UILS INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION’19 TEAM CODE – TC3

BEFORE
THE DISTRICT COURT OF JUDICATURE AT NARNIA

IN THE MATTER OF

SANGWAN SPORTS™............................................................PETITIONER

VERSUS
STATE OF NARNIA ...............................................................RESPONDENT

Most Respectfully Submitted before the Court of Civil Judge, Narnia District
Courts.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

S. PARTICULARS PAGE
NO. NO.

1. TABLE OF CASES 3

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 5

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 6

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 7-8

5. ISSUES RAISED 9

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 10

7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE I: WHETHER CRICKLORD ACADEMY IS LIABLE FOR 11-19
BREACH OF CONTRACT
ISSUE II: WHETHER SANGWAN SPORTS CAN BE MADE LIABLE
FOR DEFAMATION
ISSUE III: WHETHER SANGAN SPORTS IS ENTITLED TO THEIR
CLAIM UNDER CLAUSE (H) OF THE CONTRACT?

8. PRAYER 20

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TABLE OF CASES

S.N0. CASE CITATION

1. Parmitter v Coupland (1840) 6 M&W 105.
2. Sturt v. Blagg (1847) 10 QB 906.

3. Bromage v. Prosser, (1828) 4 B & C 247.

4. Miss Violet Wapshare v. Miss Maureen 1970 LW (Cr) 4.
Froud,
5. Sim v. Stretali 2 All ER 1237.
6. Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, p. 773. Bronu v. (1904) F 842
Ritchie

7. Dixon v. Holden, (1869) LR Eq 488.

8. Sim v. Stretch, (1936) 2 All ER 1233.

9. Silikin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers , (1958) 2 All ER 536: (1958) 1 WLR

743.

10. D.P. Choudhary v. Kumari Manjulata AIR 1997 RAJ 170

11. Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy AIR 2006 Delhi 300

12. Harsh Mendiratta v. Maharaj Singh 95 (2002) DLT 78

13. Newstead v., London Express Newspapers (1940)1 KB 377

Ltd
14. Mahender Ram v. Harnandan Prasad AIR 1958 Pat 445

15. Ganga Saran v. Ram Charan 1952 SCR 36

16. Satyabrata Ghose’s case, Inder 1954 SCR 310

Persad versus Campbell

17. P,D. Mehra & Sons v. Ram Chand Om Parkash AIR 1952 P H 34

18. Union of Indian v Domoni and Co AIR 1980 SC 1149

19. Gauri Shankar v H. P. Maitra AIR 1921 Cal 509

20. Smt. Sushila Devi v. Hari Singh AIR 1971 SC 1756.

21. Kailash Nath Associates's case {CIVIL APPEAL NO. 193 OF 2015

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[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.32039

OF 2012}
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

A. BOOKS & TREATISES

1. Prof. T. Bhattocharya, The Indian Penal Code, (4th edition), Central Law
Agency, (2004).
2. S.N. Mishra, The Code Of Criminal Procedure,(19th edition),Central Law
Publications,(2014).
3.

ABBREVIATIONS EXPANSION

& And
AIR All India Reporter
ALL Allahabad
Anr Another
Co Company
Ed Edition
Hon’ble Honorable
Ltd Limited
Ors Others
SC Supreme court
SCC Supreme Court cases
Versus
Vs
IPC Indian Penal Code
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure
No Number
Cri Criminal

K.D. Gaur, Textbook on Indian Penal Code, (5th edition), Universal Law Publishing,
(2016).

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4. R.K BANGIA, Textbook on Indian Contract Act,1872.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The plaintiff knocks the door of this hon’ble court and invokes its original civil jurisdiction
under the following sections of the CPC, 1908:
9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred – The Courts shall (subject to the provisions
herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which
their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
15. Court in which suits to be instituted – Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of
the lowest grade competent to try it.
20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises –
Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in Court within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction.
(a) The defendants or each of the defendants, at the time of the commencement of the suit
actually or voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided
that in such case either the leave of court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or
carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or
(b) Any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement
of the suit actually or voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain,
provided that in such case either the leave of court is given, or the defendants who do not
reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such
institution; or
(c) The cause of action wholly or partly arises.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

