FRANCISCO VS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.”
Issues:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Rulings:
1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable
and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office
of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by
the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the
Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid
but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET
would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and
3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process
before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would
be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance
in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme
Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the
power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada
and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar
of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD:
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term
Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by
Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or
not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that
the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently
already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from
the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those
legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like
this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
Ocampo v. Enriquez G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016 with former C.J. Sereno’s Dissenting
Opinion
AUGUST 20, 2018
FACTS:
Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the
public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of
Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of President
Duterte.
Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA)
Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:
1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their
capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3
(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).
2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as members of
the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.
3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as
member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of
Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims and
families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former President
Marcos, and several others, in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights
violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.
5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the
Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on
behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.
8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
poses a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts.
4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the
Constitution, domestic and international laws.
RULING:
Justiciable controversy
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are
present:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.
Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries
the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.cralawred As they are concerned
with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.
In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)
to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for
national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of
policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.
Locus standi
Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act
complained of, such proper party has no standing.
Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their
capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and
taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have
suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially being
assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos
at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without
showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied
provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes
available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be
sought.
For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners
failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.
Hierarchy of Courts
In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in
this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also
resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and
injunction when proven necessary.
Constitutionality
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the
effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an authoritarian
ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter
and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-dictatorship charter” and a “human rights
constitution.” For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of
Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27
and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of
the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.
As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a
people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything
remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing. Thus:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by
Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise
of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to
a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation.”
xxx
The petitions must be dismissed.
Note:
DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, C.J.:
The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations’ enduring values, which this
Court must zealously protect.
Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987 Constitution embodies the
Filipinos’ enduring values. The protection of those values has consequently become the duty of the
Court. That this is the legal standard by which to measure whether it has properly comported itself in
its constitutional role has been declared in various fashions by the Court itself.
See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the environment, women, children,
labor, the indigenous people, and consistently, those who have been or are in danger of being deprived
of their human rights.
Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively promulgate rules for the protection
of human rights, and how the Court in turn described this duty when it promulgated the writs
of kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.
Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the part of this Court to protect the
cherished values of the Constitution would be a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is designed to be
passive relative to the “active” nature of the political departments is a given. But when called upon to
discharge its relatively passive role, the post-1986 Supreme Court has shown zealousness in the
protection of constitutional rights, a zealousness that has been its hallmark from then up to now. It
cannot, in the year 2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of protective activism
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs.People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan,
FACTS:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts
Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials
of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after
their respective demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at
large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx
Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions,
authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or
acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of
PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were
denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.
After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers
to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The
same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that
they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by
GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions
for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Procedural:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the
demurrers to evidence.
Substantive:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among
GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder:
(a) Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the
total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate act of raiding the
public treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?
RULING:
Re procedural issue:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable
by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however,
that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did
not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial,
and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as
among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ
of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its
comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not
wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the
exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be
granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by
rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the
Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and
wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the
denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of
the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior
to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the
conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a
chain conspiracy.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26,
2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the
information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what
is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea
to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of
the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of
the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of
plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law
required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all
of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable
for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the
information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the
Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the
mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even
worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the
cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be
informed of the charges against each of them.
Re second substantive issues:
(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50
Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to
the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired
ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence
showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest
possibility that the CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to
either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public
treasury (under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds [See Sec.
1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a
sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or
is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in
which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a
statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore,
be modified or restricted by the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one’s own
benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not
as intended;” and malversation occurs when “any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person
to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds all the
four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the
public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the property taken,
the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and
gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim
of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken
impliedly for his personal benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly,
that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove
the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the
resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and
September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’ respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and
BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of
said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
KILOSBAYAN-VS-EXECUTIVE-SECRETARY
FACTS:
This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive Secretary, in
representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners
contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They
further added that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth, his father
was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent
Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen
and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be such.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
RULING:
xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's
ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent
Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the
time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to
this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by
injunction from doing so.
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO A.P.
MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 2007
Facts of the case:
This resolves a contempt charge against respondent Amado A.P. Macasaet (Macasaet), a newspaper
columnist, for authoring publications imputing bribery to a member of the Supreme Court namely
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, amounting to P10 million allegedly received in boxes by Cecilia
Delis (said to be the secretary of Justice Santiago), in relation to a criminal case which was decided
in favor of the accused, Henry T. Go (GR No. 172602). Justice Santiago denied the accusation and
Macasaet was ordered to submit an explanation on why no sanctions should be imposed on him for
indirect contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
states that “After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt; (d) Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;”. Macasaet testified that the information was received from confidential sources while Delis
denied any knowledge of the bribery. An investigating Committee was created to investigate the
alleged bribery committed by Justice Santiago. The Committee reported that the columns of
Macasaet appeared to be just mere hearsays and concluded that the bribery story was
“unbelievable” and further recommended that Macasaet be held in indirect contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not Macasaet is liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Held/Rationale:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of the press is a public right to scrutinize and criticize government.
However, many types of criticism become harmful and irresponsible attacks which threaten the
judicial independence. A truly independent judiciary is possible only when public confidence in the
competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of
judicial authority. These kinds of personal attacks damage and threaten the integrity and
indepedence of the judiciary. In Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, Lagunzad v. Vda Gonzales and
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, it was stated that Freedom of expression is not absolute and not without
limitations.
Upholding the findings stated in the Comprehensive Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Committee which enumerated the gross inconsistencies and assumptions of the
respondent which lacked veracity and showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery
was false or not, the Court held Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of court.
The Court also cited Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which
states that “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and necessary
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Hence, it is the obligation of the Court to sanction
those who wantonly obstruct their processes.
Separate Opinion
Associate Justice Antonio Carpio had a dissenting opinion. He stated that there was denial of due
process on the part of Macasaet because when the witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the
Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such
right. As matters stand, Macasaet will be subjected to punitive sanctions based on evidence he had
no opportunity to scrutinize. However, it was disagreed on the following grounds: (1) the
proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be regular. Thus, the onus probandi to prove
otherwise rests on Macasaet, not on the Committee. (2) assuming arguendo that Macasaet was not
able to cross-examine his witnesses, this does not necessarily mean that his right to due process of
law was violated. Further, Macasaet never assert his right to cross-examine the witnesses against
him. (3) the Court has the power to invoke the right to cross-examine the witnesses against
respondent, for and in his behalf. Otherwise, the Court will be acting as his counsel, which is absurd.
OFFICE IF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION V FLORENTINO
Facts
Way back in 1995 and another in 1998, Judge Floro was interviewed by the Supreme Court when
the former applied for judgeship. Both psychiatric evaluations provided that Judge Floro is
psychologically /intellectually unfit.
In 1998, despite the above- reported psychiatric evaluations, Judge Floro was advised to get
recommendations from law professionals. The former got favorable recommendation therefrom.
He was employed for judgeship.
In 2000, in relation to an administrative case filed against him, he again underwent psychological
and mental examination by the Supreme Court Clinic. This was after being sanctioned for contempt
for failure to comply with the February 2000 and October 2000 resolutions. Based on the three [3]
psychological tests and evaluation of the two [2] psychiatrists, the Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff
Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., stated that she has no other recourse but to recommend that Judge
Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.
Judge Defense:
Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations conducted by several mental health
professionals which were all favorable to him.
SC Ruling
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our
disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts
or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his
case indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in psychic visions, of foreseeing the future
because of his power in psychic phenomenon. He took to wearing blue robes during court sessions,
switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore
black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted
healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the
Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over
to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs, especially
since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a
judge under our judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only
positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus,
Judge Floros reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v.
Francisco, Jr.[124] sticks out like a sore thumb.In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the
testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a fairytale or
a fantastic story.[125] He then went to state that psychic phenomena was destined to cooperate
with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a
knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the primordial necessity of order in the social
life.[129]
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks
leaves much to be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may
have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness
and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a
lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x
x[130]
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of
competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge
for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of
three (3) years.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO S. ESPINA,
CRISTETA REYES, JOHNY SANTOS, ANTONIO ALEGRO, ROGELIO MENGUIN, PETE ALVERIO,
ROGEN DOCTORA and JANE GO, Respondents.
