FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014

THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V.

MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA.
TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested
parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal
or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

Antecedents

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and
Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate
stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition
for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio�s estate (Special
Proceedings No. 3094�CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that there was
no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on
September 7, 1992.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on

December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the
inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had �left no real properties but only
personal properties� worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20;
furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00;
44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of
Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to
be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma�s motion through the order of
January 8, 1993.

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8,
1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the
44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;4the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on
January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in
exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares
of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.6

On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under
oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a
formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents
Teresita had submitted.

On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to
present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the
motion for approval of the inventory.7 cralawred

On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of
court to examine Teresita on the inventory.

With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the
issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC
set dates for the hearing on that issue.8 cralawlawlib rary

Ruling of the RTC

After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14,
2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby
denies the administratrix�s motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders
the said administratrix to re�do the inventory of properties which are supposed to
constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the
properties mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then
submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.

The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration
of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She
must render such accounting within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.9 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the
reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real
properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to
Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had
already come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir
Realty.10Thelma opposed the motion.

On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,11 stating that there
was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants� agreement as
heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded
from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon
the issue.

Decision of the CA

Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties
that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her
stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION)
BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO.

II

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY
REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.

III

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN
PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12

On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as
follows:13

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED

partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby
reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353
located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject
matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in
the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned
and affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because
the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that
pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing
sold �shall be transferred to the vendee� upon its �actual and constructive delivery,�
and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a public
instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio
and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because
the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that
Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had
assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 �for the
purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of
Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were
included�; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been
�even at the losing end considering that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the
Deed of Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration
through shares of stock�; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of
assignment dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the
inventory �considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate
planning scheme�; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the name of
third persons or corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be
afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the
presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled
jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in
holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of
their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be included
in the inventory.

The CA further opined as follows:

In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are
estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to
submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included
in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because
actually, a reading of petitioners� Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001
filed before public respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning
its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which they are not
estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order
dated March 14, 2001 denying the administratrix�s motion for approval of the
inventory of properties which were already titled and in possession of a third person
that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law possessed
a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said
titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.

Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to

determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and
even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate
court, private respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would
have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the
separate jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established since it cannot be presumed.14

On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et
al.15

Issue

Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties
in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by
sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his
lifetime?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Was certiorari the proper recourse

to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?

The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the
special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her
co�respondents was not proper.

Thelma�s contention cannot be sustained.

The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether
the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila�Garrido v.
Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court
has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon.� An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The
test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does
the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is
final.

The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the
subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is
to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the
hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals.
Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for
a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the
lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in
the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate

special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then
is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita�s motion for the approval of the
inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration
were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was
not yet a final determination of their ownership.� Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the
course of the administration proceedings.

In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the decision
of the CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real
properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be changed or modified at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held that the order of
exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order �in the sense that it did not settle
once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.� The Court observed there
that:

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon
the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be
instituted by the parties (3 Moran�s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition,
pages 448�9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L�42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)

To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court declared that a
�probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally,� and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that
the �patent reason is the probate court�s limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.� Indeed, in the cited case
of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:

All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing
parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to
take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also governs appeals in special
proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a
court of law �that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable� may be the subject of an appeal in
due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory
because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non�appealable.

Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the

possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the
special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific
instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. � An interested

person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a
Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or
judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share
of the estate to which such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased

person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from
the appointment of a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights
of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new
trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of
the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.

II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?

In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion for including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been
transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the
registration of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying
the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.

Was the CA correct in its conclusion?

The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its
conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of
the RTC.

Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and
willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty�bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the
inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. � Within three
(3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the
court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the
deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement
of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to
give his or their assistance.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is
qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which
signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the
decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception,
for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate
of the decedent is �to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the
liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate.�23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested
with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the
inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in order
to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or
excluded from the inventory in the absence of �positive abuse of discretion,� for in the
administration of the estates of deceased persons, �the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to
replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive
abuse of discretion.�25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special
and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the
decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All
that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court
said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination
of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for
this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in
several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate
or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

convenience.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of
each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)

It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for
the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:

In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was
one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as
listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No.
306�R which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted,
while being examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include
in the inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said
estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio Mercado�s
share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory of
properties required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.

In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted
in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty
Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by her from money derived
from the taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal
undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being conjugal in character, one�half
thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her
husband.

In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in
Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when
her husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being
conjugal in character, and so, one�half thereof should be included in the inventory of
the properties constituting as estate of her husband.

In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No.
3353 of Pls�657�D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square
meters as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S.
Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB�12690 which was
decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which
claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said
case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado
himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu
should be included in the inventory in this case.

Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late
Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and
Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made
two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of
death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has not long to live and made
in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in
contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case should still
include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in
contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually appeared to be still
registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his death,
as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor�s Office on October 31,
1991 (Exhibit O).28

Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the
administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to include the
properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was
far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.

Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should
be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the
shares being inherited by Emigdio.

Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership
of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio�s estate, it was unavoidable for
Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting
that specific property acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the
conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must prove
the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing
evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal
partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who
the real owners of the affected properties were,31 and which of the properties should
form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio
must be included in the inventory.

Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir
Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB�12692,
a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the
estate of Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still
in Emigdio�s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten
years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.

Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB�12692. Such
lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB�12692 was susceptible of various interpretations,
including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out
their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable
considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard,
was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared
to be a family corporation.

Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir
Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the
inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per
se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the
contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of
Appeals:33

x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the
presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to
validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any
binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and
always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a
contract.(Bold emphasis supplied)

It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty
with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That
Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death was a
circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the exchange,
considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the
pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the
exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts
to be established in court.

The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of
Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the
inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the
deed of assignment. This is because:

The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of
registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder
should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the
State�s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest
damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land
and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that
were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the
ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to
have regularly performed their duties.35

Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of
January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the
parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the
issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court might have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties
arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from
ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is
because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited
jurisdiction, was still �deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdiction to make it effective.�37

Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the
important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the
heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Coderequired every compulsory heir and the surviving
spouse, herein Teresita herself, to �bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.� Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any
advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir �may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on
the heir.� Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as
an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the
decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by
gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.38

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the

inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as
an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to
Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually
part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its
orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave
abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi�judicial power was exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi�judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39

In light of the foregoing, the CA�s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review

on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15,
2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with
dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094�CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late
Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y.

BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y.
PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the
July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case
No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E.
Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they
alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June
28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming
to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of
title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and
T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives
and successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as

evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic
School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of
affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action
against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is
not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the
petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs. 10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that
the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It
observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir
– through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a
marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a
Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a
passport.13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which
his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was
issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not
the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to
state a cause of action was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined
by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert
a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be
correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the
allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred
by the defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the
same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the
latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true,
would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule
that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of
Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held
that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in
the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must
1âw phi 1

take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The
Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must
be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v.
Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be
an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and
the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear
to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in
order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the
same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material
to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of
Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out
that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein
discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As
such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal
effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to
determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant
therewith.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014

AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except

Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY
ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY,Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the

Decision1 and Resolution2 dated March 30, 2012 and September 25, 2012,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035, which
reversed and set aside the Decision dated January 20, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 10407.
The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:

On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and

Salvador Orosco (Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated February 6, 2002 before the court a quo. In it, petitioners alleged that
Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio) and Victoria
Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by his wife
Victoria, six legitimate children, and one illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina
Abarientos-Rebusquillo, petitioner in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco,
the mother of petitioner Salvador; (3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos;
(5) Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham Abarientos; and (7) Carlos Abarientos. His
wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30, 1983.

On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City
consisting of two thousand eight hundred sixty-nine(2,869) square meters, more
or less, which was covered by Tax Declaration ARP No. (TD) 0141.

In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her
daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law Domingo
Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in this case, on the pretext that the documents
were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in 2003, so petitioners
claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.

As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them, Avelina
sought the intervention of the RTC to declare null and void the two (2) documents
in order to reinstate TD0141 and so correct the injustice done to the other heirs
of Eulalio.

In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling of the
subject property. Paragraph 9 of their Answer reads:

Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the other heirs of
Eulalio Abarientos brought out the idea to [respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-
Gualvez to have the property described in paragraph 8 of the complaint
registered under the Torrens System of Registration. To facilitate the titling of the
property, so that the same could be attractive to prospective buyers, it was
agreed that the property’s tax declaration could be transferred to [respondents]
Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez and Domingo Gualvez who will spend all the
cost of titling subject to reimbursement by all other heirs in case the property is
sold; That it was agreed that all the heirs will be given their corresponding shares
on the property; That pursuant to said purpose Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo
with the knowledge and consent of the other heirs signed and executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
[respondents] Gualvez. In fact, [petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was given an
advance sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) by [respondent]
spouses and all the delinquent taxes paid by [respondents].3

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina
on the grounds that (1) with regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was
not the sole heir of her parents and was not therefore solely entitled to their
estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina did not really
intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to facilitate the
titling of such property. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate of the Deceased

Spouses Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal, dated December 4, 2001
as well as the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, notarized on February 6,
2002, covering the property described in par. 8 of the Amended Complaint
are hereby ordered ANNULLED;

2. That defendant City Assessor’s Officer of Legazpi City is hereby ordered

to CANCEL the Tax Declaration in the name of private [respondents]
spouses Gualvez under ARP No. 4143 and to REINSTATE the Tax
Declaration under ARP No. 0141 in the name of Eulalio Abarientos;

3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo is

hereby ordered to return or refund to [respondents] spouses Domingo
Gualvez and Emelinda Gualvez, the ₱50,000.00 given by the latter
spouses to the former.4

Assailing the trial court’s decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the CA
arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being a public document that
has for its object the creation and transmission of real rights over the immovable
subject property. The fact that Avelina’s testimony was not offered in evidence,
so respondents argued, the signature on the adverted deed remains as concrete
proof of her agreement to its terms. Lastly, respondents contended that the
Complaint filed by petitioners Avelina and Salvador before the RTC is not the
proper remedy provided by law for those compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of
their inheritance.
Pending the resolution of respondents’ appeal, Avelina died intestate on
September 1, 2009 leaving behind several living heirs5 including respondent
Emelinda.

In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted the appeal and
reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that the RTC erred
in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of
the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on heirship must be
made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action.
Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be
nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of
regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

Aggrieved by the CA’s Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by her heirs

except respondent Emelinda, and petitioner Salvador are now before this Court
ascribing reversible error on the part of the appellate court.

We find merit in the instant petition.

It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a
special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had
likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs
are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such
recourse.6 Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring
administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had
consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-
trial.7 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,8 this Court held:

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole
heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit
of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person
dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6,
Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an
executor therein.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or

intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate
estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence,
not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties
to the civil case - subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the
case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial x x x. (emphasis supplied)

Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of
land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It
would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate
special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as
sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses
Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not
the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living
heirs with rights over the subject land. As confirmed by the RTC in its Decision,
respondents have stipulated and have thereby admitted the veracity of the
following facts during the pre-trial:

IV – UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in the Pre-

Trial Order)

A. x x x

B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted the following

facts:

1. Identity of the parties;

2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and be

sued;

3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only surviving heir

of deceased spouses Eulalio and Victoria Abarientos;
 4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a portion of the
subject property;

5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina Abarientos;

6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a daughter of [petitioner]

Avelina A. Rebusquillo;

7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10, 1923;

8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate of the Deceased

and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by [petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo
on the subject property.9 (emphasis supplied)

In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason

that a resort to special proceeding will be but an unnecessary superfluity.
Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial
court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole
heir of the decedent. The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court is patently clear that self-adjudication is only warranted when there is only
one heir:

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. –– x x x If there

is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as
admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of
representation of his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when
she declared in the affidavit that she is "the only daughter and sole heir of
spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS AND VICTORIA VILLAREAL."10 The falsity of
this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her
father invalid. The RTC did not, therefore, err in granting Avelina’s prayer to
declare the affidavit null and void and so correct the wrong she has committed.

In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of

respondents was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not in
the right position to sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject
property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject to partition.
Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but
only an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to respondents was only
the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of
respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer
the ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the
Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes
place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the
parties conceal their true agreement. (emphasis supplied)

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative

simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any
purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
binds the parties to their real agreement.

