1
THIRD DIVISION As he was not able to generate a positive response from the
G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS
CO., LTD., Petitioners,
vs. MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2001 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60827, and the July
25, 2001 Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants
Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing
technical and management support in the infrastructure
projects of foreign governments,3 entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura,
a Japanese national permanently residing in the
Philippines.4 The agreement provides that respondent was to
extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on
April 1, 1999.5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the
project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR)
Project in the Philippines, following the company's consultancy
contract with the Philippine Government.6
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy
services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000, this time for the
detailed engineering and construction supervision of the
Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.7 Respondent
was named as the project manager in the contract's Appendix
3.1.8
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's
general manager for its International Division, informed
respondent that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged
by the company only up to the substantial completion of the
STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's
expiry.9
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent,
through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and
demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon
insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed term that had
already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the
ICA.10
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently
petitioners, respondent consequently initiated on June 1, 2000
Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages
with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.11
For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been
perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese
nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-
termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard and
ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles
of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.12
In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved
Nippon's request for the replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y.
Kotake as project manager of the BBRI Project.13
On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular
Government v. Frank14 that matters connected with the
performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at
the place of performance,15 denied the motion to dismiss.16 The
trial court subsequently denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration,17 prompting them to file with the appellate
court, on August 14, 2000, their first Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60205].18 On August 23,
2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the petition on procedural
grounds—for lack of statement of material dates and for
insufficient verification and certification against forum
shopping.19 An Entry of Judgment was later issued by the
appellate court on September 20, 2000.20
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, on
September 19, 2000, still within the reglementary period,
a second Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 already stating
therein the material dates and attaching thereto the proper
verification and certification. This second petition, which
substantially raised the same issues as those in the first, was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827.21
Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court
rendered the assailed April 18, 2001 Decision22 finding no grave
abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion to
dismiss. The CA ruled, among others, that the principle of lex loci
celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in
the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in
issue. The CA thus declared that the trial court was correct in
applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis.23
denied by the CA in the assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution.24
Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials,
petitioners instituted the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari25 imputing the following errors to the appellate
court:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN
TWO JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE
JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO, JAPAN.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS.26
The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is
whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in
civil cases for specific performance and damages involving
contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may
be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship rule,"
or forum non conveniens.
However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of
the procedural matters raised by the respondent.
Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 has already barred the filing of
the second petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827
(fundamentally raising the same issues as those in the first one)
and the instant petition for review thereof.
We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205
on account of the petition's defective certification of non-forum
shopping, it was a dismissal without prejudice.27 The same holds
true in the CA's dismissal of the said case due to defects in the
formal requirement of verification28 and in the other
requirement in Rule 46 of the Rules of Court on the statement
of the material dates.29 The dismissal being without prejudice,
petitioners can re-file the petition, or file a second petition
attaching thereto the appropriate verification and certification—

as they, in fact did—and stating therein the material dates,
within the prescribed period30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said
Rules.31
The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence
of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate
the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed
action had not been commenced. In other words, the
termination of a case not on the merits does not bar another
action involving the same parties, on the same subject matter
and theory.32
Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and
has no res judicata effect, and even if petitioners still indicated
in the verification and certification of the
second certiorari petition that the first had already been
dismissed on procedural grounds,33 petitioners are no longer
required by the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-
forum shopping in the instant petition for review of the second
certiorari petition, the status of the aforesaid first petition
before the CA. In any case, an omission in the certificate of non-
forum shopping about any event that will not constitute res
judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a fatal
defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and nullification of the
entire proceedings, considering that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certificate are no longer present.34
The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that
petitioner Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and certify, on
behalf of Nippon, the certiorari petition filed with the CA and
not the instant petition. True, the Authorization35 dated
September 4, 2000, which is attached to the
second certiorari petition and which is also attached to the
instant petition for review, is limited in scope—its wordings
indicate that Hasegawa is given the authority to sign for and act
on behalf of the company only in the petition filed with the
appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to the instant
petition for review.36 In a plethora of cases, however, this Court
has liberally applied the Rules or even suspended its application
whenever a satisfactory explanation and a subsequent
fulfillment of the requirements have been made.37 Given that
petitioners herein sufficiently explained their misgivings on this
point and appended to their Reply38 an updated
Authorization39 for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company in
the instant petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient
compliance with the Rules.
2
However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to
the defect in the verification and certification. As respondent
pointed out, and to which we agree, Hasegawa is truly not
authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in this case. The aforesaid
September 4, 2000 Authorization and even the subsequent
August 17, 2001 Authorization were issued only by Nippon's
president and chief executive officer, not by the company's
board of directors. In not a few cases, we have ruled that
corporate powers are exercised by the board of directors; thus,
no person, not even its officers, can bind the corporation, in the
absence of authority from the board.40 Considering that
Hasegawa verified and certified the petition only on his behalf
and not on behalf of the other petitioner, the petition has to be
denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman.41 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a
matter that demands strict observance of the Rules.42 While
technical rules of procedure are designed not to frustrate the
ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to effect the
proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent
the clogging of court dockets.43
Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed
a Rule 65 petition to question the trial court's denial of their
motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot be the
subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus.
The appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as
defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to trial,
and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by
appeal in due course.44 While there are recognized exceptions
to this rule,45 petitioners' case does not fall among them.
This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the
case.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum,
petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil
case for specific performance and damages filed by the
respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into
and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and
written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit
that local courts have no substantial relationship to the
parties46 following the [state of the] most significant relationship
rule in Private International Law.47
The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but
different theory when they elevated the case to the appellate
court. In the Motion to Dismiss48 filed with the trial court,
petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenient
forum. They merely argued that the applicable law which will
determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that
of Japan, following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus.49 While not abandoning this stance in their petition
before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly
invoked the defense of forum non conveniens.50 On petition for
review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other
arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens defense, and
introduced their new argument that the applicable principle is
the [state of the] most significant relationship rule.51
Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition
merely on the basis of the change in theory, as explained
in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo.52 We only pointed
out petitioners' inconstancy in their arguments to emphasize
their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws principles.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems,
three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1)
Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will
the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be
enforced?53
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts.54 Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While
jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the
"minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the
necessary "significant contacts" for the other.55 The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.56
In this case, only the first phase is at issue—
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects.
For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a
controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the
petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the
subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases
involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject
of the litigation.57 In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law.58 It is further determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein.59 To succeed in its
motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim,60 the movant must show that
the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it
because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.61
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not
claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with
jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil
Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one
not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable
by the RTC of Lipa City.62 What they rather raise as grounds to
question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most
significant relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the
ceremony"63 or the law of the place where a contract is
made.64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is
executed or to be performed."65 It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract66 and it may pertain to
the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law
intended by them either expressly or implicitly.67 Under the
"state of the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain
what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the
court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of
business, or place of incorporation of the parties.68 This rule
takes into account several contacts and evaluates them
according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue to be resolved.69
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to
the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
second phase, the choice of law.70 They determine which state's
law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a
conflicts problem.71 Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is
that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable
but also not yet called for.
3
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules
is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any
conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining
which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws
situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws
rules.72 Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence
of such law must be pleaded and proved.73
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a
foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative
agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2)
assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of
the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into
account or apply the law of some other State or States.74 The
court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from
the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize
laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements,
even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.75
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,76 be
used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is
not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a
ground.77 Second, whether a suit should be entertained or
dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon
the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.78 In this case, the RTC decided to
assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case
based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence,
this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of
defense.79
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to
entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the
grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are
inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON.
RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution1 dated
September 27, 1995 and the Decision2 dated April 10, 1996 of
the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533,4 and the
Orders5 dated August 29, 1994 6 and February 2, 19957 that
were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.8
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant
petition, as stated in the questioned Decision9, are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight
Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia,
plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members
Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals.
Because it was almost morning when they returned to their
hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of
Thamer. When they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some
pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff.
Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard
her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police
came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an
accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several
SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident.
They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange
the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer
Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the
police for the immediate release of the detained crew members
but did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She
was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not
want because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She
also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in
the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return
to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to
deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention.
Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI
(sic). In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff
to Manila.

On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to
see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police
station where the police took her passport and questioned her
about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the
police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the
case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did
the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the
afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to
Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead
ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of
the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was
asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that
this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah.
As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before
the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993
for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving
assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that
the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to
her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same
Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on
June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as
her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that
the airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service
Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya
Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to
the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her
to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did
she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with
Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court
4
found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing
and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition. 10”
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her
employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any
assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to
help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while
Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international
flights. 11
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah
dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi
Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, 12 she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being
informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13 for
damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its
country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To
Dismiss 14 which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the
Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that
defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the
claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion
to Dismiss) 15. Saudia filed a reply 16 thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended
Complaint 17 wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party defendant.
On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion
to Dismiss Amended Complaint 18.
The trial court issued an Order 19 dated August 29, 1994 denying
the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge 20 denying the Motion to
Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for
Reconsideration 21 of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It
alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the
case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper
law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On
October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition 22 (To
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994,
SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for Reconsideration raised
lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion
Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first
time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines
does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the
instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the
same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order 24 dated
February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and
the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on
October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant
Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994,
considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint,
which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorney's fees, upon the basis of the applicable
Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court as
regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new of
substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the
order sought to be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration
of the defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 25
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order 26 with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with
Temporary Restraining Order 27 dated February 23, 1995,
prohibiting the respondent Judge from further conducting any
proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
In another Resolution 28 promulgated on September 27, 1995,
now assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA's Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February
18, 1995, to wit:

The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to
Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and
Rejoinder, it appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly
entitled thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of
Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court
the instant Petition 29 for Review with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision 30 dated
April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is
an appropriate forum considering that the Amended
Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the
Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent
Court. It further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in
a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner
should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling,
find recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for
Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order 31 dated
April 30, 1996, given due course by this Court. After both parties
submitted their Memoranda, 32 the instant case is now deemed
submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No.
Q-93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the
proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
inasmuch as this case involves what is known in private
international law as a "conflicts problem". Otherwise, the
Republic of the Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done
by another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a
jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of
leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable
Court required the respondents to comment on petitioner's
April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For
A Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From
5
Notice Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be
construed with liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision
in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon.
Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining
Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day
reglementary period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP
NO. 36533 has not yet become final and executory and this
Honorable Court can take cognizance of this case. 33
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the
following issues emerge for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS
JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394
ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES".
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that
must be settled at the outset. It maintains that private
respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the
foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of
the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci
delicti commissi rule. 34
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her
Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 35 and 21 36 of the
Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic
law. 37
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no
dispute that the interplay of events occurred in two states, the
Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended
Complaint 38 dated June 23, 1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign
airlines corporation doing business in the Philippines. It may be
served with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide
Associated Sales (Phils.). Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114
Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x xx
x xxx
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to
deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention.
Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant
SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred
plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the
Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors reauested
her to see MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the
police station where the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply
stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a statement
dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she
agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed
her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to
Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead
ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of
the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was
asked to sigh a document written in Arabic. They told her that
this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah.
As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before
the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993
for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance
from SAUDIA's Manila manger, Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the
same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but
on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as
 6

