The Humanism of Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas An evaluation of his concept of education in view of classical Islamic sources* Hans Daiber Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt a.M. 1. Introduction - Il. The concept of humanism - III. Al-Attas’ concept of education — IV, Al-Attas’ on Arabic language and meaning - V. The way from “meaning” to “knowledge”, “truth” and adab - VI. The way from truth to proper behaviour - VII. The way from adab to emulation of the Prophet - VIII. The way from education to Islamic humanism - Bibliography - Summary 1. Introduction It is an honour for me to present a paper on a great scholar and unique thinker. Besides, he is an ingenious architect of buildings - the old and the new ISTAC. Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas combined his knowledge - ‘ilm and his activity - ‘amal, when he built ISTAC, meant as an institution for academic training, leading to education. He combines Islamic thought and teaching leading to educated people as cornerstones of an Islamic State. This is remarkable in so far as he based his educational program on his knowledge of the Qur'an, on Muslim thinkers, and on the requirements of a generation of Muslims who want to know the concepts of their forefathers, the shining examples. IL. The concept of humanismHere, we detect a striking similarity to “Humanism”. We use the term “humanism” in its original meaning as a description of an educational program for human beings, a program orientated towards Ancient Greek and Roman literature. This concept of humanism reached its first climax during the Renaissance in the 15th and 16th centuries AD, when the study of classical Greek and Latin authors was a way to develop the concept of a universal man independent of theological and philosophical restrictions. Already before the Renaissance, the Catalan theologian and philosopher Ramon Llull in the 13th/14th centuries AD developed a concept of education based on the idea of the universality of knowledge and its origin in ancient sciences, the authorities of antiquity. Knowledge of the Artes liberales, of logic and rhetoric with Latin as a gate to the knowledge of all other sciences, of geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy, as well as the concept of man’s freedom and responsibilty for his personal dignity and social obligation within the society constitute a humanistic concept of man on the basis of practical ethics. Ramon Llull and after him great Renaissance thinkers like Pico della Mirandola are testimonies of a new emerging ideal of an educated man and his ethical behaviour. A comparison with Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas’ concept of education immediately shows their common interest in the education of man — on the one side within a Christian humanism, on the other side: Within an Islamic humanism. III. Al-Attas’ concept of education Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas developed his concept of man’s education by referring to classical Islamic authors — and he modified them. In the revival of Islamic concepts of the past he did the same as humanists in Europe did in their orientation at Greek and Latinauthors from the past as shining examples for the development of a concept of the diginity of man and his ethical virtues. Therefore, we will have to look at the classical Islamic literary sources and at the inspirative sources of Naquib Al-Attas. We will analyse his ideas on knowledge and education in the light of Islamic thinkers since the time of Ibn Qutayba (213/828 - 276/889). We will discuss the sources mentioned by Al-Attas, the peculiarities of his concept of education and possible parallels in early Islamic thought. Al-Attas’ work is a very important contribution to the ideal of “Islamic education” which became the curriculum of the ‘International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization’ (ISTAC) in Kuala Lumpur, founded by him in 1987 and being its director until 2002, When we study Al-Attas’ ideas of education in his monograph The Concept of Education in Islam, we find similarities to the “Western” concept of education, and we find differences. Both concepts are dominated by the concern for the ethical aspect of education, the shaping of man, that is not restricted to mere knowledge, but includes his role in a good society. This common ground might be due to universal aims of education, which we find in different cultures, each containing different details that are determined by the specific times and places of a culture. Here, we will concentrate on peculiarities of the Islamic concept of education. These peculiarities arise from what we call “Islam” in its complexity, or they give a special accentuation to universal trends of man’s education, of “Bildung”, explained by German dictionaries as the totality of cognition, knowledge and experiences, combined with sound judgement and good taste. Our starting point will be Al-Attas’ description of the concept of education, which he has discussed on several occasions since 1977.His monograph The Concept of Education in Islam (1980) was translated into Arabic in 1998 and forms a chapter in his book on Islam, Secularism and the Philosophy of the Future (1985). His Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam from 1995 bears witness to the “Bildung” of a Muslim and to the Islamic concept of education. 