Picart vs.

Smith| Street March 15, 1918 | 37 Phil 809 FACTS • Amando Picart seeks to recover
from the defendant Frank Smith the sum of Php 31,100 as damages alleged to have been
caused by an automobile driven by Smith. The incident happened on Dec 12, 1912, at the
Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La Union. • Picart was riding on his pony aver the said bridge.
Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction driving his
vehicle at 10 to 12 miles per hour. • Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that
the man was not observing rules of the road. Smith continued his course and made two more
blasts. • Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he pulled his pony to the
right side of the railing. • As the automobile approached, Smith guided the automobile to its
left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. • Smith noticed that the pony was
not frightened so he continued without diminution of speed. • When he learned that there was
no possibility for the pony to go on the other side, Smith drove his car to the right to avoid
hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a close proximity to the horse that it
became frightened and turned its belly across the bridge with its head towards the railing. •
The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was
broken. • The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. • It showed that the
free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing was probably less
than one half meters. • The horse died and Picart received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done to Picart and his pony.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart the
amount of P200. The sum is computed to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of
the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel. • In the nature of things,
this change in situation occurred while the automobile was still some distance away. From this
moment it was no longer possible for Picart to escape being run down by going to a place for
greater safety. • The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith, and it was his
duty to bring his car to an immediate stop or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the
other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid collision. There was an
appreciable risk that a horse not acquainted with vehicles would react that way. The Test to
Determine the Existence of Negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used the same situation? If not then he is guilty of
negligence. The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. A prudent man, placed in
the position of Smith in the Court’s opinion would have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and
the rider as a reasonable consequence of that course.

Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA| Makalintal G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 | 16 SCRA
448 FACTS • A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline
was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted The fire then spread to and burned
several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. • The
owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the station) and
Boquiren (agent in charge of operation). • Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to
prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect
to the supervision of their employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur on the grounds that “as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seems to be
nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, “in
the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.”

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur should apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR APPLIES. CALTEX LIABLE. •
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of
explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want of care. • The aforesaid
principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is applicable in this
case. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the
control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses.
The person who knew or could have known how the fire started were the appellees and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care. • The report by the police officer
regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was
transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out,
strengthen the presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and
pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn
for around 10 taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly
smoke cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the
concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 ½ meters high at most and cannot
prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire. Decision REVERSED. Caltex liable.

Delsan Transport Lines Inc. v C&A Construction | Ynares-Santiago. G.R. No. 156034, October 1,
2003 | FACTS • NHA contracted with C&A to build a deflector wall for Vitas Reclamation Area in
Vitas, Tondo. Project was finished in 1994. In October 20, 1994 12mn Captain Jusep of Delsan
lines owned ship M/V Delsan express received information that there was a typhoon coming in
from Japan. At 8.35AM M/V Delsan Express attempted to get into North Harbor but could not.
10.00AM M/V Delsan Express dropped anchor off of Vitas 4 miles away from Napocor barge.
M/V Delsan Express nearly collided with the Napocor barge but managed to avoid it and
instead hit the deflector wall causing almost 500,000 in damage. Petitioner refused to pay and
thus a civil case was filed against Delsan by C&A. TC Ruled emergency rule applied, CA found
captain negligent.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS • W/N Captain Jusep is negligent • W/N under Art. 2180 Delsan liable
for the quasi-delict