her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
the airline had forbidden her to take that flight. At the Inflight Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. caused a "conflicts" situation to arise. amended to read as follows:
Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders. We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself exercise exclusive jurisdiction: x x x xxx xxx
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff here, and the question of jurisdiction 43 confronts the court a
to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and quo. (8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest,
shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended and cots or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, Complaint, 44 and the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a Civil Code. above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos
disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours) x x x xxx xxx
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:
laws; (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
Islamic tradition. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in — the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
the performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, due and observe honesty and good faith. Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial
plaintiff sought the help of the Philippines Embassy in Jeddah. Court]
The latter helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:
court. To pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights (a) xxx xxx xxx
of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
served the international flights. 39 in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public (b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced
policy shall compensate the latter for damages. and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff
existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
the problem herein could present a "conflicts" case. Appeals, 45 this Court held that:
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City
affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the
contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite
is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are
associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their the statutes. equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an
birth or conception. 40 Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the
gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with private defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
many. 41 The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that respondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are
actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign disturbed. 49
domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State forum.
involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the Based on the allegations 46 in the Amended Complaint, read in Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a
foreign element may assume a complex form. 42 the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction 47 we find that the quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and over the subject matter of the suit. 48 Its authority to try and
hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no
that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by longer maintains substantial connections. That would have
virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia 7691, to wit:
caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary
difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the
parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private
respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and
Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has
voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several
motions 50 praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended
Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante
Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and
explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other
reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying
for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other
than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.: 51
We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962,
aside from disputing the lower court's jurisdiction over
defendant's person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that plaintiff's cause of action has prescribed. By
interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and
Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which
it prayed the court to resolve controversy in its favor. For the
court to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd.,
it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latter's
person, who, being the proponent of the affirmative defense,
should be deemed to have abandoned its special appearance
and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.”
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that;
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for
the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special
appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a
general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for
example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further
7
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter. 52”
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof,
justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law
problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What
legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what
extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. 53
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the
legal system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all
choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions
of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum
is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two
important values should be stressed. 54
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine
under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This
process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of
qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the
facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts
rule." 55 The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the
forum to select the proper law. 56
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a
factual situation, event, or operative fact. 57 An essential
element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or
"connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules
invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property
right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of
contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the
place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 58
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve
as the possible test for the determination of the applicable
law. 59 These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting
factors" could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his
place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is
deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive
when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such
as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage
celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g.,
the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place
where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that
should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lex fori — the law of the forum — is
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters
of "procedure" not going to the substance of the claim involved
are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever
the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded
from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under
one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or
owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment. 60 (Emphasis ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including
allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed admitted for
purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there
is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that
although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought
her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in
an investigation of the charges she made against the two
SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they
were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face
trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of
Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the
"handing over" or "turning over" of the person of private
respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted
beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner's purported act
contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused
additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private

respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest,
detention and prosecution of private respondent under the
guise of petitioner's authority as employer, taking advantage of
the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged
conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was
wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted
upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be
liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the
wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact"
could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex
loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts
case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the
tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly
deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working
here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner
would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its
duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and
good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she
claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly
occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view
what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or
the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged,
according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All
told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs
of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule
of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort
liability 61 have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches
to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern
theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the
"State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our
view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual
context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the
most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be
taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
8
parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered. 62
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all
injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise
no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina
national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus,
the "relationship" between the parties was centered here,
although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere
labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in
this dispute, 63 raised by private respondent as plaintiff below
against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been
properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of
the tort complained of and the place "having the most interest
in the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the
Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues
arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in
Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law.
Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's insistence that "[s]ince
private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of
pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the
matter." 64 As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21"
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint
and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law
should govern this case. 65 And as correctly held by the
respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the
petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi
Arabia, then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to
establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is". 66
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate
court in upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's (herein
petitioner's) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was
jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after
trial was obviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated
by the nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is
the state intimately concerned with the ultimate outcome of the
case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also
for the vindication of the country's system of law and justice in a
transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial
court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of
relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign
element or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course,
should be construed as prejudging the results of the case in any
manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros P.
Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further
proceedings. SO ORDERED.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SMALL V. UNITED STATES
544 U. S. ____ (2005)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 03-750
GARY SHERWOOD SMALL, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the
third circuit
[April 26, 2005]
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States Criminal Code makes it
“unlawful for any person … who has been convicted in any
court, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm.” 18 U. S. C.
§922(g)(1) (emphasis added).
The question before us focuses upon the words “convicted in
any court.” Does this phrase apply only to convictions entered in
any domestic court or to foreign convictions as well? We hold
that the phrase encompasses only domestic, not foreign,
convictions.
I
In 1994 petitioner, Gary Small, was convicted in a Japanese
court of having tried to smuggle several pistols, a rifle, and
ammunition into Japan. Small was sentenced to five years’
imprisonment. 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757, n. 3 (WD Pa. 2002).
After his release, Small returned to the United States, where he
bought a gun from a Pennsylvania gun dealer. Federal
authorities subsequently charged Small under the “unlawful gun
possession” statute here at issue. 333 F. 3d 425, 426 (CA3
2003). Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to challenge
his conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction, being a
foreign conviction, fell outside the scope of the illegal gun
possession statute. The Federal District Court rejected Small’s
argument, as did the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 183
F. Supp. 2d, at 759; 333 F. 3d, at 427, n. 2. Because the Circuits

disagree about the matter, we granted certiorari.
Compare United States v. Atkins, 872 F. 2d 94, 96 (CA4 1989)
(“convicted in any court” includes foreign convictions); United
States v. Winson, 793 F. 2d 754, 757–759 (CA6 1986) (same),
with United States v. Gayle, 342 F. 3d 89, 95 (CA2 2003)
(“convicted in any court” does not include foreign
convictions); United States v. Concha, 233 F. 3d 1249, 1256
(CA10 2000) (same).
II
A domestic law. For another, considered as a group, foreign
The question before us is whether the statutory reference
“convicted in any court” includes a conviction entered in
a foreign court. The word “any” considered alone cannot answer
this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says, “I’ll see any
film,” may or may not mean to include films shown in another
city. In law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase “ ‘any
person’ ” may or may not mean to include “ ‘persons’ ” outside
“the jurisdiction of the state.” See, e.g., United States v. Palmer,
3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[G]eneral words,”
such as the word “ ‘any,’ ” must “be limited” in their application
“to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply
them”); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125, 132
(2004) (“ ‘any’ ” means “different things depending upon the
setting”); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357
(1994) (“[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the
broad statutory reference to ‘any’ law enforcement officer or
agency without considering the rest of the statute”); Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453
U. S. 1, 15–16 (1981) (it is doubtful that the phrase “ ‘any
statute’ ” includes the very statute in which the words
appear); Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 149 (1960) (“[A]ny
sum,” while a “catchall” phase, does not “define what it
catches”). Thus, even though the word “any” demands a broad
interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5
(1997), we must look beyond that word itself.
In determining the scope of the statutory phrase we find help
in the “commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates
with domestic concerns in mind.” Smith v. United States, 507 U.
S. 197, 204, n. 5 (1993). This notion has led the Court to adopt
the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its
statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application.
See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 285 (1949); see
also Palmer, supra, at 631 (“The words ‘any person or persons,’
are broad enough to comprehend every human being” but are
“limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the
state”); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 249–
251 (1991). That presumption would apply, for example, were
9
we to consider whether this statute prohibits unlawful gun
possession abroad as well as domestically. And, although the
presumption against extraterritorial application does not apply
directly to this case, we believe a similar assumption is
appropriate when we consider the scope of the phrase
“convicted in any court” here.
For one thing, the phrase describes one necessary portion of
the “gun possession” activity that is prohibited as a matter of
convictions differ from domestic convictions in important ways.
Past foreign convictions for crimes punishable by more than one
year’s imprisonment may include a conviction for conduct that
domestic laws would permit, for example, for engaging in
economic conduct that our society might encourage. See, e.g.,
Art. 153 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic, in Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure 171 (H.
Berman & J. Spindler transls. 2d ed. 1972) (criminalizing “Private
Entrepreneurial Activity”); Art. 153, id., at 172 (criminalizing
“Speculation,” which is defined as “the buying up and reselling
of goods or any other articles for the purpose of making a
profit”); cf. e.g., Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de Cuba, ch. II,
Art. 103, p. 68 (Dec. 30, 1987) (forbidding propaganda that
incites against the social order, international solidarity, or the
Communist State). They would include a conviction from a legal
system that is inconsistent with an American understanding of
fairness. See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2003, Submitted to the House
Committee on International Relations and the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., 702–
705, 1853, 2023 (Joint Comm. Print 2004) (describing failures of
“due process” and citing examples in which “the testimony of
one man equals that of two women”). And they would include a
conviction for conduct that domestic law punishes far less
severely. See, e.g., Singapore Vandalism Act, ch. 108, §§2, 3, III
Statutes of Republic of Singapore p. 258 (imprisonment for up to
three years for an act of vandalism). Thus, the key statutory
phrase “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” somewhat less
reliably identifies dangerous individuals for the purposes of U. S.
law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic convictions,
are at issue.
In addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or
prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign
convictions are at issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate
foreign convictions that meet the statutory definition is not
consistent with the statute’s language; it is not easy for those
not versed in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave
those previously convicted in a foreign court (say of economic
crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations. Cf. 1 United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §4A1.2(h)
(Nov. 2004) (“[S]entences resulting from foreign convictions are
not counted” as a “prior sentence” for criminal history
purposes).
These considerations, suggesting significant differences
between foreign and domestic convictions, do not dictate our
ultimate conclusion. Nor do they create a “clear statement”
rule, imposing upon Congress a special burden of specificity.
See post, at 5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). They simply convince us
that we should apply an ordinary assumption about the reach of
domestically oriented statutes here—an assumption that helps
us determine Congress’ intent where Congress likely did not
consider the matter and where other indicia of intent are in
approximate balance. Cf. ibid. We consequently assume a
congressional intent that the phrase “convicted in any court”
applies domestically, not extraterritorially. But, at the same
time, we stand ready to revise this assumption should statutory
language, context, history, or purpose show the contrary.
B
We have found no convincing indication to the contrary here.
The statute’s language does not suggest any intent to reach
beyond domestic convictions. Neither does it mention foreign
convictions nor is its subject matter special, say, immigration or
terrorism, where one could argue that foreign convictions would
seem especially relevant. To the contrary, if read to include
foreign convictions, the statute’s language creates anomalies.
For example, the statute creates an exception that allows gun
possession despite a prior conviction for an antitrust or business
regulatory crime. 18 U. S. C. §921(a)(20)(A). In doing so, the
exception speaks of “Federal or State” antitrust or regulatory
offenses. Ibid. If the phrase “convicted in any court” generally
refers only to domestic convictions, this language causes no
problem. But if “convicted in any court” includes foreign
convictions, the words “Federal or State” prevent the exception
from applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory conviction
is at issue. An individual convicted of, say, a Canadian antitrust
offense could not lawfully possess a gun, Combines Investigation
Act, 2 R. S. C. 1985, ch. C–34, §§61(6), (9) (1985), but a similar
individual convicted of, say, a New York antitrust offense, could
lawfully possess a gun.
For example, the statute specifies that predicate crimes
include “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18 U. S. C.