1 shall focus my paper on the earlier Islamic traditions in Al-Attas’ concept of education and his new assertions. The Islamic texts Al- Attas mentions as his sources, such as the Qur’an, old Arabic dictionaries like the Lisan al-‘arab by Ibn Manzir (630/1233 - 710/1311 or 1312), the books of definitions of technical terms written by ‘Alt Ibn Muhammad al-Gurgani (739/1339 - 817/1414) and Tahanawi (12th/18th c.), and works on theology, like Taftazani’s (722/1322 - 792/1390) commentary on the Creed by Nagm ad-Din an-Nasafi (459/1067 - 537/1142), or Gazali’s (450/1058 ~ 505/111) works give a basic idea of the Islamic background of Al- Attas’ concept of education. IV, Al-Attas’ on Arabic language and meaning At the beginning of his discussion, Al-Attas reminds the reader of the scientific structure of the Arabic language, which in his eyes is corroborated by the Qur'an and the hadit, as well as by the numerous dictionaries and lists of technical terms used by the Arabs in early Islamic times, Their explanations, as well as the explanations by commentators on the Qur’an, are considered to be correct and exclude any semantic changes during the centuries to come. The meaning of ambiguous expressions, according to Al- Attas, can be explained by tafstr, and their “ultimate” meaning can be explained by ta’wil. The Qur'an and the prophetic traditionappear as archetypes of knowledge and exclude historical developments ~ they do not require a historical contextualization. This starting point can refer to a classical Islamic philological exegesis of the Qur'an, which, e.g., in the commentary by al-Hakim al-GuSami/al-GiSumi @ 493/1101) combined the analysis of grammar (irda, luga, ‘rab, nazm) of the Qur’an with a description of its meaning (ma‘n@) and the deduction of legal rules (ahkam). Al-Attas does not give a detailed introduction to the principles of an interpretation of the Qur’n, nor does he explicitely refer to the zahir-batin distinction, e.g., in the request of the Ismailite Abi Hatim ar-Razi (d. 322/934) to search for the universal “meaning” (ma‘na) of the pictures (amtal) used in the divine revelation of the Qur'an. In a linguistic-semantic turn, Al-Attas postulates the existence of an “Islamic vocabulary” orientated towards the language of the Qur'an, which “islamized” both the Arabic language after the gahilr period and the non-Arabic languages of Muslim peoples. In his opinion, the result of this “Islamization” are “Islamic languages” which share the same “meanings” (ma‘na). Here, Al-Attas criticizes the “modernist movement” which lacks “intellectual and spiritual leadership”, and which, under the influence of non-Islamic world views, created semantic confusion leading to the “Deislamization” of the Arabic language. This he considers as a loss of adab. Adab is more than tarbiya “education”, more than the “process of instilling something and turning them into human beings”, into rational and at the same time spiritual beings, who are able to judge, discriminate, and clarify”. This capacity includes the ability of the educated to understand formulations and their “meanings” (ma‘na), i.e., “the recognition of the place of anything in a system, and its relation to other things”.This reminds us of Gazali’s complaint about the loss of the original meanings of terms among scholars of his time, and his increasing tendency to replace philosophical terminology with concepts of Kalam. Moreover, it reminds us of the interesting discussion in Ibn Qutayba’s Adab al-katib. This is a handbook written by a historian and scholar in the 3rd/9th century for secretaries at the caliphal court entrusted with administrative tasks. In the introduction, Ibn Qutayba criticizes those people who are “scholars” (‘ulama’) without knowledge, who want to be progressive and use terms and concepts without, in fact, knowing their real “meaning” (ma‘na). Ibn Qutayba mentions their allusion to Aristotle’s books and to logical terms taken from Aristotle, and he refers to Muhammad Ibn al-Gahm al-Barmaki’s boast of the saying awwal al-fikr nihayatu al- ‘amal, “the first in thought is the last in action”. In Ibn Qutayba’s view, none of this reaches the level of “wisdom” (hikma) and “eloquence” (al-hitab) of the Arabs in religion, law, law of inheritance, and grammar, or in the sayings of their Prophet and companions. Ibn Qutayba praises “knowledge” (‘ilm) and “speculation” (nazar) and gives an idea of his