Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr.
 Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his
Exercise (Admissions I think)| Mar. 21 2011 | J Villarama jr.
Nature of Case: petition for review on certiorari
Digest maker: J
SUMMARY: Betty and Bayani entered into a relationship even though Bayani was already
married. During their relationship they acquired 5 properties. When their relationship
soured Betty initially proposed a partition agreement which Bayani initially agreed to but
when Batty demanded more Bayani refused. Betty filed an action for judicial partition.
The SC held that Bayani was the sole owner of the properties. The SC held that the question
of ownership can be properly adjudicated in an action for partition because the first part of
an action for partiion is to determine whether or no a co-ownership actually exists. The SC
also held that Bayani’s earlier assent to the partition agreement is not an admission of the
co-ownership.
DOCTRINE: To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of
law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be
adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.
FACTS:
 Petitioner (Betty Lacbayan) and respondent (Bayani Samoy Jr.) met each other in
1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until
petitioner gave birth to respondent’s son on Oct. 12, 1979.
 During their relationship together with 3 more incorporators, were able to establish a
manpower services company.
 5 parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered
under Betty and Bayani’s names ostensibly as husband and wife.
 In 1983 Betty moved into one of the 5 properties a house on Malvar St. Later she
moved to another, on Zobel St., and finally settled on a the on in Don Enrique
heights. (All of these were part of the 5 properties)
 In 1991 their relationship turned sour. In 1998 both parties agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement.
 Initially, Bayani agreed to Betty’s proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and
Don Enrique Heights be assigned to Betty, while the ownership over the 3 other
properties will go to Bayani.
 But, when Betty had additional demands Bayani refused. Betty then filed a
complaint for judicial partition.
 Betty’s argument:
 In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together
as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as
business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.Respondent,
in his Answer, however, denied petitioner’s claim of cohabitation and said that the
properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution
from petitioner.
 During the trial, Betty admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours
a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the
wee hours of the morning.
 Betty likewise claimed that they acquired the said properties from the income of the
company.
 Bayani’s argument:
personal funds.
 He countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with Betty
to exclude the same from the property regime of his and his legal wife, and to
prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a
heavy gambler
 RTC dismissed. RTC put emphasis on Betty’ admission that the properties were not
acquired through personal funds but from the income of the manpower services
company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.
 Betty argued in CA that the RTC subjected the certificates of title to collateral attack
and that it was improper for the RTC to include the issue of ownership in an action
for partition.
 CA affirmed RTC.
 Put everything we need to know here
 yadiyadiyaaa
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership - NO
a. The SC cited Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia.
b. “The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made
by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.”
c. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is
definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of
the disputed properties.
2. WON Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the
action for partition - NO
a. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar.
b. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the
title itself.
c. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate
of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably
used.
d. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as
the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot
always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.
3. WON respondent’s assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission
against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of
co- ownership between him and petitioner – NO
a. To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of
law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made;
and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-
serving and inadmissible.
b. A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement
indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior
settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to
whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the
subject properties.
c. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent
not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as
 well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said
properties.
d. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful
spouse may have on the disputed properties.
e. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition
Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other
matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
By the tenor of its decision, the Majority effectively (and unnecessarily) introduced a cloud
over the petitioner’s interests in this commonly- owned property
This Decision should be without prejudice to an action for partition to divide up this
property—a remedy we cannot now provide in the absence of any factual basis on how the
parties contributed in acquiring this property. Alternatively, the actual partition of this
commonly-owned property should be remanded to the trial court for determination of how
partition should be made.

RULING:the petition is DENIED. Bayani was declared sole owner of the properties.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
J Brion’s Separate Opinion

Subject to my observations below, I find that the petitioner failed to discharge by clear
preponderant evidence her co- ownership of the subject properties to warrant their judicial
partition. I confine myself to this conclusion, however, as the issue before us is solely on
whether a judicial partition should be made. Specifically and as articulated in my observations
below, I cannot join the ponencia’s other rulings.

Citing art 148 of the FC J Brion states that:

Thus, any property acquired during the cohabitation can only be considered common property
if two (2) conditions are met:
first, there must be evidence showing that the properties were acquired by the parties NOTE:
during their cohabitation; and Related provisions
second, there must be evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties’ Other things the Court may have said
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.

In this case the first condition was met but not the second.

Mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code, without proof of contribution, will not
result in a co-ownership; proof of actual contribution must be established by clear evidence
showing that the party either used his or her own money or that he or she actually contributed
his or her own money to purchase the property.

Since the petition asserts an affirmative allegation (i.e., her co- ownership of the subject
properties to which she bases her action for judicial partition) she carries the burden of
substantiating her claim. She failed in this regard.

The petitioner presented contradictory evidence when she admitted that the funds used to
purchase the subject properties did not come from her own earnings but from the income of
the manpower business which she managed.

Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a business cannot automatically
be considered as personal earnings, especially in this case where the income the petitioner
referred to is corporate income.

As final observations, J Brion disagreed with the Majority’s conclusion declaring the
respondent as the sole owner of all the properties sought to be partitioned.