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Captain Jusep is negligent by waiting for 8.35AM before bringing
the ship to North Harbor Petitioners are vicariously liable under 2180 • Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code states that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Captain Jusep received the report 12MN and
waited for more than 8 hours to move the ship, he likewise ignored the weather report and in
all angles failed to take action to prevent the damage. • Under Art. 2180 whenever an
employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another there arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. • Petitioner failed to present evidence that showed
it formulated guidelines/rules for the proper performance of functions of employees and any
monitoring system. • Not necessary to state petitioner is negligent in selecting or supervising
employees as negligence is presumed by operation of law. Allegations of negligence of the
employee and existence of employer-employee relationship in complaint are enough to make
out a case of quasi-delict under 2180.
Perla Compania Inc v. Sps. Sarangaya | Corona, J. G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005| FACTS •
In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building known as “Super A Building” and was subdivided
into three doors, each of which was leased out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas
was behind the second and third doors of the building. • In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de
Seguros, Inc., through its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a
contract of lease of the first door of the “Super A Building,” abutting the office of Matsushita. •
Perla Compania renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The left side was converted
into an office while the right was used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford
Cortina, a company-provided vehicle he used in covering the different towns within his area of
supervision. • On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the
car with him. Three days later, he returned, and decided to “warm up” the car. When he pulled
up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an “odd” sound and did
not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the
accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual
sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted
from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its
rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered
burns on his face, legs and arms. • Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television
when they heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no time,
fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and appliances. • The
city fire marshall conducted an investigation and thereafter submitted a report to the provincial
fire marshall. He concluded that the fire was “accidental.” The report also disclosed that
petitioner-corporation had no fire permit as required by law. • Based on the same report, a
criminal complaint for “Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Damage in (sic) Property” was
filed against petitioner Pascual. On the other hand, Perla Compania was asked to pay the
amount of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the commercial building. At the prosecutor’s
office, petitioner Pascual moved for the withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted. •
Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed a civil complaint based on quasidelict against
petitioners for a “sum of money and damages,” alleging that Pascual acted with gross
negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of Pascual as its employee. • During the trial, respondents presented witnesses who
testified that a few days before the incident, Pascual was seen buying gasoline in a container
from a nearby gas station. He then placed the container in the rear compartment of the car. •
In his answer, Pascual insisted that the fire was purely an accident, a caso fortuito, hence, he
was not liable for damages. He also denied putting a container of gasoline in the car’s rear
compartment. For its part, Perla Compania refused liability for the accident on the ground that
it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pascual
as its branch manager.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS • W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine o <Pascual> It was
a fortuitous event • W/N Perla Compania liable under tort o <Perla Compania> We exercised
due diligence in selecting Pascual

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine • Res ipsa
loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It
relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts
of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial
evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. • The doctrine is based on the theory
that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence
in general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident
alone to establish negligence. • The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin
liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to
prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendant’s responsibility to show that there
was no negligence on his part. • To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: 1) the accident is of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the cause of the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person in charge and 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. • Under the first
requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence.
“Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is
switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a
car engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the
accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference
that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the
accident.

• The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation would have employed? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to
submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition required)
revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car, constantly
used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove
care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual
had been negligent in the upkeep of the car. The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may
be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was
independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the
caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be
such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person
tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that
aggravated the accident.[20] In fine, human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate
cause or contributory cause of the injury or loss. In a vehicular accident, for example, a
mechanical defect will not release the defendant from liability if it is shown that the accident
could have been prevented had he properly maintained and taken good care of the vehicle. The
circumstances on record do not support the defense of Pascual. Clearly, there was no caso
fortuito because of his want of care and prudence in maintaining the car. Under the second
requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls
under the exclusive control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire
originated was under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility
to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. No other person, not even the respondents,
was charged with that obligation except him. Where the circumstances which caused the
accident are shown to have been under the management or control of a certain person and, in
the normal course of events, the incident would not have happened had that person used
proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care. The burden of
evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish that he observed all that was necessary to
prevent the accident from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed. FRANK TAMARGO
Page 81 of 528 NOTE: Sensya na mahaba. Pero importante kasi yung mga requisites eh. • Under
the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the
incident. They had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance
even if it was parked in a building they owned.

YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT • In the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records.[25]
While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his
position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire. • In the
supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. o fend
off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence,
that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them. Here, petitioner-corporation’s
evidence hardly included any rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in
performing his functions. It also did not have any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of
company property like the vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require
periodic reports on or inventories of its properties either. Based on these circumstances,
petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascual’s
car or its serviceability.