In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta,11 this Court explained
the concept of the simulation of contracts:

In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as

the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an
absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended
to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As
a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may
recover from each other what they may have given under the contract. However,
if the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement,
the contract is relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real
agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and
the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement
is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in
interest. (emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from respondents’ very own Answer to
petitioners’ Complaint. As respondents themselves acknowledge, the purpose of
the Deed of Absolute Sale was simply to "facilitate the titling of the [subject]
property," not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore,
respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the
property and that there is no indication that respondents ever took possession of
the subject property after its supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive
possession of the subject property or, in the alternative, to collect rentals from its
possessor, is contrary to the principle of ownership and is a clear badge of
simulation that renders the whole transaction void.12
Contrary to the appellate court’s opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of
Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized does not accord it the quality
of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parole evidence rule. The form of
a contract does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act valid. The rule
on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides the exceptions:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. – x x x

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their

successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis supplied)

The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and
agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present case.
Again, respondents themselves admit in their Answer that the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale were only executed to facilitate the
titling of the property. The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply the exceptions
provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the true intent
of the parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the document. That said,
considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been shown to be void for being
absolutely simulated, petitioners are not precluded from presenting evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement.13

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 30,
2012 and the Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated January 20, 2009 in Civil Case No. 10407 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),Branch 4 in Legazpi City is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002]

RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.

JAO, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left
real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the
estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.[1] Pending the
appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special
administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the
assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real
properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to
their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
venue.[2] He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either
during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedents actual residence was
in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a
bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in
Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary
evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns,
voters affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor
vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent residence was in
Angeles City, Pampanga.
In his opposition,[3] Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in
Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was
conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they
died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.[4] Rodolfo himself even supplied the
entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own
signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the
decedents residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest
mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that their parents were
treated in their late years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same way that they were
taken at different times for the same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers
in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive
evidence of the decedents residence in light of the other documents showing
otherwise.[5]
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the
position.[6] Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be
archived.[7]
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived. [8] After the
parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated
Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag
and Andrea Jao.[9]
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to
wit:

A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and
1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence
of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea
V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said
document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an
inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of
merit movants motion to dismiss.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo
having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned
order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]

Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.[12] Hence, this petition for review,
anchored on the following grounds:
I

RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A

WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY
CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS

HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS.
593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN
SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN

A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS
RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE

RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A
DECEASED.
V

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY

OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH
CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE
DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES
CITY.
 VI

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL

AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN
THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO
ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP.
PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.[13]

The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in
Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City,
where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of

administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et
al., where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where
[14]

the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In
determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be considered,
namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently. [15] While it
appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City
for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their
permanent residence.
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent
therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal
belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and
was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer
to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even
before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his
domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said
that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in
Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to
petitioners Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondents
assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years
before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both
residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner
himself who filled up his late mothers death certificate. To our mind, this
unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased
mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry
in Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus
properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the
appellate courts observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even
before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied
upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the
time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To
be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time
of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or
domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held:

xxx xxx xxx the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and
residence, is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
the word domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms residence and
domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary.[17]

Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have
been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior
thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A close
perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioners assertion, the
court below considered not only the decedents physical presence in Quezon City, but
also other factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was more than
temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts factual
findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the
same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4,
Section 2,[18] on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former
understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving
summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule
73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer
to permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the
properties are kept and where most of the decedents properties are located.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in
the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons
properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may
be that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records,
or where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations
can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or
retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.
 At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between
venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court
of Appeals[19] and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus
defined, residence, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.[21] All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held
that venue for the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the
Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 102126. March 12, 1993.]

ANGELICA LEDESMA, Petitioner, v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF CIPRIANO PEDROSA

represented by Nelson Jimena, Honorable Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon in
her capacity as Presiding Judge-Designate, Branch 51, RTC, Bacolod
City, Respondents.

Hector P. Teodosio of Defensor and Teodocio Law Office for Petitioner.

Edmundo G. Manlapao for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FINAL DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF

GAINS, A MERE INCIDENT TO LEGAL SEPARATION. — On the finality of the judgment
decreeing the spouses’ legal separation as of January 4, 1973, the remaining issue for
Our resolution is the final disposition of their conjugal partnership of gains which
partnership, by reason of the final decree, had been automatically dissolved. The law
(Article 106, 107 of the Civil Code) clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal
separation on the conjugal property. The death on November 30, 1979 of herein
petitioner who was declared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before the liquidation
of the conjugal property is effected, poses a new problem which can be resolved simply
by the application of the rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of
the deceased petitioner. Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of gains under the aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be applied
effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation became final. Upon the
liquidation and distribution conformably with the law governing the effects of the final
decree of legal separation, the law on intestate succession should take over in the
disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner. This
procedure involves details which properly pertain to the lower court. The properties that
may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal
assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession in
Special Proceedings No. 134. (Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38287,
October 23, 1981)

2. ID.; ID.; FINAL DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAIN, INCIDENTAL

TO AN ANNULMENT CASE. — The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but,
with equal reason, the doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage
annulment which is the situation at bar. The respondent presiding judge is directed to
decide the partition (liquidation) case (Civil Case No. 1446) within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice of this decision to determine which of the properties of the conjugal
partnership should be adjudicated to the husband and the wife. This is but a
consequence or incident of its decision rendered in the same case annulling the
marriage.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing an order dated 24
January 1991 issued by herein respondent presiding judge-designate Bethel Katalbas-
Moscardon of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 51 which considered the
supplemental action for partition (after annulment of the marriage) as terminated due
to the death of one of the spouses (husband) and the pendency of intestate
proceedings over his estate. cralawnad

Petitioner Angelica Ledesma’s marriage to Cipriano Pedrosa was declared a nullity by

the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 51 on 8 February 1984 in Civil
Case No. 1446. 1 The dispositive portion of the order annulling the marriage also
provided thus: jgc:chanroble s.com. ph

". . . that the properties acquired by plaintiff Cipriano Pedrosa and defendant Angelica
Ledesma at the time they were living together as common-law husband and wife is
(sic) owned by them as co-owners to be governed by the provision on co-ownership of
the civil code; that the properties acquired by plaintiff and defendant after their
marriage was solemnized on March 25, 1965, which was annulled by this Court in the
above-entitled proceeding, forms (sic) part of the conjugal partnership and upon
dissolution of the marriage, to be liquidated in accordance with the provision of the civil
code." 2

Surprisingly it took some time before the next order implementing the above
disposition was issued on 4 May 1989, the pertinent part of which reads: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

". . . It appearing from the records that the court has to verify and determine the
correct inventory of the properties of Cipriano Pedrosa and Angelica Ledesma, the
parties, including the receiver, through their respective attorneys, are ordered to
submit their respective inventory, if one has not been submitted yet, before June 1,
1989. . . ." 3

Pending receipt by the court of the ordered inventory, Cipriano Pedrosa died. A
separate petition for the probate of his last will and testament was filed. 4 Nelson
Jimena was named executor and substituted Pedrosa in the partition proceedings (Civil
Case No. 1446). chanroble s.com : vi rtua l law lib rary

Due to disagreement of the parties on the characterization of the properties, the court
in the partition proceedings ordered (30 March 1990) the submission of comments,
objections and manifestations on the project of partition submitted by the parties.
During a lull in the proceedings, the presiding judge also passed away. On 24 January
1991 the following now-questioned order was issued by the herein respondent presiding
judge-designate who took over: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"It is informed by Atty. Pio Villoso that insofar as the status of this case is concerned,
the plaintiff who has long been dead, was substituted by the administrator, now the
plaintiff Nelson Jimena, and Atty. Vicente Sabornay, as the receiver. Furthermore, the
judgment as to the annulment of the marriage had already been rendered partially by
then Presiding Judge Quirino Abad Santos, Jr., on February 8, 1984. What is being
litigated here by the parties affects the property division to dissolve the partnership.
However, the plaintiff died and an intestate proceeding is now pending before Branch
43 whereby the said Nelson Jimena was actually the appointed administrator, and who
was substituted as plaintiff in this case. chanroble s lawlib rary : rednad

With all these informations, and considering the nature of the action, the Court finds
the substitution of the original plaintiff improper, as the defendant herein can pursue
her claim over the properties before the intestate proceedings being instituted. Action
for intervention in order that the judgment in this particular proceeding can be
implemented, can be raised in the intestate Court. Likewise, the appointment of the
receiver conflicts with that of the judicial administrator considering that with the filing
of the intestate case, the properties of the deceased plaintiff are in custodia legis and
this Court losses jurisdiction in determining further the distribution of the properties.

In view of the above, without prejudice to the defendant’s right to file as intervenor in
the intestate proceedings with the judgment annuling the marriage, the proceedings
becomes moot and academic with the pendency of the intestate proceeding before
Branch 43. This case is therefore deemed TERMINATED." 5

With the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration by the respondent court, this
special civil action was initiated.

Petitioner argues that respondent judge reneged in the performance of a lawful duty
when she refrained from rendering a decision in the partition case (Civil Case No. 1446)
and considered the same closed and terminated, due to the pendency of intestate
proceedings over the deceased husband’s estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159). 6 It is likewise
erroneous, petitioner contends, to rule that petitioner’s remedy is a motion for
intervention in said intestate proceedings to implement judgment in the marriage-
annulment case, since petitioner has already presented all her evidence in the
annulment case to prove which properties acquired during the marriage pertain to her.
The case of Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 7 where a similar issue was involved —
the husband having died after the legal separation of the spouses had been finally
decreed but before the actual liquidation of their community of properties — is on point.
The Court therein said: jgc:chan robles .com.p h

"WE do not find merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioned decision had not
become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute
community of property as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation.
Article 106 of the Civil Code thus reads: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

‘ARTICLE 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed;

2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property

shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the
provisions of Article 176;

x x x’

The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property
regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree of legal separation. Such dissolution
and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. This legal effect of the
decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident
of, the judgment decreeing legal separation for the purpose of determining the share of
each spouse in the conjugal assets. chanrobles law lib rary

x x x." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

". . ., the decision of the trial court dated January 4, 1973 decreeing the legal
separation between then spouses Antonio Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana
Macadangdang had long become final and executory and the division of the conjugal
property in a ‘supplemental decision’ is a mere incident of the decree of legal
separation.chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary

Since We have ruled on the finality of the judgment decreeing the spouses’ legal
separation as of January 4, 1973, the remaining issue for Our resolution is the final
disposition of their conjugal partnership of gains which partnership, by reason of the
final decree, had been automatically dissolved. The law (Article 106, 107 of the Civil
Code) clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal
property.

The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who was declared the guilty
spouse by the trial court, before the liquidation of the conjugal property is effected,
poses a new problem which can be resolved simply by the application of the rules on
intestate succession with respect to the properties of the deceased petitioner.
Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under
the aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective January 4, 1973
when the decree of legal separation became final. Upon the liquidation and distribution
conformably with the law governing the effects of the final decree of legal separation,
the law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever
remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves details
which properly pertain to the lower court.

The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by virtue of the
liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of
intestate succession in Special Proceedings No. 134." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with equal reason, the
doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage annulment which is the
situation at bar. The respondent presiding judge is directed to decide the partition
(liquidation) case (Civil Case No, 1446) within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of
this decision to determine which of the properties of the conjugal partnership should be
adjudicated to the husband and the wife. This is but a consequence or incident of its
decision rendered in the same case annulling the marriage. Petitioner’s letters to the
Court indicate that she is seventy (70) years of age and the prolonged action for
partition (liquidation) has taken a toll on her resources. Justice and equity demand the
disposition of her case with dispatch. Any properties that may be adjudicated to the
deceased husband Pedrosa can then be distributed in accordance with his last will and
testament in the special proceedings involving his estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159).

ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Judge’s order dated 24 January 1991 considering Civil
Case No. 1446 closed and terminated for being moot and academic is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge or whoever may have succeeded her is ordered to
decide said action for partition (liquidation) within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
decision.chanrobles v irt ual lawl ibra ry

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-6622. July 31, 1957.]

Intestate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE BORJA. CRISANTO DE BORJA, administrator-

appellant, v. JUAN DE BORJA, ET AL., Oppositors-Appellees.

E. V. Filamor for Appellant.

Juan de Borja for himself and co-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; NATURE OF COUNTERCLAIM. — A counterclaim is a relief available to a party-

defendant against the adverse party which may or may not be independent from the main issue.

2. ID.; PARTIES; COUNSEL FOR A PARTY SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED AS DEFENDANT IN COUNTERCLAIM.
— The appearance of a lawyer as Counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does
not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in
their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to
the parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against
persons who are acting in representation of another such as trustees in their individual capacities (Chambers
v. Cameron 2 Fed. Rules Service 155; 29 of Supp. 742), could be applied with more force and effect in the
case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the defense of
the client.

3. COURTS; JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT LIMITED AND SPECIAL. — In taking cognizance of a special
proceedings for the purpose of settling the estate of a deceased person, the Court of First Instance in its
capacity as a probate Court is clothed with a limited jurisdiction which cannot expand to Collateral matters
not arising out of or in anyway related to the settlement and adjudication of the properties of the deceased
for it is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a probate Court is limited and special. Although there is a
tendency now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of the probate Court in respect to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers, this should be understood to comprehend
only cases related to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes.

4. DAMAGES; COUNTERCLAIM; TESTATE OF INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS: MORAL DAMAGES IS EXTRANEOUS

MATTER — From whatever angle it may be looked at, a counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an
administrator against the heirs for alleged utterances, pleadings and actuations made in the course of a
proceeding, is an extraneous matter in a testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into the action of
incidental questions entirely foreign in probate proceedings should not be encouraged for to do otherwise
would run counter to the clear intention of the law.

5. EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATORS; ACTS CF ADMINISTRATOR CONSIDERED MALADMINISTRATION;

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE. — Where the records are replete with instances of highly irregular
practices of the administrator such as the pretended ignorance of the necessity of a book or ledger or at
least a list of chronological and dated entries of money or produce the intestate acquired and the amount of
disbursement made for the same properties; that admittedly the administrator did not have even a list of
the names of the lessees of the properties under his administration, nor even a list of those who owed back
rentals, and mixing the funds of the estate under his administration with his personal funds instead of
keeping a current account for the Intestate in his capacity as administrator, in such instances the probate
Court is justified in finding him guilty of acts of maladministration and in holding him accountable for loss or
damage to Intestate.

DECISION

FELIX, J.:

The case. — Quintin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, all surnamed de Borja, are the legitimate children of
Marcelo de Borja, who, upon his demise sometime in 1924 or 1925, left a considerable amount of property.
Intestate proceedings must have followed, and the pre-war records of the case either burned, lost or
destroyed during the last war, because the record shows that in 1930 Quintin de Borja was already the
administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja.

In the early part of 1938, Quintin de Borja died and Crisanto de Borja, son of Francisco de Borja, was
appointed and took over as administrator of the Estate. Francisco de Borja, on the other hand, assumed his
duties as executor of the will of Quintin de Borja, but upon petition of the heirs of said deceased on the
ground that his interests were conflicting with that of his brother’s estate, he was later required by the Court
to resign as such executor and was succeeded by Rogelio Limaco, a son-in-law of Quintin de Borja.

It also appears that on February 16, 1940, at the hearing set for the approval of the statement of accounts
of the late administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja, then being opposed by Francisco de
Borja, the parties submitted an agreement, which was approved by the Court (Exh. A). Said agreement,
translated into English, reads as follows:
chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. All the accounts submitted and those that are to be submitted corresponding to this year will be
considered approved;

2. No heir shall claim anything of the harvests from the lands in Cainta that came from Exequiel Ampil,
deceased, nor from the land in Tabuatin, Nueva Ecija;

3. That the amounts of money taken by each heir shall be considered as deposited in conjunction with the
other properties of the Intestate and shall form part of the mass without drawing any interest;

4. That it shall be understood as included in this mass the sum of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000) that the
sisters Crisanta and Juliana de Borja paid of their own money as part of the price of the lands in Cainta and
three thousand pesos (P3,000) the price of the machinery for irrigation;

5. The right, interests or participation that the deceased Quintin de Borja has or may have in Civil Case No.
6190 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, shall be likewise included in the total mass of the
inheritance of the Intestate;

6. Not only the lands in Tabuatin but also those in Cainta coming from the now deceased Exequiel Ampil
shall also form part of the total mass of the inheritance of the Intestate of the late Marcelo de Borja;

7. Once the total of the inheritance of the Intestate is made up as specified before in this Agreement,
partition thereof will be made as follows:
chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

From the total mass shall be deducted in case or in kind, Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000) that shall be
delivered to Da. Juliana de Borja and Da. Crisanta de Borja in equal shares, and the rest shall be divided
among the four heirs, i.e., Don Francisco de Borja, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, Da. Juliana de Borja and
Da. Crisanta de Borja, in equal parts. (TRANSLATION)

The Intestate remained under the administration of Crisanto de Borja until the outbreak of the war. From
then on and until the termination of the war, there was a lull and state of inaction in Special Proceeding No.
2414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branch (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja), until upon petition filed by Miguel B. Dayco, as administrator of the estate of his deceased mother,
Crisanta de Borja, who is one of the heirs, for the reconstitution of the records of this case, the Court on
December 11, 1945, ordered the reconstitution of the same, requiring the administrator to submit his report
and a copy of the project of partition.

On January 3, 1946, the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, filed his accounts for the period ranging from
March 1 to December 22, 1945, which according to the heirs of Quintin de Borja were so inadequate and
general that on February 28, 1946, they filed a motion for specification. On April 30, 1946, they also filed
their opposition to said statement of accounts alleging that the income reported in said statement was very
much less than the true and actual income of the estate and that the expenses appearing therein were
exaggerated and/or not actually incurred, and prayed that the statement of accounts submitted by the
administrator be disapproved.

The administrator later filed another report of his administration, dated August 9, 1949, corresponding to
the period lapsed from December 23, 1945, to July 31, 1949, showing a cash balance of P71.96, but with
pending obligation amounting to P35,415.

On August 22, 1949, Juan de Borja and sisters, heirs of the deceased Quintin de Borja, filed their opposition
to the statement of accounts filed by the administrator on the ground that same was not detailed enough to
enable the interested parties to verify the same; that they cannot understand why the Intestate could suffer
any loss considering that during the administration of the same by the late Quintin de Borja, the Estate
accumulated gains of more than P100,000 in the form of advances to the heirs as well as cash balance; that
they desired to examine the accounts of Dr. Crisanto de Borja to verify the loss and therefore prayed that
the administrator be ordered to deposit with the Clerk of Court all books, receipts, accounts and other
papers pertaining to the Estate of Marcelo de Borja. This motion was answered by the administrator
contending that the Report referred to was already clear and enough, the income as well as the
expenditures being specified therein; that he had to spend for the repairs of the properties of the Estate
damaged during the Japanese occupation; that the allegation that during the administration of Quintin de
Borja the Estate realized a profit of P100,000 was not true, because instead of gain there was even a
shortage in the funds although said administrator had collected all his fees (honorarios) and commissions
corresponding to the entire period of his incumbency; that the obligations mentioned in said Report will be
liquidated before the termination of the proceedings in the same manner as it is done in any other intestate
case; that he was willing to submit all the receipts of the accounts for the examination of the interested
parties before the Clerk or before the Court itself; that this Intestate could be terminated, the project of
partition having been allowed and confirmed by the Supreme Court and that the Administrator was also
desirous of terminating it definitely for the benefit of all the parties.

On September 14, 1949, the administrator filed another statement of accounts covering the period of from
March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of P71.95, with pending obligations in the
sum of P35,810.

The heirs of Quintin de Borja, Juan de Borja and his sisters, registered their opposition to said statement of
accounts and prayed the Court to disapprove the same and to appoint an accountant to go over the books of
the administrator and to submit a report thereon as soon as possible. The heir Juliana de Borja also formally
offered her objection to the approval of the accounts submitted by the administrator and prayed further that
said administrator be required to submit a complete accounting of his administration of the Estate from
1937 to 1949. On the other hand, Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco, as the only heir of the deceased
Crisanta de Borja, submitted to the Court an agreement to relieve the administrator from accounting for the
period of the Japanese occupation; that as to the accounting from 1937 to 1941, they affirmed their
conformity with the agreement entered into by all the heirs appearing in the Bill of Exceptions of Juliana de
Borja; and that they have no objection to the approval of the statement of accounts submitted by the
administrator covering the years 1945 to 1949.

On December 6, 1949, the administrator, answered the opposition of the heir Juliana de Borja, alleging that
the corresponding statement of accounts for the years 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940 and 1941 were presented
and approved by the Court before and during the Japanese occupation, but the records of the same were
destroyed in the Office of the Clerk of that Court during the liberation of the province of Rizal, and his
personal records were also lost during the Japanese occupation, when his house was burned; that Judge
Peña who was presiding over the Court in 1945 impliedly denied the petition of the heirs to require him to
render an accounting for the period from 1942 to the early part of 1945, for the reason that whatever
money obtained from the Estate during said period could not be made the subject of any adjudication it
having been declared fiat money and without value, and ordered that the statement of accounts be
presented only for the period starting from March 1, 1945. The administrator further stated that he was
anxious to terminate this administration but some of the heirs had not yet complied with the conditions
imposed in the project of partition which was approved by the Supreme Court; that in accordance with said
partition agreement, Juliana de Borja must deliver to the administrator all the jewelry, objects of value,
utensils and other personal belongings of the deceased spouses Marcelo de Borja and Tarcila Quiogue, which
said heir had kept and continued to retain in her possession; that the heirs of Quintin de Borja should
deliver to the administrator all the lands and a document transferring in favor of the Intestate the two
parcels of land with a total area of 71 hectares of cultivated land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija which were in
the possession of said heirs, together with the house of Feliciana Mariano Vda. de Sarangaya, which were
the objects of Civil Case No. 6190 mentioned in Paragraph 11 of the project of partition; that as a
consequence of the said dispossession, the heirs of Quintin de Borja must deliver to the administrator the
products of the 71 hectares of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and the rentals of the house of Feliciana
Mariano or else render to the Court an accounting of the products of these properties from the time they
took possession of the same in 1937 to the present; that there was a pending obligation amounting to
P36,000 as of September 14, 1949, which the heirs should pay before the properties adjudicated to them
would be delivered. The Court, however, ordered the administrator on December 10, 1949, to show and
prove by evidence why he should not be required to include in his accounts the proceeds of his
administration from 1937.

Meantime, Juliana de Borja filed a Constancia denying possession of any jewelry belonging to the deceased
spouses Marcelo de Borja and Tarcila Quiogue or any other persona] belonging of said spouses, and signified
her willingness to turn over to the administrator the silverwares mentioned in Paragraph III of the project of
partition, which were the only property in her care, on the date that she would expect the delivery to her of
her share in the inheritance from her deceased parents.

On July 6, 1950, Juan de Borja and his sisters Marcela, Saturnina, Eufracia, Jacoba and Olimpia, all
surnamed de Borja, as heirs of Quintin de Borja, filed a motion for the delivery to them of their inheritance
in the estate, tendering to the administrator a document ceding and transferring to the latter all the rights,
interests and participation of Quintin de Borja in Civil Case No. 7190 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, pursuant to the provisions of the Project of Partition, and expressing their willingness to put up a bond
if required to do so by the Court, and on July 18, 1950, the Court ordered the administrator to deliver to
Marcela, Juan, Saturnina, Eufracia, Jacoba and Olimpia, all surnamed de Borja, all the properties adjudicated
to them in the Project of Partition dated February 8, 1944, upon the latter’s filing a bond in the sum of
P10,000 conditioned upon the payment of such obligation as may be ordered by the Court after a hearing on
the controverted accounts of the administrator. The Court considered the fact that the heirs had complied
with the requirement imposed by the Project of Partition when they tendered the document ceding and
transferring the rights and interests of Quintin de Borja in the aforementioned lands and expressed the
necessity of terminating the proceedings as soon as practicable, observing that the Estate had been under
administration for over twenty-five years already. The Court, however, deferred action on the petition filed
by the special administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Juliana de Borja until after compliance with the
conditions imposed by the project of partition. But on July 20, 1950, apparently before the properties were
delivered to the heirs, Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco filed a motion informing the Court that the
two parcels of land located in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, produced some 21,300 cavans of palay, amounting
to P213,000 at P10 per cavan, which were enjoyed by some heirs; that the administrator Crisanto de Borja
had not taken possession of the same for circumstances beyond his control; and that there also existed the
sum of P70,204 which the former administrator, Quintin de Borja, received from properties that were
redeemed, but which amount did not come into the hands of the present administrator because according to
reliable information, same was delivered to the heir Juliana de Borja who deposited it in her name at the
Philippine National Bank. It was, therefore prayed that the administrator be required to exert the necessary
effort to ascertain the identity of the person or persons who were in possession of the same amount and of
the value of the products of the lands in Mayapyap, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and to recover the same for
the Intestate Estate.

On July 28, 1950, the special administratrix of the estate of Juliana de Borja, then deceased, filed an answer
to the motion of these two heirs, denying the allegation that said heir received any product of the lands
mentioned from Quintin de Borja, and informed the Court that the Mayapyap property had always been in
the possession of Francisco de Borja himself and prayed the Court that the administrator be instructed to
demand all the fruits and products of said property from Francisco de Borja.

