TITLE PERTINENT FACTS
67. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for
356 SCRA 636 violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-
Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her
official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens in
violation of Executive Order No. 324.
A case was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order
for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at P15,000.
The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.
68. United States vs. Pons Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium.
G.R. No. 11530. August 12, They were on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez to introduce said opium in Manila. 125 kilograms of opium
1916. of the value of P62,400 was seized by customs agents at at 144 Calle General Solano, Manila. Pons
admitted that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions; that the house at No. 144
Sec. 14 Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of handling the
prohibited drug.
Pons and Beliso were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be
confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years. Lasarte was not yet arrested.
It was alleged on appeal that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was
the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not
passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is
null and void.
69 CASCO PHILIPPINE Pursuant to the provisions of RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the
CHEMICAL CO., INC., Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
petitioner, exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum
vs. establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of the fee.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his
capacity as Auditor General of Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
authority to decree a 90-day preventive
suspension against a Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines?
Whether the courts may go behind the
legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment.
Whether "urea" and "formaldehyde" are
exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee
RULING [RELATE TO THE SECTION UNDER WHICH IT WAS ASSIGNED]
Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in
form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the
case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:
“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the
official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension.”
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed
upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member.
xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Yes. Passing over the question -whether the printed Act (No, 2381), published by authority of law, is
conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind
the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear
and explicit.
While there is no jurisprudence on whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is
well settled in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question
whether a particular bill became a law or not.
When the legislative journals show with certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear
and unambiguous respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted
to show a different date of adjournment.
As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the
various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals
say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. Thus, the Act was timely passed and Pons’ guilt is
affirmed.
NO.
It should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture
of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its
Commissioner, the view that:
the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in
his capacity as Auditor of the
Central Bank, respondents.
G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963
is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood
and hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde —
which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid therefor the aforementioned
margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, Casco made another purchase of foreign exchange
and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, Casco had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No.
1529 of the Monetary Board declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt
from the fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, Casco made a similar request for refund
of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of the amounts,
the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve the vouchers, upon the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board for Casco’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde
is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, Par. XVIII of RA 2609, which reads “urea formaldehyde” and
not “urea and formaldehyde”.
“Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product
from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity,
and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.”
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea"
and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde".
It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President.

70. In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill No. 6951 was referred,
ENRIQUE V. MORALES, reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form
petitioner, vs. ABELARDO and substance. The provision of the substitute bill reads:
SUBIDO, as Commissioner of “No person may be appointed chief of the city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has
Civil Service, respondent served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or
No. L-29658. February 27, 1969 any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank
of captain or higher.”
The petitioner asserted that there were various changes made in House Bill 6951 and according to the
Petitioner the House bill division deleted an entire provision and substituted what is now section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, which section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of
a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has
served as chief of police with exemplary record or has served in the police department of any city with the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/higher.
Petitioner even submitted documents that would appear that the omission of the phrase “who served the
police department of a city” was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the
course of engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading stage and that the change was not
made by Congress but only by an employee.
It is for this reason that the Petitioner would have the court look searchingly into the matter.
Whether the Judiciary can assail the
validity of an enrolled bill by investigating
the legislative process.
NO. ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied.
The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that section
10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by ,the Bureau of Printing. The Supreme
Court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that the Supreme Court act upon the faith and credit of what the
officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive—on which the Supreme Court cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system—the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
ln all cases, the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution expressly requires must be entered on ,the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of
a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which
the Supreme Court cannot now decide. With respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

71. Astorga vs. Villegas
No. L-23475. April 30, 1974.*
(No mention of sec14, art 6)
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266 was passed. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. The committee recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator
Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter’s incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed, substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino.
Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator
Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
The bill thereupon became RA No. 4065.
The Senate President, addressed a letter to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled
bill signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill
duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no
effect. The invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature
appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary
had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment. The President of the Philippines withdraw his
signature on House Bill No. 9266.
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition for “Mandamus, to compel
respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, and the members of the municipal board to comply
WON the SC should look into the journal Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the
to determine if the said law was validly signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill.2 It
enacted. has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication,3 to signify to the Chief Executive that
the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
YES. rejection.4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved
after it has passed both Houses.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to co-equal and independent
departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated.” Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is
absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires
it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of HBl No.
9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate
and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and
holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

72. Abakada v. Ermita, supra.
73 ANGARA VS ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
JULY 15, 1936
74. Reyes v. COMELEC, supra
with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers,
proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of theNational Assembly for the said district, the petitioner then
took his oath of office. The National Assembly, in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming
the election of members against whom no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December
3, 1935. On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission
a "Motion of Protest" against the election of Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage
of Resolution No. 8, and praying, among other things, that said respondent be declared elected member
of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.
Petitioner Angara filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a)
that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be
presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation
of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Electoral
Commission denied such"Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report
Has the said Electoral Commission acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?
Whether or Not the Commission on
RA 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
NO. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it
is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within
the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to
any other. The location of the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled
"Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in that it is
constituted by a majority of members of the Legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of
the Legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. If the power claimed for the National
Assembly to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the Electoral
Commission to lay down a period within which protest should be filed were conceded, the grant of power to
the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested with the
power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would
the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be
frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to
time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of
taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National
Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional
grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character
to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of
construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferre. In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests
has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the
time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice
of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still
lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the
Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time
for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members
against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of
the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such
member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle
a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No.
1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case
75. Vera v. Aquino, 77 Phil. 192
76. Limkaichong v. COMELEC,
594 SCRA 434
Section 17
77 Chavez v COMELEC
GR No 105323 July 3, 1992
regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism
and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said
region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering
that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates
for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections –
shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed
against their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution,
praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties.
Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
Petitions for disqualification were instituted in the COMELEC against Limkaichong on the ground that she
lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the House of Representatives. Allegedly, Limkaichong
is not a natural-born Filipino because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth.
Meanwhile, while the petitions were pending, Limkaichong won the election over her rival Olivia Paras.
Paras then filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Suspend the
Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First District of Negros Oriental.
The COMELEC Second Division disqualified Limkaichong and directed the Provincial Supervisor of the
COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend her proclamation. The PBOC accordingly suspended the proclamation
of Limkaichong.
On the following day, or on May 18, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8062 adopting
the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of
the involved cases. The PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and
proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First District
of Negros Oriental.
Thereafter, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/or Annul the Proclamation of
Limkaichong stating, among others, that Limkaichong's proclamation violated the earlier order of the
COMELEC Second Division suspending her proclamation. The petition was dismissed by the COMELEC
First Division, ratiocinating that the disqualification cases were not yet final when Limkaichong was
proclaimed. Accordingly, her proclamation which was valid or legal, effectively divested the COMELEC of
its jurisdiction over the cases.
On May 5, 19912, this Court issued Resolution in GR No. 104704, entitled “Francisco Chavez v. Comelec,
et al.,” disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in
the May 11, 1992 elections. The resolution was received by respondent Comelec on May 6, 1992. On the
same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate to all its
agents and the general public the resolution; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of
Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates, tally sheets, election returns and “to count all
votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez .
Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified
candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all “Chavez” votes in favor of petitioner as well as
the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. On Election Day, Melchor
Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive
over the radio and TV ordering that all “Chavez” votes be credited to the petitioner however it did not
reach all the precincts.
Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA 7166 which
states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the Commission to instruct without
delay the deletion of the name of said candidate.
Confusion arose as the “Chavez” votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election
Inspectors (BEIs) .As a result, “Chavez” votes were not credited in favor of petitioner.
Elections has the jurisdiction to determine
whether or not votes cast in the said
provinces are valid.
Whether or Not the administration of oath
and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose Romero should be
deferred pending hearing and decision on
the protests lodged against their
elections.
WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction over
the case.
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction
over this case
was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be
admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was
political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts
The House or Senate retains the authority to defer the oath-taking of any of its members, pending an election
contest. Independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the
power to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate in its deliberations.
The legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations, as are found in
the Republic's Constitution. The Senate, as a branch of the legislative department, has the constitutional
power to adopt rules for its proceedings, and by legislative practice the power to promulgate such orders as
may be necessaryto maintain its prestige and to preserve its dignity.
The case is therefore dismissed
No.
Events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution. Limkaichong was
proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to
officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision that
theHRET, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
Pertinently, we held that the Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The
party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
Any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction
over all matters essential to a member’s qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.
NO.
Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that “The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members.. The word “sole” underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals’
jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective Members.
It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate
Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does,
contest relating to the election of a member of the Senate.
As aforesaid, petitioner’s proper recourse is to file a regular election protest before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.

