RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented G.R. No.

183822
by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C.
Agullana,
Petitioner,
Present:
-versus-
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
PEREZ,
Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and SERENO,
JUSTA AGUSTIN, REYES, and
Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 18, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the Decision[1] dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution[2] dated 15 July 2008
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed
by herein petitioner.

The Factual Antecedents

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against
Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the
registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa
Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October
29, 1976 by the Laoag City Register of Deeds and with technical
descriptions as follows:

1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of

Laoag), with improvements thereon, situated in the barrio
of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x
containing an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty
nine (5,759) square meters more or less x x x.
 2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of
Laoag), with the improvements thereon, situated in the
barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded
x x x, containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred
and forty five (20,745) square meters, more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in

whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued.
Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D.
Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses
Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject
property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June

5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property
by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration
of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and
dismissed the complaint.

In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which

shows that they entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and
the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or
owners, disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that
defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to
occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and
considering further the length of time that the defendants
have been in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the
9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been
continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon,
this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is
concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled to the
possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of
Lot No. 11711.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is

hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed

said dismissal, the dispositive portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff-
appellant.
 SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal
of the case by the MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08
January 2008, the appellate court through its Fourteenth Division dismissed
his appeal.[4] It noted that his father engaged in a double sale when he
conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents. The
Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was dated 15
March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with respondents was later, on 15 June
1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their execution.[5] The
Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976,[6] resulted in the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of
petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents was, however, not
annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered.[7]

Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had

knowledge of the sale of the disputed real property executed between
Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this
conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession
thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful
detainer case instituted by petitioner against respondents, the appellate court
concluded that respondents possession of the property was not by mere
tolerance of its former owner petitioner's father but was in the exercise of
ownership.[8]

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his fathers sale of the
properties to respondents as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of
the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust
respondents from the subject properties.[9] The appellate court rejected his
contention that, as registered owner of the disputed properties, he had a
better right to possession thereof, compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale
relied upon by respondents in their defense of the same properties. The CA
ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge of the sale in 1973 was
equivalent to registration of respondents unregistered deed.[10] In dismissing
his appeal, the CA concluded that respondents possession was not ...
anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer; hence the complaint for ejectment must fail.[11] The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The decision of Branch
XVI, Regional Trial Court ofLaoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[12]

The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE LEGAL OWNERSHIP
OF PETITIONER ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY TO CLAIM
BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE ALLEGED SALE IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE
BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO CO
VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO
THE INSTANT CASE.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW RAISED
BEFORE IT.[13]

Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition:
who between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed
properties -- petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-
12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of
Absolute Sale over the same properties?

The Court's Ruling

We DENY the Petition.

Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need
to discuss the nature of an ejectment case for the recovery of physical
possession in relation to the Torrens system. A resolution of the issue would
be relevant to the determination of who has the better right to possession in
this unlawful detainer case.

One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real
property is accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be
either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio),
which is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought
in the proper inferior court.[14] In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve
the basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises,
possession referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure.[15]

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership,

the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties
has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the
ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership
is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.[16]

In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the
disputed properties as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father
through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that
they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they are the
owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner,
however, rebuts this claim of ownership, contending that he has registered
the disputed properties in his name and has been issued a land title under
the Torrens system. He asserts that, having registered the properties in his
name, he is the recognized owner and consequently has the better right to
possession.

Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes
of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession.[17] Petitioner
is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the
rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower
courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the
disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not
by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous,
open and notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to
this day.

Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al.,[18] which has facts

and legal issues identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein
filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondents over a disputed
property. He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as actual
occupants of the property claimed ownership thereof based on their
unregistered Deeds of Sale. The principal issue was who between the two
parties had the better right to possess the subject property.

This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one
who had the better right to possession of the disputed property based on the
following justification:
 We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not
susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant

raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the
undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for
the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the

parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property.
Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of
their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer
certificate of title in the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the

Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be
the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and

binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a
court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional
law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the
first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct
proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of

the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents'
argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was
guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a
collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A
certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be
altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law. [19]

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses

Pascual v. Spouses Coronel[20] and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome
Boneo, et al.,[21] wherein we consistently held the age-old rule that the
person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.[22]
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has
instituted an unlawful detainer case against respondents. It is an established
fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous
possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of
ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioners father. Under these
circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession
through the summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding.

Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,[23] which reads thus:

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to
its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession
thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case
against respondents. Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful
detainerare summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means
to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment
proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises,
that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does
not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. For this
reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of
one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property.
Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed
must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the
building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the persons withholding
from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is
entitled, after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold
possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case
is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must
have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It
must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of
such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is
that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of
tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents continued

possession of the subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father,
except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established
when respondents possession of the properties became unlawful a requisite
for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.

In Canlas v. Tubil,[24] we enumerated the elements that constitute the

sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows:
 Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as
well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in
the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real

property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration
or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of
the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction

of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.
The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand
and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.
... ... ...
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently
alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by

contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by

plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of
possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the

property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.

Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with
the requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer
Complaint against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have
consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued possession
of the subject properties, since their possession has been established as one
in the concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the
unlawful detainer case of petitioner.

We concur in the appellate courts findings that petitioners father

engaged in a double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the case
show that it took petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he
acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the
conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name
under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their
possession of the properties, but without bothering to register them or to
initiate any action to fortify their ownership.

We cannot, however, sustain the appellate courts conclusion that

petitioner's failure to initiate any action to annul the sale to respondents and
oust them from the disputed properties had the effect of registration of
respondents unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr.
v. Court of Appeals [25]:
(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest
which is unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his
knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of
registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to
registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780
(1990)],

Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D.

1529), provides that the registration of the deed is the
operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned. But where the party has knowledge
of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time
he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that
prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. The Torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442).
[Emphasis supplied.]

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of

petitioner was executed ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus,
the sale of the subject properties by petitioners father to respondents cannot
be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to know of
the transaction.

We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the
existence of TCT No. T-12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They
allege, though, that the land title issued to him was an act of fraud [26] on his
part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against the
Torrens title of petitioner an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful
detainer case.

It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be

the subject of collateral attack.[27] Such attack must be direct and not by a
collateral proceeding.[28] It is a well-established doctrine that the title
represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.[29] Considering that this is
an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is
possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral attack by
herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.

Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has
the better right to possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of
the subject properties. Questions as to the validity of
petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to
directly attack its validity, an issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this
unlawful detainer case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant

Petition for lack of merit. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal
Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing the
unlawful detainer case of petitioner are AFFIRMED.

We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of

evidence.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


Designated as acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special
Order No. 1174 dated January 9, 2012.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by then Associate Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza.
[2]
Rollo, p. 43.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 36-38.
[4]
Rollo, p. 36.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 40.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Rollo, p. 88.
[8]
Rollo, p. 40.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id. at 41.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[14]
FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM I (7th rev. ed. 2007).
[15]
David v. Cordova, 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
[16]
Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404, 412 (2003) as cited in Urieta vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R. No.
164402, 05 July 2010, 623 SCRA 130.
[17]
Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 634.
[18]
G..R. No. 149912, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 455.
[19]
Supra, citing Estrellita S.J. vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals and Lina F. vda. de Santiago, G.R.
No. 117971, 1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 12; citing NOBLEJAS AND NOBLEJAS, LAND TITLES AND
DEEDS, 210 (1992); citing Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9 (1990). (Ching v. Court of
Appeals was erroneously cited as G.R. Nos. 59568-76 in the original Decision in Co v. Militar).
[20]
G.R. No. 159292, 12 July 2007, 527 SCRA 474.
[21]
G.R. No. 166941, 14 December 2009, 608 SCRA 169.
[22]
Id.
[23]
G.R. No. 177637, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 461.
[24]
G.R. No. 184285, 25 September 2009, 601 SCRA 147.
[25]
414 Phil. 311, 323 (2001).
[26]
Rollo, p. 291.
[27]
Spouses Marcos R. Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Maria Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, 15
December 2010.
[28]
Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., G.R. No. 152440, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 315.
[29]
Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Magay v. Estiandan, G.R. No. L-28975, 27
February 1976; 69 SCRA 456 as cited in PENA, PENA, JR. & PENA, REGISTRATION OF LAND
TITLES AND DEEDS (2008).