On July 28, 1950, the heirs of Quintin de Borja also filed their opposition to the said motion of Francisco de
Borja and Miguel B. Dayco on the ground that the petition was superfluous because the present proceeding
was only for the approval of the statement of accounts filed by the administrator; that said motion was
improper because it was asking the Court to order the administrator to perform what he was duty bound to
do; and that said heirs were already barred or estopped from raising that question in view of their absolute
ratification of and assent to the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator.

On August 16, 1950, by order of the Court, the properties adjudicated to Juliana de Borja in the Project of
Partition were finally delivered to the estate of said heir upon the filing of a bond for P20,000. In that same
order, the Court denied the administrator’s motion to reconsider the order of July 18, 1950, requiring him to
deliver to the heirs of Quintin de Borja the properties corresponding to them, on the ground that there
existed no sufficient reason to disturb said order. It also ruled that as the petition of Francisco de Borja and
Miguel B. Dayco made mention of certain properties allegedly belonging to the Intestate, said petition should
properly be considered together with the final accounts of the administrator.

The administrator raised the matter by certiorari to this Tribunal, which was docketed as G. R. No. L-4179,
and on May 30, 1951, We rendered decision affirming the order complained of, finding that the heirs Juan de
Borja and sisters have complied with the requirement imposed in the Project of Partition upon the tender of
the document of cession of rights and quit-claim executed by Marcela de Borja, the administratrix of the
Estate of Quintin de Borja, and holding that the reasons advanced by the administrator in opposing the
execution of the order of delivery were trivial.

On August 27, 1951, the administrator filed his amended statement of accounts covering the period from
March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of P36,660. An additional statement of
accounts filed on August 31, 1951 for the period of from August 1, 1949, to August 31, 1951, showed a cash
balance of P5,851.17 and pending obligations in the amount of P6,165.03.

The heirs of Quintin de Borja again opposed the approval of these statements of accounts charging the
administrator with having failed to include the fruits which the estate should have accrued from 1941 to
1951 amounting to P479,429.70, but as the other heirs seemed satisfied with the accounts presented by
said administrator and as their group was only one of the 4 heirs of Intestate Estate, they prayed that the
administrator be held liable for only P119,932.42 which was 1/4 of the amount alleged to have been
omitted. On October 4, 1951, the administrator filed a reply to said opposition containing a counterclaim for
moral damages against all the heirs of Quintin de de Borja in the sum of P30,000 which was admitted by the
Court over the objection of the heirs of Quintin de Borja that the said pleading was filed out of time.
The oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, then filed their answer to the counterclaim denying the
charges therein, but later served interrogatories on the administrator relative to the averments of said
counterclaim. Upon receipt of the answer to said interrogatories specifying the acts upon which the claim for
moral damages was based, the oppositors filed an amended answer contending that inasmuch as the acts,
manifestations and pleadings referred to therein were admittedly committed and prepared by their lawyer,
Atty. Amador E. Gomez, same cannot be made the basis of a counterclaim, said lawyer not being a party to
the action, and furthermore, as the acts upon which the claim for moral damages were based had been
committed prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the provisions of said Code on moral damages could
not be invoked. On January 15, 1952, the administrator filed an amended counterclaim including the counsel
for the oppositors as defendant.

There followed a momentary respite in the proceedings until another judge was assigned to preside over
said court to dispose of the old cases pending therein. On August 15, 1952, Judge Encarnacion issued an
order denying admission to administrator’s amended counterclaim directed against the lawyer, Atty. Amador
E. Gomez, holding that a lawyer, not being a party to the action, cannot be made answerable for
counterclaims. Another order was also issued on the same date dismissing the administrator’s counterclaim
for moral damages against the heirs of Quintin de Borja and their counsel for the alleged defamatory acts,
manifestations and utterances, and stating that granting the same to be meritorious, yet it was a strictly
private controversy between said heirs and the administrator which would not in any way affect the interest
of the Intestate, and, therefore, not proper in an intestate proceedings. The Court stressed that to allow the
ventilation of such personal controversies would further delay the proceedings in the case which had already
lagged for almost 30 years, a situation which the Court would not countenance.

Having disposed of these pending incidents which arose out of the principal issue, that is, the disputed
statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, the Court rendered judgment on September 5, 1952,
ordering the administrator to distribute the funds in his possession to the heirs as follows: P1,395.90 to the
heirs of Quintin de Borja; P314.99 to Francisco de Borja; P314.99 to the Estate of Juliana de Borja and
P314.99 to Miguel B. Dayco, but as the latter still owed the intestate the sum of P900, said heirs was
ordered to pay instead the 3 others the sum of P146.05 each. After considering the testimonies of the
witnesses presented by both parties and the available records on hand, the Court found the administrator
guilty of maladministration and sentenced Crisanto de Borja to pay to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de
Borja, the sum of P83,337.31, which was 1/4 of the amount which the estate lost, with legal interest from
the date of the judgment. On the same day, the Court also issued an order requiring the administrator to
deliver to the Clerk of that Court PNB Certificate of Deposit No. 211649 for P978.50 which was issued in the
name of Quintin de Borja.

The administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, gave notice to appeal from the lower Court’s orders of August 15,
1952, the decision of September 5, 1952, and the order of even date, but when the Record on Appeal was
finally approved, the Court ordered the exclusion of the appeal from the order of September 5, 1952,
requiring the administrator to deposit the PNB Certificate of Deposit No. 211649 with the Clerk of Court,
after the oppositors had shown that during the hearing of that incident, the parties agreed to abide by
whatever resolution the Court would make on the ownership of the funds covered by that deposit.

The issues. — Reducing the issues to bare essentials, the questions left for our determination are: (1)
whether the counsel for a party in a case may be included as a defendant in a counterclaim; (2) whether a
claim for moral damages may be entertained in a proceeding for the settlement of an estate; (3) what may
be considered as acts of maladministration and whether an administrator, as the one in the case at bar, may
be held accountable for any loss or damage that the estate under his administration may incur by reason of
his negligence, bad faith or acts of maladministration; and (4) in the case at bar has the Intestate or any of
the heirs suffered any loss or damage by reason of the administrator’s negligence, bad faith or
maladministration? If so, what is the amount of such loss or damage?

I. — Section 1, Rule 10, of the Rules of Court defines a counterclaim as: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

SECTION 1. Counterclaim Defined. — A counterclaim is any claim, whether for money or otherwise, which a
party may have against the opposing party. A counterclaim need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought
by the opposing party, but may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought by the
opposing party’s claim.

It is an elementary rule of procedure that a counterclaim is a relief available to a party-defendant against

the adverse party which may or may not be independent from the main issue. There is no controversy in the
case at bar, that the acts, manifestations and actuations alleged to be defamatory and upon which the
counterclaim was based were done or prepared by counsel for oppositors; and the administrator contends
that as the very oppositors manifested that whatever civil liability arising from acts, actuations, pleadings
and manifestations attributable to their lawyer is enforceable against said lawyer, the amended counterclaim
was filed against the latter not in his individual or personal capacity but as counsel for the oppositors. It is
his stand, therefore, that the lower court erred in denying admission to said pleading. We differ from the
view taken by the administrator. The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a
case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of
his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that
the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim
cannot be filed against persons who are acting in representation of another — such as trustees — in their
individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied
with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely confined to
the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim
against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we
have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former a party to
the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at.

Granting that the lawyer really employed intemperate language in the course of the hearings or in the
preparation of the pleadings filed in connection with this case, the remedy against said counsel would be to
have him cited for contempt of court or take other administrative measures that may be proper in the case,
but certainly not a counterclaim for moral damages.

II. — Special Proceedings No. 6414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig branch) was instituted for
the purpose of settling the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja. In taking cognizance of the case, the Court
was clothed with a limited jurisdiction which cannot expand to collateral matters not arising out of or in any
way related to the settlement and adjudication of the properties of the deceased, for it is a settled rule that
the jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special (Guzman v. Anog, 37 Phil. 361). Although there is a
tendency now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of the probate court in respect to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers (14 Am. Jur. 251-252), this should be
understood to comprehend only cases related to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes. For it was
even said that:jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

"Probate proceedings are purely statutory and their functions limited to the control of the property upon the
death of its owner, and cannot extend to the adjudication of collateral questions" (Woesmes, The American
Law of Administration, Vol. I, p. 514, 662- 663).

It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the lower court dismissed the administrator’s
counterclaim for moral damages against the oppositors, particularly against Marcela de Borja who allegedly
uttered derogatory remarks intended to cast dishonor to said administrator sometime in 1950 or 1951, his
Honor’s ground being that the court exercising limited jurisdiction cannot entertain claims of this kind which
should properly belong to a court of general jurisdiction. From whatever angle it may be looked at, a
counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an administrator against the heirs for alleged utterances,
pleadings and actuations made in the course of the proceeding, is an extraneous matter in a testate or
intestate proceedings. The injection into the action of incidental questions entirely foreign in probate
proceedings should not be encouraged for to do otherwise would run counter to the clear intention of the
law, for it was held that: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of the creditors and those entitled
to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been
paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" (Magbanua v. Akel, 72 Phil., 567, 40 Off. Gaz., 1871).

III. and IV. — This appeal arose from the opposition of the heirs of Quintin de Borja to the approval of the
statements of accounts rendered by the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja, on the
ground that certain fruits which should have accrued to the estate were unaccounted for, which charge the
administrator denied. After a protracted and extensive hearing on the matter, the Court, finding the
administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, guilty of certain acts of maladministration, held him liable for the
payment to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, of 1/4 of the unreported income which the estate
should have received. The evidence presented in the court below bear out the following facts: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

(a) The estate owns a 6-door building, Nos. 1541, 1543, 1545, 1547, 1549 and 1551 in Azcarraga Street,
Manila, situated in front of the Arranque market. Of this property, the administrator reported to have
received for the estate the following rentals: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Period of Time Total rentals Unnual

monthly rental

March to December, 1945 P3,085.00 P51.42

January to December, 1946 4,980.00 69.17

January to December, 1947 8,330.00 115.70

January to December, 1948 9,000.00 125.00

January to December, 1949 8,840.00 122.77

January to December, 1950 6,060.00 184.16

TOTAL P40,295.00

The oppositors, in disputing this reported income, presented at the witness stand Lauro Aguila, a lawyer who
occupied the basement of Door No. 1541 and the whole of Door No. 1543 from 1945 to November 15, 1949,
and who testified that he paid rentals on said apartments as follows: chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

1945

Door No. 1541 (basement)

February P20.00 Door No. 1543

March 20.00 For 7 months at P300

April 60.00 a month P2,100.00

May-December 800.00

Total P900.00

1946

January-December P1,200.00 January-December P4,080.00

1947

January P100.00 January P380.00

February 100.00 February 380 00

March 180.00 March 1-15 190.00

April-December 1,440.00 March 16-December 4,085.00

1,820.00 P5,035.00

1948

January-December P1,920.00 January-December P5,150.00

1949

January-November 15 P1,680.00 January-December P4,315.00

From the testimony of said witness, it appears that from 1945 to November 15, 1949, he paid a total of
P28,200 for the lease of Door No. 1543 and the basement of Door No. 1541. These figures were not
controverted or disputed by the administrator but claimed that said tenant subleased the apartments
occupied by Pedro Enriquez and Soledad Sodora and paid the said rentals, not to the administrator, but to
said Enriquez. The transcript of the testimony of this witness really bolster this contention - that Lauro
Aguila talked with said Pedro Enriquez when he leased the aforementioned apartments and admitted paying
the rentals to the latter and not to the administrator. It is interesting to note that Pedro Enriquez is the
same person who appeared to be the administrator’s collector, duly authorized to receive the rentals from
this Azcarraga property and for which services, said Enriquez received 5 per cent of the amount he might be
able to collect as commission. If we are to believe appellant’s contention, aside from the commission that
Pedro Enriquez received he also sublet the apartments he was occupying at a very much higher rate than
that he actually paid the estate without the knowledge of the administrator or with his approval. As the
administrator also seemed to possess that peculiar habit of giving little importance to bookkeeping methods,
for he never kept a ledger or book of entry for amounts received for the estate, We find no record of the
rentals the lessees of the other doors were paying. It was, however, brought about at the hearing that the 6
doors of this building are of the same sizes and construction and the lower Court based its computation of
the amount this property should have earned for the estate on the rental paid by Atty. Aguila for the 1 1/2
doors that he occupied. We see no excuse why the administrator could not have taken cognizance of these
rates and received the same for the benefit of the estate he was administering, considering the fact that he
used to make trips to Manila usually once a month and for which he charged to the estate P8 as
transportation expenses for every trip.

Basing on the rentals paid by Atty. Aguila for 1 1/2 doors, the estate would have received P112,800 from
February 1, 1945, to November 15, 1949, for the 6 doors, but the lower Court held him accountable not only
for the sum of P34,235 reported for the period ranging from March 1, 1945, to December 31, 1949, but also
for a deficit of P90,525 or a total of P124,760. The record shows, however that the upper floor of Door No.
1549 was vacant in September, 1949, and as Atty. Aguila used to pay P390 a month for the use of an entire
apartment from September to November, 1949, and he also paid P160 for the use of the basement of an
apartment (Door No. 1541), the use, therefore, of said upper floor would cost P230 which should be
deducted, even if the computation of the lower Court would have to be followed.

There being no proper evidence to show that the administrator collected more rentals than those reported
by him, except in the instance already mentioned, We are reluctant to hold him accountable in the amount
for which he was held liable by the lower Court, and We think that under the circumstances it would be more
just to add to the sum reported by the administrator as received by him as rents for 1945-1949 only, the
difference between the sum reported as paid by Atty. Aguila and the sum actually paid by the latter as rents
of 1 1/2 of the apartments during the said period, or P25,457.09 1/4 of which is P6,364.27 which shall be
paid to the oppositors.

The record also shows that in July, 1950, the administrator delivered to the other heirs Doors Nos. 1545,
1547, 1549 and 1551 although Doors Nos. 1541 and 1543 adjudicated to the oppositors remained under his
administration. For the period from January to June, 1950, that the entire property was still administered by
him, the administrator reported to have received for the 2 oppositors’ apartments for said period of six
months at P168.33 a month, the sum of P1,010 which belongs to the oppositors and should be taken from
the amount reported by the administrator.

The lower Court computed at P40 a month the pre-war rental admittedly received for every apartment, the
income that said property would have earned from 1941 to 1944, or a total of P11,520, but as We have to
exclude the period covered by the Japanese occupation, the estate should receive only P2,880 1/4 of which
P720 the administrator should pay to the oppositors for the year 1941.

(b) The Intestate estate also owned a parcel of land in Mayapyap, Nueva Ecija, with an area of 71 hectares,
95 ares and 4 centares, acquired by Quintin de Borja from the spouses Cornelio Sarangaya and Feliciana
Mariano in Civil Case No. 6190 of the Court of First Instance of said province. In virtue of the agreement
entered into by the heirs, this property was turned over by the estate of Quintin de Borja to the intestate
and formed part of the general mass of said estate. The report of the administrator failed to disclose any
return from this property alleging that he had not taken possession of the same. He does not deny however
that he knew of the existence of this land but claimed that when he demanded the delivery of the Certificate
of Title covering this property, Rogelio Limaco, then administrator of the estate of Quintin de Borja, refused
to surrender the same and he did not take any further action to recover the same.

To counteract the insinuation that the Estate of Quintin de Borja was in possession of this property from
1940 to 1950, the oppositors presented several witnesses, among them was an old man, Narciso Punzal,
who testified that he knew both Quintin and Francisco de Borja; that before the war or sometime in 1937,
the former administrator of the Intestate, Quintin de Borja, offered him the position of overseer (encargado)
of this land but he was not able to assume the same due to the death of said administrator; that on July 7,
1951, herein appellant invited him to go to his house in Pateros, Rizal, and while in said house, he was
instructed by appellant to testify in court next day that he was the overseer of the Mayapyap property for
Quintin de Borja from 1937-1944, delivering the yearly proceeds of 1,000 cavanes of palay to Rogelio
Limaco; that he did not need to be afraid because both Quintin de Borja and Rogelio Limaco were already
dead. But as he knew that the facts on which he was to testify were false, he went instead to the house of
one of the daughters of Quintin de Borja, who, together with her brother, Atty. Juan de Borja, accompanied
him to the house of the counsel for said oppositors before whom his sworn declaration was taken (Exh. 3).

Other witnesses, i.e., Isidro Benuya, Federico Cojo, Emilio de la Cruz and Ernesto Mangulabnan, testified
that they were some of the tenants of the Mayapyap property; that they were paying their shares to the
overseers of Francisco de Borja and sometimes to his wife, which the administrator was not able to
contradict, and the lower Court found no reason why the administrator would fail to take possession of this
property considering that this was even the subject of the agreement of February 16, 1940, executed by the
heirs of the Intestate.

The lower Court, giving due credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the oppositors, computed the
loss the estate suffered in the form of unreported income from the rice lands for 10 years at P67,000 (6,700
a year) and the amount of P4,000 from the remaining portion of the land not devoted to rice cultivation
which was being leased at P20 per hectare. Consequently, the Court held the administrator liable to
appellees in the sum of P17,750 which is 1/4, of the total amount which should have accrued to the estate
for this item.

But if We exclude the 3 years of occupation, the income for 7 years would be P46,900 for the ricelands and
P2,800 (at P400 a year) for the remaining portion not devoted to rice cultivation or a total of P48,700, 1/4
of which is P12,175 which We hold the administrator liable to the oppositors.

(c) The Hacienda Jalajala located in said town of Rizal, was divided into 3 parts: the Punta section belonged
to Marcelo de Borja, the Bagombong pertained to Bernardo de Borja and Francisco de Borja got the Jalajala
proper. For the purpose of this case, we will just deal with that part called Junta. This property has an area
of 1,345, hectares, 29 ares and 2 centares (Exh. 36) of which, according to the surveyor who measured the
same, 200 hectares were of cultivated rice fields and 100 hectares dedicated to the planting of upland rice.
It has also timberland and forest which produce considerable amount of trees and firewoods. From the said
property which has an assessed value of P115,000 and for which the estates pay real estate tax of P1,500
annually, the administrator reported the following.

Expenditures

(not including

administration’s

Year Income fees.

1945 P625.00 P1,310.42

1946 1,800.00 3,471.00

1947 2,550.00 2,912.91

1948 1,828.00 3,311.88

1949 3,204.50 4,792.09

1950 2,082.00 2,940.91

P12,089.50 P18,739.21

This statement was assailed by the oppositors and to substantiate their charge that the administrator did
not file the true income of the property, they presented several witnesses who testified that there were
about 200 tenants working therein, that these tenants paid to Crisanto de Borja rentals at the rate of 6
cavanes of palay per hectare; that in the years of 1943 and 1944, the Japanese were the ones who collected
their rentals, and that the estate could have received no less than 1,000 cavanes of palay yearly. After the
administrator had presented witnesses to refute the facts previously testified to by the witnesses for the
oppositors, the Court held that the report of the administrator did not contain the real income of the
property devoted to rice cultivation, which was fixed at 1,000 cavanes every year — for 1941, 1942, 1945,
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950, or a total of 8,000 cavanes valued at P73,000. But as the administrator
accounted for the sum of P11,155 collected from rice harvests and if to this amount we add the sum of
P8,739.20 for expenses, this will make a total of P19,894.20, thus leaving a deficit of P53,105.80, 1/4 of
which will be P13,276.45 which the administrator is held liable to pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja.

It was also proved during the hearing that the forestland of this property yields considerable amount of
marketable firewoods. Taking into consideration the testimonies of witnesses for both parties, the Court
arrived at the conclusion that the administrator sold to Gregorio Santos firewoods worth P600 in 1941,
P3,500 in 1945 and P4,200 in 1946 or a total of P8,300. As the report included only the amount of P625,
there was a balance of P7,675 in favor of the estate. The oppositors were not able to present any proof of
sales made after these years, if there were any and the administrator was held accountable to the
oppositors for only P1,918.75.

(d) The estate also owned ricefields in Cainta, Rizal, with a total area of 22 hectares, 76 ares and 66
centares. Of this particular item, the administrator reported an income of P12,104 from 1945 to 1951. The
oppositors protested against this report and presented witnesses to disprove the same.

Basilio Javier worked as a tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja which is near the land belonging to the
Intestate, the 2 properties being separated only by a river. As tenant of Juliana de Borja, he knew the
tenants working on the property and also knows that both lands are of the same class, and that an area
accommodating one cavan of seedlings yields at most 100 cavanes and 60 cavanes at the least. The
administrator failed to overcome this testimony. The lower Court considering the facts testified to by this
witness made a finding that the property belonging to this Intestate was actually occupied by several
persons accommodating 13 1/2 cavanes of seedlings; that as for every cavan of seedlings, the land
produces 60 cavanes of palay, the whole area under cultivation would have yielded 810 cavanes a year and
under the 50-50 sharing system (which was testified to by witness Javier), the estate should have received
no less than 405 cavanes every year. Now, for the period of 7 years — from 1941 to 1950, excluding the 3
years of war — the corresponding earning of the estate should be 2,835 cavanes, out of which the 405
cavanes from the harvest of 1941 is valued at P1,215 and the rest 2,430 cavanes at P10 is valued at
P24,300, or all in all P25,515. If from this amount the reported income of P12,104 is deducted, there will be
a balance of P13,411.10 1/4, of which or P3,352.75 the administrator is held liable to pay to the oppositors.

(e) The records show that the administrator paid surcharges and penalties with a total of P988.75 for his
failure to pay on time the taxes imposed on the properties under his administration. He advanced the reason
that he lagged in the payment of those tax obligations because of lack of cash balance for the estate. The
oppositors, however, presented evidence that on October 29, 1939, the administrator received from Juliana
de Borja the sum of P20,475.17 together with certain papers pertaining to the intestate (Exh. 4), aside from
the checks in the name of Quintin de Borja. Likewise, for his failure to pay the taxes on the building at
Azcarraga for 1947, 1948 and 1949, said property was sold at public auction and the administrator had to
redeem the same at P3,295.48, although the amount that should have been paid was only P2,917.26. The
estate therefore suffered a loss of P378.22. Attributing these surcharges and penalties to the negligence of
the administrator, the lower Court adjudged him liable to pay the oppositors 1/4 of P1,366.97, the total loss
suffered by the Intestate, or P341.74.

(f) Sometime in 1942, a big fire razed numerous houses in Pateros, Rizal, including that of Dr. Crisanto de
Borja. Thereafter, he claimed that among the properties burned therein was his safe containing P15,000
belonging to the estate under his administration. The administrator contended that this loss was already
proved to the satisfaction of the Court who approved the same by order of January 8, 1943, purportedly
issued by Judge Servillano Platon (Exh. B). The oppositors contested the genuineness of this order and
presented on April 21, 1950, an expert witness who conducted several tests to determine the probable age
of the questioned document, and arrived at the conclusion that the questioned ink writing" (Fdo)" appearing
at the bottom of Exhibit B cannot be more than 4 years old (Exh. 39). However, another expert witness
presented by the administrator contradicted this finding and testified that this conclusion arrived at by
expert witness Mr. Pedro Manzañares was not supported by authorities and was merely the result of his own
theory, as there was no method yet discovered that would determine the age of a document, for every
document has its own reaction to different chemicals used in the tests. There is, however, another fact that
called the attention of the lower Court: the administrator testified that the money and other papers
delivered by Juliana de Borja to him on October 29, 1939, were saved from said fire. The administrator
justified the existence of these valuables by asserting that these properties were locked by Juliana de Borja
in her drawer in the "casa solariega" in Pateros and hence was not in his safe when his house, together with
the safe, was burned. This line of reasoning is really subject to doubt and the lower Court opined, that it
runs counter to the ordinary course of human behavior for an administrator to leave in the drawer of the
"aparador" of Juliana de Borja the money and other documents belonging to the estate under his
administration, which delivery has receipted for, rather than to keep it in his safe together with the alleged
P15,000 also belonging to the Intestate. The subsequent orders of Judge Platon also put the defense of
appellant to bad light, for on February 6, 1943, the Court required Crisanto de Borja to appear before the
Court of examination of the other heirs in connection with the reported loss, and on March 1, 1943,
authorized the lawyers for the other parties to inspect the safe allegedly burned (Exh. 35). It is
inconceivable that Judge Platon would still order the inspection of the safe if there was really an order
approving the loss of those P15,000. We must not forget, in this connection, that the records of this case
were burned and that at the time of the hearing of this incident in 1951, Judge Platon was already dead. The
lower Court also found no reason why the administrator should keep in his possession such amount of
money, for ordinary prudence would dictate that as an administration funds that come into his possession in
a fiduciary capacity should not be mingled with his personal funds and should have been deposited in the
Bank in the name of the intestate. The administrator was held responsible for this loss and ordered to pay
1/4 thereof, or the sum of P3,750.

(g) Unauthorized expenditures —

1. The report of the administrator contained certain sums amounting to P2,130 paid to and receipted by
Juanita V. Jarencio the administrator’s wife, as his private secretary. In explaining this item, the
administrator alleged that he needed her services to keep receipts and records for him, and that he did not
secure first the authorization from the court before making these disbursements because it was merely a
pure administrative function.

The keeping of receipts and retaining in his custody records connected with the management of the
properties under administration is a duty that properly belongs to the administrator, necessary to support
the statement of accounts that he is obliged to submit to the court for approval. If ever his wife took charge
of the safekeeping of these receipts and for which she should be compensated, the same should be taken
from his fee. This disbursement was disallowed by the Court for being unauthorized and the administrator
required to pay the oppositors 1/4 thereof or P532.50.

2. The salaries of Pedro Enriquez, as collector of the Azcarraga property; of Briccio Matienzo and Leoncio
Perez, as encargados, and of Vicente Panganiban and Herminigildo Macetas as forest-guards were found
justified, although unauthorized, as they appear to be reasonable and necessary for the care and
preservation of the Intestate.

3. The lower Court disallowed as unjustified and unnecessary the expenses for salaries paid to special
policemen amounting to P1,509. Appellant contended that he sought for the services of Macario Kamungol
and others to act as special policemen during harvest time because most of the workers tilling the Punta
property were not natives of Jalajala but of the neighboring towns and they were likely to run away with the
harvest without giving the share of the estate if they were not policed. This kind of reasoning did not appear
to be convincing to the trial judge as the cause for such fear seemed to exist only in the imagination.
Granting that such kind of situation existed, the proper thing for the administrator to do would have been to
secure the previous authorization from the Court if he failed to secure the help of the local police. He should
be held liable for this unauthorized expenditure and pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja 1/4 thereof or
P377.25.

4. From the year 1942 when his house was burned, the administrator and his family took shelter at the
house belonging to the Intestate known as "casa solariega" which, in the Project of Partition, was
adjudicated to his father, Francisco de Borja. This property, however, remained under his administration and
for its repairs he spent from 1945-1950, P1,465.14, duly receipted.

None of these repairs appear to be extraordinary for the receipts were for nipa, for carpenters and
thatchers. Although it is true that Rule 85, Section 2 provides that:
chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

SEC. 2. EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR TO KEEP BUILDINGS IN REPAIR. — An executor or administrator

shall maintain in tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and
deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court.

yet considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa solariega" he was not paying any rental at all, it
is but reasonable that he should take care of the expenses for the ordinary repair of said house. Appellant
asserted that had he and his family not occupied the same, they would have to pay someone to watch and
take care of said house. But this will not excuse him from this responsibility for the disbursements he made
in connection with the aforementioned repairs because even if he stayed in another house, he would have
had to pay rentals or else take charge also of expenses for the repairs of his residence. The administrator
should be held liable to the oppositors in the amount of P366.28.

5. Appellant reported to have incurred expenses amounting to P6,304.75 for alleged repairs on the rice mill
in Pateros, also belonging to the Intestate. Of the disbursements made therein, the items corresponding, to
Exhibits I, I-1, I-21, L-26, L-15, L-64 and L-65, in the total sum of P570.70 were rejected by the lower court
on the ground that they were all unsigned although some were dated. The lower Court, however, made an
oversight in including the sum of P150 covered by Exhibit L-26 which was duly signed by Claudio Reyes
because this does not refer to the repair of the rice-mill but for the roofing of the house and another building
and shall be allowed. Consequently, the sum of P570.70 shall be reduced to P420.70 which added to the
sum of P3,059 representing expenditures rejected as unauthorized to wit: chan rob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

Exhibit L-59 P500.00 Yek Wing

Exhibit L-60 616.00 Yek Wing

Exhibit L-61 600.00 Yek Wing

Exhibit L-62 840.00 Yek Wing

Exhibit L-63 180.00 Yek Wing

Exhibit Q-2 323.00 scale "Howe"

Total P3,059.00

will give a total of P3,479 1/4 of which is P869.92 that belongs to the oppositors.

6. On the reported expenses for planting in the Cainta ricefields: — In his statement of accounts, appellant
reported to have incurred a total expense of P5,977 for the planting of the ricefields in Cainta, Rizal, from
the agricultural year 1945-46 to 1950-51. It was proved that the prevailing sharing system in this part of
the country was on 50-50 basis. Appellant admitted that expenses for planting were advanced by the estate
and liquidated after each harvest. But the report, except for the agricultural year 1950 contained nothing of
the payments that the tenants should have made. If the total expenses for said planting amounted to
P5,977, 1/2 thereof or P2,988.50 should have been paid by the tenants as their share of such expenditures,
and as P965 was reported by the administrator as paid back in 1950, there still remains a balance of
P2,023.50 unaccounted for. For this shortage, the administrator is responsible and should pay the oppositors
1/4 thereof or P505.87.

7. On the transportation expenses of the administrator: — It appears that from the year 1945 to 1951, the
administrator charged the estate with a total of P5,170 for transportation expenses. The unreceipted
disbursements were correspondingly itemized, a typical example of which is as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"1950

"Gastos de viaje del administrador

"From Pateros

"To Pasig 50 x P 4.00 = P200.00

"To Manila 50 x P10.00 = P500.00

"To Cainta 8 x P 8.00 = P 64.00

"To Jalajala 5 x P35.00 = P175.00

P939.00"

(Exhibit W-54)

From the report of the administrator, We are being made to believe that the Intestate estate is a losing
proposition and assuming arguendo that this is true, that precarious financial condition which he, as
administrator, should know, did not deter Crisanto de Borja from charging to the depleted funds of the
estate comparatively big amounts for his transportation expenses. Appellant tried to justify these charges by
contending that he used his own car in making those trips to Manila, Pasig and Cainta and a launch in
visiting the properties in Jalajala, and they were for the gasoline consumed. This rather unreasonable
spending of the estate’s fund prompted the Court to observe that one will have to spend only P0.40 for
transportation in making a trip from Pateros to Manila and practically the same amount in going to Pasig.
From his report for 1949 alone, appellant made a total of 97 trips to these places or an average of one trip
for every 3 1/2 days. Yet We must not forget that it was during this period that the administrator failed or
refused to take cognizance of the prevailing rentals of commercial places in Manila that caused certain loss
to the estate and for which he was accordingly held responsible. For the reason that the alleged
disbursements made for transportation expenses cannot be said to be economical, the lower Court held that
the administrator should be held liable to the oppositors for 1/4 thereof or the sum of P1,292.50, though We
think that this sum should still be reduced to P500.

8. Other expenses: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

The administrator also ordered 40 booklets of printed contracts of lease in the name of the Hacienda Jalajala
which cost P150. As the said hacienda was divided into 3 parts, one belonging to this Intestate and the other
two parts to Francisco de Borja and Bernardo de Borja, ordinarily the Intestate should only shoulder 1/3 of
the said expense, but as the tenants who testified during the hearing of the matter testified that those
printed forms were not being used, the Court adjudged the administrator personally responsible for this
amount. The records reveal, however, that this printed form was not utilized because the tenants refused to
sign any, and We can presume that when the administrator ordered for the printing of the same, he did not
foresee this situation. As there is no showing that said printed contracts were used by another and that they
are still in the possession of the administrator which could be utilized anytime, this disbursement may be
allowed.

The report also contains a receipt of payment made to Mr. Severo Abellera in the sum of P375 for his
transportation expenses as one of the two commissioners who prepared the Project of Partition. The
oppositors were able to prove that on May 24, 1941, the Court authorized the administrator to withdraw
from the funds of the Intestate the sum of P300 to defray the transportation expenses of the
commissioners. The administrator, however, alleged that he used this amount for the payment of certain
fees necessary in connection with the approval of the proposed plan of the Azcarraga property which was
then being processed in the City Engineer’s Office. From that testimony, it would seem that appellant could
even go to the extent of disobeying the order of the Court specifying for what purpose that amount should
be appropriated and took upon himself the task of judging for what it will serve best. Since he was not able
to show or prove that the money intended and ordered by the Court to be paid for the transportation
expenses of the commissioners was spent for the benefit of the estate as claimed, the administrator should
be held responsible therefor and pay to the oppositors 1/4 of P375 or the sum of P93.75.

The records reveal that for the service of summons to the defendants in Civil Case No. 84 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, P104 was paid to the Provincial Sheriff of the same province (Exhibit H-7). However,
an item for P40 appeared to have been paid to the Chief of Police of Jalajala allegedly for the service of the
same summons. Appellant claimed that as the defendants in said case lived in remote barrios, the services
of the Chief of Police as delegate or agent of the Provincial Sheriff were necessary. He forgot probably the
fact that local chiefs of police are deputy sheriffs ex-officio. The administrator was therefore ordered by the
lower Court to pay 1/4 of said amount or P10 to the oppositors.

The administrator included in his Report the sum of P550 paid to Atty. Filamor for his professional services
rendered for the defense of the administrator in G. R. No. L-4179, which was decided against him, with
costs. The lower Court disallowed this disbursement on the ground that this Court provided that the costs of
that litigation should not be borne by the estate but by the administrator himself, personally.
Costs of a litigation in the Supreme Court taxed by the Clerk of Court, after a verified petition has been filed
by the prevailing party, shall be awarded to said party and will only include his fee and that of his attorney
for their appearance which shall not be more than P40; expenses for the printing and the copies of the
record on appeal; all lawful charges imposed by the Clerk of Court; fees for the taking of depositions and
other expenses connected with the appearance of witnesses or for lawful fees of a commissioner (De la
Cruz, Philippine Supreme Court Practice, p. 70-71). If the costs provided for in that case, which this Court
ordered to be chargeable personally against the administrator are not recoverable by the latter, with more
reason this item could not be charged against the Intestate. Consequently, the administrator should pay the
oppositors 1/4 of the sum of P550 or P137.50.

(e) The lower Court in its decision required appellant to pay the oppositors the sum of P1,395 out of the
funds still in the possession of the administrator.

In the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, there appeared a cash balance of P5,851.17 as
of August 31, 1951. From this amount, the sum of P1,002.96 representing the Certificate of Deposit No.
21619 and Check No. 57338, both of the Philippine National Bank and in the name of Quintin de Borja, was
deducted leaving a balance of P4,848. As Judge Zulueta ordered the delivery to the oppositors of the
amount of P1,890 in his order of October 8, 1951; the delivery of the amount of P810 to the estate of
Juliana de Borja in his order of October 23, 1951, and the sum of P932.32 to the same estate of Juliana de
Borja by order of the Court of February 29, 1952, or a total of P3,632.32 after deducting the same from the
cash in the possession of the administrator, there will only be a remainder of P134.98.

The Intestate is also the creditor of Miguel B. Dayco, heir and administrator of the estate of Crisanta de
Borja, in the sum of P900 (Exhibits S and S-1). Adding this credit to the actual cash on hand, there will be a
total of P1,034.98, 1/4 of which or P258.74 properly belongs to the oppositors. However, as there is only a
residue of P134.98 in the hands of the administrator and dividing it among the 3 groups of heirs who are not
indebted to the Intestate, each group will receive P44.99, and Miguel B. Dayco is under obligation to
reimburse P213.76 to each of them.

The lower Court ordered the administrator to deliver to the oppositors the amount of P1,395.90 and P314.99
each to Francisco de Borja and the estate of Juliana de Borja, but as We have arrived at the computation
that the three heirs not indebted to the Intestate ought to receive P44.99 each out of the amount of
P134.98, the oppositors are entitled to the sum of P1,080.91 — the amount deducted from them as taxes
but which the Court ordered to be returned to them — plus P44.99 or a total of P1,125.90. It appearing,
however, that in a Joint Motion dated November 27, 1952, duly approved by the Court, the parties agreed to
fix the amount at P1,125.58, as the amount due and said heirs have already received this amount in
satisfaction of this item, no other sum can be chargeable against the administrator.

(f) The probate Court also ordered the administrator to render an accounting of his administration during the
Japanese occupation on the ground that although appellant maintained that whatever money he received
during that period is worthless, same having been declared without any value, yet during the early years of
the war, or during 1942-43, the Philippine peso was still in circulation, and articles of prime necessity as rice
and firewood commanded high prices and were paid with jewels or other valuables.

But We must not forget that in his order of December 11, 1945, Judge Peña required the administrator to
render an accounting of his administration only from March 1, 1945, to December of the same year without
ordering said administrator to include therein the occupation period. Although the Court below mentioned
the condition then prevailing during the war-years, We cannot simply presume, in the absence of proof to
that effect, that the administrator received such valuables or properties for the use or in exchange of any
asset or produce of the Intestate, and in view of the aforementioned order of Judge Peña, which We find no
reason to disturb, We see no practical reason for requiring appellant to account for those occupation years
when everything was affected by the abnormal conditions created by the war. The records of the Philippine
National Bank show that there was a current account jointly in the names of Crisanto de Borja and Juanita
V. Jarencio, his wife, with a balance of P36,750.35 in Japanese military notes and admittedly belonging to
the Intestate and We do not believe that the oppositors or any of the heirs would be interested in an
accounting for the purpose of dividing or distributing this deposit.

(g) On the sum of P13,294 for administrator’s fees: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ib rary

It is not disputed that the administrator set aside for himself and collected from the estate the sum of
P13,294 as his fees from 1945 to 1951 at the rate of P2,400 a year. There is also no controversy as to the
fact that this appropriated amount was taken without the order or previous approval by the probate Court.
Neither is there any doubt that the administration of the Intestate estate by Crisanto de Borja is far from
satisfactory.

Yet it is a fact that Crisanto de Borja exercised the functions of an administrator and is entitled also to a
certain amount as compensation for the work and services he has rendered as such. Now, considering the
extent and size of the estate, the amount involved and the nature of the properties under administration,
the amount collected by the administrator for his compensation at P200 a month is not unreasonable and
should therefore be allowed.

It might be argued against this disbursement that the records are replete with instances of highly irregular
practices of the administrator, such as the pretended ignorance of the necessity of a book or ledger or at
least a list of chronological and dated entries of money or produce the Intestate acquired and the amount of
disbursements made for the same properties; that admittedly he did not have even a list of the names of
the lessees to the properties under his administration, nor even a list of those who owed back rentals, and
although We certainly agree with the probate Court in finding appellant guilty of acts of maladministration,
specifically in mixing the funds of the estate under his administration with his personal funds instead of
keeping a current account for the Intestate in his capacity as administrator, We are of the opinion that
despite these irregular practices for which he was held already liable and made in some instances to
reimburse the Intestate for amounts that were not properly accounted for, his claim for compensation as
administrator’s fees shall be as they are hereby allowed.

Recapitulation. — Taking all the matters threshed herein together, the administrator is held liable to pay to
the heirs of Quintin de Borja the following: c han rob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

Under Paragraphs III and IV: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

(a) P7,084.27

(b) 12,175.00

(c) 16,113.95

(d) 3,352.75

(e) 341.74

(f) 3,750.00

(g) 1. 532.50

2. 377.25

4. 366.28

5. 869.92

6. 505.87

7. 500.00

8-a.

b. 93.75

c. 10.00

d. 137.50

P46,210.78

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified by reducing the amount that the
administrator was sentenced to pay the oppositors to the sum of P46,210.78 (instead of P83,337.31), plus
legal interests on this amount from the date of the decision appealed from, which is hereby affirmed in all
other respects. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

SECOND DIVISION

LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID G.R. No. 188921

AMANDO C. ROMERO,
Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
AURORA C. ROMERO and Promulgated:
VITTORIO C. ROMERO,
Respondents. April 18, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
praying for the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated 14 April
2009 and the subsequent Resolution [2] dated 21 July 2009.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioners which alleged grave abuse of discretion in the Resolutions dated 14
December 2007 and 29 January 2008 issued by Judge Maria Susana T. Baua in
her capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. The said
Resolutions dismissed petitioners complaint against private respondents Aurora
C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.

Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death on 18 October 1974, their mother,
respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real
and personal properties in trust for her children.[3] Since that year until the present,
she continues to be the administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments
comprising the estate of her late husband.

Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of
Sale were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal properties
of their parents. These included the following real and personal properties:

1. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-G of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No.
16142 and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 290013 in the name of
Vittorio C. Romero. A warehouse stands on the lot, covered by Declaration
of Real Property No. 16142.

2. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-D of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No.
405, and TCT No. 77223 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and
Aurora Cruz-Romero.

3. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-E of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of
 Real Property No. 407 and TCT No. 77224 in the names of Spouses Dante
Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.

4. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-H of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No.
406, and TCT No. 77225 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and
Aurora Cruz-Romero.

5. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3815-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-227224

situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of four hundred ninety-four square meters under TCT No. 113514 in the
name of Aurora Cruz vda. de Romero.

6. A parcel of land located in Barangay Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

containing an area of more or less three hundred seventy-nine square meters
under Declaration of Real Property No. 16136. It is not yet registered under
Act 496 or the Old Spanish Mortgage Law, but registrable under Act 3344
as amended. The improvement thereon, a building classified as a warehouse,
is covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16136 A.

7. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

containing an area of more or less two hundred four square meters under
Declaration of Real Property No. 16139. It is not yet registered under Act
496 or Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon is covered by
Declaration of Real Property No. 16140.

8. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

containing an area of more or less eleven thousand six hundred forty-six
 square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 724 and TCT No.
284241 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.

9. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

containing an area of more or less one thousand two hundred fifty-six square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 725 and TCT No. 284242 in
the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.[4]

Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio

through fraud, misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering the above-
mentioned properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their
mother, Aurora.[5] Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon her, and even
administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the
Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.

On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,

Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended)[6] against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero. Respondents filed their
Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after the death
of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered
conjugal. They allege that the lots covered by TCT Nos. 290010, 290011, 113514,
and Tax Declaration Nos. 16136 and 11639 were paraphernal properties of Aurora
which she had mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly had to shell out substantial amounts
in order to redeem them. The lots covered by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225
were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-fact of her children on 23 November
2006, since her authority to do so had never been revoked or modified.
 On 14 December 2007, the RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing
petitioners complaint, stating thus:

xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains

pending in that no distribution of the assets of the estate of the late Dante
Y. Romero, nor a partition, has been effected among his compulsory
heirs. Thus, the contending claims of plaintiffs and defendants in this
case could not be adjudicated nor passed upon by this Court without
first getting a definitive pronouncement from the intestate court as
to the share of each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his
estate.

Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the

properties being claimed by plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same
being paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up and established in
the intestate proceedings.[7] (Emphasis supplied.)

The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, citing Section 3, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court which bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an action to
recover the title or possession of lands until such lands have actually been
assigned. The court ruled that plaintiffs must first cause the termination of Special
Proceedings No. 5185 to its logical conclusion before this case could be
entertained by the Court.[8]

Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering
the said Resolutions, petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On
14 April 2009, the CA rendered the assailed judgment dismissing the Petition,
ruling that the properties involved in this case are part of the estate left to the heirs
of Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of an intestate
proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI). [9] The
CA based its judgment on the findings of the RTC that the inventory of the estate
of Judge Romero submitted to the CFI included the same parties, properties, rights
and interests as in the case before it.
 Petitioners now come to us on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the probate
court may rule on issues pertaining to title over property only in a provisional
capacity. They assert that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal, just because the
intestate proceeding has not yet terminated. Petitioners, as heirs, are purportedly
allowed to exercise their option of filing a separate civil action in order to protect
their interests.

Thus, the singular issue in the case at bar is whether or not petitioners in this
case may file a separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of
title, despite the pendency of the settlement proceedings for the estate of the late
Judge Dante Y. Romero.

Ruling of the Court

The probate court has jurisdiction to

determine the issues in the present case

Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons or the appointment of executors, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. [10] They
cite Ongsingco v. Tan,[11] Baybayan v. Aquino[12] and several cases which state that
when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of
a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, the intestate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
these questions. Petitioners conclude that the issue of ownership of the properties
enumerated in their Petition and included in the inventory submitted by respondent
Aurora Romero to the intestate court, must be determined in a separate civil action
to resolve title.[13]

The rulings in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly inapplicable, as they both
arose out of facts different from those in the case at bar. Baybayan involved a
summary settlement for the estate of the decedent, in which a parcel of land
representing the share of decedents nephews and nieces was already covered by a
TCT under the name of a third party. To defeat the writ of partition issued by the
probate court, the third party, petitioners Baybayan et al., had to file a separate
civil action for quieting of their title and for damages. The issue before the Court
then devolved upon the propriety of the probate courts order to amend the
Complaint for quieting of title before the regular court. More
importantly,Baybayan pertained to a civil action involving third parties who were
not heirs, and not privy to the intestate proceedings in the probate court. The
present action was instituted precisely by heirs of Judge Romero, against their
brother, who is also an heir, and their mother, who is the administrator of the
estate.

In Coca v. Borromeo,[14] this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass
upon the issue of title, precisely because the only interested parties are all heirs to
the estate, subject of the proceeding, viz:

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be

resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a
mode of practice "which may be waived."

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be

passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should
be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or
exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
 Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of

title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide
the question of ownership.

We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the

general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate
action.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the

ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion
for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested parties are the
heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.[15] (Citations
omitted.)

While it is true that a probate courts determination of ownership over properties

which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is
applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and strangers thereto.
Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan,[16] the court stated thus:

xxx The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in
the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are
allowed to do so protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.
In the case of In re Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de
Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et al., 67 Phil., 353, this court
held:

A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate

proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine
 whether or not the properties included therein or excluded
therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although
such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and
without prejudice to the right of interested parties, in a
proper action, to raise the question on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.

To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United

States.

* * * That the probate court is without jurisdiction to

try the title to property as between the representatives of
an estate and strangers thereto is too well established by
the authorities to require argument.

There is also authority abroad that where the court is without

jurisdiction to determine questions of title, as for example, as between
the estate and persons claiming adversely, its orders and judgments
relating to the sale do not render the issue of title res
judicata.[17] (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)

In any case, there is no merit to petitioners claim that the issues raised in the case
at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a
separate civil action. The issue before the court is not really one of title or
ownership, but the determination of which particular properties should be included
in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the
properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of their parents
and, therefore, part of the estate that was illegally sold to the respondent. Some of
these real properties identified seem to be the same real properties that form part of
the inventory of the estate in the intestate proceedings.[18]

Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they also
seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor their claim,
they argue that the properties are conjugal in nature and hence form part of their
inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends that the lots are the paraphernal
properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio subsequently
redeemed.

In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Supreme Court declared that the

determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of
inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court:

xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a

deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong
to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is
so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation
of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses. Thereafter, distribution is made of
the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed
him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which
each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community
property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary
corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the
ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the
distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the
complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties
are affected.

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the

question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether
they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is
to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings.[20] xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the
allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate.
To date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order adjudicating
the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can competently rule on
whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the
probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to
the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been paid.

Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from

filing the present action

Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has the power to rule
on their Complaint, the submission of the issues in this case to the probate court is
merely optional, and not mandatory upon them. Hence, they argue, they still have
the right to bring these issues in a separate civil action, if they so choose. They
argue further that Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court is not
applicable to the present case.

The said provision states that:

Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an executor
or administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover
the title or possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be
maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the
court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time
allowed for paying debts has expired.

Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain exceptions. They
invoke the doctrine that while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the
recovery of property of the estate represented by an administrator, these heirs may
maintain such action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the suit, or has
allegedly participated in the act complained of.
 On this contention, petitioners theory must again fail. There is nothing on
the record that would prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or
entered into sale agreements in violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really
accusing a co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain properties
which they allege to be properties of their parents.

Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate,
Aurora Romeros acts as the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole
jurisdiction of the probate court. In Acebedo v. Abesamis,[21] the Court stated:

In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a

pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective
heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter
should be threshed out in a separate action.

The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do

not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to
an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the
approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity
as a probate court.[22]

Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or ownership. They

are, in effect, questioning the validity of the sales made by the administrator, an
issue that can only be properly threshed out by the probate court. Paragraph 13 of
petitioners Complaint alleges as follows:

13. The purported transfers and sales executed by Defendant

Aurora C. Romero to and in favor of Defendant Vittorio C. Romero are
nullities since all were simulated, entered into without the intent and
volition of Defendant Aurora C. Romero, attended by force,
intimidation, duress and fraud and not supported with any valid or
sufficient consideration and with the sole depraved intentions of
depriving the other
 compulsory heirs of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero of their rightful
share in the estate.[23] (Emphasis omitted.)

Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of property

under administration is the recognition that the probate court has the power to
rescind or nullify the disposition of a property under administration that was
effected without its authority.[24] That petitioners have the prerogative of choosing
where to file their action for nullification whether with the probate court or the
regular court is erroneous. As held in Marcos, II v. Court of Appeals:

xxx (T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit

with limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over the estate of deceased
individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked,
and made effective, cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be
ignored with impunity by the very parties invoking its authority.

In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the

jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; to
determine who are the heirs of the decedent; the recognition of a natural
child; the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the
decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and to
pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights. [25] (Citations
omitted.)

Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by

petitioners co-heir, Vittorio, can only be determined by the probate court, because it
is the probate court which is empowered to identify the nature of the property, and
that has jurisdiction over Auroras actions and dispositions as administrator.
In Peaverde v. Peaverde,[26] the Court even adjudged the petitioners guilty of forum-
shopping for filing a separate civil action despite the pendency of the said petitioners
own case seeking that letters of administration be granted to them. Similar to the
case at bar, the petitioners in Peaverde also sought the annulment of titles in the
name of their co-heir:

The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-
19471, which seeks letters of administration for the estate of Mariano
Peaverde; and (2) Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks the annulment
of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Peaverde and
the annulment of titles in his name as well as the reopening of the
distribution of his estate.
Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to
share in the estate of Mariano, specifically the subject land previously
owned in common by Mariano and his wife, Victorina.This is also what
they hoped to obtain in filing Civil Case No. Q-95-24711.

Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the
ultimate distribution and partition of a decedent's estate. This is also
manifestly sought in Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely calls for
the "Reopening of Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peaverde. In both
cases, petitioners would have to prove their right to inherit from the estate
of Mariano Peaverde, albeit indirectly, as heirs of Mariano's wife,
Victorina.

Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-

shopping.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc.
No. Q-94-19471 and Civil Case No. Q-95-24711 are identical. There is
also no question that the rights asserted by petitioners in both cases are
identical, i.e., the right of succession to the estate of their aunt, Victorina,
wife of Mariano. Likewise, the reliefs prayed for --- to obtain their share
in the estate of Mariano --- are the same, such relief being founded on the
same facts ---their relationship to Mariano's deceased wife, Victorina.[27]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are

already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976, the 14 April 2009
judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104025 finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.

Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.

HILADO, J.:

Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy
Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O.
Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain
and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that
the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be
promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and
maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the
municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a
Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore,
overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions
of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public
convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante,
authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator,
appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate
an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in
the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the
said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and
in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's
brief, pp. 33-34).

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

 1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with
law.

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably

supported by evidence.

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice
and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators,
a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased demand.

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted

departure from its announced policy with respect to the establishment and
operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the
commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of
Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending
before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate
applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have
had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final
conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the
commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000,
and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business,
he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant
had he not died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440
a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The
commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his
estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid
right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one
which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of
the assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility that
in the end the commission might have denied application, although under the
facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial
ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his
memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public
convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset".
Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a
certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent
in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land
and during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the
ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person,
there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have
survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also
be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal
representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar
Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired
certificate of public convenience — the evidence established that the public
needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite
citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course,
such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject
to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but
the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option
in the illustration just given.

Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or
defend actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of
the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or
defended "in the right of the deceased".

Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or
administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits,
and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or
to the possession of any other person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367)
the present chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the
decisions cited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action

affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person
which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be
instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action
is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very
nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public

convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the
foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by
their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the
assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of
the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation
of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the
heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the
prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of
public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is
but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of
the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.

Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of
the Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable and movable
things rights which are not material. The same eminent commentator says in the
cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted
in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
also property for juridical purposes.

Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property
includes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad
commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same
volume we read:

However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been
declared to include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and
embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or executed.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O.

Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.

Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine
in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery

committed after the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to
the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate.
Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep.
77.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of
forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding
his estate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the
forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per
Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
 . . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does
not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention)
cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal
contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal
signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural
persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304;
Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work
that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a
human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of
natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which
the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class
of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law.
"Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje &
L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of
the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they
declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate,
to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming
him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as
correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the
forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged;
and this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle.
We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it
seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an
artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a
disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural
persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the
artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural
persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due
administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an
instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having
intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons
having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known
who those persons were, or what was the nature of their respective
interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate
— and not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it.
(107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of
Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for
no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment
amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the
expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have
occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate
thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate
of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent
of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of
Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the
estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of
said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that

defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the
amount of P245,804.69 . . . .

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of
law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661
of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the
decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs.
Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co.
vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided
by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in
the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that
it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent,
instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise.

The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's

personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood
— the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle
that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the
present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to
be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same
legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate,
represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill
those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the
fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L.
Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a
collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and
duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.

Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of
section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof
expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue
certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and
necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to
corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted
and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that
sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong
entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the
legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is
considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the
impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of
the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the
jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra,
when the Supreme Court of said State said:

. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded

as an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a
disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one
example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights
guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term
"person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional
guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the
intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural,
persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among
these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we
hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of
the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise
during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of
those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was
the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission
in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final
conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered
extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid,
and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and
heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the
application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as
likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before
the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful,
would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in
that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more
than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired
certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the
same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension
of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting
his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the
investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant,
not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the
Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the
constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal
principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law
indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of
Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein,
we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension
of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of
the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the
certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change,
and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic
ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice
plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of
a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be
also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking
the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of
said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both
the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended,
within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony
with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR,

Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA,
respondents.

Francisco Carreon for petitioners.

Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to
the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is
sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition
for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter
alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate
and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On
even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8,

1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the
proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of
a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of
Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule,
and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court,
Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground
raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her
appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or
incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest
against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
administratrix and as officer of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of

administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for

the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This
supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the
allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was
elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his
last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the
names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado
G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as
heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and
that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia
G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this
supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason,
among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning
because the original petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and
supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of
jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of
Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special
administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973,

praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances
from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation
made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to
making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the
state of the deceased."

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,

received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of
Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,

because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has
not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3)
Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit
from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to

substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said
Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded
sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom
the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one,
to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in
the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging
to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for
acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still
another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the
petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus

motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1subject only to the previous qualification
made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the
marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the special
administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August
20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of
title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was
ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name
without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not
appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue
of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973,
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of
Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration
in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured.
Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying
to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973

to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of
previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to
the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the
resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action,
and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her
motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise
prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first,
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special
administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the
assets of the estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the

foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as
they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal
standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d)
appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e)
delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in
the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July
19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one,
directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special
administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of
sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the
estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule
two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another,
directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the
word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C)
before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of
Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was
Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence
certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his
death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death,
and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the
first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a

special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily
to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the
questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974,
denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion
to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among
others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974,
directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix,
Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the
proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G.
Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975
a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the
same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa
B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of
the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00.
Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge
Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings
therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested,
however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the
decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the
Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet
become final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the

proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of
the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to

Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had
already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before
the Court.

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge
Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the
benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of
the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January
12,1976.

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a

petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on
February 9, 1976.

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari
in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the

decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province
in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule
79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name
and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of
assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who
seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed.
The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country
are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an
inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the
state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the
clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It
could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter
"existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There
are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses
the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby
lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this
provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has
nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the
country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the
Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean?
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his
death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi
termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. 9Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on

the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her
original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973,
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna,
and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B.
Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and
improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of
Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non
sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his
death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court
and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended
petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place
of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by
Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's
residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning
over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated
January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels
of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last
place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes
imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is
subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When
improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In
the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not
necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last
residence of the decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special

administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference
to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that
"(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court
may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate
of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors
or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special
administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is
under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment
and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or
not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator
should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special
administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference
in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special
administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect
is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under
the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or
bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
ownership of a property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow
of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that
Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is
a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On
this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the
issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who
are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the
administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21The preference of Preciosa B.
Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the
deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia,
he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First
District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of
Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment
of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and
the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the
case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-
42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special
administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations
is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in

G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966

ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.

Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners.

Torres and Torres for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition

this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No.
1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without
jurisdiction.

The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court,
dated June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:

It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and

Antonio Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to
try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907
entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr.
Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case".

The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963
in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported
last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria
Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave
of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963
before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on
March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr.
Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident
of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria
 Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on
March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition
in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4,
1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in
Parañaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963;
that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal,
Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the
petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at
11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the
case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792,
July 27, 1955.

The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand
that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the
case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4,
1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the
case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on
the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to
preference over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the
existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of
Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants
clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to
prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now petitioners,
came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court,
and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27,
1955.

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent

is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
 jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First

Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the
late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was
filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu
proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued
the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):

SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be

published. — When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of
a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time
and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest
the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be
published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate
has been filed by the testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition
for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon
the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit
of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to
the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the
precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable. 1äwphï1.ñët

But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will
being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the
Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal
province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish
priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that
he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in
Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked
jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates
is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the
testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw
Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil.
676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left
personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June
11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before
us.

In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:

"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the

jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that
the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents
which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will
have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in
another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt
administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf.
Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942).
Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last
resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the
probate court over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters,
and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney General vs. Manila
Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136,
Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over
all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased.1 Since, however, there are many Courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the
venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of
residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new
Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall
be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for
reconsideration is denied.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First
Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express
provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins
that:
 The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
(Sec. 1)

This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper
venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first
invoked, without taking venue into account.

There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One
is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the
delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently
done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the
Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not
designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between
applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.

The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only
subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:

ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;

(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place
only with respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed;

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not
happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or
repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of
accretion takes place;

(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases

provided in this Code.

Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final
decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be
instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy
proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will
of Father Rodriguez is pending.

We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the
settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate.
proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the
proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.

Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners
Rodriguez.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO

EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE
EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.

Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.

Filemon Cajator for appellants.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of
the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952,
residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953,
Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio,
objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the
deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and
praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had
been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled
this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal
taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and
brothers.

The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November
28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
 Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides
at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and
had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his
home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad
condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a
house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While
transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered
a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr.
Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was
brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November
26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common
law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died
therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease",
at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed
or even slept in said house at España Extention.

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent
was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years,
the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the
absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile
once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws,
p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson,
192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres
Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which
the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to
stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich,
Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of
the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent
was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City
several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he
intended to stay in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to
have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-
appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite the
allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein,
that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon
City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full
brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice,
presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A España Extention was purchased,
and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in
buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the
decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the
acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This
conclusion is untenable. law phil.net

The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had
been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It
is not improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice was given and
followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more
effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by
presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with
"knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return
home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also,
Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed.
129).

Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San
Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed
Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A España Extention,
Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month
before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his
residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the decedent
in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the
deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at
the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise,
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that
Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a
witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his
first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion and
would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false.
Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the
decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter,
shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly
strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga,
evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence
of record.

The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in
evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. The
reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said documents
during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:

Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the
records for whatever action oppositors may want to take later on because
until now the personality of the oppositors has not been established
whether or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court
cannot pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the
jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should
be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)

In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in
evidence before appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the
case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When appellants, however, sought,
during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged
illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection
thereto stating:

Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it
seems that you are now trying to prove the status of your client; you are
leading so that. The main point here is your contention that the deceased
was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to
cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I
will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are persons who should
inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)

Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of
the decedent, because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to
establish such "personality", they were barred from doing so on account of the
question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the
foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from the
circumstances surrounding the case.

To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While,
on the one hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce
evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of
court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-
examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the
authority of the court.

What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the
hearing, in the lower court, appellants' counsel announced that he would take
part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this
proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said
counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the appellants. As,
the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel:
"Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are
trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless
you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon,
appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then, too,
at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the
reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they
maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially
made of record that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that
appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.

At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only
their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid
improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3
which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the Philippines;
and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court
should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper
effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper
venue?" In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein,
dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late
Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing
thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The
latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which was
received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953,
Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the
decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal
of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in
an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of
the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts."

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar.
Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the
decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case
exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court
evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts
with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a
competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar
case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by
law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More
specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have
properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their
respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one
of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction
— and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other
courts — but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule
75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next
preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may
settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.law phil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place

of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are

instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the
same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De
Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings
before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending
therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter,
be initiated in the proper court.

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled
in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no
authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have
sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is
dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and
set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its
May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December
14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets

and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his
death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of

Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial
court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5,

1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing
that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree
of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii
to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage,
filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from
hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed
the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile,
the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then
Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan
pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the
Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the
facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion
for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to
file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as
his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled
that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab
initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage
to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was
a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge

Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October
24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation,
or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions
as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that
the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of
the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason
and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable
reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot
deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect
to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by
the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have
capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34

which
were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review
on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of
the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They
claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving
wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of
Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining
the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished

from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that
is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
"domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes
of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese
General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address
of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to
1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is
in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,

Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in
the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who
is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential
basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner
and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a
divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties
from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or
a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should
no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner

has to be considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to
a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held
that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his
Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations
of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition
of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of
upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of
the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended,
it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case

of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent. 1aw phi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance

intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce
is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light
of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to
its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as
well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In
Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration

may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2,
Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of

administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as
known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning.
It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless
the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties

who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only
be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code
or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.