78. Guerrero v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 137004, July 26, 2000 ALO
Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city election registrars throughout the
country to examine the minutes of voting submitted by the BEIs and to credit all the “Chavez” votes, which
have been declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying the latter to (1) implement its
May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes to scan for the “Chavez”
votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the appropriate entries in the election
returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.
Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner filed this urgent petition
for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the Comelec from
proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate. Petitioner alleges that respondent Comelec acted
capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion.
Sen. Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the law does not
allow pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of members of the Senate.
In the Second Division of the COMELEC, Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify respondent Fariñas as a Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse NO
candidate for the position of Congressman. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had been campaigning as a of discretion in holding that the
candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a Certificate of Candidacy determination of the validity of the In the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its
for said office. Ruiz asked the COMELEC to declare Fariñas as a “nuisance candidate” pursuant to certificate of candidacy of respondent jurisdiction over Case No. SPA 98-277 had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Fariñas as
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and to disqualify him from running in the May 11, 1998 elections, Fariñas is already within the exclusive Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare
as well as in all future polls. jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and
On May 8, 1998, Fariñas filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting candidate House of Representatives? assumption of the position by Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the
Chevylle V. Fariñas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17
of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
In dismissing Ruiz’s petition, the Second Division of the COMELEC stated, “[T]here is none (sic) in the returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
records to consider respondent an official candidate to speak of without the filing of said certificate. Hence, been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives,
there is no certificate of candidacy to be cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be disqualified.” COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The post-election tally of votes in Ilocos the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction
Norte showed that Fariñas got a total of 56,369 votes representing the highest number of votes received over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.
in the first district. Fariñas was duly proclaimed winner.
On June 3, 1998, Fariñas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. On June
10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his “Petition-In-
Intervention” in COMELEC Case No. SPA 98-227. Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate of
the Liberal Party (LP) in said elections for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected by Case No.
SPA 98-227. Guerrero contended that Fariñas, having failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy on or
before the last day therefor, being midnight of March 27, 1998, Fariñas illegally resorted to the remedy of
substitution provided for under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code and thus, Fariñas’
disqualification was in order. Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative of the first district of
Ilocos Norte be declared vacant and special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Fariñas.
On January 6, 1999, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Ruiz’s motion for reconsideration and Guerrero’s
petition-in-intervention in Case No. SPA 98-227.
79 Barbers vs. Commission on
Elections
G.R. No. 165691. June 22, 2005
80 Guerrero v Comelec 211
Robert Z. Barbers (“Barbers”) and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the Philippines
in the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections (“elections”).
COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of Senators promulgated a resolution proclaiming
the first 11 duly elected Senators in the elections. The COMELECdeclared that it would proclaim the
remaining 12th winning candidate for Senator after canvassing the remaining unsubmitted COCs.On 2
June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated another resolution proclaiming Biazon as “the 12th
ranking duly elected 12th Senator. According to COMELEC, Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than
Barbers. The COMELEC stated that this difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain
precincts where there was failure of elections.Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon
as Senatorclaiming that the latter’s proclamation was void, illegal and premature being based on an
incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs andvotes and the results
of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the
elections.On the other hand, Biazon asserts that the COMELEC 1st Division has no jurisdiction to review,
reverse or modify the actuations of COMELEC en banc sitting as NationalBoard of Canvassers for
Senators and that because he already took his oath, it should not entertain Barbers’ petition. It also argued
that considering his lead over Barbers, the remaining votes in the uncanvassed COCs would not
substantially affect the results as to the 12th
senator. On the other hand, Barbers countered by saying that there could be novalid proclamation based
on an incomplete canvass. COMELEC denied Barbers’ petition.It ruled that Barbers’ petition cannot be
categorized as a pre-proclamation controversy since the issues cited are not proper for such nor it can
be categorized as an election protest since the ground cited also does not make it as such. Besides, the
COMELEC also found out that considering Biazon’s lead over that of Barbers, even if those unincluded
votes would be counted in favor of Barbers still it would not affect the results. MR deniedby COMELEC
en banc. Hence, this petition.
In the Second Division of the COMELEC, Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify respondent Fariñas as a
Whether this Court can take cognizance
of this petition.
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse
No.
Certiorari as a special civil action is available only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit:
(a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding.
There must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for certiorari to prosper.
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organization registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides:
RULE 12. Jurisdiction.—The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections,17 we
ruled that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the
“sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members,”
thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election
cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.
The word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (“SET”) underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is
therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barbers contests
Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction
to act on Barbers’ complaint.
NO
SCRA 315 candidate for the position of Congressman. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had been campaigning as a
candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a Certificate of Candidacy
for said office. Ruiz asked the COMELEC to declare Fariñas as a “nuisance candidate” pursuant to
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and to disqualify him from running in the May 11, 1998 elections,
as well as in all future polls.
On May 8, 1998, Fariñas filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting candidate
Chevylle V. Fariñas who withdrew on April 3, 1998.
In dismissing Ruiz’s petition, the Second Division of the COMELEC stated, “[T]here is none (sic) in the
records to consider respondent an official candidate to speak of without the filing of said certificate. Hence,
there is no certificate of candidacy to be cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be disqualified.”
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The post-election tally of votes in Ilocos
Norte showed that Fariñas got a total of 56,369 votes representing the highest number of votes received
in the first district. Fariñas was duly proclaimed winner.
On June 3, 1998, Fariñas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. On June
10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his “Petition-In-
Intervention” in COMELEC Case No. SPA 98-227. Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate of
the Liberal Party (LP) in said elections for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected by Case No.
SPA 98-227. Guerrero contended that Fariñas, having failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy on or
before the last day therefor, being midnight of March 27, 1998, Fariñas illegally resorted to the remedy of
substitution provided for under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code and thus, Fariñas’
disqualification was in order. Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative of the first district of
Ilocos Norte be declared vacant and special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Fariñas.
On January 6, 1999, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Ruiz’s motion for reconsideration and Guerrero’s
petition-in-intervention in Case No. SPA 98-227.
81 Abayon vs HRET, G.R.
No.189466 February 11,
These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to
2010
pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of
Congress.
Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in
the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., et al., all
registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its
nominee, petitioner Abayon, claiming that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House
of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. They
alleged that she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of
an incumbent congressional district representative. Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-
list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged
to the women sector. Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over
the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the
registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC.
Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the
2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., et
al. who are members of some other party-list groups, him with respondent HRET a petition for
quowarranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, and alleged that Palparan was ineligible
to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others
said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the
party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives.
Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility
as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that
of discretion in holding that the
determination of the validity of the In the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its
certificate of candidacy of respondent jurisdiction over Case No. SPA 98-277 had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Fariñas as
Fariñas is already within the exclusive Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and
House of Representatives? assumption of the position by Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the
COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17
of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction
over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.
Whether or not respondent HRET has Yes. The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
jurisdiction over the question of petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over
qualifications of petitioners Abayon the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
and Palparan as nominees of Aangat
Tayo and Bantay party-list
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as
organizations, respectively, who took
and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies
the seats at the House of
who the "members" of that House. Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:
Representatives that such
"members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected
organizations won in the 2007
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
elections.
This means that, from the Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected"
into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that
peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the
voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner.
They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of
laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,a party-list
representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote
cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who,
in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to
represent.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or
her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and
 party-list group, not before the HRET. the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a
party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to
examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs
to the party or organization that nominates them.8 But where an allegation is made that the party or
organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the
lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken
out of its hand.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization
of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

81. Petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN Whether the Tribunal gravely abused We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the
coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The six its discretion in dismissing the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, senators who composed the tribunal were Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. petition for disqualification or and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga. inhibition filed by herein petitioners. ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS,
ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, Later, the petitioners, with Senator Estrada being replaced with Senator Enrile, filed with the respondent Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
G. ESPINA, WILSON P. resolution of the contest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, therein. They proposed to amend the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA R. being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal. remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
ESTRADA-KALAW, be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring the concurrence of five (5) the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be its Chairman.
JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme
PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative'
M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns
PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. and qualifications of Senators.
ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ, Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1—an unmistakable indication that the
LORENZO G. TEVES, "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
FERNANDO R. VELOSO,
petitioners, To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty
which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
vs. evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
TRIBUNAL, respondent. would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon….Yet the
G.R. No. 83767 October Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
27, 1988 Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Special Civil Action for certiorari Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
to nullify and set aside the
Resolutions of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal dated
February 12, 1988 and May 27,
1988, denying, respectively, the
petitioners' Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition and
their Motion for Reconsideration
thereafter filed.
82. Pimentel v. HRET, G.R. No. On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-
141489, November 29, 2002 List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular
vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House.
Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang
Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
(AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE).
Subsequently, the House constituted its House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
Commission on Appointments (CA) contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional
bodies. It does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House
nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. The House contingents to the HRET and
the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate
President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A.
R. Melo, as Chairman of the HRET, requesting to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the
Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayers ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list
representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
83. Bondoc vs. Pineda In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
G.R. No, 97710. September 26, winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is
1991. composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the
House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a
Under sec. 17 decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted
with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido
Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said
political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter
informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided
to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
84 ROSETTE YNIGUEZ Lerias and Mercado were both running for Representative of Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987
LERIAS, petitioner, elections. During the canvass of votes it appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass from the
Whether the present composition of the
House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because there are no
party-list representatives in the hret.
Whether or not the House of
Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, may
change that party’s representation in the
HRET to thwart the promulgation of a
decision freely reached by the tribunal in
an election contest pending therein. [NO,
DUH]
Is the HRET correct?
No. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the
seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to
elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members
in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members
would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional
provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject
to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government
to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. N
either can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly
nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the
HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-
list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available
facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election
process.
The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions,
with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the
HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration.
Disloyalty to party not a valid cause for termination of membership. As judges, the members of the tribunal
must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and
independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party
and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of
the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause,
such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party
or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party
disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
NO. The foregoing findings and pronouncements of the HRET (majority opinion) are totally bereft of any
support in law and settled jurisprudence.
vs. Municipality of Libagon which had been questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been
HOUSE OF tampered with, the candidates who received the two highest number of votes were Roger G. Mercado
REPRESENTATIVES with 34,442 votes and Rosette Y. Lerias with 34,128 votes, respectively.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
ROGER G. MERCADO, In the provincial board's copy of the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received
respondent. 1,811 votes while Mercado received 1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the
G.R. No. 97105 October canvass, Lerias would have received 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving Lerias a
15, 1991 winning margin of 146 votes. But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate
of canvass contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used as basis
of the canvass.
Lerias appealed the ruling of the provincial board of canvassers to the COMELEC praying that the
Commission order the provincial board of canvassers to use their copy of the certificate of canvass for
Libagon. At the scheduled hearing Lerias agreed to use the COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass
provided that it be found to be authentic and genuine. A similar reservation was made by Mercado.
The COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass was produced and when opened it showed that Lerias
received only 1,411 votes in Libagon because in Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 she received in each of the
said precincts 100 votes less than what she received as shown in the provincial board of canvasser's
copy of the certificate of canvass. Thus, Mercado was proclaimed winner, with a margin of 254 votes.
Lerias sought relief from the COMELEC but was denied.
The case eventually reached the HRET. In her protest, Lerias contested the results of the election in
Libagon asserting that the total votes credited to her in the said four precincts (1,411 votes) were less
than or short by 400 votes from that actually obtained by her (1,811 votes) and if the provincial board of
canvassers' copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon were to be used as basis of the canvass instead
of the COMELEC copy, she would have garnered 35,930 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes or a
winning margin of 146 votes.
The Tribunal, by a vote of 5-4, dismissed the petition of Lerias. The HRET majority opinion rejected the
election returns and sustained the certificate of canvass because (1) the COMELEC found that the
COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass is "regular, genuine and authentic on its face" and said
finding of the COMELEC had been sustained by the Supreme Court; (2) the protestant (meaning Lerias)
had agreed during the pre-proclamation proceedings to the use of the COMELEC copy of the certificate
of canvass; and (3) the authenticity of the election returns from the four (4) disputed precincts had not
been established.
The Chairperson of the Tribunal, the Honorable Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera dissented, in this wise:
“It becomes only too obvious then that by sheer force of numbers; by overturning, at the post-appreciation
stage, the rulings earlier made by the Tribunal admitting the claimed ballots for Protestant Lerias; by
departing from the interpretation of the neighborhood rule heretofore consistently followed by the Tribunal;
by injecting `strange jurisprudence,' particularly on the intent rule; the majority has succeeded in altering
the figures that reflect the final outcome of this election protest and, in the process, thwarting the true will
of the electorate in the lone district of Southern Leyte.”
85 May 11, 1987 (After congressional elections) -- Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner, was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
vs. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and September 16, 1988 -- the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned
THE LATTER’S CAPACITY AS from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their
SECRETARY OF THE former party to only 17 members.
COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, respondent.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
G.R. No. 86344. December 21,
newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting
1989.*
of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his
removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting
WON the Court can take cognizance of
the case
In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate,
the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced
or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. Where it has been duly determined that
actual voting and election by the registered voter had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting
centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resulting disenfranchisement of
the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the voting.
Canvassing boards, the COMELEC and the HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and
may do so only upon the most convincing proof that the returns are obviously manufactured or fake. And,
conformably to established rules, it is the party alleging that the election returns had been tampered with,
who should submit proof of this allegation.
At this juncture, it is well to stress that the evidence before the HRET is the original copy of the election
returns while the COMELEC's copy of the certificate of canvass, is merely a xerox copy, the original thereof
had not been produced.
Public interest demands that pre-proclamation contests should be terminated with dispatch so as not to
unduly deprive the people of representation, as in this case, in the halls of Congress. As the Court has
stressed in Enrile v. COMELEC, and other cases, the policy of the election law is that pre-proclamation
controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and
proclamation should be delayed as little as possible. The powers of the COMELEC are essentially executive
and administrative in nature and the question of fraud, terrorism and other irregularities in the conduct of the
election should be ventilated in a regular election protest and the Commission on Elections is not the proper
forum for deciding such matters; neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the COMELEC or the board
of canvassers the power, in the canvass of elections returns to look beyond the face thereof `once satisfied
of their authenticity'. We believe that the matters brought up by petitioner should be ventilated before the
House Electoral Tribunal. Unlike in the past, it is no longer the COMELEC but the House Electoral Tribunal
which is `the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications' of the members of
the House of Representatives.
It would appear, therefore, that this Court sustained the use of the COMELEC's copy of the certificate of
canvass instead of the copy of the provincial board of canvassers only to establish prima facie (but not
actually) the winner (as called for by the summary nature of pre-proclamation proceedings), without prejudice
to a more judicious and unhurried determination in an election protest, and because Lerias' thru counsel had
previously agreed conditionally and qualifiedly to its tentative use for pre-proclamation proceedings. The
decision of this court was merely an affirmance of the action of the COMELEC and it cannot be relied upon
as a final adjudication on the merits, on the issue of the genuineness and authenticity of the said certificate
of canvass. Besides, the use of said COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass by the board of canvassers
did not foreclose the right of Lerias to prove that the votes attributed to have been received by her as stated,
in said certificate of canvass is not correct. Acceptance of a certificate of canvass as genuine and authentic
for purposes of canvass simply means that said certificate of canvass is genuine and authentic for the
purpose of determining the prima facie winner in the election. But the very purpose of an election contest is
to establish who is the actual winner in the election.
Anent the pronouncement of the HRET (majority opinion) that having agreed to the use of the COMELEC's
copy of the certificate of canvass, Lerias is now estopped from assailing it, suffice it to state that Lerias
agreed to the use of said copy because she was not aware then that the figures therein had been altered. It
is a matter of record that she immediately objected after she discovered the discrepancy. At any rate, she
cannot be estopped from protesting a falsification of the voters' will because such estoppel would contravene
public policy.
Yes. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is
LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respon-dent’s assertion, the Court
has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary
act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner
from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion
explained in Tanada v. Cuenco: x x x the term political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, x x x it refers “to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the

86. Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr.
G.R. No. 86649. July 12, 1990.*
“Sec. 18. There shall be a COA
consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex oficio Chairman,
12 Senators, and 12 Members of
the HOR elected by each House
on the basis of proportional
representation from the political
parties and parties or
organizations registered under
the party-list system represented
therein.
The chairman of the
Commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it
within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission.
The commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
87 GUINGONA VS GONZALES
MARCH 1, 1993
initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary
restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the
Commission on Appointments.
Arguments for the petitioner:
(a) he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is
permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.
(b) the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.
Arguments for the respondent:
(a) the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court. (Main fact for judicial department)
(b) he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives
which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner.
(c) nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the HOR of the candidates of
diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, LB, LP, NP-Unido, KBL, Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para
sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the
only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.’
The HOR, upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the
Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the
Commission on Appointments which petitioner is not included. On 1987, upon nomination of the Minority
Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the COA,
representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
A year later, the “Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino” (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a political party.
As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House
committees, including the House representation in the COA, had to be reorganized.
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as
representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the COA and House Electoral Tribunal (p. 15,
Rollo). Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of respondents as
members of the COA, on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation.
In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Tañada and respondents Senate President
Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo, said respondents moved for a reconsideration of the
whether the members of the House in the
COA were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the
political parties therein as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Whether the conversion of fractional
membership of a political party into a
Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: Section
1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
The respondent’s contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While he may
be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner’s removal, we feel that this
objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one thing,
treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the respondent’s
right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the
Emergency Powers Cases that where serious constitutional question are involved, “the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside,
if we must, technicalities of procedure.”
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing consideration, that the issue presented to us is
justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained
of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even
if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed
by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of
the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same maybe brushed aside, conformably
to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised maybe addressed.
Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not
include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
YES. The composition of the House membership in the COA was based on proportional representation of
the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of
the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the
Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members
from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the
next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done “on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
therein.
Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng)
represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12
House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership,
i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.
There is no merit in the petitioner’s contention that the House members in the COA should have been
nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated
by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided
in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the COA—eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority—is unassailable.
YES.
"It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of the
 decision of the Supreme Court dated October 20, 1992, on the following grounds:
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION Senator Tañada alleges that:
1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents;
2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the
1935 and 1987 Constitutions;
3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;
4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Tañada to the
Commission on Appointments.
In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege:
1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng vs. Mitra,
Jr. and Daza vs. Singson.
2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission on Appointments to enable it to
function as a constitutional body.
3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political parties
and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.
4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which
contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional member ship of any party in the
Commission.
88 Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
1 (2006) Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in
a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
whole membership amounting to a political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:
reduction of the other party's
representation in the Commission on
Appointments is a clear violation of the LDP - 7.5
Constitutional mandate requiring
membership therein be based on LP-PDP-LABAN - .5
proportional representation of the political
parties NPC – 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD – 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the
basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority
in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one
half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than
their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer
in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP
and reduced the representation of one political party—either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that
twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission
on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation
Respondents, however, accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives
of each political party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members
of each political party at the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the
Senate. In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the LakasNUCD upheld
the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the
Commission based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on
Appointments.
We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected
to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is not
mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that
there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the Commission on
Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication
of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. x x x This interpretation finds support in the
case of Tañada vs. Cuenco, where this Court held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the
election of the specified number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they
should be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in
interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail.
Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not
fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the
Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten
(10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator Tañada is excluded from the Commission on
Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has
representation in the Commission in the presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as
Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it deprives it of the
of inquiry vested in Congress. information in possession of these officials. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec.
21 Article VI of the Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry –
with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting conditions which the

89. Gudani v. Senga
NOTE: The discussion is more
of Section 18 of Article VII and
not Section 18 of Article VI
B/Gen. (ret.) Francisco Gudani
and Lt. Col. Alexander Balutan
vs. Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga as
AFP Chief of Staff, Col. Gilberto
Jose Roa as the Pre-trial
Investigating officer, the Provost
Marshall General of the AFP and
the general Court Martial.
G.R. No. 170165. August 15,
2006
Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing
and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec.
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court
marshal for such attendance.
On September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security. The hearing was scheduled to investigate the allegations of massive cheating during the
elections and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt (“Hello Garci”) purportedly of a phone
conversation between PGMA and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. Gen. Gudani was the
commander, and Col. Balutan was a member, of “Joint Task Force Ranao”, a military task force
responsible for the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao
del Norte and Lanao del Sur.
Gen. Senga replied through a letter to Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend the hearing due to
a previous commitment in Brunei, but he nonetheless “directed other officers from the AFP who were
invited to attend the hearing.” On 26 September 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a
Memorandum directing the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
filed their respective requests for travel authority.
On the following day, Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon, requesting the postponement of the
hearing scheduled for the following day, since the AFP Chief of Staff was himself unable to attend said
hearing, and that some of the invited officers also could not attend as they were “attending to other urgent
operational matters.” By this time, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had already departed Baguio for
Manila to attend the hearing.
Then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was transmitted to the
PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as follows: “Per instruction of Her Excellency
PGMA, no AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional or senate hearing without her Approval.
Inform BGGEN Francisco Gudani and LTC Alexander Balutan accordingly.”
The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator that “no
approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear” before the hearing scheduled
on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and
they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.
Few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga
issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee “in spite of the
WON the President may prevent a
member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry?
legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information, recourse
must be had on others who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.
The operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case.
The Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.
A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are
two distinct functions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain to the same
power of the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the
aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Hence, the oversight function of Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power – the president on whom the executive power is vested,
hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the power of impeachment. Members of SC are likewise
exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well
as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
Yes. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which
begins with the simple declaration that “the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines x x x” Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article
XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over
the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the
President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be
sanctioned under civilian law.
However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn
on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval
before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed
forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the
President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate
that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost
respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court
will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes
that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. At the same
time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject
to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation.53 Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s
power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s
right to conduct legislative inquiries. The remedy lies with the courts.

90 Negros Oriental Electric
Cooperative II v. Sangguniang
Panglungsod
GR no. 72492, November 5,
1987
91 SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR
ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.)
and MARIA FE C. DELA PAZ, vs
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
fact that guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an
appearance”; that such directive was “in keeping with the time-honored principle of the Chain of
Command”; and that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Articles of War 65 (Willfully
Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings” Both
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.
On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive
Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The E.O. “enjoined officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.” This Court subsequently
ruled on the constitutionality of the said executive order in Senate v. Ermita.
It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, particularly
seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners from
testifying before Congress without her prior approval be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges stated
in the charge sheets against petitioners be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga, Col. Galarpe, Col. Roa, and
their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined
from proceeding against petitioners, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate on 28
September 2005.
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection
with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Petitioner Paterio Torres and Arturo
Umbac were both invited to an investigation to be conducted by the respondent’s Committee in connection
with the operations of public utilities specifically the Negros Orriental Electric Cooperative II.
NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused
to appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate and to order the improvement of
alleged inefficient lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification
Administration, and neither the charter of the city, nor the old Local Government Code (Batas Pamabansa
Blg. 337) grants the SP such power.
Due their failure to appear at the said investigation, petitioners were reproving for legislative contempt.
On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National Police (PNP) officers
arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the International Criminal
Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the delegation
was Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however,
was to retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.
On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow airport
departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately P6,930,000.00]
found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly
equivalent to P2,970,000.00).
Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP
Whether the Sanguniang Panlungsod
has the power to mandate the testimony
of witnesses and order arrests who fail to
observe the subpoena?
WON respondent Committee is devoid of
any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow
incident as the matter does not involve
state to state relations.
NO.
There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to
punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers,
the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for
contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated
legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot
be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power
to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of
Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The AdHoc
Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.
WHEREFORE, the subpoena dated October 25, 1985 requiring the attendance and testimony of the
petitioners at an investigation by the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee, and the Order issued by the latter on
October 29,1985 directing herein petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative
contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra vires. The
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee are without power to punish
non-members for contempt. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on November 7, 1985
enjoining said respondents, their agents and representatives, and the police and other peace officers from
enforcing the aforesaid Order of the respondent committee is made permanent.
NO. Respondent has jurisdiction.
Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: “Each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings.
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power
is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.
The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that, in Tañada v. Cuenco, was characterized as a
question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
 delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government confiscated the euros.
On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting them
were subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for the investigation it was to conduct on the
Moscow incident on October 23, 2008.
On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of attending the hearing,
petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion
to Quash Subpoena. Senator Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committee’s jurisdiction and
commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.
92 STANDARD V SENATE Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an institution incorporated in England with
limited liability and is licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the Philippines.
The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1)
proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling
petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB- Philippines to attend and testify before any further hearing
to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any hold-
departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be
rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2)
prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted
pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.
On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege
speech entitled “Arrogance of Wealth” before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo
denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities
Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator
Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile
had
introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166 to wit:
RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED
AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS
OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC
Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial
hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and
resolution filed by Senator Enrile. Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing,
requesting them to submit their written position3paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to
respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there
were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby
posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among
I. Whether the respondents have the
jurisdiction to conduct an investigation in
aid of legislation
II. Whether the filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or
a quasi-judicial body should
automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation.
III. Whether the respondents violated
petitioners’ rights to due process, privacy,
travel and self incrimination
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. Pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules,
the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives
of quorum, voting and publication.
Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue dependent upon the
wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action.
The Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines and Russia. Gen. Dela
Paz went to Moscow in an official capacity, as a member of the Philippine delegation to the INTERPOL
Conference in St. Petersburg, carrying a huge amount of “public” money ostensibly to cover the expenses to
be incurred by the delegation. The matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take judicial notice
of the fact that the Philippines is a state-party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions contain provisions
dealing with the movement of considerable foreign currency across borders.
The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted by the respondent
Committee and the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon
Committee). Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee
may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office
by officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities,
and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its attention by any of its members.
The arrest order issued against the petitioners has been rendered ineffectual. In the legislative inquiry held
on November 15, 2008, jointly by the respondent Committee and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Gen.
Dela Paz voluntarily appeared and answered the questions propounded by the Committee members. Having
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Senate Committees, there was no longer any necessity to
implement the order of arrest.
I. YES
Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the petitioners claim that since the issue of whether
or not SCB- Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that
took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the
judicial powers vested solely in these courts.
The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does not apply squarely to petitioners’ case.
It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was one over which jurisdiction
had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier. To the extent that,
in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and administrative
bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a
resemblance between this case and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there. Central to the Court’s
ruling in Bengzon—that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any constitutional mooring to
conduct the legislative investigation—was the Court’s determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid
of legislation. The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation contained
no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look into possible
violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019.
II. NO.
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert
any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is
an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation. As
succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)—[T]he power of inquiry—with
process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information—which is not infrequently true—recourse must be had to others who possess it.
III. NO
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the
 those invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved
that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the
Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them
and/or include them in the Bureau’s Watch List.
The February 28, 2005 hearing was adjourned without the setting of the next hearing date. However,
petitioners were later served by respondent with subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum to compel
them to attend and testify at the hearing set on March 15, 2005.
93. ROMERO vs ESTRADA
G.R. No. 174105 April
Petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation
2, 2009
which read in part “…RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
IN ITS ONGOING INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE ALLEGED OWWA LOSS OF P480
MILLION TO FOCUS ON THE CULPABILITY OF THEN PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS, THEN OWWA
ADMINISTRATOR WILHELM SORIANO, AND R-II BUILDERS OWNER REGHIS ROMERO II x x x The
inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to
the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to craft a much needed legislation
relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions. By virtue of the
power vested in Congress by Section 21, Article VI of 1987 Constitution regarding inquiries in aid of
legislation, may we have the privilege of inviting you to the said hearing to shed light on any matter, within
your knowledge and competence, covered by the subject matter and purpose of the inquiry. Rest assured
that your rights, when properly invoked and not unfounded, will be duly respected. “
In his letter-reply, petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the
Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate (PS)
principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such
power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign
character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. In this
case, petitioners’ imputation that the investigation was “in aid of collection” is a direct challenge against the
authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find the contempt
citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified.
It is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of
witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said
witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering that
most of the officers of SCBPhilippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade the compulsive
character of respondent’s summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the respondent to request
the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said witnesses from evading the
inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a court. The BID instead included
them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying petitioners’ intended travel abroad for
five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them.
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that
privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees
respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to
privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704
(2006), we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally
prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to
privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis
relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), there is no infringement of the
individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case,
to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the
public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling
enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.
As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCB-Philippines, are not being indicted
as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent merely as resource persons, or
as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. As distinguished by this Court—[An] accused occupies a different tier
of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question
requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand
and refuse to answer any and all questions. Concededly, this right of the accused against self-incrimination
is extended to respondents in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to
criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by
law; and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.
However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by
the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline
appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded.
NO. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub
Whether or not the subject matter of the
judice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Committee’s inquiry is sub judice.
Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent Committee’s assailed
investigation, is no longer sub judice or "before a court or judge for consideration." The sub judice issue has
been rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008
in G.R. No. 164527. At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication
by the Court, still, such circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. In Sabio
v. Gordo, the Court held that As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. Nazareno––
[T]he power of inquiry––with process to enforce it––is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information––which is not infrequently true––recourse must be had to others who
 Resolutions. The Committee found his excuse unmeritorious and thus was denied. On the same date, possess it.
invitations were sent to each of the other six petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of R-II
Builders, Inc., requesting them to attend another Committee hearing. Senator Jinggoy Estrada, as
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases before
Chairperson of the Committee, caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum on petitioner Romero
lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that
II directing him to appear and testify before the Committee at its hearing relative to the aforesaid Senate
these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases and special
resolutions.
civil actions awaiting final disposition before this Court.

Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to
The foregoing consideration is not all. The denial of the instant recourse is still indicated for another
enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued. Failing to
compelling reason. As may be noted, PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the letter-
secure the desired TRO sought in the petition, petitioner Romero II appeared at the Committee
invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to appear and testify in connection with the twin
investigation.Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO alleging
resolutions were sent out in the month of August 2006 or in the past Congress. On the postulate that the
among others that xxx (2) when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource person,
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before and after it, the aforesaid
the latter spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National Housing Authority,
invitations and subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry conducted is, for
none of which were related to the subject of the inquiry;. The manifestation was followed by the filing on
all intents and purposes, terminated. In this regard, the Court draws attention to its pronouncements
another urgent motion for a TRO in which petitioners imputed to the Committee the intention to harass
embodied in its Resolution of September 4, 2008 in G.R. No. 180643 entitled Neri v. Senate Committee on
them as, except for petitioner Romero II, none of them had even been mentioned in relation to the subject
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations:
of the investigation.Meanwhile, respondents interposed an opposition, observing that the Senate’s
motives in calling for an investigation in aid of legislation were a political question. They also averred that
the pendency of Chavez "is not sufficient ground to divest the respondents of their jurisdiction to conduct Certainly, x x x the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
an inquiry into the matters alleged in the petition. election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business,
the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before it.

The Senate Rule states among others that “All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the
expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present[ed] for the first
time.”

Following the lessons of Neri, as reiterated in Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, et al., it can very well be stated that the termination of the
assailed investigations has veritably mooted the instant petition. This disposition becomes all the more
impeccable, considering that the Senate of the present Congress has not, per available records, opted to
take up anew, as an unfinished matter, its inquiry into the investment of OWWA funds in the Smokey
Mountain project.

Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before
it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, and the
Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it
in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if
incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked:

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that ["this right may be] invoked by the said
directors and officers of Philcomsat x x x only when the incriminating question is being asked, since
they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them."
That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees
their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be presented
before the courts.

94. More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between Whether the legislative inquiry As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue
the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that Article III of the Constitution. derogation of the constitutional requirement.
petitioner, placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the
Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of
vs. Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results
THE HOUSE OF of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
REPRESENTATIVES hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
INFORMATION, PUBLIC Alarmed by the developments in the congressional investigation, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
ORDER AND SAFETY, Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally
SECURITY, INFORMATION obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
AND COMMUNICATIONS implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general
TECHNOLOGY, and inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL of the House proceedings. which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
REFORMS, respondents. publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Two years later, when the issue was again revisited by the Senate, petitioners Santiago Ranada and
G.R. No. 170338 Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition xxx
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
x---------------------- docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry.
x rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available
They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA III of the Constitution.
and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance
The Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs,
petitioners,
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance
vs. objectives—the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any
THE SENATE OF THE custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
REPUBLIC OF THE inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275. Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT
THE HONORABLE MANUEL The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
VILLAR, respondents. available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
G.R. No. 179275 Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
x---------------------- accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the
x Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
petitioner-in-intervention
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
x---------------------- Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
x R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does
BENIGNO NOYNOY C. not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
AQUINO, RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, PANFILO M. The Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
LACSON, LOREN B. in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the
LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not
TRILLANES, respondents- be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear
intervenors contravention of the Constitution.

December 23, 2008

Petition for Prohibition and

Injunction, with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining the Senate
of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees
from conducting any inquiry in
aid of legislation centered on the
"Hello Garci" tapes.
95. Neri v. Senate, 564 SCRA
152
96. Arnault vs. Nazareno
G. R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950
Under sec. 18
Senate Committees invited Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA), to attend their joint investigation on the alleged anomalies in the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project where the Philippine Government contracted with the Chinese firm
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) involving the amount of US$329,481,290. When Neri
testified, he disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200
million in order for him to approve NBN-ZTE deal. Neri narrated that he informed President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that PGMA instructed him not to accept the bribe.
When Neri was probed on questions:
1. WON PGMA followed up on the NBN project,
2. WON PGMA directed him to prioritize the project, and
3. WON PGMA directed him to approve the said project
Neri refused to answer and invoked the “executive privilege.” Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to Neri. They required him to appear and testify on November 2007. However, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s
testimony invoking executive privilege on the ground that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair the diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, Neri cannot provide the
Committee any further details of their conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.
Consequently, Neri did not appear before the Senate Committees. The latter issued a Show Cause Letter
to Neri requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the
scheduled hearing on November 2007.
On 29 November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that his non-appearance was
upon the order of the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines.
Senate Committees found the explanation unsatisfactory. They cited Neri in contempt and ordered for his
arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and gives his
testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt Order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
stressed that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim to executive
privilege in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita.
Senate Committees claimed that the refusal of Neri to answer the three questions violates the people’s
right to public information.
October, 1949, the Philippine Government, , through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two
estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively.
Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact
in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault.
The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact,
the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault.
Buenavista Estate - originally owned by the San Juan de Dios Hospital.
June 29, 1946- the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000(annual
pmt=500T) to Ernest H. Bur who made a down payment of P10,000. Burt has made no other payment.
Tambobong Estate - originally owned by the Philippine Trust Company.
May 14, 1946- PTC sold estate for P1,200,000 (90T w/in 9mo, 10 installments of 110T) to Ernest H. Burt
who paid P10,000 down payment. 9months expired but Burt’s did not pay any other amount then or
afterwards.
Whether Neri’s refusal to answer the 3
questions were covered by executive
privilege?
1. WON the Senate has power to punish
Arnault for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000. [YES]
2. WON the Senate has authority to
commit Arnault for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session,
which ended on May 18, 1950. [YES]
Yes. In the case of United States vs. Nixon, the Court laid out the three elements of a valid claim of executive
privilege:
1. The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power;
2. It must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. (The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President)
and
3. It may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
First, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that the communications
elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process,” and that “the information sought
to be disclosed might impair the diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.
Second, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the President’s Cabinet.
Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Presidential
communications are presumptive privilege and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing
of public need by the branch seeking access to such conversations.
In the case at bar, the Senate Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the
three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards
the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, “the
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed
in pursuit of legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself provides that
this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the
limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered.
The petition was granted. The subject Order citing petitioner in contempt of the Senate Committee and
directing his arrest and detention was nullified.
1. The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the
United States or a State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult
to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be
coextensive with the range of legislative power.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject
of the inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The materiality of a question that may be propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. Since the Court
has no power to determine what legislation to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that the information
sought from a witness which is material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed
or possible legislation. It is not within the province of the Court to determine or imagine what legislative
measures Congress may take after the completion of the legislative investigation.
It is the duty of every citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. His
 September 4, 1947- the PTC sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress
Administration for P750,000.
February 5, 1948- the Rural Progress Administration made a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution
and cancellation of his contract of purchase
Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt’s certificate of title and
the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank,
from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of
October, 1949,
constitutional privilege against self- incrimination, unless clearly established, must yield to that duty. When a
specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other
is clear and imperative, the former must yield to the latter. The right to live is one of the most sacred that the
citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect
the life of others.
2. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish. for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the
existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The
Senate is a continuing body which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress
or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt
in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.

February 27, 1950 - the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which creates a special committee to
investigate the Buenavista and the Tambobong estates deal.

The special committee examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was the herein
petitioner, Jean L. Arnault.
An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent
unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his
alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before
October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.

Arnault testified that :

- two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October
29, 1949; -
on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the PNB in which he
deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000;
- he draw two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies,
Inc., and another for P440,000 payable which he himself cashed.
Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the P440,000 (he could not remember the name and his answer
will be self-incriminating. This is contradictory: if he cannot give a name, how could his answer be self-
incriminating? ).

The senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him
to jail and is being contested in this petition.

97 Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA Former President Cory issued EO No. 1 creating the PCGG. She entrusted upon this body the task of
704 recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Marcos and his close associates.
To ensure the PCGG’s unhampered performance of its tasks, Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that:
G.R. No. 174340 October “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
17, 2006 legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”
20 years later, the Senate invited PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio to be one of the resource persons in a
Senate investigation. However, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation invoking Section 4 (b) of E.O. No.
1.
May Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 be
invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify non-
appearance on legislative investigations?
NO. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral
of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in
order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal.
The Court’s high regard of such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically
ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation,
is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant to Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power
of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to
this class.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates
or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public
accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public

98 ARVIN R. BALAG, Petitioner, This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of an issuance of a temporary
versus - CARPIO, SENATE OF restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin
THE PIDLIPPINES, SENATE implementation of the Senate P.S. Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of Complaint by the
COMMITfEE ON PUBLIC Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs filed by Arvin R. Balag (Balag) against the
ORDER AND DANGEROUS Senate of the Philippines, et. al. (respondent). On September 17, 2017, a first-year law student from the
DRUGS, ETC. University of Santo Tomas named Horacio Castillo III, allegedly died due to hazing-related activities
conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity.
G .R. No. 234608
On September 20, 2017, the senate released Senate Resolution No. 504 entitled “a Resolution Directing
the Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of
Horacio Castillo III Allegedly due to Hazing-Related Activities” filed by Sen. Paolo Benigno Aquino IV.
When Balag attended the hearing dated on October 18, 2017, Sen. Grace Poe asked Balag if he was
the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity however, Balag refused to answer and invoked his right to self-
incrimination. Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that it was just a “simple question” to invoke self-incrimination
and warned Balag that he may be cited in contempt, but Balag still refused to answer.
According to Sen. Grace Poe, Balag’s signature appeared on the document for the application of the
Aegis Juris Fraternity in the organizational sheet submitted in the school administration and it was
indicated therein that Balag was the President, yet he still refuses to answer the simple question asked.
Balag was then cited in contempt and was ordered to place in detention under the Senate Sergeant at
Arms’ supervision after the senate hearing. Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave Balag a chance to purge out of
contempt, however, Balag still refused to answer and invoked his right to self-incrimination. When Balag
was asked of the question of whose decision it was to bring the victim to the hospital, Balag submitted a
plea to lift his contempt and stated that he was a member of the Aegis Juris Fraternity, however, he does
not know who the president was because he was enrolled at another university at the time of the incident.
The question asked before his plea was again repeated and Balag invoked again his right to self-
incrimination.
99. Senate v. Ermita, supra.
100. SANLAKAS vs. They came in the middle of the night. Armed with highpowered ammunitions and explosives, some three
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in
Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded,
G.R. No. 159085. February 3, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the PNP.1
2004.* In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress
SEC 23. the rebellion.
In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas v. Executive Sec),2 party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng
Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration
of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces.3
Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.) are
officers/members of the Social Justice Society (SJS), “Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar
reviewers.” They contend that the declaration is a “constitutional anomaly” that “confuses, confounds and
misleads” because “[o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order,
are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens.”7 Finally, they contend that the presidential
WON the Senate Committee acted with
grave abuse of discretion in conducting
the legislative inquiry and citing Balag in
contempt
Whether the declaration of a “state of
rebellion” have any legal meaning or
consequence. NO.
information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence
of any constitutional basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. However, the period of imprisonment
under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until
the termination of the legislative inquiry. The December 12, 2017 Resolution of the Court ordering the
temporary release of Arvin R. Balag from detention is hereby declared FINAL.
Yes. However, the court denied the petition for being moot and academic. In the present case, the Court
finds that there is no more justiciable controversy to be decided up since in its resolution dated December
12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release of Balag pending resolution of the instant
petition. Thus, Balag was no longer detained under the Senate's authority. However, the court still resolved
the case despite being moot and academic.
The court ruled that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during
inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry. The court stated
that the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry should be balanced. The
Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against
recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when
the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said
witness.
However, during recess, the Senate will be prevented from effectively conducting legislative hearings. But
the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that
the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry upon the approval or
disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and
compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected
because their detention shall not be indefinite.
The interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry are balanced. The
Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry
against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate
immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the
constitutional rights of the said witness. However, the Senate will be prevented from effectively
conducting legislative hearings during recess - shall be duly addressed because it is expressly
provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings
while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the
Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At the
same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be
indefinite.
It has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited
to the determination of “actual controversies.”18 Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot,
if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review.”19 The case at bar is one such case. Only petitioners Rep.
Suplico, et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject
issuances.
The majority made it clear that exercise of the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers does not require the
declaration of a “state of rebellion” or a declaration of a “state of lawless violence” or a “state of invasion.”
When any of these conditions exist, the President may call out the armed forces to suppress the danger.
Thus, the declaration of a “state of rebellion” does not have any legal meaning or consequence. This
declaration does not give the President any extra powers. It does not have any good purpose.
The President, as Commanderin-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated power[s].”30 From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the
exercise of such power.31 However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,32
 issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President.
In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico, et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo), petitioners brought suit as
citizens and as Members of the HOR whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected.
Petitioners do not challenge the power of the President to call out the Armed Forces.11 They argue,
however, that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a “superfluity,” and is actually an exercise of
emergency powers.12Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress
granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the
lifting of the declaration.16 In addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing of the petitioners to
bring suit.
101 DAVID VS ARROYO
MAY 3, 2006 On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency.
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5
(G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their
professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence,
such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
102.Ampatuan v. DILG On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some
Secretary Puno, G.R. No. news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,1 placing “the
190259, June 7, 2011 Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabatounder a state of emergency.” She
directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and
by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places.
Three days later, President Arroyo also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the DILG. But, due to issues
raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273- A (AO 273-
A) amending the former, by “delegating” instead of “transferring” supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials,4 filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG
Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and seize the regional government’s powers, in violation of
the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and
the Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative
supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.
Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the
deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.
Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute a usurpation of
legislative powers hence, unconstitutional
Whether or not the President unlawfully
exercised emergency powers when she
ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP
personnel in the places mentioned in the
proclamation.
“[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that
‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-
Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers
beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1
and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article
VI.
NO.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to “other national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of
our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and
grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should
first authorize the President before he can declare a “state of national emergency.” The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence
of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a
constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and
Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
NO. Such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence; Unless it is shown that such determination was
attended by grave abuse of discretion, the court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.—While it is
true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it would
generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in IBP v. Hon. Zamora, 338 SCRA
81 (2000), it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling
out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination
was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
PGMA’s reason: The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time was too grave to ignore and she had
to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated
that there was movement in these
places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans.Thus, to pacify the
people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the
armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously

103. Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R.
No. 231658, July 4, 2017 (See
MR Fbnruary 6, 2018 ELEGIO
104 Guingona v Carague
196 SCRA 221
105. Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 235 SCRA 630 ALO
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service)
and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled “Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act),” by P.D. No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177,
and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990
budget pursuant to said decrees.
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House
of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version
(S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law.
It appears that on various1dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills were
introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and
Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197,
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November
17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.
It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways
and Means.
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which,
after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that “House Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as
reconciled and approved by the conferees.”
The Conference Committee bill, entitled “AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT)
SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” was thereafter approved
by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill
was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic
Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general
circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect
Whether or not the appropriation of P86
billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget
violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution?
Whether RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the HR as required by Sec
24 Article 6 of the Constitution
threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
No.
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by
law,” such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other
words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms.
The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or
in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public
purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention
clearly and certainly appears from the language employed, whether in the past or in the present.
The Court therefor, finds that RA. No. 4860, as amended by PD No.81, Section 31 of PD. 1177 and PD No.
1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by
Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
NO.
Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that
although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the
verb “shall originate” is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word “exclusively” and the phrase “as
on other bills” in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as
having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law—but the revenue bill—which is required
by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize
this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the
result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be
discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill
may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute—and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law—must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” It would be to
violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior
to the Senate.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House
can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who
are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views
are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

106 Wenceslao Pascual vs
Secretary of Public Works and
Communications
GR No. L-10405, December 29,
1960
Contention: Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result
of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
Nature of Action: Appeal from a decision of CFI.
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual,
then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually
going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio
Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same
Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in
Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the
expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the
other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
Whether or not the appropriation is valid
No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of
the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact
that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance
with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can
be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the
land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that
said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
The donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines will
use the parcels of land hereby donated for street purposes only and for no other purposes whatsoever; it
being expressly understood that should the Government of the Republic of the Philippines violate the
condition hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto
revert to the DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA.
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public
purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its
validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed
to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each
advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
107 Tolention v Sec of Finance
“SEC. 24. All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.”
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House
of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version
(S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law.
It appears that on various1dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills were
introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and
Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197,
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November
17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.
It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways
and Means.
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which,
after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that “House Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as
reconciled and approved by the conferees.”
The Conference Committee bill, entitled “AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT)
SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” was thereafter approved
by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill
was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic
Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general
circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect
Contention: Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result
of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
Whether RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the HR as required by Sec
24 Article 6 of the Constitution
NO.
Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that
although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the
verb “shall originate” is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word “exclusively” and the phrase “as
on other bills” in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as
having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law—but the revenue bill—which is required
by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize
this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the
result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be
discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill
may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute—and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law—must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” It would be to
violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior
to the Senate.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House
can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who
are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views
are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
108. Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides: Whether Section 14 of Rep. Act No. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider.
9006 is a Rider.
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, The proscription in Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution requiring every bill passed to embrace only
MANUEL M. GARCIA, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus
FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS the filing of his certificate of candidacy. calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND The petitioners mainly allege that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an
ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that—Constitutional provisions relating to the
THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power
REPRESENTATION OF THE of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably
MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
IN THE HOUSE OF to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
REPRESENTATIVES, They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The
petitioners, 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
vs. Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of
THE EXECUTIVE other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned principles but also the objectives thereof:
SECRETARY, COMMISSION therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
ON ELECTIONS, HON. Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006. Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. – The State shall, during the election period, supervise or
FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of
JR., SECRETARY OF THE communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service,
INTERIOR AND LOCAL including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
OF THE SENATE, AND elections.
SECRETARY GENERAL OF The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form
THE HOUSE OF of harassment and discrimination.
REPRESENTATIVES,
respondents. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the
G.R. No. 147387 said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x its content.

CONG. GERRY A. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on
SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act
No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate
vs. the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in
the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
COMMISSION ON inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
ELECTIONS, respondent. providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
G.R. No. 152161 xxx
December 10, 2003 The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
Two Petitions under Rule 65 of discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
the Rules of Court, as amended, Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of
seeking to declare as society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage
unconstitutional Section 14 of political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom
Election Act), insofar as it or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based
expressly repeals Section 67 of on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for
Omnibus Election Code) the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the
range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court
in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that
the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its
belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws—the fair,