§922(g)(9). Again, the language specifies that these predicate
crimes include only crimes that are “misdemeanor[s] under
Federal or State law.” §921(a)(33)(A). If “convicted in any court”
refers only to domestic convictions, this language creates no
problem. If the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the
language creates an apparently senseless distinction between
(covered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed within
the United States and (uncovered) domestic relations
misdemeanors committed abroad.
For example, the statute provides an enhanced penalty where
unlawful gun possession rests upon three predicate convictions
for a “serious drug offense.” §924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. II).
Again the statute defines the relevant drug crimes through
reference to specific federal crimes and with the words “offense
under State law.” §§924(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (2000). If “convicted in
any court” refers only to domestic convictions, this language
creates no problem. But if the phrase also refers to foreign
convictions, the language creates an apparently senseless
distinction between drug offenses committed within the United
States (potentially producing enhanced punishments) and
similar offenses committed abroad (not producing enhanced
punishments).
For example, the statute provides that offenses that are
punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to two years, and
characterized under state law as misdemeanors, are not
predicate crimes. §921(20). This exception is presumably based
on the determination that such state crimes are not sufficiently
serious or dangerous so as to preclude an individual from
possessing a firearm. If “convicted in any court” refers only to
domestic convictions, this language creates no problem. But if
the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the language
creates another apparently senseless distinction between less
serious crimes (misdemeanors punishable by more than one
year’s imprisonment) committed within the United States (not
predicate crimes) and similar offenses committed abroad
(predicate crimes). These illustrative examples taken together
suggest that Congress did not consider whether the generic
phrase “convicted in any court” applies to domestic as well as
foreign convictions.
The statute’s lengthy legislative history confirms the fact that
Congress did not consider whether foreign convictions should or
should not serve as a predicate to liability under the provision
here at issue. Congress did consider a Senate bill containing
language that would have restricted predicate offenses to
domestic offenses. See S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p.
10
31 (1968) (defining predicate crimes in terms of “Federal”
crimes “punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one
year” and crimes “determined by the laws of the State to be a
felony”). And the Conference Committee ultimately rejected this
version in favor of language that speaks of those “convicted in
any court, of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 28–29 (1968). But the history does not suggest that
this language change reflected a congressional view on the
matter before us. Rather, the enacted version is simpler and it
avoids potential difficulties arising out of the fact that States
may define the term “felony” differently. And as far as the
legislative history is concerned, these latter virtues of the new
language fully explain the change. Thus, those who use
legislative history to help discern congressional intent will see
the history here as silent, hence a neutral factor, that simply
confirms the obvious, namely, that Congress did not consider
the issue. Others will not be tempted to use or to discuss the
history at all. But cf. post, at 13 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The statute’s purpose does offer some support for a reading of
the phrase that includes foreign convictions. As the Government
points out, Congress sought to “ ‘keep guns out of the hands of
those who have demonstrated that they may not be trusted to
possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.’ ” Brief
for United States 16 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,
Inc., 460 U. S. 103, 112 (1983)); see also Lewis v. United
States, 445 U. S. 55, 60–62, 66 (1980); Huddleston v. United
States, 415 U. S. 814, 824 (1974). And, as the dissent properly
notes, post, at 12, one convicted of a serious crime abroad may
well be as dangerous as one convicted of a similar crime in the
United States.
The force of this argument is weakened significantly, however,
by the empirical fact that, according to the Government, since
1968, there have probably been no more than “10 to a dozen”
instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as a
predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution. Tr. of Oral Arg.
32. This empirical fact reinforces the likelihood that Congress, at
best, paid no attention to the matter.
C in Nigeria, and engaged in oil exploration and production in
In sum, we have no reason to believe that Congress
considered the added enforcement advantages flowing from
inclusion of foreign crimes, weighing them against, say, the
potential unfairness of preventing those with inapt foreign
convictions from possessing guns. See supra, at 4. The statute
itself and its history offer only congressional silence. Given the
reasons for disfavoring an inference of extraterritorial coverage
from a statute’s total silence and our initial assumption against
such coverage, see supra, at 5, we conclude that the phrase
“convicted in any court” refers only to domestic courts, not to
foreign courts. Congress, of course, remains free to change this
conclusion through statutory amendment.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Third Circuit is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 10–1491
_________________
ESTHER KIOBEL, individually and on behalf of her late husband,
Dr. BARINEM KIOBEL, et al., PETI- TIONERS v. ROYAL DUTCH
PETROLEUM CO. et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the
second circuit
[April 17, 2013]
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, a group of Nigerian nationals residing in the
United States, filed suit in federal court against certain Dutch,
British, and Nigerian corporations. Petitioners sued under the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U. S. C. §1350, alleging that the
corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian Government in
committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria. The
question presented is whether and under what circumstances
courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort
Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the
territory of a sovereign other than the United States.
I
Petitioners were residents of Ogoniland, an area of 250
square miles located in the Niger delta area of Nigeria and
populated by roughly half a million people. When the complaint
was filed, respondents Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and
Shell Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c., were holding
companies incorporated in the Netherlands and England,
respectively. Their joint subsidiary, respondent Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (SPDC), was incorporated
Ogoniland. According to the complaint, after concerned
residents of Ogoniland began protesting the environmental
effects of SPDC’s practices, respondents enlisted the Nigerian
Government to violently suppress the burgeoning
demonstrations. Throughout the early 1990’s, the complaint
alleges, Nigerian military and police forces attacked Ogoni vil-
lages, beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and

destroying or looting property. Petitioners further allege that
respondents aided and abetted these atrocities by, among other
things, providing the Nigerian forces with food, transportation,
and compensation, as well as by al- lowing the Nigerian military
to use respondents’ property as a staging ground for attacks.
Following the alleged atrocities, petitioners moved to the
United States where they have been granted political asylum
and now reside as legal residents. See Supp. Brief for Petitioners
3, and n. 2. They filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, alleging jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Statute and requesting relief under customary
international law. The ATS provides, in full, that “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. According to
petitioners, respondents violated the law of nations by aiding
and abetting the Nigerian Government in committing (1)
extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture and
cruel treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violations
of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced
exile; and (7) property destruction. The District Court dismissed
the first, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims, reasoning that the facts
alleged to support those claims did not give rise to a violation of
the law of nations. The court denied respondents’ motion to
dismiss with respect to the remaining claims, but certified its
order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to §1292(b).
The Second Circuit dismissed the entire complaint, rea-
soning that the law of nations does not recognize corpo- rate
liability. 621 F. 3d 111 (2010). We granted certiorari to consider
that question. 565 U. S. ___ (2011). After oral argument, we
directed the parties to file supplemen- tal briefs addressing an
additional question: “Whether and under what circumstances
the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States.” 565 U. S. ___ (2012).
We heard oral argument again and now affirm the judgment
below, based on our answer to the second question.
II
Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS was
invoked twice in the late 18th century, but then only once more
over the next 167 years. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §9, 1 Stat 77; see
Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9,895) (DC Pa. 1793);
Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (No. 1,607) (DC SC 1795); O’Reilly
de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U. S. 45 (1908) ; Khedivial Line, S.A.E.
11
v. Seafarers’ Int’l Union, 278 F. 2d 49, 51–52 (CA2 1960) (per
curiam). The statute provides district courts with jurisdiction to
hear certain claims, but does not expressly provide any causes
of action. We held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 714
(2004) , however, that the First Congress did not intend the
provision to be “stillborn.” The grant of jurisdiction is instead
“best read as having been enacted on the understanding that
the common law would provide a cause of action for [a] modest
number of international law violations.” Id., at 724. We thus
held that federal courts may “recognize private claims [for such
violations] under federal common law.” Id., at 732. The Court in
Sosa rejected the plaintiff’s claim in that case for “arbitrary
arrest and detention,” on the ground that it failed to state a
violation of the law of nations with the requisite “definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations.” Id., at 699,
732.
The question here is not whether petitioners have stated a
proper claim under the ATS, but whether a claim may reach
conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.
Respondents contend that claims under the ATS do not, relying
primarily on a canon of statutory interpretation known as the
presumption against extraterritorial application. That canon
provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none,” Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 6), and
reflects the “presumption that United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world,” Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 437, 454 (2007) .
This presumption “serves to protect against unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord.” EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) (Aramco). As this Court has
explained:
“For us to run interference in . . . a delicate field of international
relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary
to make fairly such an important policy decision where the
possibilities of international discord are so evident and
retaliative action so certain.” Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,
S. A., 353 U. S. 138, 147 (1957) . The presumption against
extraterritorial application helps ensure that the Judiciary does
not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U. S. law that carries
foreign pol- icy consequences not clearly intended by the
political branches.
We typically apply the presumption to discern whether an Act
of Congress regulating conduct applies abroad. See, e.g.,
Aramco, supra, at 246 (“These cases present the issue whether
Title VII applies extraterritorially to regulate the employment
practices of United States employers who employ United States
citizens abroad”); Morrison, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 4) (noting
that the question of extraterritorial application was a “merits
question,” not a question of jurisdiction). The ATS, on the other
hand, is “strictly jurisdictional.” Sosa, 542 U. S., at 713. It does
not directly regulate conduct or afford relief. It instead allows
federal courts to recognize certain causes of action based on
sufficiently definite norms of international law. But we think the
principles underlying the canon of interpretation similarly
constrain courts considering causes of action that may be
brought under the ATS.
Indeed, the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in
the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the
ATS, because the question is not what Congress has done but
instead what courts may do. This Court in Sosa repeatedly
stressed the need for judicial caution in considering which
claims could be brought under the ATS, in light of foreign policy
concerns. As the Court explained, “the potential [foreign policy]
implications . . . of recog- nizing . . . . causes [under the ATS]
should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the
discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing
foreign affairs.” Id., at 727; see also id., at 727–728 (“Since many
attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of
new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse
foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at
all, with great caution”); id., at 727 (“[T]he possible collateral
consequences of making international rules privately actionable
argue for judicial caution”). These concerns, which are
implicated in any case arising under the ATS, are all the more
pressing when the question is whether a cause of action under
the ATS reaches conduct within the territory of another
sovereign.
These concerns are not diminished by the fact that Sosa
limited federal courts to recognizing causes of action only for
alleged violations of international law norms that are “ ‘specific,
universal, and obligatory.’ ” Id., at 732 (quoting In re Estate of
Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F. 3d 1467, 1475 (CA9
1994)). As demonstrated by Congress’s enactment of the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 106Stat. 73, note
following 28 U. S. C. §1350, identifying such a norm is only the
beginning of defining a cause of action. See id., §3 (providing
detailed definitions for extrajudicial killing and torture); id., §2

(specifying who may be liable, creating a rule of exhaustion, and
establishing a statute of limitations). Each of these decisions
carries with it significant foreign policy implications.
The principles underlying the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality thus constrain courts exercising their power
under the ATS.
III
Petitioners contend that even if the presumption applies, the
text, history, and purposes of the ATS rebut it for causes of
action brought under that statute. It is true that Congress, even
in a jurisdictional provision, can indicate that it intends federal
law to apply to conduct occurring abroad. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C.
§1091(e) (2006 ed., Supp. V) (providing jurisdiction over the
offense of genocide “regardless of where the offense is
committed” if the alleged offender is, among other things,
“present in the United States”). But to rebut the presumption,
the ATS would need to evince a “clear indication of
extraterritoriality.” Morrison, 561 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). It
does not.
To begin, nothing in the text of the statute suggests that
Congress intended causes of action recognized under it to have
extraterritorial reach. The ATS covers actions by aliens for
violations of the law of nations, but that does not imply
extraterritorial reach—such violations affect- ing aliens can
occur either within or outside the United States. Nor does the
fact that the text reaches “any civil action” suggest application
to torts committed abroad; it is well established that generic
terms like “any” or “every” do not rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality. See, e.g., id., at ___ (slip op., at 13–
14); Small v. United States, 544 U. S. 385, 388 (2005) ; Aramco,
499 U. S., at 248–250; Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281,
287 (1949) .
Petitioners make much of the fact that the ATS provides
jurisdiction over civil actions for “torts” in violation of the law of
nations. They claim that in using that word, the First Congress
“necessarily meant to provide for jurisdiction over
extraterritorial transitory torts that could arise on foreign soil.”
Supp. Brief for Petitioners 18. For support, they cite the
common-law doctrine that allowed courts to assume jurisdiction
over such “transitory torts,” including actions for personal
injury, arising abroad. See Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 177,
98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1030 (1774) (Mansfield, L.) (“[A]ll actions of a
transitory nature that arise abroad may be laid as happening in
an English county”); Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11, 18
(1881) (“Wherever, by either the common law or the statute law
of a State, a right of action has become fixed and a legal liability
12
incurred, that liability may be enforced and the right of action
pursued in any court which has jurisdiction of such matters and
can obtain jurisdiction of the parties”).
Under the transitory torts doctrine, however, “the only
justification for allowing a party to recover when the cause of
action arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a well founded
belief that it was a cause of action in that place.” Cuba R. Co. v.
Crosby, 222 U. S. 473, 479 (1912) (majority opinion of Holmes,
J.). The question under Sosa is not whether a federal court has
jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action provided by foreign or
even international law. The question is instead whether the
court has authority to recognize a cause of action under U. S.
law to enforce a norm of international law. The reference to
“tort” does not demonstrate that the First Congress “necessarily
meant” for those causes of action to reach conduct in the
territory of a foreign sovereign. In the end, nothing in the text of
the ATS evinces the requisite clear indication of
extraterritoriality.
Nor does the historical background against which the ATS was
enacted overcome the presumption against ap- plication to
conduct in the territory of another sovereign. See Morrison,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 16) (noting that “[a]ssuredly context
can be consulted” in determining whether a cause of action
applies abroad). We explained in Sosa that when Congress
passed the ATS, “three principal offenses against the law of
nations” had been identified by Blackstone: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.
542 U. S., at 723, 724; see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 68 (1769). The first two offenses have no
necessary extraterritorial application. Indeed, Blackstone—in
describing them—did so in terms of conduct occur- ring within
the forum nation. See ibid. (describing the right of safe conducts
for those “who are here”); 1 id., at 251 (1765) (explaining that
safe conducts grant a member of one society “a right to intrude
into another”); id., at 245–248 (recognizing the king’s power to
“receiv[e] ambassadors at home” and detailing their rights in the
state “wherein they are appointed to reside”); see also E. De
Vattel, Law of Nations 465 (J. Chitty et al. transl. and ed. 1883)
(“[O]n his entering the country to which he is sent, and making
himself known, [the ambassador] is under the protection of the
law of nations . . .”).
Two notorious episodes involving violations of the law of
nations occurred in the United States shortly before passage of
the ATS. Each concerned the rights of ambas- sadors, and each
involved conduct within the Union. In 1784, a French adventurer
verbally and physically assaulted Francis Barbe Marbois—the
Secretary of the French Legion—in Philadelphia. The assault led
the French Minister Plenipotentiary to lodge a formal protest
with the Continental Congress and threaten to leave the country
unless an adequate remedy were provided. Respublica v. De
Longschamps, 1 Dall. 111 (O. T. Phila. 1784); Sosa, supra, at
716–717, and n. 11. And in 1787, a New York constable entered
the Dutch Ambassador’s house and arrested one of his domestic
servants. See Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction
over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
Conn. L. Rev. 467, 494 (1986). At the request of Secretary of
Foreign Affairs John Jay, the Mayor of New York City arrested
the constable in turn, but cautioned that because “ ‘neither
Congress nor our [State] Legislature have yet passed any act
respecting a breach of the privileges of Ambassadors,’ ” the
extent of any available relief would depend on the common law.
See Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va. J. Int’l L.
587, 641–642 (2002) (quoting 3 Dept. of State, The Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States of America 447 (1837)).
The two cases in which the ATS was invoked shortly after its
passage also concerned conduct within the territory of the
United States. See Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. 810 (wrongful seizure of
slaves from a vessel while in port in the United States); Moxon,
17 F. Cas. 942 (wrongful seizure in United States territorial
waters).
These prominent contemporary examples—immediately
before and after passage of the ATS—provide no support for the
proposition that Congress expected causes of action to be
brought under the statute for violations of the law of nations
occurring abroad.
The third example of a violation of the law of nations familiar
to the Congress that enacted the ATS was piracy. Piracy typically
occurs on the high seas, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States or any other country. See 4 Blackstone, supra, at
72 (“The offence of piracy, by common law, consists of
committing those acts of robbery and depredation upon the
high seas, which, if committed upon land, would have amounted
to felony there”). This Court has generally treated the high seas
the same as foreign soil for purposes of the presumption against
extraterritorial application. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155 –174 (1993) (declining to apply a
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act to conduct
occurring on the high seas); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 440 (1989) (declining to apply a
provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 to the
high seas). Petitioners contend that because Congress surely