 Cricklord Academy trains cricket players, organizes matches and is a well-known

academy in northern region of Hogwarts. The academy has given excellent players
like Rohit Kohli, Sachin Gavaskar, Kapil D’Souza and Syed Khan to the nation and
organizes an annual national cricket tournament for U-21 and U-19 category where
teams from all over Hogwarts participate.
 This year the tournament was from 5th to 9th November, 2019 for which the academy
desired to place an order of cricket kits to Sangwan Sports™. The kits were to be
delivered to the participating teams by the Cricklord Academy a week prior to the
tournament as per the general established practice.
 On 20th September, 2019 Sangwan Sports™ entered into a contract with Cricklord
Academy for supplying 200 kits at the price of Rs. 6,00,000/- to the academy by 25th
October, 2019. Cricklord Academy paid an earnest amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- in
furtherance of the contract that was prepared by the representatives of both the parties
and duly signed by both the parties where Clause (g) of the contract mentioned that in
case of non-delivery of kits by the company, on the above mentioned date of the
contract, Cricklord Academy will be entitled to get double the earnest amount paid by
them. Clause (h) stated that if the academy did not pay the full sum on the delivery
date i.e. 25th October, 2019 then Sangwan Sports™ will be entitled to the double of
sum decided for the payment of 200 kits. Clause (i) mentioned that 1/4th of the kits
must be delivered within the initial 15 days of the contract wherein the quality of the
kits shall be checked & the remaining kits shall be delivered altogether on 25th
October, 2019.
 On the fateful day of 21st October, 2019 a fire broke out in the Head Office and
manufacturing unit of Sangwan Sports™ at around 7:00 pm, burning everything to
ashes. The fire also resulted in the death of 10 employees and 30 others were injured.
The matter became a national headline and was covered by all the leading newspapers
for the next 2-3 days.
 On 23rd October, 2019 Cricklord Academy got to know about the incident from
newspapers and with the matches scheduled in coming days, assumed that the
contract between them and Sangwan Sports™ had become impossible to perform on
the part of the company and thus gave the contract of the remaining kits to Ardhaan
Sports Goods Corporation.
 On 27th October 2019 a press conference was organized by the CEO & Board of
Directors of Sangwan Sports™ after they realized that the Academy had turned
hostile towards them. In the press conference which was attended by leading media
houses, wherein the CEO maintained that, “It is very saddening how some
associations instead of standing with us in our hard times betrayed us & backed out
from the very contract that bound us. We, from now onwards shall be more vigilant,
keeping in mind the associations, we shall never cater to in future, considering their
track record in failure to perform their contracts. It is notified upon our partners that
associations like these are based on tenets of betrayal and opportunism. We will be
filing a law suit against one of such associations very soon.”

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 The very next day Sangwan Sports™ filed a law suit against Cricklord academy for
breach of contract and The company sought payment of compensation as per clause
(h) of the contract.
 On 30th October, 2019 a cross suit for defamation against Sangwan Sports™ was
filed by the Academy contending that the statement given by the CEO in the press
conference damaged their reputation & due to the influence of their CEO’s market
presence, other production companies are hesitant to do business with them, further
affecting the tournament’s public image.

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ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE I:

WHETHER CRICKLORD ACADEMY IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT?

ISSUE II:

WHETHER SANGWAN SPORTS CAN BE MADE LIABLE FOR DEFAMATION?

ISSUE III:

WHETHER SANGAN SPORTS IS ENTITLED TO THEIR CLAIM UNDER CLAUSE

(H) OF THE CONTRACT?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I: WHETHER CRICKLORD ACADEMY IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF

CONTRACT?
It is humbly submitted that firstly,the defendants cannot be held liable for the breach of the
contract as the actions so taken by the defendants was in regard to the information so received
by them and they presumed that the contract between them and the plaintiffs has become
impossible to perform and the exception so ruled under section 56 of the Indian contract
act,1872 could be validated in such sense.
Secondly, the actions can be justified through the latin maxim “ les non cogit ad
impossibilia” which means that the law will not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly
perform. As there was no updated status of the order of remaining kits and no
communication or intimation was made by the plaintiff even on the due date of delivery of
goods it was effectively and fairly considered that the contract has been frustrated or made
impossible to perform.

