AAAj

4,1
Accounting as a Critical
Social Science
Jesse F. Dillard
8 thin State University, USA

Heretofore the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however,
is to change it (Karl Marx).

Introduction
Critical social science is based in the philosophy of critical theory|1|, a school
of thought founded in the Idealism of Kant and Hegel. An attempt is made to
merge orthodox Marxism with social science, thus providing an alternative path
for social development. The initial objective of such an undertaking is to:
lay a foundation for an exploration, in an interdisciplinary research context, of questions
concerning the conditions which make possible the reproduce ion and transformation of society,
the meaning of culture, and the relation between the individual, society and nature. While
there are differences in the way they formulate questions, the critical theorists believe that
through an examination of contemporary social and political issues they could contribute to a
critique of ideolog and to the development of an non-authoritarian and non-bureaucratic
politics (Held, 1980, p. 16).
The belief is that human beings can be enlightens d, empowered and
emancipated|2| via a critical theoretic applied to their current oppressive
circumstances. This process leads to a rational evaluation of one’s life and social
arrangements that results in changing the practices and policies deemed irrational
and oppressive. The question addressed here is the place of accounting, if any,
within this context.
Specifying what is meant by accounting appears deceptively obvious, at least
for those of us in the field. If one goes to any accounting text, one finds a definition
such as the one provided by the American Accounting Association (1966, p. 1),
describing accounting as “the process of identifying, measuring, and
communicating economic information to permit informed judgments and decisions
by users of the information”. Anthony and Reece (1983) commented that this
definition focuses on accounting as a decision aid in comparison to some other
more technical definitions that focus more on the technology of accounting. For
example, Laughlin (1987, p. 479) defines accounting as “an enterprise based formal
system which expresses in fundamentally numerical terms past, present and future
financial actions of such enterprises”. Many variations can be found in between
these two extremes. Thus the precise definition of accounting emerges as
problematic. In each definition, however, there is a dominant techno-

The author Ashes to acknowledge the insightful comments provided by Professors Rob Nehmer
and Richard Laughlin. An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Public Interest Section
Research Retreat, 12 August 1988, Orlando, Florida.
logical component. Technology is some system of axioms, laws, rules and/or Accounting as a
relationships, which are applied in order to affect some transformation having Critical Social
practical significance. Identifying, measuring, and communicating imply a Science
technology directed toward converting, or translating, economic activity into
quantifiable representations to be used as decision inputs.
Accounting is a technology, but it is a technology that is not ideologically 9
sterile. The “axioms, laws, etc.” are not based on observed phenomenon, as
purportedly is the case in the physical sciences, but emanate from the social
sphere. For accounting, in spite of its apparent objectivity, there are no “physical
absolutes” upon which to base, and verify, the technology. The framework is
a social construction. The technology is framed by ideology. The interpretation
of events, and even the specification of what constitutes an event, are functions
of the socio-political point of view.
Our perception of “reality” is like gazing into a mirrored surface. We can
only see what is reflected back to us. Different surfaces (ideological frames)
reflect a different reality. Yet, the more we gaze into the mirror, the more the
reflection becomes our “objective reality”. The output from accounting
technology is projected onto the reflective surfaces and its distortion s are
interpreted as objective representations of “real” phenomena. This is an iterative
process, where the societal frame determines accounting technology and
accounting technology in turn influences the social, which in turn influences
accounting technology, and so on. If there is no intervention, if the images of
existence are not directed toward alternative ideological mirrors and the distorted,
yet differently distorted, “realities” considered, then accounting will continue
to reinforce and reify the social system from which it emanated. As Argyris
and Schon (1978) and others have argued, one must step outside the s'/stem
in order to evaluate it. A critique indicates from whence accounting is chiming
and therefore provides an opportunity to break the cycle of the dominant social
system producing accounting, and accounting in turn reproducing and reifying
the dominant social system.
There are different levels at which accounting and the social system can be
viewed. At a fairly specific level, the actions and interactions of social victors
can be observed at the direct interface between accounting technological
proposals and implementations and those affected. Examples include value-added
reporting (Burchell et al., 1985) and cost accounting (Loft, 1986). The following
discussion addresses the societal-accounting relationship from a some what
broader perspective: as a critique of the milieu from whence the social system
emanates, that is, the basic underlying assumptions and ideology which underlay,
and to some extent motivate, the actions of the social actors. A critique: it this
meta-level concerns conditions which make possible the reproduction and
transformation of society. Through an examination of contemporary social,
economic and political issues, means for producing a critique are proposed that
potentially could assist in a rational evaluation of one’s Ne and social arrangements
and motivate changes in practices and policies deemed irrational and oppressive.
If one accepts the dominance of capitalist power in advanced capitalist
countries (3), accounting as it is practiced in these countries is a technology
 of capitalism, viewed as little more than a technical, context-free activity,
4,1 determined by capitalistic power and advocated by professional ideology
(Braverman, 1974; ’Tricker, 1978; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980; Lehman and Tinker,
1987). Gilling, as reported by Burchell et al. (1955), defines “
professional ideology ” as follows:
10 All professions have a defining ideology, which in a general sense establishes a pattern of
thought and a way of looking at the world for the profession. This pattern of thought defines
the activities of the profession, its problems and appropriate ways of approaching these
problems. The behavior of a profession towards its environment is a matter of perception of
that environment. Once an image of that environment has been ‹ stablished, then behavior
will be determined by that image and the frame of reference that it creates tp. 69).
While Gilling is concerned with “technical issues” (e.g. historical costs,
replacement costs, current costs), as well as accounting principles and practices,
this definition also describes capitalist ideology’s domination over the accounting
profession. Continuing the metaphor, this is the surface of the distorted mirror
whence we gain our perspective.
The depiction of accounting as a socially determined technology does not
exclude or relegate the social dimension of accounting. On the contrary,
it explicitly recognizes the often ignored reality that the social system
emanates from a capitalist-dominated source. The technical is, in fact,
dominated by the social, thus substantially, and ideologically, constraining the
possible technological manifestations (4). Within this context, accounting is
fundamentally directed toward preserving and enhancing the capitalists’
control over the means of production.
What follows is an excursion over uncharted terrain to explore the extent to
which the accounting domain can be regarded as, or can benefit from, a critical
social science. The itinerary is as follows. The philosophical assumptions
underlying a functionalist and critical social-science via w of accounting are
presented and compared. A critical social-science homework is presented, along
with its inherent imitations. Next, a critique of accounting' is undertaken in the
light of a critical social-science view. Specifically the critical social-science
theoretic is used to evaluate two extant accounting theories. "the excursion is
suspended at that point with a summary of the insights gained and
suggestions for future itineraries.
Accounting and Critical Social Science
Philosophical Assumptions
First, we need to specify the ontological, epistemological and methodological
perspectives of critical social science and compare them 'with those underlying
a non-functionalist view of accounting. Burrell and Morgan (1979) present a useful,
though somewhat simplistic, comparative typology that is briefly presented
below|5|. The quadrants are formed by two dimensions subjective-objective
and regulation-radical change, representing four paradigm classes: functionalism,
interpretivism, radical humanism and radical structuralism. Continuing the
“mirrorphorical metaphor”, the paradigms represent different distorted mirrors.
The critical social-science surface is placed in the radical humanist quadrant
and the objectivist paradigm, the surface through which accounting is
predominantly viewed, is placed in the functionalist quadrant|6 |. Radical Accounting as a
humanism is predicated on the subjective realization of one’s life world and the Critical Social
need to overcome the dehumanizing circumstances that prevent self fulfilment. Science
Objectivism assumes that general causal, basically context-free, relationships
can be specified through systematic observation. Improvement in the quality
of life is brought about by controlling one's environment and by identifying and 11
manipulating cause-and-effect relationships.
The four “principal images” (historical record, current economic reality,
information system, economic commodity) identified by Davis et al. (l982) as
having “shaped’ ’ financial accounting are all firmly grounded in functionalism.
The reviews of Hopper and Powell (1985) and Laughlin and Lowe (1959) illustrate
the dominance of functionalism in management accounting. While there is a
growing number of people, primarily researchers, who are advocating different
perspectives (see Chua (1986), Hopper and Powell (1985) and Hopper, Storey
and Willmont (1987) for reviews), they have had little impact, to date, on main-
line accounting theory and even less on accounting practice. The reasons for
differences between a critical social-science image of accounting and an objectivist
image of accounting can be illustrated by contrasting their basic philosophical
assumptions as shown in Table I {7}.

Radical humanism Philosophical Assumption Functionalism

Nominalism Ontology Realism

Anti-positivism Epistemology Positivism Table f.
Voluntarism Human Nature Determinism Philosophical
Assumstion
Ideographic Methodology Nomothetic Underlying Radical
Radical change Societal Status quo Humanism and
Functionalism

Ontology refers to the nature of being or reality. Realism, fundamental to

objectivism and thus to extant accounting theories, posits the existence of a
world external to, and independent from, cognition. Nominalism does not.
Epistemology refers to the means or process of knowing. From the objectivist
perspective, accounting is firmly entrenched in positivism |8| and thus sees
knowledge of the physical and social world as gained through an accumulation
of activities by “observers” searching for consistencies and causal relationships.
Anti-positivism, the epistemological perspective of a critical social science, views
the social world relativistically and does not acknowledge general underlying
causal relationships; knowing comes from experience as an active participant
in the social world. The term, human nature, as used by Burrell and Morgan,
refers to the effect that environment has on human beings. Voluntarism purports
that humans are autonomous, with the free will to act as they choose.
Determinism postulates that human actions are dictated by the external
 environment. Methodology, the way in which investigation is carried out, is
4,1 dependent on the positions taken with respect to the other philosophical
assumptions. The realist, positivist, deterministic perspective calls for
12 nomothetic methodology that emphasises systematic protocol and technique
in gaining knowledge of the social world. If the alternative position is taken,
an ideographic approach focusing on subjective, historical, individual accounts
of actions and events is called for. Societal orientation refers to the inclination
of the dynamic forces in society. Status quo presumes that the momentum of
society is toward equilibrium or a steady state; conflict is seen as a temporary
local disruption. Radical change, on the other hand, sees society as moving
toward change, overcoming the status quo; conflict is viewed as a reflection of
inherent inequalities and contradictions within the prevailing social structure.
The functionalist paradigm is the dominant perspective for looking at
accounting, as well as the dominant one in social science. The language in which
we think about, and communicate, accounting is that of functionalism. This
creates difficulty in reframing accounting within a critical social-science posture.
How can one possibly perceive accounting or any science as anti-positive,
nominalist, voluntaristic or ideographic? Not only does it go against our training,
it contradicts our general sense of things; subjective is not scientific. This
conception follows from our generally unquestioned acceptance of the physical-
science model as the appropriate one for looking at accounting specifically, and
the social sciences in general.
Accounting from the functionalist perspective is predicated on the idea that
a state change, usually specified as an economic event, or transaction, has
occurred. The basis for defining what constitutes the most fundamental atom
of accounting rests within, and is dictated by, the society's dominant economic
system|9|. The processes of identifying, measuring and communicating
(implemented operationally as accounting practices and procedures) are speci6ed
within this context. The controlling interest within the dominant economic
system, having gained power as a result of the system, controls the specification
of accounting activity. Thus, I find it quite improbable that, except in indirect
ways, accounting would be focused towards exposing the weaknesses of that
economic system in such a way that would contribute to a critique leading to
rational evaluation of social arrangements.
If accounting is not continually viewed through the mirror of critical social
science, maybe it is in need of this perspective. The next section presents a
proposed outline of a critical social science, viewed as derivative of critical
theory, set forth by Fay (1987) (10). Its limitations are also discussed. Accounting is
then analysed within this critical social-science framework.

Critical Social Science

Before presenting Fay’s framework, it is appropriate to locate the notion of
critical social science within the multiple non-functionalist ways of looking at
accounting. Again, following the Burrell and Morgan (1979) classification,
interpretivist literature is the most prevalent non-functionalist way of viewing
accounting. The primary, and interrelated, paradigms include phenomenology,
hermeneutics, ethno-methodology and symbolic interactionism. |For reviews Accounting as a
see Chua (1986) and Hopper and Powell (1985). | Citing Fay ll97S), Chua (1986) Critical Social
summarises the objectives of this research stream: Science
…interpretive knowledge reveals to people what they and others are doing when they act
and speak as they do. It does so by highlighting the symbolic structures and taken-for-granted
themes which pattern the world in distinct ways. 13
Interpretive science does not seek to control empirical phenomena, it has no tec hnical
application. Instead, the aim of the interpretive scientist is to enrich people's understanding
of the meanings of their actions, thus increasing the possibility of mutual communication and
influence. By showing what people are doing, it makes it possible for us to apprehend a new
language and form of life (p. 615).
As with critical social science, the interpretivist deals with the subjective, social
world understood from the context of the social actors. However, unlike
critical social science, this perspective does not question the fundamentals of
the social environment within which it is conceived and nurtured:
little consideration ….. is given to how wider social and political collectives impinge upon
the processes by which “common sense understandings” are shared by others (Hopper and
Powell, 1985, p. 93).
Such neglect legitimates and sustains the current capitalist social, economic
and poetical order, inhibiting meaningful change (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Baritz,
1960; Cooper, 1983; Tinker et al. 1982; Tinker, 1986). The practical intent of
critical social science, as opposed to the interpretivist position, is to bring about
change in the social order.
At another level, the comparison between interpretivism and critical social
science can be illustrated by again referring to the underlying philosophical
assumptions. Voluntarism is fundamental for both. The creation of one’ social
world from within is based on the ontological assumption of nominalism. The
critical social scientist, and to a lesser extent the interpretivist, assumes that
individuals can change their existence through self-understanding. For critical
social science, epistemology is viewed from two levels. For the individual, self-
awareness results in liberating activity and belief. At a more general level, self-
estrangement is seen as a common human condition, to be remedied by self-
awareness and, at least at an abstract level, cause-and-effect relationships
between self-awareness and “happiness” are presumed. Interpretivism also
makes an anti-positivist epistemological assumption but does not recognize either
a structural component in the social world or the centrality of emancipation.
Furthermore, from a societal orientation, interpretivism views stability as the
order of things, thus, at least implicitly, reinforcing the status quo. On the other
hand, critical social science assumes that societal contradictions and inequailities
motivate radical change thus overcoming the status quo.
The work of Hopper et al. (1987) provides an example of perceptions
reproduced by alternative reflective surfaces. They use labour-process theory
as the basis for their critique. The labour-process approach assumes that
organisational reality emanates from class struggle, as opposed to the
functionalist view of rational and co-operative behaviour. Organisational reality
is one of conflict arising from the “fundamental antagonism between capital
141313

AAAJ and labour”. The interpretivist recognises the subjectivity and uncertainty faced
4,1 by actors but does not recognise whence these are motivated. Thus, the focus
of analysis shifts from a relatively “micro” level (individual, subunits and systems)
14 for the functionalist, to “bracketed” social interactions for the interpretivist,
to the genesis of social construction for those with the radical (labour-process)
perspective.
While there is a basic agreement as to the need for social praxis, there is
substantial diversity in what are commonly referred to as radical theories that
carries over naturally into critical accounting research. It may be argued that
most of the current “critical accounting research” has adopted, at least to some
extent, a radical structuralist position. While not necessarily founded on
materialism, this work tends to be concerned with the effects of power and
privilege as they emanate from exploitative social, political and economic
structures and thus has a decidedly more deterministic perspective. See Hopper
and Powell (1985), Chua (1986) and Hopper et al. (1987) for discussion and review
of the accounting literature.
Critical social science is rooted in critical theory, thus focusing on the
subjective, voluntary empowering action of individual members of society in
bringing about individual, and thus social, emancipation. Critical social science
is based on “humanistic self-estrangement” and is designed “to explain social
file in general or some particular instance in a way that is scientific, critical,
practical and non-idealistic”. The term scientific refers to “comprehensive
explanations in terms of a few basic principles which are subject to public
evidence” ; critical means “the offering of a sustained negative evaluation of
the social order on the basis of explicit and rationally supported criteria”, and
practical refers to “the situation of some members of society identified by the
theory to transform their social existence in specified ways through fostering
in them a new self-knowledge to serve as the basis for such a transformation’ '.
Critical social science is non-idealistic in the sense that it ‘'is not committed
to the claims either that ideas are the sole determinant of behavior ….. or
that emancipation simply involves a certain sort of enlightenment … . . . or that
people are able and willing to change their self-understanding simply on the
basis of rational agreement ...” (Fay, 1987, p. 26).
While there are differences in focus and application (Held, 1980), developments
in critical theory are seen as complementary, emanating from a common origin
and having the same ultimate objective of achieving human enlightenment,
empowerment and emancipation through revelation and change within, and
brought about by, individual social actors. Laughlin (1987, 1988 a, b) has applied
a critical framework derived from the work of Habermas (l984, 1988) in studying
the evolution and change of accounting systems. Habermas’, and therefore
Laughlin's, focus is the centrality of language and its role in society, whereas
critical social science, as outlined below, takes a more traditional revolutionary-
focused critical perspective.
Critical social science as described by Fay (1957, pp. 31-7) is a single theory
comprised of four interrelated parts, or theories, made up of ten sub-theories
focusing on understanding the interaction between social practice and institutions
on one hand and false self perceptions on the other. A general outline is Accounting as a
presented in Table II and discussed below. Critical Social
Science

1. Theory of False Consciousness

A. Ideological critique 15
B. How self-misunderstanding was acquired and maintained
C. Reveal superior alternative
II. Theory of Crisis
A. Specify what constitutes a social crisis
B. How crisis is realised and unremediable
C. Specify historical development of crisis
III. Theory of Education
A. Necessary and sufficient conditions for enlightenment
B. Necessary conditions for enlightenment to be obtained
IV. Theory of Transformative Action
A. Specify societal aspects that must be altered Table II.
B. Detailed plan of action Outline o/ GritycaJ
Social Science

The first category is a theory of false consciousness and follows directly from
sell-estrangement theory. Self-estrangement theory (p. 16) states that most
people are unaware that human existence is split into two spheres, the
manifest/ordinary and the hidden/extraordinary, and understand themselves in
light of the former. Because their life is structured this way, it is needlessly
frustrating and unsatisfying. The basic dynamics of human life can be
understood through the hidden/extraordinary sphere that can be made evident
through shedding illusions. As this sphere becomes the basis of belief and
activity, human life becomes as satisfying as it can be. A theory of self-
estrangement as it relates to critical social science addresses the ways self-
understanding is false and/or incoherent by explaining the origins of false
consciousness as well as the circumstances that permit its perpetuation. This
necessarily historical narrative then leads to the formulation of a preferred
alternative and illustrates its superiority by comparing the alternative with the
present state. For example in Marx’s theory of capitalist society, people’s
self-understanding is shown to be the result of reified social relations. The
capitalist social order is shown to cause the false social order, and the
resulting illusions are shown to be instrumental in maintaining that order.
This social order is contrasted with what is presented as the superior
communist alternative.
The second critical social-science category is a theory of crisis.
Complementing the heightened awareness of individual false consciousness,
a theory of crisis explains the nature and causes of crisis inherent in a social
system. It is assumed that the dominant, alienating perceptions have been
perpetuated by the prevailing social structure. A theory of crisis includes a
historical interpretation of how the interaction between these social structures
 and individual false consciousness leads to crisis. From a structural perspective,
4,1 what is meant by social crisis is specified highlighting the possible contradictions.
The theory proceeds to explain how individual false consciousness, in conjunction
with the basic organisation of society, leads to alienation and social instability
and why these cannot be overcome under the current social order. Marx's theory
of social contradictions, based on the forces of production, provides an account
16 or crisis. Applying this to a capitalist society, he suggests that the interactive
effects of falling profits and class polarisation will lead to the increasing
impoverishment of the workers and the monopolisation of capital. A historical
rendering of class polarisation and capital accumulation, ultimately leading to
crisis, is undertaken by tracing the evolution of commodity production, surplus
values and class antagonism.
The third category is a theory of education. A theory of education builds
upon the understanding of the individual and the social structure which is gained
through the theory of false consciousness and the theory of crisis. An
understanding is gained as to what people believe and how these shared beliefs
need to be changed. A theory of education attempts to specify both the
conditions needed for this emancipatory enlightenment to be realised and the
mechanisms useful in bringing it about. This requires the specification of
necessary and sufficient conditions, given the society members’ capacities for
rational reflection. A theory of education must also specify the conditions under
which people would most probably be responsive to critical analysis, and provide
criteria for determining if and when these conditions are present. Marx’s theory
of class consciousness describes the role of education in the process by which
a person identifies himself or herself with a particular class and becomes aware
of the irresolvable tensions arising from inherent, conflicting interests. The
communist party's role in enlightening and uniting the working class in
opposition to the current social order is set forth. Marx's theory of
socialisation specifies the changing conditions in the current social order, for
example, unions, mechanisation of production, and worker co-operatives, all
of which make possible class consciousness.
The fourth category is a theory of transformative action. The first three
“theories” are directed toward informing and motivating transformative action
by revealing those aspects of life that must be changed to overcome alienation.
People are made aware that they must bring about these changes in their
“mode of living” if they are to move toward emancipation. A theory of
transformative action sets forth an action plan indicating how, and by whose
action, change is to be realised. The conditions for the necessary changes in
self-perception and in social organisations, if social crisis is to be
appropriately resolved, are specified, as well as a detailed plan of action
indicating who is to do what and by what means the plan should be carried
out. Marx presents a theory of revolutionary praxis which requires that such
capitalist institutions as private property, markets and the state be replaced
by co-operative, labour-directed mechanisms. He describes general
strategies whereby those who are already enlightened (party members) can
bring about the education of a target audience (workers) such that these
oppressive institutions are changed so that social transformation can be
brought about {11}.
Limitations of Critical Social Science Accounting as a
Ideally, the critical social scientist has the responsibility of revealing the true Critical Social
nature of existence and motivating socially transforming action which leads to Science
emancipation. The power of human reason to initiate change is rudimentary
to the notion of critical social science. Clarity of vision leads to emancipation. Fay
(1987) undertakes a critique of critical social science in an attempt to render it
more practical and realistic by bringing into question its “ontological commitment
to the activist conception of human beings”. The nominalist notion that ideas are
the sole behaviour determinants is viewed as incomplete, even naive in some
extreme circumstances, and limits the emancipatory effect of “critical”
enlightenment. From an epistemological perspective, human reason does not
have the ability to provide self-clarity because of what Fay refers to as the
“opacity’’ of being; that is, the inherent indeterminacy of existence states as
well as the historicity of human beings. This does not depart from an anti-
positivist position but points out that the requisite “rational analysis”
required by critical social science is ultimately unobtainable. If this is the
case, the goal of emancipation through rational enlightenment is undefinable.
Fay goes on to argue that even if this were not the case, critical social science
tends to inappropriately equate freedom and happiness. Freedom does not
necessarily lead to collective autonomy and thus consensus of opinion and
action. He sees this as a major shortcoming in the epistemological
underpinnings of critical social science.
Physical limitations are not taken into account as possible impediments to
emancipation. Humans are limited in their abilities to attain an understanding
of their current unsatisfactory existence by both their historical and/or traditional
circumstances and their bodily, or somatic, nature. Fay argues that humans
are always a part of the playing out of existence. As an active participant.,
one cannot step outside the current situation; this leads to the position that
history and tradition cannot be overcome. By “stepping outside” one is not in
fact removed but remains an actor within. These limitations bring into
question the essential voluntarist human-nature assumption. Thus, critical
social science’s primary means for overcoming alienation and oppression
through reflective observation and evaluation of history and tradition are, in
fact, inoperable. Furthermore, humans absorb certain traits, not through the
mental, but directly through the physical — through their bodies. Mental
reflection can neither identify nor overcome these dispositions. External
force is also a very real impediment to emancipation. Death is the ultimate
obviation of a more satisfying life. Fay argues that such absolute imposition is
contrary to the, at least implicit, dyadic nature of oppression.
Fay is arguing that the ontological, epistemological and human-nature
assumptions that underlie critical social science must be recognised only as
approximations of reality and thus there are major limitations. Humans are
subject to deterministic forces in nature, in history and within their own mental
and physical being which limit the utopian possibilities of critical social science.
However, this does not totally negate its value but suggests that its limitations
must be recognised in the quest toward human enlightenment, empowerment
and emancipation.
 Critical social science, as presented above, includes the presumption of the
4,1 possibility of meta-theories. The interpretivist might challenge this presumption
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Interpretivism is primarily concerned with
understanding “everyday life” by focusing on the individual making sense of,
and acting in, his or her present circumstance. At least, at some intermediate
18 level, each situation is seen as the product of past and present merging to
produce the unique moment {12}. Thus, attempts to develop generalisations in
the form of meta-theories inhibits the field of vision. Critical social science also
focuses on the individual, but views meta-theories as enhancing understanding,
and as integral in placing the individual within his or her social, historical and
political context. As this context is considered, the origins of false consciousness
are revealed. As these origins become evident to the individual, the process
of emancipation begins {13}. Critical social science is limited, from an interpretivist
perspective, by the degree to which such meta-theories are a possibility.

Critique of Accounting
Critical social science’s current appeal is in the critique It provides grounds
for questioning the dominant functionalist view of investigation, understanding
and value. For example, such a critique might reveal that impassioned observation
is, in fact, impossible (Habermas, 1984, 1988; and Harré et al., 1985), thus
pointing out a major fallacy in the epistemological underpinnings of accounting.
A critique of accounting can bring such discrepancies to light. Unfortunately,
critical social science provides no panacea. It does, however, expose the
underlying assumptions upon which the accounting is built.

Application to Extant Accounting Theories

Two extant accounting theories are viewed through the reflective surface of
critical social science. The first, proposed by Mattessich (1964), is a derivative
of functionalist philosophy within a capitalist economic system. Thus, the theory
is not concerned with overcoming alienation but only with the technical process
of valuation, where valuation is defined as the objective value based on marginalist
economic concepts. Following the traditional accounting perspective, there is
no awareness of false consciousness, crisis, education or transformative action.
There is no recognition of social good except in the distorted, oblique belief
that all are best served by perpetuating the capitalist system.
Mattessich calls for accounting to be integrated into the field of management
science, which includes economics and analytical methods of entity administration
and management. Initially, Mattessich makes some rather encouraging
statements from a critical social-science perspective. For example,
The chief economic problem of the second half of the twentieth century might well be
characterized as a search for surveyability, for goal clarification, for making more manageable
the gigantic economic apparatus which threatens to subjugate man and pervert his mind (p. 13).

It even sounds Marcusean. Mattessich goes on to bemoan the arduous

responsibility of the ulcerated business executive, but evidences no concern for
other constituents. However, given the unquestioned acceptance of management Accounting as a
science as the appropriate base for developing accounting theory, it is not Critical Social
surprising that the theory is deeply mired in the standard technological Science 19
accounting context of functionalism and reflects the associated underlying
philosophical assumptions. As argued earlier, these assumptions do not foster
a socio-economic critique.
Mattessich proposes a “general” set of basic assumptions that beget axioms
upon which accounting as a “discipline concerned with the quantitative
description and projection of income circulation and of wealth aggregates” (p.
19) can be constructed. Accounting is then recast within a set theoretic logic
(see Mattessich’s Appendix A). What is proposed is a “better” technology
based on a fundamental set of basic assumptions that allow for alternative
representations consistent with the prevailing economic environmental factors.
Does this “better” technology assist in the rational evaluation of one’s life
and social arrangements, motivating changes in practices and policies
deemed irrational and oppressive? Given its functionalist base, the likelihood
is small. Mattessich’s representation seems to sustain a false
consciousness by objectifying socially constructed hierarchies and thus
establishes them as something separate and distinct from their creators
and perpetuators.
Mattessich’s basic assumptions evaluated from a critical perspective
demonstrate that the theory primarily instigates and perpetuates domination.
The first assumption, monetary value, is reductionist, as are most of the others,
specifying the allowable language for the articulation of value. By restricting
the language of discussion, social relations are reified and objectified and thus
become viewed as an objective and unalterable environment, within which all
action takes place. This rejects the reduction of human labour to a dehumanizing
commodity value. Time intervals allow for the continuous to be viewed discretely,
but with no concern for the effects of such distortions. Meaningless time
segments are assigned meaning by the need for “an accounting” of the surplus
extracted from the means of production. Structure embodies sets of class
hierarchies reflecting ‘‘significant” entity categories. There is no consideration
of the influence of structure on how human beings are perceived, or perceive
themselves, within this context. Socially constructed classifications are objectified
and legitimised by a formal structural hierarchy. Duality restricts the relevant
information associated with a transaction to a classification within the
prespecified structure (accounts) and a time specification (date). No other
attributes or interpretations are permitted. Aggregation reduces system
components, further separating the means of production from those who
control them. Economic objects are real (commodities and services) or
financial (claims) objects with value and/or physical properties subject to
change. This basic assumption constrains the perspective to commodities,
services and financial claims. This institutionalises the separation of labour
from both capital and the means of production. By focusing on the “object”,
the “ground” becomes blurred. Thus, there is no “individual”, and much less
a “self”, within this construct. Change is considered only within the purview
of the economic object. Social change would be considered only indirectly,
and reflected, within the economic object and its valuation.
AAAJ Inequity in monetary terms is strictly a technological statement relating to
4,1 valuation problems associated with unstable measures, but it is a statement
that implicitly emanates from capitalist information requirements. Economic
20 agents restrict the considered actions of human beings to economic activities
and the group classification to those having meaning primarily within a
marginalist economics context (e.g. owners, managers, employees). Entities
are acknowledged as social institutions but only economic attributes are
recognised. Economic transactions are an empirical phenomenon in a strictly
positive sense and they represent the fundamental component of accounting.
The only characteristics of concern are those associated with changes in the
economic objects.
The remaining “basic assumptions” are specified as hypotheses having the
possibility of taking on many values, which depend on the specific situation
being considered. These “assumptions” are technical “rules” for implementing
the system given the first ten basic assumptions. Valuation concerns the values
to be assigned to an accounting transaction. Realisation indicates when value
is assigned. Classification pertains to where an accounts transaction is located
within the system. Data input relates to the form in which data enter the system.
Duration concerns the length of the “accounting period”. Extension refers to
the ability to consolidate systems. Materiality concerns “if and when” a
transaction is to be entered. Allocation pertains to entity decomposition into
sub entities.
Mattessich's proposed framework focuses on valuation and contains no basis
for a critique of the economic, social or political arrangements. The economic
system is viewed as sovereign and it is accounting’s role to comprehend and
accommodate this system. This implicitly assumes that technology is context-
free with respect to associated moral or ethical issues; technology reflects a
reality apart from political and cultural influences. Mattessich indicates an
appreciation of this problem. In discussing Sprouse and Moonitz’s (1962) notion
of neutrality, Mattessich remarks that it:
can never be anything else but a “neutrality’' influenced by a certain viewpoint and biased
more or less toward one or the other objectives, at best a “neutrality” that weighs
(according to a specific value judgement) the bias by the importance of the functions
which favors or disfavors (p. 176).
Further, in discussing valuation from a management science perspective,
Mattessich states that:
the insight that valuation requires specification of the context as well as of the objective pursued,
supplies evidence that the accountant's multipurpose financial statements are indeed
highly dogmatic tools. This situation can be remedied only if it is possible to endow the
financial statements with a value scale that covers those ranges of purpose and context that
are common to all business situations (p. 215).

Unfortunately, Mattessich has a rather narrow view of dogma and is not very
creative in specifying the value scale. His suggested solutions merely pile on
more technology with the same underlying philosophical assumptions.
Ontological and epistemological narrowness is not alleviated.
 Mattessich's theory mirrors the prevailing socio-economic system and is thus Accounting as a
a means for perpetuating false consciousness in recognising no perspective other Critical Social
than the current capitalist-dominated one. Crisis, education and transformative Science
action are not part of functionalist perspective and are in fact obscured by
this axiomatic theory of accounting. By recognising the functionalist foundation
and the accompanying philosophical assumptions, the theory can be positioned 21
with respect to its emancipatory potential, or lack thereof.
The second theory considered was proposed by Tinker (1985) and suggests
a ‘‘new accounting problematic” which apparently moves toward an accounting
based on alternative philosophical assumptions. The problematic is founded in
Marx’s labour theory of value and, as such, it can be loosely classified as radical
structuralist. In this case, the primary difference between the functionalist
perspective is the societal orientation. Tinker’s proposal is predicated on
structural conflict and contradictions that ultimately lead to overcoming the status
quo. Attention is directed toward structural contradictions and associated
accounting theories. As pointed out by Laughlin and Puxty (1986), Tinker claims
that accounting is socially constructed and socially constructing. It is socially
constructed in that value theory, in this case marginalist economics, has a
dominant influence on accounting theory. It is socially constructing in that
economic exchange transactions are understood in the light of prevailing
accounting theory. The influence of capitalism, as articulated through marginalist
economics, is shown to dominate the prevailing interpretation of economic
exchange transactions. As a result, an “equal exchange” is socially defined
owing to the privileged status of selected economic exchange dimensions, or
interest groups.
The logic upon which the Tinker's proposal is based reflects a critique of
extant marginalist-based accounting and suggests adopting an “alienation theory
of value” as a basis for developing accounting technology. Drawing from Marxist
political economic thought, Tinker proposes that accounting, and society for
that matter, should be viewed from the perspective of alienation among societal
groups. Accounting is seen as one of many belief-forming institutions that are
firmly situated in a social and historical context. The context thus inherently
biases the resulting technological system and perpetuates a state of false
consciousness. Accounting is a technology or “logic for appropriating material
production through economic exchange”; therefore it reflects the prevailing
ideology. Accounting “is ultimately ideological because it facilitates the
appropriation of surplus value, a process that has no ultimate magical
foundation {14}. “Without such a foundation, accounting is exposed as an
ideology, a way of rationalising or explaining away the appropriation of the
production of one social class by members of another”. Thus, it is “an
intellectual and pragmatic tool in social domination” (p. 100).
In proposing an accounting system based on an alienation theory of value,
Tinker argues that contemporary accounting systems measure, and disclose,
indices of wealth accumulation but are not concerned with distribution issues.
Further, “all accounting problems are really problems of income appropriation
and alienation” (p. 170). Alienation is defined as an “appropriation of human
 essence” or “an obstacle to human growth and development” that is “frequently
4,1 reflected in unequal exchange” (p. 172). Tinker claims that there is currently
no way of detecting “inequity and appropriation in exchange.” This entails
22 being able to determine whether a transaction represents an equal exchange
or an exploitative one. He envisions accounting practice as providing the
means for resolving social conflict, appraising the terms of exchange
between social
constituencies, and arbitrating, evaluating, and adjudicating social choices.
In order to accomplish this, the definition of an economic transaction is
broadened to the “transfer of a capacity to affect human well being”.
Following from this, Tinker aims to “evolve a new theoretical structure for
accounting capable of adjudicating the social worth of transactions” (p. 136).
“Problems of alienation hierarchy” are presented and matched with a hierarchy
of accounting systems. At the lowest level is wealth mis-specification alienation
and it is coupled with marginalist-entity accounting. Next is fiduciary alienation,
matched with conventional accounting. Intra-class and externalized
alienation is specified and related to social-constituency accounting.
Alienation under capitalism is the top level of the problem hierarchy. By
employing a labour theory of value, emancipatory accounting is the only
alternative that can reveal the inequities inherent within capitalism, because
it goes beyond the marginalist constraints inherent in other accounting
systems.
Since Tinker bases his emancipatory accounting system on Marx’s theory
of value, one might expect there to be a good deal of correspondence between
it and critical social science. Marx’s theory of false consciousness holds that
in capitalist societies self-understanding is the result of reified social relations.
The capitalist order and resulting illusions are shown to be instrumental in
maintaining social order. Tinker specifically undertakes an ideological critique
and, in doing so, identifies the capitalistic apologetic of marginalism as the
underlying theoretical basis for conventional accounting. Self-misunderstanding
is acquired and maintained as one views oneself as a marginalist. (The result
of social indoctrination.) This way of thinking becomes embodied in the criteria
used to evaluate belief systems pertaining to wealth and income distribution.
One might argue that this is one component, or dimension, of perpetuating
false consciousness. It does not delve to the psychological depths of the concept
as previously discussed, but it is at least a surface component relating to the
economic domain of one’s being. (Its revelation might also be construed as
education.) Tinker demonstrates ways in which understanding is false and
incoherent, citing recent “accounting” scandals as evidence. The representation
of economic exchange transactions is presented as the result of underlying value
assumptions associated with contemporary accounting. The capitalist traits of
property ownership and prevailing power structures are proposed as originators
and perpetuators and thus the foundation for a theory of crisis and transformative
action is laid. A superior alternative is proposed in the form of emancipatory
accounting based on Marx’s value theory as opposed to conventual accounting
based on marginalist-value theory.
With respect to a theory of crisis, Tinker assumes that, as proposed by Marx,
social contradictions based on the forces of production provide an account of
crisis. Within the context of accounting, a social crisis is constituted in terms Accounting as a
of alienation and is realised in the way economic exchange transactions are Critical Social
understood, as reflected in accounting theory which is in turn influenced by Science 23
the prevailing theory of value. At least implicitly, the situation cannot be overcome
without a change in the prevailing theory of value. The disproportionate allocation
and distribution of wealth resulting from class polarisation and monopolisation
of capital will continue, given the current specification of economic exchange
transactions. By tracing the development of economic value theory and tying
it into current accounting thought and practice, a historical account of alienation
is specified.
As with the theory of false consciousness, Tinker’s theory of crisis is
consistent with the requirements of a critical social science. The last two
categories, education and transformative action, are not explicitly addressed
by Tinker. One might argue that the book itself is an attempt at education;
however, it does not address necessary and sufficient conditions for theory-
envisioned enlightenment nor does it address whether the requisite change
conditions are present. No guidance, or plan of action, is provided as to how
the emancipatory accounting system is to replace conventional accounting and
how it is to be implemented.
Tinker’s proposal is more attuned to a critical social-science perspective
than is Mattessich’s. Both authors see value as central and both argue that
there are major problems with marginalism as a basis for an accounting
theory of value. They differ in that Tinker suggests a radically different theory of
value and argues that marginalism is socially biased as well as theoretically
deficient. Mattessich, on the other hand, advances satisficing which is only a
“vulgar” marginalism and represents an incremental adjustment by
relaxing the optimisation assumption. This allows Mattessich to respond
better to criticisms of conventional accounting (e.g. Edwards and Bell. 1962;
Churchman, 1961).
Both proposals promote a general theory of value but the bases are different.
Tinker proposes labour value and surplus value as the foundation while
Mattessich sees profits, capital, rents and wages as the fundamental components.
The two authors are going in opposite directions with their
recommendations. Mattessich extols the virtues of management science and
economic science and proposes a framework that embodies reductionist
quantification of all factors of production. The framework does not address
moral or ethical implications of wealth distribution, only wealth representation
within a relatively narrow focus. Tinker focuses on the need to provide
information on wealth distribution and recognises the underlying alienation
issues. Mattessich proposes multivalue-statement presentations representing
different underlying valuation assumptions (i.e. historical costs, price-level
changes, replacement costs). Tinker defines value from a societal perspective
and asks that it be a representation of alienating relationships (i.e. racism,
sexism, classism). The two proposed systems can be viewed as orthogonal
with respect to representation. Mattessich has a “vertical” view, focusing
on functional groups such as subunits, entities, regions, etc. Whereas Tinker
takes a “horizontal” view, focusing on social groups such as workers,
women, capitalists, etc.
 Summary and Suspension
4,1 Accounting, as we know it, is the result of the economics of monopoly
capitalism. It is predicated, and constructed, upon these foundations and is
solely directed towards these ends. So deeply is it embedded in the
prevailing system that the potential for change is highly constrained other
24 than as dictated, or allowed, by the system. A fundamental change in the
underlying economic structure
must occur before change can occur in accounting technology. This also suggests
that accountants, at least professionally, are dominated and constituted by the
dominant system. Given this context, I believe it to be pragmatically impossible
to legitimately view accounting, that is the discipline and practice thereof,
as anything other than a technical artifact of the dominant system. Thus, it
would appear difficult for accounting, as observed in the functionist / capitalist
reflector, to be critical of itself or the dominant system, and much more
difficult for it to take a proactive role in systematic transformation.
Accounting, viewed from a functionalist perspective, cannot maintain a
reflective view outside the current system. The accountant's current reflecting
surface filters out the tensions arising from systemic conflicts and ignores or
distorts local crises in ways directed towards maintaining and strengthening the
status quo. Thus, there is no legitimate theory of false consciousness, crisis,
education or transformative action.
Accounting, viewed from a critical social-science perspective, provides a richer
picture. Investigating the relationships between accounting and the social system
provides opportunities for a critical social scientist in accounting to engage in
critical evaluation. For example, if Fay's criteria are applied, the following queries,
underlying the evaluation carried out in the prior section, represent possible
itineraries for a critique of accounting. Such a critique would raise
questions in terms of false consciousness like: What aspects of accounting
relate to perpetuating false consciousness? How can critical social
scientists use accounting information to render these situations
transparent? How can accounting be used to facilitate an ideological critique?
Can accounting be useful in explaining how misunderstandings arise and how
they are maintained? How might accounting be useful in constructing
alternative self-understanding?
Such an approach also addresses a range of questions related to aspects
concerning crisis. What is the role of accounting in crisis? Does it have
descriptive capabilities meaningful in defining crisis? What are the
limitations in the accounting system that are impediments to overcoming
the current unstable situation? Can accounting help explain why the
current social order cannot overcome instability? Can accounting
information be useful in articulating a historical account of the crisis in terms
of false consciousness and contradictions?
This approach also highlights issues concerning education. How can accounting
be used to facilitate understanding of the critique promulgated? How
can accounting be used to articulate and/or identify necessary and
sufficient conditions for the theory to obtain? Are there internal
contradictions in accounting systems that reflect contradictions in the
present socio-economic system?
Finally, the approach raises issues about transformative action. What is the
place of accounting in undertaking transformative action? Can it be used to
 Accounting as a
motivate change? Can it be used to indicate that change has taken place?
Critical Social
Recognition that accounting is determined by the system within which it is
embedded indicates the limitations of accounting, as a technology of Science
capitalism, in providing a legitimate critique of the dominant structure. The
accounting system is one component constructed by the system in order to
perpetuate itself. Thus, for those who are pliers of this trade, the primary 25
question remains:
What actions should we undertake? Should we instigate changes in the accounting
system such as those proposed by Tinker with a view toward inducing changes
in the dominant system? Should we continue to direct our efforts toward refining
accounting as a means of providing relevant and timely financial information
as proposed by Mattessich?
Hopefully, such issues as have been raised in this paper will be explored within
the context of enlightened discourse, with the framework outlined providing
direction for such dialogue, although its inherent limitations must be borne in
mind. If we appreciate the power of accounting knowledge to influence resource
allocations and sustain control of dominant power groups (Knights and Collinson,
1987) within the current socio-economic environment, we can no longer
ignore the moral, ethical and political consequences of our trade. If we do so, we
will continue as accessories, albeit unwitting/unwilling, in facilitating and
perpetuating the alienation of vast numbers of human beings. We can no longer
be satisfied with only interpreting the world; we must become an active catalyst
for change.

Notes
1. In this paper critical theory refers to that body of thought promulgated by the Frankfurt
School, whose primary figures were Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse (see Held, 1960).
They attempted to reinterpret Marxism through social critique in the light of the failures
of communism in the Eastern Bloc, the rise of Fascism and the stability of late capitalist
societies. I have chosen not to include the more focused perspective of communicative
action as articulated by Habermas (l984, l988). For initial applications in the accounting
literature of Habermas's communication model see Laughlin (1987, 1988a, b),
2. Emancipation is defined as a ‘‘state of reflective clarity in which people know which
of their wants are genuine because they know finally who they really are, and a state
of collective autonomy in which they have the power to determine rationally and freely
the nature and direction of their collective existence.” (Fay, 1987, p. 205).
3. See Held (1980, p. 414) for the arguments in support of this position made by the members
of the Frankfurt school.
4. Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) state that “ … technology cannot determine social relations
except within the framework constituted by the existing social relationships”.
5. The limitations implicit in such a typology are recognised (see also Chua 1986), especially
Appendix 1). However, it is useful in the comparisons undertaken in this paper. This
typology has also been used by others in investigating different aspects of accounting
(see Hopper and Powell (1985), Laughlin and Lowe (1989), Roberts and Scapens (1985)).
6. Objectivism is used to describe the traditional view of accounting as objectively
differentiable from the environment within which it exists, so that it can, and should,
be separated from its context when it is studied. While Burrell and Morgan (1979)
specify several other functionalist theories (systems theory, integration theory and
social action
AAAJ theory), the extensive review of current accounting thought presented by Laughlin and
Lowe 1989) suggests that objectivism is the more appropriate description of the dominant
4,1 accounting perspective. It is not uncommon to find functionalism and objectivism used
interchangeably in referring to the dominant “physical science” model of accounting.
To be consistent with Burrell and Morgan's presentation, functionalism is used when
referring to paradigms and objectivism is used when referring to paradigmatic subsets.
However, in this paper, the meanings are essentially the same.
26
7. It is recognised that the comparisons discussed here are not clear cut. The terminology,
and the arguments behind it, have taken on many hues and tints during the ongoing
debate surrounding these fundamental issues. As a matter of expedience, the clear, yet
necessarily simplistic, distinctions made by Burrell and Morgan (1970) are adopted.
8. Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 4) present a broad definition of positivism “as
seeking to explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for
regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements”. The term is
used collectively to include the different branches of positivist philosophy (e.g.
logical positivism).
9. Within the historical and analytical limits of capitalism, according to Marx’s analysis,
technology, instead of simply producing social relations, is produced by the social relation
represented by capital (Braverman, 1974, p. 20).
10. Fay's proposal is not presented as the Gritted social science model but as a
representation of how such models may be formulated.
11. It should be noted that Marx’s theory is presented as an exa mple of one which meets
the critical social science set forth by Fay. The validity of the theory as an explanation
of capitalist society is another, not necessarily related, matter.
12. One might argue that interpretativists posit meta-theories by making such presuppositions
as these, as well as by improving methodological structure. However, a discussion of
these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
13. Meta-theories are also central to functionalism; but, unlike critical social science, they
are viewed as an end unto themselves. Once a theory is verified; the case is closed.
The critical social scientist sees these theories as a means to an end.
14. It should be noted, as Tinker points out, that any “accounting” will be ideological.
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