away with and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines
signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society
and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is
bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But
policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government
policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches
of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the
wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on
sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve
the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular
manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the
serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within
the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from
repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v.
Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its
pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a
laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to
repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby
enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the
fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of
Congress – is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials
and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto
by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No.
9006 which provides that it “shall take effect immediately upon
its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render
the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down
the rule:
... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date without its previous
publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall
be shortened or extended….
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine
enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its
express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly
entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do
not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom
of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative
branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the
court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such
transgression has been shown in this case.

Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials

who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned
from their positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a

petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for
issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their
certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their
positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only
copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:
NO.

In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA.

9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for
giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with
appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the
substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that
there was no violation of the equal protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion
on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the
issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t
squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and

elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid
classification, the proviso does not comply with the second
requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the

use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or
even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would
be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare
of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition
that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still
in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding

appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy
high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker
in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned
once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This
scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use
his position in the government to wield influence in the political
world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public

offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character,
whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level.
Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the
fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.

Pundaodaya –versus- Comelec & Noble,

G.R.179313, Sept.17, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner ran against Noble for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections. Pundaodaya filed a
petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter
lacks the residency qualification. Pundaodaya claimed that
Noble is a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Noble
averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. In a resolution, the
Second Division of the COMELEC ruled and disqualified Noble
from running as mayor. Noble filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution. In the meantime, he garnered
the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning
candidate. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to Annul
Proclamation. The COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision
of the Second Division and declared Noble qualified to run for
the mayoralty position. Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for
certiorari
Issue:
Should “residence” and “domicile” be construed as referring to
“dwelling”? Did Noble effectively change his domicile?
Held:
The Court found that Noble failed to convince that he
successfully effected a change of domicile. To establish a new
domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not
only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and
probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of
abode. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that
the term “residence” is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather
to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident
of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and
52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to
challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections
of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Limbona vs. Mangelin (170 SCRA 786)

.R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989
Facts: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang
Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government and was later
elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly.
Congressman Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker
of the Assembly for consulations and dialogues on the recent
and present political developments and other issues affecting
Regions IX and XII hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous
governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the
President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative
Commission as mandated by the Commission.
Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all
Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as
“our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take
(sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang
pampook … .”
In defiance of Petitioner’s advice, After declaring the presence
of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to
preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the
affirmative.
Issue:
Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous
governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject
to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is
the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous
governments of Region IX and XII?
Held:
Firstly, We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that
should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal,
the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to
commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most
elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within
the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their
erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the
moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is
exercised with grave abuse.
the Decree PD 168 established “internal autonomy” in the two
regions “[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its
Constitution,” with legislative and executive machinery to
exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments “more responsive and accountable,”
“and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over
them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.” He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to “self-immolation,”
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on
the effects and limits of “autonomy.” On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted,
under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in
the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the
Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it
is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential
Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in
the second sense, that is, in which the central government
commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that “[t]he President shall have
the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions.” In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their
legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative
services
Hence, we assume jurisdiction.

Vilando v. HRET, Limkaichong & Nograles

G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 : August 23, 2011

RENALD F. VILANDO, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER
PROSPERO NOGRALES, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate

of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Negros Oriental.She won over the other contender,
Olivia Paras.OnMay 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as
Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the
basis of Comelec Resolution No. issued onMay 18,
8062

2007.OnJuly 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the

House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the

proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the Commission
on Elections(COMELEC)which reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed

against Limkaichong by her detractors.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F.

Vilando(Vilando),as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered
voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate
petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the
HRET.These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they
both challenged the eligibility of one and the same
respondent.Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese
citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and
proclaimed.They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy),
whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother
who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time
of her marriage to the latter.Also, they invoked the jurisdiction
of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship,
which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the
naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-

born Filipino citizen.She averred that the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and
had already attained the status ofres judicata.Further, she
claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be
assailed through a collateral attack.

OnMarch 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and

declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House
of Representatives.

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision,

but it was denied by the HRET in its Resolution datedMay 17,
2010. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando.

ISSUES:
1) Whether the case is already moot and academic;
2) Whether Limkaichong is a natural born-citizen

HELD:

POLITICAL LAW: question on citizenship

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the

House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at
anytime. For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to
resolve the petition on the merits.This position finds support in
the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and
academic, if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. The
question on Limkaichongs citizenship is likely to recur if she
would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable
of repetition.

In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed
no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not
disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.

Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto petition does not

operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichongs
father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from
the beginning, is devoid of merit.
In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the
ground that she is a Chinese citizen.To prove his point, he makes
reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of
Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would
constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father.In
our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be
done through a direct action for its nullity.

The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs

father should be in accordance with Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473.As held inLimkaichong v.
Comelec,thus:

As early as the case ofQueto v. Catolico, where the Court of

First Instance judgemotu propioand not in the proper
denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of
certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths
of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization
due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the

proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain
infirmities, fatal or otherwise,but that is beside the point in this
case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon
such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with
the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the
cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5),
Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely,
"upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor
General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial
fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these
officers, presumably after previous investigation in each
particular case.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question the
illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a
matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case
involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

POLITICAL LAW: jurisdiction of the HRET

Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility

of Limkaichong, the HRET,having the plenary, absolute and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications,can pass
upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions,

specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of
lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the
HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members.This
constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the
HRET.Rule 14 thereof restates this duty, thus:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all

contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.

Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. The power granted to HRET
by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained originally in the legislature.Such power is
regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of
any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.
Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and
exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the
legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of
disqualifying Limkaichong.To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as
already stated, is not permissible.The HRET properly resolved
the issue with the following ratiocination:

xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father Julio

Ong Sy, is the respondent in the present case.The Tribunal may
not dwell on deliberating on the validity of naturalization of the
father if only to pursue the end of declaring the daughter as
disqualified to hold office.

Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue,

it cannot do so because its jurisdiction is limited to the
qualification of the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a
sitting Member of the Congress.

Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the

naturalization proceedings for a determination of the citizenship
of the ascendant of respondent. A petition forquo warrantois not
a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo
warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also
a blatant violation of due process on the part of the persons who
will be affected or who are not parties in this case.

The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of

validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of
the Court of First Instance(CFI)Negros Oriental, which granted
the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent
any evidence to the contrary.
POLITICAL LAW: citizenship provision in the 1935
constitution

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City

on November 9, 1959.The governing law is the citizenship
provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof,
reads:
Article IV
Section 1.The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
(3)Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
xxx
Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred
the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a
Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and

the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were
invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and
having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached
majority age.The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that
Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen:

Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those

persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section
1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution)It matters not whether the
father acquired citizenship by birth or by
naturalization.Therefore, following the line of transmission
through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent
has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy
and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds

support inparagraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution.

Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine

citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born citizen
of thePhilippines, having been born to a mother who was a
natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because
respondent was able to elect citizenship informally when she
reached majority age.Respondent participated in the barangay
elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voters affidavit
as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of
La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004.These are positive acts of
election of Philippine citizenship.The case ofIn re:Florencio
Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in
actions indubitably showing a definite choice.We note that
respondent had informally elected citizenship afterJanuary 17,
1973during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as
citizens of thePhilippinesall those who elect citizenship in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution.The 1987 Constitution
provisions, i.e.,Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2, Article
[IV]were enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one
born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically
accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred
natural-born status.It was the intention of the framers of the
1987 Constitution to treat equally those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority either before or after the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution.Thus, those who would elect Philippine
citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the 1987
Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also
natural-born Filipinos.The following are the pertinent provisions
of the 1987 Constitution:
Article IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section
1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine
citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese
citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section
1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1)
Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February
5, 1959, must likewise fail.

As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer
in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese
Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother
indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. Verily, Vilando failed to
establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to
warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.

POLITICAL LAW: application for alien certificate of

registration
Also, an application for an alien certificate of
registration(ACR)is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of
Philippine citizenship.It is well to quote the ruling of the HRET
on this matter, to wit:

An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who

declares that he is not a Filipino citizen.It is obtained only when
applied for.It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains
a declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information,
a photograph, and physical details that identify the applicant.It
bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of
change to foreign citizenship.It certifies that a person named
therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting and that
such person was issued a certificate of registration under the
Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law.It is only
evidence of registration.

Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The

Civil Register Law), and much less like other public records
referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of
registration is not a public document that would be prima facie
evidence of the truth of facts contained therein.On its face, it
only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself
to registration.Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of
the declarant.This is especially so where the declarant has in fact
been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her
status as such.

Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong's mother was not

tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship.Neither
did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship.In a string of
decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application
for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not
an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the
same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in
this case.

Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can

transmit her citizenship to her daughter.

Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are

beyond judicial interference.The only instance where this Court
may intervene in the exercise ofits so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or
resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to
constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a
remedy for such abuse. In this case, there is no showing of any
such arbitrariness or improvidence.The HRET acted well within
the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo warranto
petition.