concept of adab, combining knowledge with ethics. V. The way from “meaning” to “knowledge”, “truth” and adab To a similar concept of adab Al-Attas adds his emphasis on the process of getting knowledge and on its recipient, the “rational being” (al-hayawan al-natiq), who - as halifa “vicegerent” of God and created in God’s “own image” - is able to articulate with his audible speech and articulation of the “meaning” (ma‘na) the “inner, unseen reality” (‘aql or qalb). Al-Attas explains “meaning” as the recognition of the place of anything in a “system”. This implies the clarification and understanding of the relation a thinghas with other things, its order. Here, Al-Attas refers to Gurgani’s and Tahanawi’s books on definitions and_ their, ultimately Avicennian, distinction between essence and existence. “Essential relation” and “specific difference” are considered as something immutable, otherwise there would be constant change, which would make the recognition of things impossible. This reminds us of the criticism of the sophists by the Islamic philosopher Farabi (258/872 - 339/950 or 951) and of Farabi’s own view about the reality of existing things, as he developed it in his monograph on the ideal State, his Mabad? ara’ ahl al-madtna al- fadila, These things are identical with the “meaning” (mafham) of their terms, and in their essence and meaning they are created by an external divine Creator. According to Farabi, knowledge of what derives from the divine First Cause, through mediation of the prophet and ruler, is philosophical truth. This philosophical truth is imitated by religion, and this imitation is not only an easily comprehensive picture of what in philosophy is based on philosophical proofs ~ it is also the reality of philosophical truth, the ethical realization of the theory of philosophy and its universals, Philosophy, that is scientific cognition, becomes moral insight. It becomes reality in the shape of the imitation of religion and its laws, the rules that regulate man’s actions. Here, we detect a common interest of Al-Attas and Farabt concerning epistemology and its indebtedness to divine inspiration. Al-Attas does not mention Farabi and merely speaks of the “concerted agreement that all knowledge comes from God”. And whereas Farabi inserts - in the footsteps of Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander of Aphrodisias - a long discussion of the soul and its faculties, Al-Attas confines himself, in the footsteps of Gurgani, to the mention of the soul as interpreter and as something which “arrives ... at the meaning of a thing or an object of knowledge”. Headds the role of tafstr and ta’wtl (“an intensive form of tafsrr”) as “methods of approach to knowledge and scientific methodology”. Here, the Qur'an is considered to be the “final authority that confirms the truth in our rational and empirical investigations”, It conveys knowledge to man - ie. “recognition of the proper places of things in the order of creation such that it leads to the recognition of the proper place of God in the order of being and existence”. Knowledge is knowledge of God the Creator, as He is revealed in the Qur'an. The concept of God's “secret” (gayb) and Ibn Sina’s concept of God, who can be known from His creation only in a “doubtful manner” (bi-tasktk), here is purposely not discussed. Instead, Al-Attas adds to the “recognition” the “acknowledgement of the proper (that is real and true) places of things in the order of creation such that it leads to the recognition of the proper place of God in the order of being and existence”. Al-Attas here has in mind the necessary “action” (‘amal) by man in the world of empirical things, including religious and ethical aspects of human existence. VI. The way from truth to proper behaviour Al-Attas’ evaluation of the recognition of truth as the recognition of proper behaviour, of man’s duty and obligation, of his conduct that conforms with truth is remarkable. This truth means consonance with the requirement of “wisdom” (hikma) and “justice” (‘adl). Wisdom is understood as knowledge given by God, which enables man to have “correct judgement” with regard “to the proper places of things”. The assessment of knowledge as ability to judge, bestowed on man by God, followed by right action, ive., the conduct of man who keeps to his obligation, has its roots in Islamic theology and in the definition of belief as “knowledge” (‘ilm) and “action” (‘amal) - as Al-Attas acknowledges withreferences to the later sources ‘All Ibn Muhammad al-Gurgani’s Kitab al-Ta‘rifat, and to Taftazani, an older contemporary of Gur$ani, and the commentary on the Creed (‘Aqd@’id) by Nagm ad- Din an-Nasafi (d. 536/1142). In fact, the correlation of knowledge and action already exists in the Quranic equation of ‘ilm “knowledge” and aman “belief’ and in the discussions on the significance of ‘amal “work” for “belief”. Moreover, we can add - with