M.
Rafique
Afzal.
A
History
of
the
All­India
Muslim
League,
1906­1947.


Karachi:

Oxford
University
Press,
2013.
Pages:
xxiii+781.
Price
(Hardcover):
Rs.
1595.
ISBN:

978­0­19­906735­0.



Review
by
Ilhan
Niaz• 

March
22,
2014



M.
 Rafique
 Afzal’s
A
 History
 of
 the
 All­India
 Muslim
 League,
 1906­1947
is

predestined
to
become
the
standard
historical
account
of
the
League
because
of
its

attention
to
detail,
comprehensiveness,
clear
prose,
and
rigorous
research.
At
nearly

800
 pages,
 the
 account
 is
 also
 exhaustive
 and
 provides
 a
 tremendous
 amount
 of

information
 about
 the
 League,
 its
 inner
 workings,
 and
Jinnah’s
 leadership.
 There

are
 three
 lessons
 in
 particular
 that
 emerge
 from
 the
 narrative,
 none
 of
 which
 are

particularly
flattering
to
the
League.
First,
the
League
was,
in
organizational
terms,

an
 inconsequential
 entity
 until
 the
 1940s.
 Second,
 during
 its
 heady
 ascent
 in
 the

1940s
as
the
crisis
of
British
imperial
succession
deepened,
the
League
was
plagued

by
 factionalism
 and
 infighting.
 Third,
 barely
 keeping
 the
 League
 in
 balance

was
Jinnah
and
his
followers
at
the
central
level.

To
 begin
 with,
 with
 a
 Rs.
 500
 per
 month
 minimum
 income
 requirement
 for

membership
 during
 its
 early
 years,
 the
 League
 was
 an
 elitist
 party
 that,
 though
 it

claimed
 to
 act
 in
 the
 best
 interests
 of
 the
 Muslims
 of
 India,
 primarily
 represented

only
 the
 wealthiest
 segment
 of
 Indian
 Muslim
 society.
 Unlike
 the
Indian
 National

Congress
(INC),
which
underwent
a
transition
to
mass
politics
in
the
early
1920s,

the
League
sought
to
craft
a
national
profile
for
itself
without
following
a
Congress‐
like
strategy
of
reaching
out
to
the
people.
The
result,
as
Afzal
explains,
was
that
the

League
ended
up
“Fumbling
in
the
Dark”
in
the
1920s
and
1930s.
Thus,
the
total

membership
of
the
All‐India
Muslim
League
ranged
from
about
600
in
1917
to
about

1300
in
1927.
In
1922,
out
of
a
total
of
1093
members,
a
mere
23
had
actually
paid

their
 party
 membership
 dues.
 To
 call
 the
Muslim
 League
a
 political
 party
 at
 this

stage
 would
 perhaps
 stretch
 the
 definition
 of
 this
 term
 to
 the
 point
 of

meaninglessness.

In
spite
of
its
organizational
weakness
and
lack
of
popular
support,
the
League
was

able
to
stage
a
comeback
from
the
mid‐1930s
onwards
and
it
managed
to
transform

itself
 into
 a
 national
 movement
 by
 1946.
 This
 turnaround
 was
 the
 product
 of
 a


























































•

Ilhan
Niaz
is
Assistant
Professor
of
History
at
the
Quaid­i­Azam
University,
Islamabad,
and
the

author
 of
 The
 Culture
 of
 Power
 and
 Governance
 of
 Pakistan,
 1947­2008
 (Karachi:
 Oxford

University
 Press,
 2010,
 2011,
 2012;
 2016
 ).
 His
 newest
 book,
 Old
 World
 Empires:
 Cultures
 of

Power
and
Governance
in
Eurasia
has
been
published
by
Routledge,
New
York
&
London
(2014).



number
of
factors
including
Jinnah’s
leadership,
the
behavior
of
Congress
ministries

in
 1937‐9,
 and
 the
 growing
 imminence
 of
 British
 departure
 from
 South
 Asia.
 The

latter
in
particular
meant
that
the
smug
parochialism
of
the
Unionists
of
the
Punjab

or
Khudai
Khidmatgars
of
the
North‐West
Frontier
Province
was
increasingly
out
of

touch
 with
 the
 evolving
 historical
 and
 strategic
 realities
 of
 a
 nascent
 post‐colonial

world.

Where
 Afzal’s
 narrative
 provides
 great
 insight
 is
 in
 regard
 to
 the
 internecine

warfare
 that
 raged
 within
 the
 Muslim
 League
 throughout
 the
Pakistan
 Movement.