In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of

the HRET which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of
Limkaichong

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was
declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of
the Second District of Palawan. This district then included,
among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was
elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City,
and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms
immediately before the elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as
Representative), Puerto PrincesaCity was reclassified as a
"highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city
of theProvince of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this
new status was the ineligibility of PuertoPrincesa City residents
from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the
position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his
Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy.
Sta. Monica, PuertoPrincesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy.
Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of
Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando
R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due
course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.
Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of
Palawan.

Held:
YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of
Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not
misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement
as mandated by the Constitution.

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in

the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The
respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient
to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and
residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on
this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not
present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s
statement in his COC regarding his residence was a
misrepresentation."

Rogelio Bagabuyo vs Commission on Elections

573 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Local Government –
Reapportionment
Municipal Corporation – Plebiscite
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in
2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to
have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was
passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created.
Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he
went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the
COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections.
Bagabuyo was contending that the 2 district was created
nd

without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the

Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at
bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA
9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no
such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No.
9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s
territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required. What happened here was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two
legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city
council members citywide for its population of approximately
500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with
one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two
congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s
population. This easily means better access to their
congressman since each one now services only 250,000
constituents as against the 500,000.

Aquino III v. Comelec [April 7, 2010]

Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment.”
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264,
and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating
an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative
districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in
order to create an additional legislative district for the province.
Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a
new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population
standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act
No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the
phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only
required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local
Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue
of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election,
Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives,
a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for
the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District
of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that
he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola
Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground
that the latter lacked the residence qualification as
a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one
year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the
entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year
and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution
that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run
in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won
against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the
Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission
resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office
for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15
and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually
connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino
from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of
choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the
district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as
synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous
constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court
cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile
or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the
1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that
resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the
same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e.,
his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar
with the conditions and needs of the community from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements,
this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place
through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to
the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the
period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the

district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention
that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of
choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR
one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in
which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992)
election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of
San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to
that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as
his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be
a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of
origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC
was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City
is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City
is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of
Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his
claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole
purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from
Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by
the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on
Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent
Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next
highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second
district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the
disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after
the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the
house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased
in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to the
adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral
Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despite its own
recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be
judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the
Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency
requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to
evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal
impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of
Congressional candidates in newly created political districts
which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the
election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s
district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to determine
and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner
in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a
person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and
cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage
of the creation of new political districts by suddenly
transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their
genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed
mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a
qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot be better.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011
342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law – Party
List Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC
resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38 additional party-list
representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the
respondent parties, avers that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was
mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional
seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-
list lawmakers is mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in
Congress. The same declared therein a policy to promote
“proportional representation” in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations
and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to
be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this
percentage could have “additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes.”
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can
have more than three seats in the House of Representatives (sec
11(b) RA 7941).
Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district
representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of
seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise
“twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list.” We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
———————————- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of
district representatives, as may be provided by law, will
necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of
party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208
district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national
elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed
as follows:
208
——– x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to
comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does
the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up
all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is
“No.”

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No.
3785 which approved the participation of 154 organizations and
,

parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list

elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec
acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was
proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party
list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding
the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one
purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." Tha facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in

the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in
the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law
pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to
determine proportional representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the
cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the
noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of
the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was
beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of
facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the

clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the Court decided to
set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the
petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance
by the party lists

Lokin vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010

FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a
duly registered party-list organization, manifested their intent to
participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. They submitted a list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the
number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the elections, the
list of nominees was amended: the nominations of the petitioner
Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn; Armi
Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and
Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.
Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second
seat and that Lokin, as second nominee on the original list, to a
proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-
Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the
amendment of the list of nominees and the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved the
amendment of the list of nominees with the new order as
follows:
1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane Borje
The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the
official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her
oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.
Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of
CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari
assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it
expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to
change its nominees.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the
controversy;
2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is
unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act; and
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and
allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC
without any basis in fact or law and after the close of polls.
RULING:
The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokin’s
case is not an election protest nor an action for quo warranto.
Election protest is a contest between the defeated and the
winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities, to determine who obtained the higher number of
votes entitling them to hold the office. On the other hand, a
special civil action for quo warranto questions the ineligibility of
the winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari
against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of
the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of
the action for certiorari and the action for mandamus are based
on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were
different. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively to obtain a favorable judgment.
The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was
invalid. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 as an
implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List
System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot amend an act
of Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the
provisions of the law it administers and enforces. Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each registered party, organization
or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-
five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in
case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons
who have given their consent in writing may be named in the
list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office
or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shal be allowed after the
same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in
cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of
the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a
single and definite meaning, there is no room for interpretation
or construction but only for application. Section 8 clearly
prohibits the change of nominees and alteration of the order in
the list of nominees’ names after submission of the list to the
COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which an
organization can substitute another person in place of the
nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC :
(1) when the nominee fies; (2) when the nominee withdraws in
writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the
application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but
reasonably construed.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions
under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it provided four
instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party” as
statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no
authority to expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to
implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law it
intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR
adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict
between the law and the IRR, the law prevails.
The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted. Section
13 of Resolution No. 7804 was declared invalid and of no effect
to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to
withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the
nomination to the COMELEC.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections

694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Department – Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani
vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by
the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented
sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against
COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set
in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as
the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated
cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must
use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized
and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those
who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national
and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall
not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as
has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list
elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition
nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so
through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit
indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack
well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the
party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include
all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a
political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the
people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent
of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the
party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized
sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list
system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is
also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not
have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in
the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list
representation should not be understood to include only labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic
Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se
economically marginalized but are still qualified as
“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined
political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.

G.R. No. 193643 January 29, 2013

ANTONIO D. DAYAO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and
small industry players in the LPG and energy sector. It sought to
register as a party-list organization for the May 10, 2010
elections and was approved by the COMELEC. Petitioners filed
a complaint and petition before the COMELEC for the
cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a party -list
organization, arguing that LPGMA does not represent a
marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators,
officers and members are not marginalized or underrepresented
citizens. In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require that party-
list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or
underrepresented sector of the society. It also averred that the
ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just trying to
resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition for registration.
The COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First,
the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among
the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
Second, the complaint is actually a belated opposition to
LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been approved
with finality. Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were
denied.
Issues:
1) Whether or not a belated opposition to a petition for
registration bars the action of complainants.
2) Whether or not the Constitution and the Party-List System
Act (RA 7941) require that incorporators, officers and members
of a party-list must be marginalized or underrepresented citizens.
Ruling of the Court:
There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the
complaint for cancellation. However, in light of COMELEC
Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions ought
to be dismissed. 1) An opposition to a petition for registration is
not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint for
cancellation. Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds
and procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation,
viz: Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. For
 the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to
cancel the registration of a party-list group, the law imposes
only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is
afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of
the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6
exists. 2) In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC, the Court explained that the "laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections" referred to in paragraph 5
include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, which declares the
underlying policy for the law that marginalized and
underrepresented Filipino citizens become members of the
House of Representatives. A party or an organization,
therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be
disqualified. The party-list system of representation was
crafted for the marginalized and underrepresented and their
alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is

BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim
the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the
Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the
national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus

assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did
not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-
88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked

the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veteransformula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veteransformula is violative of the Constitution and
of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the
COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of
the NBC.

Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the

comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following
issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April
2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the party-
list elections?

Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition.

We SET ASIDEthe Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3
August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution
dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the
distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates

the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot
allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20%
party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap,
as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats,

the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number
of available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissiveceiling.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional,

we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered
by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of
seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the
remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between
the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and
the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer
of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available
seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available
seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed.
We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round
of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to
determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate
is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits

major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly
intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of
the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of
the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party"
that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party
or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially
legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-
list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according

to Puno, J.)
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the computation of
seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in
the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the
majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my
interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with
respect to the participation of the major political parties in the
election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence
with theirs, hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are

no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena.
This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where
major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be
voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major
political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution
of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major
political parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties
garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes
counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining
155 parties (including those whose qualifications were
contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each.
Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the
major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of
votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their
members as party-list representatives. In contrast, only about 4%
of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the
155 parties garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and

underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987
Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list
system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic
dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized
how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can
be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the
machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions.
If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list
system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of
the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the
democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve
as the graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the

entry of major political parties into the party-list system.

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura,

J.)

However, I wish to add a few words to support the

proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote required for
entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of
Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement ─ fixed at 2%
of the total number of votes cast for the party list system ─
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As
such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional policy, as
well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to
allow the people’s broadest representation in Congress,the raison
d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.

Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s decision
in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14th Congress,
55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the
Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be realized,
because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it
mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all,
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system can never
exceed 100%.