regard to the combination of knowledge and moral action as part of religion - the famous and already mentioned forerunner Farabi. He developed an epistemology on the basis of Neoplatonism, Aristotle, as well as Aristotle’s commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. According to this epistemology, theoretical insight is divine inspiration coming from God to the prophet-philosopher as emanations of the divine Active Intellect. It becomes reality in the form of rules and laws prescribed by religion. These laws and rules describe God's will in the shape of symbols and pictures also understandable to not philosophically minded people. These laws and rules of religion determine the conduct of man and they are the fulfilment of theoretical insight, the actualization of philosophy, Farabi alignes this with Aristotle’s epistemology, according to which man can only think in pictures, The symbols of religion, the pictures of human thinking, the laws and rules - they shape man’s conduct and his moral actions. VIL. The way from adab to emulation of the Prophet Farabi offers a combination of the knowledge bestowed by God on man and the moral actions of man, comparable with what we find in Al-Attas’ statements. Al-Attas continues his discussion with the introduction of the term adab, instead of tarbiya, as a key term forthe description of the “discipline of body, mind, and soul”, which has the task to “assure the recognition and acknowledgement of one’s proper place in relation to one’s physical, intellectual, and spiritual capacities and potentials”. Adab is knowledge of the purpose of seeking knowledge, namely, knowledge of the purpose of inculcating goodness in man. This goodness of man is based on knowledge and action. It is the result of man’s lower animal self, recognizing and acknowledging its proper place in relation to the higher rational self that constitutes the adab of the lower self. Adab, or the process of ta’dtb “education” leading to adab, appears in a proper place in Al-Attas’ doctrine as the shaping of the lower capacities of man, i.e., the shaping of man’s “animal soul” (an-nafs al-hayawaniyya) by his “rational soul” (an-nafs an-natiqa). This term, which should replace the term tarbiya, makes man a good man in terms of his relation to his family, to people, his community, and to society. In a comparable manner, Farabi emphasized the role of the individual and his soul and its capacities which, in the struggle between the rational soul and its lower parts, strive for happiness in this world and in the hereafter, Farabi gives a differentiated picture of the role of the individual in a hierarchically structured society, in which the lower serves the higher. Society consists of the “leader” and the “led”, imam and ma’mam. The highest position an imam could reach is to be a philosopher-ruler who receives his inspiration from the divine Active Intellect. FarabT does not use the term adab in his monograph on the perfect State (al-madina al-fadila), apparently, because he did not intend to offer a handbook on morals and behaviour for the members of a society, as the “mirrors for princes” did, composed by Ibn al-Mugaffa‘ and his epigones. On the contrary, he offered a kind of epistemology with the intention toemphasize the necessity of self-education by constant reflection in an endless process of assimilation to God, Al-Attas has differing accentuations, but with Farabi he shares the evaluation of man as a human being striving for knowledge that comes from God, and for good action and conduct in society, in accordance with his knowledge. Accordingly, adab is “recognition and acknowledgement of the reality that knowledge and being are ordered hierarchically, according to their various grades and degrees of rank, and of one’s proper place in relation to that reality and to one’s physical, intellectual and spiritual capacities and potentials”. Farabi would not have opposed this. However, he would have avoided the term adab as a concept in its narrow sense. Farabi stressed the necessity of constant reflection in combination with divine inspiration - par excellence in the person of the prophet-ruler, who transmits his knowledge and experiences to the ruled, Moreover, Farabi invites the reader of his monograph on the “Principles of the insights of the citizens of the best State”, to be critical against any political system. He is doing this by ending his book with a long chapter on “ignorant” and “erring” cities, partly in the footsteps of Plato’s Republic. His ideas about the perfect State are restricted to general remarks on the intellectual qualities of the just ruler. In Farabi divine inspiration stimulates the creative phantasy of man’s constantly critical reflection on the correlation of scientific cognition and moral insight that is practical prudence within the perfect State. This is a universal World State, made up of aruler and the ruled, and