G.R. No. 178096 March 23, 2011

ROSA DELOS REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO ODONES and ARWENIA ODONES, NOEMI OTALES, and
GREGORIO RAMIREZ, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the
February 19, 2007 Decision1 and the May 22, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming the June 20, 2006 decision3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling,
Tarlac, which in turn set aside the March 28, 2006 decision4 of the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, in a complaint for unlawful detainer, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants,
ordering defendants, spouses Arwenia Odones and Francisco Odones, their heirs and
assigns and all persons acting in their behalves to vacate the premises and to surrender
possession thereof to the plaintiff. Defendants are likewise ordered to pay One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos as reasonable compensation for the use of the land and Attorney’s fees
in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.5

The Facts

This case emanated from a complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Injunction6 filed
by petitioner Rosa delos Reyes (petitioner) against respondents spouses Arwenia and
Francisco Odones, Noemi Otales, and Gregorio Ramirez (respondents) before the MTC of
Camiling, Tarlac, on July 12, 2005. The complaint alleged these material facts:

3. That [petitioner] is the owner of a parcel of land covered x x x by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 392430, of the Land Records for the Province of Tarlac,
located at Pao, Camiling, Tarlac, x x x.

4. That even before the document upon which the title was based, [petitioner] has
long been the owner thereof;

5. That [respondents] are staying on the said property with a house/improvements

therein, with the mere tolerance of [petitioner] only without any contract whatsoever
and for which there is an implied understanding to vacate upon the demand;
 6. That [petitioner] previously demanded verbally upon [respondents] to vacate which
they refused and for which a written notice was sent advising them to vacate the said
property within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter to vacate x x x.

7. That the said letter was sent by registered mail on June 17, 2005, which was duly
received x x x.7

In their Answer with Counterclaim,8 respondents claimed that they are the owners of the lot,
having purchased the same by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and
Sale9 dated January 29, 2004, executed by the heirs of Donata Lardizabal, the land’s original
owner. Respondents denied that their occupancy of the property was by virtue of petitioner’s
tolerance.10

Respondents further argued that the basis of petitioner’s Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT),
which is a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 18, 1972,11 was a forgery because the
purported vendors therein, Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan, died on June 30,
192612 and June 5, 1971,13 respectively. Incidentally, the said TCT and Deed of Absolute
Sale are the subject of a pending case for annulment of title before the RTC, Branch 68,
Camiling, Tarlac.14

In a decision dated March 28, 2006, the MTC ruled in favor of petitioner, and ordered
respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same,
plus attorney's fees.

Respondents appealed15 to the RTC, arguing that since the complaint failed to allege how
respondents entered the property or when they erected their houses thereon, it is an
improper action for unlawful detainer, and the MTC had no jurisdiction over the same.16

In its June 20, 2006 decision,17 the RTC set aside the MTC’s judgment and dismissed the
complaint. The RTC held that the complaint failed to aver acts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer since it did not state how entry was effected or how and when the
dispossession started. Hence, the remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse with the CA, asseverating that the RTC
misappreciated the allegations in the complaint and that respondents were estopped from
assailing the MTC’s jurisdiction because they did not raise such issue in the proceedings
before that court. Petitioner insisted that, as the registered owner of the lot, she has a
preferential right of possession over it.18

On February 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, adding that, as pronounced
in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,19 in order to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the owner’s
permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession.20 Petitioner
moved for reconsideration,21 but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated May 22,
2007.22 Hence, the instant petition23 ascribing the following errors to the CA:

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE CASE OF GO, JR. v.
COURT OF APPEALS.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HON. MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT OF CAMILING, TARLAC NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS
ARE ALREADY ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE
DECISIS.24

The petition is meritorious.

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court
which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases,
the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary
in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without
resort to parol evidence.25

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.26 The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper
MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought up within one year from the date
of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession.27

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:

1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

tolerance of the plaintiff;

2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of

the termination of the latter's right of possession;

3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.28

Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, petitioner’s allegations in the complaint
clearly makes out a case for unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction over the
subject matter on the MTC. Petitioner alleges that she is the owner of the lot, as shown by
TCT No. 392430, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac; that respondents are occupying
the lot by virtue of petitioner’s tolerance; and that petitioner sent a letter to respondents on
June 17, 2005, demanding that they vacate the property, but they failed and refused to do
so. The complaint was filed on July 12, 2005, or within one year from the time the last
demand to vacate was made.

Firm is the rule that as long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful
detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The CA misapplied the ruling in Go29 that tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession, which possession is sought to be recovered. The CA, in affirming the RTC,
likewise erroneously applied the rule that jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint for ejectment, such that when the complaint fails to faithfully aver facts constitutive
of unlawful detainer, as where it does not state when and how entry was effected, or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.

The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry
into the property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness
of the filing of the complaint before the MTC, and not when the jurisdiction of the MTC is
assailed because the case is one for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.30 This is
because, in forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of
defendants’ actual entry into the property; whereas, in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted
from the date of the last demand to vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed
on time, there is a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint is one for forcible entry or for
unlawful detainer; and since the main distinction between the two actions is when and how
defendant entered the property, the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint.31 1avv phi 1
In Go, there was evidence that the possession by the defendant was illegal at the inception
and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint. No such similar finding is extant in this
case. Further, one of the factual issues raised in Go was whether the action was filed within
one (1) year from the date the last demand was made. Here, it is beyond dispute that the
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed within one (1) year from the date the demand letter
was sent on June 17, 2005.

Based on the foregoing, the MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint and we
agree with its conclusion that petitioner is entitled to the physical possession of the lot, she
having been able to prove by preponderance of evidence, through the TCT registered in her
name, that she is entitled to possession of the property as owner. The countervailing
evidence presented by respondents that sought to dispute the authenticity of petitioner’s TCT
cannot be given weight in this case. Settled is the rule that the validity of a certificate of title
cannot be attacked in an action for ejectment.32

This notwithstanding, the determination made herein as regards petitioner’s ownership of the
lot by virtue of TCT No. 392430 is only prima facie and only for purposes of resolving the
issue of physical possession. These pronouncements are without prejudice to the case of
annulment of the deed of sale and TCT filed by respondents against petitioner.33 Lastly,
these pronouncements are not binding on respondents Noemi Otales and Gregorio Ramirez
over whose persons no jurisdiction was acquired by the MTC.34

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 19, 2007 Decision and the May 22,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
March 28, 2006 decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, is REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes

*Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Special
Order No. 975 dated March 21, 2011.

1Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose C.
Reyes, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, concurring; rollo, pp. 28-35.

2 Id. at 38.

3 Id. at 124-126.

4 Id. at 85-89.

5 Id. at 88-89.

6 Id. at 54-60.

7 Id. at 54-56.

8 Id. at 67-70.

9 Id. at 71-72.

10 Supra note 8.

11
Id. at 73.

12 Id. at 77.

13 Id. at 78.

14 Id. at 74-76.

15 Notice of Appeal; id. at 90.

16 Appeal Memorandum; id. at 91-96.

17 Supra note 3.

18 Petition for Review; rollo, pp. 147-175.

19 G.R. No. 142276, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 755.

20 Supra note 1.

21 Rollo, pp. 40-53.

22 Supra note 2.

23 Rollo, pp. 3-26.

24 Quoted in brevity; id. at 10.

25 Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 156,
citing Domalsin v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114,
133-134.

26 Valdez, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 132424, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 369, 376.

27 Id.

28 Cabrera v. Getaruela, G.R. No. 164213, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 129, 137.

29 Supra note 19.

30 Canlas v. Tubil, supra note 25, at 160.

31 Id., citing Javelosa v. CA, 333 Phil. 331, 340 (1996).

32Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November
25, 2009, 605 SCRA 315, 330.

Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, G.R. No. 166941, December 14, 2009, 608
33

SCRA 169, 175.

34 Supra note 4, at 88.