Samelo vs Manotok Services G.R. No.

170509

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully

withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor,
vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied.[16] The only
issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
by any of the parties involved.[17] Thus, when the relationship of lessor and
lessee is established in an unlawful detainer case, any attempt of the parties
to inject the question of ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it
might throw light on the right of possession.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner and the

respondent entered into a contract of lease. We note in this regard that in her
answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim before the MeTC, the
petitioner did not deny that she signed the lease contract (although she
maintained that her signature was obtained through the respondents
misrepresentations). Under the lease contract, the petitioner obligated
herself to pay a monthly rental to the respondent in the amount of
P3,960.00. The lease period was for one year, commencing on January 1,
1997 and expiring on December 31, 1997. It bears emphasis that the
respondent did not give the petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration
of the lease contract in December 1997 (the notice to vacate was sent only on
August 5, 1998), and the latter continued enjoying the subject premises for
more than 15 days, without objection from the respondent. By the inaction
of the respondent as lessor, there can be no inference that it intended to
discontinue the lease contract.[19] An implied new lease was therefore
created pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code, which expressly provides:

Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying
the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and
unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is
understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the
original contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The
other terms of the original contract shall be revived.

An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following
requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the original contract of lease has
expired; b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the
lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the
acquiescence of the lessor.[20] As earlier discussed, all these requisites have
been fulfilled in the present case.

Article 1687 of the Civil Code on implied new lease provides:

Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to
be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month,
if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day,
if the rent is to be paid daily.

Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered
to be from month to month, in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code.
[A] lease from month to month is considered to be one with a definite period
which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the
lessor.[21] When the respondent sent a notice to vacate to the petitioner on
August 5, 1998, the tacita reconduccion was aborted, and the contract is
deemed to have expired at the end of that month. [A] notice to vacate
constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor that it no longer consents
to the continued occupation by the lessee of its property.[22] After such
notice, the lessees right to continue in possession ceases and her possession
becomes one of detainer.[23]

Estoppel of tenant
We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the respondent had no
authority to lease the subject premises because the latter failed to prove that
it is its owner or administrator.

The Rules of Court protects the respondent, as lessor, from being questioned
by the petitioner, as lessee, regarding its title or better right of possession
over the subject premises. Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states
that the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of
the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
Article 1436 of the Civil Code likewise states that a lessee or a bailee is
estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as against the
lessor or bailor.

These provisions bar the petitioner from contesting the respondents title
over the subject premises. The juridical relationship between x x x [a] lessor
and x x x [a lessee] carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. As [lessee,
the petitioner is] estopped [from denying the] landlord's title, or to assert a
better title not only in [herself], but also in some third person while [she
remains] in possession of the subject premises and until [she surrenders]
possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had
no title at the time the relation of [the] lessor and [the] lessee was created,
and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who
succeed to his title.[24] Once a contact of lease is shown to exist between the
parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the
conclusive presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or a better right of
possession to the subject premises than the lessee.

The Court thus explained in Tamio v. Ticson:

Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not depend on the formers title
but on the agreement between the parties, followed by the possession of the
premises by the lessee under such agreement. As long as the latter remains
in undisturbed possession, it is immaterial whether the lessor has a valid title
or any title at all at the time the relationship was entered into. [citations
omitted]

Corpuz vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822

Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al., which has facts and
legal issues identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed
an unlawful detainer case against the respondents over a disputed property.
He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of
the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds
of Sale. The principal issue was who between the two parties had
the better right to possess the subject property.

This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one
who had the better right to possession of the disputed property
based on the following justification:

We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any
of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature
and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the
Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of Possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the
land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the
petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely
showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The
Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in
the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System

was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon

the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass
upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly
belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation
of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the

property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents'
argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was
guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a
collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate
of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified
or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Carbonilla v. Abiera, which reads thus:

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof
from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession,
he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what
action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action
to prosper.

In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against

respondents. Ejectment cases, forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect
actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The
only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is:
who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is,
to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does
not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. For this
reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who
has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional
facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the
complaint and sufficiently proven.

The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the building

was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful
detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the persons withholding from another
of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the
expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession under the
contract, either expressed or implied.

A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that

possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned
unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown
that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful
possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such
possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be
proved.

In Canlas v. Tubil (G.R. No. 184285), we enumerated the elements that

constitute the sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows:

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well
as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the
complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement
of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without
resort to parol evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from

one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of
his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The
possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which

lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action
must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue
in said case is the right to physical possession.

Samonte v. Century Savings Bank, G.R. No. 176413, November 25,

2009
It should be stressed that unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits, under
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, are designed to summarily restore physical
possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or
forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties'
opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These
actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would
take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession,
and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in
nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case
cannot be clothed with finality.

Cruz vs. Capco G.R. No. 176055, March 17, 2014

"The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real
property – possession de facto and not possession de jure."45 But "[w]here
the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better
right to possess the property."46 Here, both parties anchor their right to
possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own
ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the
heirs of the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC
correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this case to determine the
issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that "[t]he adjudication
of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property."47

The spouses Dela Cruz were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that
they are the owners of the lot. Their allegation that the subject property was
adjudicated to Teodora by virtue of a decision in a land registration case and
was later conveyed in their favor, is supported by (1) a copy of the Decision
in the said land registration case; (2) the title of the land issued to Teodora
(TCT No. 31873), and, (3) the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
of Teodora wherein the latter’s heirs agreed to convey the said property to
Amelia.

The spouses Capco, on the other hand, aside from their bare allegation that
respondent Rufino is an heir of the true owners thereof, presented nothing
to support their claim. While they submitted receipts evidencing their
payments of the realty taxes of their house and the camarin standing in the
subject property, the same only militates against their claim since the latest
receipts indicate Teodora as the owner of the land. Moreover, the spouses
Capco’s attempt to attack the title of Teodora is futile. "It has repeatedly been
emphasized that when the property is registered under the Torrens system,
the registered owner's title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be
collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has
even been held that it does not even matter if the party's title to the property
is questionable."

All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion, as affirmed by the
RTC, that the spouses Dela Cruz are better entitled to the material possession
of the subject property. As its present owners, they have a right to the
possession of the property which is one of the attributes of ownership.