ISSUE II: WHETHER SANGWAN SPORTS CAN BE MADE LIABLE FOR

DEFAMATION?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the plaintiff is liable for defamation
owing to a malicious propaganda as- The statement made was defamatory (A); the statement
referred to the defendant (B); the statement was published (C).

ISSUE III: WHETHER SANGAN SPORTS IS ENTITLED TO THEIR CLAIM

UNDER CLAUSE (H) OF THE CONTRACT?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any
compensation from the defendant as the promise as stated in the contract was not fulfilled by
the plaintiff.

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1. WHETHER THERE IS BREACH OF CONTRACT?

It is humbly submitted that firstly,the defendants cannot be held liable for the breach of the
contract as the actions so taken by the defendants was in regard to the information so received
by them and they presumed that the contract between them and the plaintiffs has become
impossible to perform and the exception so ruled under section 56 of the Indian contract
act,1872 could be validated in such sense.
Secondly, the actions can be justified through the latin maxim “ les non cogit ad
impossibilia” which means that the law will not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly
perform. As there was no updated status of the order of remaining kits and no
communication or intimation was made by the plaintiff even on the due date of delivery of
goods it was effectively and fairly considered that the contract has been frustrated or made
impossible to perform.
Frustration’ means that when the contract is rendered impossible of its performance by the
external causes which are beyond the contemplation of the parties concerned. In the instant
case, when the defendants got to know about the unfortunate incident which took place with
the plaintiff.
Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act (1872) Says that: “An agreement to do an act
impossible in itself void. A Contract to do act which, after the contract is made, becomes
impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful,
becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful where one person has promised
to do something which he knew, or with reasonable diligence might have known, and which
the promisor did not know, to be impossible or unlawful, such promisor must make
compensation to such promisor for any loss which such promise sustain through the
nonperformance of the promise. ”
On a plain reading of Section 56 of the Contract Act, it is evident that the section envisages
some impossibility or unlawfulness of the performance of the act which the parties had not
contemplated. In the case of Ganga Saran v. Ram Charan 1 Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India observed: “We hold therefore that the doctrine of frustration is really an aspect or part
of law of discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act
agreed to be done and hence comes within the purview ofsection-56 of the Indian Contract
Act”.
It leads to a pertinent question as to what is such impossible act that would lead to frustration
of contract. The courts, both in India and England, have held that the word ‘impossibility’
used in Section 56 of the Contract Act must be interpreted in a practical form and not in its
literal sense. Thus, a contract would come under the purview of Section 56 of the Contract
Act even if it is not an absolute impossibility, but the contract has fundamentally changed,
which the parties had not contemplated at the time of the agreement. This principal has been
upheld in Satyabrata Ghose’s case2, Inder Persad versus Campbell and other judgement
of English Courts.

1
1952 SCR 36
2
1954 SCR 310

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The doctrine of frustration is however applicable in two cases, firstly that If the object of the
contract has become impossible to perform or an event has occurred making the performance
of the contract to be impossible which should be beyond the Control of promisor.
The legal basis of the doctrine of frustration in India was further strengthened be in
Satyabrata Ghose v Mugneram Bangur3 in which apex court stated: “The essential idea
upon which the doctrine is based is that of impossibility of performance of the contract, in
fact Impossibility and Frustration are often used as inter-changeable expressions.
The changed circumstances make the performance of the contract impossible and the parties
are absolved from the further performance of it as they did not promise to perform an
impossibility the doctrine of frustration is really and aspect or part of the law of the discharge
of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done
and hence comes within the purview of section 56 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.
For bringing the contract into the exception of doctrine of frustration under section 56 of
Indian Contract Act,1872. The essentials to be taken into consideration are:

2.1 There must be a valid and subsisting contract between the parties;

2.2 There must be some part of the contract yet to be performed;

2.3 That part of the contract, which is yet to be performed, should become impossible or
unlawful; and

2.4 That the impossibility should be by reasons of some event which the promisor could
not prevent.
It includes both - (1) Impossibility of the performance of the contractual obligation and (2)
Impossibility of the fulfillment of the ulterior purpose for which the contract was entered
into.
In other words, ‘Frustration’ occurs, when the performance of a contract becomes Impossible
i.e. the purpose which the parties had in mind is frustrated. If the performance becomes
impossible because of a supervening or unexpected and unforeseen event, then the promisor
is excused from the performance.