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away

completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need for such
a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and
elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring
opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that
a minimum vote requirement is needed --

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the

party-list system as a fallback position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not

ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the
elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard,

and earn their seats within the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty

as that of the elected representatives in the legislative body,
rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative
body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an
appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate

political party groups and those who have not really been given
by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the
Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list
system; and

7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial

following can be represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady

increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the
creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable
growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no
longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable
changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with
the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from
ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans

Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling
for the number of party-list seats in Congress.But when the
enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise
purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a
condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely
beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must
strike down the offending condition as an affront to the
fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom
of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this
Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at
all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular
legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision
inoperative and ineffectual

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for
accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said
petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that
since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they
are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable
under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this
instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does
not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on
moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution
and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the
Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on
moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government
action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to
be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position
that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations
of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at
worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any
act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything
else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,”
the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement
without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly
needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws
is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention
held on November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural
session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28,
1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which
seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution,
lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971,
COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention
that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial
elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition
for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null
and void.

ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a
justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The
jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the
Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single
amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of
Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments
must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite.
Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample
basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the
Constitution, not separately but together.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA) VS.

MATHAY G.R. NO. L-25554, OCTOBER 4, 1966

Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting

Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the
Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them
from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the
increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30,
1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the

Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by
RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner
contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI,
Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given
being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who
took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only
on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the
House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on
December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require

that not only the term of all the members of the House but also
that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period

before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to
“all members of the Senate and theHouse of Representatives” in
the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized
by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of thefull
term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the
measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby
rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the
purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature.
The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with
the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the
House,” underscores that in theapplication of Art. VI, Sec.
14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms
of office of all members of the Legislaturethat enacted the
measure must have expired before the increase in compensation
can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased

compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969, when thefull term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
BENJAMIN LIGOT VS ISMAEL MATHAY
56 SCRA 823 – Political Law – Salaries of Representatives –
Retirement
Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three
consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second
term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 “fixing the
salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of
the national government” was enacted into law and took effect
on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators
and congressmen) were increased under said Act from 7,200.00
to 32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said
increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution.”
Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim
for retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186, section 12 (c)
as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for
retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or
elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last
three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate
received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as
provided by law.” The House of Representatives granted his
petition however, Jose Velasco, the then Congress Auditor
refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then,
Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement
gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not
applied to him during his incumbency which ended December
30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such
increases would become operative only for members of
Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30,
1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of
his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as
provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was already
P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement
benefit.
HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on
the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of
increasing his compensation during his term of office and of
achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s
claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of
Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on
December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a
retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within
the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their
compensation and “other emoluments” to their salary as
provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of
Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed
on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
(which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving
during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that
which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during
their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his
decision in the similar case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-
Congressman Melanio Singson, “Such a scheme would
contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same
prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do
indirectly what cannot be done directly.”

MARTINEZ V MORFE (1972) CASE DIGEST

FACTS:
The question raised in these certiorari proceedings is the scope
to be accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and
representatives from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the
same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace.

Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr.,

as delegate of the present Constitutional Convention would
invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above
constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article
145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or
employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or
search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty
higher than prision mayor."
Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, for
falsification of a public document and for violation of the
Revised Election Code.
The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the ground
that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal
prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil
cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of
the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it
would be unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not senators should be immune from the criminal

charges.

HELD:
No. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the
Constitution, the immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason
exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or
adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. Breach of
the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised
Penal Code or any special statute.
It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace
must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one
susceptible to prosecution. There is a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates
to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom
to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.
When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification
in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal
offense, they would be considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the
same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a
legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and
well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law.
Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be
treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong
public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness
is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular
sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to
discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members
of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said
provision provides the President the power to appoint an
administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its
operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman
and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners
maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of
Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that
"no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public officer or position
during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress
encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to
appoint.
ISSUE:

Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the

constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts.
RULING:

The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer

to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public
office that is a full time job to let them function without the
distraction of other governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which

it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of
the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the
Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority
the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it
curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom
to appoint by limiting his choice.

HOMOBONO ADAZA VS FERNANDO PACANA, JR.

September 3, 2011
135 SCRA 431 – Political Law – Congress – Singularity of
Office/Position
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of
Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his
oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial
governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected
vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under
the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March
3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza
followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections,
petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while
Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas
Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the
functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath
of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President
Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July
25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s
office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term
of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province
until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and
that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France,
Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold
the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be
an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the
Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously.
Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost
can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of
succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
provides as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan
Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet . . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence
Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on
his holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that
when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a
private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere
private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left
vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and
it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of
members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which
specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the
various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a
certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of
absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the
coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed
his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in
Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code.

PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN, JR. G.R. NO. L-51122, MARCH 25, 1982

Facts:
After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent
Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings,
questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the
petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that
no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before
anyadministrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body.
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for

P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the
notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a
motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI
shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership
of the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a

stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without
violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the
Constitution

Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention,

Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another,
although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in
litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the

intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He
had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing
10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them
“after the fact” that is, after thecontested election of directors,
after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1
day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC.
And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent
Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing,
perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under
litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to
find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before
an administrativebody. In the opinion of the Court, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in
Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was
an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity.
CASE DIGEST: DANTE V. LIBAN, ET AL. V. RICHARD J. GORDON

FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation

on a Supreme Court decision which ruled that being chairman of
the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify
him from being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is
unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the
Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The
Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC
as a private corporation. Respondent takes exception to the
second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality
of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation.
Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was only
touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the
constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota
of the case. ADVERTISEMENT: Work from home! Be an
online English tutor. Earn at least PHP100/hour.

ISSUE:

Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the

constitutionality of the PNRC statute?
HELD: In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC
statute was raised in the issue of standing. As such, the Court
should not have declared certain provisions of such as
unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the PNRC is sui
generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the Constitution
wants to prevent Congress from creating. First, the PNRC is not
organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist
victims of war and administer relief to those who have been
devastated by calamities, among others. It is entirely devoted to
public service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the
Constitution aims to eliminate abuse by the Congress, which
tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created in
order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as
embodied in the Geneva Convention. The creation of the PNRC
is compliance with international treaty obligations. Lastly, the
PNRC is a National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is
not like government instrumentalities and GOCC. The PNRC is
regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed
to local law regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it
was improper for the Court to have declared certain portions of
the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. However, it is the stand of
Justice Carpio that there is no mandate for the Government to
create a National Society to this effect. He also raises the fact
that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a private corporation
organized for public needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that
the PNRC is neither private or governmental, hence it was
within the power of Congress to create.

It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court

should exercise judicial restraint when it comes to issues of
constitutionality where it is not the lis mota of the case.

SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, JR.

G.R. NO. 134577, NOV. 18, 1998
o While the Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
 constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the
minority leader. No law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.
o Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in
Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
o Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of legislature
o Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of
procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and
waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo

Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position
of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was
declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen.
Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming position of minority leader. He explained that
those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the
“majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However,
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party –
number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen.
Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this
case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:
o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the
Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate
minority leader
o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in
 matters of legislative procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of

times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or
more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous
words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that
the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one
half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby
delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the
“minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the
framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual
meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President

of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more
than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the
minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with

the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one
half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast,
minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number
of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal
parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater
number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser
would be the minority. But where there are more than two
unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the
minority entitled to select the leader representing all the
minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as
in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves),
there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party”
for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to
different political parties or are independent. No constitutional
or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority
groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the
right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in

Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a

Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of

Congress the power “to determine the rules of its
proceedings.” xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal

affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the

positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an
open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the
holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and
long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this
Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the
legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds
of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers,
courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion
that where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of

procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and
waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do

not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may
 be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon
the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and

prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it
is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative.
This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally
intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of
constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold
-- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a
coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be
neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast
and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would

practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

AVELINO VS. CUENCO

Facts:
1. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a
speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate
President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the
Senate President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from
delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver
his privilege speech to formulate charges against the
incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio
adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his
followers.
 2. Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into
a record:
1. The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the
petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President
Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze
the functions of the Senate.
2. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that
respondent be designated to preside over the session
which suggestion was carried unanimously.
3. The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon
took the Chair.
3. Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon
motion of Senator Arranz, because the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed
the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
4. Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was
then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter
Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said
Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his for approval
motion

thereof and the same was unanimously approved.

5. The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto
proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful
Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco,
contending that the latter had not been validly elected
because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the
majority required of the 24-member Senate.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly
approved.
3. Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the
rightful President of the Philippines Senate and oust
respondent.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance
of the case. The court will be against the doctrine of
separation of powers.
1. In view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant
to the Senate of the power to elect its own president,
which power should not be interfered with, nor taken
over, by the judiciary.
2. The court will not interfere in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as
the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority
of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy
lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme
Court.
2. Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has
jurisdiction.
1. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was
the majority required by the Constitution for the
transaction of the business of the Senate, because,
firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because at the
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and
thirdly because in view of the absence from the
country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three
senators.
2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of
“each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House:
does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of
all the members constitute “the House”. There is a
 difference between a majority of “the House”, the
latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an
absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
3. The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.
1. The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner
as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of
the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by
that majority.
2. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more
senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from
the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for
the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators
who approved the resolutions herein involved could
ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the
shadow of a doubt.

Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the

petition on the ground as it involved a political question. The
Supreme Court should abstain in this case because the selection
of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who
are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or
reinstate them.