consisting of smaller units of nations and communities which serve each other. Farabi is not as idealistic as Al-Attas, who speaks of the possibility of education, ta’dib, in the sense of “inculcation” of knowledge in a process that “makes man recognize and acknowledge his positionin relation to God, his true Possessor, and that makes him act in accordance with this recognition and acknowledgement”. In the view of Al-Attas, adab should be understood in its original and early meaning as something related to man’s emulation of the sunna of the Holy Prophet as an “embodiment of excellence in conduct”, and as something fused together with ‘ilm and ‘amal, “knowledge” and “action”. The loss of adab is considered by Al- Attas to be the reason for the loss of justice and for the “error in knowledge of Islam and the Islamic vision of reality and truth” among Muslims today, including their leaders “who are not qualified for valid leadership” and “who do not possess the high moral, intellectual and spiritual standards required for Islamic leadership”. Here, Al-Attas stresses the indispensability of a “constant guidance by the learned and the wise within it (sc. the society) so as to ensure its salvation”. According to Al-Attas, the learned and wise are those who “exercise constant vigilance in detecting erroneous usage in language”. By doing this, they can avoid semantic change leading to “general confusion and error in the understanding of Islam and of its world view”. Farabi did not discuss such confusions stemming from semantic changes and the erroneous use of terms. For him, existing things are identical with the “meaning” (mafham) of their terms, and in their essence and meaning they are created by an external divine Creator. Here, Al-Attas in the same way presupposes an original meaning of terms, which is the truth, and which should be preserved. Comparable with Farabi, who keeps to the necessity of the guidance by a ruler and wise man with prophetic qualities, Al- Attas postulates an “Islamic leadership” with “high moral, intellectual and spiritual standards”. In addition, he considers education to be the task of the individual and not of the State - specifying this view in other places with references to the goodaction and conduct of man in society. Finally, he considers the Prophet Muhammad to be the Universal and Perfect Man, who can become a “model to emulate in life”. Here too, Al-Attas has modified the view of Farabi, who did not identify the prophet-ruler with the Prophet Muhammad, but instead speaks of the emulation of God by man under the guidance of a prophet-ruler. Consequently, Al-Attas talks about the duty of men and women in the Islamic university to reflect the Holy Prophet in terms of knowledge and right action, so that they might resemble the Prophet in quality as nearly as possible. For this reason, and in view of the fact that all knowledge comes from God, the religious sciences, in a wider sense the “Islamic thought”, are necessary for all Muslims (fard al-‘ayn), “Rational, intellectual and philosophical sciences”, including human sciences, natural sciences, applied sciences, and technological sciences are obligatory for some Muslims only. The prevalence of the religious sciences is based on the fact that the Qur’an, the revelation of God’s wisdom to the Prophet Muhammad, is the starting point of the Islamic concept of education. For this reason, the study of the Arabic language of the Qur'an, its explanation, and the acquisition of its ultimate meaning by tafstr and ta’wil, are central in religious studies, in addition to the study of sunna, Sart‘a, tawhtd (theology), and tasawwuf (Islamic metaphysics, including psychology, cosmology, ontology, and “legitimate elements of Islamic philosophy”). On the basis of the cited preconditions and on the basis of the Islamic doctrine of the Qur’an and its language as ultimate and archetypical realities, as “the Sublime Exemplar of al-bayan”, Al- Attas’ concept of an Islamic philosophy of education appears to be consistent. Consequently, errors and confusions in humanknowledge are due to wrong interpretations of the Qur'an, its meaning, and its Arabic language. The Qur'an is not considered to be a literary document with its own history and prehistory, and any developments of the Quranic language are not caused by historical developments, they are the result of human error and confusion. VIII. The way from education to Islamic humanism Education is emulation of the Prophet and His sunna through increasing knowledge, which ultimately comes from God and results in the good. This explanation implies the characterization of education, formulated by Al-Attas as ta’drb leading to adab, as an ongoing process of increasing knowledge and improving action. A comparison with the European concept of “education”, in German “Bildung” in contrast to “Ausbildung” (“instruction”), shows common features and significant