2.1 THERE MUST BE A VALID AND SUBSISTING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE

PARTIES;

It is submitted that SECTION 10 OF THE ICA, 1872 states “All agreements are contracts if
they are made by the free consent of the parties competent to contract, for a lawful
consideration and with lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.”The
contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant stands valid as it meets all the essentials as
prescribed under the Act to form a contract.

2.2 THERE MUST BE SOME PART OF THE CONTRACT YET TO BE

PERFORMED;

3
supra

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In the instant case the plaintiff and defendant have already partly performed the contractual
obligation by delivering 50 kits and by paying a consideration of Rs. 100000 at an early stage
but some part of the contract is yet to be performed. In the case of the plaintiff the company is
yet to deliver the rest of the kits to the defendants and the payment for the same have to be
done by the defendants on due date of delivery. Thus a part of the performance is yet to be
performed.

2.3 THAT PART OF THE CONTRACT, WHICH IS YET TO BE PERFORMED,

SHOULD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE OR UNLAWFUL; AND

The doctrine of frustration is relevant when it is alleged that a change of circumstances

after the formation of the contract has rendered it physically or commercially
impossible to fulfill the contract or, has transformed the required performance into a radically
different obligation from that undertaken in the contract. According to Viscount Simon L. C’s
Opinion4 “Frustration is the occurrence of an intervening event or change of circumstances
so fundamental as to be regarded by the law both as striking at the root of the
agreement and as entirely beyond what contemplated by the parties when they entered
into the agreement.
As observed in the case of P,D. Mehra & Sons v. Ram Chand Om Parkash 5"It is clear
that if there is entirely unanticipated change of circumstances the question will have to be
considered whether this change of circumstances has affected the performance of the contract
to such an extent as to make it virtually impossible or even extremely difficult or hazardous.
If that be the case, the change of circumstances not having been brought about by the fault of
either party, the courts will not enforce the contract”
In words of Justice Krishna Iyer quoting Union of Indian v Domoni and Co6. held
that“Most legal system makes provision for the discharge of contract where subsequent its
formation, a change of circumstances senders the contract legally or physically impossible of
performance. And indeed it is a part of statutory law of India. ”
The doctrine that if a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated by unanticipated
change in circumstances, that party’s duties are discharged and the contract is considered
terminated".
Thus, the change of circumstances led to the impossibility of contract ie. Breaking of fire in
the manufacturing and main unit of the plaintiff’s company was apparent on the face that due
to the unfortunate incident the plaintiff’s won’t be able to complete the contract so formed
and so the defendants in order to provide adequate kits to the participants timely gave the
order to Ardhaan Sports Good Corporation.
2.4 THAT THE IMPOSSIBILITY SHOULD BE BY REASONS OF SOME EVENT
WHICH THE PROMISOR COULD NOT PREVENT.
In the instant case, breaking out of fire was not in the hands of the plaintiff and which led to
the impossibility. Paying reliance over the judgement of Calcutta high court in the case
of Gauri Shankar v H. P. Maitra7 the Court observed that according to the doctrine a

4
(1945) A.C. 221.
5
AIR 1952 P H 34
6
AIR 1980 SC 1149
7
AIR 1921 Cal 509

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subsequent event or contingency beyond the control of the parties at the time of transaction,
for the occurrence of which they have not provided may, sometimes operate to undermine
and avoid the contract between them.
Similarly the change of circumstances were beyond the control of the parties.
Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act (1872) embodies a positive rule of law relating to the
application of Doctrine of Frustration in India. In the case of Smt. Sushila Devi v. Hari
Singh8 it was observed that : “Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act Lays down a rule of
positive law and does not leave the matter to be determined accordingly to the intention of the
parties"
The SC in Satyabrata Ghose’s case (supra) has held that the “doctrine of frustration of
contract is really an aspect or part of the law of discharge of contract by reason of
supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done and hence comes within
the purview of Section 56 of the Indian Contract, Act”.
Thus as stated above, the defendants cannot be held liable for the breach of contract as the
contract was frustrated due to the impossibility of performance of contract. Moreover, there
was no intimation of the update or status of the order of the remaining kits to be provided by
the plaintiff being given to the defendants on the due date of delivery as predetermined by
both the parties while formation of the contract which fairly led to the assumption that the
contract was impossible to performed and has been frustrated due to the change in
circumstances due to which the defendants had to place order for the remaining kits to the
Ardhaan Sports Good Corporation so that the participants could be delivered the sport kits on
time and for the smooth functioning of the tournaments. Thus, there was no intention on the
part of the defendants to defeat the purpose of the contract and hence they cannot be held
liable for the same.

