Constitutional Law II
The Ordinance was similar to another Ordinance
Case Digest
A. Fundamental Powers of State
I. Police Power
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila
FACTS
1. Mayor Alfredo Lim passed an Ordinance which penalized
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments that offer short time admission (stay for less
than 12-hours) and “wash-up” rates (stay for only 3 hours).
Any violation would result to either P5, 000 or imprisonment for
less than 1 year or both.
2. Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief:
a. Praying for an injunction/TRO be issued, and
b. praying to have the Ordinace be declared invalid
and unconstitutional. They alleged that PD 259
authorized them to charge customers on a short-time
basis and to charge them for wash-up rates.
3. White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and
Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a
motion to intervene in support of MTDC’s petition on the
ground that the Ordinance affected their business interests as
they operate several drive-in hotels and motels in Manila.
4. The petitioners agreed to submit the case for judgment since it
was a based on a purely legal question.
5. RTC declared the Ordinance null and void because
a. it was against personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution
b. it went against encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to need investment.
c.
annulled in another case 1 , wherein what it sought to
prevent could easily be circumvented (i.e. Preventing
illicit relationships festering in the motels/hotels could
easily be consummated by paying for a 12-hour stay).
6. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari with SC,
which the latter treated as a petition for certiorari and referred it
to CA.
7. The City argued that the Ordinance was a valid exercise of
police power under Section 458(4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code2 and Art. 3, Sec. 18(kk) of the Reivsed
Manila Charter3.
8. Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional
because it violates right to privacy and the freedom of
movement. Furthermore, it is an invalid exercise of police
power because it was unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
9. CA reversed RTC’s decision and found it to be constitutional
for the following reasons:
a. The Ordinance didn’t violate the right to privacy or
freedom to movement because it only penalizes a small
group – the owners or operators of establishments that
offer short time stays.
b. Police power is limited only by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method, which what the
Ordinance satisfied.
 c. The adverse effects to such establishments is justified by b. The purpose of the ordinance is to regulate public
the well-being of its constituents. morals. The ban is rooted in the police power as
d. As ruled in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association conferred on LGU’s by the Local Government Code. Brief
v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by the law. discussion on police power:
i. No exact definition but it highlights its
comprehensiveness and its flexibility to meet
different conditions.
ISSUE with HOLDING
ii. It is based on the necessity of the State and its
1. WON the Ordinance is constitutional. NO. corresponding right to protect itself and its
a. Test of a valid ordinance as laid in several cases people.
including City of Manila: iii. Although the goal of regulating public morals falls
i. must not contravene the Constitution or any under the purview of police power, it does not
statute; automatically justify any and all means of
ii. must not be unfair or oppressive; achieving this goal.
iii. must not be partial or discriminatory; 1. The means must still align with the
iv. must not prohibit but may regulate trade; Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and
v. must be general and consistent with public specifically due process.
c. Due process evades a precise definition.
Test Source/Cas Means End Applicatio i. The purpose of due process is to prevent
e n arbitrary government encroachment
 Freedom against the life, liberty, and property of
of the individuals
mind ii. Two kinds of due process:
US v.
Strict Compellin  Liberty 1. Procedural: procedures government
Carolene Necessary
Scrutiny g  Restricting
Products must follow before it deprives a person of
the
political life, liberty or property.
process 2. Substantive: inquires whether the
government has sufficient justification
Intermediat Craig v. Substanti  Gender for depriving a person of life, liberty
Important
e Scrutiny Boren al  Legitimacy or property
US v. 3. Test:
Rational Reasonabl Legitimat  Economic
Carolene
Basis e e legislation
Products
policy; and  Discussion on Liberty
vi. must not be unreasonable. o Not a list of what may be done or not be done
 o Atmosphere of freedom where they don’t feel
labored under a Big Brother as they interact with
each other, their society, and nature, in a
manner innately understood by them as
inherent, without doing harm or injury to others
o Right to exist and to be free from arbitrary
servitude or restraint
o The spirit behind the Ordinance is to curtail
sexual behavior since these establishments are
notorious for venues for prostitution, adultery,
and fornications.
o Despite the veracity of such, legitimate sexual
behavior, which is constitutionally
protected, will be curtailed as well.
o The concept of liberty compels respect for
the individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect.
o There are other legitimate activities that
may be affected by the Ordinance and that
cannot be discounted.
 Applying the Test to the Ordinance:
o The Court did not use the rational basis test in
this case because the ordinance did not just
prejudice the property or business of the
petitioners, but the constitutional rights of their
patrons as well. They would be deprived of
availing short time access or wash-up rates to
lodging establishments.
o This thus constitutes a restriction on the
fundamental right to liberty, which must pass
the strict scrutiny test.
 The Government must show that no
other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose that is
less intrusive.
 There must be a reasonable relation
between the purpose of the measure
and the means for its
accomplishment because such
measure will be struck down if it
arbitrarily intrudes into private rights.
o Urban decay as seen in the rampant prostitution,
drug use, and adultery, should not be used to
prevent legitimate businesses from offering a
legitimate product.
 The Ordinance did not distinguish
between the places frequented by people
doing illicit activities and those doing
legitimate actions.
 What the Ordinance seeks to curtail is
already prohibited, so why not apply
those laws instead?
 There are other less intrusive ways in
curbing prostitution and drug use –
active police work or strict enforcement
of laws regulating prostitution.
o Individual rights may be adversely affected only
to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest.
o The promotion of public welfare and a sense of
morality among citizens deserve the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such
measures don’t trample rights this Court is
sworn to protect.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED
OTHER NOTES
2. WoN petitioners have standing to plead for protection of their
patrons’ equal protection rights
 Petitioners were arguing that their business is being
unlawfully interfered by the Ordinance and that it infringed
on their clients’ right to equal protection.
 According to the Court, they have standing. The third party
standing and the overbreadth doctrine applies.
o In Powers v. Ohio, the US SC outlined the criteria to
invoke such standing:
 Petitioner must have suffered an injury-in-
fact, giving him a sufficient concrete interest
in the outcome of the issue at hand.
 Petitioner must have a close relation to the
the third party.
 There is a hindrance between the third party
and his ability to protect his interests.
o In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are allowed to raise the rights of third parties.
o This doctrine applies when a statue restrains
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
o The petitioners here are alleging that the Ordinance
intrudes on their right to liberty of their clients,
therefore the overbreadth doctrine applies.
Ynot vs. IAC
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of
carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A
which not only banned the movement of carabaos from one province
to another but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984,
Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred that EO
626-A was unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his
right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-
A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the
EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due
process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of
the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other
does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot
should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are
being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that
the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due
process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to
manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of
admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any
person who did not approve could stay away.

Balacuit vs. CFI
FACTS:
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan pass an ordinance
penalizing any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation
engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or
other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to
require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay
full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should
charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets.
The Petitioners, theater owners, aggrieved by said ordinance, they
file a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City assailing the constitutionalit of Ordinance No.
640.
The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the
City of Butuan constitutional and valid.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights
of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the
interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it
has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful
curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the
guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No.
237 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby
rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void.

ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD:
YES. Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true
that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot
be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the
business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling
may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered
with even by the exercise of police power.33 A police measure for the
regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should
not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens
of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to fix a price at
which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of
 The trial court granted the motion, holding that the expropriation
was not of extreme necessity. Hence this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of

the Power of Eminent Domain.

Held: It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be

II. Eminent Domain expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation;
that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the
Republic vs. La Orden public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public
character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into
To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefor.
with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the
The petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines through proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order
the Office of the Solicitor General; and the respondent is La Orden de to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question
PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very
owns the San Beda College. liberally took judicial notice but also up on other factors that do not
appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of
Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda evidence. The parties should have been given an opportunity to
Street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga St. (now present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that
Recto) from its junction with Mendiola St., up to the Sta. Mesa might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question
Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a of fact involved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga
portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.
belonging to La Orden situated on Mendiola St. Not having been able WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the
to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the present case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
Government instituted an expropriation proceeding. On May 27, accordance with this decision.
1957 the trial court valued the property in question at P270,000.00
and authorized appellant to take immediate possession upon
depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with the City
Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order
directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the
property aforesaid.
In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the grounds that: (1) the property sought to be
expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not
subject to expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for the proposed
expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass
through a different site which would entail less expense to the
Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a
property dedicated to education.

Municipality of Meycauyan vs. IAC vs. IAC 157 SCRA 640 (1988)
Fact: In 1975, private respondent Philippine Pipes and
Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a
parcel of land which will to enable the storage of the respondent’s
heavy equipment and various finished products such as large
diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors,
bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter
concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the
Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R.
Legaspi, passed Resolution manifesting the intention to expropriate
the respondent’s parcel of land. On 1976, the Special Committee
recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove the
resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the
Municipality to expropriate the respondent’s property for use as a
public road. The respondent, then, reiterated to the Office of the
Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the
aforesaid parcels of land. On 1983, however, the Municipal Council
of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed
Resolution for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent’s
land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid
resolution and filed with the RTC a special civil action for
expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of value of the land, the
RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner. In 1984,
the RTC issued an order the taking of the property and ascertain the
just compensation for the property. The respondent went to the IAC
on petition for review. In 1985, the IAC affirmed the RTC’s decision.
However, it was subsquently reversed after the court found no
genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as
there were several other roads for the same purpose and another
more appropriate lot for the proposed public road.
Issue: WHether the expropriation of the Respondents Lot is of Public
Necessity?
Held: No, the Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise
the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is
justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine
necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the
power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity therefor. here is no genuine necessity for the Municipality
of’ Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the
Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation for use as a public
road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road
and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question
and lying Idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was
found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site
for its heavy equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining
vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to
be very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified
damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to
build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and
better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity
maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment
doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to
expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for
sale for a wider public road to attain decongest (sic) of traffic because
as observed by the Committee
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community

FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the

expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into
an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that
such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private
cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not
necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed
that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss
and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in
the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not
necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein
assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine
the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of
the necessity of the expropriation.

HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of

eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and
for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation
to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that
the courts have the right to inquire to.
 once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said
affected portion of their property.

In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking

under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and
effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission
NPC vs. Gutierrez lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for
an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
Facts:
National Power Corporation a GOCC vested with Eminent Domain For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled
power initiated negotiations for right of easement to construct to a just compensation.
transmission lines to several lots. The commissioners appointed
recommended P1.00/sqm easement fee for Gutierrez lot. This was
countered by Gutierrez with P10.00/sqm as disturbance Wherefore, the assailed decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
compensation. Court countered with P5.00/sqm. The lower court
granted P10.00/sqm but this was appealed and was reduced to
P5.00/sqm. Still not satisfied NPC appealed to CA. CA sustained the
decision of the lower court.

NPC contend that full ownership is retained by the private

respondents and they are not totally deprived of the use of the land.
They can continue planting the same agricultural crops, except those
that would result in contact with the wires. On this premise,
petitioner submits that if full market value is required, then full
transfer of ownership is only the logical equivalent.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement
fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmission
lines.

Held:
While it is true that plaintiff are only after a right-of-way easement, it
nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary
rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon
defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than
three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension
current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and
limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be
discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants

Republic vs. Castelvi
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with
Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the
permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the
property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the
AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation
proceedings for the land in question.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of
1947 or 1959.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as
of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property that year .
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the
“taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain
cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court,
“momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of real
property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a
period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory.
The fact that the Republic, through AFP, constructed some
installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the
entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although
renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By
express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition
as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is
claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land
permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and
express terms of the lease contract.
The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of
the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for
public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was
continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision
in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the
property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paing,
Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property
as lessee thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the
Castellvi’s property should not be determined on the basis of the
value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit
an error when it held that the “taking” of the property under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this
case.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to
be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought
to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES
IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically
prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and
hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist
Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not
market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment.
MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels
but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in
the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is
to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC
noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching,
is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is
subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for
the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance
was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional
and repugnant to general laws.
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various
stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within
Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc.
(PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation
and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA,
et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable
exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause;
amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law;
and lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act
No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police
power[13] under the General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid
classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that
aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides
application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of
health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed
the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only
upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision
reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of
protecting the public and the environment against the harmful
effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due
process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and
oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a
ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under
Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to
other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in
requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section
6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-
07under its corporate powers... the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the
questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the
alleged health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies
the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will
promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents.
Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license
for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge
its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact
legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate
powers of the local government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid
piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's
exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have
properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive due process
requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for
the Government's action.[113] This means that in exercising police
power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or
despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose.
So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public
purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to
achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals
regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom
spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial
resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be completed
within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the
respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the
consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain
of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business
permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of
police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer
zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being
confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural
landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property
that amounts to taking without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained
that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the
owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The
concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State
governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate
governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all
persons or things without distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit
legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal
protection envisions equality among equals determined according to
a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another.[123] In other word, a
valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the
class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis
approach appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test,
we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means
and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the
means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a
substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification
includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by
insisting that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm
to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this
justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the
classification must rest on substantial distinction?We answer in the
negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but
results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even
manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and
alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.[141] A
ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers
from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not
include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law
seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically
underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an
irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the
intended purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

Reyes vs. NHA
Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed
complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the
petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate
the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of
these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA
violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the
Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the
squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular
inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of
the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise
question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it
entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units,
which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the
expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA
has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation
judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to
herein petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in
the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated
property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.
Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA.
Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use.
It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer
limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been
held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit,"
"public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use."
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and
urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area
is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for
the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will
make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the
purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in
furtherance of social justice.
 Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of
just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes

impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution
is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the
decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s
EPZA vs. Dulay own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of
is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
government without them reaching the agreement as to the over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which
was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the
basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and
hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA
then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the
respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of

determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Association of Small Land Owners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal,
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several
measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and
229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No.
79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131
and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood,
i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian
Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under
the above-quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power
and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the
application of both powers at the same time on the same subject.
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended
for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse,
which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene
materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals.
The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the
taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires
the payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power
of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain
Facts:
At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the
towns near the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to
residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to
the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner,
without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam.
Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept
the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done
gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its employees,
and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further
contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the
damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents
assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened
was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque
injuria.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming
of the typhoon is a fortuitous event
(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum
absque injuria
Held:
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a
fortuitous event or an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence,
delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results
in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between
themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the
law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides
"whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God
or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The
principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that
the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human
intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result
of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or
neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the case at
bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners
can not escape liability because their negligence was the proximate
cause of the loss and damage.
(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED",
would not strike one to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to
set alarm and cause people to take precautions for their safety's sake.
The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible
officials of the municipalities concerned who could have
disseminated the warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary
employees and policemen. As it happened, the said notices do not
appear to have reached the people concerned, which are the residents
beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not
receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the
defendants allegedly sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual
that they cannot claim, as they do in their second assignment of error,
that the sending of said notice has absolved them from liability.
(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error
that the damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature
of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although there
was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the
fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have the right,
duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of
Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however
noble their intention may be. The end does not justify the means,
particularly because they could have done otherwise than
simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say,
petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.
FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for
expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said
lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The
Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the
lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering
the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just
compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed
on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National
Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
"denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal
rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised
value of the lots within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961,
the Denzons· successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed
with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages
against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.
On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of
Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority
of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land,
Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market
value".
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have
retained their right as such over lots because of the Republic·s failure
to pay the amount of P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation
proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles,
they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932
and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the
Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover
possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair
market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their
failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in
1976. The lot title was issued in his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with
the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and
exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner
including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the
CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC
Decision saying: ´... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because
the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,but
also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just"...”
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review
alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its
failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered
as early as May 14, 1940.
HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no
person shall be deprived of his private property without due process
of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due
process is that there must be just compensation whenever private
property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of
our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the
foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is
contrary to the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours,
where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of
compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid
in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab
initio.
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the
Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors-in- interest the sum of
P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question."
Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s
mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While
it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of
government, and the government may take them whenever the
necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from the
taking of private property by the government under the power of
eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of
the just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire
ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just
compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly,
without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer
of title from the landowner to the expropriator.
SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two
stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two
stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic
v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not
completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the
failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-
interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process
incomplete.
Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case
entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from
the Republic.
While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings,
the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it
takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the
payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of
the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just."
Agan vs. PIATCO
Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the
possibility of investing in the new NAIA airport terminal, so they
formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to
the government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III
project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air
Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that
preference was given to Paircargo, but still the project was awarded
to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport
Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a
concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said
terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of
pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the
concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and
charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with
the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a
contract with several service providers. The workers filed the petition
for prohibition claiming that they would lose their job, and the
service providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention.
Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the
legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar
petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor
PIATCO contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded
null and void.
Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void,
together with its amendments for being contrary to the constitution.
Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to
public policy. The amendments have the effect of changing it into
and entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon. The
amendments present new terms and conditions which provide
financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical
and financial parameters of other bidders had they know that such
terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the
amendments and supplements thereto are set aside for being null
and void.
The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the
concession agreement as their livelihood is to be taken away from
them.
David vs. Arroyo
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and
the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she
declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was
aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to
bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all
plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that
day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was
raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA
articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current
imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c
declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David
and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also
such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-
Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the
Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth
because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by
reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021.
The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out
power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE:Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by
reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of
the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The
SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time
some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the
following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in
issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between
the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute
such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling
for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents,
GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to
prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not
stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool
developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases.
The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call
upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion
are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’
and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP
1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC
ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only
criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it
becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such
criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president
declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated
Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to
the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the
clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’
The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted
former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081).
The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as
it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1,
Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private
corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities
but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but her
exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it
for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from
Congress must be based on the following:
1 There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law
Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the
president by the president.