Before us is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order which seeks to: (a) annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 31733 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Pedro S. Espina Et. Al.", insofar as it
denied the People’s prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina of the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban City from hearing Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 93-01-39, respectively, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Cristeta Reyes, Et. Al." and "People of the Philippines v. Jane C. Go", and b) enjoin
respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal cases.
Acting on the said petition, the Court on April 3, 1995 resolved to require respondents all of whom
are the accused in the aforesaid criminal cases, to comment thereon within 10 days from notice, to
issue the temporary restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin respondent judge from taking
further action in Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 93-01-39 until further orders from the Court.
It appearing that private respondents Cristeta Reyes & Rogen Doctora, Johny Santos & Antonio
Alegro & Jane C. Go failed to file their respective comments within the period which expired on April
17, 1995 and April 18, 1995, respectively, the Court on June 26, 1995 resolved to require said
private respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplinary dealt with for such failure,
and to file the required comments, both within ten (10) days from notice.
As to respondents Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro (prisoners at the Tacloban City Jail), copies of the
resolution requiring them to file comment were returned unserved with the postmaster’s notation
"unknown in said address." The Court, on October 11, 1995 directed the Solicitor General to serve
the same on said respondents and to inform the Court of such service, both within ten (10) days
from notice.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Compliance stating that the required copies were sent to
private respondents Santos & Alegro through ordinary mail on December 26, 1995.
To date, all the respondents have not yet filed their comments, for verily, delay in the submission of
the same would appear to benefit respondents, and sanction against them may not really amount to
much, considering that most of them are under detention. Thus, so as not to unduly delay the
disposition of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, we now resolve to dispense with
respondent’s comments and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there
must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge which was explained in Javier v. Commission of Elections (144 SCRA 194 [1986], in the
following words:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as
the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be
sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade
of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which
the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouncement according to a prepared
script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all
the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the
pertinent law.
In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, can not be
considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both
the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision in
Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional
State Prosecutor’s Office level against herein respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing
of her husband Dominador Go.
Judge Espina’s decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for
the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would
have been more prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the
criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The Honorable Pedro Espina, Presiding Judge of Branch 7 of the
Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban is hereby declared disqualified
from taking cognizance of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39. It is further ordered that
these criminal cases be re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.
SO ORDERED.
GREGORY ONG CASE
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING
HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
September 23, 2014
Per Curiam
FACTS: When the Pork Barrel Scam broke the news in 2013, incriminating evidence surfaced
implicating Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Ong. Multiple sworn statements and
verbal testimonies of Marina Sula pointed out that Ong had visited the office of key Pork Barrel
Scam player Janet Lim Napoles. A photo published by Rappler showed Senator Jinggoy Estrada,
Napoles and Ong together in a party. Ong explained himself in a letter to CJ Sereno, saying that the
photo was taken in one of Sen. Estrada’s birthday parties and it would have been rude of him not to
pose with other guests. He categorically stated that he did not attend any event hosted by Napoles
during or after she had a case (the Kevlar cases) in the Sandiganbayan in which she was acquitted.
Sereno then requested the court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this
Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the
legal profession. Ong filed a comment saying that the testimony of Sula was merely heresay and that
what Napoles told her was simply to convince the people helping her that their cases would be fixed
and may not have been true. As to Sula’s testimony that Ong visited Napoles’ office, Ong clarified
that he struck uyp a conversation with Napoles during Senator Esrtrada’s party regarding the
“miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo” and that
Napoles had a way to help Ong access the statue in order to help him with his Prostate Cancer
(they’re both devotees). Because of this, he wanted to personally thank Napoles and that was the
occasion when he went to her office and that in that time she no longer had any pending case with
the Sandiganbayan.
Upon the court finding possible transgressions to the New Code of Judicial Conduct, they Re-
docketed the case and assigned it to retired SC Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation.