2.WHETHER SANGWAN SPORTS ™ CAN BE MADE LIABLE FOR

DEFAMATION?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the plaintiff is liable for defamation
owing to a malicious propaganda as- The statement made was defamatory (A); the statement
referred to the defendant (B); the statement was published (C).
(A) The statement made was defamatory
i. The statement made by plaintiff was “It is very saddening how some associations
instead of standing with us in our hard times betrayed us & backed out from the very
contract that bound us. We, from now onwards shall be more vigilant, keeping in
mind the associations, we shall never cater to in future, considering their track record
in failure to perform their contracts. It is notified upon our partners that associations

8
AIR 1971 SC 1756.

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like these are based on tenets of betrayal and opportunism. We will be filing a law suit
against one of such associations very soon.” The words are prima facie defamatory.

ii. A statement is defamatory when it has the tendency to injure a persons’ reputation.
The usual definition adopted in judgements is that a defamatory statement is one
which exposes a person to ‘contempt, hatred or ridicule, or tends to injure him in his
profession or trade, or causes him to be shunned or avoided by his neighbours’.9 The
usage of words such as betrayal and opportunism was an extremely harsh comment on
the moral character of the defendant which had made the defendant suffered a
tremendous loss of reputation.

iii. The plaintiff had a malicious propaganda, which is evident by the fact that they
organised a press conference for defaming the defendant which was attended by
leading media houses that have the capability of reaching to thousands of people
within a short span of time. Mode of the publication is an important test for
determining that the words are defamatory10. Malice is implied from publication of a
defamatory statement.11 The publication when made with the intention of defaming
someone constitutes defamation.12

iv. It has been held in Sim v. Stretali13 -“The test of a defamatory nature of a statement is
its tendency to excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinions or feeling of other
persons. The typical form of defamation is an attack upon the moral character of the
plaintiff attributing to him any form of disgraceful conduct.” The statements were
defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning as it excited adverse opinion or
feelings of other persons against the defendant which was evident by the fact that
media was involved by the plaintiff when it should have been dealt privately. The
defendant defamed the defendant with the help of media without even trying to
personally communicate with them once.

v. The right of a person during his lifetime to the unimpaired possession of his
reputation and good name is recognized by law14. Everyone has an inherent right to
have his reputation preserved inviolate. It is a jus in rem a right absolute and good
against all the world. A man’s reputation is his property and possibly more valuable
than any other form of property15. The right of the defendant is violated by the
plaintiff.
The plaintiff referred the defendant as opportunist and traitor, which degrades the
efficiency of the defendant. It implies the inability of the defendant in attaining good
standards which is certainly not the case.

9
Parmitter v Coupland (1840) 6 M&W 105.
10
Sturt v. Blagg (1847) 10 QB 906.
11
Bromage v. Prosser, (1828) 4 B & C 247.
12
Miss Violet Wapshare v. Miss Maureen Froud, 1970 LW (Cr) 4.
13
(1936) 2 All ER 1237.
14
Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, p. 773. Bronu v. Ritchie (1904) F 842.
15
Dixon v. Holden, (1869) LR Eq 488.

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vi. The plaintiff had published a statement which had brought the defendant into hatred,
contempt or ridicule and lowered the reputation in the eyes of right- thinking
members of society generally16.

In light of the statements made above, it is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court ,
that the defendant has suffered tremendously on account of having its image lowered in
the eyes of public because of the false and defamatory statements published by the
plaintiff via media by organising a press conference.

