Muhammad Irfan Ardhani

45189193
Review on Mohamad Rosyidin’s article “Foreign policy in changing global politics:
Indonesia’s foreign policy and the quest for major power status in the Asian Century”

[South East Asia Research 2017, Vol. 25(2) 175-191]

Name : Muhammad Irfan Ardhani

Student Number : 45189193

Course Code : POLS7208

Course Subject : International Relations of the Asia-Pacific

Course Coordinator : Dr. Melissa Curley

Word Count : 1561

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Mohamad Rosyidin’s article, “Foreign policy in changing global politics: Indonesia’s foreign
policy and the quest for major power status in the Asian Century”, is an endeavor to explain the
unwillingness of Indonesia’s government in pursuing the major power status in the world
politics. This unwillingness is due to Indonesia’s reluctance to promote its position as the new
major power country in Asia region. Even though the changing of geopolitical landscape that is
widely known as the “Asian Century” has provided Indonesia with structural opportunity to gain
the status, Indonesia seems not interested to seize this chance. Rosyidin contends that domestic-
oriented characteristic of Indonesia’s foreign policy and the embedded perception of Indonesia’s
status as the middle power among its foreign policy elites are the main factors behind the
reluctance. In this regard, Rosyidin states that Indonesia is missing an important chance, since a
country with high status is likely to have a better opportunity in securing its interests.

Rosyidin begins his explanation by introducing “status” as an important yet less common
concept in International Relations (IR). He admits that status is more popular in the study of
Sociology. Thus, IR scholars tend to appropriate the logic of the concept from sociologists. For
IR scholars, “status”, which is attached to states, contains material and ideational elements. In
this regard, economic capability, military might, tradition, size of population, domestic politics,
and diplomatic clout are the elements of states’ status. The possession of these elements
determines states’ status within international society, whether they are major, middle, or small
powers. Rosyidin then argues that “status” defines state’s role in international society. For him,
becoming a major power is necessary, since the higher status attached to a state, the higher
benefit in terms of attainment of national interests it can obtain. According to Rosyidin, to pursue
the major power status, states should possess material capabilities, have positive engagement in
the global affairs through conflict mediation and international organization, and get recognition
from other countries. In addition, states can also attain the status by expanding their spheres of
influence in the global level through their involvement in peacekeeping missions, mediation of
conflicts between major powers, initiation of international norms, and etc.

Rosyidin then contextualizes the concept of status with the practices of Indonesia’s foreign
policy. Although becoming a major power country is not an easy task, Rosyidin contends that the
attainment of the status is necessary for Indonesia. However, domestic-oriented nature of

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Indonesia’s foreign policy and elite’s perception about its role as middle power pose considerable
impediments toward the transformation of its status. Focusing his research on the Joko Widodo
(Jokowi) administration, Rosyidin finds that Indonesia’s foreign policy is no longer international-
oriented as his predecessor, President Yudhoyono, did. Jokowi pays more attention in linking the
country foreign policy with the domestic political aspirations. Under Jokowi’s leadership,
Yudhyono’s style foreign policy is considered as not urgent because of its non-material nature
and its lack of immediate economic benefit. In addition, for a long period, Indonesia has been
satisfied to be a middle power country. It is noteworthy that the status is in line with the free and
active principles of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Furthermore, the middle power status gives
Indonesia benefits from the current global order. As the status entailing Indonesia’s acceptance
toward the status quo, aspiration to become a major power can be seen as a threat toward the
current great powers which at the end of the day will harm Indonesia’s strategic position.

While Rosyidin’s article is necessary for raising concern toward the use of “status” concept in
IR, yet highlighting the possible outcome if Indonesia transforms itself into a major power, his
study indicates a lack of comprehension on the competing concepts of middle power. Since
middle power has important position to support his arguments, it is important to portray the
concept in a comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, Rosyidin’s exploration about the competing
concepts of middle power is insufficient. As a consequence, this insufficiency puts him into a
middle power trap. On the one hand, Rosyidin fails to properly examine the practices of
Indonesia’s middle power diplomacy, both in Yudhoyono and Jokowi administration. On the
other hand, he gives a theoretically less precise recommendation toward Indonesia’s foreign
policy personnel.

In Rosyidin’s article, countries are regarded as middle power when they actively engaged the
dynamics of world politics. Middle powers, for Rosyidin, are committed into diplomacy that
preserved international peace (Cooper 1997, cited in Rosyidin 2017: 184) and involved in
various multilateral forums in order to solve the myriad of global problems (Rosyidin 2014, cited
in Rosyidin 2017: 185). In addition, emerging middle powers usually try to raise their
international profile and to gain the international acknowledgement (Jordaan 2013, cited in
Rosyidin 2017: 185). For this reason, the works of Holbraad (1984); Cooper, Higgot, Nossal
(1993); and Ruhama (2015) on the concept of middle power become more compelling. Their

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works observe the specific behaviors of middle power countries in greater details. Holbraad
(1984: 5) argues that under the dominance of great powers in the international system, middle
powers indeed do not have the capability to determine the system. To mitigate threats that are
posed by great powers, these countries are involved in multilateral forums and hold prominent
role as the stabilizer of international system. In addition, middle powers are prone to engaged in
multilateral cooperation that attempts to embody the values of good international citizenship
(Cooper, Higgott, Nosal 1993: 19). These countries use their technical advantage to take
leadership role in multilateral forums in addressing a wide range of international issues, from
epidemics, disarmaments, to human rights protection through a niche diplomacy. On the other
hand, Ruhama (2015: 19) classifies middle power countries into classic middle power and
emerging middle power classification. While classic middle powers demonstrate their ability to
become bridge-builder, interlocutor, and conflict mediator in the global politics, emerging middle
powers assert their independency while develop its power within their region. By operating these
conceptual frameworks, we are likely to have a better comprehension on Indonesia’s middle
power diplomacy.

In assessing Yudhoyono’s foreign policy, Rosyidin appreciates his international-oriented foreign

policy and assume it as a milestone toward a major power Indonesia. He advances his argument
by stating that Yudhoyono’s legacy should be upholded by the current administration.
Notwithstanding, if we observe Yudhoyono’s foreign policy carefully, the involvement of
Indonesia in various multilateral organizations and its role as bridge-builder between great
powers (Beeson and Lee 2015: 224), in essential reflects the Coopers, Higgot and Nossal (1993:
19) notion on middle power. It seems that Rosyidin critiques the perception of middle power
among Indonesia’s foreign policy elite by praising the best practice of Indonesia’s middle power
diplomacy. On the other hand, Rosyidin also overlooks the important aspects of Jokowi’s middle
power diplomacy. Rosyidin fails to acknowledge the changing character of Indonesia’s middle
power diplomacy under Jokowi leadership. Rather than embracing the idea of classic middle
power, Jokowi embraces the notion of emerging middle power (Ruhama 2015: 21). Therefore,
Indonesia performs a more assertive foreign policy and shows its independency toward the great
powers in the region. Under Jokowi leadership, Indonesia demonstrates a confrontational
behavior when the country renames its territory on the South China Sea as the North Natuna Sea.
In addition, as a response to Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing, Jokowi has been

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implementing “sinks the vessels policy” (Otto 2014; Parameswaran 2015). Even though these
two measures have evoked diplomatic protests from many countries, including China, it seems
that Jokowi will continue his policy. Far more important is Indonesia’s effort to introduce a new
international norm beyond its region by promoting the idea to classify IUU Fishing as a
transnational-organized crime in various international forums (Rustam and Sangaji 2015;
Parameswaran 2017; Chapsos and Hamilton 2018: 1). In these forums, many countries in the
world, including Norway and Sweden, has supported Indonesia’s idea on IUU Fishing
(Parameswaran 2015). Jokowi’s assertive foreign policy, even more, has been interpreted by
some scholars as Indonesia’s aspiration to become a great power (Fealy and White 2015: 92).

Another problem with Rosyidin’s analysis lies on his theoretically less precise recommendation
to Indonesia’s foreign policy personnel. In order to achieve the status of major power, he
suggests that Indonesia’s government should increase its possession on material capability, its
involvement in conflict mediation and international organizations, its initiative in promulgating
international norms and etc. However, some of these recommendations, in fact, indicates the
behavior of middle power countries as suggested by Holbraad (1984: 5); Cooper, Higgot, Nossal
(1993: 19); and Ruhama (2015: 19). Even so, under Yudhoyono and Jokowi administration,
Indonesia has implemented these strategies. Perhaps not all of these strategies resulted in positive
outcome. However, advising the government to achieve major power status with middle power
strategies doesn’t seem sensible.

Overall, in discussing the importance of “status” concept in IR in particular for Indonesia’s

foreign policy, this article deserves appreciation. Rosyidin ambitious suggestion for Indonesia to
transforms its status into a major power country in order to gain more advantages in international
politics is quite intriguing. However, Rosyidin’s theoretical problem in the delineation of the
competing concepts of middle power pose at least two significant problems. First, Rosyidin
abandons some important features of Indonesia’s middle power diplomacy under the Yudhoyono
and Jokowi leadership. Last but not least, because of his inadequate understanding on the middle
power concept, Rosyidin’s recommendation reliability is under question.

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References

Beeson, Mark and Lee, Will 2015 ‘The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation
between Indonesia and Australia?’, in C B Roberts, A D Habir, and L C Sebastian eds.
Indonesia’s Ascent London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapsos, Ioannis and Hamilton, Steve 2018 ‘Illegal fishing and fisheries crime as a transnational
organized crime in Indonesia’ Trends in Organized Crime (2018): 1-19 doi: https://doi-
org.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/10.1007/s12117-018-9329-8

Cooper, Andre F; Higgott, Richard A and Nossal, Kim Richard 1993 Relocating middle powers:
Australia and Canda in a changing world order Vancouver: UBC Press.

Fealy, Greg and White, H 2016 ‘Indonesia’s Great Power Aspirations: A Critical View’ Asia &
The Pacific Policy Studies 3(1): 92-100.

Holbraad, Carsten 1984 Middle powers in international politics London: Macmillan.

Otto, Ben 2014 ‘President Jokowi Orders ‘Shock Therapy’ For Illegal Fishing Boats’ The Wall
Street Journal December 9. Accessed 18 March 2018. Available at
https://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2014/12/09/president-jokowi-orders-shock-therapy-for-
illegal-fishing-boats/

Parameswaran, Prashanth 2017 ‘Indonesia Wants Global War on Illegal Fishing’ The Diplomat 9
May. Accessed 18 March 2018. Available at https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/indonesia-wants-
global-war-on-illegal-fishing/

Parameswaran, Prashanth 2015 ‘Explaining Indonesia’s ‘Sink The Vessels’ Policy Under Jokowi’
The Diplomat January 13. Accessed 18 March 2018. Available at
https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/explaining-indonesias-sink-the-vessels-policy-under-jokowi/

Ruhama, Zulfa 2016 ‘Indonesia’s Middle Power Project in the Indo-Pacific: During the
Precidencies of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo, 2004-2016’ Master thesis,
unpublished. Flinders University.

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Rustam, Sunnan J and Sangadji, Rayyanul M 2015 ‘IUU fishing as transnational organized
crime’ The Jakarta Post 27 March. Accessed 18 March 2018. Available at
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/27/iuu-fishing-transnational-organized-crime.html.