NO.

It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to
libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e.,
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security. Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said
statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances
are to be treated as unprotected speech. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television
broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and
care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners
utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. The suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one
perspective, permissible restriction. This disposition was made against the backdrop of the following interplaying
factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v.
Kalaw Katigbak, easily reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a
reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a G or for general
patronage rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
[s]uitable for all ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain
anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision. The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech.
NO. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to
libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e.,
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security. Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said
statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances
are to be treated as unprotected speech. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television
broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and
care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners
utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. The suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one
perspective, permissible restriction. This disposition was made against the backdrop of the following interplaying
factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v.
Kalaw Katigbak, easily reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a
reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a G or for general
patronage rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
[s]uitable for all ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain
anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision. The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech.
NO. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to
libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e.,
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security. Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said
statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances
are to be treated as unprotected speech. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television
broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and
care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners
utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. The suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one
perspective, permissible restriction. This disposition was made against the backdrop of the following interplaying
factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v.
Kalaw Katigbak, easily reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a
reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a G or for general
patronage rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
[s]uitable for all ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain
anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision. The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech.
NO. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to
libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e.,
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security. Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said
statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances
are to be treated as unprotected speech. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television
broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and
care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners
utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. The suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one
perspective, permissible restriction. This disposition was made against the backdrop of the following interplaying
factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v.
Kalaw Katigbak, easily reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a
reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a G or for general
patronage rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
[s]uitable for all ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain
anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision. The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech.
NO. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to
libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e.,
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security. Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said
statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances
are to be treated as unprotected speech. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television
broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and
care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners
utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. The suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one
perspective, permissible restriction. This disposition was made against the backdrop of the following interplaying
factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v.
Kalaw Katigbak, easily reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a
reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a G or for general
patronage rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
[s]uitable for all ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain
anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision. The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech.
NO. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to
libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e.,
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security. Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said
statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances
are to be treated as unprotected speech. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television
broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and
care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners
utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. The suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one
perspective, permissible restriction. This disposition was made against the backdrop of the following interplaying
factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v.
Kalaw Katigbak, easily reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a
reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a G or for general
patronage rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
[s]uitable for all ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain
anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision. The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech.