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SANGWAN SPORTS™………………………………………..PLAINTIFF
(A Private company)
VS.
STATE OF NARNIA……………………………………………DEFENDANTS
TEAM CODE: 03
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UILS INTRA DEPARTMENT MOOT COURT COMPETITION’19
TABLE OF CONTENTS
S. PARTICULARS PAGE
NO. NO.
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
2. TABLE OF CASES
3. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
4. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS
6. ISSUES RAISED
7. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
8. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE I: WHETHER CRICKLORD ACADEMY IS LIABLE FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT
ISSUE II:WHETHER SANGWAN SPORTS CAN BE MADE LIABLE
FOR DEFAMATION
ISSUE III: WHETHER SANGAN SPORTS IS ENTITLED TO THEIR
CLAIM UNDER CLAUSE (H) OF THE CONTRACT?
9. PRAYER
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS EXPANSION
& And
AIR All India Reporter
ALL Allahabad
Anr Another
Co Company
Ed Edition
Hon’ble Honorable
Ltd Limited
Ors Others
SC Supreme court
SCC Supreme Court cases
Versus
Vs
IPC Indian Penal Code
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure
No Number
Cri Criminal
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TABLE OF CASES
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The plaintiff knocks the door of this hon’ble court and invokes its original civil jurisdiction
under the following sections of the CPC, 1908:
9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred – The Courts shall (subject to the provisions
herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which
their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
15. Court in which suits to be instituted – Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of
the lowest grade competent to try it.
20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises –
Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in Court within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction.
(a) The defendants or each of the defendants, at the time of the commencement of the suit
actually or voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided
that in such case either the leave of court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or
carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or
(b) Any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement
of the suit actually or voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain,
provided that in such case either the leave of court is given, or the defendants who do not
reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such
institution; or
(c) The cause of action wholly or partly arises.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
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Immediately after which, Sangwan Sports™ upon information from its agents in the
business circle, about the academy’s deal with Ardhaan Sports tried to contact
Cricklord Academy but all the attempts to establish a communication with them went
in vain. On 27th October 2019 a press conference was organized by the CEO & Board
of Directors of Sangwan Sports™ after they realized that the Academy had turned
hostile towards them.
In the press conference which was attended by leading media houses, wherein the
CEO maintained that, “It is very saddening how some associations instead of standing
with us in our hard times betrayed us & backed out from the very contract that bound
us. We, from now onwards shall be more vigilant, keeping in mind the associations,
we shall never cater to in future, considering their track record in failure to perform
their contracts. It is notified upon our partners that associations like these are based on
tenets of betrayal and opportunism. We will be filing a law suit against one of such
associations very soon.”
The very next day Sangwan Sports™ filed a law suit against Cricklord academy for
breach of contract contending that only their manufacturing unit had caught fire and
they being thorough professionals had already manufactured and stored 130 kits in
their go down in Zirakpur and wanted to deliver the same to the academy. The
company sought payment of compensation as per clause (h) of the contract.
On 30th October, 2019 a cross suit for defamation against Sangwan Sports™ was
filed by the Academy contending that the statement given by the CEO in the press
conference damaged their reputation & due to the influence of their CEO’s market
presence, other production companies are hesitant to do business with them, further
affecting the tournament’s public image
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ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE I:
ISSUE II:
ISSUE III:
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
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It is humbly submitted that the Defendant No.1 is liable for breach of contract in the instant
case. This submission of the Plaintiff is twofold:
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The counsel for plaintiff would like to place reliance in the case of syed hasan miya zaidi v.
zabir the court was of the view that enshrined U/S 39 of Indian Contract Act, 1872, which
embodies the principle of English law, pertaining to the anticipatory breach of contract i.e.
if one party to a contract resiles from the contract, the other party i.e. the innocent party has
an option. He may accept the repudiation and sue for damages or breach of contract.
Whether or not the time for performance has come or he may if he chooses disregard or
refuse to accept it and then, the contract remains in full effect.
The anticipatory breach simply means that a party is in breach from the moment his
actual breach becomes inevitable
Thus, repudiation can occur when the either party refuses to perform his part, or makes it
impossible for him to perform or even fails to perform his part of contract in each of the cases
in such a manner as to show an intention not to fulfill his part of the contract.