Byzantine
 complexity
 and
 relentless
 intriguing
 and
 leg
 pulling
 characterized
 the

provincial
Muslim
Leagues,
both
while
they
were
out
of
power
and
when
they
came

into
 it.
 The
 formation
 of
 the
 League
 ministry
 in
 NWFP
 in
 May
 1943
 under
 the

leadership
of
Aurungzeb,
is
a
case
in
point.
Aurangzeb
failed
to
conciliate
his
rivals

within
the
party
and
in
fact
“hardened
their
animosity
by
his
attitude”
and
“created

new
opponents”
(416).
The
lack
of
trust
within
the
provincial
League
was
so
great

that
 the
 enrolment
 campaign
 was
 entrusted
 to
 Qazi
 Isa,
 a
 member
 of
 the
 central

committee.
This
didn’t
work
as
planned
for
Qazi
Isa’s
“alleged
partiality,
arrogance,

and
 close
 association
 with
 Aurangzeb
 damaged
 the
 whole
 reorganization
 process,

which
 had
 not
 been
 completed
 even
 by
 April
 1945”
 (417).
 Afzal’s
 account
 of
 the

rivalries
and
intrigues
within
Sindh
is
such
that
one
might
well
be
reading
a
chapter

from
 medieval
 history.
 The
 story
 that
 comes
 across
 with
 astonishing
 and

embarrassing
 clarity
 is
 that
 the
 provincial
 Muslim
 League
 leaders
 were
 largely
 an

assortment
 of
 pompous
 low‐lives
 whose
 desire
 for
 self‐aggrandizement
 trumped

any
meaningful
role
for
enlightened
self‐interest,
let
alone
high
ideals
of
patriotism.

In
spite
of
the
terrible
drawbacks
it
suffered
from,
the
All‐India
Muslim
League
was

able
 to
 fulfill
 the
 claims
 of
 its
 propaganda
 machine
 that
 it
 was
 the
 sole

representative
 party
 of
 the
 Indian
 Muslims.
 It
 did
 so
 in
 dramatic
 fashion
 in
 the

1945‐6
elections
campaign
where
the
Muslim
League
secured
all
the
seats
reserved

for
 Muslims
 at
 the
 center
 and
 nearly
 all
 the
 seats
 in
 the
 provinces.

 Afzal’s

meticulously
 researched
 narrative
 furnishes
 a
 solid
 explanation
 for
 how
 this
 was

achieved
 in
 spite
 of
 the
 bickering
 and
 backstabbing
 at
 the
 provincial
 leadership

level.
 The
 first
 component
 was
 the
 steady
 growth
 of
 Muslim
 League
 offices
 and

chapters
 owing
 to
 effective
 financial
 management
 at
 the
 center
 and
 dedicated

workers
 in
 the
 field.
 The
 second
 was
 that
 the
 demand
 for
 a
 separate
 state
 for
 the

Muslims
 had
 genuine
 popular
 resonance
 and
 enabled
 the
 Muslim
 League
 to

(temporarily)
escape
the
limitations
of
politics‐as‐usual.
And
the
third
element
was

Jinnah’s
leadership
and
the
patience
with
which
he
managed
his
unruly
cohorts.

In
terms
of
readership,
the
book
under
review
is
addressed
primarily
to
researchers

and
those
with
an
above
average
interest
in
the
history
of
the
Pakistan
Movement

and
the
Muslim
League.
It
will
appeal
to
historians
as
well
as
political
scientists
and

provides
a
useful
starting
point
for
generating
research
questions
about
the
Muslim

League.
Non‐specialist
readers
will
likely
be
deterred
by
the
length
of
the
book
but,

given
 the
 jargon‐free
 prose,
 those
 patient
 enough
 will
 find
 reading
 Afzal’s
 latest

offering
richly
rewarding.

Afzal’s
A
 History
 of
 the
 All­India
 Muslim
 League
is
 now
 the
 gold
 standard
 narrative

account
on
the
subject.
It
is
superbly
researched,
copiously
referenced,
and
provides

a
 holistic
 account
 of
 the
 struggles
 of
 the
 Muslim
 League
 as
 an
 organization
 and
 a

national
 movement.
 In
 its
 pages,
 one
 finds
 revealed
 the
 elements
 that
 eventually

made
the
Muslim
League
a
force
to
be
reckoned
with,
for,
after
all,
it
succeeded
in
its

aim
of
creating
Pakistan.
At
the
same
time
the
inherent
weaknesses
of
the
League,

its
lack
of
a
second
tier
of
able
leaders
who
could
take
up
the
mantle
in
the
event
of

the
 central
 leadership
 being
 eliminated,
 and
 its
 reliance
 on
 Jinnah’s
 personal

authority
 to
 maintain
 coherence,
 as
 catalogued
 by
 Afzal,
 help
 answer
 important

questions
about
its
breakdown
after
independence.
On
balance
A
History
of
the
All­
India
Muslim
League
is
a
fine
effort
well
worth
reading
for
its
informative
richness.





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