Professional Documents
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41 People VS Ancajas
41 People VS Ancajas
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THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
That on the 16111 day of July 1998, between the hours of 8:00 to
9:00 o'clock in the evening, at the house of the victim at Taytayan,
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Thinking that appellants had already left, she continued walking to her
parents’ house but appellants reappeared and held her hands again.12 She
shouted for help and struggled to be freed from their hold but appellant
Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief13 and appellant Vergel
punched her in the stomach which caused her to lose consciousness.14
At about 1 o’clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, AAA regained her
consciousness and she noticed that she was only wearing her t-shirt as her
3
In consonance with our decision in People v. Cabalquinto, September 19, 2006, we withheld the
real name of the rape victim and instead a fictitious initials is used to represent her.
4
Records, p. 1; Docketed as Criminal Case No. B-00457.
5
Id. at 9.
6
TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 8.
7
Id. at 7.
8
Id. at 9.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 10.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 13-14.
13
Id. at 14.
14
Id. at 15-16.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 199270
bra, panty and maong pants were on her side.15 She felt pain all over her
body. 16 Her vagina hurt17 and it was covered with blood. Her panty and
maong pants were also stained with blood.18 She went back to her
employers' house and told them that she was raped by appellants.19
Dr. Mary Ann Jabat (Dr. Jabat) of the Severo Verallo Memorial
District Hospital, Bogo, Cebu, conducted an examination on AAA and
issued a Medical Certificate22 dated July 17, 1998. The medical findings and
testimony of Dr. Jabat revealed that AAA had lacerations in the perineum
and hymen (at 3 o'clock and 10 o'clock positions); her labia majora had
erythema and slight edema; and the vaginal swab indicated the presence of
spermatozoa. She said that the lacerations in the perineum and the hymen
were due to the insertion of a foreign object or the male organ23 and that the
presence of spermatozoa signifies recent sexual intercourse.24
15
Id. at 17-18.
16
Id. at 16.
17
Id. at 26.
18
Id. at 18.
19
Id. at 19; TSN, November 11, 1999, p. 6.
20
TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 27.
21
Id.
22
Records, p. 7.
23
TSN, January 25, 2000, p. 13.
24
Id.
25
TSN, August 17, 2005, pp. 24-26.
26
TSN, August 24, 2005, pp. 3-7.
27
Id. at 7-9.
28
Id. at 8; TSN, August 17, 2005, p. 10.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 199270
house is also 100 meters from their house.29 Appellants' sister Lucille and
their mother Amparo Ancajas corroborated their alibis.
The defense also presented Dr. Jesus Cerna, a medico legal expert,
who gave a different explanation on Dr. Jabat's medical findings,30 and
Doroteo Booc, appellants' brother-in-law, to show that he saw AAA walking
with a male companion on that fateful night.31 Appellant Allain's birth
certificate was presented to show that he was still seventeen (17) years old
at the time the alleged rape of AAA was committed.32 Also presented was
the police blotter which contained four (4) names as suspects on AAA's rape
but the same police blotter also contained in the progress report that AAA
only suspected accused-appellants as her rapists and refused to acknowledge
the other two.
On March 28, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,33 the dispositive
portion of which states:
SO ORDERED.34
The RTC ratiocinated that the elements of the crime of rape were duly
proven by the prosecution and the fact of rape had been corroborated in its
material details by the medical findings of Dr. Jabat. It found that AAA had
positively identified appellants whom she was familiar with being her
neighbors and childhood friends.
29
TSN, August 17, 2005, p. 11.
30
TSN, March 14, 2003, pp. 9-29.
31
TSN, September 26, 2003. p. 8.
32
TSN, March 8, 2006, p. 6; Exhibit “2”.
33
Per Executive Presiding Judge Antonio D. Marigomen. CA rollo, pp. 68-96.
34
Id. at 96.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 199270
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal which the CA gave due course.
The parties were required to submit their respective briefs and upon their
compliance, the case was submitted for decision.
On April 27, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC
decision.
The issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt appellants' guilt for the crime of rape.
Article 266-A38 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements
of the crime of rape as follows:
35
Records, p. 251.
36
Rollo, p. 19.
37
Id. at 25; 35-37.
38
The applicable law when the crime was committed was RA 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
which took effect on October 22, 1997. The new provisions on Rape are found in Arts. 266-A to 266-D of
the Revised Penal Code.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 199270
The prosecution must prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge
of the complainant; and, (2) that the same was accomplished under any of
the above-enumerated circumstances. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is
essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only
the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse.39 Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the
victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with.
Thus, if the victim’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can
justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the
accused should be acquitted of the crime.40
Appellants’ claim that rape was not was established as AAA had
been unconscious during its alleged commission is not persuasive.
39
People v. Cias, 665 Phil. 470, 481 (2011).
40
Id. citing People v. Lazaro, 613 Phil. 200, 207 (2009).
41
People of the Philippines v. Bobby Belgar, G.R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014.
42
Id., citing People v. Tabarangao, 363 Phil. 248, 261 (1999); People v. Abiera, G.R. No. 93947,
May 21, 1993, 222 SCRA 378, 384; People v. Ulili, G.R. No. 103403, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 594,
606; People v. Santiago, 274 Phil. 847, 859 (1991).
43
Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 4.
44
People v. Evangelio, et al., 672 Phil. 229, 243 (2011), citing Diega v Court of Appeals, 629 Phil.
385, 396 (2010).
Decision 7 G.R. No. 199270
Here, AAA was on her way to her parents' house when appel+lants,
her neighbors since childhood, appeared and held her hands. She struggled
and shouted but appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief to
prevent her from shouting, while appellant Vergel punched her in the
stomach which caused her to lose consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, she felt pain all over her body and her vagina. She found her
bra, bloodied panty and maong pants beside her. She went back to her
employers' house and told them that appellants raped her. AAA’s testimony
was corroborated by Dr. Jabat’s declaration that the lacerations in AAA's
perineum and hymen were due to the insertion of a foreign object or the
male organ and the presence of spermatozoa signified recent sexual
intercourse. It is well settled that when the victim’s testimony is
corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration, there is sufficient
foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge.45 The lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical
evidence of forcible defloration.46
45
People v. Batula, G.R. No. 181699, November 28, 2012, 686 SCRA 576, 586.
46
Id., citing People v. Belen, 432 Phil. 881, 893 (2002).
47
TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 11.
48
People v. Baun, 584 Phil. 560, 574 (2008).
49
People v. Evangelio, supra note 44, at 246, citing Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, 549
Phil. 783, 805 (2007).
50
People v. Rebutar, 181 Phil. 35, 43 (1979).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 199270
51
People v. Mitra, 385 Phil. 515, 536 (2000), citing People v. Silvestre, G.R. No. 109142, May 29,
1995, 244 SCRA 479, citing People v. Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 546;
People v. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712. See People v. Buka, 205 SCRA
557 (1992); People v. Devaras, G.R. No. 48009, February 3, 1992, 205 SCRA 676; People v. Casinillo,
G.R. No. 97441, September 11, 1992, 213 SCRA 777; People v. Florida, G.R. No. 90254, September 24,
1992, 214 SCRA 227.
52
People v. Marquez, 400 Phil. 1313, 1328 (2000), citing People v. De Labajan, 375 Phil. 1022,
1032 (1999), citing People v. Navales, G.R. No. 112977, January 23, 1997, 266 SCRA 569, see also People
v. Javier, G.R. No. 84449, March 4, 1997, 269 SCRA 181 (1997); People v. Amaca, 277 SCRA 215 (1997)
and People v. Midtimod, 283 SCRA 395 (1997).
53
People v. Islabra, G.R. Nos. 152586-87, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 547, 559, citing People v.
Santos, G.R. Nos. 138308-10, September 26, 2001, 366 SCRA 52, 59.
54
Id., citing People v. Iluis, 447 Phil. 517, 528 (2003).
Decision 9 G.R. No. 199270
The inclusion of the two additional names was cured by the sworn statement
of AAA and her categorical declaration56 in open court that appellants were
the perpetrators of the crime charged and no other. It is well entrenched that
entries in a police blotter, although regularly done in the course of the
performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such
entries, for these are often incomplete and inaccurate. These, therefore,
should not be given undue significance or probative value as to the facts
stated therein.57
It has already been established that appellants were the ones who
raped AAA. The DNA test is not essential, while there exists other evidence
pinning down appellants as the perpetrators.58 Moreover, if the prosecution
had not conducted such DNA test, appellants should have moved for such
test during the trial to prove their innocence.
All told, we find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of
proving the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
55
Records, p. 155.
56
TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 7-20.
57
Beltran, Jr., et al. v. Court of Appeals, 662 Phil. 296, 311 (2011).
58
People v. Lucero, 659 Phil. 518, 539 (2011).
59
Records, p. 154.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 199270
We beg to differ.
To begin with, on May 20, 2006, Republic Act (RA) No. 9344,
otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, took
effect. RA No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application, as held in
People v. Sarcia,60 which stated:
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
60
615 Phil. 97, 128 (2009).
61
612 Phil. 582, 606 (2009).
Decision 11 G.R. No. 199270
Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e., from
reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal. Being a divisible penalty,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.63 To determine the minimum
of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by one
degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years. There being no modifying circumstances attendant
to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be imposed
in its medium period. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be
taken from the full range of prision mayor.64
Notwithstanding, the RTC did not apply the law saying that the
benefits of a suspended sentence shall not apply to appellant Allain because
he is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua making
reference to Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,65 Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the law.
We do not agree.
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has
been found guilty of a heinous crime.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If
the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
67
People v. Sarcia, supra, at 128-129 (Citations omitted).
68
Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. – If the child is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court, instead of executing the judgment of conviction, shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Suspension of
sentence can be availed of even if the child is already eighteen years (18) of age or more but not above
twenty-one (21) years old, at the time of the pronouncement of guilt, without prejudice to the child’s
availing of other benefits such as probation, if qualified, or adjustment of penalty, in the interest of justice.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a child in conflict with the law who has once
enjoyed suspension of sentence, but shall nonetheless apply to one who is convicted of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 9346
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty and in lieu thereof, reclusion perpetua, and after application
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. (Emphasis supplied.)
Decision 14 G.R. No. 199270
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to
Section 38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40
is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the application
of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the
legislative intent of the said law.
69
661 Phil. 224 (2011).
70
People v. Jacinto, supra, at 256-257. (Citations omitted)
Decision 15 G.R. No. 199270
The damages ·awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid. 73
SO ORDERED.
71
People v'. Delfin, GR. No. 190349, December 10, 2014, citing People i-: Buynmre, G.R. No.
188978, June 13, 2012, 67'2 SCRA 446. 466.
n Id.
73
Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, .Jr., GR. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703
SCRA 439, 459.
Decision 16 GR. No. 199270
WE CONCUR:
J. VELASCO, JR.
'
IAa.~
ESTELA M:f-ERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
CERTIFICATION