In the instant case the counsel would like to state that since the defendants got to know about
the unfortunate incident it didn’t tried to check upon the status and contact the plaintiff”s in
any way and despite of waiting till the due date of the contract ie when the kits were to be
delivered to the defendants it placed an order of the same to the third party which itself shows
and proves that the defendants have repudiated the contract and without any intimation but
just with its actions has breached the contract while the plaintiffs tried to communicate with
the defendants.
In the case of Food corporation v. J.P Kesharwani , where one party making unilateral
alterations without any intimation to the other and then cancelling the contract, this amounted
to breach (repudiation) therefore it can be correctly stated that, any kind of contract may be
examined as broken once a party refuses to perform under the contract as promised,
regardless of when performance is supposed to occur. This unconditional refusal is known as
a repudiation of contract.
In the case of Universal Cargo in the year 1957 it was held by the Supreme Court that the
“Anticipatory breach means that a party is in breach from the moment that his actual breach
becomes inevitable. Since the reason for the rule is that a party is allowed to anticipate an
inevitable event and is not obliged to wait till it happens, it must follow that the breach which
he anticipates is of just the same character as the breach which would actually have occurred
if he had waited.”
The counsel would also place reliance upon the case ofInternational Contractors Limited v.
Prasanta Kumar Sur, properly analysed, only lays down that in certain circumstances it is
not necessary for the party complaining of an anticipatory breach of contract by the other
party to offer to perform his remaining obligations under the contract in order to show his
readiness and willingness to perform the contract and claim specific performance of the
said contract.
In case of 'Steel Bros and Co. Ltd. v. Dayal Khatav & Co.', 47 Bom 924, emphasising this
distinction Mullah J. observed as follows:
"A good deal was said on both sides as to the rule of 'anticipatory breach' in its relation to C.
I. F. contract. It is now elementary law that where in a contract for sale of goods a buyer
clearly shows his intention not to be bound by it and repudiates the contract it amounts to a
breach of the contract (Indian Contract Act, Section 120). In such a case the seller may
treat the notice of intention as inoperative, in which case he keeps the contract alive for the
benefit of the buyer as well as his own or he may treat the repudiation as wrongful putting an
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end to the contract and may at once bring his action as on a breach of
it. (Indian Contract Act, Section 39). But the repudiation which absolves the seller from the
performance of conditions precedent must have been made before the due date for the
performance of the contract.
In the case of Rajesh Deorao Meshram, ... vs Murlidhar S/O Namdeorao Khangar on 11
December, 2007 the courts was of view that once a party to a contract has repudiated
a contract, it is not necessary for the other party to tender the amount payable under
the contract in the manner provided in the contract in order to successfully claim the
specific performance of the contract. The decision, however, nowhere lays down that where
one party to a contract repudiates the contract, the other party to the contract who claims
specific performance of the contract is absolved from his obligation to show that he was
ready and willing to perform the contract.
Thus the counsel submits that the defendants breached the contract so formed between
the parties.
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It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the plaintiff is not liable for defamation
as the defendant has not come to the court with clean hands. The statements made by the
plaintiff are not defamatory in nature as-The statement is a matter of Truth (A); the statement
made was a fair comment (B);
(A) The statement is a matter of truth
i. The counsel on behalf of the plaintiff contends that the words complained of are in
substance and in fact true. The statement made was – “Travel Solutions Private
Limited – a bunch of liars, cheats and thieves with no ethics. The worst company
ever. A statement is true in substance if the erroneous details in no way aggravate the
defamatory character of the statement or alter its nature1 .In the case of Dainik
Bhaskar v. Madhusudan Bhaskar2,it was held that it is not necessary to justify every
detail of the charge, provided that the gist of the libel is proved to be in substance
correct, and that the details, etc., which are not justified, produce no different effect
on the mind of the reader than the actual truth would do.
ii. It is important to mention here that the plaintiff completed the order on time and did
everything to satisfy the plaintiff but the later didn’t even communicated with the
defendant once when they got to know that a fire broke down in their head office and
presumed that they will not be able to complete the order on time and gave it someone
else. The plaintiff has betrayed us when we needed their support and this shows their
opportunistic behaviour. These characteristics are certainly not possessed by a
company which has ethics and consequently it proves that imputation is true. The
statement “the law will not permit a man to recover damages in respect of an injury to
a character which he does not or ought not to possess”3aptly fits on the defendant.
(B) The statement made was a fair comment
i. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the statement made by the
plaintiff was a comment which is a statement of opinion of facts 4(which includes
inference of facts) and the matter alleged to be defamatory is nothing but a fair
comment on a matter of public interest, which a fair minded person can honestly
make on the facts proved.5 Any person, whether he is a private individual has a right
to hold any view he pleases on a matter of public concern, and to express the same.
ii. The matter complained of as defamatory, was an honest expression of opinion made
in good faith and for the good of the public.6 A matter of public interest is a matter
1
Clarke v Taylor, (1836) 2 Bing 654; Sutherland v Stopes, (1925) AC 78 -81.
2
AIR 1991 MP 162.
3
McPherson v. Daniels, (1829) 10 B & C 263.
4
Christile v. Robertson, (1889) 10 New South Wales LR 161.
5
J.B. Jeyaretnam v. Goh ChokTong (1985) 1 MLJ 334.
6
Balasubramania v. Rajagopalachariar, AIR 1944 Mad 484:46 Cr LJ 71.
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iii. Hence, the plaintiff had no malicious intention in doing so as the plaintiff
communicated the matter to the public from a sense of duty and legal morality being
a law-abiding citizen of the country. The comments made by the plaintiff are based
on facts as already mentioned.
iv. The doctrine of fair comment is based on the hypotheses that the publication in
question is one which, broadly speaking, is true in fact, that the facts stated therein
are such as would go to serve the public interest.11 It is said that nothing is libel
which is a fair comment on a subject fairly open to public discussion.12 It is the
expression of criticism that has to be fair.13
v. As remarked by Lord Denning in Slim v. Daily Telegraph Ltd.14 , “He must honestly
express his real view. So long as he does this, he has nothing to fear, even though
other people may read more into it.”
vi. The plaintiff sincerely criticises the deficient services discharged by the defendant.
The defendant has breached the trust and confidence reposed by the plaintiff which
invites criticism. Hence, the plaintiff states that the ‘fair criticism of plaintiff does not
amount to defamation’ as the view expressed is honest.15
Therefore it is well established before this Hon’ble Court that the comment is fair as it is
stated on facts. The defendant has expressed the opinions honestly, done so upon facts
accurately stated and hence there is hardly any scope for complaint of defamation.16
7
V. Mitter, Law of Defamation and Malicious Prosecution.
8
London Artists, Ltd. v. Littler, (1969)2 QB 375.
9
Cox v. Feeney, (1863) 4 F&F 13
10
Silikin v. Peaverbook Newspapers, (1958) 2 All ER 516.
11
VishanSarup v. NardeoShastri AIR 1965 All 439, 1965 Cr LJ 334
12
W.S. Irwin v. D.F. Reid, AIR 1921 Cal 282:63 IC 467:48 Cal 304:25 CWN 150.
13
V. Mitter, Law of Defamation and Malicious Prosecution.
14
(1968) 2 QB 157.
15
Silikin v. Peaverbook Newspapers, (1958) 2 All ER 516.
16
Branson v. Bower, (2002) 2 WLR 452.
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2.Fair Comment-
# The comment must be an expression of opinion rather than assertion of fact.
# The comment must be fair i.e. without malice.
# The matter commented upon must be of public interest.
3. Privilege-
There are certain occasions when the law recognizes the right to freedom of speech
outweighs the plaintiff’s right to reputation, the law treats those occasions as
‘Privileged’. These are further of two types –
Absolute privilege- No action lies for the defamatory statement even though the
statement is false or made maliciously. It applies to :
Parliamentary Privilege, Judicial proceeding and State communication.
Qualified privilege- It is necessary that the statement must have been without malice.
The defendant has to prove that statement was made on a privileged occasion fairly.
17
(1865) 6 B&S 340
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public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for
the public good is a question of fact.18
With these defences, the plaintiff is not liable to pay compensation for defamation,to the
defendant.
18
IPC_186045.pdf
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PRAYER
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