intended the ATS to provide jurisdiction for actions against
pirates, it necessarily anticipated the statute would apply to
conduct occurring abroad.
Applying U. S. law to pirates, however, does not typi- cally
impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct
occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign,
and therefore carries less direct foreign policy consequences.
Pirates were fair game wherever found, by any nation, because
they generally did not operate within any jurisdiction. See 4
Blackstone, supra, at 71. We do not think that the existence of a
cause of action against them is a sufficient basis for concluding
that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that
does occur within the territory of another sovereign; pirates
may well be a category unto themselves. See Morrison, 561
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16) (“[W]hen a statute provides for
some extraterritorial application, the presumption against
extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to its terms”);
see also Microsoft Corp., 550 U. S., at 455–456.
Petitioners also point to a 1795 opinion authored by Attorney
General William Bradford. See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Atty.
Gen. 57. In 1794, in the midst of war between France and Great
Britain, and notwithstanding the American official policy of
neutrality, several U. S. citizens joined a French privateer fleet
and attacked and plundered the British colony of Sierra Leone.
In response to a protest from the British Ambassador, Attorney
General Bradford responded as follows:
So far . . . as the transactions complained of originated or
took place in a foreign country, they are not within the
cognizance of our courts; nor can the actors be legally
prosecuted or punished for them by the United States. But
crimes committed on the high seas are within the jurisdiction of
the . . . courts of the United States; and, so far as the offence
was committed thereon, I am inclined to think that it may be
legally prosecuted in . . . those courts . . . . But some doubt rests
on this point, in consequence of the terms in which the
[applicable criminal law] is expressed. But there can be no doubt
that the company or individuals who have been injured by these
acts of hostil- ity have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the
United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts
in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the
laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States . . . .” Id., at 58–
59.
Petitioners read the last sentence as confirming that “the
Founding generation understood the ATS to apply to law of
13
nations violations committed on the territory of a foreign
sovereign.” Supp. Brief for Petitioners 33. Respondents counter
that when Attorney General Bradford referred to “these acts of
hostility,” he meant the acts only insofar as they took place on
the high seas, and even if his conclusion were broader, it was
only because the applicable treaty had extraterritorial reach. See
Supp. Brief for Respondents 28–30. The Solicitor General, having
once read the opinion to stand for the proposition that an “ATS
suit could be brought against American citizens for breaching
neutrality with Britain only if acts did not take place in a foreign
country,” Supp. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8, n. 1
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), now suggests
the opinion “could have been meant to encompass . . . conduct
[occurring within the foreign territory],” id., at 8.
Attorney General Bradford’s opinion defies a definitive
reading and we need not adopt one here. Whatever its pre- cise
meaning, it deals with U. S. citizens who, by partic- ipating in an
attack taking place both on the high seas and on a foreign shore,
violated a treaty between the United States and Great Britain.
The opinion hardly suffices to counter the weighty concerns
underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Finally, there is no indication that the ATS was passed to
make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the
enforcement of international norms. As Justice Story put it, “No
nation has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum of the
whole world . . . .” United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26
F. Cas. 832, 847 (No. 15,551) (CC. Mass. 1822). It is implausible
to suppose that the First Congress wanted their fledgling
Republic—struggling to receive international recognition—to be
the first. Indeed, the parties offer no evidence that any nation,
meek or mighty, presumed to do such a thing.
The United States was, however, embarrassed by its potential
inability to provide judicial relief to foreign officials injured in the
United States. Bradley, 42 Va. J. Int’l L., at 641. Such offenses
against ambassadors vio- lated the law of nations, “and if not
adequately redressed could rise to an issue of war.” Sosa, 542
U. S., at 715; cf. The Federalist No. 80, p. 536 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(A. Hamilton) (“As the denial or perversion of justice . . . is with
reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that
the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in
which the citizens of other countries are concerned”). The ATS
ensured that the United States could provide a forum for
adjudicating such incidents. See Sosa, supra, at 715–718, and n.
11. Nothing about this historical context suggests that Congress
also intended federal common law under the ATS to provide a
cause of action for conduct occurring in the territory of another
sovereign.
Indeed, far from avoiding diplomatic strife, providing such a
cause of action could have generated it. Recent experience
bears this out. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11, 77–
78 (CADC 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (listing recent
objections to extraterritorial applications of the ATS by Canada,
Germany, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South Africa,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Moreover, accepting
petitioners’ view would imply that other nations, also applying
the law of nations, could hale our citizens into their courts for
alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the United
States, or anywhere else in the world. The presumption against
extraterritoriality guards against our courts triggering such
serious foreign policy consequences, and instead defers such
decisions, quite appropriately, to the political branches.
We therefore conclude that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that
nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption. “[T]here is no
clear indication of extraterritoriality here,” Morrison, 561 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 16), and petitioners’ case seeking relief for
violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United
States is barred.
IV
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside
the United States. And even where the claims touch and
concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application. See Morrison, 561 U. S. ___ (slip op.
at 17–24). Corporations are often present in many countries,
and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence
suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute
more specific than the ATS would be required.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141536. February 26, 2001
GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, petitioner,
vs. RON ZABARTE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Summary judgment in a litigation is resorted to if there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, other than the amount
of damages. If this verity is evident from the pleadings and the

supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file with
the court, the moving party is entitled to such remedy as a
matter of course.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, challenging the August 31, 1999 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 67 in Civil Case No. 64107; and
the January 20, 2000 CA Resolution 2 which denied
reconsideration.
The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from,
the same is AFFIRMED." 3
The Facts
The facts of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows: 4
“It appears that on 24 January 1994, [Respondent] Ron Zabarte
commenced [an action] to enforce the money judgment
rendered by the Superior Court for the State of California,
County of Contra Costa, U.S.A. On 18 March 1994, [petitioner]
filed his Answer with the following special and affirmative
defenses:
xxx xxx xxx
‘8) The Superior Court for the State of California, County of
Contra Costa[,] did not properly acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of and over the persons involved in [C]ase #C21-
00265.
‘9) The Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment in Case
#C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991 was obtained without
the assistance of counsel for [petitioner] and without sufficient
notice to him and therefore, was rendered in clear violation of
[petitioner’s] constitutional rights to substantial and procedural
due process.
‘10) The Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment in Case
#C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991 was procured by means
of fraud or collusion or undue influence and/or based on a clear
mistake of fact and law.
‘11) The Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment in Case
#C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991 is contrary to the laws,
public policy and canons of morality obtaining in the Philippines
and the enforcement of such judgment in the Philippines would
result in the unjust enrichment of [respondent] at the expense
of [petitioner] in this case.
14
‘12) The Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment in Case
#C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991 is null and void and
unenforceable in the Philippines.
‘13) In the transaction, which is the subject matter in Case #C21-
00265, [petitioner] is not in any way liable, in fact and in law, to
[respondent] in this case, as contained in [petitioner’s] ‘Answer
to Complaint’ in Case #C21-00265 dated April 1, 1991, Annex ‘B’
of [respondent’s] ‘Complaint’ dated December 6, 1993.
’14) [Respondent] is guilty of misrepresentation or falsification
in the filing of his ‘Complaint’ in this case dated December 6,
1993. Worse, [respondent] has no capacity to sue in the
Philippines.
’15) Venue has been improperly laid in this case.’
(Record, pp. 42-44)
“On 1 August 1994, [respondent] filed a [M]otion for [S]ummary
[J]udgment under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court alleging that the
[A]nswer filed by [petitioner] failed to tender any genuine issue
as to the material facts. In his [O]pposition to [respondent’s]
motion, [petitioner] demurred as follows:
‘2) [Petitioner] begs to disagree[;] in support hereof, [he] wishes
to mention that in his ‘Answer with Special and Affirmative
Defenses’ dated March 16, 1994 [petitioner] has interposed that
the ‘Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment’ is null and
void, fraudulent, illegal and unenforceable, the same having
been obtained by means of fraud, collusion, undue influence
and/or clear mistake of fact and law. In addition, [he] has
maintained that said ‘Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in
Judgment’ was obtained without the assistance of counsel for
[petitioner] and without sufficient notice to him and therefore,
was rendered in violation of his constitutional rights to
substantial and procedural due process.’
“The [M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment was set for hearing on
12 August 1994 during which [respondent] marked and
submitted in evidence the following:
Exhibit ‘A’ - x x x Judgment on Stipulation For Entry In Judgment
of the Supreme Court of the State of California[,] County of
Contra Costa[,] signed by Hon. Ellen James, Judge of the
Superior Court.
Exhibit ‘B’ - x x x Certificate of Authentication of the [O]rder
signed by the Hon. Ellen James, issued by the Consulate General
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Exhibit ‘C’ - [R]eturn of the [W]rit of [E]xecution (writ
unsatisfied) issued by the sheriff/marshall, County of Santa
Clara, State of California.
Exhibit ‘D’ - [W]rit of [E]xecution
Exhibit 'E' [P]roof of [S]ervice of copies of [W]rit of [E]xecution,
[N]otice of [L]evy, [M]emorandum of [G]arnishee, [E]xemptions
from [E]nforcement of [J]udgment.
Exhibit ‘F’ - Certification issued by the Secretary of State, State
of California that Stephen Weir is the duly elected, qualified and
acting [c]ounty [c]lerk of the County of Contra Costa of the State
of California.
Exhibit ‘G’ - Certificate of [A]uthentication of the [W]rit of
[E]xecution.
“On 6 April 1995, the court a quo issued an [O]rder granting
[respondent’s] [M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment [and]
likewise granting [petitioner] ten (10) days to submit opposing
affidavits, after which the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution (Record, pp. 152-153). [Petitioner] filed a [M]otion for
[R]econsideration of the aforesaid [O]rder and [respondent]
filed [C]omment. On 30 June 1995, [petitioner] filed a [M]otion
to [D]ismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case and forum-non-conveniens (Record, pp. 166-
170). In his [O]pposition to the [M]otion (Record, pp. 181-182)
[respondent] contended that [petitioner could] no longer
question the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground that
[the latter’s] Answer had failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction.
[Petitioner] countered by asserting in his Reply that jurisdiction
[could] not be fixed by agreement of the parties. The lower
court dismissed [his] [M]otion for [R]econsideration and
[M]otion [to] [D]ismiss (Record, pp. 196-198), x x x.”
The RTC 5 eventually rendered its February 21, 1997
Decision, 6 which disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering
[petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following amounts:
“1. The amount of U.S. dollars $241,991.33, with the interest of
legal rate from October 18, 1991, or its peso equivalent,
pursuant to the [J]udgment of [S]tipulation for [E]ntry in
[J]udgment dated December 19, 1991;
“2. The amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
“3. To pay the costs of suit.
“The claim for moral damages, not having been substantiated, it
is hereby denied.” 7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner was estopped from assailing the judgment that had
become final and had, in fact, been partially executed. The CA
also ruled that summary judgment was proper, because

