[G.R. No. 99050. September 2, 1992.
] II
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
CONWAY B. OMAWENG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused Conway B. Omaweng was originally indicted for the
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. 1
Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the
granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared
that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation
and, finding probable cause against the accused, ordered the
elevation of the case to the proper court. 2
On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Mountain Province filed an Information charging the accused
with the violation of Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The accusatory portion
thereof reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"That on or about September 12, 1988, at Dantay, Bontoc,
Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously dispatch in transit or transport in a Ford Fiera,
owned and driven by him, 10 1/4 kilos of processed
marijuana in powder form contained in al plastic bags of
different sizes which were placed in a travelling bag destained
(sic) and intended for delivery, disposition and sale in
Sagada, Mountain Province, with full knowledge that said
processed marijuana is (sic) prohibited drug or from which
(sic) prohibited drug maybe manufactured.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 3
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 713.
After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the
Provincial Fiscal, 4 the accused entered a plea of not guilty
during his arraignment on 20 June 1989.
During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented four
(4) witnesses. The accused did not present any evidence
other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn
Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution
witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod.
On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment 5
convicting the accused of the crime of transporting prohibited
drugs penalized under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered imposing upon
the accused herein the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos.
Pursuant to Sec. 20, Art. IV of the aforecited special law, the
drugs subject of the crime are ordered confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government. Accordingly, it is further
directed that such drugs so confiscated and forfeited be
destroyed without delay per existing rules and regulations on
the matter.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED." 6
Hence, this appeal.
In the Appellant’s Brief, Accused imputes upon the trial court
the commission of the following errors.
"I
. . . IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JOINT CLARIFICATORY
STATEMENT OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE ACCUSED IS NOT THE OWNER OF THE
PROHIBITED DRUG SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
III
. . . IN NOT RULING THAT THE CONTRABAND SUBJECT OF
THE INSTANT CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR
HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH (sic) AND SEIZURE." 7
The appeal is without merit. The decision appealed from must
be upheld.
After a careful review and evaluation of the evidence, We find
to have been fully proven the following facts as summarized
by the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee. 8
"In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph Layong, a PC
constable with the Mt. Province PC Command at Bontoc, Mt.
Province proceeded with other PC soldiers to Barrio Dantay,
Bontoc and, per instruction of their officer, Capt. Eugene
Martin, put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one
going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc (TSN, November 9,
1989, pp. 3-4). They stopped and checked all vehicles that
went through the checkpoint (TSN, April 5, 1990, p. 12).
At about 9:15 A.M., Layong and his teammate, Constable
David Osborne Famocod (sic), saw and flagged down a
cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing Plate No. ABT-634 coming
from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio (TSN,
November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5, 8). The vehicle was driven by
appellant and had no passengers (TSN, November 9, 1989,
pp. 4-5).
Layong and his companions asked permission to inspect the
vehicle and appellant acceded to the request. (TSN,
November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5). When they peered into the rear
of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially
covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat
on the right side of the vehicle (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp.
6, 10, 11).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Layong and his companions asked permission to see the
contents of the bag (TSN, November 9, 1989, p. 6). Appellant
consented to the request but told them that it only contained
some clothes (TSN, November 9, 1989, p. 6). When Layong
opened the bag, he found that it contained forty-one (41)
plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized
substances (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7, 9).
Layong gave a packet to his team leader, constable David
Osborne Fomocod, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that
it was marijuana (TSN, November 9, 1989, p. 16).
The PC constables, together with appellant, boarded the
latter’s Ford Fiera and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to
report the incident to the PC Headquarters (TSN, November
9, 1989, pp. 7-8) The prohibited drugs were surrendered to
the evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling (TSN, November
9, 1989, pp. 7-8).
Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC Forensic Chemist at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, who has conducted more than
2500 professional examinations of marijuana, shabu and
cocaine samples, conducted two chemistry examinations of
the substance contained in the plastic packets taken from
appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or
marijuana (TSN, October 24, 1990, pp. 3, 5-81)." 9
Anent the first assigned error, the accused contends that the
prosecution failed to prove that he is the owner of the
marijuana found inside the travelling bag which he had in his
vehicle, a Ford Fiera Proof of ownership is immaterial.
Accused was prosecuted for the dispatching in transit or
transporting of prohibited drugs pursuant to Section 4, Article
II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. This section does not
require that for one to be liable for participating in any of the
proscribed transactions enumerated therein, he must be the
owner of the prohibited drug. It simply
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any
of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this
Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed."cralaw virtua1aw library
This section penalizes the pusher, who need not be the owner
of the prohibited drug. The law defines pusher as "any person
who sells, administers, delivers, or gives away to another, on
any terms whatsoever, or distributes, dispatches in transit or
transports any dangerous drug or who acts as a broker in any
of such transactions, in violation of this Act. 10
In People v. Alfonso, 11 where the accused was charged with
the unlawful transportation of marijuana under the aforesaid
Section 4, this Court ruled that ownership is not a basic
issue.cralawnad
The facts, as proven by the prosecution, establish beyond
cavil that the accused was caught in the act of transporting
the prohibited drug or, in other words, in flagrante delicto.
That he knew fully well what he was doing is shown beyond
moral certainty by the following circumstances: (a) the
prohibited drug was found in a travelling bag, (b) he is the
owner of the said bag, (c) he concealed the bag behind a
spare tire, (d) he was travelling alone, and (e) the Ford Fiera
in which he loaded the bag was under his absolute control,
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court (on
circumstantial evidence), the combination of all these
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. Such circumstances, unrebutted by strong
and convincing evidence by the accused, even gave rise to
the presumption that he is the owner of the prohibited drug.
12
The second assigned error is devoid of merit. The declaration
in the joint clarificatory sworn statement executed by the
apprehending officers, that the marijuana subject of the case
was surreptitiously placed by an unknown person in the bag
of the accused, is not supported by evidence. Said sworn
statement cannot be used as a basis for exoneration because
the very same officers who signed the same reiterated on the
witness stand their statements in their original affidavit
implicating the accused, both the criminal complaint before
the Municipal Trial Court of Lontoc and the information in this
case were based on this original affidavit. No probative value
could be assigned to it not only because it was procured by
the defense under questionable circumstances, but also
because the affiants therein merely expressed their personal
opinion. The trial court’s correct exposition on this point, to
which nothing more may be added, deserves to be quoted,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the portions of the ‘Joint Clarificatory Sworn
Statement- of prosecution witnesses Layong and Fomocod
cited (Exhs. "I" to "I-C" ; p 155, Record), the defense would
want this Court to draw the inference that the accused
Conway Omaweng is innocent as confirmed by no less than
the persons who apprehended the suspect in flagranti (sic). In
other words, that the said accused is not the owner of the
contraband confiscated but someone else; that to (sic)
mysterious individual placed the prohibited articles inside the
travelling bag of the accused without the knowledge and
consent of the latter; and that the identity of this shadowy
third person is known by the PC/INP investigators. The
isolated declarations, albeit under oath are much too asinine
to be true and do not affect the credibilities of the witnesses
— affiants and the truth of their affirmations on the stand. As
gleaned from parts of the record of the reinvestigation of this
case conducted by the Provincial Fiscal (Exhs "G" and "D" ;
pp. 158 and 161, Record), it appears that Layong and
Fomocod were prevailed upon to affix their signatures to (sic)
the document styled as ‘Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement’
by interested persons in a vain ploy to extricate the accused
from the morass he got himself into. Testifying in open court,
the same witnesses maintained the tenor of their original
affidavit supporting the filing of the criminal complaint in the
lower court (Exh. "C" ; p. 2, Record) No additional
information was elicited from said witnesses during their
examination from which it can reasonably be deduced that a
third person instead of the accused is the culprit and that the
suspect is being framed-up for a crime he did not commit.
Nonetheless, granting arguendo that the declarations of
Layong and Fomocod now the bone of contention, are on the
level, the same are but mere opinions and conclusions
without bases. Any which way, to believe that any person in
his right mind owning several kilos of hot hashish worth tens
of thousands of pesos would simply stash it away in the
travelling bag of someone he has no previous agreement with
is a mockery of common sense. And to think further that the
PC/INP agents know of such fact yet they kept the vital
information under ‘confidential Status’ (whatever that means
in police parlance) while an innocent person is being
prosecuted and practically in the shadow of the gallows for
the offense would be stretching human credulity to the
snapping point. By and large, the fact remains as the
circumstances logically indicate that the accused Conway
Omaweng has knowledge of the existence of the contraband
inside his vehicle and he was caught red-handed transporting
the hot stuff." 13
The third assignment of error hardly deserves any
consideration Accused was not subjected to any search which
may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 14 If one had
been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as
the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges
of the Court." 15 He willingly gave prior consent to the search
and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and
travelling bag. Prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified
thus:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
"PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what
did you do?
A When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we
could see the contents.
Q And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there
was any?
A He said ‘you can see the contents but those are only
clothings (sic).’
Q When he said that, what did you do?
A We asked him if we could open and see it.
Q When you said that, what did he tell you?
A He said you can see it.
Q And when he said ‘you can see and open it,’ what did you
do?
A When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was
not clothings (sic) that was contained in the bag.
Q And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did
you do?
A When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some
of the contents and showed it to my companion Fomocod and
when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana." 16
This testimony was not dented on cross-examination or
rebutted by the accused for he chose not to testify on his own
behalf.
Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures As this Court stated in People v.
Malasugui: 17
". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to
have it made of (sic) his person or premises, he is precluded
from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631.) The right to be secure
from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived
and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly."cralaw virtua1aw library
Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41)
packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to
seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure.
Besides, when said packages were identified by the
prosecution witnesses and later on formally offered in
evidence, the accused did not raise any objection whatsoever.
Thus, in the accused’s Comments And/Or Objections To Offer
of Evidence, 18 We merely find the following:chanrobles law
library

"EXHIBIT COMMENTS AND/OR OBJECTIONS

"A" The bag was not positively identified to be

the same bag allegedly found inside the

vehicle driven by the accused. The

arresting officers failed to show any

identifying marks; thug, said bag is an

irrelevant evidence not admissible in court;

"A-1" to "A-40" Objected to also as irrelevant as the 40

bags now being offered are not the same

bags alleged in the information which is 41

bags. The prosecution failed to proved (sic)

beyond reasonable doubt that Exhibit "A-1"

to "A-40" are the same bags allegedly taken

from inside Exhibit "A" because what is

supposed to be inside the bag are 41 bags

and not 40 bags."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial t

of Bontoc, Mountain Province of 21 March 1991 in Criminal
Case No. 713 finding the accused CONWAY B. OMAWENG
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, is
hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-95630 June 18, 1992
SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA. LUISA VEROY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. WILLIAM L. LAYAGUE, Presiding Judge, Branch XIV,
Regional Trial Court at Davao City; and BRIG. GEN. PANTALEON
DUMLAO, Commanding General, PC-Criminal Investigation
Service, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This was originally a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: certiorari, to review the Order of
the respondent Judge dated October 2, 1990 denying herein
petitioner's Motion for Hospital Confinement; mandamus, to compel
respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' long pending motion for bail;
and prohibition, to enjoin further proceedings on the ground that the
legal basis therefore is unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at
No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City.
When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of
Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in
June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East
Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently residing. The care and
upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys,
Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a
portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to
Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other
expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys
to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the
circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give
her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the
master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were
retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the
caretakers could enter the house.
On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol
Station, PC/INP, acting upon a directive issued by Metrodiscom
Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of herein petitioners
in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as
a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the
help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was
not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma.
Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by
Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it
was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel
soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to
Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not
be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of
the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys.
The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero to
Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him
twice by telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on
the condition that the search be conducted in his presence.
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house
of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant
to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers
facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna
Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a
locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open
the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt. Obrero
and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted
the search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a
magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside
an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed
materials of RAM-SFP (samples of which were attached as Annexes
"H" and "H-1" of the petition) (Rollo, pp. 49-55) were also found in the
children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area
revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's
brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo.
sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one
blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled
"Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the
Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines
and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo
Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and
receipt of the articles seized, in the house (Annex "F" of the
Petition, Rollo, p. 48). Said receipt was signed by Eric Burgos, one of
the caretakers, and George Badiang, the locksmith, as witnesses. Sgt.
Justalero turned over the articles to Sgt. Rodolfo Urbano at the police
station.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City
Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who was designated Acting
Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the Department of Justice
through Department Order No. 88 dated May 16, 1990. In a resolution
dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an
information against herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in
Furtherance of Rebellion) (Annex "L" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 71).
Hence, on August 8, 1990. an Information for the said offense was filed
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the Regional
Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 20595-90 and entitled "People of the Philippines v. Atty.
Leopoldo Veroy and Mrs. Maria Luisa Veroy" (Annex "K" of the
Petition, Rollo, p. 70). No bail was recommended by the prosecution.
The aforementioned resolution dated August 6, 1990 of Fiscal
Ponferrada was received by the petitioners on August 13, 1990. On the
same day, the latter filed a Motion for Bail before herein respondent
Judge Layague which was denied on August 17, 1990 for being
premature since at that time, petitioners had not yet been arrested.
Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet been
served on them, herein petitioners voluntarily surrendered themselves
to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the CIS
that initiated the complaint. However, the latter refused to receive them
on the ground that his office has not yet received copies of their
warrants of arrest.
In the meantime, on August 15, 1990, herein petitioners were admitted
to the St. Luke's Hospital for various ailments brought about or
aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the
criminal complaint. On August 17, 1990, Brig. Gen. Dumlao granted
their request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and
placed under guard thereat.
In an Indorsement dated August 20, 1990, the CIS through Capt.
Benjamin de los Santos, made its return to the trial court informing the
latter of the voluntary surrender of herein petitioners and the fact that
they were under hospital confinement. Herein Petitioner reiterated their
Motion for Bail. In an Order dated August 24, 1990 (Annex "M" of the
Petition, Rollo, p. 74), the hearing for the Motion for Ball was set for
August 31, 1990 to enable the prosecution to present evidence it
opposition to said motion. The prosecution filed its written opposition
(Annex "N" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 75) on August 28, 1990, arguing
that the evidence of petitioners' guilt was strong and thereafter
presented its evidence.
On September 21, 1990, respondent Judge required the CIS to
produce the bodies of herein petitioners on October 1, 1990 for
arraignment (Annex "O" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 76). Upon their
arraignment, herein Petitioners entered a plea of not guilty and filed an
"Urgent Motion for Hospital Confinement" (Annex "OO" of the
Petition Rollo, p. 77) which was denied by the court in its Order dated
October 2, 1990 (Annex "P" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 80). It likewise
ordered their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center, Ma-
a, Davao City pending trial on the merits. Herein petitioners argued
orally a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the
prosecution. At the conclusion thereof, the court a quo issued a second
order annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 83) denying then motion for
reconsideration and as to the alternative prayer to reopen the motion
for hospital confinement, set the continuance thereof to October 17,
1990. It was further ordered that the petitioners shall remain under the
custody of the PC-CIS pending resolution of the case.
Meanwhile, petitioners were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where
their physical condition remained erratic. On or about October 18,
1990, herein petitioners were informed that Brig. Gen. Dumlao had
issued a directive for their transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to
Camp Crame on the basis of the October 2, 1990 Order (Annex "Q" of
the Petition, Rollo, p. 83). Petitioners made representations that the
tenor of the court order warranted maintenance of the status quo, i.e.,
they were to continue their hospital confinement. However, Brig, Gen.
Dumlao informed them that unless otherwise restrained by the court,
they would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of the trial
court.
Hence, this petition on October 25, 1990 this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court, ordering: (a) respondent Hon.
William L. Layague to refrain from further proceeding with petitioners'
"Motion for Hospital Confinement" in Criminal Case No. 20595-90
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Veroy and Ma. Luisa
Veroy"; and (b) respondent Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao to refrain
from transferring petitioners from the St. Luke's Hospital (Rollo, pp. 84-
A to 84-C).
On November 2, 1990, respondent Judge issued an order denying
petitioners' Motion for Bail (Annex "A" of the Second Supplemental
Petition, Rollo, p. 133). Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition on
November 7, 1990 (Rollo, P. 105) and a Second Supplemental Petition
on November 16, 1990 (Rollo, p. 120) which sought to review the order
of the trial court dated November 2, 1990 denying their petition for bail.
Acting on the Supplemental Petition filed by Petitioners and taking into
consideration several factors such as: a) that the possibility that they
will flee or evade the processes of the court is fairly remote; b) their
poor medical condition; and c) the matters in their Second
Supplemental Petition especially since the prosecution's evidence
refers to constructive possession of the disputed firearms in Davao
City through the two (2) caretakers while petitioners lived in Manila
since 1988, this Court, on November 20, 1990, granted petitioners'
provisional liberty and set the bail bond at P20,000.00 each (Rollo, p.
141). Petitioners posted a cash bond in the said amount on November
23, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 143-145).
The petition was given due course on July 16, 1991 (Rollo, p. 211).
Respondents adopted their Comment dated December 28, 1990
(Rollo, pp. 182-191) as their Memorandum while, petitioners filed their
Memorandum on September 9, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 218-269).
As submitted by the respondents, and accepted by petitioners, the
petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge to resolve
petitioners' Motion for Bail, and the petition for certiorari to review the
order of respondent judge initially denying their Motion for Hospital
Confinement, were rendered moot and academic by the resolutions of
this Court dated November 20, 1990 and October 25, 1990,
respectively. What remains to be resolved is the petition for prohibition
where petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the
third paragraph of Section 1 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution;
2. Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been
repealed by Republic Act No. 6968;
3. Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No.
1866 the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in admitting in evidence certain articles
which were clearly inadmissible for being violative
of the prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been
laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January
30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of
attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy.
Likewise, petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed
Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute
are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the
legislature must be determined from the language employed, and
where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction (Provincial Board of Cebu v. Presiding Judge of Cebu,
CFI, Br. IV, G.R. No. 34695, March 7, 1989 [171 SCRA 1]). A perusal
of the aforementioned laws would reveal that the legislature provided
for two (2) distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms under
Presidential Decree No. 1866; and (2) rebellion, coup d' etat, sedition
and disloyalty under Republic Act 6968; evidently involving different
subjects which were not clearly shown to have eliminated the others.
But petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866
is couched in general or vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire",
"dispose" or "possess" are capable of various interpretations such that
there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes
"constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive
possession should be applied. Petitioners were not found in actual
possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They were in Quezon City
while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were
being charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole
circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to
them (Memorandum for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 242-244).
Otherwise stated, other than their ownership of the house in Skyline
Village, there was no other evidence whatsoever that herein petitioners
possessed or had in their control the items seized (Ibid., pp. 248-250).
Neither was it shown that they had the intention to possess the
Firearms or to further rebellion (Ibid., P. 252).
In a similar case, the revolver in question was found in appellant's
store and the question arouse whether he had possession or custody
of it within the meaning of the law.
This Court held that:
The animus possidendi must be proved in opium
cases where the prohibited drug was found on the
premises of the accused and the same rule is
applicable to the possession of firearms. The
appellant denied all knowledge of the existence of
the revolver, and the Government's principal
witness stated that there were a number of
employees in the store. The only testimony which
tends to show that the appellant had the
possession or custody of this revolver is the
inference drawn from the fact that it was found in
his store, but we think that this inference is
overcome by the positive testimony of the
appellant, when considered with the fact that there
were a number of employees in the store, who, of
course, could have placed the revolver in the
secret place where it was found without the
knowledge of the appellant. At least there is a very
serious doubt whether he knew of the existence of
this revolver. In such case the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the appellant. (U.S. v. Jose
and Tan Bo., 34 Phil. 724 [1916])
But more importantly, petitioners question the admissibility in evidence
of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had
permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their
residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the
presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include
any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house.
The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative
of their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence
against them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution).
However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a
valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions
thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a
moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo
Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for
searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being
used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While
Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the
house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were
not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a
search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but
rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same.
Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house
but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the
circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time
to procure a search warrant but did not.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, (Guazon v. De
Villa, supra.; People v. Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988
[163 SCRA 402]; Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987 [151
SCRA 279]), warrantless searches were declared illegal because the
officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a
search Warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal searches,
were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently
instituted against the accused-appellants (People v. Cendana, G.R.
No. 84715, October 17, 1990 [190 SCRA 538]).
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they
are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule
having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles
seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the
exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the
petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of
firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides,
assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala
prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must
be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or
voluntariness there is no crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal
case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93516 August 12, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA
DADO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an
information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident
to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with
Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y
Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites
Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric
and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz (Records, p. 3). Such
information was later amended to exclude all the above-enumerated
persons except the accused-appellant from the criminal charge. The
amended information reads:
That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the
City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Basilio DAMASO @
Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have
in his possession, custody and control one (1)
M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with
magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
the crime of subversion, filed against said accused
in the above-entitled case for Violation of Republic
Act 1700, as amended by Executive Order No.
276.
Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866.
(Records, p. 20)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged (Records, p. 37). Trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The
counsel for accused-appellant interposed his objections to the
admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being
hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search
warrant. On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested that he was not
presenting any evidence for the accused (TSN, December 28, 1989, p.
139). On January 17, 1990, the trial court rendered decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio
Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka
Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation
of Presidential Decree Number 1866, and
considering that the Violation is in furtherance of,
or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion, pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935
and live ammunition and all the articles and/or
items seized on June 19, 1988 in connection with
this case and marked and submitted in court as
evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government, the same to be turned
over to the Philippine Constabulary Command at
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR
INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE
WOEFULLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT
PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS
DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E
AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE
WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE
SAME COURT AND THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE
THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY ACCUSED-
APPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE
CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM
ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN
FURTHERANCE OF OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN
CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF
SUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief,
as follows:
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a
Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the
152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan,
and some companions were sent to verify the
presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay
Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said
place, the group apprehended Gregorio
Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa
and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the
persons apprehended revealed that there was an
underground safehouse at Gracia Village in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the
Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group
proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They
found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7
caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn,
October 23, 1989).
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan,
Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the
rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of
Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They
interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of
Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked
with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She
guided the group to the house rented by appellant.
When they reached the house, the group found
that it had already been vacated by the occupants.
Since Morados was hesitant to give the new
address of Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for
the Barangay Captain of the place and requested
him to point out the new house rented by
appellant. The group again required Morados to
go with them. When they reached the house, the
group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her
that they already knew that she was a member of
the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but
when she saw Morados she requested the group
to go inside the house. Upon entering the house,
the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw
radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox
copiers and a computer machine. They also found
persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco
(namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Maries
Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda
Morados). The group requested the persons in the
house to allow them to look around. When Luz
Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw
books used for subversive orientation, one M-14
rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio,
artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales,
Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They
confiscated the articles and brought them to their
headquarters for final inventory. They likewise
brought the persons found in the house to the
headquarters for investigation. Said persons
revealed that appellant was the lessee of the
house and owned the items confiscated therefrom
(pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn,
October 31, 1989). (p. 5, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee,
p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their
drive against lawless elements in our society, We must, however,
stress that the latter's efforts to this end must be done within the
parameters of the law. In the case at bar, not only did We find that
there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in
obtaining evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the
evidence as presented against him is weak to justify conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled
out as the sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of, or incident
to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is no
substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the
appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house
where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the
owner of the said items. The prosecution presented two witnesses who
attested to this fact, thus:
Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
Fiscal
Q How about this Bernie
Mendoza, who was the one
renting the house?
A He was not around at that
time, but according to
Luz (Tanciangco) who
mentioned the name Bernie
Mendoza (as) the one who
was renting the house and at
the same time claiming that it
was Bernie Mendoza who
owns the said items. (TSN of
October 31, 1989, p. 40)
xxx xxx xxx
Q I am showing you another
picture which we request to
be marked as Exhibit "K-2,"
tell us if it has any connection
to the house?
A The same house, sir.
Q Now, this person who
according to you allegedly
occupied the house at
Bonuan Gueset, by the name
of Bernie Mendoza, in your
capacity as a Military officer,
did you find out the identity?
A I am not the proper (person)
to tell the real identity of
Bernie de Guzman.
Q Can you tell the Honorable
Court the proper person who
could tell the true identity of
Bernie Mendoza?
A The Intelligence of the
Pangasinan PC Command.
Q Can you name these
officers?
A Captain Roberto Rosales
and his assistant, First Lt.
Federico Castro. (ibid, pp. 54-
55)
M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez
Q That underground house,
do you know who was the
principal occupant of that
house?
xxx xxx xxx
A During our conversation
with the occupants, they
revealed that a certain Ka
Bernie is the one occupying
the house, Bernie
Mendoza alias Basilio
Damaso.
. . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)
Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the
witnesses testified on matters not on their own personal knowledge.
The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the testimonies may
be hearsay, the same are admissible because of the failure of counsel
for appellant to object thereto.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its
being admitted as evidence. But, one should not be misled into
thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they
now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, cannot be given credence. In People vs. Valero, We emphatically
declared that:
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the
presentation of incompetent evidence, like
hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the
rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for
the striking out of the same does not give such
evidence any probative value. The lack of
objection may make any incompetent evidence
admissible. But admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not has no
probative value.
(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675,
emphasis supplied)
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as
witnesses the persons who knew the appellant as the lessee
and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could
have exercised his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness.
Likewise, the records do not show any other evidence which
could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the
house and the owner of the subversive items. To give
probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the
appellant on this basis alone would be to render his
constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the
lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the
reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the
requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in
the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The purpose of the law is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and
unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637,
646). However, such right is not absolute. There are instances when a
warrantless search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search
incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure
of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-58889,
July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is
present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt.
Quijardo entered the appellant's house upon invitation of Luz
Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper of the appellant; that
when Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw a copier
machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and
more subversive items; that technically speaking, there was no search
as the group was voluntarily shown the articles used in subversion;
that besides, a search may be validly conducted without search
warrant with the consent of the person searched in this case,
appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to
look around the appellant's house; and that since the evidence seized
was in plain view of the authorities, the same may be seized without a
warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin,
65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant
was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his
alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31,
1989, p. 10). We Find no evidence that would establish the fact that
Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she
was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his
house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz
Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any
color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary to
the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government (Rodriguez v.
Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the search
conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if
the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the
authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent
on this point. The fact that they came to the house of the appellant at
nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them the license to go
inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency
of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They
knew where the petitioners were. They had every
opportunity to get a search warrant before making
the raid. If they were worried that the weapons
inside the compound would be spirited away, they
could have surrounded the premises in the
meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should
disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing
their way into the petitioner's premises with all the
menace of a military invasion. (G.R. No. 69401,
June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the
accused-appellant is in the identification of the gun which he was
charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended information
(supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was described as an M-14 rifle with serial
no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial
number thus:
FISCAL
Q Will you kindly restate again
the items that you found
inside the house?
Lt. Quijardo:
A When she opened the
doors of the rooms that we
requested for, we immediately
saw different kinds of books of
which we believed to be used
for subversive orientation and
the M-14 rifle.
Q In what portion of the house
did you find this M-14 rifle
which you mentioned?
A In the same room of which
the subversive documents
were placed.
Q If this firearm would be
shown to you would you be
able to identify the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a rifle
bearing a serial number
1249985 which for purposes
of identification, may we
request your Honor, that this
rifle be marked as Exhibit "D."
COURT:
Mark it.
FISCAL:
Q Kindly examine the said
firearm and tell the Honorable
Court the relation of that
firearm to the firearm which
according to you you found
inside the room allegedly
occupied by one Bernie
Mendoza?
A This is the same rifle which
was discovered during our
raid in the same house. (TSN,
October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38,
emphasis supplied).
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is
merely a typographical error.
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the
charge. Its correction or lack of it could spell the difference between
freedom and incarceration of the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the
prosecution has the burden to prove the existence of the firearm and
that the accused who possessed or owned the firearm does not have
the corresponding license for it. Since the gun as identified at the trial
differs from the gun described in the amended information, the corpus
delicti (the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually
been committed) has not been fully established. This circumstance
coupled with dubious claims of appellant's connection to the house
(where the gun was found) have totally emasculated the prosecution's
case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to
the argument raised by the defense that the crime of subversion
absorbs the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of or
incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion. It appears
that the accused-appellant is facing a separate charge of subversion.
The defense submits that the trial court should have peremptorily
dismissed this case in view of the subversion charge. In People of the
Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., We set forth in no uncertain terms the
futility of such argument. We quote:
If We are to espouse the theory of the
respondents that force and violence are the very
essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction
from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag (G.R. No.
27683, 1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976]), the
Court categorically distinguished subversion from
rebellion, and held:
Violation of Republic Act No.
1700, or subversion, as it is
more commonly called, is a
crime distinct from that of
actual rebellion. The crime of
rebellion is committed
by rising publicly and taking
up arms against the
Government for any of the
purposes specified in Article
134 of the Revised Penal
Code; while the Anti-
Subversion Act (Republic Act
No. 1700) punishes affiliation
or membership in a
subversive organization as
defined therein. In rebellion,
there must be a public
uprising and taking of arms
against the Government;
whereas, in subversion, mere
membership in a subversive
association is sufficient and
the taking up of arms by a
member of a subversive
organization against the
Government is but a
circumstance which raises the
penalty to be imposed upon
the offender. (Emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military
Commission (G.R. 58284, 109 289 (1981]), this
Court said that subversion, like treason, is a crime
against national security, while rebellion is a crime
against public order. Rising publicly and taking
arms against the Government is the very element
of the crime on rebellion. On the other hand, R.A.
1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) , other similar
 associations and its successors because their
existence and activities constitute a clear, present
and grave danger to national security.

The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that

the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government, not only by force and violence
but also by deceit, subversion, and other illegal
means. This is a recognition that subversive acts
do not only constitute force and violence (contrary
to the arguments of private respondents), but may
partake of other forms as well. One may in fact be
guilty of subversion by authoring subversive
materials, where force and violence is neither
necessary or indispensable.

Private respondents contended that the Court

in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled that if an
accused is simultaneously charged with violation
of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of
absorption of common crimes as applied in
rebellion would have found application therein.
The respondents relied on the opinion of this Court
when it said:

. . . in the present case,

petitioner is being charged
specifically for the qualified
offense of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition
under PD 1866. HE IS NOT
BEING CHARGED WITH THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE
BEING SEPARATELY
CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings
of the Court in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find
no application in this case.

This is however a mere obiter. In the above case,

the Court upheld the validity of the charge under
the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The
Court opined that the dictum in the Hernandez
case is not applicable in that case, considering
that the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two
distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms
qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2)
subversion qualified by the taking up of arms
against the Government (R.A. 1700). The practical
result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave
difficulty on an accused in instances similar to
those that obtain in the present case, but the
wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of
its power to enact laws is something that the Court
cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April
22, 1992).

Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-

appellant of the charge of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance
of, or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion, We are
therefore, left with no option, but to acquit the accused on reasonable
doubt.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED

and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 84079 May 6, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NESTOR KALUBIRAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant is questioning his conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of Dumaguete City of selling marijuana in violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the trial court erred in giving
credence to the evidence of the prosecution, in violating his
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
in not according him the presumption of innocence.
Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on July 12, 1985, at about nine o'clock
in the evening, at Real Street in Dumaguete City, by elements of the
Narcotics Command stationed in that city. His arrest was the result of a
"buy-bust" operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer
while the other team members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-
arranged signal. Quindo approached the accused-appellant, who was
with a group of friends in front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic, and asked
if he could "score," the jargon for buying marijuana. Kalubiran
immediately produced two sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid
him a previously marked P 5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the signal and
Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado frisked
the accused-appellant. He recovered the marked money and found 17
more sticks of marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The other team
members, namely M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran,
came later in a jeep, where they boarded Kalubiran to take him to the
police station.
The 19 sticks of marijuana were marked and then taken to the PC
Crime Laboratory, where they were analyzed, with positive results, as
reported and later testified on by Forensic Chemist Myrna Arreola. The
above-named Narcotics agents all testified and corroborated each
other in narrating the "buy-bust" operation.
As might be expected, the defense had a different version of the
accused-appellant's arrest. Kalubiran said he and his friends were in
front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic that evening of July 12, 1985, when
a jeep stopped in front of them and several persons alighted. One of
them—whom he subsequently identified as Quindo—approached and
frisked him. Finding nothing on him, Quindo went back to the jeep, and
he for his part left for his house. However, he was called back by
another person he later came to know as Villamor. He was told at
gunpoint to board the jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the
police station. He was released the following day with the help of a
lawyer his girl friend, Norma Diez, had contacted. He denied having
sold marijuana and insisted that the 19 sticks of marijuana and the
marked bill never came from him.
Norma Diez corroborated Kalubiran. So did the other defense witness,
Bob Reloj, except that he testified he was also frisked and likewise
taken to PC headquarters and later to the police station, where he and
Kalubiran were detained for three days.
After examining and evaluating the evidence of the parties, Judge
Enrique C. Garrovillo found in favor of the prosecution, declared
Kalubiran guilty as charged, and sentenced him to life imprisonment
plus a P 20,000.00 fine and the costs. It is from this judgment that
Kalubiran has filed this appeal.
This Court places much reliance upon the factual findings of the trial
judge who has the advantages of directly observing the witnesses on
the stand and to gauge by their demeanor whether they are being true
to their oath or lying in their teeth. Such an opportunity is not available
to the appellate judge, who must depend on the inanimate record that
cannot reveal the tell-tale signs by which the truth may be discerned
and the falsehood exposed. Lacking any showing of arbitrariness—and
there is none in the case at bar—such findings of the trial court cannot
be faulted by this Court.
There are indeed some inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses but we do not find them substantial enough to
impair the essential veracity of their narration of Kalubiran's arrest as it
actually happened. We have said often enough that such imperfections
may in fact bolster rather than emasculate a person's credibility as one
cannot be expected to remember a particular incident with unerring
accuracy in every minute detail.
It is the defense evidence that in fact suffers from the defects it would
impute to the prosecution. While it has not been shown that the
Narcotics agents were acting with ulterior motives rather than merely
pursuing their duties, Norma Diez's testimony is reasonably suspect as
she is the girl friend of Kalubiran and can be expected to be loyal to
him, to the point of even lying for him. As for Reloj, his inconsistency
with Kalubiran's testimony is not merely insignificant but loudly
proclaims its own falsity. It is noted that Reloj said he was also
arrested with the accused-appellant and the two of them were detained
at the police station for three days. The accused- appellant said he
was the only one arrested and that he was released the following
morning.
The defense argues that Kalubiran would not have sold marijuana at a
public place and in plain view of the people as this would be contrary to
human nature and caution. We are not impressed. The people he was
with at the time were his own group, friends who were probably aware
of his unlawful trade and did not care much what he did. Moreover, it is
to be expected that he did not sell the marijuana openly or with
reckless fanfare but with appropriate furtiveness, as befitted him
shameful trade.
At any rate, we have already observed in People vs. Paco,1 that:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at
anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted
and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is
completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a
public place and in the presence of other people may not
always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as
these factors may even serve to camouflage the same.
Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug
pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall (People
vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986,142 SCRA 329;
People vs. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987,
147 SCRA 252), in front of a store (People vs. Khan, supra)
along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People vs. Toledo, G.R. No.
67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in front of
a house (People vs. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February
23, 1988).
The defense posture that Kalubiran's arrest and search violated the Bill
of Rights demonstrates an unfamiliarity with the applicable rules and
jurisprudence. The accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante
delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of any
person actually committing a crime. The search was made as an
incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of
Rule 116. In addition to the aforecited Rules, there is abundant
jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and seizures under the
conditions established in this case.2
The argument that the marijuana and the marked money were not
sufficiently identified must also be rejected.1âwphi1 The exhibits were
placed in a steel cabinet by Villamor for safekeeping before he
personally took the marijuana to the PC Crime Laboratory for
examination. It was also Villamor who had also earlier initiated the
P5.00 bill and later identified it at the trial as the money paid to the
accused-appellant in exchange for the two sticks of marijuana.
The Court notes that Kalubiran was accused only of selling the two
sticks of marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when
he should also have been charged with possession of the 17 other
sticks found on his person at the time of his arrest. It is unfortunate that
he cannot be held to answer for the second offense because he has
not been impleaded in a separate information for violation of Section 8
of the said law.
It is futile for Kalubiran to invoke the constitutional presumption of
innocence because it has been overcome with overwhelming evidence
establishing his guilt. His defense is not only weak; what is worse for
him is that the prosecution is clearly strong and has proved his offense
beyond the whisper of a doubt.
Persons like the accused-appellant deserve the severe sanctions of
the law for the misery they spread among our people, especially the
youth, many of whom have forfeited their future because of the evil
influence of drugs. The strong arm of the law must never weaken
against the onslaughts of this terrible affliction.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998
RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16,
1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convincing petitioner Rodolfo
Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to
possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane
(bags) containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing
5.5 grams which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law. 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of
Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about
12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat.
Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the
Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of
drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling
"something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left,
they approached petitioner, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to
the police headquarters where he was charged with
possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner
posted bail 3 and the trial court issued his order of release on
July 29, 1991. 4
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal
Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the articles
sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the
apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for examination
tested positive for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5
grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening,
he was sleeping in his house and was awakened only when
the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen
were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when they
could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police
station for investigation and later indicted for possession of
prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's, defense as a "mere
afterthought" and found the version of the prosecution "more
credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision,
convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the
court finds the accused Rodolfo Espano y Valeria guilty of the
crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section
2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences
him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government
and shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board
without delay.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in
convicting him on the basis of the following: (a) the pieces of
evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent over the doctrine
of presumption of regularity, (c) he was denied the
constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory
process; and (d) his conviction was based on evidence which
was irrelevant and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this
Court finds no compelling reason sufficient to reverse the
decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on
the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect.
Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial,
the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of
credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could have
altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the
prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of the
defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat.
Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by
reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any
intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as
possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill
motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
which provides:
. . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other
members of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in
mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were motivated
either by the desire to extort money or exact personal
vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice, when they
entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of any intent on
the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a
serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, .
. . , must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated
claim of appellant that she had been framed. 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not
deserve any consideration. He simply contended that he was
in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court
has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses;
and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving
that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission and that it was physically impossible for him to
be there. Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a
defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to
prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act." 9 No clear and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to
present the alleged informant in court cast a reasonable
doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without
merit, since failure of the prosecution to produce the
informant in court is of no moment especially when he is not
even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust
operation had indeed been conducted. In this case, Pat.
Pagilagan, one of the policemen who apprehended petitioner,
testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified
him as the one they caught in possession of prohibited drugs.
Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case
against appellants. There is no compelling reason for us to
overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of
Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for the prosecution, was
straightforward spontaneous and convincing. The testimony
of a sole witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the
court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. 10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the
prosecution was able to prove that petitioner indeed
committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of
conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized
should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He
was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers on the basis of information
received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw
petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After
the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two
cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful
and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at
petitioner's residence, however, the same are inadmissible in
evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section
2 which provides:
that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or
control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid
under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful
arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however,
which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became
unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a
search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the
reach and control of petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Section 8, in
relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended. Under the said provision, the penalty imposed is six
years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos. With the passage of
Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31,
1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on the
quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 7629, Section 20, and as interpreted in People
v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of marijuana
involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty
ranges from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking
into consideration that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent,
the amendatory provision is favorable to him and the quantity
of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty
imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the
imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day
to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976
dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4)
months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search

incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at
Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions.

In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:

As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's

house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of
its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body
search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the
appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives
were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot
fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the
same being limited to body search and to that point within
reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may
furnish him with the means of committing violence or of
escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside
his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said
G.R. No. L-63630 April 6, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41,
finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the
municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN y
BERNARDINO, knowing fully well that Marijuana is a
prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have his possession, control and custody one (1)
bag of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of
one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to Olongapo City,
without authority of law to do so. (At p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt was based is narrated by the trial court as follows:
It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution
that in the late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio
Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando
Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario
Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the
Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San
Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance
was aimed not only against persons who may commit
misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who
may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on
informations supplied by informers; that it was around 9:30 in
the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a
traveling bag (Exhibit G) who was acting suspiciously and
they confronted him; that the person was requested by
Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling
bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the
patrolmen identified themselves; that found inside the bag
were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic
wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less; that the person
was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the
said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and
explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to
deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to
the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for
further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo
submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's
Report (Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the
following morning or on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio
Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto Quevedo,
who happens to be his brother and who has had special
training on narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little portion
of the marijuana leaves and to have the remaining portion
examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field
test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana leaves and found positive
result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the remaining bigger
quantity of the marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at
Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of
March 3, 1982 (Exhibit A and A-1) and when examined, the
same were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1).
(At pp. 9-10, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by
the trial court as follows:
The accused declared that he got married on October 25,
1981 and his wife begot a child on June 10, 1982; that he
was formerly employed in the poultry farm of his uncle
Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he is engaged in
the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds, including
chicks, and used to conduct his business at Taytay, Rizal;
that he goes to Subic at times in connection with his
business and whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-
rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose the same in
Manila; that he never left his residence at Antipolo, Rizal, on
March 2, 1982; that on March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to
collect a balance of P100.00 from a customer thereat and to
buy C-rations; that he was able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00
o'clock in the evening and he stayed in Nena's house up to
8:00 o'clock because he had a drinking spree with Nena's
son; that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from
Olongapo City but he failed and was able to take the bus
only by 9:00 o'clock that evening that it was a Victory Liner
Bus that he rode and because he was tipsy, he did not
notice that the bus was only bound for San Fernando,
Pampanga; that upon alighting at the Victory Liner
Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed the
street to wait for a bus going to Manila; that while thus
waiting for a bus, a man whom he came to know later as
Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he has any
residence certificate; that when he took out his wallet, Pat.
Punzalan got the wallet and took all the money inside the
wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat. Punzalan told him
that he'll be taken to the municipal building for verification as
he may be an NPA member; that at the municipal building,
he saw a policeman, identified by him later as Pat. Silverio
Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened when he arrived that
Pat. Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out
everything from his pocket saying that the prisoners inside
the jail may get the same from him; that inside his pocket
was a fifty-peso bill and Pat. Quevedo took the same, telling
him that it shall be returned to him but that it was never
returned to him; that he was thereafter placed under
detention and somebody told him that he is being charged
with possession of marijuana and if he would like to be
bailed out, somebody is willing to help him; and, that when
he was visited by his wife, he told his wife that Patrolman
Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he told his
wife not to complain anymore as it would be useless. (Rollo,
pp. 10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the
lone assignment of error in his appeal:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND FINDING HIM GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND
DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48, Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating
the lower court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal,
counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan died. Thereafter, this court
appointed a new counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra and pursuant
thereto, the Deputy Clerk of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of Court,
required the new counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter
complied and, in her brief, raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A
PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A
WARRANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA
LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM
ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused
was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore
inadmissible in evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is
a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
 Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at
the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the
exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and
is consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court,
confronted with the same issue, held that:
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs.
Pat. Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the
latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search
being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco
V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity
in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People
v. Amininudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case the PC officers had
earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant. was on
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting
on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he
descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag
he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held
that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was
seized illegally. The records show, however, that there were certain
facts, not sing in the case before us, which led the Court to declare the
seizure as invalid. As stated therein:
The present case presented no such urgency From the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at react two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was
coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known.
The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain.
And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was
the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial
court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes
reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-
appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-
the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was
not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore
apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search
warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband
goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible
to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana
leaves supposedly seized from him was never authenticated and
therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes
on the fact that the marijuana package brought by patrolman Roberto
Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a
tag bearing the name of the accused. We rule, however, that since
Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana package
together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist
Marilene Salangad likewise testified that she received the marijuana
together with the letter-request and said letter-request bore the name
of the accused, then the requirements of proper authentication of
evidence were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package
examined by the forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified as the
one seized from accused.
Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime
Laboratory was not properly authenticated, still, we cannot discount the
separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which
yielded positive results for marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was
convicted was insufficient and doubtful and that the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the
informer should have been presented before the lower court. We
discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled
issue. This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of
the informer, where his testimony would be merely corroborative or
cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R.
No. 84960, September 1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262,
March 16, 1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v.
Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of
the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest
consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is
peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had first hand
opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of
witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their
testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989;
People v. Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no reason to disturb the
following findings:
The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio
Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan are positive and sufficiently
clean to show the commission by the accused of the offense
herein chatted. These prosecution witnesses have no motive
to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense
against the accused. The knowledge on what these
witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the
official performance of their duties and then, (sic) being no
showing that they are prejudiced against the accused, their
testimonies deserve full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what
they found in the possession of the accused were marijuana
leaves were corroborated by the examination findings
conducted by Pat. October to Salangad of the PCCL, with
station at camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits
C and C-1). (Rollo, p. 11)
Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to
the effect that Pat. Punzalan got all the money from his
wallet when he was accosted at the Victory Liner Terminal
and was told just to keep quiet otherwise he will be
"salvaged" why will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to
the municipal Building for interrogation and/or verification?
Would not Pat. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the
accused? This is unnatural. And this is also true on the
testimony to the accused that Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his
fifty-peso bill arid never returned the same to him. If the
policemen really got any money from the accused and that
the marijuana leaves do not belong to the accused, why will
the two policemen still produce in Court as evidence that
expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from
the accused and which contained the marijuana in question
if the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary,
presented by the prosecution in this case were all based on
personal knowledge acquired by the prosecution witnesses
in the regular performance of their official duties and there is
nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or
that they have any prejudice against the herein accused.
Between the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses and
that of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the
accused, the former should prevail. (Rollo, p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony.
He could have availed himself through compulsory court processes of
several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not one other witness
was presented nor was any justification for the non-appearance given,
the inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated testimony remains. It
cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive testimonies given by the
prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as
correctly observed by the lower court, is an added circumstance
tending to establish his guilt.
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:
The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the
accused weighs one (1) kilo, more or less. The intent to
transport the same is clear from the testimony of Pat.
Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other things, that
 when he confronted the accused that night, the latter told
him that he (accused) is bringing the marijuana leaves to
Olongapo City. Moreover, considering the quantity of the
marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused
and the place he was arrested which is at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a place where the accused is not residing, it can
be said that the intent to transport the marijuana leaves has
been clearly established. (Rollo, pp. 13-14)

The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other

hand, he categorically denied in court, that he is transporting the
marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even
assuming it to be true, the extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted
because it does not appear in the records that the accused, during
custodial investigation, was apprised of his rights to remain silent and
to counsel and to be informed of such rights. In People v. Duero 104
SCRA 379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the
prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral
confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and
intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in
evidence. This ruling was reiterated in People v. Tolentino, 145 SCRA
597 [1986], where the Court added that:

In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on

presumption of regularity of official acts relative to
admissibility of statements taken during in-custody
interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full
adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a trial that
prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his
constitutionally protected rights.

The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or
less, and from this finding extracted a clear intent to transport the
marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that although the
information stated the weight to be approximately one kilo, the forensic
chemist who examined the marijuana leaves testified that the
marijuana weighed only 600 grams Such amount is not a considerable
quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to
transport the marijuana leaves.

Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from
the fact that the accused was arrested at San Fernando, Pampanga, a
place which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime with an
extremely severe penalty must be based on evidence which is clearer
and more convincing than the inferences in this case.

What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent
to transport the marijuana leaves but his actual session.

The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana

under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended).

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby

AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

 G.R. No. 235749, June 19, 2019
RAMON PICARDAL Y BALUYOT, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari1 (Petition) filed by accused-appellant Ramon
Picardal y Baluyot (Picardal) assailing the Decision2 dated May
31, 2017 and Resolution3 dated October 27, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38123, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated September 24, 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 14-
304527, finding Picardal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms.
The Facts
An Information5 was filed against Picardal for Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearms, the accusatory portion of which
reads:cralawred
That on or about March 28, 2014, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully and
unlawfully have in his possession and under his control one
(1) caliber .38 revolver loaded with five (5) live ammunitions,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefore (sic) from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law.6
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
When arraigned, Picardal pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's version, as summarized in its Appellee's
Brief,7 is as follows:cralawred
Police Officer (PO) 1 Mark Anthony Peniano is a regular
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned at
Ermita Police Station located at Baseco PNP Compound, Port
Area, Manila. On March 27, 2014, at around 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, together with his companion PO1 William
Cristobal and PO1 Rodrigo Co, while they were on a beat
patrol back to the station, they chanced upon a person
urinating against the wall. The police officers approached said
person who was later identified as accused-appellant Ramon
Picardal. The place is well-lighted since it is within the main
road. PO1 Peniano told accused-appellant that it is forbidden
to urinate in public. In view of said violation, they invited
accused-appellant to go with them to the precinct. When PO 1
Peniano is about to handcuff him, accused-appellant
attempted to run. His attempt failed since PO1 Peniano was
able to get hold of his hand. Once caught, PO1 Peniano
frisked accused-appellant and was able to recover a caliber
.38 revolver from his waist. The rusty [pistol] with a handle
made of wood contained five (5) live ammunitions. Accused-
appellant was brought to the police station, after PO1
Cristobal apprised him of his constitutional rights.
At the police station, PO1 Peniano referred accused-appellant
to the officers in-charge for the purpose of medical
examination and the recovered items were surrendered to
P/Chief Insp. William Santos for safekeeping. The following
morning, the items were retrieved back by PO1 Peniano and
gave the same to the assigned investigator, PO3 Anthony
Navarro, for proper marking.
PO1 Peniano had the confiscated firearm checked with the
Firearm and Explosive Division (FED) of the PNP and it was
discovered that the same is a loose firearm. The FED was
issued a certification stating that accused-appellant is not
licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber.8
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
On the other hand, the evidence of the defense is based on
the lone testimony of Picardal, who testified as
follows:cralawred
x x x Accused RAMON PICARDAL (Picardal) denied the
charges against him. On March 28, 2014, he was buying
viand in the wet market of Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila,
when he noticed three (3) armed police officers in uniform
within the vicinity. Two (2) of the three (3) police officers
called him because of allegedly urinating at the side of the
market. Upon denying the said accusation, the police officers
got mad, frisked him, took his cellphone, and brought him to
the police precinct. He went voluntarily with the police officers
to the police precinct and was detained there overnight.
Thereafter, he was brought for inquest the following day. He
was surprised when he was charged for urinating and illegal
possession of firearms. He also denied that said confiscated
items were seized from him. He asked the police officers to
take his finger print to prove that the subject firearm does not
belong to him, but the police officers refused. The case for
urinating in public filed against him was dismissed by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 26.9
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, in its Decision10 dated September 24,
2015, the RTC convicted Picardal of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:cralawred
WHEREFORE, accused RAMON PICARDAL y BALUYOT is
hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms penalized
under Section 28(a) in relation to Section 28(e-1) of Republic
Act No. 10591 and there being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance that has been established, accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of
8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 10 years,
8 months and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.11
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
In finding Picardal guilty, the RTC held that the prosecution
was able to prove all the elements of the crime charged,
namely: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the
fact that the accused, who owned or possessed it, does not
have the license or permit to possess the same. The RTC also
held that Picardal's defense of denial was self-serving and
inherently weak.12
Aggrieved, Picardal appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the questioned Decision13 dated May 31, 2017, the CA
affirmed the RTC's conviction of Picardal. Relying on the
testimonies of the apprehending officers, in addition to the
certification presented in court which said that Picardal was
"not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind of
caliber,"14 the CA held that Picardal was indeed guilty of the
crime charged.
Hence, the instant Petition.
Issue
Proceeding from the foregoing, for resolution of the Court is
the issue of whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting
Picardal.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the factual findings
of the CA, affirming that of the trial court, are generally final
and conclusive on the Court.15 The foregoing rule, however, is
subject to the following exceptions:cralawred
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
findings are based;
(7) the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record;
(8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.16 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the ninth exception applies. The CA
manifestly overlooked the undisputed facts that: (1) the
firearm subject of this case was seized from Picardal after he
was frisked by the police officers for allegedly urinating in a
public place; and (2) the aforementioned case for "urinating
in a public place" filed against Picardal was subsequently
dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.17 The act
supposedly committed by Picardal — urinating in a public
place — is punished only by Section 2(a) of Metro Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) Regulation No. 96-
00918 (MMDA Regulation), which provides that:cralawred
Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts
a) It is unlawful to dump, throw or litter, garbage, refuse,
or any form of solid waste in public places and immediate
surroundings, including vacant lots, rivers, canals, drainage
and other water ways as defined in Section 1 of this
Regulation and to urinate, defecate and spit in public
places. (Emphasis supplied)
The MMDA Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for
a violation of the said section is only a fine of five hundred
pesos (PhP500.00) or community service of one (1) day. The
said regulation did not provide that the violator may be
imprisoned for violating the same, precisely because it is
merely a regulation issued by the MMDA. Stated differently,
the MMDA Regulation is, as its name implies, a mere
regulation, and not a law or an ordinance.
Therefore, even if it were true that the accused-appellant did
urinate in a public place, the police officers involved in this
case still conducted an illegal search when they frisked
Picardal for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a
search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no or there
could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of.
In Luz v. People,19 a man who was driving a motorcycle was
flagged down for violating a municipal ordinance requiring
drivers of motorcycles to wear a helmet. While the police
officer was issuing him a ticket, the officer noticed that the
man was uneasy and kept touching something in his jacket.
When the officer ordered the man to take the thing out of his
jacket, it was discovered that it was a small tin can which
contained sachets of shabu. When the man was prosecuted
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the Court acquitted
the accused as the confiscated drugs were discovered through
an unlawful search. Hence:cralawred
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he
was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he
was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to
be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application
of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's
license of the latter[.]
xxxx
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No.
98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to
wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information
or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine
only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense.20 (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The same principle applies in the present case. There was
similarly no lawful arrest in this case as Picardal's violation, if
at all committed, was only punishable by fine.
In this connection, the Court, in Sindac v.
People,21 reminds:cralawred
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a
search and seizure must be carried out through or on
the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which, such search
and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3
(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant
before a search may be affected is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made — the process cannot be reversed.22 (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original)
Thus, as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search,
the same cannot be used in any prosecution against him as
mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. As there is no longer any evidence against
Picardal in this case, he must perforce be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is

hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 31, 2017 and
Resolution dated October 27, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 38123 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Ramon Picardal y Baluyot
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and is ORDERED
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being
lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment
be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

cralawlawlibrary

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, J. Reyes, Jr.,

and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as
Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO,
as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding
Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with
preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila;
Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the
Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion
Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent
Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond
of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in
connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but
which were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit
respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever
in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case
this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the
questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with
said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of
the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information
received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of
personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be
released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila
and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa,
Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone.
When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of
November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after
the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.
The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the
two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon
investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to
the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in
Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the
name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention
of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B.
Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
"for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among others, that
Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased
them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that
she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods
from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc,
Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that
anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for
Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained
therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto
Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods
because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision
of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them
to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to
seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because
Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without
knowledge that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet
been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the
Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and
that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and
they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and
Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex
parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or
their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a
writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as
a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio
issued an order ex parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No.
67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from
opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the
hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966.
However, when the restraining order was received by herein
petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of
the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police
Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein
respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an
amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496, including as party
defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and
Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners
(defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with
Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying
the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the
trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and
affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila
had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court
had jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause of action in
view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative
remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau
of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full
duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of
the Manila Police Department had the power to make the seizure; that
the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under
Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search,
seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the
enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that
the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was
not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the
goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and
Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority
to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would
not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below
for the lifting of the restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the
conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be
made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the
claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling
Center of the Manila Police Department. On December 13, 1966, the
above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of
the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966,
filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the
inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited
importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the
patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be
determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the
motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release
of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over
the case, and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were
not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental
opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging
that on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the goods had
been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and
the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property
proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should
thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967,
herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes
and other charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On
February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent
manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond
of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order
releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967,
said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own
behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court
releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila
Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of
the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure
proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for
reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed
the present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners alleged, among
others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering
the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for
the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila,
presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2)
respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to
exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent
and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the correct taxes; and
(4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods
was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for
prohibition and certiorari in this case. In their answer, respondents
alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower
court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No.
67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because
said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure, and
identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question
were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could
no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding duties
and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs
premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of
Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good
faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the
subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the
goods was affected by members of the Manila Police Department at a
place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and
affected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and
detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently
issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not
being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority
to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of
prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the
present action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge
that they would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods
under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods
may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods
was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the
respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of
March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction,
among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from
imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and
penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent
and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to
enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported
from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been
terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or
secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties,
taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in
the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal
Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other
charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as
evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs,
that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full.
Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been
assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles
found in the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the
quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the
payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and
receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies'
sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the
"compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and
1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100
pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in
bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands
(white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in
bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in
Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in
Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale
No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens
in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles
contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to
forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the
Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise,
the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to
forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to
seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question
had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had
lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were
intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of
the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of
their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the
Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained
jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and
Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold
possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other
charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of
the same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were
under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the
time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496,
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise
jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio
Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided by this Court on April 27,
1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it
appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose
Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags, valued
at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the port of
Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an
inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs
premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held
them for further verification, and upon examination the goods were
found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the
carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from
the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting that it is a
purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was
involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods;
and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964,
Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the
Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs
authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that
the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction over the goods because the
same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not liable for
duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original
importation; that the goods were not in the hands of the importer nor
subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary to
law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the
importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the
Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and
identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the
Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs, as
respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action,
and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The
Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in
abeyance pending decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory
injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of
P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of
Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction,
and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to
comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing
by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said
customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14,
1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the
Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute
forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court
of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release
the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition
in the Court of first Instance was filed (on October 26, 1964)
ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and
forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau
should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in
question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e.,
before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of
the seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or
not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation.
Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales
thereof, for the same were found to have been released
regularly from the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to
goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs
custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m.
of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power,
among others to collect revenues from imported articles,
fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other
 frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws
(Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at
the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have been
released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they
are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for
which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the
goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-
22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax
Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and
Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse to the
Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods
would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs
authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive
the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate
jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v.
Averia, supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction
over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the
Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law
being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation,
not to mention that the former are later enactments, the
Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the
Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs
acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or
detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present
case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on
November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of
Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector
of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents
contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to
divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire
jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition
for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of
divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the
goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing
said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer
of the Manila Police Department, could not seize the goods in question
without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The
Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been
deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the
purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to make seizure,
among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when
the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed
under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine
any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he
had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable
articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably
suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot
be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police
of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in
question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand
assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and
the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what
happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit,
made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine
bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given
authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had
authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a
competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter,
pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or
any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the
search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a
judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor,
that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search
and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United
States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court, considering a legal
provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs
Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th
Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in the
following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made
as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods
subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of
similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and
concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be
put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3
Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made lawful for
customs officers not only to board and search vessels within
their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom
they should suspect there was merchandise which was
subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United
States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person
in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they
should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon,
which they had probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the
same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and
forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L.
315, chap. 100), for a year and expired. The Act of February
28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above described,
chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section
was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866,
chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter embodied
in the Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2
Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of
its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and
treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v.
Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his
companion policemen did not have to make any search before they
seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and
amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin
Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. 18 All that they
complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they
were intercepted without any search warrant near the
Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department,
where they were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect
that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be
obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280,
39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W.,
389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389,
27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by defendant's counsel was
whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched
without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized
used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition
laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the
constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution
directly prohibits search and seizure without a warrant, as is
 sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and
seizure is forbidden. . . .

. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is

unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a judicial
and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a
seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances
under which it is made must be looked to.

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of

recent development, which has multiplied by quantity
production and taken possession of our highways in
battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their
easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered
vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a
capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for
successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent
approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the
world before their advent. The question of their police control
and reasonable search on highways or other public places is
a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in
so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which is itself is no
small matter. While a possession in the sense of private
ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and
transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes
or on private premises, the privacy of which the law
especially guards from search and seizure without process.
The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to
facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those
against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape,
burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge.
Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts
proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of
and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other
public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in
its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in
view of all the circumstances under which it is made.

Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila

Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with
law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in
the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of
this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in
their pleadings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by

petitioners;

(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without
jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated
March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila;

(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this

Court on March 31, 1967 restraining respondent Judge from executing,
enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case
No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from
proceeding in any manner in said case;

(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila; and1äwphï1.ñët

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the

costs.

It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,

Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
 [G.R. No. 125959. February 1, 1999]
JOSE MARIA M. ASUNCION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the resolution of the
Honorable Court dated February 10, 1997, which denied his
Petition for Review on Certiorari for his failure to sufficiently
show that respondent Court of Appeals had committed a
reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment.
The said petition seeks a review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in C.A. GR CR. No. 16308, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Jose Maria M. Asuncion, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170,
finding the petitioner Jose Maria M. Asuncion guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for possession of regulated drugs
punishable under Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts of the case, as found by the trial court, and adopted
by the appellate court, are as follows:
Accused Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori, also known as
Binggoy and/or Vic Vargas, is charged with violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425 in an Information
which reads:
That on or about the 6th day of December 1993, in the
Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody, and control one (1) small plastic packet marked #1
A.S.A. 12-6-93 (g. wt-0.1216 gram) containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride and another small plastic
packet marked #2 A.S.A. 12-6-93 (G. wt-0.0594 gram)
containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride which substances
when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive
results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known
as Shabu.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on December 6,
1993, in compliance with the order of the Malabon Municipal
Mayor to intensify campaign against illegal drugs particularly
at Barangay Taong, the Chief of the Malabon Police Anti-
Narcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol on the area
with specific instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a
certain plate number and watch out for a certain drug pusher
named Vic Vargas. Pursuant thereto, SPO1 Advincula, PO3
Parcon, PO3 Pilapil and a police aide were dispatched at
around 11:45 in the evening. The team proceeded to
Barangay Taong where they were joined by their confidential
informant and the latter informed them that a gray Nissan car
is always parked therein for the purpose of selling shabu.
While patrolling along Leoo Street, the confidential informant
pointed the gray Nissan car to the policemen and told them
that the occupant thereof has shabu in his possession. The
policemen immediately flagged down the said car along First
Street and approached the driver, who turned out to be
herein accused Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori, a movie actor
using the screen name Vic Vargas and who is also known as
Binggoy. Advincula then asked the accused if they can inspect
the vehicle. As the accused acceded thereto, Advincula
conducted a search on the vehicle and he found a plastic
packet containing white substance suspected to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit D-1) beneath the
drivers seat. The accused told the policemen that he just
borrowed the said car and he is not the owner thereof. The
accused was thereafter taken at the police headquarters for
the purpose of taking his identification. However, when he
was frisked by Advincula at the headquarters, the latter
groped something protruding from his underwear, which
when voluntarily taken out by the accused turned out to be a
plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit D). A press
conference was conducted the following day presided by
Northern Police District Director Pureza during which the
accused admitted that the methamphetamine hydrochloride
were for his personal use in his shooting.
Advincula further testified that prior to this incident, they
already had an encounter with the accused but the latter was
able to evade them, and that they did not secure a search
warrant for the reason that the accused uses different
vehicles and they cannot get his exact identity and residence.
The suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride confiscated
from the accused (Exhibits D and D-1) were transmitted to
the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division (Exhibit A), and upon
examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug (Exhibits B and C).
On the other hand, the accused denied the charges against
him. He testified that on December 6, 1993, between 8:00
and 9:00 oclock in the evening, he was abducted at gun point
in front of the house where his son lives by men who turned
out to be members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit;
that he was told to board at the back seat by the policemen
who took over the wheels; that he acceded to be brought at
the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon for drug test but only his
blood pressure was checked in the said hospital; that he was
thereafter brought at the Office of the Malabon Police Anti-
Narcotics Unit; and that he is not aware of what happened at
11:45 in the evening as he was then sleeping at the said
office.1
On June 14, 1994, a decision was rendered by the trial court
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. The dispositive portion of the said decision
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 16, Article
III, Republic Act 6425 and considering the quantity of the
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride involved in this case, hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1)
year eight (8) months and twenty (20) days as minimum, to
three (3) years six (6) months and twenty (20) days, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000.00. Cost de officio.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, subject matter of this
case, is forfeited in favor of the government, and the Branch
Clerk of Court is directed to turn over the same to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition, upon the
finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
On June 29, 1994, a Notice of Appeal was filed and the
records of the case were transmitted by the trial court to the
Court of Appeals. On April 30, 1996 a decision was rendered
by the appellate court, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
(Dated June 14, 1994) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
170) in Malabon, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 14254-MN
is hereby MODIFIES as to the penalty imposed but AFFIRMED
in all other respects. Thus, the accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of SIX (6)
Months of arresto mayor in its maximum period as minimum
to FOUR (4) Years and TWO (2) Months of prision
correctional in its medium period as maximum (People v.
Simon, 234 SCRA 555; People v. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 67;
People v. Judrito Adava y Balasbas (G.R. No. 102522, [June
5, 1994]; People v. Sixto Morico (G.R. No. 92660, July 14,
1995]) and the fine of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00)
imposed on the accused (appellant) is hereby deleted in
accordance with the Supreme Courts ruling in People v.
Judrito Adava y Balasbas, supra) and People v. Sixto Morico,
(supra).
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3
On August 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner.4 Thus, a petition for
review on certiorari was filed before this Court, with petitioner
arguing that the Court of Appeals erred:5
I.
IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT THE TIME
OF COMMISSION IS NOT MATERIAL IN PROVING THE
OFFENSE CHARGED.
II.
IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRED TO EFFECT A WARRANTLESS
ARREST AND SEARCH EXIST UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
AS NARRATED BY THE PROSECUTIONS WITNESSES.
III.
IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
DEFENSE EVIDENCE ARE MERE DENIALS WHICH CANNOT
OVERRIDE THE POSITIVE ASSERTIONS OF THE
PROSECUTIONS WITNESSES.
On February 10, 1997, the First Division of this Court issued a
resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the
respondent court had committed any reversible error in
rendering the questioned judgment.6cräläwvirtualibräry
A motion for reconsideration of this resolution was filed on
March 17, 1997. In this pleading, petitioner sought the
reconsideration of the said dismissal on grave constitutional
considerations, arguing that the warrantless search was
illegal. The shabu recovered, being illegally obtained, was
inadmissible as evidence. Petitioner also argued that the
raising of constitutional issues necessitated a re-examination
of the issues presented.7cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, this Court is called upon to resolve the constitutional
issues raised by the petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration.
After a careful examination, this Court finds no cogent reason
to overturn the decision of the appellate court.
Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest,
search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right
that no less then the fundamental law of the land8 ordains it.
However, the rule that search and seizure must be supported
by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving
vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause.9 The
prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the
fact that the search in question was made as regards a
moving vehicle petitioners vehicle was flagged down by the
apprehending officers upon identification. Therefore, the
police authorities were justified in searching the petitioners
automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded
immediate action.
This Court, in the case of People v. Lo Ho
Wing,10 elucidated on the rationale for the exemption of
searches of moving vehicles from the coverage of the
requirement of search warrants, to wit:
the rules governing search and seizure have over the years
been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the
object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described
to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected
by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
The apprehending officers even sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. As
such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid
warrantless search and the petitioner himself freely gave his
consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result
were admissible in evidence.11cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant had vigorously argued for the application of the rule
enunciated in the case of People v. Idel Aminnudin y
Ahni,12 wherein it was held that warrantless arrests could not
be justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante
delicto or a crime was about to be committed or had just
been committed. It was also held in that case that evidence of
probable cause should be determined by judge and not by law
enforcement agents. Corollarily, any search could not be
considered as an incident to a lawful arrest if there was no
warrant of arrest and the arrest did not come under the
exceptions allowed by Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.13cräläwvirtualibräry
In ruling for defendant-appellant Aminnudin, the Court
justified its stand in this manner:
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by
him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or
had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the
obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircrafts are
subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of
the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant
can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was
coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known.
The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain.
And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the
head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that a search warrant was not necessary.
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the
warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it
has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as
a result of what are popularly called buy-bust operations of
the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because
at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of
selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What
he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was
only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable
cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that
authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately
arrest him.14
From the foregoing, it could be seen that the case under
review presented different factual circumstances which would
not call for the application of the ruling in
the Aminnudin case.
First of all, even though the police authorities already
identified the petitioner as an alleged shabu dealer and
confirmed the area where he allegedly was plying his illegal
trade, they were uncertain as to the time he would show up in
the vicinity. Secondly, they were uncertain as to the type of
vehicle petitioner would be in, taking into account reports that
petitioner used different cars in going to and from the area.
Finally, there was probable cause as the same police officers
had a previous encounter with the petitioner, who was then
able to evade arrest.15 As the Solicitor General argued:

. . .With this knowledge and experience, the narcotic

operatives had reasonable ground to believe that the gray
Nissan car referred to by their confidential informant was one
of the vehicles being used by their subject so that when the
same was pointed to them by their confidential informant,
with the information that the occupant thereof was carrying
shabu, the operatives had to act quickly. Otherwise, they
would again lose their subject whom they reasonably believed
to be committing a crime at that instance. There would be no
more time for them to secure a search warrant.16

Thus, when the police officers suddenly sighted petitioners

gray Nissan Sentra, they obviously no longer had the time to
apply for a search warrant. The dictates of urgency
necessitated the flagging down of the vehicle.

Time and again, it has been held that the findings of the lower
court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded
great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified
before the court.17 In this case, this Court finds no cogent
reason to deviate from this time-honored precept.

Taken as a whole, the evidence for the prosecution,

particularly the positive testimonies of the apprehending
police officers, SPO1 Antonio Advincula, PO3 Enriqueto Parcon
and PO3 Rolando Pilapil, more than met the quantum of proof
needed to find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellate court was correct in giving scant consideration
of the petitioners defense, which consisted of mere denials of
the incidents narrated by the prosecution witnesses. Like all
other cases involving the possession of prohibited drugs, it
was argued by the petitioner that he had been framed-up.
But then, in drug related cases, for this defense to prosper,
the evidence must be clear and
convincing.18cräläwvirtualibräry

Unfortunately for petitioner, his defense was anchored only

on a single document a medical certificate signed by a Dr.
Aster Sagun, Jr. of the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon.19 Said
document, according to the defense, proved that petitioner
was indeed forcibly abducted by the police, brought to the
said hospital at around 9:00 oclock in the evening and
afterwards was brought to the police station, where he slept
until the alleged time of his arrest. To the mind of this Court,
petitioner placed too much reliance on said document, which
did not even give an inch towards proving their allegations.
The medical certificate could not possibly prove anything
more than the fact that petitioner had his blood pressure
checked at said hospital at said time. To claim that it proved
something more would be to venture into speculation and
guesswork.

One final note. Considering the fact that less than one (1)
gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was found
in the possession of petitioner, this Court agrees with the
penalty imposed by the appellate court as this in line with
previous decisions on the matter.20cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for

Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and

Pardo, JJ., concur.
G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES,
accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup
d' etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by
the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various
government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were
being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At
around midnight of November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the
Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout
Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army
Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television station.
Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort
Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan,
Metro Manila. 1
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate
informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which
were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
103.
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson
and several John Does whose true names and identities have not as
yet been ascertained, were charged with the crime of illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion,
penalized under Section 1, paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree No.
1866, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER,
1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA,
PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, and without
authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their
possession, custody and control, the following to
wit:
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or
dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16
ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of
MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or
permit to possess the same from the proper
authorities, and armed with said dynamites,
ammunition and explosives and pursuant to their
conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and
prompted by common designs, come to an
agreement and decision to commit the crime of
rebellion, by then and there participating therein
and publicly taking arms against the duly
constituted authorities, for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its
activities and removing from its allegiance the
territory of the Philippines or parts thereof. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson,
Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John Does were charged
with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in
Quezon City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit
on the right thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.
However, he admitted that he is not authorized to possess any
firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. 3 The parties likewise stipulated
that there was a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to
December 9, 1989. 4
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj.
Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region
Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team composed of
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one
S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually
started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was
conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division
that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-
SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around
ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon
Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to
conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the
Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp
Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves
from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At
that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the
approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the
car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six
meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at
the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the
right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate
because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that
civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a
searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader,
M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of
the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the
Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons
of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of
different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right
portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the
Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De
Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform
with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the
raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and
Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were
then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives
and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant
was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that
time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was
simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from
the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able
to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr.
Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident.
First, he claims that on November 30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to help
in the birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the
Eurocar Sales Office on December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that
when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on
December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut which is
adjacent to the building. According to him, he was tasked to guard the
office of Col. Matillano which is located at the right side of the building.
He denies, however, that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano
when the raiding team barged in and that he had explosives in his
possession. He testified that when the military raided the office, he was
ordered to get out of his house and made to lie on the ground face
down, together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were janitors of the
building. He avers that he does not know anything about the
explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand up, the
explosives were already there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade
of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP),
and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's
involvement in the 1987 coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again
went to see Matillano because he had no job. Col. Matillano then told
him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the marketing
for them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office, appellant
worked for Matillano.
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to
testify against him because "bata raw ako ni Col. Matillano eh may
atraso daw sa kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata
niya ang ipitin natin."
On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting
appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, it made a recommendation
that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely executing
or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd
paragraph of Art. 135, R. P. C., the court recommends that Rolando de
Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a jail term of five
(5) years of good behavior.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal
possession of firearms for the reason that he did not have either
physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no
intent to possess the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the
building where the ammunition and explosives were found; he was
merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding
the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have
actual possession of the explosives. He claims that intent to possess,
which is necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential
Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,
Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearms,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall
be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of,
or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of
crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation
of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and
explosives, and which criminal acts have resulted in loss of human
lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable resources of the
country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country during the
first few years of the transitional government under then President
Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such
as Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and
preempt the commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public
peace and order.
I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an
essential element of the offense punishable under Presidential Decree
No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally
possess firearms and ammunition.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is
merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession
but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's
control and management. 6 This has to be so if the manifest intent of
the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public
security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder
of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the
object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have
no bearing whatsoever. 7
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to
convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be
an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query
assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of
firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, 8 in which
case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. 9
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to
commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has
the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to
commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit
a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very
nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the
crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate
the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal
intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal
intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a
firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an
intent to possess on the part of the accused. 11 Such intent to possess
is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent
which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.
Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an
offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in
convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in
order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a
firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless
possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a
statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, 12 such as
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is
absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that
appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed
several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite
license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia
categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar
Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw
De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives
marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant denied
any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended
that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col.
Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there
was no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was merely
employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of
impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot
inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a
case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous
acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in
the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not
controverted that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having
served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from the
service for going on absence without leave
(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that
he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the
dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which
were confiscated by the military from his possession. As a former
soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the
dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot
feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large
quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where
the explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor one
where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun
store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be
put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a
place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has
nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and
ammunition.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so
hold, that appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the articles
confiscated from his person.
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a
valid search and seizure in this case. While the matter has not been
squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of
advertence thereto by the parties, to delve into the legality of the
warrantless search conducted by the raiding team, considering the
gravity of the offense for which herein appellant stands to be convicted
and the penalty sought to be imposed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales
Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. 15 The raid
was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was
being used as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was
a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance
team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales
Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or
arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered
firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably
explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that
time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of
the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack
by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that
the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5,
1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with.
The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling
which was amply explained in People vs. Malmstedt 20 and bears
reiteration:
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not
armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal effects of accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and
there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure is not determined by any fixed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of
each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where
the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic
bag owned by the accused, or where the accused
was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the
NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs,
their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his
possession. Said information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from
Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few
hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio
City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In
the Tangliben case, the police authorities
conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner
Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, against persons engaged
in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on
information supplied by some informers.
Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously
and pointed out by an informer was apprehended
and searched by the police authorities. It was held
that when faced with on-the-spot information, the
police officers had to act quickly and there was no
time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM
officers merely conducted a routine check of the
bus (where accused was riding) and the
passengers therein, and no extensive search was
initially made. It was only when one of the officers
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during
the course of the inspection, that accused was
required to present his passport. The failure of
accused to present his identification papers, when
ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the
suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to
hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an
innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the
authorities, to readily present his identification
papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure
of the accused to produce his passport, taken
together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to
hide something illegal from the authorities. From
these circumstances arose a probable cause
which justified the warrantless search that was
made on the personal effects of the accused. In
other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in
requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and
in opening one of the wrapped objects found
inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with
hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by
refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM
agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including, to search even without warrant, in the
light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement,
to the detriment of society.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion
whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense.
The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance
of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but
really in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the
exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly
constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of
violence against the rebels find justification in the
exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the
essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection,
most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely
seizing their persons and detaining them while any
of these contingencies continues cannot be less
justified.
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that
from November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989, there was
a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's
possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and
recovered from him was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating
or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court below held
that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs
of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the
Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is
guilty of the act of guarding the explosives and "molotov" bombs for
and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and
improperly used by the court below as a basis in determining the
degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It
must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense
of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of
rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code. These are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses
with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a
crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as
illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in
the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and
punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of
firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. 22

As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section

1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the Court has explained that said
provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the
same act is penalized under two different statutes with different
penalties, even if considered highly advantageous to the prosecution
and onerous to the accused. 23 It follows that, subject to the presence
of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate
prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked
because the first is an offense punished by a special law while the
second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant
elements.

It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the

aforestated provision of the Revised Penal Code in this prosecution for
a crime under a special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its
recommendation for executive clemency in favor of appellant De
Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of five years with good
behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive prerogative
of the President whose decision thereon should be insulated against
any tenuous importunity.

Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and

ammunition confiscated from appellant De Gracia were illegally
possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly
existing at that time. In the words of the court a quo:

2. the nature and quantity of the items — 5

bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of M-16
ammo and 100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate
that the reports received by the military that the
Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the
rebels was not without basis. Those items are
clearly not for one's personal defense. They are
for offensive operations. De Gracia admitted that
per instruction of Col. Matillano he went down to
Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo to stay guard
there.

His manifestation of innocence of those items and

what he has been guarding in that office is not
credible for: (a) he was a former military
personnel; (b) at the birthday party of Col.
Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers
and ex-soldiers were present which self-evidently
discloses that De Gracia, in the company of his
boss, was still very much at home and constantly
in touch with soldiers and the armed rebellion of
November 30, 1989 to December 8 or 9, 1989 was
a military coup d' etat; (c) it appears that he is the
only person tasked with caretaking (sic) there in
the Matillano office, which shows that he is a
highly trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano;
and (d) as heretofore discussed, De Gracia was
earlier seen with some men who fired upon a car
of the AFP intelligence agents. 25

Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in
furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case
was committed under the governance of that law, the imposition of the
death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently,
appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty
of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court,
albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith.

WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby

AFFIRMED, but its recommendation therein for executive clemency
and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs
against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.