She examined the statements made by Benhur Luy during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigations pointing out that because he is Napoles’ second cousin, she divulged to him, prior to
the release of the Kevlar case decision, that her contact in the Sandiganbayan was Ong. He also
testified that he kept ledgers showing that Napoles spent a total of P100M in the Snadiganbayan
when she gave various amounts to different people during the pendency of the case and to Ong in
particular after which, she was already confident that she would be acquitted. He also testified to a
transaction between Ong and Napoles regaring P25.5M that they wanted to put into an account so
that it would accrue 13% interest and that he personally prepared the checks used for this
transaction. Justice Sandoval Gutierrez also examined the statements made by Sula, an employee of
JLN corporation in charge of formation of corporations, applying for licenses and the like. She
corroborated the testimony of Benhur Luy and reiterated her previous testimony on Napoles
promisisng her that a TRO would be iussued in thew case investigating the PDAF case. She said that
every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that Justice Ong will help
her in the Kevlar case. Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she
will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan.
In his defense, Ong denied that he ever met Napoles prior to or during the pendency of the Kevlar
case, denied that he received any money from Napoles, that the Kevlar case was decided based on
the merits, he never had any transactions with Napoles, he only visited her office for the purpose of
thanking her for that Black Nazarene thing, and that the whistleblowers’ testimonies were
conflicting and lack credibility.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez evaluated and concluded that the testimonies of Benhur Luy and Marina
Sula, because they were only denied and in no way challenged or refuted by Ong via adverse
testimony, were not lies. Ong did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula
and he failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr.
Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding their role which enabled him to
wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. His act of visitng Napoles’ office is unquestionably
disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the
privileges the law confers on him. Dishonesty violates Canon 2 ( 1 and 2) on Integrity of the same
Code providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must
reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary and further constitutes gross misconduct
in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
In the end of her investigation report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez recommended that Ong be found
guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH
FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits.
RULING: The SC adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice
which are well-supported by the evidence on record.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by
the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they
testified. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of
witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases. In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's
assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these
witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with Napoles.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while
·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct
as is not to be excused." Ong’s association with Napoles during the pendency of the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or
even preponderant. The testimonies of Luy and Sula, considering that they were employees of
Napoles privy to her daily business and personal activities and that she occasionally updated them
on developments regarding the case, were able to provide substantial evidence.
Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the
performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received. An
accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a
panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against Ong
connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.
Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges
against Ong. Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent,
we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles.
Ong’s act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper
and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. A judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes
this appearance. The SC’s previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or
socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court.
Caneda v. Alaan: "A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price
one has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely
venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all
his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no
ground for reproach."
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were
committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of
a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or
resolution.
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting
Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not
presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand,
Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office
appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. The Court finds that respondent, in not being
truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu
proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
DISPOSITIVE: Court finds Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY,
for which he is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits,
if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
OCAMPO v ARCAYA-CHUA
The OCA, through then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office of the Chief
Justice in a Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the reports about the rampant selling of TPOs and
PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a TPO in the said case, granting, among
others, the custody of the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and
directing therein respondent, Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away from the home and office of Chang
Tan as well as from the school of the subject minor.
According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua received money from Chang
Tan in exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing
the TPO. Her speedy issuance of the Orders dated May 7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not only showed her
unusual interest in the case, but it also appeared that the Order dated May 8, 2007 was tailor-fitted
to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in the latter's heated argument with the OIC of Branch
144.
Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is justified under Sections 8 and 15 of R.A.
No. 9262, as well as under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC, which specifically applies to a petition for
custody of minors. Contrary to OCAs finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang Tan in SP
No. M-6373 did not contain the requisite allegation of violence committed by therein respondent
Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17 of the Application was explicit that a
complaint for child abuse was filed against Stephanie Pulliam, based on, among other evidence, a
handwritten letter of Rafi wherein she enumerated the many abuses that her mother had committed
upon her. The complaint for child abuse was attached as an annex to the Application as well as to
the Petition. Other annexes attached to the Application, mentioning in detail the acts of violence
committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and
Rafi herself, as well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez.