petitioner had failed to tender any genuine issue of fact and was
merely maneuvering to delay the full effects of the judgment.
Citing Ingenohl v. Olsen, 8 the CA also rejected petitioner’s
argument that the RTC should have dismissed the action for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment, on the ground of forum non
conveniens. It reasoned out that the recognition of the foreign
judgment was based on comity, reciprocity and res judicata.
Hence, this Petition. 9
Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits this lone but all-
embracing issue:
“Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in a manner x x x
contrary to law when it affirmed the Order of the trial court
granting respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
rendering judgment against the petitioner.” 10
In his discussion, petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling
in this wise:
1. That his Answer failed to tender a genuine issue of fact
regarding the following:
(a) the jurisdiction of a foreign court over the subject matter
(b) the validity of the foreign judgment
(c) the judgment’s conformity to Philippine laws, public policy,
canons of morality, and norms against unjust enrichment
2. That the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable
to the instant case.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Question: Summary Judgment
Petitioner vehemently insists that summary judgment is
inappropriate to resolve the case at bar, arguing that his Answer
allegedly raised genuine and material factual matters which he
should have been allowed to prove during trial.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the alleged “genuine
issues of fact” raised by petitioner are mere conclusions of law,
or “propositions arrived at not by any process of natural
reasoning from a fact or a combination of facts stated but by the
application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded.” 11
The RTC granted respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment
because petitioner, in his Answer, admitted the existence of the
Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment. Besides, he had
already paid $5,000 to respondent, as provided in the foreign
judgment sought to be enforced. 12 Hence, the trial court ruled
that, there being no genuine issue as to any material fact, the
case should properly be resolved through summary judgment.
The CA affirmed this ruling.
15
We concur with the lower courts. Summary judgment is a
procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which
the pleadings raise only a legal issue, and not a genuine issue as
to any material fact. By genuine issue is meant a question of fact
that calls for the presentation of evidence. It should be
distinguished from an issue that is sham, contrived, set in bad
faith and patently unsubstantial. 13
Summary judgment is resorted to in order to avoid long drawn
out litigations and useless delays. When affidavits, depositions
and admissions on file show that there are no genuine issues of
fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to pierce the allegations
in the pleadings and to obtain immediate relief by way of
summary judgment. In short, since the facts are not in dispute,
the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying
the law to the material facts.
Petitioner contends that by allowing summary judgment, the
two courts a quo prevented him from presenting evidence to
substantiate his claims. We do not agree. Summary judgment is
based on facts directly proven by affidavits, depositions or
admissions. 14 In this case, the CA and the RTC both merely ruled
that trial was not necessary to resolve the case. Additionally and
correctly, the RTC specifically ordered petitioner to submit
opposing affidavits to support his contentions that (1) the
Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment was procured on
the basis of fraud, collusion, undue influence, or a clear mistake
of law or fact; and (2) that it was contrary to public policy or the
canons of morality. 15
Again, in its Order 16 dated November 29, 1995, the trial court
clarified that the opposing affidavits were “for [petitioner] to
spell out the facts or circumstances [that] would constitute lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of and over the persons
involved in Case No. C21-00265,” and that would render the
judgment therein null and void. In this light, petitioner’s
contention that he was not allowed to present evidence to
substantiate his claims is clearly untenable.
For summary judgment to be valid, Rule 34, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court, requires (a) that there must be no genuine issue
as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and
(b) that the party presenting the motion for summary judgment
must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 17 As
mentioned earlier, petitioner admitted that a foreign judgment
had been rendered against him and in favor of respondent, and
that he had paid $5,000 to the latter in partial compliance
therewith. Hence, respondent, as the party presenting the
Motion for Summary Judgment, was shown to be entitled to the
judgment.
The CA made short shrift of the first requirement. To show that
petitioner had raised no genuine issue, it relied instead on the
finality of the foreign judgment which was, in fact, partially
executed. Hence, we shall show in the following discussion how
the defenses presented by petitioner failed to tender any
genuine issue of fact, and why a full-blown trial was not
necessary for the resolution of the issues.
Jurisdiction
Petitioner alleges that jurisdiction over Case No. C21-00265,
which involved partnership interest, was vested in the Securities
and Exchange Commission, not in the Superior Court of
California, County of Contra Costa.
We disagree. In the absence of proof of California law on the
jurisdiction of courts, we presume that such law, if any, is similar
to Philippine law. We base this conclusion on the presumption
of identity or similarity, also known as processual
presumption. 18 The Complaint, 19 which respondent filed with
the trial court, was for the enforcement of a foreign judgment.
He alleged therein that the action of the foreign court was for
the collection of a sum of money, breach of promissory notes,
and damages. 20
In our jurisdiction, such a case falls under the jurisdiction of civil
courts, not of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The jurisdiction of the latter is exclusively over matters
enumerated in Section 5, PD 902-A, 21 prior to its latest
amendment. If the foreign court did not really have jurisdiction
over the case, as petitioner claims, it would have been very easy
for him to show this. Since jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in a complaint, he only had to submit a copy of the
complaint filed with the foreign court. Clearly, this issue did not
warrant trial.
Rights to Counsel and to Due Process
Petitioner contends that the foreign judgment, which was in the
form of a Compromise Agreement, cannot be executed without
the parties being assisted by their chosen lawyers. The reason
for this, he points out, is to eliminate collusion, undue influence
and/or improper exertion of ascendancy by one party over the
other. He alleges that he discharged his counsel during the
proceedings, because he felt that the latter was not properly
attending to the case. The judge, however, did not allow him to
secure the services of another counsel. Insisting that petitioner
settle the case with respondent, the judge practically imposed
the settlement agreement on him. In his Opposing Affidavit,
petitioner states:

“It is true that I was initially represented by a counsel in the
proceedings in #C21-00625. I discharged him because I then felt
that he was not properly attending to my case or was not
competent enough to represent my interest. I asked the Judge
for time to secure another counsel but I was practically
discouraged from engaging one as the Judge was insistent that I
settle the case at once with the [respondent]. Being a foreigner
and not a lawyer at that I did not know what to do. I felt helpless
and the Judge and [respondent’s] lawyer were the ones telling
me what to do. Under ordinary circumstances, their directives
should have been taken with a grain of salt especially so [since
respondent’s] counsel, who was telling me what to do, had an
interest adverse to mine. But [because] time constraints and
undue influence exerted by the Judge and [respondent’s]
counsel on me disturbed and seriously affected my freedom to
act according to my best judgment and belief. In point of fact,
the terms of the settlement were practically imposed on me by
the Judge seconded all the time by [respondent’s] counsel. I was
then helpless as I had no counsel to assist me and the collusion
between the Judge and [respondent’s] counsel was becoming
more evident by the way I was treated in the Superior Court of
[t]he State of California. I signed the ‘Judgment on Stipulation
for Entry in Judgment’ without any lawyer assisting me at the
time and without being fully aware of its terms and
stipulations.” 22
The manifestation of petitioner that the judge and the counsel
for the opposing party had pressured him would gain credibility
only if he had not been given sufficient time to engage the
services of a new lawyer. Respondent’s Affidavit 23 dated May
23, 1994, clarified, however, that petitioner had sufficient time,
but he failed to retain a counsel. Having dismissed his lawyer as
early as June 19, 1991, petitioner directly handled his own
defense and negotiated a settlement with respondent and his
counsel in December 1991. Respondent also stated that
petitioner, ignoring the judge’s reminder of the importance of
having a lawyer, argued that “he would be the one to settle the
case and pay” anyway. Eventually, the Compromise Agreement
was presented in court and signed before Judge Ellen James on
January 3, 1992. Hence, petitioner’s rights to counsel and to due
process were not violated.
Unjust Enrichment
Petitioner avers that the Compromise Agreement violated the
norm against unjust enrichment because the judge made him
shoulder all the liabilities in the case, even if there were two
other defendants, G.S.P & Sons, Inc. and the Genesis Group.
16
We cannot exonerate petitioner from his obligation under the
foreign judgment, even if there are other defendants who are
not being held liable together with him. First, the foreign
judgment itself does not mention these other defendants, their
participation or their liability to respondent. Second, petitioner’s
undated Opposing Affidavit states: “[A]lthough myself and these
entities were initially represented by Atty. Lawrence L. Severson
of the Law Firm Kouns, Quinlivan & Severson, x x x I discharged x
x x said lawyer. Subsequently, I assumed the representation for
myself and these firms and this was allowed by the Superior
Court of the State of California without any authorization from
G.G.P. & Sons, Inc. and the Genesis Group.” 24 Clearly, it was
petitioner who chose to represent the other defendants; hence,
he cannot now be allowed to impugn a decision based on this
ground.
In any event, contrary to petitioner’s contention, unjust
enrichment or solutio indebiti does not apply to this case. This
doctrine contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay,
and the person who receives the payment has no right to
receive it. 25 In this case, petitioner merely argues that the other
two defendants whom he represented were liable together with
him. This is not a case of unjust enrichment.
We do not see, either, how the foreign judgment could be
contrary to law, morals, public policy or the canons of morality
obtaining in the country. Petitioner owed money, and the
judgment required him to pay it. That is the long and the short
of this case.
In addition, the maneuverings of petitioner before the trial court
reinforce our belief that his claims are unfounded. Instead of
filing opposing affidavits to support his affirmative defenses, he
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order allowing
summary judgment, as well as a Motion to Dismiss the action on
the ground of forum non conveniens. His opposing affidavits
were filed only after the Order of November 29, 1995 had
denied both Motions. 26 Such actuation was considered by the
trial court as a dilatory ploy which justified the resolution of the
action by summary judgment. According to the CA, petitioner’s
allegations sought to delay the full effects of the judgment;
hence, summary judgment was proper. On this point, we concur
with both courts.
Second Question: Forum Non Conveniens
Petitioner argues that the RTC should have refused to entertain
the Complaint for enforcement of the foreign judgment on the
principle of forum non conveniens. He claims that the trial court
had no jurisdiction, because the case involved partnership
interest, and there was difficulty in ascertaining the applicable
law in California. All the aspects of the transaction took place in
a foreign country, and respondent is not even Filipino.
We disagree. Under the principle of forum non conveniens, even
if the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may
nonetheless refuse to entertain a case for any of the following
practical reasons:
“1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided
elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case
transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses
have their residence there;
2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a
practice known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure
procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-
residents or aliens when the docket may already be
overcrowded;
4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for
effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and
The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.” 27
None of the aforementioned reasons barred the RTC from
exercising its jurisdiction. In the present action, there was no
more need for material witnesses, no forum shopping or
harassment of petitioner, no inadequacy in the local machinery
to enforce the foreign judgment, and no question raised as to
the application of any foreign law.
Authorities agree that the issue of whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on the basis of the above-mentioned
principle depends largely upon the facts of each case and on the
sound discretion of the trial court. 28 Since the present action
lodged in the RTC was for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, there was no need to ascertain the rights and the
obligations of the parties based on foreign laws or contracts.
The parties needed only to perform their obligations under the
Compromise Agreement they had entered into. 1âwphi1.nêt
Under Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
judgment in an action in personam rendered by a foreign
tribunal clothed with jurisdiction is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by
a subsequent title. 29
Also, under Section 5(n) of Rule 131, a court -- whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere -- enjoys the presumption that it is

acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction, and that it is
regularly performing its official duty. 30 Its judgment may,
however, be assailed if there is evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of
law or fact. But precisely, this possibility signals the need for a
local trial court to exercise jurisdiction. Clearly, the application
of forum non coveniens is not called for.
The grounds relied upon by petitioner are contradictory. On the
one hand, he insists that the RTC take jurisdiction over the
enforcement case in order to invalidate the foreign judgment;
yet, he avers that the trial court should not exercise jurisdiction
over the same case on the basis of forum non conveniens. Not
only do these defenses weaken each other, but they bolster the
finding of the lower courts that he was merely maneuvering to
avoid or delay payment of his obligation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Double costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J.
BETIA, Petitioners, v. MA. JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH
B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A. CRISTOBAL AND LORAINE S.
SCHNEIDER-CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
All Filipinos are entitled to the protection of the rights
guaranteed in the Constitution.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure praying that judgment be rendered reversing and
setting aside the June 16, 2011 Decision1 and September 13,
2011 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
113006.
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation
established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. It has a Philippine office located at 4/F, Metro
House Building, Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City.3 In its
Petition filed with this court, Saudia identified itself as follows:
1. Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and
existing under the Royal Decree No. M/24 of 18.07.1385H
(10.02.1962G) in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA"). Its
17
Philippine Office is located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil
J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City (Philippine Office). It may be served
with orders of this Honorable Court through undersigned
counsel at 4th and 6th Floors, Citibank Center Bldg., 8741 Paseo
de Roxas, Makati City.4 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were
recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants
with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.5 After undergoing seminars
required by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
for deployment overseas, as well as training modules offered by
Saudia (e.g., initial flight attendant/training course and transition
training), and after working as Temporary Flight Attendants,
respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then
entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette
M. Rebesencio (Ma. Jopette) on May 16, 1990;6 Montassah B.
Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen
Ruth) on May 22, 1993;7 and Loraine Schneider-Cruz (Loraine)
on August 27, 1995.8
Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they
were separated from service on various dates in 2006.9
Respondents contended that the termination of their
employment was illegal. They alleged that the termination was
made solely because they were pregnant.10
As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their
respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary
procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia
had given its approval but later on informed respondents that its
management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their
maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file
their resignation letters.11
Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would
terminate them all the same. The threat of termination entailed
the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount
entitlements.12
Specifically, Ma. Jopette received a call on October 16, 2006
from Saudia's Base Manager, Abdulmalik Saddik
(Abdulmalik).13 Montassah was informed personally by
Abdulmalik and a certain Faisal Hussein on October 20, 2006
after being required to report to the office one (1) month into
her maternity leave.14 Rouen Ruth was also personally informed
by Abdulmalik on October 17, 2006 after being required to
report to the office by her Group Supervisor.15 Loraine received
a call on October 12, 2006 from her Group Supervisor, Dakila
Salvador.16
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity
leaves and demand for their resignation on its "Unified
Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified
Contract).17 Under the Unified Contract, the employment of a
Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. It
provides:
(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be
physically fit on board to provide various services required in
normal or emergency cases on both domestic/international
flights beside her role in maintaining continuous safety and
security of passengers, and since she will not be able to maintain
the required medical fitness while at work in case of pregnancy,
accordingly, if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time
during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment
contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical
fitness.18 (Emphasis supplied)
In their Comment on the present Petition,19 respondents
emphasized that the Unified Contract took effect on September
23, 2006 (the first day of Ramadan),20 well after they had filed
and had their maternity leaves approved. Ma. Jopette filed her
maternity leave application on September 5, 2006.21 Montassah
filed her maternity leave application on August 29, 2006, and its
approval was already indicated in Saudia's computer system by
August 30, 2006.22 Rouen Ruth filed her maternity leave
application on September 13, 2006,23 and Loraine filed her
maternity leave application on August 22, 2006.24
Rather than comply and tender resignation letters, respondents
filed separate appeal letters that were all rejected.25
Despite these initial rejections, respondents each received calls
on the morning of November 6, 2006 from Saudia's office
secretary informing them that their maternity leaves had been
approved. Saudia, however, was quick to renege on its approval.
On the evening of November 6, 2006, respondents again
received calls informing them that it had received notification
from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia that their maternity leaves had been
disapproved.26
Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their
benefits, respondents executed handwritten resignation letters.
In Montassah's and Rouen Ruth's cases, their resignations were
executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had
provided. These letterheads already had the word
"RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portions of their headings
when these were handed to respondents.27

On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against
Saudia and its officers for illegal dismissal and for underpayment
of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day,
premium, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay,
separation pay, night shift differentials, medical expense
reimbursements, retirement benefits, illegal deduction, lay-over
expense and allowances, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.28 The case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter
Hermino V. Suelo and docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-
12342-07.
Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.29 It claimed
that all the determining points of contact referred to foreign law
and insisted that the Complaint ought to be dismissed on the
ground of forum non conveniens.30 It added that respondents
had no cause of action as they resigned voluntarily.31
On December 12, 2008, Executive Labor Arbiter Fatima
Jambaro-Franco rendered the Decision32 dismissing
respondents' Complaint. The dispositive portion of this Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises' considered, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of
jurisdiction/merit.33
On respondents' appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission's Sixth Division reversed the ruling of Executive
Labor Arbiter Jambaro-Franco. It explained that "[considering
that complainants-appellants are OFWs, the Labor Arbiters and
the NLRC has [sic] jurisdiction to hear and decide their complaint
for illegal termination."34 On the matter of forum non
conveniens, it noted that there were no special circumstances
that warranted its abstention from exercising jurisdiction.35 On
the issue of whether respondents were validly dismissed, it held
that there was nothing on record to support Saudia's claim that
respondents resigned voluntarily.
The dispositive portion of the November 19, 2009 National
Labor Relations Commission Decision36 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the appeal impressed with merit. The respondents-
appellees are hereby directed to pay complainants-appellants
the aggregate amount of SR614,001.24 corresponding to their
backwages and separation pay plus ten (10%) percent thereof as
attorney's fees. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
December 12, 2008 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. Attached
is the computation prepared by this Commission and made an
integral part of this Decision.37
18
In the Resolution dated February 11, 2010,38 the National Labor
Relations Commission denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
In the June 16, 2011 Decision,39 the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners' Rule 65 Petition and modified the Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission with respect to the award
of separation pay and backwages.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated November 19, 2009 issued by public respondent, Sixth
Division of the National Labor Relations Commission - National
Capital Region is MODIFIED only insofar as the computation of
the award of separation pay and backwages. For greater clarity,
petitioners are ordered to pay private respondents separation
pay which shall be computed from private respondents' first day
of employment up to the finality of this decision, at the rate of
one month per year of service and backwages which shall be
computed from the date the private respondents were illegally
terminated until finality of this decision. Consequently, the ten
percent (10%) attorney's fees shall be based on the total
amount of the award. The assailed Decision is affirmed in all
other respects.
The labor arbiter is hereby DIRECTED to make a recomputation
based on the foregoing.40
In the Resolution dated September 13, 2011,41 the Court of
Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Appeal was filed.
The issues for resolution are the following:
First, whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission may exercise jurisdiction over Saudi
Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine law in adjudicating the
present dispute;
Second, whether respondents' voluntarily resigned or were
illegally terminated; and
Lastly, whether Brenda J. Betia may be held personally liable
along with Saudi Arabian Airlines.
I Act leads to no other conclusion than that Saudia is a foreign
Summons were validly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over it
validly acquired.
There is no doubt that the pleadings and summons were served
on Saudia through its counsel.42 Saudia, however, claims that
the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission
had no jurisdiction over it because summons were never served
on it but on "Saudia Manila."43 Referring to itself as "Saudia
Jeddah," it claims that "Saudia Jeddah" and not "Saudia Manila"
was the employer of respondents because:
First, "Saudia Manila" was never a party to the Cabin Attendant
contracts entered into by respondents;
Second, it was "Saudia Jeddah" that provided the funds to pay
for respondents' salaries and benefits; and
Lastly, it was with "Saudia Jeddah" that respondents filed their
resignations.44
Saudia posits that respondents' Complaint was brought against
the wrong party because "Saudia Manila," upon which summons
was served, was never the employer of respondents.45
Saudia is vainly splitting hairs in its effort to absolve itself of
liability. Other than its bare allegation, there is no basis for
concluding that "Saudia Jeddah" is distinct from "Saudia Manila."
What is clear is Saudia's statement in its own Petition that what
it has is a "Philippine Office . . . located at 4/F Metro House
Building, Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City."46 Even in the
position paper that Saudia submitted to the Labor
Arbiter,47 what Saudia now refers to as "Saudia Jeddah" was
then only referred to as "Saudia Head Office at Jeddah,
KSA,"48 while what Saudia now refers to as "Saudia Manila" was
then only referred to as "Saudia's office in Manila."49
By its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign corporation, has a
Philippine office.
Section 3(d) of Republic Act No.. 7042, otherwise known as the
Foreign Investments Act of 1991, provides the following:
The phrase "doing business" shall include . . . opening offices,
whether called "liaison" offices or branches; . . . and any other
act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance
of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of
commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business
organization. (Emphasis supplied)
A plain application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign Investments
corporation doing business in the Philippines. As such, Saudia
may be sued in the Philippines and is subject to the jurisdiction
of Philippine tribunals.
Moreover, since there is no real distinction between "Saudia
Jeddah" and "Saudia Manila" — the latter being nothing more
than Saudia's local office — service of summons to Saudia's

office in Manila sufficed to vest jurisdiction over Saudia's person
in Philippine tribunals.
II
Saudia asserts that Philippine courts and/or tribunals are not in
a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts. This is because respondents' Cabin Attendant contracts
require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia, rather than
those of the Philippines.50 It claims that the difficulty of
ascertaining foreign law calls into operation the principle
of forum non conveniens, thereby rendering improper the
exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals.51
A choice of law governing the validity of contracts or the
interpretation of its provisions dees not necessarily imply forum
non conveniens. Choice of law and forum non conveniens are
entirely different matters.
Choice of law provisions are an offshoot of the fundamental
principle of autonomy of contracts. Article 1306 of the Civil Code
firmly ensconces this:
Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.
In contrast, forum non conveniens is a device akin to the rule
against forum shopping. It is designed to frustrate illicit means
for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would
otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute
resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.
Contractual choice of law provisions factor into transnational
litigation and dispute resolution in one of or in a combination of
four ways: (1) procedures for settling disputes, e.g., arbitration;
(2) forum, i.e., venue; (3) governing law; and (4) basis for
interpretation. Forum non conveniens relates to, but is not
subsumed by, the second of these.
Likewise, contractual choice of law is not determinative of
jurisdiction. Stipulating on the laws of a given jurisdiction as the
governing law of a contract does not preclude the exercise of
jurisdiction by tribunals elsewhere. The reverse is equally true:
The assumption of jurisdiction by tribunals does not ipso
facto mean that it cannot apply and rule on the basis of the
parties' stipulation. In Hasegawa v. Kitamura:52
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law V'hich will
19
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The "favor lex loci intentionis."57 These jurists and commentators
power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a proceed from the Civil Code of Spain, which, like our Civil Code,
state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While is silent on what governs the intrinsic validity of contracts, and
jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often, coincide, the the same civil law traditions from which we draw ours.
"minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the
necessary "significant contacts" for the other. The question of In this jurisdiction, this court, in Philippine Export and Foreign
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is Loan Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc.,58 manifested
different from the question of whether the courts of that state preference for allowing the parties to select the law applicable
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.53 to their contract":
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly
As various dealings, commercial or otherwise, are facilitated by
provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal
the progressive ease of communication and travel, persons from
systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must
various jurisdictions find themselves transacting with each
be governed by the lex contractus or "proper law of the
other. Contracts involving foreign elements are, however,
contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
nothing new. Conflict of laws situations precipitated by disputes
(the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either
and litigation anchored on these contracts are not totally novel.
expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis). The law selected
may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with
Transnational transactions entail differing laws on the
the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties.
requirements Q for the validity of the formalities and
Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most basic
substantive provisions of contracts and their interpretation.
rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select
These transactions inevitably lend themselves to the possibility
the law applicable to their contract, subject to the limitation that
of various fora for litigation and dispute resolution. As observed
it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum and
by an eminent expert on transnational law:
that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the
The more jurisdictions having an interest in, or merely even a
transaction.59 (Emphasis in the original)
point of contact with, a transaction or relationship, the greater
the number of potential fora for the resolution of disputes Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant
arising out of or related to that transaction or relationship. In a contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It
world of increased mobility, where business and personal insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into
transactions transcend national boundaries, the jurisdiction of a operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn,
number of different fora may easily be invoked in a single or a makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from
set of related disputes.54 exercising jurisdiction.
Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or
As mentioned, contractual choice of laws factors into
extrinsic validity of contracts. The first paragraph of Article 17 of
transnational litigation in any or a combination of four (4) ways.
the Civil Code provides that "[t]he forms and solemnities of
Moreover, forum non conveniens relates to one of these:
contracts . . . shall be governed by the laws of the country in
choosing between multiple possible fora.
which they are executed"55 (i.e., lex loci celebrationis).
Nevertheless, the possibility of parallel litigation in multiple fora
In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of settling
— along with the host of difficulties it poses — is not unique to
conflict of laws situations on matters pertaining to substantive
transnational litigation. It is a difficulty that similarly arises in
content of contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes
disputes well within the bounds of a singe jurisdiction.
have emerged: (1) lex loci contractus or the law of the place of
the making; (2) lex loci solutionis or the law of the place of
When parallel litigation arises strictly within the context of a
performance; and (3) lex loci intentionis or the law intended by
single jurisdiction, such rules as those on forum shopping, litis
the parties.56
pendentia, and res judicata come into operation. Thus, in the
Philippines, the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provide for willful
Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to resolving
and deliberate forum shopping as a ground not only for
the present dispute is lex loci intentionis.
summary dismissal with prejudice but also for citing parties and
counsels in direct contempt, as well as for the imposition of
An author observed that Spanish jurists and commentators

administrative sanctions.60 Likewise, the same rules expressly
provide that a party may seek the dismissal of a Complaint or
another pleading asserting a claim on the ground "[t]hat there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause," i.e., litis pendentia, or "[t]hat the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment,"61 i.e., res judicata.
Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis
pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the
problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of forum
shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to
address the problem of parallel litigation within a single
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address
parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.
Forum non conveniens literally translates to "the forum is
inconvenient."62 It is a concept in private international law and
was devised to combat the "less than honorable" reasons and
excuses that litigants use to secure procedural advantages,
annoy and harass defendants, avoid overcrowded dockets, and
select a "friendlier" venue.63 Thus, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens addresses the same rationale that the rule against
forum shopping does, albeit on a multijurisdictional scale.
Forum non conveniens, like res judicata,64 is a concept
originating in common law.65 However, unlike the rule on res
judicata, as well as those on litis pendentia and forum
shopping, forum non conveniens finds no textual anchor,
whether in statute or in procedural rules, in our civil law system.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence has applied forum non
conveniens as basis for a court to decline its exercise of
jurisdiction.66
Forum non conveniens is soundly applied not only to address
parallel litigation and undermine a litigant's capacity to vex and
secure undue advantages by engaging in forum shopping on an
international scale. It is also grounded on principles of comity
and judicial efficiency.
Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal's desistance in
exercising jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens is a
deferential gesture to the tribunals of another sovereign. It is a
measure that prevents the former's having to interfere in affairs
which are better and more competently addressed by the latter.
Further, forum non conveniens entails a recognition not only
that tribunals elsewhere are better suited to rule on and
resolve a controversy, but also, that these tribunals are better
positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to dispense
justice. Forum non conveniens prevents the embarrassment of
20
an awkward situation where a tribunal is rendered incompetent
in the face of the greater capability — both analytical and
practical — of a tribunal in another jurisdiction.
The wisdom of avoiding conflicting and unenforceable
judgments is as much a matter of efficiency and economy as it is
a matter of international courtesy. A court would effectively be
neutering itself if it insists on adjudicating a controversy when it
knows full well that it is in no position to enforce its judgment.
Doing so is not only an exercise in futility; it is an act of frivolity.
It clogs the dockets of a.tribunal and leaves it to waste its efforts
on affairs, which, given transnational exigencies, will be reduced
to mere academic, if not trivial, exercises.
Accordingly, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, "a
court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most 'convenient' or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere."67 In Puyat v. Zabarte,68 this court recognized the
following situations as among those that may warrant a court's
desistance from exercising jurisdiction:
1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided
elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case
transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses
have their residence there;
2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,]
a practice known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure
procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non
residents or aliens when the docket may already be
overcrowded;
4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for
effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and
5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.69
In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd.
v. Court of Appeals,70 this court underscored that a Philippine
court may properly assume jurisdiction over a case if it chooses
to do so to the extent: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the
Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as
to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or
is likely to have power to enforce its decision."71
The use of the word "may" (i.e., "may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction"72) in the decisions shows that the matter of
jurisdiction rests on the sound discretion of a court. Neither the
mere invocation of forum non conveniens nor the averment of
foreign elements operates to automatically divest a court of
jurisdiction. Rather, a court should renounce jurisdiction only
"after 'vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances' require the court's desistance."73 As the
propriety of applying forum non conveniens is contingent on a
factual determination, it is, therefore, a matter of defense.74
The second sentence of Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is exclusive in its recital of the grounds for
dismissal that are exempt from the omnibus motion rule: (1)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia;
(3) res judicata; and (4) prescription. Moreover, dismissal on
account offorum non conveniens is a fundamentally
discretionary matter. It is, therefore, not a matter for a
defendant to foist upon the court at his or her own
convenience; rather, it must be pleaded at the earliest possible
opportunity.
On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the
rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly
pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at
the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed
waived.
This court notes that in Hasegawa,76 this court stated that forum
non conveniens is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. The
factual ambience of this case however does not squarely raise
the viability of this doctrine. Until the opportunity comes to
review the use of motions to dismiss for parallel
litigation, Hasegawa remains existing doctrine.
Consistent with forum non conveniens as fundamentally a
factual matter, it is imperative that it proceed from & factually
established basis. It would be improper to dismiss an action
pursuant to forum non conveniens based merely on a perceived,
likely, or hypothetical multiplicity of fora. Thus, a defendant
must also plead and show that a prior suit has, in fact, been
brought in another jurisdiction.
The existence of a prior suit makes real the vexation engendered
by duplicitous litigation, the embarrassment of intruding into
the affairs of another sovereign, and the squandering of judicial
efforts in resolving a dispute already lodged and better resolved
elsewhere. As has been noted:
A case will not be stayed o dismissed on [forum] non
conveniens grounds unless the plaintiff is shown to have an
available alternative forum elsewhere. On this, the moving party
bears the burden of proof.

A number of factors affect the assessment of an alternative
forum's adequacy. The statute of limitations abroad may have
run, of the foreign court may lack either subject matter or
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. . . . Occasionally,
doubts will be raised as to the integrity or impartiality of the
foreign court (based, for example, on suspicions of corruption or
bias in favor of local nationals), as to the fairness of its judicial
procedures, or as to is operational efficiency (due, for example,
to lack of resources, congestion and delay, or interfering
circumstances such as a civil unrest). In one noted case, [it was
found] that delays of 'up to a quarter of a century' rendered the
foreign forum... inadequate for these purposes.77
We deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of
prudence that a defendant not only allege supposed dangerous
tendencies in litigating in this jurisdiction; the defendant must
also show that such danger is real and present in that litigation
or dispute resolution has commenced in another
jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise
jurisdiction.
III
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate
to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the
application of foreign law.
Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate
the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require
the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.
Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of
governing law. Thai forum non conveniens may ultimately result
in the application of foreign law is merely an incident of its
application. In this strict sense, forum non conveniens is not
applicable. It is not the primarily pivotal consideration in this
case.
In any case, even a further consideration of the applicability
of forum non conveniens on the incidental matter of the law
governing respondents' relation with Saudia leads to the
conclusion that it is improper for Philippine tribunals to divest
themselves of jurisdiction.
Any evaluation of the propriety of contracting parties' choice of a
forum and'its incidents must grapple with two (2)
considerations: first, the availability and adequacy of recourse to
a foreign tribunal; and second, the question of where, as
between the forum court and a foreign court, the balance of
interests inhering in a dispute weighs more heavily.
The first is a pragmatic matter. It relates to the viability of ceding
jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal and can be resolved by
21
juxtaposing the competencies and practical circumstances of the
tribunals in alternative fora. Exigencies, like the statute of
limitations, capacity to enforce orders and judgments, access to
records, requirements for the acquisition of jurisdiction, and
even questions relating to the integrity of foreign courts, may
render undesirable or even totally unfeasible recourse to a
foreign court. As mentioned, we consider it in the greater
interest of prudence that a defendant show, in pleading forum
non conveniens, that litigation has commenced in another
jurisdiction and that a foieign tribunal has, in fact, chosen to
exercise jurisdiction.
Two (2) factors weigh into a court's appraisal of the balance of
interests inhering in a dispute: first, the vinculum which the
parties and their relation have to a given jurisdiction; and
second, the public interest that must animate a tribunal, in its
capacity as an agent of the sovereign, in choosing to assume or
decline jurisdiction. The first is more concerned with the parties,
their personal circumstances, and private interests; the second
concerns itself with the state and the greater social order.
In considering the vinculum, a court must look into the
preponderance of linkages which the parties and their
transaction may have to either jurisdiction. In this respect,
factors, such as the parties' respective nationalities and places
of negotiation, execution, performance, engagement or
deployment, come into play.
In considering public interest, a court proceeds with a
consciousness that it is an organ of the state. It must, thus,
determine if the interests of the sovereign (which acts through
it) are outweighed by those of the alternative jurisdiction. In this
respect, the court delves into a consideration of public policy.
Should it find that public interest weighs more heavily in favor of
its assumption of jurisdiction, it should proceed in adjudicating
the dispute, any doubt or .contrary view arising from the
preponderance of linkages notwithstanding.
Our law on contracts recognizes the validity of contractual
choice of law provisions. Where such provisions exist, Philippine
tribunals, acting as the forum court, generally defer to the
parties' articulated choice.
This is consistent with the fundamental principle of autonomy of
contracts. Article 1306 of the Civ:l Code expressly provides that
"[t]he contracting parties may establish 'such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient."78 Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal (acting
as the forum court) is called upon to respect the parties' choice
of governing law, such respect must not be so permissive as to
lose sight of considerations of law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy that underlie the contract central to the
controversy.
Specifically with respect to public policy, in Pakistan
International Airlines Corporation v. Ople,79 this court explained
that:
counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting
parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable
law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public
policy, are deemed written inta the contract. Put a little
differently, the governing principle is that parties may not
contract away applicable provisions of law especially
peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed
with public interest.80 (Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"[t]he State ... shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men." Contrasted with Article II, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution's statement that "[n]o person shall ... be
denied the equal protection of the laws," Article II, Section 14
exhorts the State to "ensure." This does not only mean that the
Philippines shall not countenance nor lend legal recognition and
approbation to measures that discriminate on the basis of one's
being male or female. It imposes an obligation to actively
engage in securing the fundamental equality of men and
women.
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), signed and ratified by the Philippines
on July 15, 1980, and on August 5, 1981, respectively,81 is part of
the law of the land. In view of the widespread signing and
ratification of, as well as adherence (in practice) to it by states, it
may even be said that many provisions of the CEDAW may have
become customary international law. The CEDAW gives effect to
the Constitution's policy statement in Article II, Section 14.
Article I of the CEDAW defines "discrimination against women"
as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.82
The constitutional exhortation to ensure fundamental equality,
as illumined by its enabling law, the CEDAW, must inform and
animate all the actions of all personalities acting on behalf of the
State. It is, therefore, the bounden duty of this court, in