differences. Both concepts share the concept of education as a shaping of man through an increase of knowledge and through reflection on the ethical behaviour of man in society. They differ in so far as the creative phantasy of man is replaced in the Islamic concept by a kind of intuition which is nourished by the inspirational power of the divine revelation to the Prophet, that is the Qur'an, whose archetypical value is undoubted. This could eventually restrict the possibility of man’s critical reflection, i.e., his openmindedness to a multiplicity of interests that make his life meaningful and give him orientation and self- identity, also in the confrontation with other cultures. An illustrative example is the history of Islamic culture, which in the view of orientalists is the result of an encounter between Greek- Sassanian, Jewish, and Christian cultures that has led to the development of a religion which shaped its achievements. Al-Attascalls this shaping “Islamization” which, according to him, pertains to language, thought, and reason, and which does not allow foreign influences, “the infusion of alien concepts”. In Al-Attas’ view, the other, the alien, the different that is not Islam, is not inspiring and enriching, but leads to deislamization and finally to secularization. Islam is primarily the unfolding of God’s wisdom as revealed in the Qur'an. Here, Al-Attas’ concept of Islamic education differs from the European humanistic concept of education which focuses on shaping man and his identity in the dialogue with the other, the alien. Thus, the shadow of the Qur’an does not allow the rise of “Arabic humanism”. We conclude: In view of Al-Attas’ interest in foreign cultures, including Western cultures, which he criticizes as secular civilizations, and at the same time whose knowledge he considers to be “core knowledge” (fard ‘ayn), and in view of his ideal of education understood as an ongoing process of increasing knowledge coming from God and improving the action of man in his emulation of the Prophet, Al-Attas turns out to be an Islamic humanist, Similar to the European humanism and similar to the return of the Renaissance to the Greek and Latin originals of shining models - the principle of humanists like Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466 - 1536 AD) and Philipp Melanchton (1497 - 1560) to rely on the original sources - Al-Attas rediscovered the importance of the single word in its true meaning. Different from the European humanism, the archetypical meaning of the single word in Islam is shaped by the Qur'an - considered to have universal validity. Al-Attas’ concept of education deserves due attention in contemporary discussions by European and Non-European Muslims on “Islamic education”. He makes us aware, that Islamic education has Islamic purposes, that create an Islamic identity and an Islamicauthenticity, based on the knowledge of Islam, on Islamic adab, and on God’s divine inspiration. In Europe the concept of education has been heavily debated since the turn of the millennium. The introduction of a new university curriculum, shared by all members of the European Union and leading to Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees, tends to reduce universities to mere schools for specialists, mainly serving economical interests. Critical voices emphasize the necessity of a concept of education which shapes man, gives him orientation, opens him to a multiplicity of interests, and makes his life and his role in society meaningful. These voices refer to movements of humanism in Europe existing since the 12th century AD, or to what is labeled cultural and communicative memory. They refer to Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) and his concept of responsibility (“Miindigkeit”), which is understood as a constant ethical reflection on man’s behaviour and his position in society. This deserves due attention in an equal manner as Naquib Al-Attas’ concept of education in its aspects different from and common with European humanism. In Al-Attas’ doctrine the humanistic concept of the diginity of man is described as follows: “All souls have the same status in relation to their Lord: that of being subject, possessed, owned, ruled, governed, enslaved, created, cherished and sustained.” “They were akin to one another in yonder place and here they are brethren who love one another for God’s sake. Though one be in the East and the other in the West, yet they feel joy and comfort in each other’s talk, and one who lives in a later generation than the other is instructed and consold by the words of his brother”, Al-Attas assumes a common destiny of all men “long before they appeared as earthly brothers, and they were true kith and kin before they were born in earthly kinship”. Here, Al-Attas refers to the Qur’anic-Sufi concept of the “Covenant” (mitaq) between the soul and God - the basis of Islamic brotherhood,