ISSUE: WON issuance of TPO in favor of Albert Chang Tan is proper
SC: NO!
The Court upholds the finding of Justice Salvador Fernando that respondent Judge Arcaya Chua is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP
Case No. M6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No.
9292, known as the AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family
court judge, Judge Arcaya Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9292.
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua
AM OCA IPI # 07-2630-RTJ APR 23, 2010
619 SCRA 59
Facts: In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss. Francisco
Ocampo questioned the dismissal of his motion since Milan never presented any evidence to
controvert the evidence which he submitted in support of his motion to dismiss.
Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007.
On that date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), requiring complainant
Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's
residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from
committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the
health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support of
P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for medication and
education.
Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing the TPO as the period to file his
answer had not yet expired when respondent Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was
directed to give monthly support of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his wife
alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the absence of any factual finding as to the
resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. In directing the payment of support to his
wife, respondent Judge also ignored the factual circumstances relating to the adulterous relations of
his wife and the pendency of the legal separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and
abandonment.
Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the implementation of the TPO as if
it was a matter of life and death. When her branch sheriff was not available, respondent Judge
dispatched another sheriff to implement the Order. At that time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor
daughters and family were having their Holy Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and
opened the rooms against the will of the occupants and without regard to their privacy. When the
sheriff learned that Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused from
their sleep, even as Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his minor daughters to his
wife. The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay the support of P50,000.00 right there and
then, although he was told by Francisco that he did not have such amount of money. Francesca and
Fatima refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco Ocampo told them to
go with him.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the TPO is proper.
Ruling: As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing, Justice Salazar-Fernando
found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's explanation acceptable.
Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent Judge issued the TPO. A
preliminary determination of the facts of the case justified the issuance of the TPO as it appeared
that the subject minors therein were the illegitimate children of the petitioner, Milan Ocampo,
having been conceived through artificial insemination without the required written authorization or
ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco Ocampo. The pertinent provision of the Family
Code states:
ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or
that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided that
both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed
by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together
with the birth certificate of the child.
Moreover, Milan Ocampo appended evidence of complainant Ocampo's alleged perversity and
violent behavior. A sworn affidavit of Emelita S. Valentino, narrating alleged perverse behavior of
complainant Ocampo, as well as the certification from the Philippine National Police of Meycauayan,
stating acts of violence committed by complainant Ocampo on Milan, were appended to the Petition.
The totality of the evidence thus presented, while not exactly conclusive, justified a prima facie
determination of the necessity of a TPO.
On the other hand: in the case of A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, the Court held:
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO
cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9262, the Anti–Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is
expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9262.
Case of Regalado vs. Yulo manner, the courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and
No. 42935 15February1935 supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law.)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case was brought about by the action quo warranto to determine
the respective rights of the petitioner Felipe Regalado and one of the
respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to the office of Justice of the peace of
Malinao, Albay.

Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace of Malinao,
Albay on April 12, 1906. On September 13, 1934 Regalado became 65
yrs old. As a consequence thereafter the judge of first instance of Albay,
acting in accordance w/ instructions from the Sec of Justice, designated
Esteban T. Villar, Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado
surrendered the office to Villar under protest.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Whether or not under the provisions of section 203 of the Administrative

Code, as amended by the Act No. 3899, the Justices and auxiliary justices
appointed prior to the approval of the Act No. 3899 who reached the age
of 65 yrs after said Act took effect shall cease to hold office upon
reaching the age of 65 yrs.

No, Because justices appointed prior to the approval of the act and who
completed 65 yrs of age on September 13 1934, subsequent to the
approval of the Act which was on November 16 1931 and who by law is
required to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933 is not affected by the
said act.

HELD:
RESPONDENT ESTEBAN VILLAR BE OUSTED FROM THE OFFICE OF
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF MALINAO, ALBAY, AND THAT THE
PETITIONER FELIPE REGALADO BE PLACED IN POSSESSION OF THE
SAME.

STAT CON LESSON:

The intent of the law is to be ascertained from the words used in its
construction. (If legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate