Tijam, et al v.

Sibonghanoy et al, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (bonding company) (1968)

Dizon, ​J.

I. FACTS:

June 17, 1948 - ​Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect.

July 19, 1948 - ​Spouses Serafim Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog (PET) filed a civil case in the CFI of Cebu against
spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio (RESP) to recover from them P1908.00, with legal interest from
the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs.

A writ of attachment was then issued by the court against the properties of the respondents, but this writ was
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by the respondents and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety).

CFI rendered judgment in favor of PET, after the same became final and executory, upon motion of the PET, the
court issued a writ of execution against the RESP. The writ was unsatisfied, so the PET moved for the issuance of a
writ of execution against the Surety’s bond.

Surety opposed on two grounds: (1) failure to prosecute, and (2) absence of a demand upon Surety for the payment
of the amount due under the judgment. Surety then prayed to the court to deny PET’s motion and to relieve them of
its liability under the bond in question. Court denied the motion on the ground that no previous demand has been
made on the Surety.

PET then made the necessary demand and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy such, they filed a second motion of
execution against the counter-bond.

On the date of the hearing, Surety’s counsel asked for 5 days to answer the motion and was granted by the court.
Surety failed to file such answer, so the court granted the motion for execution and issued a writ.

Subsequently, Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that it was issued without the required summary
hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the RoC. Court denied this motion.

December 11, 1962 - ​CA affirmed the orders of CFI.

January 8, 1963 - ​Upon receiving the notice of CA’s decision, Surety filed a motion for extension within which to
file a motion for reconsideration. It was granted. Two days later, instead of a MR, Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging that CFI did not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the PET as per the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 88
of which placed within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of
the subject-matter of the amount of demand does not exceed P2,000, exclusive of interest and costs. This issue on
jurisdiction was raised for the first time in this motion.

CA required PET to file an answer but the latter failed to do so.

May 20, 1963 - ​CA resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to the SC.

II. ISSUE:

W/N the Surety can raise the question of jurisdiction ​for the first time​ on appeal. ​No, the Court ruled that
Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this question.

III. RATIONALE:

It is undisputed that the amount that PET wishes to recover was less than P2,000 and in accordance to the
Judiciary Act of 1948, the exclusive jurisdiction for this civil case should be within the inferior courts. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court over the case affects its very authority to take cognizance of the case, and the objection on said
issue may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
ITCAB, however, it is the SC’s opinion that the Surety is barred by laches from invoking the plea of lack of
jurisdiction at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation. The case commenced in 1948, almost 15 years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction—a question raised for the first time on appeal.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has also been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court just because it failed to obtain an
affirmative judgment from the court.

ITCAB, from the time the Surety became a quasi-party in 1948, it could have already raised the issue on the lack of
jurisdiction. It failed to do so, and instead, it participated in several stages of the proceedings, and upon getting an
adverse decision, decided to question the jurisdiction of the court. Allowing this motion from the Surety will declare
useless all the proceedings since 1948. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

IV. DISPOSITIVE: ​UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.