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Bl Cambridge Assessment International Education Teacher Guide Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy and Theology 9774 For examination from 2019 the highest quality resources, we are undertaking a continuous asure the su our resources but also to highlight are: EU Teen erials? Oe EOE bridg GIGCSE is a registered trademark Copyright © UCLES 2017 Cambridge Assessment International Education is part of the Cambridge Assessment Group. Cambridge Assessment is the brand name of the University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate (UCLES), which itself is a department of the University of Cambridge. UCLES retains the copyright on all its publications. Registered Centres are permitted to copy material from this booklet for their own internal use. However, we cannot give permission to Centres to photocopy any material that is acknowledged to a third party, even for internal use within a Centre Contents Description of components Plato Aristotle. Rationalism Empirical philosophers Rational philosophers: Implications of the rationalist / empiricist debate Meta-Ethics Ethical Non-Naturalism Ethical Non-Cognitivism Neo-Naturalism The contrast between moral absolutism and moral relativism Divine Command Theory Descriptive Moral Relativism (Cultural relativism) Meta-ethical Relativism Normative Moral Relativism Is Moral Relativism right?. Divine command theory DCT and Euthyphro’s dilemma Strong rationalism as an approach to faith contrasted with fideism Revelation: propositional and non-propositional Sacred Texts Conscience Religious views Psychological views Sociological and evolutionary views Free will and Determinism Scepticism The relationship between knowledge, belief and justification Foundationalism Coherentism Knowledge of the external world: theories of perception The five senses and knowledge of the external world Naive realism Representative realism Berkeley's idealism: material objects are simply ideas in the mind 14 15 17 18 19 20 24 22 22 23 23 24 24 24 25 25 26 28 29 30 32 32 32 33 33 37 38 38 38 38 39 39 39 40 Phenomenalism Language, meaning and truth The falsification principle and its implications for the ethics and philosophy of religion The responses of philosophers of religion Understanding ethical language The understanding of God Arguments for the existence of God Religious experience The concept of miracle The implications of psychological understandings of religious beliet The implications of sociological understandings of religious belief Scientific theories of the origin of the universe Scientific theories of the origin of life on Earth The nature of the problem of evil 40 42 43 43 43 44 45 48 4g 50 50 51 52 52 Biblical criticism: the synoptic problem and the relationship between the Synoptic Gospels and the gospel of John Political and religious groups: Pharisees, Sadducees, Scribes and Zealots Aspects of Jesus’ teaching Passion, resurrection and the Christolagical debate. ‘The mind-body problem and attempts to solve it. Other solutions to the mind-body prablem Christian ethics Natural Law ethics Fletcher's situation ethics as a challenge to traditional Christian ethics Other ethical theories Applied ethics Historical background and development The problem of the origins of Old Testament praphecy 54 54 55 56 58 59 62 63 63 64 65 66 67 The significance of Moses, Samuel and Elijah in the development of Old Testament prophecy The relationship between prophets and kings in the pre-exilic period The relationship between prophets and the cult The problem of false prophecy The question of haw prophetic writings were collected and preserved Prophetic phenomena Classroom Practice. Reading writing Thinking Debating 68 68 69 69 70 70 4 76 7 8 8 Activities Guidance for introducing internal assessment. Preparing Leamers for Final Assessment Foundational Debates 1.2 Rationalism and Empiricism Foundational Debates 1.3 Ethics Foundational debates 1.4 The Nature of Belief Foundational debates 1.5 Conscience, Free Will and Determinism Paper 2 Topic 1: Epistemology. Topic 2: Philosophical and theological language Topic 3: Philosophy of religion Topic 4: New Testament The Four Gospels Paper 3 Topic 1: Philosophy of mind Topic 2: Ethics Topic 3: Old Testament prophecy 8 79 80 83 85 86 87 87 89 92 96 98 98 101 104 Teacher Guide Introduction Cambridge Pre-U is designed to equip learners with the skills required to make a success of their studies at university. Most notably ‘= to support independent and self-directed learning + to encourage leamers to think laterally, critically and creatively, and to acquire good problem-solving skills + to promote comprehensive understanding of the subject through depth and rigour. ‘What is covered in this guide should not be regarded as overly prescriptive or exhaustive. It seeks to offer guidance as to how a teacher might go about delivering an appropriate course of study. It should be made clear that from the outset there is core content for each of the three papers. This material will need to be mastered in order to develop the skills outlined above. Clearly learners will be unable to engage critically with the ‘Foundational Debates’ put forward by the likes of Plato and Aristotle unless they have been acquainted with the original arguments. Itis hoped that, wherever possible, learners will be encouraged actively to engage with the original arguments rather than with secondary overviews. These have their use as a supplement but should never be a substitute for the original text. A range of ways will be suggested in which they can be made more accessible to the aspiring young philosopher. For example. acting out sections of the Platonic dialogues can bring the debates alive and demonstrate to learners how philosophy in its infancy was pursued by active debate rather than the passive absorption of ideas. ‘What follows in this guide is an outline of the scheme of assessment. Each paper is dealt with individually and there is a suggested teaching approach for a section of the syllabus. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 1 Teacher Guide Scheme of assessment For Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology, learners take all three components ee Paper 1 Introduction to Philosophy & Theology hours 15 minutes | 30% Essay paper, externally assessed, 75 marks Paper 2 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy & Theology 1 2 hours 35% Written paper, externally assessed, 50 marks Paper 3 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy & Theology 2 2 hours 35% Written paper, externally assessed, 50 marks Description of components Paper 1 Introduction to Philosophy & Theology hours 15 minutes, 75 marks, 30 per cent of the total marks This paper is designed as an introduction to the key aspects of the course. Candidates answer three questions from a choice of four. The questions cover a range of themes that are central to the study of both philosophy and theology. Questions will invite description and evaluation of particular arguments and approaches. Paper 2 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy & Theology 1 2 hours, 50 marks, 35 per cent of the total marks Candidates study one topic out of a choice of four: 1. Epistemology 2. Philosophical and theological language 3. Philosophy of religion 4° New Testament: The Four Gospels. Paper 3 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy & Theology 2 2 hours, 50 marks, 35 per cent of the total marks Candidates study one topic out of a choice of three’ ‘1. Philosophy of mind 2. Ethics 3. Old Testament: prophecy. Additional information for Papers 2 and 3 In the question paper, candidates answer two questions from their chosen topic. In Section A, they answer both parts of the textual comment question; in Section B, they answer one essay question from a choice of two. 2 Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (3774) Teacher Guide Introduction to Paper 1 This paper is divided into five sections. Each of these should test learners’ understanding of the key issues in philosophy and theology. Given that the examination is linear in structure, content for this paper should be studied at the very start of the course. The approach to studying the components of this specification should be evaluative and analytical, Learners should be taught to examine the basic assumptions of each piece of philosophy or theology from a critical perspective. There is obviously no one single way of doing this and once the essence of the individual debates is understood, the application of creative thinking, insight, initiative and imagination should be actively encouraged. There is an assumption that much of the work required for learners to become conversant with the different parts of the specification should be done by extensive research. This research should combine both teacher- centred and self-directed approaches. Whilst there is no explicit requirement that leamers read and critically analyse any primary text for this section of the course, some acquaintance with the original texts would be beneficial and also help prepare learners for Paper 2 and Paper 3 Introduction to Paper 2 The examination for Paper 2 is two hours and is marked out of 50. This Paper constitutes 35% of the total marks available. Teachers may well use their choice of foundational debates to inform their choice of topics for Paper 2 and Paper 3. For example + Foundational Debates 1.1 and 1.2 can inform the epistemology module in Paper 2 + Foundational Debates 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 support philosophical and theological language, philosophy of religion and New Testament: The Four Gospels in Paper 2 and ethics and Old Testaments: prophecy components of Paper 2. + Foundational Debate 1.5 offers an excellent foundation for some of the issues and debates covered inthe philosophy of mind component in Paper 3. Encouraging learners to apply their understanding of the Foundational Debates to other areas of the syllabus supports the synoptic element of Pre-U. Learners should actively make links and explore connected areas. Where content areas are revisited or connected with other topics, learners are required to develop deeper critical awareness and understanding and engage in more conceptually sophisticated discussions. Learners should develop a synoptic approach to philosophical and theological questions. Exactly the same advice applies to Paper 3 For Paper 2, learners must study one topic from the four listed below: 1. Epistemology 2. Philosophical and theological language 3. Philosophy of religion 4. New Testament: The Four Gospels In the question paper, learners answer two questions from their chosen topic. Unlike Paper 1, one of these will require textual analysis. In Section A, they answer both parts of the textual comment question; in Section B. they answer one essay question from a choice of two. The textual comment questions in Section A invite learners to show an understanding of the background and context of the work, the arguments used and the issues raised. Critical engagement with the text involves the ability to analyse and evaluate the arguments used, including the identification of assumptions and the evaluation of evidence. Answers should develop a sustained argument. Itis important to note that, while learners will not be tested on content areas outside the scope of the specified extracts for study, credit will be given for evidence of whole textual knowledge and understanding of the wider issues raised by the text. Credit, where appropriate to the question, will also be given for a synoptic approach to the areas studied and links made between them. The required texts are clearly referenced in the resources section of this guide Introduction to Paper 3 Paper 3 follows the same structure as Paper 2. The only difference is that instead of a choice from four topics, there is a choice of three 4.” Philosophy of Mind 2. Ethics 3. Old Testament: prophecy Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 3 Teacher Guide 4 Planning the course Given that different institutions will vary with regards how many teachers and how much time is available to deliver the course, it should be noted that the following can only constitute a guide. The first two terms of study could be devoted to the teaching of the content for Paper 1. Whilst this obviously doesn't approximate to the final weighting of marks available for Paper 1 (30%), it does take into account the introductory nature of the course and the fact that the skills and much of the content required for this paper will be developed in greater depth and detail in Paper 2 and Paper 3. For this reason, it makes sense to dedicate as much time as is necessary to ensure leamers understand and are able to critically engage with the material covered Gn the following pages is a suggested approach to teaching section 1.1 of the syllabus ~ Foundational debates in philosophy which includes: + Plato: Theory of Forms; the analogies of the Sun, the Divided Line, the Cave; the nature of body and soul and their interrelationship; the Charioteer; the Good. ‘+ Afistotle: empirical understanding of the nature of body and soul: the nature of causation — the doctrine of the Four Causes; the Good; the Archer: the Prime Mover. As its ttle suggests, the purpose of this debate is to introduce learners to foundational debates in philosophy and thus the subject as a whole via detailed study of some of the arguments put forward by Plato and Aristotle. These arguments carved a path for the future of the discourse - indeed, most of the issues raised in this debate are stil of significance today. There is more than a grain of truth in Whitzhead's description of philosophy as ‘a footnote to Plato’. Via Platonic rationalism and Aristotelian empiricism, leamers are gently introduced to some of the central tenets of metaphysics, epistemology, moral and political philosophy and should. This should give them a sense of the kind of problems philosophy is interested in and perhaps more importantly, how it attempts to resolve them. As noted earlier, itis of vital importance that the debates are examined with a critical eye so that, from the very outset, leamers are encouraged to understand the nature, role, importance and value of developing a ‘heatthy scepticism’ as a tool for establishing whether or not these foundations are themselves sound The sample scheme of work which follows provides a suggested approach to developing your learners’ understanding of section 1.1 of the syllabus. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (974) Teacher Guide Iproduetonto |. Developabasie Teacher lecture on Patni philosophy paying particular atetion tothe notion of Fom\how tis non isto Piste Understanding of atone |e understood and how and uny/t difers fom our everyday understanding ofthe term, Bllosepny ana Plates Bocourt of Form (1) Flowing tis, eamers should wether oun sureary of what they understand bythe notion of Frm and how we understand this Invoducton to |. Demonsrate an Teacher acre on theoryof Forms, why we need them, what they are andhow they contrast wih partes, the Theeryof Understanding of Plt's Forms. Sccountof Forms, what | Ask yur leamersto read through an extract fom Plato and summarise key pins. They should pay patcuar| theyare ahywe need | tenon how he uses ms. them and some ofthe probleme Fito stemgted | Give leamers alist of20 objects. pars. hey should group the objects in 2 range offre ways foresale win tis | acording tothe Formtheytake. Theycanthen show these roupsto ther pats who shoul ty andiderity esount ihe Fore Plenary session on desing qualtis of Forms (ounbers and other abstract jects work well hee) Using concrete examples, lead 2 oscussion onthe ference between Form and paroular. (F) Learners should choose 10 objects and record the diference between the Form and pattelar of ach Invoducion to | + Understand analogial | Teacher oveniew ofcortetio be covered. aims and abectves| Pstonic reasoning analogies + Kou how and why Pato_| Give 2 brit presentation on analogical reasoning and how Pato uses Uses analogs and tecaphors nis In pais leamers should discuss and make notes on why Pito uses analogical reasoning. They should share phiosophy hese ideas They sould ado, or cect thernates as necessary. Extension activity From extracts of Plato's wring leamers coud identity examples of analogical reasoning and evaluate why this hasbeen used Cambie Pre-U Philosophy & Theology @774) 5 “Teacher Guide ‘Aealogyottne | Understand Plat’s | Leamers can workin pais — one should play Glaucon and the eterto play Platonic Soeats. Together, they Sun analogy ofthe san Should act outthe analogy fom Republe =0TS-£00e Folloing this you can sumarse the key points on board ofring a visual usr, Form ofthe Good = Sun Iteligence = eye Koowled “ralgyofthe | Understand Plato's | Once again aamers can warkin prs one should play Gluon andthe other shoud be Patnie Soortes. aiuded'ine Ghuded ine andhow and. | Together they shoud act eutthe analogy fom Republe £000.81 Te hy eters fori analogyofthe san ‘ek them to work togetherto discuss and note down how the analogy ofthe de nesters fom that of ene sun. Flowing this you can sirmarze keypoints onboard ofring a sual stration ofthe analagytselt and ow difers fom the analogy ofthe sun which sa fourkld stncton ding our understanding (atecion) efebjecsin te usble realm nto aca (magnation) and pits (ole) and ie nteugle realm ito Sianota (ready mathematealfgeomactial understating) and noes (nowledge of Forms), These |Sstoctons comespond tothe increasing levels of realty (fomlowest to highest) andthe subsequent pes of Sowledge’ wa whch we become sequined wth then. ‘Alegoryetthe Understand Pats allegory ofthe eave and how fafers fom the sun Bnd Guided be analogies Thpars, lamers should worktogetherto play Glaucon andthe Patio Sooraes to act outthe analogy fom publ 143-202, ‘Ask them to crete a vsualMustraton ofthe analogy whichis best done as 2 record atthe phosophe's ume, There i an excelent arated animation ofthe joumey whch ean be found hare ypuaube comMestchN=0OFTGRASOUM {) Leamers should create 2 comparison ofthe thre analogies theyhave studied and how they difer fom fone ancther: They should include 2 sual Summary ofeach analogy. © Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 0774 Teacher Guide General + Develop 2 crcl ‘ek leamers to crest two mind maps. One should show he srenghs of analogies (hey ofr a method for problems wth understanding of expressing iti argumerts ideas /concepts nah accessile manne ec. )and the second shoud show Snalogeus Sshalogous reasoning ts_|ther weaknesses (surounding the legitmacy ofthat being aalogse@). Feasonng and Senge nd Snaloges weaknesses ‘ck yor leamarsto analyse a range of analogies and judge which are efectvenetective and why? Follow this wih a discussion about the ftatons of Plato's analogies andthe use of it in Pat's piosophy Theres an excelent dscussion ofthis whch can be bund here: Fs:fpat stanordadulentieslte-myjel General cique |= Demonsrate a ereal | groups, ask your leamers to tyand dentfyanyproblems wih Plat's vew (see ftheycan think of ofPiatssiheory |" auarenessofsome ofthe | someting /2 Porm hat al games share m commen ~ you shouldbe redo ofr efectve Courter ofFonme Strengths and examples). teaknesses conceming Pisto's aosount of Forms | Folow this with a whole cass discussion and teacher inpt onthe common ertcsms of Pit's view Weaker leamers could be encouragedto read through and discuss summary of sms of Pat's account of Farm, example, Pappas te. Extension activity: ‘ek your lamers to read through Parmenidean and AisoeSanericiams of Fm nthe orignal text andy to summarse these arguments You should draw conclusions to these discussions by resting the ams and objectives. Cambie Pre-U Philosophy & Theology @774) 7 “Teacher Guide Ihroduciont Understnd Pat's [Teacher oveniew afcontenttobe covered. aims and objectives Plato's tipate |” tipartte analysis ofthe analysis ofsoul | Snuthe nmture androle_ | trode Plato's Yipate’ analysis of soul:the role and interelitedness ofeach pat an the reasoning Gfeach pat and how and | behind Pat's tichtomy hye aters tom the here bn pas /small groups, ask your leamers to ist 2 range ofmartalstatesfacttes and get them think about thich belong ote logical (opist¥on), sited @hymoeies) or appetite (epthymetion elements ofthe ay Extension activity: eamers could identity sates whch might be cassifed as belonging to mare than one category order to areas the following Guestons isthe disinaton az nest a= Plato tne? Whien ofthese examples mght be Sategorsed a being actvtes ofthe mind? Which the body? Might there be sme examples tht seem to eonespond wih botn? Why? Eiplanaton of| Understand how each of | Hiroduce how each element ofthe soul canbe elated tots corresponding counterpartin a wel-rdered how exch thethre elements ofthe |socety(ogicl= rng dass: spied = solder dass appetive = prosucng cass). these pats Sourelatesto ss forespondsto | Gourtepatinawelk | Askleamerstoworktogetherto create 2 summarythat woud help them to debate the flouing statement: thetiee trdered sooty “oth te cate adhe inahual, tis only when each par performs i Yue fancton’wahout terfering (Sassesin an he fanions of thers, tat use canbe realised. ‘deat s0ciety (F) Learners should sup their plans with ether pars and provi feedback onthe points raised and how they ight improve ‘iique of Demonstrate aerial | Tescherled class discussion asto how condincng Plato's account ofthe soul ans counterpart in socity Pisto's account |" awareness fPlatos [is shalss of soul socety Sndtheirinerelatedness | Ask your lamers wheter ornottheythink his account ofthe souls corect and, evenfso, whether 2 suitable analogycanbe drawn between sou and state? ‘ek them to lok a some ofthe frsotaaneiisms of Pato, far example Nehomachean hic. Further rial discussion canbe found in Pappas (Pao andthe Repu) and Walin (Understanding Psa). Does this change ther wew of Plats account? Tey shuld record toes hey crs. Perhaps the dette work on Plat is WKC Guthie's A Hatory of Greek Philosophy Vol V. An intresting saljcal discussion comparing Pst and Avstote’s Bvergen ews canbe ound here His iankde a wordpress com20!208/8hte-nd- arte compared! 8 Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 0774 Teacher Guide Extension activity {amers could also look at the more challenging discussion of Plato's (and ethers) acount a soul here + Htpsilats Stanford eduertestancient soul! Teacher conclusion aims and objectives revisted) Irvoducton to | + Understand Pat's | Give yourleamers an oveniew ofcortent tobe covered aims and objectives the chariteer charoteer analogy and Snalogy how trelatesto the other | invoduce the chart adegory ljoumey ofthe charoteer, ts ams and how treats tothe ether arguments analogies and hs 3nd analogies covered 9 fa. Lazners shuld read and work through the orignal tex (Phaedras2483~ ‘parite analysis of soul_ | 254) Whist dong this they shoud consider nd ste '2) how the alegory fncions 3) ow aelates tothe ether analogiesfalegores andthe tiparte tintin of soul and state previouslycovered @)_ ethers accounts conning ‘Giique of | + Demonstrate aecal | nda, aamers asked to analyse a effouk dcion they have had or might have to make and anaes Pisto's analogy |” understanding of Pat's |the process interme ofthe rol ofthe charceer (sol /intlect reason, black horse (appetite desir) and Snalogy and #= the white horse (hums sprtedness. iarelsenness tothe ther analogies and his_| Which ofthe tree gets themto thinkin which way and why? How does reason keep the athertwo ‘horses ‘iparite analysis of soul | check? nd ste Teacherted class discussion aso uhether Plato sucoeds in proving an adequate aocourt ofthe sou and stolen alscoverng tu. Given ts tereltednessthe same material used prevously (see ‘oraque of Plato's account above) can be used again hereto qude and inf dscusson {) Now would be 2 good time to recap material thus fr. Your lamers shoul sumemaise Pato’ acount of Form and how relates each ofthe analogies. They shoul also identity some ofthe problems facing Pia'saocoue Cambie Pre-U Philosophy & Theology @774) © “Teacher Guide 0 1+ The Formot | Understand nate, | ivoduce the Farm ofthe Good. Yourleamers should akeady have a solid understanding ofthis concept ‘the Good tole andimpseatons of | vents cenrattytoPltonc phlosephy and ts appearance al ofthe mata covered tus Prats account ofthe Farm ofthe Good and ts_|To help them understand tis, encourage thermo think about what Forms theyhave in commen, what role Pato sows usto recognise them a Forms to bepn we? ha exacythe same way a8 2 pariouse Form slows US Phosopny to understand the range ofparculrs whch partake in is essence, sooo Forms fem selves can onybe erifed ae such itnre fa Form of Forme: whch exch ind Form parakesin (F) Learners should appl thei understanding by responding tothe questions below ow does the Form off Good atow Pitot reso 2), metaphysical uestans conceming what seal 3) epistemological questions surounding nh and our subsequent knowledge off ©) moral uestons sumounding uses and wre 1) politcal questonsconceming the deal sate? They shoul recognise thatt is knowledge ofthe Good, amongst ther things. that establishes the piiasopher' tinessto rue. ts phlosophical importance Shou netbe ovrodked ‘que of Demonsate a eat | Ask leamersto discuss and record ther iis ofthe For ofthe Good Pits account|” understanding ofthe ofthe Good Formofthe Good, ‘General itcisms of Fors that have previously been covered are allrelevart here, Again, Pappas. Meling attolloywah regards | Gave andthe Stanford Eneyiopaeda area ood rourcesto ure Parmenfon and ‘rsttasan objections to | You should make sure that your leamers have access to Parmerideanciicisms (o patular Pamenides this concept 10.134) as they ar partly appropriate, n parulr the exitenceofimpertet Forms, the problem of aricipaton andthe thrd man argumerargurent fom intite regress They should also consider state's eique of Plt's account ofthe Good (see Nchow achean and Endemian eines. (0) Leamers sould summarise the aisiems ofthe Fo ofthe Good. They oul also compare thisto the criss of analogical reasoning that hey Werte previously. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 0774 Teacher Guide Iroduction to ‘nintroducionto Leamers should be provided with some introductory information about Aristetelan philosophy. Poste ‘isttetan philosophy, iSempiica nature and | Having red the mats lamers shoul create atable which summarises the ey erences and any how Reonrastewah | simlanes between Pato and Aiseteian phlosophy. Patni posophy (1) Lsamers can research and make nots on Aristotle's ke eticsms of Plt, ‘Asta Understané istotl’s | Leamers shouldbe introduces tothe Aristotelian concepts of substance, frm (again, contrasts should be nique of trmique of it's notion | drawn wh Plate), mater, act and poteneal Pisto's noon of | efbody and sou and how body and sau. anceps sich a5 Leamers should prove ther oun example to ilusate each ofthese Arittetan concepts. ‘Sbstnee, fr, mater, ctand peleal uncson_| Given Aristote'svews ofthese concepts, lamers should trytoidentityhou Ariote might rtique Plt's in Aistoteian plosophy | noon fbodyand sul ‘Aisates UnderstanéAistutl’s | Ask your leamersto read trough secon on Aistate’'s psychology the Stantrd Enoysopaeda empical tempiieal ccount ofthe | hippie stanord edletnes/aste syehology! Uinderstansig | ature otbody and sou, ftthenatue at | inparictar Afstotatan’ | Theyshould ecard 2surmaryof Aistteian monism and the associated problems wt is account. The Bodyand Sou! Inonsmandiow f”| Stanfrd arta shoud give them enough infomadon todo tus. Conran wah Pitnic fats 1) Leamers should make notes onthe contrast betueen stotlan monism and Platonic dualism ‘rroducionto Understand ita and how | rireduce the Greek concept ation and how @difers fom our medem understanding of causaton (beter the Grek alters tom ourmodem | understood as explanaton or reason rather than ess) concept ofaiia | Understanding af andnow it causiton Gre om our ‘modem onception of Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (0774) " “Teacher Guide 2 ‘Aistate's Understand each ofthe |The flouing vdeo: htplstudy.com/acadamylesson/ariso-tles-metaphysiesthe-our-causes. tml aooourt ofthe fourcauses and apply | afers an excelent mate overview of istle's poston ‘oureauses ‘his understanag to objects and persons | Explain andilusrate Aste’ account ofthe fur causes: material formal ecient and fal. isthe tid of these which bet approxmatesto our modam understanding ofte te. ‘sk your leamersto select three or ur objects (fr example atable) and explain themin tems of four causes. For example nthe case ofa wooden tabla, mstaral cause = wood: formal cause = for legs and 3 Smooth surtce; ficient cause = 2 carpenter and fal cause =the capactyto be wraten eaten on ee Problems wih Develop a eel Using the flowing ail, lamers should surmise the sengths and weaknesses of soe Pestotes Understnding of same of | hpspito stanford eduleesianitle-causalryBFincavDer Secnunt the srengins ond Weaknesses of itte's | Eension activity Sosourt ‘Some learners may keto look athe Ksted papers atthe end ofthe ace to extend their easing Aistote's Understand Aisatl's | Wvoduce Aisttl’s account ofthe good and his ertique othe absrad, Platone nation of goodness conception of tanoepion of good and ‘goad andhow | how Reorraste wth he | Your lamers shouldbe ae of Aistte's account ofthe role ofhab,vitueus dspostion andthe doctine Eaters om Piatoic conception |ofthemean a5 ameans br dtermning moral behavou” Pisto's acount They should make notes on concepts such 2s ate, eudainonia and hess and what Aisle understands by them (1) Give yourleamers ast of ebical demas (Sarte's Teamer isan excellent example; atematvely- hp:tnww fesian comfalyienmas him covers al ofthe standard examples) and askthemto decide ‘thatthe right couse of ation would be on nsoteban grounds (¢) Lexners should read this acl on Aristate's account and use to wre the strengths and weaknesses this accour ip: Tpsto Sanford. edulrttesiarstle-cOues] Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 0774 Teacher Guide ‘Aistate's archer andhow keer inathnis conception of (goodness he ‘oureauses and Fs doctine of| the mean Understand Pitt's ‘archer analogy and how edovetals wah ne ancepion of goodness, the fur causes and his toate ofthe mean Irvoduce the analogy ofthe archer ‘ek your leamarsto provide theiroun ilustrative example of Aistate’s analogy Give your eames 2 range of utes (br example, courage, honesty good humour et) and ask hemo Ror otter coresponding Uees of excess and defency (tr example. cowardice /rashness et). {Eamers ean hen be gen» range of oes of excess and/or geSsiency (br example sth, nsenabity and work outther corespondng tues (2. ambiton, temperance ee). (F) Use this to prompt escusson of whether or not they beSeve a vstuous aces 2s amean between the respechve ices af excess and detcency. Eight ase be worth discussing whether the uruesthat were [concen ofas vtuousin ancient Greek tes should si be regarded a: utuous today (or whether he \itues themselves ar cura specte). (1) Leamers can research the ancient Greek vues and consider anythat woud no longer be thought ofaz vituous. They should suggest how the cultural sting ofthese have changed therimporance relevance ‘Aisotes ime! (inmoves) Understand Aistatl's account of the primum Ioves (prime mover) and ‘creations tos Sesourtofeausaton Invoduce Aistote's prime mover (num movens) a5 an uncaused explanation ofallthe mation inthe The flowing deo offers an excelent 4 minute overdew of Aste’ account and roots win an explanation ofthe four causes themselves: htps Zum youtube. comateh? v= VOLmZbelUBk ‘The above exemplar scheme of work canbe used asa template not only fr developing father schemes of work for each ofthe foundational debates but azo for ‘he tapes selected fr stody or Pape 2 and Paper 3 Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (0774) ry Teacher Guide 4 Foundational debates in Philosophy This section introduces the epistemological debate and its historical background, Plato Plato's methodology is to use a rationalist approach to decide about the four ‘levels of existence’. Itis important to teach leamars about the politcal turmoil Plato was experiencing at the time which led him to believe that all social change is corruption, or decay, or degeneration. The moral will of humans, supported by the power of reason, can break this destiny of decay by installing a just government of rational philosophers who arrest all political change. The ideal state would not decay as it does not change. Equally, the empirical world should be distinguished from its metaphysical counterpart. Empirical things change and decay, whereas perfect and universal Forms do not. Truth and Reality are to be found in the world of Forms, and notin the world of sense data. The theory of Forms, and the analogies of the Sun, the Divided Line, and the Cave, can be taught against this backdrop: the world of ordinary people and sense experience contrasts with the world of philosophers who alone can comprehend Truth and the world of Forms. The empirical world of belief, ilusion and shadow can be partly understood by science; whereas the world of thought is characterised partly by maths, because the truths of maths are eternal and are accessed by reason. The empirical world is always changing, so gives us only opinion about Truth; whereas the Forms are changeless and incorruptible, so can give us knowledge of Truth, Each analogy should be studied in detail and the aim of each should be made clear. For example that of the Cave has three main functions: ‘1. the predictions made by the prisoners about the shadows correspond to the inductive methods of science, so Plato's aim is to show that although empirical science is a useful tool for helping people to make sense of the world, real truth is arrived at only by reason 2. reason answers a major question in philosophy: ‘What is the world really like?" 3. Plato is insisting that philosophers ought to be the rulers, since its their reasoning powers that enable them alone to transcend the world of sense experience and to contemplate the Forms. Study of Plato's ideas about the (tripartite) nature of body and soul and their relationship through the analogies of the Charioteer, and the Good, expand on these ideas. The proper balance of the mind over ‘thumos' and appetite corresponds with the proper balance of philosophers who rule by power of reason over auxiliaries and the working classes. Further, Plato’s concept of the Good, along with his concept of Soul, at the root of his theology. The world is directed towards good by a soul of an order higher than human, ie God. God crafted the universe out of pre-existent materials with a pattern of structure, cause and matter, and the end-purpose of the universe is good, because its structure reflects the Form of the Good. The Good is the ultimate Form of being, and in The Republic, Plato specifies the metaphysical forms of knowledge that allow people to reach it. The Sun illuminates the physical realm so that we see and understand our surroundings. The Good illuminates the intelligible realm allowing us to understand and be knowledgeable. Just as The Sun is what enables life to exist on earth, the Good gives existence to the Forms and gives knowledge in the intelligible realm. Leamers should understand that concepts such as those established at the time of Plato continue to be an important part of the debate about whether we can know ‘things’ as they really are. For example, Kant's division between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. Plato's assumption, based on his doctrine of antitheses (opposites), posit that there is a metaphysical counterpart to the empirical universe. This Underpins dualist thinking about the existence of a soul in humans, about the possibilty of the survival of souls post mortem, about the existence of God as the ungenerated, immortal, unmoving source of motion or change, and about the nature of good and evil As already mentioned, the study of all of the components of this Specification should be evaluative and critical. Learners should be taught to examine the basic assumptions of each piece of philosophy or theology from a critical standpoint. For example, itis frequently argued that Plato’s metaphysical approach has misdirected philosophy for over 2000 years so that the focus has been on supposedly transcendent entities such as: God, Truth, Justice, Soul and so on. Given the tremendous influence of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy, empiricists have complained that scientific endeavour in the 21st century is stil hampered by philosophy's obsession with metaphysics. Mind-brain dualism, for example, is stil popular, despite its near Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide complete lack of explanatory power as a philosophy of mind. Conversely, the existence of abstract entities beyond space and time are still held by some to be coherent, for example, as an explanation of mathematical truths. Aristatle By contrast with Plato, Aristotle has a largely empirical understanding of the relationship between body and soul. This needs to be taught through an understanding of the Four Causes, which in turn should be preceded by developing learners’ understanding of Aristotle's concepts of substance, form & matter, and act, & potential, Aristotle held that the only primary realities are physical things, so he had to explain why we appear to have repeatable knowledge of things which are always changing, Aristotle believed that he could solve this by saying that substances have two aspects: ‘matter which changes, and form’ which is permanent. Form originates from God, who is a pure unchanging actuality - Mind without matter. God as the Final Cause allows us (and everything else) to be what we or they are. We are all caused to be so by Gad allowing us a degree of free choice. Choice is built into the universe by the nature of changing matter, because where things change, we can exercise choice. Through these categories of substance, form & matter, act & potential, and cause, Aristotle is explaining why reality isthe way itis, including the reality of human psycho-physical existence. Flesh and blood are the material cause of humans; the formal cause of a human is the soul: the formal cause is also the efficient cause in so far as itis what makes a potential human being into a living human being. Form and matter in a human being are inseparable - if the form is removed, a corpse is left behind. The soul is what is causally responsible for the animate behaviour of living things. Soul functions are hierarchical in terms of growth and Nutrition, locomotion and perception, and thinking; hence there are three corresponding degrees of soul Nutritive (in plants), sensitive (in animals) and rational (in humans). For Plato, soul and body are separable - at death, the soul goes to the metaphysical world of Forms, and is later reincarnated into a different body. Aristotle by contrast therefore appears to be a monist (body and soul are one entity) whereas Plato is a dualist (body and soul are two different entities). This distinction can be explored in terms of the future history of the debates between monist and dualistic theories concerning mind, matter and existence post mortem. Leamers should be shown that these differences are in fact not so clear inthe debate between Plato and Aristotle because Aristotle introduces a metaphysical explanation for the human body and soul: there has to be a First Efficient Cause to explain why matter began to change into different forms, The First Efficient Cause cannot itself be made of matter, otherwise it itself would have needed an efficient cause, so the First Efficient Cause must be non-material — pure intellect. This left Aristotle with a problem: if pure intellect can exist without a body, why cannot the human intellect also exist as a soul an efficient cause without a body? Aristotle was forced to conclude that the intellect can survive as a ‘Separable Soul’ even though the personality dies with the brain. Not surprisingly, Aristotle did not explain any further. The main force of his arguments is, however, anti-Cartesian — there is no Cartesian contrast between the inner mental life of a soul over against its inference to an external physical world — and there is no idea of a soul substance over against physical substance. Soul for Aristotle has little to do with personal identity; soul is a capacity — an efficient cause — hence in this sense we should talk about ‘soul rather than ‘souls. On Aristotle's analysis, soul is part of every living thing, so that plants have nutrition, animals have nutrition and movement, and humans have nutrition, movement, reason and morality. On this view, the difference between organisms is simply complexity, and it does not follow that a more complex organism must be more valuable than a less complex one. This idea avoids having to make awkward distinctions between the souls of humans and those of other species. According to the theistic religions, animals do not have souls, and such a view has important implications for the ethical treatment of animals and the environment. Aristotle rejects Plato's view that training in maths, science and metaphysics is necessary to reach the Good. Knowing the Good is not a theoretical issue that is considered for the sake of knowledge. The function of a human being consists in an activity of the rational soul in accordance with virtue. The end-product of ethics is eudaimonia — complete well-being — which is achieved empirically through observation and practice in order to achieve that virtue. The role models are philosophers and middle-class housewives who are habitually virtuous. Virtue is a mean between excess and deficiency judged in relation to a person's natural dispositions. Excellence of character is compared to the skill of an Archer who is able to hit a target. Just as the Archer has to take into account a variaty of factors, such as the distance of the target, its size and shape, the prevailing wind, and so on, the virtuous human needs to arrive at the ethical mean by acting and reacting in appropriate ways. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 15 Teacher Guide 16 Aristotle accordingly argues that Plato's belief in perfect Ideas / Forms is misguided. To hold that Ideas are perfect, transcendent entities is meaningless, because all human activities are based in normal empirical perception. Moreover there cannot be absolute abstractions such as the perfect idea of Beauty, or Truth, or Justice, or Good, since these qualities are firmly dependent on human experience. ‘As we mentioned above, despite his empirical approach, Aristotelian metaphysics does lead to the idea of a First Efficient Cause — a Prime Mover. The Four Causes operate within a universe in which every change and movement has its cause and purpose within a hierarchy subordinated to the First Cause. Aristotle conceived of the world as the centre of the universe, as the focus of constant degeneration and reconstruction. In contrast, as we go outwards to the heavenly bodies beyond the moon, these bodies move with geometrical perfection, and are eternal and indestructible. Motion is the actualisation of potency — something which has the potential to move can be moved only by something that is actually moving Therefore the first cause of mation must already have been actual, and nat potential - it must be pure actuality, eternal, and without movement or change. It must also be non-material, because matter is potency. This kind of thing can only be a Mind. That Mind did not cause motion by any act, because to do so would cause it to change and be less perfect. Rather it caused motion by being a Final Cause, by being love or desire - itis the desire the universe has for perfection; so the universe imitates this desire by perfect (spherical) motion. Aristotle thus concluded that God exists necessarily, having aseity, and is a changeless, bodiless, eternal and utterly perfect Mind. As an eternal being, God is perfectly good, since something that exists necessarily can have no defect, imperfection being the absence of the actuality that God has. As a pure Mind, God could not think about anything which caused him to change — God thinks only about thinking, hence he does not know this changing physical world, and does not have a plan for humans. Nevertheless, like Plato, Avistotle believed that everything exists for an end, and that the end is good. Unlike Plato, he believed that that purpose is immanent, within things, although he also believed that that purpose is ultimately directed towards a transcendent end, imitating divine perfection. These are quite difficult concepts, and should be explored by extensive reading by learners atthe direction of teachers, No specialist reading is required for Plato and Aristotle in these foundational debates. Most textbooks deal with it more than adequately. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Foundational debates in Epistemology As with the section on Plato and Aristotle, careful study of epistemology is highly recommended Epistemology underpins most of philosophy and theology. The approach set out below is simply one way of approaching this. Learners should be encouraged to read at least one textbook on modern epistemology, to assimilate the language and concepts. Some time should be given to discussing the fundamental questions of epistemology, ie. what do we know? How do we know it? Can we know that we are right? There are different types of knowledge — acquaintance (knowing of or about); ability (knowing how to); conceptual (knowledge of / understanding); propositional (knowing that). The study of epistemology is the study of conceptual and propositional knowledge For the reasons given above, the following suggested schema for study goes some way beyond the requirements of the Syllabus. It should be emphasised that no exam questions will be set on material that is not contained directly within the Syllabus. The amount of knowledge, understanding and critical analysis required for sections ta and 1b is no greater than that required for any other section. Rationalism Empiricism is the view that we obtain knowledge mainly through sense experience. Rationalism is the view that we obtain knowledge mainly through reason and logic. Information does come from the senses, but itis merely data, For example, a digital camera does not understand the data it creates - it does not use reason, but simply handles data. By contrast, human reason processes and understands sense data. Leamers should be shown that empiricism and rationalism are not necessarily conflicting ways of obtaining knowledge but most philosophers tend to emphasise one more than the other. From the study of foundational debates in philosophy, learners should recognise that the most important of the Greek rationalists were Socrates and his learner, Plato. For Plato, true knowledge is gained by pure reason and the mind. Knowledge gained through sense experience is not unimportant, but is less important than ‘true’ knowledge. Plato therefore stated that scientific or empirical knowledge merely has the status of opinion, or belief Although Plato and Socrates believed that true knowledge is gained by reason, they also believed that knowledge can never be absolute. This was based on two reasons: ‘1. Their method of inquiry was one of question and answer to discover whether an argument is valid or not. This methad is called the elenchus, and tends to create more questions than solid answers. The process of question and answer itself is called dialectic, and aims to refine ideas in order to approach ultimate truth 2. Through his doctrine of antitheses, Plato held that truth is ultimately metaphysical, not physical. It cannot be comprehended absolutely by humans who live in the physical universe By contrast, Aristotle was primarily an empiricist. He rejected Plato's Forms and Plato's attitude to science and empirical knowledge. Aristotle used induction to produce first or general principles. This can be illustrated through Aristotle's theory of perception. He held that perception involves a change in the perceiver. Perceptions form patterns in the memory, which he called phantasms - objects of the imagination ‘These are the link between perception and thought or intellect. In other words: © we have empirical perceptions through our senses ‘+ empirical perceptions form memory patterns ‘+ memory patterns are then worked on by reason + this allows us to do abstract thinking Different perceptions are linked through a ‘common faculty’ that coordinates our perceptions, and this common faculty amounts to the self. Hence if someone is playing the trumpet nearby, your eyes can see the instrument, your ears can hear it, you can touch the instrument and smallits metal, and so on. Itis the common faculty that coordinates all of these perceptions so that you perceive the reality that someone is playing a trumpet. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 17 Teacher Guide 18 The different requirements of the Specification are best studied through some examples of empirical and rational philosophers. Empirical philosophers Francis Bacon — the inductive method. John Locke — seen as the father of empiricism + the mind as tabula rasa + our ideas are perceptions of things, not things in themselves + ideas as either simple and basic or complex; complex ideas are constructed by interlinking simple ideas ‘+ knowledge of physical objects; the distinction between primary and secondary qualities: ‘sensitive’ knowledge gives us likelihoods, not certainties + ctitique of Locke George Berkeley — idealism ‘+ wanted to show that philosophy could demonstrate the existence of God ‘+ to do so he took an unusual approach to empiricism: esse est percioi— to be is to be perceived - itis not possible to know that an object exists, because all we can know is our perceptions, not the object itself ‘+ since the separate existence of matter cannot be shown, the concept of matter seems to be redundant - it may be simpler to do away with matter altogether and to assume that only ideas exist ‘+ we can do this from common sense, since we lear from speaking to other minds that our perceptions about the world are consistent ‘+ error comes from thinking about what individuals perceive, so the goal of science isto de- intellectualise or conceptualise and purify human perceptions neither primary nor secondary qualities belong to objects: both are simply perceptions Berkeley's answer to the objection that when things are not being perceived they should cease to exist: God guarantees the consistency of sense perception; critique of this ‘+ Further critique of Berkeley: e.g, even if itis possible to show that we can know only our perceptions this does not prove that there is no matter which is the cause of perceptions. Moreover we do not have to choose between absolute mind and absolute matter, as Berkeley seams to want us to do perhaps the ultimate basis of reality is energy, which can manifest itself as both mind and matter. The a posteriori and the a priori Bacon, Locke and Berkeley, as empiricists, claim that knowledge is a posteriori- that it comes after sense experiance. It also comes inductively, through linked sense-perceptions Rationalist philosophers claim that: knowledge is @ prior’ before sense experience + i.e. knowledge (such as moral knowledge) is innate + mathematical knowledge is innate we know innately that events have causes, that objects have extension in space, that we exist in time, and so on @ priori knowledge is based on deductive rather than inductive reasoning Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Rational philosophers Descartes ‘© wanted a secure foundation for knowledge + began with the notion of epistemic doubt ‘+ most obviously doubting the accuracy of sense perception. Given this, empiricism must be faulty as ‘a means of knowing the world ‘+ so real knowledge comes from reason, and the role of reason is to take doubt to its extreme in order to find something that reason cannot doubt ‘the argument from doubt, by which Descartes believes that he has established that he is a thing whose sole essence is thinking / consciousness; so because he doubts, he exists ‘+ doubting is not as good as knowing: the role of God / the Ontological Argument ‘+ the distinction between facts and opinions (beliefs); factual certainty about the measurable quantities, of things contrasted with lack of certainty about their qualities. Critique of Descartes The main critique of Descartes is the reliance of the argument on Leibniz’s Law. Intentional or psychological states like doubting, knowing, believing, imagining, wondering, dreaming constitute exceptions to that Leibniz’s law. Since they have no reality corresponding to them his Ontological Argument is equally unconvincing Spinoza ‘+ God (not soul) is the infinite substance of the universe ‘+ God can be known to some extent, namely his attributes of thought (through which we have ideas, thinking, consciousness, remembering, etc.) and extension (our understanding of anything that has extension) we use reason and reflection to organise our sense perceptions, and so on critique of Spinoza's a priori assumptions G.W. Leibniz ‘+ Leibniz is worth studying as an example of a philosopher who emphasises the fundamental use of reason in our attempts to understand the world ‘+ uses the two main Principles of Non-Contradiction, and Sufficient Reason in searching for a secure foundation for knowledge ‘the only things that exist (apart from God) are monads: non-composite, simple, indivisible, souk ike entities ‘+ there are three levels of monads: simple monads, ordinary souls, and rational souls which have self awareness and reason ‘+ only rational souls have apperception (as opposed to perception, as for example in animals), ie. the knowledge gained by reacting to and operating on our perceptions ‘+ rational souls can use apperception (which is active, as opposed to perception, which is passive) to know necessary and eternal truths about the universe and God. Apperception allows us to make judgements about things such as time and space, causation, and material objects — they are well founded illusions explained by the nature of the universe at its fundamental level, e.g. space and time are internal / intrinsic features of the complete concepts of things, and are not extrinsic to those things ‘+ God apprehends space and time as numbers, and as the space-time representations that we perceive empirically ue of Li concept of monads is a rational intuition, but intuitions may bear little or no relation to realty. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 19 Teacher Guide Implications of the rationalist / empiricist debate Itwould be useful for learners to consider what happens if itis decided that neither rationalism nor empiricism can give an adequate account of knowledge. Most people tend to blend both approaches as a kind of common sense policy, but it cannot be shown that common sense is the truest or best approach to. epistemology. The problem would seem to be, therefore, that there is no reliable basis for knowledge, which leads some to scepticism. For example, the modified kind used by Descartes to arrive eventually at the cogito, and Hume’s scepticism about the limits of reason, together with his argument that induction can never give empirical certainty. Learners could read briefly about attempts to avoid scepticism, to provide a secure foundation for knowledge Points of note: ‘1. No question set for any Philosophy / Theology paper will require knowledge over and above that listed in the Syllabus 2. The purpose of extended reading of the kind referred to above is to provide learners with extended context for study, which can be very useful for attaining the Distinction grades 3. Any material of this kind that is used relevantly to answer exam questions will be credited. The Syllabus lays down the parameters for study, but these are not intended to be strict limits. 20 Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Foundational debates in Ethics For this debate learners will need to understand the nature and role of ethical discourse in establishing ethical systems and how, if at all, it differs from, other philosophical debates. In particular learners will need to consider the difference between moral (i there are such things) and epistemological facts or truths and how this distinction (if one exists) feeds into the debate between moral absolutism and moral relativism. Some understanding of the debate between cognitive and non-cognitive meta-ethics would also be beneficial. Divine command theory (the view that what is good is good because God wills / commands it) also needs studying with a critical eye so that both elements of the infamous Euthyphro dilemma are covered. This should be done in order provoke a discussion about whether the divine attributes (most notably omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence) are internally and / or externally consistent / coherent. Debates surrounding the ‘inconsistent triad’ would also be relevant hare Meta-Ethics There are two main elements in meta-ethics that need considering ‘+ the relationship between facts and values + the meaning of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Most of the discussion of these questions has been based on G.E. Moore's book Principia Ethica (Principles of Ethics’, 1903). Moore insisted that if we don’ try to answer the question of what ‘good’ means, then the rest of ethics is useless. According to Moore, there are only three possible meanings of ‘good’ 1. good is complex, it's a natural property, and we can analyse it. This is the view called Ethical Naturalism 2. good is simple, i's a non-natural property, and it cannot be analysed. This is the view called Ethical Non-Naturalism 3. good isn'ta property at all, in which case ethics isn't factual in any sense. This is the view called Ethical Non-Cognitivism Ethical naturalists and ethical non-naturalists therefore hold that ‘good’ is about facts. Ethical non-cognitivists say that it's about something else, such as emotion or will. Ethical Naturalism This approach states that we can classify the world using facts, so our ethical values are facts. They are in the world in the same way as nature's laws, and they are complex, i.e. we can analyse them to find out more about them However, when we start analysing this concept, there is very little agreement as to what the facts of ethics are. Some say the facts are about happiness (Utilitarians): others say the facts are about obedience to God's rules (e.g. Divine Command Theory), and so on Ifwe can't agree what the facts are, this shows that ethical naturalism is probably wrong, This is what Moore believed, and he expressed this by saying that in ethical naturalism, there is a gap between the fact and the value and the is and the ought. There shouldn't be a gap, so ethical naturalism is wrong. Consider this brief example PI She is old and feeble (fact) © You ought to help her (value) Perhaps all Christians would agree with the conclusion, but would all utlitarians, for example? Some might argue that under certain conditions it might be better to kill off the old and feeble, so they would gat a different ought from the is PI She is old and feeble (fact) C You ought to kill her off (value). Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 21 Teacher Guide The problem is clear: if Ethical Naturalism is right, values are facts. If so, we should not be able to gat two different values from the same fact (help her / euthanise her), so there's probably something wrong with Ethical Naturalism, Ethical Non-Naturalism This is the option preferred by Moore. 1. ‘Good’, said Moore, is simple and unanalysable. ‘Yellow’ is a simple and unanalysable property — try explaining itto someone: either they've seen it or they haven't. fthey haven't, you can never describe it in a way that will show them what itis Itis the same with ‘good’, said Moore: you either know intuitively why murder is wrong, or you don't No amount of explanation will show you. Once we see what is good, good is factual / cognitive, just as yellow is a fact. But is this any better than ethical naturalism? What i | intuit that capital punishment is good / right, but you intuit that itis bad / wrong? How do we decide who is right? Plato can be described as an ethical non-naturalist. He believed that reason could help you decide (so his view of good is called Ethical Rationalism). Think of Plato's Form of the Good: the Forms are unanalysable absolutes: you either have the brain power to reason out their existence or you don't The problem again is that the Forms may not exist. Plato said they did, but Aristotle said they didn't How do we decide who was right? Ethical Non-Cognitivism ‘|. Many philosophers have therefore concluded that good isn't about facts, e.g. AJ. Ayer argued that to say something is good of bad is simply to say that we approve or disapprove of it. If| am upset by the sight of blood, then | will simply say Murder is bad’, and will try to persuade others to agree. If enough people do agree, then they will make a rule forbidding murder. 2. RM Hate's Prescriptivism makes this a bit more sophisticated: a. | can choose what | want to call good and bad through my own wil b. What makes my choice a moral one is my willingness to universalise it, .e. to apply it to everybody. Universalisability is a principle Hare took over from Kant. If| am quite happy to make a rule universalising stealing (because I'm a thief), then | have to be happy for others to steal from me. 3. These theories look attractive to many, but have several problems, e.g a. With Ayer’s theory, how do we argue meaningfully about our emotions? The fact that we do argue about ethics, and that our values are so important to us, suggests that ‘good! is more than just an emotional response b. If we accept Prescriptivism, we are forced to accept that some difficult ideas are morally valid. For example, someone might argue’ i. allphilatelists ought to be exterminated ii, Henry is a philatelist iii, Henry ought to be exterminated. If itis a combination of will and universalisability that makes a judgement a moral one, then this judgement has to be accepted as being as valid as any other, yet | doubt that many people would be happy with that. 22 Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Neo-Naturalism ‘1 Neo-Naturalism (‘new Naturalism) is an approach which comes from philosophers like Mary Midgely and Geoffrey Warnock. Neo-Naturalism is an attempt to support Ethical Naturalism, 2. You will remember that the main problem with Ethical Natrualism is the fact-value / is-ought gap. Neo-naturalists try to bridge this gap by suggesting that morality does have an obvious factual content, namely the flourishing of human beings 3. They therefore suggest that we can give a simple test to show whether our values are indeed facts The test is: Does what | want to do contribute to the flourishing of human beings? If it does, itis good Jright.Ifit doesn't, itis bad / wrong Try this sequence: PI Hitler killed 6 million Jews during WW2 fact P2 the content of morality is the flourishing of fact human beings P3 killing 6 million Jews does not contribute fact to the flourishing of human beings Pa therefore Hitler was a bad man value 4. This appears to get over the fact-value /is-ought gap, because ‘the flourishing of human beings’ in P2/P3 becomes a factual premise rather than a value 5. Ethical Non-Naturalism stil leaves plenty of room for ethical discussion, because it isn't always clear what contributes to the flourishing of human beings and what doesnt 6. Some argue that the flourishing of human beings is too narrow to be the content of ethics, and that it doesn't stop us doing nasty things to non-humans, e.g. animals and the envionment. Do you think however, that cruelty to animals and damaging the environment would contribute to the flourishing of human beings? 7. The practical value of Neo-Naturalism is that ethics is objective, not absolute. It therefore gives us a tool to gain insist into high moral standards and values. Many hold that this is crucial in the modern world, where both polticians and religious leaders have allowed a decline in moral standards. This last point, concerning the differences between absolutism and objectivism, brings us to the first of the two sections required for study in the Pre-U Part 1 - the contrast between moral absolutism and moral relativism, The contrast between moral absolutism and maral relativism There are many accounts of morality which hold that moral values are absolute and / or objective, e.g Plato held that moral judgements are absolute, based on the unchanging Form of the Good. Reason allows Us to access these moral judgements. Kant held that we have @ moral ‘faculty’ that allows us to see the contrast between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives have the form ‘If... then’, e.g. if you want to become an engineer, then study maths and physics. If you want to be happy, then read Kant’s Grundlegung ur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) in the original German. Hypothetical imperatives thus refer to instrumental goods - things that are good as a means to an end These contrast with the intrinsic good of the categorical imperative: Do x/ Do not do y - Honour your parents 7Do not murder. Moral judgements are synthetic a priori, meaning (very basically) that they are accessible to pure reason but we can be wrong about them. We establish moral rules by subjecting moral propositions to a series of tests centred on the notion of universalisability. Those that pass the tests are accepted as absolute, universal, unbreakable rules Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 23 Teacher Guide 24 Divine Command Theory This is a version of naturalism which holds that what is right is what God commands, and since God is ‘omnipotent and omniscient, God's moral commands are likewise universal and absolute Absolutist theories such as these tend to emphasise: + that morality is in the act itself, and not in the consequence + that morality is therefore about one’s inner mental state ~ one’s motive + that an act which produces a beneficial result without the appropriate mental attitude is not a good act ‘+ that morally good behaviour may have rewards in an afterlife (not all absolutist theories maintain this, but most do). Aside from the problems faced by individual absolutist theories such as those of Plato, Kant and divine command theory, there are obvious weaknesses with all such theories, ¢.g ‘1. They rely on appeal to a religious or metaphysical entity — the Forms, or God; but since neither the Forms nar God can be observed, we have no guarantee that they exist, so theories which refer to them not based on firm foundations to begin with. Kant also has metaphysical assumptions about the noumenal world, about the necessity of human freedom, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, all of which impact to some extent on his theory of ethics. 2. No two absolutist philosophers appear to agree on what set of absolute moral laws should govern our behaviour, nor on what to do where moral absolutes conflict. 3. To be good, people have to exercise a free as opposed to a constrained moral choice, but having absolute moral rules in effect removes that freedom 4. The case for moral relativism seems stranger, to most, than that for moral absolutism: The following section considers the contrast primarily by looking at the case for moral relativism: Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of moral relativism: descriptive, meta-ethical, and normative Descriptive Maral Relativism (Cultural relativism) Descriptive relativism is the study of cultural and moral diversity - it simply describes what different moral rules and values different societies have, without making any judgement about whether these are ‘ight’ or ‘wrong’. Some cultures clearly do have different practices — some practise (or have practised) infanticide, polygamy, cannibalism, child marriages, male and female circumcision, and so on. In other words, beliefs and values differ between cultures, and what is thought to be right in one culture might be considered wrong in another. This descriptive account of moral diversity is called the Diversity Thesis, and is simply a social and anthropological analysis of what happens in the world. The Diversity Thesis often leads scholars to accept a Dependency Thesis, which is that moral right and wrong depend upon the concepts, beliefs and values of that society, and since these differ, all moral judgements are therefore relative Meta-ethical Relativism As we saw in the discussion of meta-ethics above. itis very difficult to find agreement between ethicists about the meaning of moral language. The most likely conclusion from this seems to be that there i no commonly accepted definition of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ In that case, in the same way that cultural relativism suggests that all moral judgements are culturally dependent, meta-ethical moral relativism appears to reach the same conclusion. Hence we are led to normative moral relativism Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Normative Moral Relativism Normative ethics means the debate about what kind of behaviour we should encourage or discourage in our society. A norm means a ‘normal (moral) standard’, so normative ethics asks: What kind of behaviour should we accept or reject? By contrast with absolutist systems, relativists generally hold that the goodness of an act lies in its consequences, that good, bad, right and wrong therefore depend on the situation, and that moral behaviour is an entirely empirical affair, and has nothing to do with any metaphysical entity or being such as God Normative relative theories often take different approaches, e.g ‘1. some hold that morality should be an issue for individual cultures to decide, without interference from others. 2. some argue that human nature is such that all humans should, through common sense, emphasise one predominant facet of that nature, e.g a. Utiitarians hold that humans are dominated by the twin goals of the pursuit of pleasure / happiness and the avoidance of pain / misery, so what is good depends on what generates the greatest amount of pleasure / happiness over pain / misery in the situation, b. Virtue ethicists hold that humans generally operate through prizing and instantiating particular virtues, such as: courage, justice, moderation, and so on, so we can see what is good by observing virtuous people in action. Situation ethicists hold that the primary human drive is love, so good behaviour means doing the most loving thing in the situation 3. Some hold that, if carried to its logical conclusion, there can be no agreed interpretation of moral relativism, since there can be no definition of good / bad, right / wrong, that avoids subjectivism. Moral agreement simply does not exist, e.g. some cultures abhor genocide, in others it has been practised throughout history with the consent or the indifference of the majority. If subjectivism is true, then there can be no grounds for requiring any specified behaviour beyond pragmatic grounds Itis up to the individual to work out a pragmatic approach to ethics, which might be as basic as, ‘ve and let lve’ Is Moral Relativism right? + Cultural relativism is clearly on strong ground in claiming that humans in different cultures do not all share the same values. Trying to intervene in the moral affairs of other cultures over issues like polygamy and child marriage is held by many to be unacceptable. + The complete lack of agreement over meta-ethics suggests that moral absolutism is wrong. otherwise there would be little or no disagreement about so-called absolute rules. If absolutism is wrong, then only relativism is left. + The fact that normative ethics offers so many competing theories suggests that none of them is right, 0 the only issue is the relativist one of how we reach some form of practical agreement about ethics 50 as to enable societies to function ‘+ Onthe other hand, moral relativism entails that there can be no compelling ctiticism of practices such as, burning witches, human sacrifice or torturing the innocent, so moral relativism is conceptual as well as cultural. Do we really want to say this? Do we really want to subscribe to what Mary Midgley described as the morality of oafs and depressives? + Ifthere can be no real criticism of such practices, why is it that when challenged, many of them are discontinued? Is it reasonable to hold that those who undergo death by burning, or torture, would consent to such practices if given the choice? + Ifthe natural end-product of moral relativism is subjectivism, then would people (other than philosophers) really want to live in societies governed by nothing beyond an undefined moral pragmatism? + If moral absolutism is false, this does not entail that some form of objectivism is true, e.g. that ‘good’ is that which improves the welfare of the ecosystem as a whole. People could subscribe to such an ethic either for altruistic or for selfish reasons. As Peter Singer observes, moral rules may not be absolute in reality, but they are absolute and objective for persons. For those who want to pursue the idea that morality does not exist, see for example: Joel Marks: An Amoral Manifesto, published in two parts in the magazine Philosophy Now, Issue 80 (Aug/Sept 2010, pp.30-33) and 81 (OctiNov 2010, pp.23-26) Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 25 Teacher Guide 26 Divine command theory DCT and Euthyphro's dilemma The point of this section is to investigate the rationality of claims that human morality is commanded by God The peculiarity of the claim can be expressed in all sorts of ways, and these are expressed through Euthyphro’s dilemma, which is voiced by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro. For a summary of Euthyphro, see for example: ‘+ http:academic.udayton.eduWilliamRichards/intro%20essays/Euthyphro%20summary.htm The dilemma, expressed in terms of its implications for philosophical theism, amounts to this crucial question: Does God command the good because it is good, or is it good because itis commanded by God? The problem is further explained by the fact that whichever answer is given produces an answer that is, unacceptable to theism ‘If God commands the good because it is good, then this can only be because God recognises that ‘the good’ is good far its own sake, in which case God has to acknowledge the authority of the moral law, and is subject to it, and thereby loses omnipotence; 2. If the good” is good just because God commands it, then ‘the good’ is nothing more than something arbitrarily commanded by God. If God's specification of ‘the good’ is arbitrary, then God is arbitrary, and loses omnibenevolence ‘Whether (1) is accepted or (2), therefore, God loses either omnipotence or omnibenevolence. Hence Euthyphro’s question, when addressed to philosophical theists, poses a dilemma: sacrifice God's omnipotence or sacrifice God's omnibenevolence. In either case, we end up with a God who is not God, since one of the key attributes of God has to be discarded. (1) is what Socrates’ opted for, and it also underpins Aquinas’ Natural Law system, but despite such support, there are obvious problems with it, e.g. ‘© Moral law exists as distinct from God, and so is not willed by God, and so the moral law is, equally with God, necessary. God's free willis compromised, as nothing can be commanded which is contrary to the moral law. God loses omnipotence in the sense that what is evil cannot be commanded, and by so commanding it make it good. + Ifthe moral law is independent of God, then God's existence is not required in order to account for morality. The moral argument for the existence of God, which Kant thought the only argument for God's existence to have any substance (aside from his admiration and awe of the starry heavens above him) therefore fails. (@) amounts to Divine Command Theory, which we discussed earlier, i. that that which is right is right because God commands i. Divine Command Theory is also called Voluntarism, since morality is held to depend entirely on God's will This entails that when God commanded Abraham to kill Isaac, that action became right simply because God willed it. Equally, when God commanded the slaughter of the Egyptian first-born, that action similarly became right even though most of us find it morally repugnant. The problems with Divine Command Theory / Voluntarism are enormous: «If God commands moral laws arbitrarily, then anything can become good and anything can become bad merely because God commands it. So if God commands the ritual slaughter of 1 in 5 three-year olds, this must be good; and if God forbids helping those in trouble, then helping those in trouble becomes bad. Since this is complete nonsense to any intelligent person, it iS complete nonsense, so Divine Command Theory is complete nonsense ‘+ Moreover if Divine Command Theory entails that if God can command what is normally evil to become good, then in effect God can do the logically impossible. Descartes took this view, arguing that since God created the truths of logic and maths, he could make circles with unequal radii, or make (Euclidean) triangles whose intetnal angles ware greater or less than 180 degrees, Philosophical logic suggests that such possibilties are linguistic muddles — they are improper uses of language which have no more meaning in the real world than the words thsio kkys ala mmmerpv convey meaning to anyone who reads them «If God commands moral laws arbitrarily, then they can be commanded without reason, but if God commands moral laws without reason, then there is no reason for us to obey them any more than God had reason to make them. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide «There is in fact one reason, in Divine Command Theory, for humans to obey arbitrary moral laws, namely to avoid hall and to achieve heaven, since religious literature makes it clear that these depend on obedience to God's laws. But if getting to heaven depends on obeying a set of arbitrary rules, then God can hardly be worth worshipping, and is no better than a tyrant. + One counter-objection to this is that obedience to God is a matter of common-sense prudence. This was the view taken by the French philosopher / mathematician Blaise Pascal, who articulated his own voluntarist belief in the form of a bet (Pascal's Wager) that humans are imprudent not to take This is worth studying. + Divine Command Theory is seff-contradictory because it claims that moral laws are absolute and necessary. But if God wills the moral law arbitrarily, then the laws that can be willed can vary from world to world, in which case no moral laws can be absolute or necessary. + If moral goodness depends on obedience to God's will, then the claim that God is morally good is nonsense, since it means nothing more than that God obeys his own commands. Leibniz puts it another way: it would be pointless to praise God for being good in doing what he does, because we would have to praise him equally if he had done something completely different + Divine Command Theory fas foul of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and the ‘is-ought’ gap. It is a good exercise for leamers to use the notes on this in the section on meta-ethics to find out why. Answers to Euthyphro’s dilemma These might offer a restricted version of Divine Command Theory. See, for example «+ http:/Mentativeanswers blogspot. com/2009/09/god-ethics-and-euthyphros- dilemma htm! ‘+ http:/en wikipedia. orghwiki/Euthyphro_dilemma One obvious answer to Euthyphro’s dilemma is that God has nothing to do with human morality beyond being the creator of the universe. See: John Frye: ‘A Personal Perspective on the Problem of Evil, Parts 1 and 2: Dialogue, a Journal of Religion and Philosophy, ed. J. Hall & J. Waters: Issue 35, November 2010, Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 27 Teacher Guide 28 Foundational Debates: the nature of belief The primary issue to be looked at here is the question of whether there are religious beliefs that can be said to be ‘properly basic’. This is part of the wider epistemological issue of whether any beliefs can be said to be properly basic, ie. whether or not there are beliefs that can be held to be true without question, whether they are held rationally or empirically. The rationalist / empiricist is visible in the theological / philosophical debate about belief, since some hold that belief requires evidence in order to be properly basic, whereas others take a fideistic position, that religious experience is itself properly basic. There is a divide, then, between evidentialists or strong rationalists on the one hand and fideists on the other. These are not mutually exclusive positions. An evidentialist will not automatically reject the power of religious experience, and those who accept the primacy of religious experiance might see evidentialist approaches as being a supplementary backup to faith, Strong rationalism as an approach to faith contrasted with fideism Evidentialism holds that beliefs are properly basic only i they are supported by reasonable evidence Reasonable evidence’ might be provided, for example, by the cosmological and design arguments for the existence of God. Strong Foundationalism is the strongest form of evidentialism, since it requires beliefs to be supported on the strongest foundation. According to strong foundationalism, beliefs are properly basic only if they are self evident (2.9. this is an elephant) or incorrigible (obvious to someone personally, such as, | fee! pain in my ear) Itis not obvious, however, that fideism is any more persuasive. Fideism is the theological position that results from having a ‘reformed epistemology’ — ‘reformed’ in the sense that fideistic epistemology rejects a ‘normal’ (empirical) basis for knowledge of God, and claims instead that religious belief needs no verification, but is instead self-authenticating by the power of religious experience and conviction. Reformed epistemology rejects rational philosophy, holding that personal experience of God can be so ‘overpowering that itis all that is needed to make beliefs properly basic. Hence thare are several accounts of reformed epistemological positions that rely on the power of faith — so in turn fideism literally means faith- ism, in which faith without evidence is generally seen as more virtuous than faith based on evidence Reformed epistemological views that might usefully be investigated include + The German-Lutheran theologian Rudolf Otto who characterised religious experience as a tremendous mystery, ineffable, numinous, like a tide, ecstatic and God is ‘wholly other’ +The American theologian Alvin Plantinga (Reason and Belief in God) - there are ordinary basic beliefs (e.g. | had porridge for brealfast or Jim looks miserable) and less ordinary basic beliefs (e.g God exists). Since a person needs no evidence beyond thair own thoughts for accepting ordinary basic beliefs, they don't need any evidence beyond their own thoughts for accepting God's existence +The American theologian William Alston — sense experience is the essential basis for our knowledge of the world: religious experience is the essential basis for our knowledge of God. Alston calls these 'M-beliefs’ (M for ‘manifestation’, by which we can come to know that God loves us, and 0 on. So long as M-beliefs don't make you do silly things, we are justified in believing them, «The American psychologist William James argued that religious experience is nostic, transitory, passive and ineffable. Above all, itis primary, and organised religion and creeds are secondary. Philosophy therefore has no power to cause people to doubt their religious beliefs, since religious experiences are absolutely compelling for those who have them. There are obvious problems with both evidentialism, strong foundationalism and reformed epistemology: Evidentialism and strong foundationalism can provide no indisputable evidence for the existence of God This is quite clear, since even some Christians reject some of all of the arguments for the existence of God. Reformed epistemology seems vacuous, since it can justify any belief. On Plantinga’s view, we can believe (lke Linus in the Peanuts cartoons) that God is the Great Pumpkin who rises out of Linus’ pumpkin patch at Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Halloween. Alston’s preference seems litle better, since who decides what is sensible and what is not? ‘William James’ comment that philosophy has no power to cause people to doubt their beliefs may be as regrettable as itis true, since indubitable beliefs may have no reality beyond the imagination. Faith is the expectation that your belief system is true. It also incorporates the question of how you act on that system. The faith system for foundationalists is strong rationalism, e.g. Plato, Aquinas, Kant; that for reformed epistemologists is fideism. The problem is that there seems no way of supporting a preference for one rationalist of fideist system over another. Time can usefully be spent comparing Plato, Aquinas and Kant, for example. For the fideists, Kierkegaard and Tillich are interesting for their ‘leap of faith’ scenarios, along with Pascal. Itis also informative to read Nietzsche's comments on Plato, Kant and Pascal (e.g. in Beyond Good and Evi In order to avoid the excesses of strong rationalism and fideism, some theists prefer to take the stance of critical rationalism, which insists that beliefs must be rational and not go against empirical science, e.g. in the creation debate. Some insist that this leaves us with a ‘God of the gaps’, although at least critical rationalism might avoid some of the excesses of those whose views inform them that they can never be wrong. Another way of expressing the debate about belief systems is to consider approaches to religious scriptures, This is important, since both rationalists and foundationalists appeal to scripture for confirmation of their views. Revelation: propositional and non-propositional Auseful overview of this debate is provided in John Hick's Philosophy of Religion. Hick begins with an overview of the limits of rationalism, particularly the limits of Cartesian scepticism, which might be considered perverse (although many contemporary epistemologists think otherwise). Hick goes on to say that from the point of view of a faith that is biblical, the theistic proofs for the existence of God are irrelevant, since even if God's existence could be inferred from universally accepted premises (which it cannot), this would be of merely academic interest to those who believe that they have a personal relationship with Gad and know him as a living presence. Hick refers (ominously for the rationalists) to Pascal's Memorial which was a confession of faith found after his death, and sewn into the lining of his coat, which referred to the 'God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers’ (Hick p.51), and concludes that we must investigate the claim that this God manifests himself ‘within the sphere of human experience’ through divine revelation. The response to divine revelation is faith. Accordingly, Christian thought contains two very different understandings of the nature of revelation, of faith (as the human reception of t) and of theology (as discourse based on revelation), namely the propositional and the non-propositional view. The propositional view is that scripture is a body of truths expressed as statements or propositions that have been authenticated by God, communicated to God through means beyond the ordinary course of nature. Faith amounts to an obedient acceptance of these truths. Such truths are ‘revealed theology’, and are to be contrasted with ‘natural theology’, which is what humans can work out through reason and observation. For example, the doctrine of the Trinity is revealed theology, since it cannot be arrived at by reason or observation. The propositional view accepts that there is an evidential gap between what is believed and what can be known, and the commonest way of filing that gap is by an act of the will hence the prevalence of the voluntarist views of faith that we have referred to above, e.g. Pascal and William James. Hick also discusses Tillch’s conception of faith as ‘ultimate concern’, which some might judge to be rather strange The non-propositional view, which became widespread within Protestant Christianity during the 20° Century, is that revelation is not a body of truths about God, but is God himself coming within the orbit of human experience by acting in human history. Hick dubs this the heilsgeschichtliche (salvation-history) view. in which humans attempt to understand the significance of revelatory events. Such a view emphasises the personal nature of God, and also the human freedom to respond to God in love, or not to respond at all. Humans are created in a spatio-temporal relation to God (Hick’s notion of an epistemic distance) so as to preserve freedom. So faith is the ‘correlate of freedom’ (p.61). Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 29 Teacher Guide 30 ‘Within the non-propositional view there is a corresponding view of the Bible and of theology. The Bible is not 0 much the Word of God (as in the propositional view), but is the primary witness to the Word — the human witness of God's incarnation through Jesus, as expressed in the Johannine Prologue. The whole historical arena covered by the Bible shows the human consciousness of God acting in history, the ‘canon’ of this body of writing being defined (in the New Testament) by writings of Apostolic origin and authority. The theological impact of such a view entails the rejection of the distinction between natural and revealed theology. In fact natural theology is rejected, since whereas the proper arena for understanding the material world is empiricism, the only basis for religious knowledge is that revealed by God. The role of reason is that of faith seeking understanding’ (Anselm). Sacred Texts As with the material on propositional and non-propositional views of revelation, there is a lot of internet material available about the inspiration of scripture, for example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiBiblical_inspiration Material on sacred texts, inspiration and authority is best tackled through a centre's own resources, supported by Philosophy of Religion textbooks. Learners should consider, for example, how fundamentalist, liberal and conservative views about scriptural inspiration relate to propositional and non-propositional views of scripture. It would be useful for them to have an overview of text, literary and form criticism so that they are aware of the complexities of text study. The Judaeo-Christian concept of God is awe-inspiringly complex because of its diversity. The key problems associated with the Judaeo-Christian God include the following The biblical portrait of God shows an evolution in thinking The earlier texts do not, except on a faith-driven interpretation, show any awareness of monotheistic thinking about Yahweh. For example some Christian theologians attempt to place the Christian Trinity into the Genesis creation narrative, particularly in 1:26: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our ikeness’, where ‘us’ is taken to refer to the three Persons of the Trinity. This can be argued only as an article of faith, for a number of reasons + ‘Us’ refers to the well-known Ancient Near-Eastern concept of God and the heavenly council — an attendant body of deities whose function was to operate at the command of the leader of that council, which in the Canaanite traditions was El. The heavenly court functioned on the analogy of the court of the human king, so the words in Gen. 1:26 signify Yahweh conferring with his council of attendant gods + The Genesis creation narratives are based on a much older Assyrian and Babylonian cycle of tradition - the Enuma Elish — in which this concept also governs the material. ‘+ In1:27, the creation of humans in the likeness of the gods is emphasised by the fact that humans were created male and female, as with the attendant deities in the heavenly court Monotheism, as such, might be said to appear in the writings of the (presumably exilc) prophet Second Isaiah, although this is stil debatable. According to most scholars, the Book of Job post-dates Second Isaiah, but Job uses as its framework the concept of Yahweh in his heavenly council. One of that council is the satan— not the Satan of later Judaism, but a god whose function was to ‘accuse’ (hassatan means ‘accuser’) humans of their crimes. Moreover the God of the Bible is not the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God of later philosophical thinking. Yahweh carries out a series of actions which can only be regarded as morally reprehensible, such as the extinction of the mass of humanity and other species in the Flood (a story lifted almost in its entirety from the earlier Babylonian Epic of Gilgamesh), the extermination of the Egyptian firstborn, and so on: the list is vast. Leamers should cross-reference here to the critique of Divine Command Theory. Any omniscient deity must know the future, or at the very least must know the likely consequences of giving humans free will, so the whole concept of disobedience to God's will is an odd one, made even odder by the concept of punishment in hell for disobedience. ‘Some may counter that all of this misses the point, and that what we have in the Bible is, as we mentioned in discussing the non-propositional view of scripture, the human understanding of God, which can of course be sequential Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide The important things about the God of the Judaeo-Christian scriptures might therefore be said to include the ideas that God + is personal © answers prayer + reveals himseff to humans in history, particularly through the Incamation of Jesus + desires human obedience to his moral commands. These commands can be seen’ © inthe ethical teaching the Old Testament, which centres on the Law of Moses, particularly the Ten Commandments © the ethical teaching of the New Testament, seen in the ethics of Jesus, The gospels and of St Paul + has a purpose for the universe The authority of scripture therefore lies in revealing these ideas to humans, The God of faith is largely seen as the God of the Bible, and not so much in the God defined by philosophy. As Pascal said — the God of faith is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, not the God of the philosophers. The attributes or predicates of the God of philosophical theism are different from those of the God of the Bible. Describing God through predicates is largely a logical and evidential way of looking at God. For example, God is conceived of as being omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, and many Christians believe that itis necessary for God to have at least these three attributes in order to be worthy of worship. Nevertheless as we said above, the view of God in the Bible has an evolutionary aspect to it, and since the canon of scripture was closed nearly 2000 years ago, philosophical Christianity has added to that development. In modern Christianity, therefore, there are conceptions of God and of God's authority that are more complex than those in the Bible. Three examples of this include: ‘1. Philosophers (like Aquinas) generally think of God as being outside space and time, primarily because to create the universe, God needs to be external to the universe. Thus in much modern Christian thought, God is thought of as utterly transcendent — spaceless, timeless, bodiless, immutable, impassible and perfect. At the same time, God is immanent within space-time, for example through the person of Jesus. 2. Deists believe that an omnipotent God created the universe, modelled it on scientific laws, and then left itto develop. Humans also have free will to develop and improve through their own unfettered choices and actions. Hence if moral and natural evils are to be controlled, they will be so through human science for the latter and human choice for the former. There are no miracles and no direct, acts of intervention by God, since these would contravene God's natural (scientific) laws and human free will. Scripture is for human consideration and reflection, but contains no direct instructions or commands, since understanding the Bible as having that kind of authority (and inspiration) would again contravene human free will 3. 20" Century Process theologians (among others) have reasoned that God cannot be bath ‘omnipotent and omnibenevolent, otherwise God would control evil: they therefore see God as emergent alongside the universe, appealing to the view of creation discussed above. in which God's creative acts are confined to ordering the chaos of pre-existent matter. Process theologians see God as the fellow-sufferer who understands’, and who seeks to persuade humans to love him rather than exercising direct power and authority. The Christian view of God is, then, enormously complex, and Christians have a huge variety of shades of opinion about God's nature, about how that nature is revealed in scripture, and about how God shows his authority both in the world and through scripture. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 34 Teacher Guide 32 Foundational Debates: conscience, free will & determinism The function of this section of the Syllabus is to introduce learners to a variety of understandings of conscience, ranging from religious definitions to those from psychology and other disciplines. Conscience The depth to which this is done, and the question of what to consider, is of course up to centres and learners. Considering the following would be a reasonable foundation: Religious views Augustinian tradition Conscience as innate, put there by God, so amounting to innate knowledge of God's moral laws; aided by grace, which operates only through the correct motive of love of God There are many problems with Augustine, including: those who have never heard God's commands cannot be morally accountable, issues about free wil falling foul of Euthyphro's dilemma, the fact that the innate conscience seems to work only haphazardly, etc Thomist tradition Based in Natural Law and being fully human — using reason as the basis of morality. What is innate is a wish to do good and to avoid evil (the ‘synderesis rule’); so conscience is reason deciding what's right and wrong in connection with Natural Law. Reason can make mistakes, so needs to be informed about biblical / church rules, Comments on Aquinas: some acts are judged to be intrinsically evil, so the conscience can be left stranded. Aquinas does avoid Euthyphro’s dilemma, since God is not a moral agent; but the theory of Natural Law may be false, and the synderesis rule may be false. Kant Rejects religious ideas about conscience because they go against the autonomy of the moral law. Conscience is a faculty that tells us right from wrong, working through the categorical imperative Kant's ideas are unique but odd: God squeezes in the back door through the summum bonum; how do we know we have a moral faculty? Psychological views Bishop Butler ‘Conscience is in human nature rather than simply in reason. It uns on the two principles of prudence and benevolence, and is the part of the hierarchy of the self which arbitrates between prudence and benevolence. Egoism (contra Kant) is as necessary as altruism; both should be kept in balance by the conscience. Conscience works intuitively, like an art dealer judging which of two paintings is original, Freud Conscience is one aspect of the super ego. The super ego is a precipitate from childhood/parents, and forms unconsciously within the ego. It also embraces racial, national and familial traditions and social milieu. It works essentially through guilt, because we work through pleasure, and the conscience will not let us achieve all our desires. Our awareness of this conflict is the origin of the guifty conscience. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Sociological and evolutionary views For the former, conscience is the social conditioning that the group brings to bear on the individual, e.g Durkheim's view that God is a projection of society's powers and belief in God gwes indwiduals a moral obligation to obey society's demands. Conscience is simply the perception of loyalty towards the group. To say that someone has no conscience is simply to say that they are socially maladjusted. This view is, reinforced by the evolutionary view that conscience is a mechanism whereby the group grows stronger. Itis a survival mechanism through adherence to shared moral values. This is often rejected on the grounds that great moral teachers (2.g. the prophets and Jesus) stood outside the group to criticise it. Nevertheless the idea that the prophets (and Jesus) stood outside the group is only one reading of the Old Testament and New Testament. Most prophets appear to have operated through the normal mechanisms of the cult. There is no indication that Jesus stood outside the Judaism of his day. The sociological / psychological / evolutionary synthesis has good explanatory power. The psychological view makes sense, particularly that of Butler — one learns altruism through egoism. Reason obviously plays a part in moral awareness, although not all reasoning is sane, so an abnormal psychology can do very good or very bad things. Conscience might fairly be described as human rationality deciding what to do when the answer is not immediately obvious, so the processes of conscience can be both conscious and unconscious. For the latter, psychological views are convincing The concept of a conscience depends, of course, on the operation of a free will, since one common factor in explanations of the conscience is that we are free to obey it or to disobey. This forms the basis of the next section. Free will and Determinism The section deals with the debate between Libertarianism, Hard Determinism and Soft Determinism about whether the universe is determined and whether humans are free The following gives one suggested outline of how this section might be dealt with. The outline contains the basic concepts that could be covered. Centres are of course free to augment this from the mass of modern literature on this subject, although some of that is beyond the scope of Pre-U study. = rational agents have control over the will inism — all human action is caused by preceding events, and not by the exercise of the will The background in the epistemological debate Determinism and free will contrast with Aristotelian empiricism and Platonic rationalism / Plato's doctrine of antitheses / Forms. This opposition lies between the world of changing and corruptible material objects and the world of unchanging, perfect, metaphysical Forms Metaphysical ideas can encompass the concept of mind acting on matter, including that of the mind directing the material processes of the brain through free mental choices, Cartesian substance dualism This reinforces the contrast between the empirical emphasis on matter that is physical, has extension in space, changes and decays, and includes the brain; contrasted with mind, which is non-physical, unextended, immortal, and includes the concept of mind. Again, itis the mind that is the agent of cognition. Mat lism v. Dualism Materialism: + only material objects exist matter acts. For humans, all there is, is the brain and central nervous system every aspect of thinking reduces to the movement and arrangement of sub-atomic particles materialism has a monist understanding of persons materialism is essentially determinist: all material objects are subject to the laws of cause and effect (assuming there are any), including mental events all events reduce to the behaviour of matter relations between humans reduce to biological, physical and chemical entities there is no unobservable, private ‘sel’ left over. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 33 Teacher Guide 34 Dualism: mind acts on matter © mind / soul therefore directs the brain + in dualism, you can therefore have an agent of the will an "’, or self, who can make or initiate rational choices and decisions this is the process of volition (so ‘voluntarism’, from volens, ‘will) in dualism, the '' is non-reducible, and is a free agent, ie. thoughts are the effect: the 'T' is the cause of the thoughts in the brain + the 'is ‘causa sui’— the cause of itself i.e. nothing else causes itto think - it freely and generate thoughts through choice + in materialist philosophy, by contrast, all there is, is the thought + some translate Descartes cogito as, ‘there is a thought’ Where lies the truth? Most of the evidence from studies in areas such as physics, neuroscience, psychology and genetics convince the appropriate researchers in those fields that determinism is true. The fact that scientific laws appearto be ubiquitous suggests that Determinism is true But ‘folk psychology’ (common sense philosophy) assumes freedom of the will, and that assumption is without doubt the most popular amongst those without a technical knowledge of the debate. Otherwise whole swathes of human concams are meaningless, e.g. about truth, moral values, relationships, life after death and so on Determinism suggests that all such concerns are empty. For example genetic determinism assumes that human genes determine who we are at every level, including physically, emotionally and behaviourally The law rejects genetic Determinism Stephen Mobley (in Georgia, USA) used genetic determinism as his defence in a murder trial. He came from a Dutch family which he claimed had a gene that was responsible for his aggressive behaviour. The court rejected this and insisted that he had the free will to over-ride his genetic disposition. ‘The whole issue of freedom and Determinism is seen by many as the cri ethics. In dualist theories, the soul can survive death (2.9, through reincarnation or immortality), In most monist theories, there is no soul to survive death. Christianity is largely monist, however, and teaches resurrection of the body-soul issue in philosophy and Moreover the issue of life after death is linked to the issue of free moral choice. If persons are free moral agents, then their actions in this lfe are often held to govern what happens to them when they die. Humans are therefore seen as morally accountable, and clearly the notion of moral accountability makes no sense unless humans are free agents (think of Kant and the ‘ought’) This is a crucial issue, since if Determinism is true, there is no self that can be a free moral agent, so there can be no moral accountability. If there is no moral accountability, then people cannot be held to be accountable for their moral actions. If so, no authority can assume the right to punish others. How strong is the evidence for Determinism? Physical Determinism seems to follow inevitably from empirical science. All events in the universe are interconnected causally, and this seems to be the implication of both physics at the macro level and of quantum mechanics The equations in physics are time-bivalent (they work just as well backwards in time as they do forwards), so all current effects in the material universe can be traced back to the first cause of the universe. This has theological implications for Determinism, since an omniscient mind (God) would be able to predict the whole future of the universe from its first fact This includes predictions of mental events. For example, Hume suggests that there are two external causes of thought, neither of which needs a controlling agent ‘+ contiguity (one thought brings another into existence naturally) + sense experience (sense stimuli evoke corresponding thoughts). Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide So is theological Determinism true? Calvin should be studied in this respect. Is God's omniscience causal? It is often asserted that timeless omniscient God (see the preceding exercise on God's attributes) causes all events, including mental events, by foreseeing them The general answer to this is that an omniscient God would presumably be atemporal, so would see or observe the results of human future free choices but would nat cause them: God's omniscience would be acausal, not causal Psychological Determinism This argues that the purposes, needs and desires of individuals are central in explaining human behaviour e.g. BF. Skinner's behavioural analysis reduces all mental states to publically observable behaviour — stimulus and response. This doesn't necessarily make sense. Skinner has a materialist / positivist agenda. He cannot admit the existence of private mental ife, because to have a private mental ie suggests the existence of a self; yet there is no necessary correlation between a person's mental states and their public behaviour: people can laugh when internally they want to cry. The existence of qualia (the concept of what itis like to experience something) poses problems for Skinner's argument. For this, see, for example, Frank Jackson's 1982 article on ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ See the discussion in http:/en. wikipedia org/wiki/Mary’s_room and other sites. Moreover Skinner claims that all psychological states are the product of deterministic mechanistic states of the brain and central nervous system, and so are ultimately meaningless. If that is the case, then his claim that psychological states are meaningless is itself meaningless, so why should we listen to it? The main positions in the debate are those of Hard Determinism, Libertarianism, and Compatibilism (Soft Determinism) For Hard Determinism, see for example: Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Freud, Skinner, et al. For Libertarianism: Reid, Kant, et al For Compatibilism (‘Soft’ determinism): Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mil, Ayer, et al. The language of the debate varies according to the users: Incompatibilism Hard Determinism and Libertarianism are incompatibilist «Hard Determinism — if Determinism is true, then no human actions are free. Determinism is true, 50 no human actions are free + Libertarianism — if Determinism is true, then no human actions are free. Some human actions are free, so Determinism is false Compatibilism Hume: “By liberty ... we can only mean a power of acting or nat acting, according to the determinations of the will that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may, if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains, On this account, there can be no freedom except if Determinism is true, so Compatibilism holds: + Determinism is true = We are therefore free to act within the constraints of our nature. The best illustration of this asks you to imagine standing on a platform as a train comes in. In front of you is your greatest enemy. You have the opportunity, in the press of bodies, to push your enemy under the wheels of the train. If it is within your pre-determined nature to be able to push, then you are free to push. If tis not, you are not. Compatibilism is a very complicated approach, and time spent reading some of the literature, both book- based and internet-based, will be rewarding Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 35 Teacher Guide 36 One might make a case for saying that if Determinism is true, then the agent could not have chosen otherwise, since the agent's will ike every other event, is completely determined. Whether or not you will push your enemy under the wheels of the train is already pre-determined, Js Determinism true? This is one of the issues you need to decide. At the physical level of events, we don't know, in scientific terms. Itis often claimed that the quantum-mechanical world is indeterminate, but there is a difference between algorithmic determinism and non-computability. For example the movements of molecules in gaseous interactions are so incredibly complex that itis utterly incomputable, but that does not say that those movements are not deterministic: an omniscient mind could presumably know them. What about genetic Determinism? Presumably this is true to some degree, since genetics pre-determines all sorts of things about the product of sexual behaviour, but this does not entail that all mental events must be genetically determined. There is some evidence from neuroscience that the brain operates mechanically, but this is inconclusive This can be seen, for example, in the brain’s BP (Bereitschaftspotential- ‘readiness potential). In particular, experiments by Benjamin Libet during the 1980s concerning the relationship between consciousness and volition concluded that the BP started about 0.35 sec earlier than the subject's reported conscious awareness of the will o make a movement. Libet concluded that there is no freedom of the will to initiate movement However others use the same evidence to suggest that consciousness operates freely, and not mechanistically. They see hard materialism as a hangover from Newtonian science, with its mechanistic picture of virtually empty absolute space, which has led us to a machine- interpretation of the universe Material objects were seen as ‘iliard ball’ particles, so humans in turn were seen as aggregates of these particles, as having no freedom, and as being merely machines. 