rendering judgment on the disputes brought before it, to ensure
that no discrimination is heaped upon women on the mere basis
of their being women. This is a point so basic and central that all
our discussions and pronouncements — regardless of whatever
averments there may be of foreign law — must proceed from
this premise.
So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly
discriminatory nature of Saudia's policy. As argued by
respondents, Saudia's policy entails the termination of
employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the
risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that
pertains specifically to women. Saudia's policy excludes from and
restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration but
sex.
We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present
physical limitations that may render difficult the performance of
functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless,
it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a
disability so permanent and immutable that, it must entail the
termination of one's employment. It is clear to us that any
individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies
that limit the performance of functions. However, we fail to
appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing
occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete
termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.
Apart from the constitutional policy on the fundamental equality
before the law of men and women, it is settled that contracts
relating to labor and employment are impressed with public
interest. Article 1700 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he
relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual.
They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts
must yield to the common good."
Consistent with this, this court's pronouncements in Pakistan
International Airlines Corporation83 are clear and unmistakable:
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its
employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of
Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement, and, secondly,
lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in
connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi,
Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to
prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and'regulations
to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee
relationship between petitioner PIA and private
respondents. We have already pointed out that the relationship
is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise
applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered
illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern
22
their relationship. . . . Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 in Bank of America, NT&SA90 were all satisfied.
of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to
oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested In contrast, this court ruled in The Manila Hotel Corp. v. National
upon them by Philippine law.84 (Emphasis supplied) Labor Relations Commission91 that the National Labor Relations
Q Commission was a seriously inconvenient forum. In that case,
As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege
private respondent Marcelo G. Santos was working in the
to be) the illegal termination of respondents' employment, this
Sultanate of Oman when he received a letter from Palace Hotel
case is immutably a matter of public interest and public policy.
recruiting him for employment in Beijing, China. Santos
Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and jurisprudence,
accepted the offer. Subsequently, however, he was released
Philippine laws properly find application in and govern this case.
from employment supposedly due to business reverses arising
'Moreover, as this premise for Saudia's insistence on the
from political upheavals in China (i.e., the Tiananmen Square
application forum non conveniens has been shattered, it follows
incidents of 1989). Santos later filed a Complaint for illegal
that Philippine tribunals may properly assume jurisdiction over
dismissal impleading Palace Hotel's General Manager, Mr.
the present controversy. Philippine jurisprudence provides
Gerhard Schmidt, the Manila Hotel International Company Ltd.
ample illustrations of when a court's renunciation of jurisdiction
(which was, responsible for training Palace Hotel's personnel
on account of forum non conveniens is proper or improper.'
and staff), and the Manila Hotel Corporation (which owned 50%
of Manila Hotel International Company Ltd.'s capital stock).
In Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals,85 this
court noted that the trial court failed to consider that one of the
In ruling against the National Labor Relations Commission's
plaintiffs was a domestic corporation, that one of the
exercise of jurisdiction, this court noted that the main aspects of
defendants was a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of
the case transpired in two (2) foreign jurisdictions, Oman and
the latter's debt that was the object of the transaction subject of
China, and that the case involved purely foreign elements.
the litigation. Thus, this court held, among others, that the trial
Specifically, Santos was directly hired by a foreign employer
court's refusal to assume jurisdiction was not justified by forum
through correspondence sent to Oman. Also, the proper
non conveniens and remanded the case to the trial court.
defendants were neither Philippine nationals nor engaged in
business in the Philippines, while the main witnesses were not
In Raytheon International, Inc. v. Rouzie, Jr.,86 this court
residents of the Philippines. Likewise, this court noted that the
sustained the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction considering
National Labor Relations Commission was in no position to
that the trial court could properly enforce judgment on the
conduct the following: first, determine the law governing the
petitioner which was a foreign corporation licensed to do
employment contract, as it was entered into in foreign soil;
business in the Philippines.
second, determine the facts, as Santos' employment was
terminated in Beijing; and third, enforce its judgment, since
In Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr.,87 this court found no
Santos' employer, Palace Hotel, was incorporated under the
reason to disturb the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction over
laws of China and was not even served with summons.
a case in which, as noted by the trial court, "it is more
convenient to hear and decide the case in the Philippines
Contrary to Manila Hotel, the case now before us does not
because Todaro [the plaintiff] resides in the Philippines and the
entail a preponderance of linkages that favor a foreign
contract allegedly breached involve[d] employment in the
jurisdiction.
Philippines."88
Here, the circumstances of the parties and their relation do not
approximate the circumstances enumerated in Puyat,92 which
In Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. Schonfeld,89 this
this court recognized as possibly justifying the desistance of
court held that the fact that the complainant in an illegal
Philippine tribunals from exercising jurisdiction.
dismissal case was a Canadian citizen and a repatriate did not
warrant the application of forum non conveniens considering
First, there is no basis for concluding that the case can be more
that: (1) the Labor Code does not include forum non
conveniently tried elsewhere. As established earlier, Saudia is
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of a complaint for
doing business in the Philippines. For their part, all four (4)
illegal dismissal; (2) the propriety of dismissing a case based
respondents are Filipino citizens maintaining residence in the
on forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; and
Philippines and, apart from their previous employment with
(3) the requisites for assumption of jurisdiction as laid out
Saudia, have no other connection to the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia. It would even be to respondents' inconvenience if this
case were to be tried elsewhere.
Second, the records are bereft of any indication that
respondents filed their Complaint in an effort to engage in
forum shopping or to vex and inconvenience Saudia.
Third, there is no indication of "unwillingness to extend local
judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens."93 That Saudia has
managed to bring the present controversy all the way to this
court proves this.
Fourth, it cannot be said that the local judicial machinery is
inadequate for effectuating the right sought to be maintained.
Summons was properly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over
its person was validly acquired.
Lastly, there is not even room for considering foreign law.
Philippine law properly governs the present dispute.
As the question of applicable law has been settled, the supposed
difficulty of ascertaining foreign law (which requires the
application of forum non conveniens) provides no
insurmountable inconvenience or special circumstance that will
justify depriving Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to assume, for the sake of discussion, that it is
the laws of Saudi Arabia which should apply, it does not follow
that Philippine tribunals should refrain from exercising
jurisdiction. To. recall our pronouncements in Puyat,94 as well as
in Bank of America, NT&SA,95 it is not so much the mere
applicability of foreign law which calls into operation forum non
conveniens. Rather, what justifies a court's desistance from
exercising jurisdiction is "[t]he difficulty of ascertaining foreign
96
law" or the inability of a "Philippine Court to make an
97
intelligent decision as to the law[.]"
Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper
98
and practicable (i.e., "to make an intelligent decision" ),
Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the
parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning to make a
pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents'
citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made
averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia. In their Comment,
respondents write:
Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is
illegal and unlawful to terminate the employment of any woman Corporation,105 constructive dismissal has been described as
by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more
harsh and strict [sic] in that no employer can terminate the
23
employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the the same case, it was noted that "[t]he gauge for constructive
same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's
Labor Laws on the matter is hereto quoted as follows: position would feel compelled to give up his employment under
"An employer may not terminate the employment of a female the prevailing circumstances."107
worker or give her a warning of the same while on maternity
leave." (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Applying the cited standards on resignation and constructive
Royal Decree No. M/51.)99 dismissal, it is clear that respondents were constructively
dismissed. Hence, their termination was illegal.
All told, the considerations for assumption of jurisdiction by
Philippine tribunals as outlined in Bank of America,
The termination of respondents' employment happened when
NT&SA100 have been satisfied. First, all the parties are based in
they were pregnant and expecting to incur costs on account of
the Philippines and all the material incidents transpired in this
child delivery and infant rearing. As noted by the Court of
jurisdiction. Thus, the parties may conveniently seek relief from
Appeals, pregnancy is a time when they need employment to
Philippine tribunals. Second, Philippine tribunals are in a position
sustain their families.108 Indeed, it goes against normal and
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts. Third,
reasonable human behavior to abandon one's livelihood in a
Philippine tribunals are in a position to enforce their decisions.
time of great financial need.
There is no compelling basis for ceding jurisdiction to a foreign
tribunal. Quite the contrary, the immense public policy
It is clear that respondents intended to remain employed with
considerations attendant to this case behoove Philippine
Saudia. All they did was avail of their maternity leaves. Evidently,
tribunals to not shy away from their duty to rule on the case.
the very nature of a maternity leave means that a pregnant
IV
employee will not report for work only temporarily and that she
Respondents were illegally terminated.
will resume the performance of her duties as soon as the leave
In Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines,101 this court defined voluntary
allowance expires.
resignation as "the voluntary act of an employee who is in a
situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be
It is also clear that respondents exerted all efforts to' remain
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no
employed with Saudia. Each of them repeatedly filed appeal
other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a
letters (as much as five [5] letters in the case of Rebesencio109)
formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the
asking Saudia to reconsider the ultimatum that they resign or be
intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of
terminated along with the forfeiture of their benefits. Some of
relinquishment."102 Thus, essential to the act of resignation is
them even went to Saudia's office to personally seek
voluntariness. It must be the result of an employee's exercise of
reconsideration.110
his or her own will.
Respondents also adduced a copy of the "Unified Employment
Contract for Female Cabin Attendants."111 This contract deemed
In the same case of Bilbao, this court advanced a means for
void the employment of a flight attendant who becomes
determining whether an employee resigned voluntarily:
pregnant and threatened termination due to lack of medical
As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of
fitness.112 The threat of termination (and the forfeiture of
relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the
benefits that it entailed) is enough to compel a reasonable
alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether
person in respondents' position to give up his or her
he or she, in fact, intended, to sever his or her
employment.
employment.103 (Emphasis supplied)
Saudia draws attention to how respondents' resignation letters
On the other hand, constructive dismissal has been defined as were supposedly made in their own handwriting. This minutia
"cessation of work because 'continued employment is rendered fails to surmount all the other indications negating any
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a voluntariness on respondents' part. If at all, these same
demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits."104 resignation letters are proof of how any supposed resignation
did not arise from respondents' own initiative. As earlier pointed
In Penaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing out, respondents' resignations were executed on Saudia's blank
letterheads that Saudia had provided. These letterheads already
tantamount to "involuntarily [sic] resignation due to the harsh, had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portion of
hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer."106 In their respective headings when these were handed to

respondents.113
"In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause
for dismissing an employee rests on the employer."114 In this
case, Saudia makes much of how respondents supposedly
completed their exit interviews, executed quitclaims, received
their separation pay, and took more than a year to file their
Complaint.115 If at all, however, these circumstances prove only
the fact of their occurrence, nothing more. The voluntariness of
respondents' departure from Saudia is non sequitur.
Mere compliance with standard procedures or processes, such
as the completion of their exit interviews, neither negates
compulsion nor indicates voluntariness.
As with respondent's resignation letters, their exit interview
forms even support their claim of illegal dismissal and militates
against Saudia's arguments. These exit interview forms, as
reproduced by Saudia in its own Petition, confirms the
unfavorable conditions as regards respondents' maternity
leaves. Ma. Jopette's and Loraine's exit interview forms are
particularly telling:
a. From Ma. Jopette's exit interview form:
3. In what respects has the job met or failed to meet your
expectations?
THE SUDDEN TWIST OF DECISION REGARDING THE MATERNITY
LEAVE.116
b. From Loraine's exit interview form:
1. What are your main reasons for leaving Saudia? What
company are you joining? xxx xxx xxx Others
CHANGING POLICIES REGARDING MATERNITY LEAVE
(PREGNANCY)117
As to respondents' quitclaims, in Phil. Employ Services and
Resources, Inc. v. Paramio,118 this court noted that "[i]f (a) there
is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting
or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the settlement are
unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims must
be struck down as invalid or illegal."119 Respondents executed
their quitclaims after having been unfairly given an ultimatum to
resign or be terminated (and forfeit their benefits).
V for every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at least
Having been illegally and unjustly dismissed, respondents are
entitled to full backwages and benefits from the time of their
termination until the finality of this Decision. They are likewise
entitled to separation pay in the amount of one (1) month's
salary for every year of service until the fmality of this Decision,
with a fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted
as one (1) whole year.
Moreover, "[m]oral damages are awarded in termination cases
24
where the employee's dismissal was attended by bad faith,
malice or fraud, or where it constitutes an act oppressive to
labor, or where it was done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy."120 In this case, Saudia
terminated respondents' employment in a manner that is
patently discriminatory and running afoul of the public interest
that underlies employer-employee relationships. As such,
respondents are entitled to moral damages.
To provide an "example or correction for the public good"121 as
against such discriminatory and callous schemes, respondents
are likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
In a long line of cases, this court awarded exemplary damages to
illegally dismissed employees whose "dismissal[s were] effected
in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner."122 This court
has awarded exemplary damages to employees who were
terminated on such frivolous, arbitrary, and unjust grounds as
membership in or involvement with labor unions,123 injuries
sustained in the course of employment,124 development of a
medical condition due to the employer's own violation of the
employment contract,125 and lodging of a Complaint against the
employer.126 Exemplary damages were also awarded to
employees who were deemed illegally dismissed by an employer
in an attempt to evade compliance with statutorily established
employee benefits.127 Likewise, employees dismissed for
supposedly just causes, but in violation of due process
requirements, were awarded exemplary damages.128
These examples pale in comparison to the present controversy.
Stripped of all unnecessary complexities, respondents were
dismissed for no other reason than simply that they were
pregnant. This is as wanton, oppressive, and tainted with bad
faith as any reason for termination of employment can be. This
is no ordinary case of illegal dismissal. This is a case of manifest
gender discrimination. It is an affront not only to our statutes
and policies on employees' security of tenure, but more so, to
the Constitution's dictum of fundamental equality between men
and women.129
The award of exemplary damages is, therefore, warranted, not
only to remind employers of the need to adhere to the
requirements of procedural and substantive due process in
termination of employment, but more importantly, to
demonstrate that gender discrimination should in no case be
countenanced.
Having been compelled to litigate to seek reliefs for their illegal
and unjust dismissal, respondents are likewise entitled to
attorney's fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary
award.130
VI
Petitioner Brenda J. Betia may not be held liable.
A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those
of the persons composing it. Thus, as a rule, corporate directors
and officers are not liable for the illegal termination of a
corporation's employees. It is only when they acted in bad faith
or with malice that they become solidarity liable with the
corporation.131
In Ever Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. (EEMI) v. Samahang
Manggagawa ng Ever Electrical,132 this court clarified that "[b]ad
faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some
motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud."133
Respondents have not produced proof to show that Brenda J.
Betia acted in bad faith or with malice as regards their
termination. Thus, she may not be held solidarity liable with
Saudia.
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner
Brenda J. Betia is not solidarity liable with petitioner Saudi
Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian
Airlines is liable for moral and exemplary damages. The June 16,
2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly, petitioner
Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
(1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the
respective dates in which each of the respondents were
illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which
each of the respondents commenced employment until the
finality of this Decision at the rate of one (1) month's salary
six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 per
respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per
respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.
 25

Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total

judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full
satisfaction thereof.
This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed
computation of the amounts due to respondents which
petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.
SO ORDERED