(B) The statement referred to the defendant

i. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the derogatory statements used
by the plaintiff clearly referred to the defendant which is evident by the fact that the
plaintiff gave a statement in their press conference that they are going to file a suit
against one of such opportunist company that betrayed them and then the next day,
they filed a suit against the Cricklord Cricket Academy which makes it obvious that
they were talking about them.

ii. Every man whether he is in public life or not, is entitled not to have lies told about
him and by that is meant that one is not entitled to make misstatement of facts about a
person which are untrue and which redoundto his discredit. That is to say it tends to
lower him in the estimation of right- thinking men.17 The plaintiff has lied about the
academy that they betrayed them. When the defendant heard about the news that a fire
broke out in the Head Office and manufacturing unit of Sangwan Sports so they
assumed that the plaintiff will not be able to complete the order ,thus they had no
other option left than giving the contract to some other company. The plaintiff instead
never tried to contact the defendant to clear the misunderstandings and defamed the
defendant in front of media.
(C) Sangwan sports to be held liable for defamation under Torts and IPC
i. TORTS
Defamation is injury to the reputation of a person. If a person injures the reputation
of another he does so at his own risk, as in the case of an interference with the
property. A man’s reputation is his property, and if possible, more valuable, than
other property.

Any intentional false communication, either written or spoken, that harms a person's
reputation; decreases the respect, regard, or confidence in which a person is held; or
induces disparaging, hostile, or disagreeable opinions or feelings against a person, is
called defamation.
In D.P. Choudhary v. Kumari Manjulata18
The plaintiff – respondent Manjulata about 17 years of age belonged to a

16
Sim v. Stretch, (1936) 2 All ER 1233.
17
Silikin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers, (1958) 2 All ER 536: (1958) 1 WLR 743.
18
AIR 1997 RAJ 170

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distinguished family and studied B.A. There was a publication of a news item in a
local daily Dainik Navjyoti that last night she ran away with a boy named Kamlesh;
but she had gone to attend night classes. The news item was untrue and negligently
published with utter irresponsibility. She was shocked and ridiculed by others. It was
held that the action was defamatory and she was entitled with the damages of Rs
10000/- by way of general damages.
Here, it is a case of Civil Defamation which involves no criminal offence, but on
account of this kind of defamation, you could sue the person to get a legal
compensation for your defamation. It is studied under law of torts i.e. as a civil
wrong.

IPC

According to section 499 of IPC, Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be

read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation
concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that
such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases
hereinafter excepted, to defame that person19.
Section500 provides that a person committing an offense under this section is liable
with simple imprisonment for a term of 2 years or fine or with both.20

Essentials of Defamation –
There are three main essentials of Defamation viz.,
1.The statement must be published
Defamation is the publication of a statement which tends to lower a person in the
estimation of right thinking members of society generally or which tends to make
them shun or avoid that person.

The standard to be applied is that of a right minded citizen. A man of fair average
intelligence, and not that of a special class of persons whose values are not shared or
approved by the fair minded members of the society generally.

Here, the statement made by the plaintiff in the press conference attended by leading
media houses is a form of publication which damaged the defendant’s reputation due
to which other business companies are hesitant to do business with them.

In Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy21,

An inquiry commission was setup for examining the facts and circumstances relating
to assassination of late Shri Rajiv Gandhi. The defendant, at a press conference
alleged that the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu had prior information that LTTE
cadre would make an assassination bid on the life of Rajiv Gandhi. The plaintiff was
engaged as a sr. counsel to the then CM of TN. In discharge of his professional duties,

19
Article 499, IPC_186045.pdf
20
Article 500, IPC_186045.pdf

21
AIR 2006 Delhi 300

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the plaintiff cross examined the defendant. During the proceeding, the defendant in
the written conclusive submission, alleged that the plaintiff had been receiving money
from LTTE, a banned organization. The statement by defendant was ex facie
defamatory.
2.The statement must refer to the plaintiff
If the person to whom the statement was published could reasonably infer that the
statement referred to the plaintiff, the defendant is nevertheless liable.
Here, the plaintiff referred the statement to the defendant which can be proved by the
fact that the plaintiff mentioned that they are going to file a suit against a company
which betrayed them and the next day, they filed a suit against the defendant which
indicates to the society that they were talking about the defendant.

In Newstead v., London Express Newspapers Ltd.22

The defendants published an article stating that ‘Harold Newstead, a Camberwell
man’ had been convicted of bigamy. The story was true of Harold Newstead, a
Camberwell barman. The action for defamation was brought by another Harold
Newstead, the barber. As the words were considered to be understood as referring to
the plaintiff, the defendants were liable.

The Delhi HC in Harsh Mendiratta v. Maharaj Singh23 said that an action for
defamation was maintainable only by the person who was defamed and not by his
friends or relatives.
3.Defamation must be published
Publication means making the defamatory matter known to some person other than
the person defamed and unless that is done, no civil action for defamation lies.

In the case of Mahender Ram v. Harnandan Prasad24it was said when a defamatory
letter is written in urdu to the plaintiff and he doesn’t know urdu, he asks a third
person to read it , it is not defamation unless it was proved that at the time of writing
letter defendant knew that urdu was not known to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff has fulfilled all the essentials of defamation and thus, is liable to pay
compensation to the defendant.

22
(1940)1 KB 377
23
95 (2002) DLT 78
24
AIR 1958 Pat 445

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3. WHETHER SANGAN SPORTS IS ENTITLED TO THEIR CLAIM

UNDER CLAUSE (H) OF THE CONTRACT?

1. Promise not fulfilled by Sangwan Sports.

It is contended by the Defendants that Sangwan Sports is not entitled to any claim under
clause
(h) of the contract signed between Sangwan Sports and Cricklord Academy. It is submitted
to the Honourable Court that since no delivery was made by Sangwan Sports, no amount
can be claimed by them.
Section 52 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 clearly states that "where the order in which
reciprocal promises are to be performed is expressly fixed by the contract, they shall be
performed in that order," In the present case, the order can be ascertained by looking at the
clause (g) which states that in case of non-delivery of the goods on the said date, Cricklord
Academy shall be entitled to an amount. Therefore, since no delivery was made by Sangwan
Sports, no payment shall be made by Cricklord Academy.

2. Not Sangwan Sports but Cricklord Academy entitled to compensation.

It is further contended that Cricklord Academy paid an earnest amount of Rs. 1,00,000 at the
time of signing the contract. If anyone is to get paid, it is Cricklord Academy.
Further, the defendant would like to claim compensation from Sangwan Sports under the
section 75 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The section clearly states that "A person who
rightfully rescinds a contract is entitled to consideration for any damage which he has
sustained through the no fulfillment of the contract." Since the delivery of the kits was not
completed by Sangwan Sports, the Academy had to go through a lot of trouble in order to
look for another company to deliver the kits as the matches were approaching. Hence, for
this, the Academy claims appropriate compensation from the Company for the damages
sustained.

It is also contended that when the Defendants came to know about the fire at Sangwan
Sports, they had to face a lot of mental agony as the matches were fast approaching and the
delivery was impossible. This also makes them entitled to a compensation by Sangwan
Sports.

It is further contended that the earnest money paid by Cricklord Academy, that is the Rs.
1,00,000 must also be refunded back. To support this, the Defendant would like to cite a
case in which the Supreme Court has said that a forfeiture of an earnest amount paid may be
in the form of a penalty. Also, Supreme Court has further clarified in Kailash Nath
Associates's case25that it is very much possible that forfeiture of an amount can be in the
nature of penalty and if the amount which is allowed to be forfeited under the contract is in
the nature of penalty then Courts are empowered to treat the amount of liquidated damages
(earnest money) as one in the nature of penalty clause.

25
{CIVIL APPEAL NO. 193 OF 2015[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.32039 OF 2012}

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PRAYER

In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and cases cited it is most humbly prayed before
this Hon’ble Court-
1. To declare that the Defendants have not breached the Contract.
2. To declare that the Plaintiffs are liable for defamation.
3. To declare that the plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation under the
aforementioned clause.
4. To award compensation to the defendant for mental pain and agony.
Or grant such other relief as the court may deem fit in the light of justice, equity and good
conscience.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KIDNESS THE DEFENDANT SHALL DUTY BOUND EVER
PRAY

Sd/-
Counsel for the Defendant.

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