http://www.ccel.org/ccel/berkhof/systematictheology.

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Since it does not terminate on the creature, it can in the abstract be

interpreted as having no ethical bearings. This explains that the
Jesuits taught that the divine concurrence was simultaneous only, and
not previous and pre-determining, and that some Reformed theologians
limited the previous concurrence to the good deeds of men, and for the
rest satisfied themselves with teaching a simultaneous concurrence.

c. It is, finally, an immediate concurrence. In His government of the

world God employs all kinds of means for the realization of His ends;
but He does not so work in the divine concurrence. When He destroys the
cities of the plain by fire, this is an act of divine government in
which He employs means. But at the same time it is His immediate
concurrence by which He enables the fire to fall, to burn, and to
destroy. So God also works in man in endowing him with power, in the
determination of his actions, and in sustaining his activities all
along the line.

4. THE DIVINE CONCURRENCE AND SIN. Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, and

Arminians raise a serious objection to this doctrine of providence.
They maintain that a previous concurrence, which is not merely general
but predetermines man to specific actions, makes God the responsible
author of sin. Reformed theologians are well aware of the difficulty
that presents itself here, but do not feel free to circumvent it by
denying God's absolute control over the free actions of His moral
creatures, since this is clearly taught in Scripture, Gen. 45:5;
50:19,20; Ex. 10:1,20; II Sam. 16:10.11; Isa. 10:5-7; Acts 2:23;
4:27,28. They feel constrained to teach: (a) that sinful acts are under
divine control and occur according to God's pre-determination and
purpose, but only by divine permission, so that He does not efficiently
cause men to sin, Gen. 45:5; 50:20; Ex. 14:17; Isa. 66:4; Rom. 9:22; II
Thess. 2:11; (b) that God often restrains the sinful works of the
sinner, Gen. 3:6; Job 1:12; 2:6; Ps. 76:10; Isa. 10:15; Acts 7:51; and
(c) that God in behalf of His own purpose overrules evil for good, Gen.
50:20; Ps. 76:10; Acts. 3:13.

This does not mean, however, that they all agree in answering the
question. whether there is a direct, immediate and physical energizing
of the active power of the creature, disposing and pre-determining it
efficaciously to the specific act, and also enabling it to do that act.
Dabney, for instance, while admitting such a physical concurrence in
the lower creation, denies it with respect to free agents. The great
majority, however, maintain it also in the case of free moral beings.
Even Dabney agrees that God's control over all of the acts of His
creatures is certain, sovereign, and efficacious; and therefore must,
along with the others, face the question as to the responsibility of
God for sin. He gives his conclusion in the following words: "This,
then, is my picture of the providential evolution of God's purpose as
to sinful acts; so to arrange and group events and objects around free
agents by his manifold wisdom and power, as to place each soul, at
every step, in the presence of those circumstances, which, He knows,
will be a sufficient objective inducement to it to do, of its own
native, free activity, just the thing called for by God's plan. Thus
the act is man's alone, though its occurrence is efficaciously secured
by God. And the sin is man's only. God's concern in it is holy, first,
because all His personal agency in arranging to secure its occurrence
was holy; and second, His ends or purposes are holy. God does not will
the sin of the act, for the sake of its sinfulness; but only wills the
result to which the act is a means, and that result is always worthy of
His holiness." [84] The vast majority of Reformed theologians, however,
maintain the concursus in question, and seek the solution of the
difficulty by distinguishing between the materia and the forma of the
sinful act, and by ascribing the latter exclusively to man. The divine
concursus energizes man and determines him efficaciously to the
specific act, but it is man who gives the act its formal quality, and
who is therefore responsible for its sinful character. Neither one of

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