20*-century quantum mechanics changed this picture. The implications of the 2-slt experiment are that the world of quantum particles does not produce determinate experience: experience is the result of the interaction of intelligent / conscious observers with quantum mechanical systems. Qualia cannot be explained in deterministic terms — qualia need to be understood by an agent of experience To some, Determinism is paradoxical The determinist seeks to persuade the non-determinist that Determinism is true, and thus ought to be believed; but on the basis of Determinism, ‘ought’ has no meaning, because ‘ought’ means, ‘could and should have done otherwise’; but to do otherwise is impossible according to Determinism. Also, Determinism seems to be self-defeating. In order to determine whether or not Determinism is true there needs to be a rational basis for thought, otherwise no-one could know what is true or false. But Determinism assumes that thought is the product of non-rational causes (such as the environment), so all thought is non-rational. On this basis, no-one could ever know whether Determinism is true or not, $0 to argue that Determinism is true is self-defeating ‘Some see consciousness as the pre-requisite for free will Candidates should be introduced to Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment, which states that robotic, systems will never think because they are not self-aware. See, for example http:/iplato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ There seems litle doubt that any kind of judgement on free will and Determinism needs to await closer investigation from physics and neuroscience. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Epistemology This topic is examined in Paper 2 and this section of the Teacher Guide outlines the debates that learners should be familiar with. These focus on the problem of knowledge, most notably: © What is knowledge? © What, if anything, can be said to be known for certain? + How can it be known? Set texts that will be required for study include Berkeley's Dialogues, Hume's Enquiries (Sections II-VIll) & Russell's Problems of Philosophy. Scepticism The following items in the Syllabus form an interrelated whole rather than separate areas of study: = Why philosophers have raised doubts about the success of both empiricism and rationalism in understanding the world. + The role of philosophical doubt: Descartes’ search for knowledge that cannot be doubted © Global Scepticism: the question of whether or not anything can be known for certain, Study of rationalism and empiricism in Paper 1 will have set the scene for the study of epistemology. Empirical positions face a number of sceptical attacks, ranging from the problems of perception to the problem of induction. Equally, rationalism has difficulty convincing sceptics about the intuition / deduction thesis, innate ideas, metaphysics and so on. Scepticism is a wide ranging topic, so scepticism can be (for example) religious, philosophical or scientific. It can be local or global, on the one hand applying doubt for example to specific empirical and rational claims, and on the other to our claims to have knowledge at all Learners might find the following websites useful: www. philosophyonline.co.ukitok/scepticism8. htm http:N/plato. stanford. edu/entries/skepticism/ wwvw.iep.utm.edu/skepcont/ The point of studying scepticism is to consider the role of doubt in the search for knowledge. Previous sections have considered different ways of justifying beliefs, such as foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism. Scepticism asks whether any such justification is possible in the first place A.scheme of study might include the following’ + how ordinary incredulity or doubt differs from philosophical doubt + local doubt or scepticism as a challenge to justify our propositions about particular subject matter, or as ontological doubt about the existence of certain entities, for example: examples of sceptical arguments about perception, e.g. about perception (such as the brain in a vat hypothesis, arguments about illusions; disagreements over sense perceptions). contemporary radical or global epistemological scepticism Cartesian doubt as an attempt to find an absolute basis for knowledge or its success or failure Radical Pyrrhonian epistemological scepticism: no belief is more reasonable than its denial the closure principle or responses to global scepticism, e.g. Ryle, Wittgenstein, relibilism Radical scepticism is not a claim that ‘nothing can be known’, since that claim is logically incoherent in 80 far as the proposttion ‘nothing can be known’ provides at least one thing that can be known. Further, unless we know the meaning of the words with which epistemological arguments are formed. then the proposition that we know nothing cannot be understood, whereas clearly it can. Equally, radical scepticism is not a claim that ‘all beliefs are false’, which is similarly incoherent. Rather, the radical sceptic holds that the attempt to justify knowledge justifies only scepticism. The difficulty with knowledge-justification is in finding beliefs that can be held to be properly basic and therefore to be in need of no further justification Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 37 Teacher Guide 38 The relationship between knowledge, belief and justification There is no agreed definition of knowledge, although the classical definition, considered by Plato, is that knowledge is justified true belief. The websites below give useful overviews: http://en.wikipedia.org/wikivknowledge www. wordig.com/definition/knowledge There are problems with Plato, e.g. false beliefs, accidentally true beliefs or Gettier conditions. Does justification need to be infallible, or is fallbilty acceptable? Foundatianalism This is the view that all knowledge or justification should be based on a foundation of noninferential knowledge or justified belief Foundationalism rejects: ‘+ the infinite regress argument and the justification of knowledge through a noninferential foundation the proposed infallbility of foundational beliefs attempts to derive the infallible foundation fram beliefs or experience problems with such derivations the problem of descent into skepticism fallibilist claims concerning the foundation Coherentism This rejects the regress argument; the view that knowledge can be justified through a holistic process. Coherentism promotes the view that justification should be based on coherent evidence Choherentism rejects: + linear justification + the requirement for coherent sets of beliefs + the ‘multiple coherent sets’ objection to Coherentism. Reliabilism This is the view that justification is not about infallible or probabilistic evidence, but is about being produced by a reliable process. There are problems with this, including + difficulties in defining reliable processes the problem of reliable knowledge based on falsehood externalist reliabilism, tracking the causal chains that underpin knowledge internalist reliabilism problems with exteralist and internalist tracking Knowledge of the external world: theories of perception Kant attempted to bridge the gap between empiricism and rationalism by considering the role of the human mind in constructing reality and knowledge. According to Kant, for example, space and time are not objective, self-subsisting realities: they are pure intuitions. We cannot have a concept of space or time without referring to our experience of objects, and we cannot represent any objects without representing space or time. The only way of perceiving the world is spatio-temporally because any information we receive must be located spatially and temporally in relation to ourselves. In other words, space and time are mental constructs, During the 20 Century, the possibilty that the mind is inextricably bound up with the realities it perceives was brought into sharp focus by quantum mechanics, through which an experiment first performed by Thomas Young around 1803 was interpreted to show that to some extent the mind appears to condition the reality it experiences Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide For an excellent video representation of the implications of the two-slt experiment, see www.metacafe.comiwatch/4096579/dr_quantum_double_sit_experiment_entanglement/ The implications of this experiment for epistemology are fascinating. Reality as we encounter it at its most fundamental level— that of sub-atomic particles or strings ~ appears to form a probability wave — a sea of quarks moving forward in space-time, in which the probabilty wave is ‘collapsed’ into ‘hardened’ reality by the choices or mental states of observers. Knowledge is not simply an external concept by which brains act as passive receptors of empirical information: itis the product of an interaction between minds and objects Some solutions to the equations postulate the ‘many worlds’ interpretation of reality, in which the super- positional states of sub-atomic particles cater for different choices or different probabilities by creating an alternative universe or sets of universes in which the different resolutions of all super-positional states are realised. In this respect, scepticism may be an inappropriate response; or, rather, itis misdirected. Radical scepticism denies an adequate justification of belief, but if belief and empirical observation of the world are active rather than passive, then to that extent belief is its own justification. Quite how compelling this is, is yet to be seen, although its effects can be seen in post-modein epistemology, and with the emphasis that ‘truth’ is what coheres among those who discuss it, rather than something that corresponds with an objective reality. Gifted leamers can be directed into all sorts of interesting research avenues. For the basics, candidates are required to study realism, idealism and phenomenalism, The five senses and knowledge of the external world It does not matter whether learners begin with naive realism or with representative realism. In some ways it might be preferable to begin with representative realism, since this introduces learners to sense data, the latter generally being denied in naive realism, Naive realism A general schema for naive realism «the reality of material objects + naive realism as the common sense view + material objects can continue to exist and retain at least some of their properties which we perceive them as having, even when they are unperceived ‘+ scientific naive realism denies the latter claim, maintaining that some of the properties of material objects, such as taste, colour and smell, depend on the existence of a perceiver + problems for naive realism: ilusions, hallucinations and counter-arguments. Representative realism + through perception we are indirectly aware of physical / material objects through having direct awareness of internal, non-physical objects the concept of sensa/ sensibila / sense data / perceptions (whatever we call them) as mental images perceived directly in the mind, representing material objects, so giving indirect knowledge of the real world of physical or material objects appeal to introspection the time lag argument the argument from illusion / hallucination the argument from the complexity of the causal processes of perception Locke's argument based on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities / analysis of Locke the objection that representative realism leads to scepticism through the alleged redundancy of ‘real’ material objects the problem of showing that sensa / sense data exist Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 39 Teacher Guide 40 Berkeley's idealism: material abjects are simply ideas in the mind For Berkeley, reality is primarily mind-dependent. Material objects, in order to exist, must be perceived: esse est percipi (aut percipere) — ‘to be is to be perceived (of to perceive)’ so material objects cannot exist independently of minds Berkeley's objections to naive realism: secondary qualities are subjective / in the mind; and to representative realism: primary qualities are also in the mind, Material objects are bundles of ideas that we learn to associate with each other Berkeley as a reductive rather than an eliminative idealist The objection that if material objects do not exist, what causes perceptions? Berkeley's reply that the complexity and systematic nature of our perceptions requires that they are caused by anothar mind that of God. For the realist, material objects are continuous and independant; for Berkeley, they are continuous and dependent The objection that if material objects are simply ideas, then perceivers should not be able to distinguish between ideas in the mind and external material objects. With illusions such as a stick appearing to bend when entering water, for example, these show a difference between perception and the real world, so the real world must exist independently of people's perceptions of it Berkeley's reply that there is no real world corresponding to an illusion: all there is, is people's perceptions in which the stick looks bent. In any case, perception is non-voluntary and is caused by the mind of God. The objection that Berkeley's account of perception entails that when objects are not being perceived they do not exist: this is counter-intutve, since a fire that has burned down during an interval when a perceiver has left the room has clearly continued to exist unperceived during that interval. Berkeley's reply that God's omnipresence guarantees the consistency of perception. the objection that Berkeley wants us to choose between absolute mind or absolute matter, whereas it may be that the two integrate: for example we might want to say that energy can manifest itself both as mind and as matter There are many other objections to Berkeley which learners can be encouraged to consider, not least that God is the real presupposition of his epistemology: his explanation of the continued existence of material objects when unperceived therefore relies on a dubious metaphysical explanation. One focal point for leamer comprehension when studying realism, idealism and phenomenalism is precisely that point namely what happens to material objects when they are unobserved Many epistemologists prefer phenomenalism in so far as itis thought to give a more credible answer to that question than that of Berkeley. Phenomenalism Phenomenalism holds that statements about material objects can be analysed in terms of statements describing sensory experiences. It takes its departure through considering the inadequacies of other theories of perception, claiming that we should not go beyond the evidence of the senses — material objects exist as permanent possibilities of sensation. Two different views are given by Mill, who viewed objects as permanent possibilities of sensation’ and Ayer who developed linguistic phenomenalism J.S. Mill and A.J. Ayer Mill's ‘metaphysical’ account of phenomenalism: material objects are permanent possibilities of sensation Ayer’s linguistic account: material objects are logical constructions, and their elements are sense data Objections to phenomenalism: ¢.g. Mills claim that sense experience habituates us to ‘permanent possibilties’ really cannot account for the orderly nature of sense data. The predictability of sense experience suggests that material objects really do exist, and this accounts, in part, for the predictive power of science Ayer’s account uses a clumsy system of ‘counterfactuals’ when trying to describe objects that are not being observed. In order to produce an adequate description of perception through linguistic phenomenalism, the list of counterfactuals would be infinite Phenomenalism has great difficulties in trying to specify counterfactuals for objects and events in the remote past Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide If (as Ayer claims) there are no ‘things in themselves’, and objects can be described by lists of sense data, it would seem that no coherent account can be given about other minds. Ayer's positivist agenda restricted knowledge to immediate experience, in which case how are we to make sense of other people's mental states? The main oddity of phenomenalism seems to be in its assertion of the permanent possibilities of sensation whilst at the same time denying that there is a permanent ground for those possibilities, namely the existence of a real physical world Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (974) 41 Teacher Guide 42 Philosophical and Theological Language This topic is designed to introduce learners to the study of philosophical and theological language, and to encourage them to explore the implications of different theories. This is covered in Paper 2 and set texts for study include Mitchell's The Philosophy of Religion and A J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. Language, meaning and truth The verification principle and its implications for the ethics and philosophy of religion is an important concept. Learners will beneft from understanding the background to the debate about verfication — its history in the aims of logical positivism to tie meaning to experience (and thus to eliminate religion and metaphysics) The following points support the verification principle: + following Hume's Fork, only the propositions of maths and logic, together with those that can be tested by sense experience, are allowed to be meaningful the debate is about meaning, and not simply about truth or falsity verification in principle and verification in practice Ayer’s contention that religious statements are not verifiable even in principle strong and weak verification. Ayer's conclusion that religious language is meaningless because there are no empirical observations which could show it to be true or false. Statements about a transcendent God can possess no literal significance. + Ayer’s critique of ethics / analysis of ethical statements. Normative ethical statements cannot be reduced to ethical concepts; nor are they absolute; assertions of value are nat scientific / statements of fact: their function is emotive. They do not reduce to radical subjectivism: subjectivists argue that moral judgements are assertions of feeling, whereas moral judgements are not assertions of anything - they are expressions of feeling: emotive ejaculations, Critique of the verification principle: ‘= the suggestion that it fails its own test / Ayer’s contention that as a criterion of - meaning, the principle is exempt from its own test + the elimination of a whole range of human culture, including poetry, aesthetics, ethics and theoretical science + Swinbume: some propositions are meaningful to a given person without his having any idea of what empirical observations could count against them (the toys in the toy cupboard, for example) + Hick: religious statements can be verified in principle - eschatological verification. Counter critique that this is asymmetrical verification ‘+ Braithwaite: religious statements are verifiable weakly because they are conative, expressing the believer's intention to act ethically by observing his moral behaviour Hare: religious statements do not need to be verified, since they are non-cognitive bliks Wittgenstein: Language Game analysis shows that itis not legitimate to use verificationism as an external assessment of religious propositions analysis of Ayer’s ethical emotivism. The suggestion that it trvialises ethics general effects of verficationism on the discussion of religious and ethical language Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide The falsification principle and its implications for the ethics and philosophy of religion The falsification principle + Karl Popper - falsification as a test of scientific theories + Flew and falsification: use of the falsification principle to attack religious language and belief. The strong falsification principle is not demonstrable, and as with strong verification, the strong falsification principle needs to be modified to falsification in principle. Wisdom's Parable of the Gardener. + Flew: religious statements such as ‘God loves us’, “God has a plan’, etc., seem to be vast cosmological assertions, but die a ‘death by a thousand qualifications. Non-falsifiability means non- truth Critique of the falsification principle = Hare's argument that religious statements are non-cognitive biiks. Flew's counter-argument. + Swinbume: the falsification principle is no more successful in discrediting religious propositions than the verification principle (more ‘toys in the toy cupboard’). + Mitchel’ Parable of the Stranger: religious statements are potentially falsifiable by the problem of evil and Flew’s response. + Hick — Parable of Celestial City ‘there are three successive sevens in the decimal solution of pi as an example of a proposition that (Ike religious assertions) can be verified i true but is unfalsifiable if false. Counter - this claim is not valid in maths. «Wittgenstein: religious propositions are not falsifiable by those who have no use for the religious language game; discussion of verification and falsification is pointless, The responses of philosophers of religion Leamers should consider the verification and falsification challenges, debates about whether religious language is cognitive or non-cognitive and the extent to which religious language can be said to be true Areas of study for this could include the following points: «Some philosophers conclude that religious language is meaningful non-cognitively, e.g. Hare and Braithwaite. Particularly Braithwaite's claims © that religious language amounts to conative statements of ethical intention © that this approach validates religion as a whole, and not the tenets of any one religion) Critique of Hare & Braithwaite Some conclude that religious language is meaningful cognitively: e.g, Mitchell that religious statements are verifiable and falsifiable cognitively on the analogy of trust; Hick, that religious language is verifiable eschatologically. Critique of Mitchell and Hick. Wittgenstein’s separate theory of meaning: religious language is one of a series of meaningful language games. Wittgenstein’s approach as generally non-cognitive. Critique of Wittgensteinian fideism. += D.Z. Philips: religious language is a self-authenticating non-cognitive language game. Critique of Philips. + Paul Tillch: religious language is symbolic. Symbols are non-cognitive, but God as ‘Being-Itself is non-symbolic and cognitive. J.R. Randall's analysis of symbol as norliteral language. Critique of Tillich and Randall + The status of truth claims’ in such interpretations: e.g. in what sense are non-cognitive claims true? The correspondence and coherence views of truth. Post modern views that religious ‘truth’ is part of a meta narrative / al realities are social constructs, ete. Understanding ethical language The debate about the meaning of the word ‘good’ in moral statements: + The view that good is a factual property; ethical naturalism; ethical non-naturalism + The view that good is non-cognitive: emotivist interpretations of ethical language; prescriptvist interpretations of ethical language + The implication of meta-ethies for normative ethics The analysis of Meta-ethics in Paper 1, gives a basis for study for this section. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 43 Teacher Guide a4 The understanding of God The use of myth, symbol and analogy to express human understanding of God Analogy Teachers could consider beginning with an overview of the debate about whether religious language is univocal, equivocal or analogical, ie. about how language might or might not apply to God. Myth Mythological language should not be automatically labelled as non-cognitive, since the function of myths generally springs from a cognitive core. For example in the Genesis creation narratives, aetiological myths are stories that explain natural curiosities about the world, for instance that snakes have no legs, that childbirth is painful, that languages are diverse, and so on. In this sense, myth amounts to theological speculation that has a cognitive intention. The myths of creation and flood are representations of much older cosmogonic myths ~ the Enuma Elish and the Epic of Gilgamesh — the Babylonian stories of creation and flood respectively. These explain the origins of the world, the diversity of species, and even the origins of death in relation to sexuality (for example Genesis assumes that the ‘sin’ of Adam and Eve is sexual knowledge: reproduction leads to children, so an assumed primordial state of human immortality was lost in favour of sexual awareness) The framework of myths becomes non-cognitive and symbolic whan myths are reinterpreted to express some archetypal view: so for example in the New Testament, the writers arguably applied the myth of the dying and rising god as an interpretation of who Jesus was. This raises one important point about what should be taught about myth. The requirement of the Syllabus is that myth should be studied as part of the human understanding of God. Cosmogonic myths suggest that reality can be understood only in relation to a divine realm, so myth is one part of thinking about God that is inevitably speculative. The scope of this is vast, and itis up to centres what they study. Bultmann’s call to demythologise the Bible did not intend to strip out its myths but to reinterpret them for Christians today: hence the myth of Jesus’ resurrection is the myth of the dying and rising god, used by the New Testament writers to warn that the Last Judgement was imminent. Now that (most) Christians no longer see that event as imminent, the myth needs to be reinterpreted for Christians today, in the sense that baptism into the Church is an act of resurrection ne common interpretation of the nature of God is that he is an ethical being who makes moral demands on people. In this respect, Braithwaite’s non-cognitive interpretation of scripture (‘An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief’, in Mitchell's Philosophy of Religion) argues that the real function of religious language is to express ethical intention. The point of the myth of the Virgin Birth is that God is held to relate in some personal way to humans; the point of the story being that we should revere motherhood: hence Mary is cast as an archetypally pure mother — as the mother of God Concepts of God This should include consideration of God as: omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient, creator, sustainer, both transcendent and immanent, perfect, simple. Learners should consider if these descriptions can be coherently applied to God? The analysis of Judaeo-Christian concepts of God in Paper 1, gives a basis for study for this section, Wittgenstein’s concept of language games On this kind of analysis, verification of religious language is intrinsic to the religious language game, so needs no justification by appeal to external criteria. Study of Wittgenstein’s theory of language games presents no special dificulties. It would be useful to incorporate D.Z. Philips’ comments on the subject, since these are required for study as part of one of the set texts (ch.7 of Mitchell, Philosophy of Religion). For the analysis of language game theory, three of the principle areas for analysis include ‘its allegedly fideistic status, in that it can be used to justify beliefs that are unscientific and trivial 2. its claim that no evidence is needed to support religious statements: people lose their faith precisely because something happens to them which provides evidence that their beliefs are wrong 3. arguments that theism can be defended cognitively, and that the proposition, ‘There is a God’ is a normal cognitive proposition. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Philosophy of Religion This topic is designed to introduce candidates to some of the central issues in the philosophy of religion Most notably, arguments for the existence of God; the nature, role and varieties of religious experience. Set texts for study include Polkinghorne’s Science and Creation and Hick's Evil and the God of Love Arguments for the existence of God For A Level orientated material, see Christopher Hamilton: Understanding Philosophy for AS Level, AGA, pub. Nelson Thornes, 2003. ISBN O- 7487-6660-3: Part 1, ‘Philosophy of Religion II Mike Atherton, Chris Cluett, Oliver McAdoo, David Rawlinson, Julian Sidoli: AQA Philosophy: AS, pub. Nelson Thornes, 2008/ ISBN978-0-7 487-8958-2: Section 4, The Philosophy of Religion’ Cosmological arguments for the existence of God For the cosmological argument, the presuppositions of the argument are crucial for its success or failure. For example the Kalam argument assumes that the universe has a beginning, whereas some accounts of the origins suggest that the existence of the universe is cyclic, although this does not deny the possibilty of an atemporal creator. The problem is that itis no longer considered an improper question to ask what happened before the Big Bang: for example, in M-theory, it has been suggested that this universe resulted from collisions between membranes in a vastly more complex system than Big Bang theory suggests. The parameters for creating universes are, in short, unknown. Another presupposition is that the creator is the God of (Christian) theism, as in Aquinas’ Ways’ presupposition that is denied by Hume et al Areasonable basis for study of the argument (aside from W.L. Craig's version of the Kalam argument) might include: Aquinas first three Ways’, Leibniz’ (deistic) Principle of Sufficient reason, Swinburne’s C-inductive probabilistic argument / criticisms of these arguments. For a summary of the sceptical positions, see, for example: http:/iplato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/ Design arguments for the existence of God The assumptions behind the design argument are again problematic, although they do not invalidate the argument. The supposition that the universe exhibits an order that is purposive poses a question, since the various physical constants in the universe maintain a regularity that appears to be an inevitable part of any system. In biological terms, evolution is held to instantiate a principle order that is nevertheless blind. In terms of astrophysics, the formation of stellar systems is similarly held to be the result of either blind chance or of some internally necessary principle The supposition that the designer, if there was one, was the God of (Christian) theism is again denied, on the basis of Humean critiques in which a designer need not be single, omnipotent, omniscient, male, or any other kind of superlative A reasonable basis for study of the argument might include: Paley's arguments from purpose and from regularity; Swinburne's arguments from spatial order and from temporal order, which correspond more or less with those of Paley; arguments using the strong anthropic principle Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 45 Teacher Guide 46 Critique of these arguments: http://en.wikipedia orgiwiki/Teleological_argument#Contradictory_premises_lead_to_an_infinite_regress www iep.utm.edu/design #3 www infidels. orgfibrarylmodern/theism/design. htm! http:Niplato.stanford.edu/entriesiteleologica-arguments/ The debate about intelligent design Leamers should be made aware of the creationist presuppositions in the debate about intelligent design, ¢.g the fundamentalist or literalist assumptions of Young Earth Creationism and Old Earth Creationism. These were largely replaced by ‘Creation Science’, which in the American courts lost the right to be taught in schools as science. Its replacement was ‘intelligent design’, which made a bid for scientific respectability by advocating the concept of ‘irreducible complexity’. Intelligent design also incorporates the anthropic principle (the ‘ine tuning’ argument) Intelligent design is exemplified by the American biochemist Michael Behe who introduced the concept of irreducible complexity’. There is a range of criticism against intelligent design, for example, irreducible complexity is overwhelmingly rejected by scientific ‘orthodoxy’. This includes a rejection of the anthropic principle on the basis of multiverse theory which is the possibilty of an infinite number of universes existing inthe past. There is also condemnation of the attack on natural selection. If intelligent design maintains that natural selection is true, then it cannot be true that an intelligent creator designed the universe, which is clearly false Arguments from morality to God The main presupposition here is that morality points to God in some way. This is almost universal in religious teaching, but the arguments are not compeliing: see: John Frye: ‘A Personal Perspective on the Problem of Evil. The argument comes in various forms, and one example underpins Divine Command Theory. This has the somewhat citcular notion that God gives authority to the existence of absolute laws discovered by reason, and at the same time, the existence of God can be inferred from the existence of objective moral laws, Kant's form of the argument derives God as a postulate of practical reason, as one of a series of assumptions (admitted to be so by Kant) about the nature of the universe and human free will These are useful websites to refer to: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_morality www bringyou.to/apologetics/p20 htm www youtube. com/watch?v=ai2lAanQ6p8 www atheistnexus.orgiprofiles/blogs/the-moralargument-for-the?xg_source=activity www ministrymaker. com/c-s-lewis-morak argument-for-the-existence-of-god https:bearspace.baylor.edu/Chris_Shrock/wwwflavorsmoralargument20080310.htm Kant's argument from the human sense of obligation to obey moral values is problematic on several counts, e.g. Kant’s own Christian presuppositions, which sit oddly with his claim that the moral law is autonomous; the fact that vast swathes of humanity appear to feel no obligation to obey moral laws; the fact that Kant's, categorical imperatives can conflict; the peculiarties of the logic about the summum bonum, and so on. By Kant's own admission, the moral argument is an assumption based on other assumptions (such as the freedom of humans and the fairness of the universe). All moral arguments face attack from explanations of morality that do not involve God, such as psychological, sociological and evolutionary explanations; also from explanations which hold that moral law is objective without reference to God Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Ontological arguments Can the existence of God can be derived from the concept of God? Before tackling the different versions of the argument, learners should be grounded in its language, e.g synthetic/analytic, a prior/a posterior, de dicto/de re, inductive/deductive, and so on. reasonable outline could include the following: Anselm is probably as good a place to start as any, beginning especially with Anselm's text, which avoids truncated versions of the argument which gravitate straight to the superiority of real perfect beings over imaginary perfect beings. Descartes version of the argument, with the similarity to Anselm's argument in Proslogium 3 concerning necessary existence General rejections of the argument, e.g © Aquinas, that we cannot define God, so the argument cannot start © Hume: there is no being whose non-existence would be a contradiction / impossibility of such an a priori proof /all existential statements are synthetic © Kant: existence is not a predicate; Descartes’ argument that triangles and God have necessary predicates which cannot be rejected without contradiction cannot be held to apply to imaginary entities, for which we are entitles to reject any imagined predicates as equally imaginary Norman Malcolm's anti-real version of the argument. This is dificult, and suffers from several problems that should be clarified for learners: e.g © Malcolm's admission that the argument does not convince atheists calls into question the status of an anti-real argument based on logical necessity © the focal line of Malcolm's argument: the existence of God is either necessary or impossible Itis impossible only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or logically absurd itisnt, therefore God exists © thisis flawed, since the second line here has the logical structure: © not x +not y =z (not seff-contradictory + not logically absurd = God exists but such an equation can also have the solution not x + not y= not z— God does not exist. The formulation merely tells you that there are two possible outcomes. It does not tell you which outcome is true Plantinga’s modal form of the argument, For those who wish to pursue it, learners would need to be introduced to the basics of modal logic. The argument is generally discredited in that the structure of its attempt to prove the existence of a being of maximal excellence and maximal greatness can also be used to prove the existence of a being no maximality. Again, the argument merely says that there are two possibilities about a logically necessary being: t exists, or it does not. the value of the argument for faith: e.g. Karl Barth's view that Anselm’s argument was not intended a a logical proof; critique of this view. For a range of material, see, ¢.g. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 47 Teacher Guide 48 Religious experience The literature which covers religious experience is enormous. William James is generally seen as the seminal writer, particularly in his argument that religious experience is primary, and creeds and organised religion as a whole are secondary. With mystical experiences, James concluded that these have a common, tuninterpreted, four-point phenomenological core, and where this is displayed, such experiences point to God. Many of the issues are definitional, since without definition it is impossible to know what one is arguing for (see http:/en wikipedia org/wikifReligious_experience). Swinburne's categorisation is not accepted as Universal, but is often used as a basis in textbook material, as itis constructed from a variety of empirical and non-empirical / mystical experiences, Is religious experience cognitive or non-cognitive? Much of this depends on the way they are classified. Some advocate an empirical / cognitive perceptions model, e.g. W. Alston, who holds that religious experience is a normal empirical perception: the perceiver perceives God in some form or other, e.g. through Swinburne’s common or uncommon public sensory objects. Other prefer a non-cognitive feelings’ model, e.g. F. Schleiermacher. In this instance religious experience is an intuitive and selt-authenticating feeling of dependence on God, See also R. Otto. Such models claim that religious experience is mystical and ineffable — brings a knowledge of God that is not factual, even though the experience may have a cognitive effect on behaviour. Leamers should be shown that these are not necessarily competing models, e.g. in Swinburne’s view, experiance of Gad can be given both through cognitive phenomena and through mystical experiences. Criticism of the cognitive model identifies that there is an inferential gap between experience and interpretation. If person (a) claims that an experience of a sunset is a normal cognitive perception, but person (b) claims that God is in the sunset, than itis clear that (a) and (b) have different inferences from the same sense object, which is problematic. Criticism of the non-cognitive model comes e.g, from Ayer in ch.6 of Language, Truth & Logic mystics are merely giving us indirect information about the condition of their own minds. William James’ view that mystical experiences are genuine where they have a common uninterpreted phenomenological core has difficulties in coping with the fact that (1) some core descriptions are different to his classification, and (2) some (2.9. S.Kat2) claim that no experience is unmediated by prior concepts and beliefs Arguments from religious experience to God These generally state that religious experiences testify to + the reality of their object + the receiver of religious experiences is the expert whose testimony we should accept + religious experiences are widespread and compelling + arguments can be developed from the effects of religious experiences (e.g. AE. Taylor) For website material, see http:/Iresources.r9paul.org/ASA2/RSIA2_Philosophy_RevisionNotes.paf www youtube. comwatchv=F4X fmH4miWud www. scandalon.co.uk/philosophy/religious_experiences htm http://ew.routledge. com/textbooks/philosophy/downloads/a2/unit3/philosophy- religion/ReligiousExperience. pdf www. youtube. comiwatch?v=uyrth7 QY9gQ8feature=related ‘www. infidels. org/library/modern/tichard_gale/swinburne_argument html There are criticisms of the argument, e.g. from psychology (Freud, Nietzsche), that similar experiences can be induced by drugs and there is also evidence from parapsychology and near-death experiences Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide The concept of miracle Hume's rejection of miracles; the debate about God's intervention in the world As with religious experience, miracle is largely a definitional issue in that miracles are understood variously as extraordinary coincidences, significant events that take place within the boundaries of natural law, and so on. + Since Hume, ithas been the general rule to begin with Hume's definition of miracles as violations of natural law by an unseen sypematural agent who intervenes purposively in the world. In this sense, for example, miracles are used as evidence for the existence of God, since supposedly they reveal the activities of a benevolent and omnipotent creator. + Hume's critique is best presented on two fronts: his subsidiary reasons for disbelief in miracles, based on psychology, e.g. that humans are naturally credulous, miracle accounts come from ‘ignorant and barbarous nations’, they are debunked by conflicting miracle claims, and the like © these points back up Hume's main argument based on the principle of induction. Witness testimony has to be more reliable in direct proportion to the improbabilty of what the witness claims to have observed. The most improbable event would be a violation of the laws of nature, since induction teaches us that the laws of nature do not admit violations; so by definition a miracle is always the least likely explanation of what has occurred: the probabilty of a witness lying or being mistaken is always greater than the probability that a miracle has occurred Counter-arguments to Hume. + There are departures from Hume's view, e.g. Hick’s argument that if miracles appear to violate laws of nature, those laws cannot be violated, so if an irregularity occurs, the law simply expands to include it; therefore miracles cannot occur. There is a disjunction here between those who assume that the laws of nature cannot be broken and those who assume that Gad can do so. The disjunction is not simply between theists and atheists, since Hick is a theist, and like many theists he rejects miracles. + Swinbure’s answer to Hume on probability, using the principles of testimony and Credulity + Much of the contemporary discussion of miracle centers on: ‘© scientific rejection of miracles based on problems such as God's causal agency © God's omnibenevolence For the issue of God's causal agency, there is a problem of how a metaphysical being can operate as a cause within the physical universe. Aquinas’ view, that God acted timelessly to perform miracles, although this does not impress physicists. For the issue of God's omnibenevolence, Maurice Wiles argues that we must reject providential or interventionist miracles. If God's direct action, independent of secondary causation, is an intelligible concept, then ‘it would appear to have been sparingly and strangely used’ ie. a God who intervenes to change water into wine at a society wedding yet refuses to help the victims of the Holocaust cannot be classed as. omnibenevolent, Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 49 Teacher Guide 50 The implications of psychological understandings of religious belief For learners to understand the range of material available, a quick scan through some of the videos available can be useful (search Videos for psychology of religion’) As an indication of how contemporary psychology approaches religion, see, for example: Lawrence Brown: The Psychology of Religion: an Introduction For a cross-section of different views, a useful framework might include + Ludwig von Feuerbach: humans are not made in God's image. God is a super-projection of the ‘human image which degrades humanity, because it cannot match up to that image. Religious belief is a form of unwarranted pessimism + Leuba: religious belief has biological value, but no objective truth. God is an invention of the rational mind, and provides some comfort through seeing God as a father figure, but we need a better vision = of humanity idealised’. + Freud: religious belief is a neurosis based on the father-figure, fear of death, and an inabilty to cope with the real world ‘+ William James: God manifests himsetf through human psychology, and has real and useful effects Tike altruism += C.G. Jung: belief in God is archetypal — a psychological necessity for a healthy soul, but God is not necessarily an objective reality + Nietzsche: God is a psychological and ethical invention based around the will to power. Christianity is explained by the psychology of revenge + Ryle & Skinner: statements about Gad reduce to meaningless description of brain states. The implications of sociological understandings of religious belief The best-known sociological critiques of religion come from the 19% Century, and form a good basis for beginning the study of the sociology of religion. These include’ ‘Marx. A good introduction to Marx can be found in W.J. Abraham: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, pub. 1985, Prentice-Hall, ch.19, ‘Christianity and Marxism’ Nietzsche - used a partly sociological critique of religion: it is a means of social control. Durkheim: the main function of religion is to provide a moral obligation to obey society's demands, Weber's reductionist thesis that the study of religion reduces to the study of humanity and society. Auseful introduction to the sociology of religion can be found in Malcolm Hamitton: The Sociology of Religion: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, 2" ed Religion, science, evil and life after death Asa general reader, see: Alister E. McGrath: Science & Religion: an Introduction Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Scientific theories of the origin of the universe Leamers will not be expected to give extended scientific details of the theories they discuss, but the science should be referred to in sufficient detail to correlate with the detail of whatever religious response is arrived at For some of the ‘origins’ scenarios, there isno religious response, so learners can formulate responses (where possible) based on likely religious comment. In order accustom leamers to the complexities of the ideas and the language, they could consult: www astronomycafe.net/qadir/acosmbb html www-ralentz com/old/astro/hawking-1 html www_bbe.co.uk/news/uk-11161493 Most of the focus will be on different versions of Big Bang theory, e.g. the single universe presupposed by the Kalam cosmological argument. The fate of this universe might be heat death from endless expansion (Big Freeze’), or else the universe might contract at a critical limit, depending on its density. This leads to the pulse theory, that the universe reaches a limit of expansion, then contracts to re-form the Singularity (‘Big Crunch’), and then explodes in another Big Bang, in a theoretically endless cycle (Oscillation theory). The following further points and theories are taken largely from www. bbe. co.uk/dna/h2g2/alabaster/A2986365 The view that the universe had no beginning This was proposed recently by Martin Bojowald on the basis of loop quantum gravity. He postulated that the universe had no beginning, was infinitely large, deflated to a ‘Big Crunch’ and re-expanded to what we see today, www. world-mysteties.com/medonald_origins htm In theological terms, although Christian theology generally teaches that God created the universe ex nihilo (from nothing), that is only an interpretation of Genesis 1:1-3 based on a probably-faulty translation of the Hebrew. The most likely translation makes the intial verbs into participles (At the beginning of God's creating the universe, the universe being void, etc), with the first main verb coming with ‘And God said, ‘Let there be light’. This implies a belief in a pre-existing chaotic universe — God's creative act is not to produce it from nothing, but to organise i, turning chaos into order. This view is clearly emphasised in the creation material inthe Psalms, and itis presupposed in the Bab ylonian myths which Genesis recapitulates. Learners could investigate these ideas in connection with Process Theology, which sees God and the universe as emerging alongside each other (there are various forms of Process ideas) The Ekpyrotic theory is a development from String Theory /M theory. The universe has the form of a ‘brane’ (a membrane) existing in mult-dimensional hyperspace, and was formed when two branes collided Ekpyrotic derives from the Greek ekpyrosis— from the fir’, in that the Stoics saw the universe as being periodically reborn in a ball of fire. The branes have always been there, so this is a version of the previous theory, except that the collisions between branes are held to be periodic, so the theory is sometimes described as ‘cyclic’ The ‘Sister Universe’ theory also derives from M theory, with the difference that a once ten-dimensional Universe split into two, one of which (ours) had a four-dimensional nature, the other six; so this universe derives from the breakdown of a higher-dimensional universe. The ‘sister’ universe then collapsed to about 10° centimetres in size Spontaneous particle creation suggests, on the basis of quantum mechanics, that the universe was created for free’ out of the mutual annihilation of particles of matter and anti-matter that created themselves from nothing. The theory is generally disliked by scientists because it relies on the existence of ‘nothing’, and itis hard to see how the concept of nothing can be said to exist. The universe created itself through a quantum tunnelling effect: The odd thing about this idea is that the universe can give birth to another universe, and then go back in time to become the cause of itself Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 51 Teacher Guide 52 The universe was created by aliens in a laboratory: This is the view of Ed Harrison, who uses it to dispose of the anthropic problem (which might have a religious answer) of why the boundary conditions in this universe are set precisely at the right parameters to produce intelligent obsetvers. The aliens pre-set the boundary conditions. Eventually, beings in this universe will be able to do the same thing, thus spawning other universes in which the boundary conditions are always just right to produce intelligent observers. Scientific theories of the origin of life on Earth Although ultimately all theories of the origins of ite derive from cosmological models about the universe, learners should be careful to distinguish between scientific theories about the origins of life on Earth and theories about the origins of the universe. This is mentioned because learners often fail to make this distinction http://en.wikipedia orgiwik/Abiogenesis#Pasteur_and_Darwin http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ev olution http://en. wikipedia org/wiki/Evolution_as_theory_and_fact The main points to study are the contrasting and sympathetic religious ideas, so again, the amount of science required is ‘sufficient detail to correlate with the detail of whatever religious response is arrived at’ Religious responses might include + creationist responses ~ Young Earth / Old Earth / Inteligent Design, in so far as these ideas deal with the origins of life / critique of these religious believers who accept the scientific evidence for some form of evolutionary hypothesis, use of the design argument to balance religious and scientific ideas, e.g. Paley's argument about the adaptation of animals to their environment, and the complexity of the eye; Swinburne’s scientific version of the design argument, proposing, contra Dawkins, that evolution and genetics are not self- explanatory; that they confirm to rigid scientific laws that are themselves descriptions and not at all explanations of the origins of lfe; personal explanation is needed for the latter, ie. from a being outside the system. Evolution is not guided but is initiated. For learners with no knowledge of the field, the following is very good: God and Evolution: a Reader, ed Mary Kathleen Cunningham The nature of the problem of evil The following outline might serve as a basis: + natural and moral evil / pointless evil + the lagical and the evidential problem of evil. For the former, the ‘inconsistent triad’ + the additional problem of God's omniscience: why would an omnipotent God bother to create such a universe? Extracts from Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov’ + The Free Will Defence: freedom as a higher-order good that legitimises God's inclusion of so much evil in the universe theodicies: Augustine / Irenaeus / Process Theodicy / best possible world theory, etc. the view that evil is inevitable in any space-time universe: see John Frye: ‘A Personal Perspective on the Problem of Evil, Parts 1 and 2: Dialogue, a Journal of Religion and Philosophy. This article contains a critique of all the above points, including Mackie's analysis of the Free Will Defence Debates about body and soul reincarnation, rebirth and res: ion to life after death; the coherence of concepts of Teaching of this section needs to cover the background to the debate about reincarnation, rebirth and. resurrection, in the debate about the nature of persons and personal identity. Suggested outline: ‘+ the criteria for personal identity: memory, personality, body. One accessible volume for much of this is: Personal Identity, ed. John Perry. See also Perry's short, A Dialogue on Personal identity and Immortality + dualist and monist understandings of the nature of persons Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide illustration of dualism through Plato, Aristotle (whose understanding includes metaphysical elements such as the separable soul), Cartesian dualism, Hindu/Buddhist teaching on reincarnation/rebirth «+ illustration of monism or soft materialism through hard materialist, reductionist and behaviourist rejection of dualism (Ryle et al). Christian teaching on resurrection of the body and Hick’s attempt to show that resurrection of the body is logically possible (the scenarios about Mr X) + thought experiments: Parft's conclusion that personal identity should be rejected in favour of psychological continuity. Part 3 of Parft's book is listed for Paper 3 (Philosophy of Mind) ‘+ investigating the implications of near-death experiences, see: Mark Fox: Religion, Spirituality and the Near-Death Experience Nearly all internet material on this subject should be avoided The relation between life after death and the problem of evil Suggested outline ‘life after death in the western tradition includes the resurrection of the body, judgement, heaven and hell. These are usually seen as physical states which are underpinned by Divine Command Theory and belief in moral freedom. Often seen as an immoral view, since it is compelled by fear of punishment and desire for reward + the latter is typified in Pascal's Wager, and to some extent in fideist approaches, e.g. Kierkegaard since K's ‘leap in the dark’ seems irrational, is not a genuinely free moral choice but seems to be a psychological compulsion deriving from a desire for ife after death + Divine command theory seems incoherent, because of Euthyphro's dilemma, which leaves God either as morally arbitrary or lacking omnipotence. Obedience would spring naturally from a connection with life after death ‘+ life after death in the eastern tradition includes the reincarnation of the soul, governed by karma, cause and effect. This has two major prablems: the poor can be marginalised or despised: good karma is achieved at someone else's expense, sinca it presumes the necessary existence of those who generate bad karma: good cannot operate in the absence of evi. Some philosophers see any philosophy of reward after death as psychological manipulation: e.g. Marx — promises of life after death are an opiate and an illusion designed to secure obedience and acceptance of suffering now; Nietzsche: the promise of Ife after death is a Christian technique for controlling people — an aspect of ‘will to power’. Even Kant arguably negated his ethical theory by linking itto the summum bonum as an after-life reward from God. Irenaeus’ theodicy avoids the incoherencies of Augustine’s account. Life after death is given as an act of divine love, not as a reward. On this view, human moral good is desired by God, but Gad wishes humans to achieve it freely. In 21** Century science, traditional religious modes of life after death are being superseded by concepts involving a plethora of inked ideas: cryonics, genetic manipulation for longevity, robotic / humanoid bodies, mind-upload into quantum-mechanical communities, memory imprints / mental snapshots for encoding re- Usable information about persons, psychological continuity / continuation, etc. The models for life after death here are changing rapidly, perhaps eventually making religious concepts redundant. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 53 Teacher Guide 5a New Testament: The Four Gospels Leamers are expected to have a good knowledge and understanding of various scholarly approaches to The Four Gospels. They should be confident in their exploration of the historical, cultural and theological context The set texts for study are the gospels themselves. ‘When studying The Four Gospels, itis important that comment on the biblical text should be detailed, analytic and critical. Much more is expected than a simple paraphrase of the text. The passages set for study should therefore be considered with the help of scholarly commentaries. As an example, centres should look at the Specimen Papers and their Mark Schemes as these serve as good indicators of the kind of approach expected for New Testament and The Four Gospels. Text questions will not be set on obscure scriptural passages. Before studying the gospels in detail it is worth considering the historical context they were written in and their authorship. Biblical criticism: the synoptic problem and the relationship between the Synoptic Gospels and the gospel of John It would be useful to begin with the basic approaches of text, literary, form and redaction criticism of the New Testament texts. While these are not examinable in themselves, they should help learners to understand the complicated processes of text transmission, e.g. in form criticism, the separation of pericopes from their narrative framework; the derivation of forms’ from specific activities of the Early Church, and so on. This kind of study gives key insights into understanding Jesus’ teaching and the Christological debate, e.g, the form of healings, and Jesus’ reputation as a miracle worker, conflict narratives illustrating conflict with the authorities both in the life of Jesus and of the Early Church over such issues as fasting, eating with sinners, et. Discipleship stories ilustrate the correct response to Jesus; historical stories about the church in which the church can be seen to be working out its stance such as Jesus’ authority (healing the paralytic), eating with sinners, Sabbath observance etc., and so on. The ‘synoptic problem’, e.g. the triple tradition, the double tradition, the priarty of Mark and alternative solutions, e.g. the Griesbach hypothesis. The double tradition and ‘Q’, problems for 4-source hypotheses, e.g. agreement between Matthew and Luke against Mark, the overlap between Mark and Q, complicated solutions Political and religious groups: Pharisees, Sadducees, Scribes and Zealots Josephus’ reference to 4 schools of thought in Judaism at the time of Jesus: Pharisees, Sadducees, anti- Roman revolutionary groups such as the Zealots & Sicarii, and the Essenes, possibly a sect of dissident priests. Interpretation does not successfully distinguish between the Pharisees and the Scribes. ‘Pharisee’ from a root meaning ‘separated’ ( or ‘expounders) believed in resurrection of the dead, unlike the Sadducees (Acts 2316-9). Pharisees are usually cast in the role of opponents of Jesus in the Synoptics and John, there are details of allegations about them in the New Testament, e.g. rigid legalists, love of chief seats, pride when praying, etc. Thay are seen as responsible for Jesus’ death, despite their absence from the passion narratives; responsible for failing to recognize Jesus nature and authority, probabilty that conflict with Jesus over Law is a read-back from the situation of the Early Church, positive comments in the gospels, e.g. Nicodemus, Gamaliel, Paul's Pharisaic background and contemporary reassessments, Scribes are perhaps a professional group whose legal expertise made them natural allies of the Pharisees, suggested origin of the Scribes following reference to Ezra the Scribe Contrasts / conflicts between Pharisees and Sadducees, Pharisees are seen as closer to the people: Sadducees from the priestly/aristocratic class, focused on the authority of the Temple as opposed to the Law of Moses, cultural conflict over Hellenization of Judaism, conflict over Torah, with Sadducees accepting only the written Law, while Phariszes accepted rabbinic interpretation / probable extinction of Sadducees after destruction of the Temple in 70. Political involvement of the Sadducees, e.g. dominant in the Sanhedrin Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide (apparently with Pharisaic representation — Acts 23:6), in state administration, military matters, liaison with the Romans, etc. / apparent hostility to Jesus, e.g. the question about resurrection and life after death, attitude of John the Baptist to Sadducees and Pharisees — Matthew 3:7 — a ‘viper’s brood’ Zealots were a poltical / military group in 1"*-century Judaism. They wished to foment revolt against the Romans, e.g. the war of 66-70. ‘Zealot’ comes from the Hebrew kanai, zealous (for God). One of Jesus’ disciples is called Simon ‘the Zealot’ (Mk 3:18); the word used to describe Barabbas in John 18:40 is the same as that used by Josephus of the Zealots. Judas Iscariot's surname possibly relates the Sica although the etymology is disputed. Sicari practised violence against Jews who were considered insufficiently ant-Roman. The references to the Zealats in the gospels and New Testament underlines the background to Jesus’ teaching in the political and religious unrest of the 1" century. See Stanton: The gospels and Jesus, chapter 16. www jewishvirtualibrary.org/jsource/udaica/ejud_0002_0021_0_21428. html www jewishencyclopedia. comWview jsp?artid=49Bletter=Z http://maxwellinstitute. byu. edu/publications\transcripts/?id=104 http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiPharisees www jewishencyclopedia. comWviewjsp?artid=252Bletter=P http://catholic-resources.org/BibleMJewish_Groups.htm Aspects of Jesus’ teaching Jesus’ teaching about the kingdom of God, including the parables Different ways of reading the parables, attempts to reconstruct context, the views that context is largely unrecoverable, analysis of meaning as they are used within the gospels, allegorical and metaphorical understandings of parabolic material C.H. Dodd: The Parables of the Kingdom John Drury: The Parables in the gospels: History and Allegory Parables of the kingdom J. Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus Sanders & Davies: Studying the Synoptic Gospels Stanton: The gospels and Jesus, chapters 12 & 13 The nature and interpretation of Jesus’ miracles Debates about the nature and interpretation of miracle stories; their role in authenticating Jesus as Messiah and as showing Jesus’ authority to converts; questions of historicity, e.g. concerning miracles whose basis perhaps derives from the Old Testament (e.g, the feeding miracles and material in | & II Kings) For a survey of the miracle stories of the gospels, and modern approaches to their interpretation, see ‘Wenham and Walton, Exploring the New Testament, ch. 5 For a structuralist reading of some of the miracle stories, see e.g. Sanders & Davies: Studying the Synoptic Gospels: ch.15, ‘Structuralism and De-Construction’ Stanton: The gospels and Jesus, chapter 14 Jesus’ teaching on discipleship and commitment Apostles / disciples / followers / disciples as central figures in the gospel narratives, Discipleship as expression of Christian attitude / call to discipleship / discipleship in Paul and John — life in Jesus The demands of discipleship, e.g. Luke 14 /the Great Commission / Jahn 13:36 — the commandment to love one another / John 15:8 — bear fruit / Romans 121-2; 2 Corinthians 6:14-18, ete Stanton: The gospels and Jesus, chapter 11 Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 55 Teacher Guide 56 Jesus’ debate and conflict with the authorities Conflict, ¢.g., over Law / Sabbath / eating with sinners / fasting / food laws / hand-washing, etc. See, e.g. Bultmann: History of the Synoptic Tradition, Section A ‘Apophthegms’ Atland J. Hultgren: Jesus and His Adversaries: the Form and Function of the Conflict Stories in the Synoptic Tradition, Stanton: The gospels and Jesus, chapter 16 Jesus’ apocalyptic teaching The basis of New Testament apocalyptic teaching in Judaism; Jewish apocalyptic writing in the 1** century The view that apocalyptic was a reaction against the ongoing political suppression of the Jews, looking instead to divine intervention, imminent expectation of the kingdom of God, etc. The view that apocalyptic is not so much eschatological but is characterized by disclosure of higher wisdom through revelation. Mark 13 the cosmic catastrophes preceding the Son of Mian EP. Sanders The Historical Figure of Jesus concludes that Jesus rejected the title Messiah: that we do not know that Jesus was referring to himself when he talked of the Son of Man coming on the clouds as a divine judge: and that the biblical references to the Son of Man as a suffering figure are not genuine David Wenham: The Rediscovery of Jesus’ Eschatological Discourse (Gospel Perspectives 4) www6.wittenberg.edu/cgi-binfibMonors/katie_bringman_03.pdf Passion, resurrection and the Christolagical debate The historicity and interpretation of the arrest and trial narratives © Order and contents of the arrest and trial narratives in the Synoptics and in John. + Nature and theology of Judas’ betrayal + Contradictions between John and the Synoptics, the problem of the different trial scenes — Annas, Caiaphas, the Sanhedrin, Pilate, Herod Antipas, Pilate ‘+ The nature of the charge against Jesus: the problem with the charge of blasphemy, the political implications of Jesus arrest and trials, the problem with the accounts of Pilate, described by Philo (to Gaius Caesar) as inflexible and cruel, ete. + The theology of the accounts. The theology of the crucifixion narratives ‘+ The crucifixion narratives; significant points, e.g. the meaning of the cry from the cross; forgiveness, the tearing of the Temple curtain, ete. + Attitudes to crucifixion/ictims of crucifixion in the Gentile world, attitude of the Jews — seen as a degradation: Deuteronomy 21:23 — hence for Jews there would have been no possibility of accepting a crucified Messiah; a crucified God would have been a contradiction in tems + Crucifixion in Pauline theology: Paul's attempt to reconcile the Jewish approach to crucifixion with the death of Jesus, e.g. 1 Corinthians 1:23, We preach Christ cructfied, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles, Galatians 3 + Theological themes: the passibilty/impassibilty of God; Jesus as a sacrificial atonement / redemption from human sin /futflment of the Law / Jesus as priest and victim, etc. Stanton: The gospels and Jesus, chapter 17. The significance and historicity of the resurrection accounts, including the resurrection appearances The unobservabilty of the resurrection; dependent on the resurrection appearances. The difficulties with interpreting the language of the resurrection accounts and appearances, which are inevitably symbolic. Early gospel formula in 1 Corinthians 15:3F, the different accounts of the resurrection — contradictions, dependence of the discussion on the synoptic problem, the ending of Mark seen as inadequate, Matthew's revision of Mark, different consideration and points of view of the gospel writers, e.g. Luke's resurrection narratives written in anticipation of Acts, his emphasis on bodily resurrection, and the foretelling of Jesus’ suffering, death and resurrection in Moses and the Prophets, historicity of John’s account; opposing views, theology of the resurrection narratives and resurrection theology in the context of 1" century Judaism etc. Assessment of Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide any historical basis for the resurrection accounts; history and theology; resurrection eschatology and symbolism. The particular nuances of Jesus’ titles: Son of God, Son of Man, Son of David, Messiah. JE. Alsup: The Post-Resurrection Appearance Stories of the gospel Tradition: A History-Of-Tradition Analysis with Text- Synopsis, The debate about who Jesus was: Son of God, Son of Man, Son of David, Messiah Whilst, strictly speaking, the Specification does not refer to the phrase, ‘The Historical Jesus’, some analysis of the historical Jesus is unavoidable in studying the debate about “who Jesus was". Again, this is inevitable in considering the implications of the titles, Son of God, Son of man, Son of David, Messiah. The assumptions of the quest of the historical Jesus, e.g, that critical examination of the text could reveal something of the Jesus of history as opposed to the Christ of faith, the counter-assumption that such a figure cannot be known as opposed to the portrait developed through church tradition, non-Christian sources as evidence about Jesus (Tacitus, Suetonius, Josephus, the Talmud) / weakness of the view that Jesus did not, exist. The debate about the historical Jesus from Schweitzer through dialectical (or ‘kerygmatic) theology and the assertion that looking for a ‘historical’ Jesus is illegitimate in face of the Bible as'Word’ which requires obedience. The ‘New Quest’ of the historical Jesus — questions about the historical/earthly Jesus are legitimate; James M. Robinson's argument that history is not a simple concern with facts but is concerned with the ‘selfhood’ of those involved, and we do have material about the selfhood of Jesus in the gospels and the current position of scepticism As a very good introductory discussion, see, e.g. Sanders & Davies: Studying the Synoptic Gospels chapters 20-22 James M. Robinson: A New Quest of the Historical Jesus (Studies in Biblical Theology No. 25), AE Harvey: Jesus and the Constraints of History Stanton: The gospels and Jesus, chapter 15 Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 57 Teacher Guide 58 Philosophy of Mind This topic is relevant to Paper 3 and is designed to introduce leamers to some of the main discussion points inthe philosophy of mind: attempts to solve the mind-body problem, the problem of other minds, the problem of personal identity, and the problem of consciousness. Set texts for study include Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (chapters 10-15) and John Searle's Minds, Brains and Science (see resources section of this guide and specification for further detail) The mind-body problem and attempts to solve it Cartesian Substance Dualism: mind as a non-physical substance separate from body; the explanatory weakness of substance dualism Antecedents in Platonic dualism + Descartes’ substance dualism © the essential properties of bodies and souls © the argument from imaginabilty © the argument from doubt © the argument from clear and distinct perception Critique of the Cartesian arguments General critique in favour of substance dualism, e.g. the reasoning power of minds differentiates them from bodiesimaterial objects / can physical objects be conscious? Against- the mind-body relation / interaction between metaphysical soul and physical body / Hume's, empirical rejection of dualism / Kant - there is no evidence that ‘souls think’ as unextended incorporeal substances; the problem of counting souls / the homunculus fallacy. Pethaps main problem with sid is its lack of explanatory power: e.g. it says nothing about how one mental state can cause another / cannot explain how some mental states cause physical actions /it does not explain the nature of consciousness, and so on. See, e.g., Ravenscroft 13 http:Nplato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/ www-iep.utm.edu/dualism/ www newadvent.org/cathen/05169a.htm www_philosophyonline.co.uk/pom/pom_dualism.htm Property Dualism Property dualism — the idea that there is only physical substance, with two distinct kinds of properties — physical and mental, e.g. Non-reductive physicalism — mental properties can be mapped to neurobiological properties, but are not reducible to them. ‘Anomalous monism, e.g. Donald Davidson - mental features supervene on physical properties / inreducibilty, co-variation, dependence Searle's ‘biological naturalism’ — brains cause minds. Searle's denial that his position illustrates property dualism Epiphenomenalism: mental states and their properties are epiphenomena of the states of a closed physical system but mental states have no effect on physical events, Critique of these variations and general problems for property dualism, e.g. the problem of consciousness — how does matter produce qualia? The epiphenomenal impotence of mental causation For website material, see, €.9 ‘www. imprint.co.uk/pdf/searle-final pdf http:N/plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ www. learnerpulse. com/articles/277/property-dualism--physicalism-unclenching-the-soldiers-fist www. iep.utm.edu/dualism/ Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Other solutions to the mind-body problem The Mind-Brain Identity theory + the proposed identity of mental states with brain states / as an ontological (and not an analytic) reduction. + the plausibility of token-token identity (over type-type) for mental states / multiple realisabilty of mental states / Putnam's critique ‘+ strengths of mind brain identity theory — simplicity: reduction to the physical / solves the Cartesian problem of how non-physical mind can interact with the physical brain / explains why brain damage causes impaired mental function ‘+ problems for mind brain identity theory — it contravenes Leibniz’s Law on the identity of indiscernibles = the problem of identifying mental states with spatial locations in the brain - counter to this: Nagel: this treats mental states as separate logical substances, whereas they are not /the Cartesian argument that brain states are public whereas mental states are private, so cannot be identical / qualia, privileged access /the debate about intentional mental states / Saul Kripke's argument against MBIT / eliminative materialism — denying the existence of the mental as a radical version of reductive materialism, http:N/plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/#at www.iep.utm.edufidentitys#H5 www. acrewoods.netlibrary/mind/mind-brain-identity-theory http:/forainmeta. com/mind/mind3. php http://consc.netimindpapersi4.1b www. docstoc. com/docs/25987285Week-3--Kripkes-crticisms-of-the-mind-brain-identity-theory-and www.newdualism. org/papers/P. Lo yd/phinow2 htnr#summary Functionalism + Functionalism rejects the notion that the mind is a logical substance: rather, itis a function describable in terms of input and output / functions are multiply realised, so can be specified abstractly / and could be discharged by a process in @ non-material soul as well as by the physical processes of the brain / although the vast majority of functionalists are physicalists + strengths of functionalism, ¢.g. avoids assuming the existence of non-material souls / avoids the assumption of MBIT that mental states are found only in human brains / disposes of the problem of mind-body causation / avoids the problem with behavioural theories of mind that identify mental states with actual and possible behaviour — e.g. with pain, behaviour is not caused by pain — itis part of the whole functional state of ‘being in pai + problems for functionalism: the problem of consciousness remains central forall physicalist accounts of the mind / Frank Jackson's Mary's Room’ /'Blockhead’ / China Brain’, etc http:/iplato.stanford.edu/entriesfunctionalism/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) \www.iep.utm.edufunctism/ www. oocities.org/griseboroughi27. htm ‘The Computational Theory of Mind «Putnam / Fodor (The Language of Thought, 1975). The mind is a computer — intentional states involve symbolic representations that have semantic and syntactic properties; thoughts are complex. symbols having both syntactic and semantic properties; reasoning is a type of computation known as formal symbol manipulation; so thinking is computation. + problems for CTM — computation is insufficient for consciousness and understanding - Searle's Chinese Room, the ‘systems’ reply, accounts of psychological phenomena that do not require rule- governed reasoning, e.g. ‘neural network’ or ‘connectionist’ approaches (2.9. Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind ch.7). http:/fplato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wik/Computational_theory_of_mind The problem of other minds The problem of justifying the belief that others have minds: the argument from analogy; Wittgenstein’s analogy argument Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 59 Teacher Guide 60 + The epistemology of mind — (if mental states are not reducible to physical states such as brain states) how can the existence of minds other than our own can be known? / solipsism. + Mill's argument from analogy / problems with the analogical argument - Wittgenstein’s attack based on rejection of a logically private language — we neither have such a language nor can we create one. + Strawson’s approach to the problem of other minds / problems with Strawson’s account - AJ. Ayer's ‘Zombie argument’- we could conceivably ascribe mental states to zombies, yet zombies can have no mental states. http:Niplato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/#3.2 wwvw.iep.utm.edu/solipsis/ http://ew.routledge.com/textbooks/philosophy/downloads/a2/unit3/philosophy-mind/ProblemOtherMinds pdf http://consc.natimindpapersi5.3 The problem of personal identity As a useful starting point, see: Personal Identity, ed. John Perry ‘The metaphysical question about Pl: A person P af time t1 is numerically identical with a person P at an earlier time 10 if and only if... | question of what logically necessary conditions/sufficient conditions answer the metaphysical question / views that Pl consists in numerical identity of the soul, or numerical identity of the body, or numerical identity of the brain; or that Pl is not a case of numerical identity but of psychological continuity between different stages of a person, continuity being provided, e.g. by memory. + numerical identity of the soul 2.g. Cartesian dualism / Swinburne - PI is a primitive and irreducible notion / problems with dualism/souls, e.g, there are no criteria for individuating souls ‘+ numerical identity of the body — problems with this view, e.g. Sidney Shoemaker's thought- experiment of Brown and Robinson. ‘= numerical identity of the brain — problems with this, e.g. from thought-experiments on brain fission and brain fusion in which numerical identity of the brain is lost. «the view that PI consists in psychological continuity: Parfit's development of the work of Locke / Locke: PI consists in having the same consciousness / in effect PI is provided by memory / Thomas Reid's critique of Locke — the ‘Brave Ensign’ paradox — memory cannot be a sufficient criterion of Pl / Parfit's claim that memory chains do not have to be complete to constitute PI, but should demonstrate sufficient continuity and connectedness between memories and personality / problems with Parfi’s account: itis a reductive analysis of Pl, so cannot make use of the concept itis supposed to be analysing (2. of ‘same person), yet it does so in its claim that genuine memory chains cannot be ‘wayward’ (3" person) or take a branching form / also, Butler argued 3 centuries ago that memory presupposes Pl, so cannot constitute it. www thelearnerroom.co.ukAwiki/Revision:Personal_Identity Notes http:N/plato.stanford.edu/entries/reid-memory-identity/#ObjLocPerlde http:Nplato. stanford edu/entriessidentity-personal/ www.iep.utm.edu/person-if The ‘hard problem’ of consciousness + The ‘hard problem’ of consciousness centres around several questions, e.g. Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all? Why does experience have a subjective component? Why do qualia exist? Why do physical brain-processes give rise to a rich inner life? Why are we not philosophical zombies? + contrast with the ‘easy problem’, e.g. the reportabilty of mental states, the ability of a system to access its own internal states, etc. + the difficuties/impossibility of defining phenomenal consciousness Suggested place to start: Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind, Part 4: ‘Consciousness’ http://consc.net/papersifacing, htm! www. dhushara.com/book/brainp/hard/hard.htm http:N/plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/ www-iep.utm.edu/consciou/ www. quantumconsciousness.org/ Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide http:/lusers.ecs.soton.ac.uk/hamad/Papers/Py104/searle. prob. htm www.newadvent org/cathen/0427 4a. htm www-iep.utm.edu/qualia’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia http:Nplato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies! Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 61 Teacher Guide 62 Ethics This topic is designed to introduce candidates to some of the key ethical theories and their application in relation to selected contemporary issues. Set texts for study include J. S. Mil’s Utiltarianism (pp 78-123 & 251-321) and Sartre's Existentialism and Humanism (again, see resources section and specification for further detail) Christian ethics As a background reference work, see: A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. John Macquarrie & James Childress The ethics of the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5-7) «There are several accessible websites for learners to introduce themselves to this subject, @.g http:Moible. org/article/summary-understanding- sermon-mount «+ http:en wikipedia. orghwiki/Sermon_on_the_Mount Video material is probably best avoided, except under teacher supervision ‘+ The Setmon’s status as a compendium of Christian ethical teaching, compiled by Matthew from various sources rather than preached as a sermon by Jesus + Issue of what goes back to Jesus, and what relates to Matthew's concerns + Interpretation of the ethical teaching © Whether Jesus clarifies or interprets the Law of Moses (Matthew 5:17) —the meaning of fulfilment’ 5:21-48 seems to contrast Jesus’ teaching with that of Moses © the relationship between the Sermon and Paul's gospel of grace © to whom is the Sermon addressed? — people in general, or those committed to Jesus? (contrast between 5:1 and 5:2). How much is an ethic of discipleship, and how much is addressed to ‘all nations’ (28:18-20) © isthe Sermon an ethical code to be followed in detail, or does it set out the principles on which moral conduct is to operate? are the commands to be taken literally, or as hyperbole — as ‘Kingdom Ethics’ in a time when the Kingdom of God was expected? How much of the material is dominated by this kind of eschatology — e.g, the Lord's Prayer? Paul on ethics, with particular reference to his letter to the Romans See, e.g. Wolfgang Schrage: The Ethics of the New Testament, 1988 (translation) Issues include, for example: + Paul's use of Jewish ethics + specific use of Jesus’ ethical teaching, ¢.g. 1 Cor. 7:10 /9:14; ascriptions to what the command of the Lord requires with regard to the conduct of women in church meetings, etc. Romans 13:9 on love (not ascribed to Jesus); imitating Christ (1 Cor.11:1; 1 Thess. 1:6), probably intended as a general principle Paul's own ethical directives, e.g. directives on marriage: the subordination of women to men, etc. Philosophical basis for ethics: Romans 12-13 etc.: the consecrated life: Christian duty; Christians and the state; love fuffls the law; love respects the scruples of others influence of his eschatological expectations on Paul's ethics (e.g. 1 Cor. 7; 12:13; Gal. 3:28) Paul's ethics appears perhaps situational with regard to the needs and circumstances of the various churches (e.g. Rome); hence Pauline ethics does not have the mould of a rational system: it bears signs of evolution, e.g. in his attitude to marriage Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Natural Law ethics General outline and critique of: + formulation of NLE as a branch of natural theology, where reason shows humans that God requires morally good behaviour. ‘Good! discoverable within our common human nature, which derives from our creation by God, so ‘good’ actions are those which help us to become fully human, and ‘bad’ actions are those which hinder that + absolutist or deontological basis of the theory with a teleological perspective derived from Aristotle's, doctrine of the Four Causes. + development by Aquinas to clarify and support biblical ethics: © fellowship with God as the only final end/purpose available to humans © Aquinas’ 5 main principles: human purpose discovered by reason, reason can be confused about real and apparent goods, habitual virtues help us to avoid sin, virtue is intrinsic good because it leads to God, primary and secondary precepts help us to achieve the final end of fellowship with God: exempiiication. casuistry and case law within the Roman Catholic Church; function of Double Effect: examples. Proportionalism as a modern attempt to take account of the criticisms whilst preserving the strengths of natural law ethics. www iep.utm.edu/natlaw/#H43 http:/plato.stanford.edu/entries/maturaklaw-ethics/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_law Christian Ethics: An Introduction. Ed. Bernard Hoose Berard Hoose: Proportionalism. The American Debate and its European Roots Louis P. Pojman: Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 3%. edition A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer Ethics, ed. Peter Singer Mel Thompson: An Introduction to Philosophy and Ethics. Fletcher's situation ethics as a challenge to traditional Christian ethics Suggested outline ‘+ Situational ethics takes different forms, based around a single fundamental principle such as: obedience to God's will, free choice, love. Situational ethics theories have a tendency to be antinomian. Fletcher's version presents itself as a middle path between antinomianism and legalism, based on the primacy of agapeic love. Any other principles and rules act meraly in an advisory capacity. Love's decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively. ‘+ Situational ethics as a relativist, teleological, situational reaction against deontological, prescriptive Natural Law Ethics Fletcher's belief that Jesus’ morality was practical, and critical of Pharisaic legalism Fletcher's four working principles and six premises influence of utiitarianism and existentialism critique of situational ethics on the basis of scripture, tradition, moral experience, the difficulties of interpreting situations; the fact that Christianity has other resources for understanding the situational application and interpretation of rules, such as conscience, prudence, casuistry, etc. http://en.wikipedia orgiwiki/Situational_ethics www bigissueground. com/philosophy/ash-situationethics.shtm! http:srs.rainhammark.com/?cat=29 Mel Thompson: An Introduction to Philosophy and Ethics. Access to Philosophy Series, Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 63 Teacher Guide 64 Other ethical theories Louis P. Pojman: Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 3%. edition Also very useful: Tom L. Beauchamp: Philosophical Ethics. An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. 2" edition Christopher Hamilton: Understanding Philosophy for AS Level, AQA Utilitarianism Resource material is vast. Aside from Pojman, e.g Anthony Quinton: Utiltarian Ethics, Henry Sidgwick: The Methods of Ethics A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer Ethics, ed. Peter Singer J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams: Utilitarianism: For and Against, Mel Thompson: An Introduction to Philosophy and Ethics. Access to Philosophy Series, www utilitarianism. com/ www newadvent org/cathen/15241c.htm http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiUtiltarianism http://en.wikipedia orgiwiki/Preference_utiltarianism Kantian ethics ‘Within the schema of teaching Kantian ethics, a few things stand out, on the basis of past experience of what learners fail to do in examinations: + Itis useful to contrast the force of the categorical imperative with that of assertoric and problematic hypothetical imperatives. + The formulations of the categorical imperative frequently get confused + Itis helpful to use the Kantian text for his 4 examples of how maxims can fail the tests of the categorical imperative: ie. promise-breaking, suicide, neglecting talents, and not helping others. + Itis helpful to clarify R.M. Hare's ‘principle of overridingness’ as an attempt to rescue Kant from the problem of conflicting universal laws; also W.D. Ross's similar attempt based on prima facie duties These often get mentioned by candidates, but with some eye-catching libels on both scholars! Literature on Kant is vast, much of it good. Using the sources referred to above, @.9. Louis P. Pojman: Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 3". edition Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, pub. Oxford Univ. Press, 1994, B Il ‘Kant's Ethics of Duty’. A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer Mel Thompson: An Introduction to Philosophy and Ethics. Access to Philosophy Series http:/fplato. stanford edu/entries/kant-moral/ Virtue ethies Suggested basics: © Background in Aristotle + reasons for re-surfacing of virtue ethics in the 20" Century. — complication and inflexibility of law- based absolutist systems, pragmatic value (Foot), person-centred ethics, since virtue is in the person, not the act, virtue as a disposition that can be learned through observing virtuous people. Understanding eudaimonia, ete examples of contemporary virtue ehtics ~ e.g. Anscombe, MacIntyre, critique of virtue ethics. Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp & Michael Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy Alasdair Macintyre: A Short History of Ethics. A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century, Louis P. Pojman: Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 3" edition William J. Prior: Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics David Bostock: Aristotle's Ethics WER. Hardie: Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 2"* edition Gerard J. Hughes: Aristotle on Ethics © wwwiep.utm.eduiirtuel Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide http:/fplato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ http://en.wikipedia.orgiwiki/Alasdair_Macintyre www rsrevision.com/AleveVethicsivirtue_ethics! www. class uidaho.edu/ngier/103/VE103 htm http:/Ihomepages.ed.ac.uk/wpollardWirtueethics. pdf Existentialist ethics: Sartre's theory of choice Probably the most accessible guide to Sartre and the text of Existentialism and Humanism is: Gerald Jones, Daniel Cardinal, Jeremy Hayward: Existentialism and Humanism: Jean-Paul Sartre. Philosophy in Focus Series. It is aimed at A-level and undergraduate learners, and contains an excellent summary. See also: A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer Mel Thompson: An Introduction to Philosophy and Ethics. Access to Philosophy Series www marxists.orgiteference/archive/sartresworks/exist/sartre.htm www-iep.utm.edu/sartre-ex! http:Niplato.stanford.edu/entries/sartre/ Applied ethics The application of ethical theory to issues of: = War and peace ~ Abortion and euthanasia - Embryo research and genetic engineering - Environmental ethics - Business ethics For this section, the intention is not to require learners to have a matrix approach where individual theories are matched to ethical issues. This would be stultfying and pointless. What is important is the application of ethical theory to the issue, so questions as narrow as: ‘Examine Sartre's contribution to the ethics of war and peace’ will not be asked. In any case, some of the ethical theories have a lot more, or a lot less, to say than others, and that will be apparent during the study of each issue. It would be pointless to ask questions about how the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount apply to environmental ethics, whereas Natural Law has a lot to say about most things. In questions where the command word is ‘examine’, for example, ‘Examine Christian ethical approaches to issues of war and peace’, there is a lot to say, and what is looked for includes an in-depth knowledge of Christian ethics, in terms either of what specific types of Christian ethicists do say and write about war and peace as well as how general Christian ethical principles apply to war and peace To take another example, if a question asks learners to ‘Critically examine ethical approaches to issues of war and peace’, part of the learner's job will of course be to select appropriate examples from different branches of ethics. The selection would be justified by relevance and by the learner's flow of analysis. Bearing in mind the requirement for appropriate knowledge. a learner who uses Kantian ethics within an answer to this question will be aware that the general tone of Kantian ethics does not justify killing, nevertheless learners should know that Kant considered the practice of warfare morally permissible in the rnon-ideal circumstances in which states might find themselves, and he advocated the legitimacy of a preventative war. See, for example: http:/Autor2u.net/blog/index php/religious-studies/commentsiust-war- theory! The intention is, then, that leamers should engage in interested and accurate study of ethical issues on a fairly broad basis, One final point is comment: learners should not get so involved in the science of each issue as to lose sight of the ethical issue. It is common for candidates to write in detail about genetic research, for example, without according the ethical issues themselves more than a passing glance. As with Philosophy of Religion, the general rule is to know enough of the science to serve as evidence for the ethical / philosophical point being made. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 65 Teacher Guide 66 Old Testament: Prophecy This topic is designed to introduce learners to the major themes of prophecy that permeate the Old Testament material, and to a consideration of the key questions: © Where did prophecy come from? = How do we interpret its phenomena? + What was the message of the prophets? Set texts for study include 1 and 2 Kings; Second-Isaiah, Micah and Malachi; Jeremiah; The Book of Hosea and The Book of Amos. As a reminder, for leamers studying the Old Testament, itis important that comment on the biblical text should be detailed, analytic and critical. Much more is expected than a simple paraphrase of the text. The passages set for study should therefore be considered with the help of scholarly commentaries on the text. As an example, centres should look at the Specimen Papers and their Mark Schemes as these serve as ood indicators of the kind of approach expected for New Testament and The Four Gospels. Text questions will not be set on obscure scriptural passages, Historical background and development There are two important pre-considerations: ‘1. Itwould be helpful for learners to be aware of the basic findings and approaches of text, literary, form and redaction criticism of the Old Testament texts, particularly in connection with the requirement to study the processes underlying the compilation of prophetic books. This helps to prevent a simplistic understanding of prophecy and prophetic books. 2. Leamers should not Christianise the Old Testament. The prophetic books are set for study in their Old Testament context, and not in a New Testament understanding of their significance in relation to Jesus. For example, with the so-called ‘Servant Songs’ in Second Isaiah, it would be legitimate to note that they were re-interpretad by Christian theologians to apply to Jesus, but it would not be legitimate to assume that any application to Jesus underpins the Hebrew text. As another example, it would be legitimate (and then only if was relevant) for a leatner to note that Christian theologians applied the sign given to Ahaz in Isaiah 7:14 to the birth of Jesus, but it would not be legitimate to assume that the Isaiah text had any such intention: the Hebrew ‘almaf’ refers simply to a woman of marriageable age, and does not authenticate the Greek translation parthenos/ virgin in Matthew 1:23. The Hebrew word invariably used for ‘virgin’ is ‘betulah’, not ‘almah’. moreover the name of the son, Immanuel, would be a normal type of Hebrew name in which part of the name uses the word ‘el’ (god), as in Samuel (‘asked of God' / ‘heard by God). Further, i the name Immanuel signified anything else, it referred to the fact that the king was in Jewish tradition seen as representing God himself, so it probably refers to Ahaz's son Hezekiah. In any event the prophecy was given to assure Ahaz that the Syro-Ephraimite invasion of Judah ca 735 BC would fail, and the prophecy was apparently fulfiled seven centuries before Jesus, so ifit referred to Jesus, it could hardly have been much consolation to Ahaz. Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide Reading Reference material may need to be ordered through libraries if the books are not already in stock, since some books are out of print, and much of the modern material is too esoteric for A-Level study. Where commentaries on individual prophets are used, these should be critical, and not simply theological J. Lindblom: Prophecy in Ancient Israel, Tradition and Interpretation: Essays by Members of the Society for Old Testament Study, ed. G.W. Anderson Bruce C. Birch, Walter Bruce Brueggemann, Terence E. Fretheim & David L. Petersen: A Theological Introduction to the Old Testament, 2" edition Joseph Blenkinsopp: A History of Prophecy in Israel (revised & enlarged) Robert P. Carroll: When Prophecy Failed. Reactions and Responses to Failure in the Old Testament Prophetic Traditions, Brevard S. Childs: Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture Philip R. Davies: The Prophets (A Sheffield Reader) Otto Eissfeldt: The Old Testament: An Introduction, translated P.R. Ackroyd, Klaus Kach: The Prophets, Volume One: The Assyrian Period Klaus Kach: The Prophets, Volume Two: The Babylonian and Persian Periods, Harry Mowvley: Guide fo Old Testament Prophecy, Robert H. Pfeiffer: Introduction to the Old Testamen Theodore H. Robinson: Prophecy and the Prophets in Ancient Israel (Studies in Theology Series) J. Alberto Soggin: Introduction to the Old Testament, 3" edition P. kyle McCarter, Jr. Textual Criticism: Recovering the Text of the Hebrew Bible Norman Habel Literary Criticism of the Old Testament Gene M, Tucker: Form Crtticism of the Old Testament Walter E. Rast: Tradition History and the Old Testament For a look at the current state of Old Testament studies, see: John J. Collins: The Bible after Babel: Historical Criticism in a Postmodern Age The problem of the origins of Old Testament prophecy Suggested basis ‘* Prophecy was a weltestablished function in the Ancient Near East: examples - Wen Amun in Egypt, the mantic/muhhum prophets of the god Dagan duting the time of Hammurabi / the Syrian weather- god Hadad, in the Mari texts using a prophet as his mouthpiece. Hence Israelite prophecy likely to be an imported phenomenon. © General Canaanite background of the Old Testament suggests an immediate influence from Baal prophets (G. von Rad /J. Lindblom, although Lindblom thinks the Canaanite influence is merely an influence, and Israelite prophecy arose spontaneously). + Possibility of an Israelite origin for prophecy in Israel W. Eichrodt) e.g. based on the assertion that Israelite prophecy is unique and that Israel was forbidden to use the means of gaining information that were open to other nations (e.g. Deuteronomy 18) / prophecy allowed only in the name of Yahweh / the association with ethical monothaism / Kenite hypothesis and association with Moses (probably anachronistic) + The view of F.M. Cross et al., that prophecy began with Samuel in connection with the monarchy, since kings used prophets on the model of Canaan and elsewhere: based also on 1 Sam9'9, the editorial note that he who is now called a nabi (prophet) used to be called a seer (ro’eh). + ‘Seer'—In 2 Sam. 24:11, Gad is called ‘Gad the nab, David's seer (hozeh). "Seer in 1 Sam. 9:9 is ro’eh, so the words seem interchangeable. Zadok is called a ro'eh in 2 Sam. 15:27, where it seems to correspond to the Accadian baru, because his divination was through the priestly oracle. Hanani the ro’eh (2 Chron. 16:7 19) appears to be the same as the nabi, See Lindblom 89ff.Itis not clear what was distinctive about the nabis (see T.H. Robinson, chilll, Klaus Koch, volume 1, 19ff) Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 67 Teacher Guide 68 The significance of Moses, Samuel and Elijah in the development of Old Testament prophecy Moses Samuel: Elijah: The rel eg Moses’ significance as a leader & prophet / significance of his call & commission role in the Exodus narrative / use of miracles as a demonstration of divine power role as covenant-mediator role iclw ecstatic prophecy (Num.11) probabilty that Moses’ prophetic role and status is editorial read-back. lived and was at the centre of a time of radical change, amphictyony to monarchy circumstances of birth and call suggest a special prophetic mission development of role of seer/nabi 1 Sam / relation to the prophetic bands (the bene hanebiim — ‘sons of the prophets) Samuel's role in the prosecution of the Philistine war Samuel's role as adviser to Saul /rejecting Sauls disobedience role as judge and priest analysis of the above: suggestion that much of this is a literary construct archetypal importance i/clw Sinai, election, covenant, salvation, law, revelation of God, etc. reviving contact with God and vision importance of theophany, restoring proportion his archetypal sense of failure & isolation, which surfaces in later prophets wonder working ability / translation to heaven transfer of his prophetic authority to Elisha messianic associations in later Judaism relationships with the authorities of his day — setting up a pattern of prophetic confrontation with/criticism of kings, analysis of these points, lationship between prophets and kings in the pre-exilic period for example the role of prophets in anointing kings — evidently a necessary process for authentication / role of the king as intermediary between Yahweh and state role of court prophets — supportive functions within the court role of prophets in requiring social justice predictions of the end of the northern and southern kingdoms examples, e.g. interplay between Ahab, Micaiah ben Imlah & Zedekiah ben Chena‘anah (1 Kings 22), / David & Nathan / Isaiah & Ahaz / Amos & Jeroboam / Jeremiah & Zedekiah, and so on Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide The relationship between prophets and the cult the view that all prophets were associated with the cult, perhaps some tied to a sanctuary, others with a more free-ranging role potential equation of priestly with prophetic functions, not just in the early period the fact that prophetic oracles are analogous to priestly oracles ecstatics — in sanctuaries — 1 Sam.3. Saul & the band of prophets (1 Sam. 10:10); Elijah on Carmel the known fact that Canaanite & other models are aware of professional cultic prophets / leaders of prophetic guilds seers / visionaries may have been involved in the cult cultic associations in later periods debated, but oracular speech forms, particularly the lamentation, seem to presuppose such a connection association of many prophets with the temple, e.g. Nathan (2 Sam.7 & 1 Kings 1); Isaiah’s call narrative; Jeremiah’s temple sermon; Amos at Bethel; Jeremiah’s priestly family; Hosea/Hosea’s wife perhaps as cultic functionaries, ete. the view that some of the prophets (2.9. some of the writing prophets) were deliberately outside the cult so as to criticise it (e.g. Amos insists he was not a nabibut a shepherd, although this is ambiguous, and could be read in the past tense: ‘I was no nabi (implying ‘now am a nabi'. Jer. 29:26 — priest has authority over prophet, which may imply a difference of location as well as function standard arguments that prophets were against established religion prophetic fears about syncretism and idolatry, putting religious observance before moral holiness; and insincerity in dealings with God The problem of false prophecy alleged differences between true and false prophets Putative association of false prophecy with court prophecy — but: Nathan & David, Isaiah & AhaziHezekiah Putative association of false prophecy with cultic prophecy, but there are several examples of true’ prophets with cultic functions suggestion that false prophets prophesied for money; but Samuel was a paid seer Jeremiah’s criteria for false prophets (8:10 / 14-13-15 / 23:14); his dealings with false prophets — e.g Hananiah the idea that true prophets had a call, false propehts did not; but we do not know that either view is true false prophets also used messenger formulae criterion of fulfilment for true prophecy (Deut. 18:22: ef. Jer. 29-9; 1 Kings 22:28) — weak, because fulfilment as a criterion refers only to predictive prophecy, which is only a small part of prophecy, moreover, prophecy was believed to apply to future situations also some hold that false prophets were ecstatics and true prophets were not, but that is a weak argument (Elijah et al) false prophets prophesy peace / true prophets prophesy doom — Jer. 6-14; 288-9) — but Isaiah used salvation oracles (Isa. 7). In its favour, the editorial additions to the Book of the Twelve are, uniformly, salvation oracles the whole issue is complicated by 1 Kings 22, which suggests that false prophecy is controlled by Yahweh Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 69 Teacher Guide 70 The question of how prophetic writings were collected and preserved stock view that most, but not all, messages were originally spoken, then written down by scribes, friends, the prophets themselves, or disciples / examples, some prophecy passed on in oral tradition in prophetic or cuttc circles processes of transmission and compilation of prophatic books; appearance of same oracle in more than one book (Jer. 52/2 Kings 24°18-25:30) / assimilation into larger collections / editing / redaction of larger collections (e.g. Isaiah scroll / Book of the Twelve) / exilic or post-exilc final redaction, e.g salvation oracles in Book of the Twelve fluidity of the process — e.g. prophetic scrolls at Qumran critical issues — see Lindblom, chill, 6. Prophetic phenomena See, eg + Lindblom, chapters Il & Ill, e.g. 122ff © Mowvley, chapters 1 & Il + Koch, Volume 1, part I + self-induced ecstasy «the issue of why revelation from Yahweh would be any different in the Ancient Near East from revelation from any other god / claim that Yahwism was distinct through ethical monotheism / other critical issues Prophetic call narratives See,eg proposed formal structure for call narratives, e.g. paranormal element, ecstatic audition / vision, sense of commission, reluctance, prophetic compulsion, etc. specific examples: Amos 7 and its interpretation Isaiah 6, apparently an ecstatic call experience visionary nature of Jeremiah’s call other call narratives, e.g. Moses / Hosea ef al. call narratives as formative for the prophets life / function / message, e.g. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Amos, et al critical issues: Lindblom Ill, 9 Oracles of salvation; oracles of doom formal structure, using the traditional messenger formulae: coh ‘amar Yhwh (‘Thus says Yahweh’) / ‘Ne'um Yhwh (‘Oracle of Yahweh’) Doom oracle far more prevalent than salvation oracle. Doom oracle structure = Thus says Yahweh/ reason for the complaint/ sometimes a contrast with Yahweh's previous acts on behalf of (Israe) contrasted with current behaviour / pronouncement of doonvdestruction / concluding formula — Oracle of Yahweh formal structure used to demarcate oracles in the prophetic books doom oracles / association with prophetic rib (lawsui) form for breaking the stipulations of the covenant collections of (doom) oracles against the foreign nations, e.g. Amos 1:3-2:16 salvation oracles seen by Jeremiah as signifying false prophecy - true prophets prophesy doom — Jer, 6:14; 28:8-9) / editorial additions to the Book of the Twelve are, uniformly, salvation oracles / Particularly significant at the end of Amos 9, when the salvation oracle is incongruous after Unrelieved doom oracles in the rest of the book against this, Isaiah used salvation oracles (Isa. 7) / other examples suggestion that salvation oracles were uttered by prophets and priests as part of their cuttic function / suggestion that some examples in Psalms and Jeremiah presuppose that the prophet was paid to offer a cultic lament on behalf of a suffering worshipper, in which the divine ‘lot’ (Urim & Tummimn) signified doom or salvation / application of this suggestion to Jeremiah’ so-called ‘confessions’ Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology 9774 Teacher Guide issue of 1 Kings 22 and the ‘lying spirit of prophecy’ put into the mouths of Ahab’s court prophets, where the salvation oracle is engingered by Yahweh to bring about Ahab’s death in the attack on Ramoth-gilead Abnormal psychological phenomena, including the miraculous element in prophecy The nature and mear Lindblom, Chull, 1. Ch.ll ecstasy: orgiastic and lethargic - related to the root meaning of nabi— e.g. 1 Sam.10:Sff., Saul meets a band of prophets said to be in prophetic ecstasy — mithnabbe'im / Eljah running before Ahab’s chariot from Mt Carmel to Jezreel (cf. ‘the hand of Yahweh’ came upon him — 1 Kings 18:46) / Elisha in passive trance in front of Hazael / clairvoyance - Samuel with Saul's lost asses /foretelling / foreseeing / visionary experiences / the prophet standing in the council of Yahweh to hear his dabhar (word), ete. miracles: sze Lindblom Ill, 10. In general terms, the miracles are seen as examples of Heilsgeschichte — ‘salvation history’: they are examples of how God intervenes in human affairs through prophets, in order to disclose his will Miracles were seen as visual demonstration of the effectiveness of the prophet's message: ¢.g during Moses’ efforts to remove the Hebrews from captivity in Egypt / in the desert wanderings / ‘major events such as Eljah on Carmel, the raising of the widow's son from death, his miraculous translation to heaven, etc. They testify to the power of Yahweh over (e.g. Baal), and thus have political importance in perpetuation of the Yahweh cut in early Israel 1g of symbolic acts in pre-exilic prophecy critical issues: Lindblom ch.lll, 7 symbolic acts were used as a visual adjunct to the prophetic messages. Their dramatic power was presumably intended to reinforce and illustrate the message, e.g. Isaiah walking naked & barefoot. Jeremiah & the loincloth, and so on in some instances the symbolic action dominates the prophet's life, as in the Book of Hosea, where Hosea is told to marry a harlot as a symbol of Israel's status, having abrogated the conditions of the covenant despite Yahweh's hesed-love. The names of Hosea's children are symbolic also. The nature of the symbolism is not entirely clear, since if Hosea was literally in a relationship with a (cult) prostitute, this would have been against the law/covenant anyway there are many symbolic acts in the prophetic iterature, particularly in the Books of Isaiah and Jeremiah, where the symbolism is often for political and religious purposes. The ‘writing prophets’ and their message Amos’ message of social justice, and of the complete destruction of the state ‘Amos message of doom as being the first to prophesy unrelieved doom /the complete destruction of the state these are generally seen as two aspects of one complete message — doom is the inevitable result of social injustice; although Israel is also castigated for religious and political sins emphasis that Yahweh will not revoke the punishment (ch.1-2) as the recipient of election promises, punishment is even more certain: election requires greater responsibility (3:2) visions of destruction (3:12; 7:4-6 7-9; 8:1-3,9-14; 91-10 lament over fallen Israel: 5:2-3,16-17 the Day of the Lord will be darkness, not light (5:18-20) the self-indulgent rich will be the first into exile: 6:1-7, and punishment will be thorough (6:8-14) the threatipromise of exile given through Amaziah: 7:10-17. social justice: selling the righteous for silver /father & son going in to the same maiden / ying down beside the altar on garments taken in pledge / the fat cows of Bashan / taking bribes / turning aside the needy at the gate of justice / sybartic luxury in the face of the poverty of the masses, etc critical issues: e.g. whether or not Amos contains any concession towards salvation oracle See Blenkinsopp: Il9; Koch, Volume One, Il, 4 Cambridge Pre-U Philosophy & Theology (9774) 71

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