109. Garcia vs Mata G.R. No. L-
33713 July 30, 1975
110. Demetria v. Alba, 148
Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his reversion
to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332. On June
18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months
and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 (the act under consideration) took effect, petitioner
had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines;
Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial
proceedings;
From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has
neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed
in the Government in any capacity;
As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary petitions with the
offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the President, respectively, but
received reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General.
The petitioner consequently argues that his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960 was in
violation of the provision in RA 1900 Par 11 which states that “xxx That reserve officers with at least ten
years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval
of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings
or upon their request” which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers on active duty
with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned service.
On the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence
whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore
proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.
The petitioners, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa, sought to prohibit Manuel
Whether or not the paragraph in question
violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 and Sec.
19 par. 2 of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines.
. Whether the transfer of funds under PD
honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress—is achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in
its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the
public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members
of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their
reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the
existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
YES. A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any
appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first clause of paragraph 11
itself, which reads,
After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more
than two years during any period of five consecutive years:
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation
of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental government
policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP.
The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph.
In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general appropriation
act." It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines
which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any
provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or
was not germane to or properly connected with that subject.
In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly connected
therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and every fair intendment
and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of the validity of the legislative enactment. But when an
act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title,
such provisions are inoperative and without effect.
We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. Thus, in Sumulong
vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is "a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject."
The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a
provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.6
The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the
government." Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted subject or
any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision in the body of the act is not
fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty
and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.
Yes. In the 1973 Constitution, it is explicitly stated that one cannot transfer an appropriation for one item to
SCRA 208 Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the
Budget Reform Decree of 1977.
Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides
that: “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
Demetria and others alleged that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal
transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President
to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations. They averred that this is
unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and
held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its
performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot
and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which
states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
111, Liga ng mga Barangay vs. A consolidation of 2 cases
Commission on Elections
1st case: Petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an organization of barangays, represented by petitioner Alex
G.R. No. 114809. May 5, 1994 L. David, its president and secretary general as well as a taxpayer, question what they perceive as “the
threatened illegal transfer, disbursement and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution
Under sec. 25 and the law” relative to the conduct of the forthcoming barangay elections (scheduled for 9 May 1994).
2nd case: Petitioners claim that in the General Appropriation Act of 1994, only P137,878,000.00 were
appropriated by Congress for the holding of the 1994 barangay elections. By early 1994, according to
petitioners, Congress itself had made an assessment that such appropriated sum would be insufficient to
defray the cost of holding the said elections and that they are to effect a transfer or re-allocation of the
following amounts to be sourced from the executive and legislative branches of Government to
COMELEC. The money shall come from DILG, Countryside Development Fund, from the Senate, House
of Reps, and from IRA of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities.
COMELEC denied the allegations and said that these are merely culled from mere unofficial proposals or
suggestions made in the process of searching for funds for the said elections but which were later
discarded by the proponents themselves. It said that the money will come from its own savings resulting
from unused funds originally intended for the conduct and supervision of elections and other political
exercises.
112 ANDRES SANCHEZ, Congress passed RA 7180 (General Appropriations Act of 1992), which provided an appropriation for the
LEONARDO D. REGALA, DILG and set aside the amount of PHP 75 Million for the DILG’s Capability Building Program. Atty.
RAFAEL D. BARATA, NORMA Mendoza, Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local
AGBAYANI, and CESAR N. Autonomy, informed then Deputy Executive Secretary de la Serna of the proposal to constitute and
SARINO, petitioners, implement a “shamrock” type task force to implement local autonomy institutionalized under the LGC.
vs. The stated purpose for the creation of the task force was to design programs, strategize and prepare
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, modules for an effective program for local autonomy.
1177 is unconstitutional?
WON the alleged scheme of transferring
funds to be adopted by COMELEC is
valid. [YES]
Whether there is a legal basis for the
transfer of funds of the Capability Building
Program Fund appropriated in the 1992
General Appropriation Act from the
Department of Interior and Local
Government to the Office of the President
another. However, it allowed enactment of a law which authorized transfer of funds in order to augment an
item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the govt. branch or constitutional body concerned.
This leeway is limited, and was only granted to allow heads of govt. branches some flexibility in the use of
public funds and resources. This limitation stems from the fact that the PURPOSE and CONDITION for fund
transfering was required.
It should also be noted that the 1987 Constitution carries verbatim Section 16(5) Article 8 of the 1973
Constitution
Paragraph 1 of The Budget Reform Decree of 1977 unduly overextends the privilege granted in Sec. 16(5)
because the President can indiscriminately transfer funds from the Executive Dept.’s branches to any branch
in the General Appropriations Act without regard as to whether or not 1) the funds are actually savings in the
item from which it is taken, 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the said transfer
is made. Although there is no complete disregard of the standards in the fundamental law, it goes beyond
the tenor thereof. It puts the bypasses the safeguards in Sec. 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
on the release of money from the Treasury.
The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make it so that one branch is
subordinate to another. In other words, all the branches are created equal. When the legislative or executive
branch is acting within the limits of authority, the judiciary cannot interfere with the former. But the when
former acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it is the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches had assumed to do as void. Respondents are not acting within their sphere of responsibility
and are hence, enjoined form acting under the unconstitutional provision in question.
The Solicitor General defends the above COMELEC scheme as allowed by Sec. 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution and Sections 17 and 19 of the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994.
Article VI par (5) states: “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment
any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.”
The funds of local government units may also be used to help defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay
elections. For authority, respondents cite Opinion No. 51, s. 1994 of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice,
dated 19 April 1994, issued upon request from the COMELEC, wherein the former takes the view that under
Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code, local government units are required to appropriate funds for
barangay elections.
Pursuant to said opinion of the Secretary of Justice, the COMELEC issued Comelec Resolution No. 2713,
dated 21 April 1994, promulgating the guidelines for the sharing by local government units in the expenses
of the barangay elections.
The validity of the aforesaid COMELEC resolution is not at issue in the petitions before us. What is in issue
here is the existence or lack of factual basis on whether or not the impleaded public respondents are
attempting, or intending to effect the transfer of funds which would be in direct contravention of Sec. 25(5),
Art. VI, of the Constitution.
The Court acknowledges that petitioners have displayed vigilance and acted with the best of intentions when
they filed the present petitions. Yet, it would have been more prudent for them to have first obtained an official
statement or at least confirmation from respondents as to the veracity of the reports contained in the said
news item—which could itself have been quoted out of context by the reporter concerned or simply
abbreviated to meet the day’s deadline.
WHEREFORE, finding the explanation of respondents to be well taken, the Court resolved to DISMISS the
petitions for lack of merit.
NO. The ruling of the COA was affirmed. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent
and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had
been intended.
Clearly, there are two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation with the corresponding
funds may legally be effected. First, there must be savings in the programmed appropriation of the
respondent.
The proposal was accepted by the Deputy Executive Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary
G.R. No. 127545 April 23, Sarino, who issued a memorandum for the transfer and remittance to the Office of the President of the
2008 sum of PHP 300,000.00 for the operational expenses of the task force. An additional cash advance of
PHP 300,000.00 was requested. These amounts were taken from the fund.
2 cash advances, both in the amount of PHP 300,000.00, were withdrawn from the fund by the DILG and
transferred to the Cashier of the Office of the President. The first cash advance was liquidated (payroll,
office rentals, etc.) although no receipts were presented. There is no record of the liquidation of the second
cash advance. However, upon post audit conducted by the department auditor, the amounts were
disallowed because (1) no legal basis for the created task force to claim payment through DILG by way
of cash; (2) previous cash advance granted to accountable officer has not yet been liquidated; (3)
expenditure funded from capability building are subject to restrictions/conditions embodied in the Special
Provisions of the DILG Appropriations of which RA 7180 which should be met; (4) estimate of expenses
covered by the cash advance not specified.
transferring agency. Second, there must be an existing item, project or activity with an appropriation in the
receiving agency to which the savings will be transferred. Actual savings is a sine qua non to a valid transfer
of funds from one government agency to another. The word "actual" denotes that something is real or
substantial, or exists presently in fact as opposed to something which is merely theoretical, possible, potential
or hypothetical. As a case in point, the Chief Justice himself transfers funds only when there are actual
savings, e.g., from unfilled positions in the Judiciary.
Contrary to another submission in this case, the President, Chief Justice, Senate President, and the heads
of constitutional commissions need not first prove and declare the existence of savings before transferring
funds, the Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra, categorically declared that the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall approve the realignment (of savings).
However, "[B]efore giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that: (1) The funds
to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to
be taken; and (2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to
which said transfer or realignment is to be made."

A notice of disallowance was sent to Sarino, et. al., holding the latter jointly and severally liable for the
amount and directing them to settle the disallowance. The COA affirmed the disallowance.

COA’S STAND:
The COA’s position is that there is no legal basis for the transfers in question because the Fund was
meant to be implemented by the Local Government Academy. Further, transfer of funds under Sec. 25(5),
Art. VI of the Constitution may be made only by the persons mentioned in the section and may not be re-
delegated being already a delegated authority. Additionally, the funds transferred must come only from
savings of the office in other items of its appropriation and must be used for other items in the
appropriation of the same office. In this case, there were no savings from which augmentation can be
taken because the releases of funds to the Office of the President were made at the beginning of the
budget year 1992.

The COA also posits that while the Fund is a regular appropriation, it partakes the nature of a trust fund
because it was allocated for a specific purpose. Thus, it may be used only for the specific purpose for
which it was created or the fund received. The COA concludes that petitioners should be held civilly and
criminally liable for the disallowed expenditures.

113 Araullo vs Benigno Aquino
III,
GR No 209287, July 1, 2014
Motion for Reconsideration
February 3, 2015
This case is a consolidation of nine (9) cases, assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP) of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and in relation to this,
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541 and related issuances of the DBM in the implementation of DAP.
This issue exploded when the topic of the Congressional pork barrel was still fresh in the public mind.
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary was just filed with the Supreme Court [which is subsequently declared
unconstitutional (November 19, 2013).
September 3, 2013 – Belgica, et. al. and Villegas filed an Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for the Immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA
of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void
for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
September 25, 2013 – Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered his privilege speech stating that some senators
received Php 50 Million each as incentive for impeaching Chief Justice Corona.
Secretary Abad responded through a public statement explaining that the funds released were based on
the Senators’ letters of request for funding and explained further that these funds were part of the DAP
designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion (they also made claims in
their website regarding DAP and where it comes from).
DBM cited the following as legal bases for DAP’s use for savings:
a. Section 25(5) Article VI, 1987 Constitution
b. Section 39 (Authority to use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of
Expenditure Appropriations, Chapter 5, Book VI of EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)
c. General Appropriations Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013 provisions on the following:
i. Use of savings
ii. Meaning of savings
iii. Priority in the use of savings
d. For the use of the unprogrammed funds, DBM cited provisions in the GAA 2011-2013 as
legal bases
1. WON there is a controversy
ripe for judicial determination
2. WON DAP violates Sec. 29
Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution
3. WON DAP, NBC 541 and all other
executive issuances implementing DAP
violate Sec 25, Art 6 of the 1987 Consti.
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following
acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and
related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the
declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the
end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of
other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation
in the General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification
by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with
the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.
1. YES. THERE IS AN ACTUAL CONTROVERSY RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION.
The Court quotes Belgica vs. ES Ochoa ; “is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion
of opposite legal claims…there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence…a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it…”
The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of DAP and its relevant
issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. They meet the “ripeness”
requirement since these allegedly unconstitutional acts acts were already being implemented by the
DBM. Moreover, DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds.
In addition, the fact that funds have been allocated or utilized give rise to an actual controversy
Respondents claim that since DAP has been discontinued, the challenges are now moot and academic.
The Court says: the discontinuing of DAP did not moot the challenges to its constitutionality.
Because it falls under all exceptions for mootness to be disregarded: (1) there was a grave violation of
the constitution, (2) the case involves a paramount public interest, (3) the constitutional issue raised
here requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public and (4)

114. Cordero vs. Cabatuando
No. L-14542. October 31, 1962.
SEC 26.
Nine (9) petitions assailing the constitutionality are filed within days. The Court consolidated these cases
to form the case at hand. Hence this case.
Petition To declare null and void the disputed order of the Court of Agrarian Relations, disqualifying
petitioner Manuel A. Cordero “from appearing as counsel for petitioner tenant in this case, or for any
tenant in any other cases.
The record discloses that on July 21, 1958, the Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Agricultural Tenancy
Commission of the DOJ, thru its Trial Attorney, herein petitioner Manuel A. Cordero as counsel for indigent
petitioner tenant Vicente Salazar, filed with the Second Regional District of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, against respondent landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana and others “for reinstatement and
reliquidation of past harvests”; respondent landlord Sta. Romana filed a “Motion to Disqualify Counsel
praying among others for the disqualification of petitioner Manuel A. Cordero to act as counsel for tenant
Vicente Salazar.
WON sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263,
amending sections 53 and 54 of Republic
Act No. 1199 are constitutional. YES
this case is capable of repetition yet evading review (there is nothing to stop the DBM from re-
implementing DAP).
2. NO. DAP WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE HENCE, NO APPROPRIATION LAW
WAS REQUIRED TO ADOPT OR IMPLEMENT IT.
DAP was only a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending the adoption of which
was by virtue of the authority of the President to ensure laws are properly executed. It is the Executive
playing its role as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate
to faithfully execute laws including GAAs. Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or implement
DAP Thus Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1) Article VI of the
Constitution
3. YES THE VIOLATED SECTION 25(5) ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION.
To discuss this, we follow the three (3) requisites set out in Section 25(5) of Article VI: (1) There is a
law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices. (2) The funds to be transferred
are savings generated from the appropriations of their respective offices; and (3) The purpose
of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices.
FIRST REQUISITE: there is a law authorizing the president to transfer funds within his office
This requisite is not met. GAA of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid (faithful to the consitution) provisions to
authorize transfer of funds under the dap, hence the transfers were unconstitutional.
SECOND REQUISITE: the funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations of
their respective offices – where there actually savings?
Araullo, et. al,. claim that the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments were
not ACTUAL savings within the context of Section 25(5) Art. 6 of the Constitution. Araullo, et. al,. also
argue that “savings” should be understood to refer to the excess money after the items that needed to
be funded have been funded, or those that needed to be paid have been paid and they insist that
savings cannot be realized with certainty in the middle of the fiscal year. Araullo, et. al,. also say that
“slow-moving” PAPs could not be savings as they actually have not been abandoned yet (remember
the note earlier in NBC 541) The OSG represents that “savings” meant “appropriations balances” –
the difference between the appropriation authorized by Congress (the Program Amount in the GAA)
and the actual amount allotted for the appropriation.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under DAP came from “pooling unreleased
appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services which will lapse at the end of the year,
unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects, and discontinued projects per Zero-Based
Budgeting findings.” There is no clear legal basis for this declaration of DBM and their treatment of
unreleased or unallotted appropriations as savings.
THUS THE SECOND REQUISITE IS NOT MET. the court says: these items have not yet ripened into
categories of items from which savings can be generated – they haven’t even reached the agency to
which they were allotted to under the GAA. these do not fall under the definition of savings reflected in
the GAA (items 1 to 3 aforementioned).
THIRD REQUISITE: the purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices
This requisite is not met as some of the savings pooled under dap were allocated to PAP’s that were
not covered by any appropriation in the pertinent GAA. Again, proof of non-compliance to this requisite
are the cross border augmentations from savings which are clearly prohibited by the constitution.
section 25(5) article VI only allows augmentation within the respective offices stated therein.
It is to be noted that the basic law, RA. 1199, is called “The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.” The
constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title of the bill. The title of Republic Act No. 2263 reads as follows: “AN ACT
AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES.”
The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a single general
subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid.
The provisions of sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 are certainly germane to, and are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the one general subject, agricultural tenancy.

115 PHILCONSA VS GIMENEZ
DECEMBER 18, 1965
116.Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA
172
Meanwhile, Congress passed RA No. 2263, amending the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines
(RA No. 1199) providing among others that— “In all cases wherein a tenant cannot afford to be
represented by counsel, it shall be the duty of the trial attorney of the tenancy mediation commission to
represent him, upon proper notification by the party concerned, or appoint counsel de oficio for the
indigent tenant.” (Sec 54, RA No. 1199, as amended by Sec 20 of RA No. 2263).
After the enactment of RA 2663, petitioner contend “that the issue in the case at bar is now moot and
academic.” Respondent judge, allege that, before the enactment of RA No. 2263, there was no Tenancy
Mediation Division, and that its only basis for existence, are sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263 (authorizing
the Secretary of Justice, to carry out a national enforcement program including the mediation of tenancy
disputes), which are null and void because the Constitution provides that “no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” He
contended further that nowhere in the titles of RA No. 1199 and RA No. 2263 is the creation of the Tenancy
Mediation Division ever mentioned.
This is a case involving the grave and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress)." The suit was
instituted by the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (PHILONSA), a non-profit civic organization, duly
incorporated under Philippine laws, by way of a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress
from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the
payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives of retirement and
vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing
officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from paying the said
retirement and vacation gratuities."
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for the retirement
of the members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void for the
provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title
of the bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
(THE TITLE OF THE LAW: AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX)
Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company assails the power vested in NAPOCOR
that "in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its
electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a
net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses."
Whether the title of the law in question
sufficiently complies with the provisions of
Section 21, Article VI, of the Constitution
that "no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.”
Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.
The only amendment brought about by RAt No. 2263 is the transfer of the function of representing these
indigent tenants to the DOJ, apparently to consolidate in the latter Department the functions relative to the
enforcement of tenancy laws. In essence, therefore, there is no change in the set-up established by Republic
Act No. 1199 and that provided for by Republic Act No. 2263. There is only a transfer of functions from one
department of the government to another.
To declare sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of
the duty of representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the trial
attorneys in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. In
other words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of Republic Act No. 2263 would do harm to, and
would be nugatory of, the intention of Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our tenancy laws in
the Department of Justice.
NO. It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection
(c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the retirement benefits
are granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty
years of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth
Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to
elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide
retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to
Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for
Members of Congress and elected officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House)
is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service
Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be
expressed in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature;
and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order
that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. 1, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book
One [1965], p. 119)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their
contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not
necessary that the title be a complete index of the content. (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)
The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be
reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation.
It should be given a practical, rather than technical, construction. It should be a sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions
of the statute are germane to that general subject. (Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections,
73 Phil. 288, 291)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act
3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1,
section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
YES. WHEREFORE, there being no showing that Republic Act No. 3043 is unconstitutional, the decision of
the lower court, dismissing the petition, is affirmed. With costs against petitioner Alalayan.
No bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in [its]

117 Insular Lumber Co. v. CTA
GR No. L-31057. May 29, 1981
Insular Lumber Company vs.
CTA and CIR
Section 26 (1) - “Every bill
passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title
thereof.”
Also it could “renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and
energy,".
This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA 2641. Alalayan and PPDC are
contractors with NAPOCOR. They are re-suppliers of power produced by NAPOCOR. They aver that the
provision of the said RA is a rider in only meant to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR.
Insular Lumber Company is a licensed forest concessionaire. The Company purchased manufactured oil
and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession, sawmill, planning mills, power units,
vehicles, dry kilns, water pumps, lawn mowers, and in furnishing free water and light to its employees, on
which specific tax was paid.
In 1964, the Company filed with the CIR a claim for refund of P19,921.37 representing 25% of the specific
tax paid on the manufactured oil and fuel used in its operations pursuant to the provisions of Section 5,
Republic Act No. 1435.
Commissioner denied the Company’s claim for refund on the ground that the privilege of partial tax refund
granted by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining
concessions is limited to a period of five (5) years from June 14, 1956, the date of effectivity of said Act.
The Company filed a petition for review before the CTA. CTA ruled that the operation of a sawmill is
distinct from the operation of a forest concession. Hence, the refund provision of above mentioned law
cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19K claimed, representing the 25% of
specific tax paid, CTA found out that only the amount of P14K was paid on oil utilized in logging
operations. CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14K because the Company’s right to claim
the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period from January 1963 to April 1963
had already prescribed. Hence, the Company was credited the refund of P10K only. Both the Company
and the CIR appealed from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
CIR contended that the title of R.A. No. 1435 is “An Act to Provide Means for Increasing the Highway
Special Fund.” The Commissioner contends that the subject of R.A. No. 1435 was to increase Highway
Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of
miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly
WON R.A. No. 1435 is unconstitutional.
title . . ." This provision is similar to those found in many American State Constitutions. It is aimed against
the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus
precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of
the bill. Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider.
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be deemed
sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus,
mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index
of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its
title. More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the
legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment. "Of course,
the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators."
RA. 3043, approved June 17, 1961, entitled "An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty-One." "SEC. 3 The
National Power Corporation is hereby authorized to represent and transact for the benefit and in behalf of
the public consumers, and it shall in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder require
as a condition that the franchise holder, if it receives at least fifty percent of its electric power and energy
from the National Power Corporation, shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its
investments plus two-month operating expenses.
Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity
for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on
manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed
increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the
general subject of the law.
The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title
of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences
of the law or its operation. This does not seem to this Court to have been ignored in the passage of Republic
Act No. 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether
its title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which passed it. Furthermore, in deciding the
constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled, every presumption favors the validity of the Act.
As is true in cases presenting other constitutional issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional
whenever possible. Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the Act, the
legislation should be sustained. In the incident on hand, this Court does not even have any doubt.
 not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather
than an increase of the Highway Special Fund. Hence, it is unconstitutional for violating Article VI,
Section21(1) of the 1935 Constitution which provides: “No bill which may be enacted into a law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
118 Tio v Videogram Regulatory Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987
Board, 151 SCRA 208 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board".
P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and a 30% tax on the
gross receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local government (Sec. 10). PD 1987 was
reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the NIRC. The amendment provides that “there shall be collected
on each processed video tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos. Provided, That manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms
including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof,
have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have
caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in
the collection of sales, contractor’s specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial
losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
119. Philippine Judges The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the
703 ALO Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the abovenamed measures.
Whether or not there is undue delegation
of power and authority
The petition assails the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its
title embraces more than one subject and
does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies
of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.
Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board (Board) has
authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a
fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions
for the Board" is an undue delegation of legislative power.
This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the
Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned
being "subject to the direction and control of the Board."
That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the PD as
unconstitutional, Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in
law.
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege
from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions
and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith.”
The petitioners’ contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the
Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive
as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. To require every end and
means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment
to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between
both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval
of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the
rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill.) The journals are themselves also binding on
the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the
reason thus: To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we
have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of
the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Applying these
principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an amendment was made upon the last

120. PHilippine Judges v Prado
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the abovenamed measures.
The petition assails the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its
title embraces more than one subject and
does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies
of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are
bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the
very least, a becoming courtesy.
NOTES:
“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.”
The purposes of this rule are:
(1) to prevent hodge-podge or “log- rolling” legislation;
(2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no
intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
(3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the
subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege
from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions
and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith.”
The petitioners’ contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the
Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive
as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. To require every end and
means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment
to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between
both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval
of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the
rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill.) The journals are themselves also binding on
the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the
reason thus: To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we
have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of
the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Applying these
principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are
bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the
very least, a becoming courtesy.
NOTES:

121 CIR vs CTA
G.R. No. 47421. May 14, 1990
122. Gonzales vs Macaraig G.R.
No. 87636. November 19, 1990.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Manila Hotel Corporation, SC overruled Court of Tax Appeals
decision that caterer’s tax under RA6110 is illegal because it was vetoed by Former President Marcos
andCongress had not taken steps to override the veto. SC ruled in this case that the law has always
imposed a 3% caterer’s tax, as provided in Par 1, Sec 206 of the Tax Code.Presently, Manila Golf and
Country Club, a non-stock corporation claims that it is exempt from the 3% on gross receipts
becausePresident Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax Law).President Marcos vetoed
Sec 191-A because according to him it would1) shift the burden of taxation to the consuming public and
2) restrain the development of hotels which are essential to the tourist industry. The protestation of the
club was denied by petitioners saying that Sec42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words “hotels,
motels,rest houses.” House of Ways and Means concurred with petitioners stating that veto message only
seems to object with certain portions of 191-A and that can be gleaned by the reasons given by the
President.
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the
Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget
submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress
presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and approval. On 29 December 1988, the
President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the
process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the same Resolution No. 381 mentioned at the outset, further
expressed that the veto by the President of Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without any force
and effect; hence, the aforesaid Section 55 remains. Thus it is that, on 11 April 1989, this Petition for
Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed, with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55,
and seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688. No Restraining Order was
issued by the Court.
The Contending Views
In essence, petitioners’ cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the President’s line-veto power
as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded
her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) which are provisions; (2) when
the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions
or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the
WON veto referred to the entire section or
merely the 20% tax on gross receipts of
operators and proprietors of eating places
within hotels, motels and rest houses.
Whether or not the President exceeded
the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto "provisions"
of an Appropriations Bill?
“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.”
The purposes of this rule are:
(1) to prevent hodge-podge or “log- rolling” legislation;
(2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no
intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
(3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the
subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
SC ruled that the presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels and rest houses in the
20% caterer’s tax bracket but not to the whole section.
We agree with then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels
and rest houses in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are “items” in themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3),
Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore, the President has the power to veto. An “item” in a revenue
bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax
and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and
enumerates the persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word “item” as
referring to the whole section would tie the President’s hand in choosing either to approve the whole section
at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section
at the expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be
prevented in giving the President the power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated
rendering that power inutile (See Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 55 LRA 882 [1901])
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. (Please see
the provision). Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result
in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or
the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations
Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill
does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987
Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President’s veto power as
previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely
pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate
veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J)
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be
the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the
general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI,
Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in
its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire
bill.chanrobles law library
Petitioners’ further submission that, since the exercise of the veto power by the President partakes of the
nature of legislative powers it should be strictly construed, is negative by the following dictum in Bengzon,
supra, reading:jgc:c"The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the
affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of
which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in
the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or
hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed
power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law
and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that
power.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, counters that the issue at bar among others are;
that Section 55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the
President’s veto; that the power of the President to augment items in the appropriations for the executive
branches had already been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of Pres.
Decree No. 1177, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the President is
empowered by the Constitution to veto provisions or other "distinct and severable parts" of an
Appropriations Bill.
by the Legislature".
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, we are of the opinion
that Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term.
Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the
Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some" particular appropriation" therein. The challenged
"provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or
distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the
Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the
Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the original recommendations made by the President
and to the source indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e., the "Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring
Office".Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY ‘89) and
Section 16 (FY ‘90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be
treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general appropriation bill with
veto-proof ‘logrolling measure,’ special interest provisions which could not succeed if separately enacted, or
‘riders,’ substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto.
Inappropriateness of the so-called "Conditions/Restrictions"
Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where
conditions are attached, the veto power does not carry with it the power to strike them out, citing
Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE, 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-
20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In other words, their theory is that Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16
(FY ‘90) are such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the veto power.chanrobles virtual lawlibra
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall
be spent; and that in addition to distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation
Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that
the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation
itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster, supra, at 320). That was also the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that
the veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition
related was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever.
However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some
matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation (Henry v. Edwards, La, 346, So 2d
153). Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a
budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness.
Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) must also be held to be
inappropriate "conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY ‘90), have been "artfully drafted" to
appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for
substantive and, therefore, separate legislation.
Further, neither of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The reason, as
explained earlier, is that items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on the face of the
enrolled bill or Appropriations Act itself. They can only be detected when compared with the original
budgetary submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90) themselves provide that
an item "shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the
 specific purpose is provided in this Act."cr

The Power of Augmentation and The Validity of the Veto

The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) because they nullify the authority
of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations,
as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.

When Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90), therefore, prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation
of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory authority
of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest
of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by
no means vests in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners contend, the leeway
granted being delimited to transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only
from savings.

More importantly, it strikes us, too, that for such a special power as that of augmentation from savings, the
same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is "one the primary and
specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the public treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice, 292 U.S., 410, 57 S.Ct. 252). It is a legislative authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power
of augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation
of money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.chanrobles law library : red

The same thing must be said of Section 55 (FY ‘89), taken in conjunction with Section 12, and Section 16
(FY ‘90), which prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved and/or
reduced by Congress. They are non-appropriation items, an appropriation being a setting apart by law of a
certain sum from the public revenue for a specific purpose (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil. 912,
916 [1936]). It bears repeating that they are more of a substantive expression of a legislative objective to
restrict the power of augmentation granted to the President and other key officials. They are actually matters
of general law and more properly the subject of a separate legislation that will embody, define and delimit
the scope of the special power of augmentation from savings instead of being inappropriately incorporated
annually in the Appropriation Act. To sanction this practice would be to give the Legislature the freedom to
grant or withhold the power from the Executive and other officials, and thus put in yearly jeopardy the exercise
of that power.

123.Philconsa v. Enriquez,
supra.

124.Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

125. The respondent taxpayer, Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc. operates an electric power plant serving Whether or not Section 4 of R.A. No. A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is
the adjoining municipalities of Lingayen and Binmaley, both in the province of Pangasinan, pursuant to 3843 is unconstitutional for being found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike The Legislature
THE COMMISSIONER OF the municipal franchise granted it by their respective municipal councils, under Resolution Nos. 14 and violative of the "uniformity and has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax exemptions
INTERNAL REVENUE, 25 of June 29 and July 2, 1946, respectively. Section 10 of these franchises provide that: equality of taxation" clause of the have never been deemed violative of the equal protection clause. 1 It is true that the private respondents
petitioner, Constitution. [No] municipal franchises were obtained under Act No. 667 2 of the Philippine Commission, but these original
...The said grantee in consideration of the franchise hereby granted, shall pay quarterly into franchises have been replaced by a new legislative franchise, i.e. R.A. No. 3843. As correctly held by the
vs.
the Provincial Treasury of Pangasinan, one per centum of the gross earnings obtained thru respondent court, the latter was granted subject to the terms and conditions established in Act No. 3636, 3
LINGAYEN GULF ELECTRIC this privilege during the first twenty years and two per centum during the remaining fifteen as amended by C.A. No. 132. These conditions Identify the private respondent's power plant as falling within
POWER CO., INC. and THE years of the life of said franchise. that class of power plants created by Act No. 3636, as amended. The benefits of the tax reduction provided
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, On February 24, 1948, the President of the Philippines approved the franchises granted to the private by law (Act No. 3636 as amended by C.A. No. 132 and R.A. No. 3843) apply to the respondent's power plant
respondents. respondent. and others circumscribed within this class. R.A-No. 3843 merely transferred the petitioner's power plant from
that class provided for in Act No. 667, as amended, to which it belonged until the approval of R.A- No. 3843,
On November 21, 1955, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed against and demanded for the and placed it within the class falling under Act No. 3636, as amended. Thus, it only effected the transfer of a
G.R. No. L-23771 deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges for the years 1946 to 1954 applying the franchise tax rate of
5% on gross receipts from March 1, 1948 to December 31, 1954 as prescribed in Section 259 of the
August 4, 1988 National Internal Revenue Code, instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. The
private respondent requested for a reinvestigation of the case on the ground that instead of incurring a
An appeal from the decision of
the CTA absolving the deficiency liability, it made an overpayment of the franchise tax, but was denied. They protested the said
assessment and requested for a conference with a view to settling the liability amicably, but was denied,
respondent taxpayer from
liability for the deficiency thus the appeal to the CTA.
percentage, franchise, and fixed In a letter dated August 21, 1962, the Commissioner demanded from the private respondent the payment
taxes and surcharge assessed their deficiency franchise tax and surcharges for the years 1959 to 1961 again applying the franchise tax
against it. rate of 5% on gross receipts. the private respondent protested the assessment and requested
reconsideration thereof, but the same was denied. Thus, the appeal to the respondent CTA.
Pending the hearing of the said cases, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3843 was passed granting to the private
respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of the electric light, heat, and power system in the
same municipalities of Pangasinan. Section 4 thereof provides that:
In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay into the
Internal Revenue office of each Municipality in which it is supplying electric current to the
public under this franchise, a tax equal to two per centum of the gross receipts from electric
current sold or supplied under this franchise. Said tax shall be due and payable quarterly and
shall be in lieu of any and all taxes and/or licenses of any kind, nature or description levied,
established, or collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial or national, now
or in the future, on its poles, wires, insulator ... and on its franchise, rights, privileges, receipts,
revenues and profits, from which taxes and/or licenses, the grantee is hereby expressly
exempted and effective further upon the date the original franchise was granted, no other tax
and/or licenses other than the franchise tax of two per centum on the gross receipts as
provided for in the original franchise shall be collected, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding.
126. Abra Valley College v. Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and institution of higher learning in Bangued, Abra. In
Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 1974, the CFI ordered for
the seizure and sale of the subject school property for nonpayment of real estate taxes and penalties.
Private respondents stated that the college lot and building in question are not only used for educational
purposes of the college, but also as the permanent residence of the President and Director, Mr. Pedro V.
Borgonia, and his family including his in-laws and grandchildren; while the ground floor of the college
building is being used and rented by a commercial establishment.
127. John Hay Peoples R.A. No. 7227 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," which was
Alternative Coalition vs. Lim enacted setting out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into
alternative productive uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of
G.R. No. 119775. October 24, America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their
2003 extensions including the Camp John Hay Station in the City of Baguio. It created public respondent Bases
Conversion and Development Authority2 (BCDA), and the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone
Under sec. 28 (Subic SEZ). Also the said law granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free
importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes.
On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with
private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc.
(ASIAWORLD), preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La
Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four months later,
BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORD executed a Joint Venture Agreement whereby they bound themselves
to put up a joint venture company known as the Baguio International Development and Management
Corporation.
Meanwhile, the Baguio City government passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken
Whether or not the lot and building in
question are used exclusively for
educational purposes and thus exempted
from paying taxes?
Whether or not Proclamation No. 420
(particularly Sec. 3) is unconstitutional
since it provides for national and local tax
exemption and grants other economic
incentives to the John Hay SEZ. [YES]
taxable property from one class to another.
We do not have the authority to inquire into the wisdom of such act. Furthermore, the 5% franchise tax rate
provided in Section 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application. 4 We note that
the said Section 259 of the Tax Code expressly allows the payment of taxes at rates lower than 5% when
the charter granting the franchise of a grantee, like the one granted to the private respondent under Section
4 of R.A. No. 3843, precludes the imposition of a higher tax. R.A. No. 3843 did not only fix and specify a
franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts, but made it "in lieu of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary
notwithstanding," thus, leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. "Charters or special laws
granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. They do not constitute a part
of the machinery of the general government. They are usually adopted after careful consideration of the
private rights in relation with resultant benefits to the State ... in passing a special charter the attention of the
Legislature is directed to the facts and circumstances which the act or charter is intended to meet. The
Legislature consider (sic) and make (sic) provision for all the circumstances of a particular case." 5 In view
of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the respondent court's ruling upholding the constitutionality of
the law in question.
No. Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption
from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.
Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to
and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or
lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence.
In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by
any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption
from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same
to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein, and neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay
SEZ find support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420.
While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of SEZs, free trade
zones and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A.
No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds
no support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find support in the other
laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before the issuance
of the proclamation or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.
Tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed—if it were the
intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given to the
Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in R.A. No. 7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the legislature,
unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation
or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Other than
Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions, or local governments may pass
 by BCDA in their MOA and as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. One of which is Resolution ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.
No. 255, seeking and supporting the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation
declaring an area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a law granting any
7227. tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. In the same vein,
the other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress to
On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 which established a SEZ on a portion legislate upon. If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption
of Camp John Hay, and in effect, granted tax exemptions pursuant to R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ extends and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
to other SEZs.
Thus, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID and
The petitioners now allege that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet is accordingly declared of no legal force and effect.
to be established in base areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 thereof of tax exemption and investment
incentives to the therein established Subic SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ,
petitioners conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the Constitution which provides that
"No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress."

On the other hand, respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives
similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation
is merely implementing the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business
activity or investment. They underscore the point that the government's policy of bases conversion can
not be achieved without extending the same tax exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to
other SEZs.

128 LUNG CENTER OF THE The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon City. Erected in the 1. Whether the petitioner is a charitable YES. The petitioner is a charitable institution on the basis of the said laws. However, Some of the real
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. The ground floor is institution within the context of property of the petitioner are not considered exempt from real property taxes.
vs. being leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the
QUEZON CITY and to other private parties. The right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and articles of
CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in Orchids and Garden Center. The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160; incorporation. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its
his capacity as City Assessor of medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined
Quezon City, respondents. the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government. 2. Whether the real properties of the in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used
petitioner are exempt from real property altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit
G.R. No. 144104 June Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about PHP 4.5 Million, predicating taxes. of the persons managing or operating the institution.
29, 2004 its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim. When appealed to the QC-Local
Board of Assessment, the same was dismissed. The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt
Central Board of Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
used exclusively for charity. (strictissimi juris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to:
● income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies
to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center
of the Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and
● taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion
alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).

129 G.R. No. 196596. BIR issued to DLSU Letter of Authority (LOA) No. 2794 authorizing its revenue officers to examine the WON DLSU's income and revenues Wherefore, SC denied the petition of CIR and affirmed the ruling of CTA En Banc.
November 9, 2016.* latter's books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the period Fiscal proved to have been used actually,
COMMISSIONER OF Year Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years directly and exclusively for educational Yes. Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution refers to 2 kinds of institutions; (1) non-stock, non-profit
INTERNAL REVENUE, May 19, 2004, BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) to DLSU. purposes are exempt from duties and educational institutions and (2) proprietary educational institutions. DLSU falls on the first category. The
petitioner, vs. DE LA SALLE August 18, 2004, the BIR through a Formal Letter of Demand assessed DLSU the following deficiency taxes difference is that The tax exemption granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions is conditioned
UNIVERSITY, INC., respondent. taxes: (1) income tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and bookstores operating within the WON the entire assessment should be only on the actual, direct and exclusive use of their revenues and assets for educational purposes. While tax
campus; (2) value-added tax (VAT) on business income; and (3) documentary stamp tax (DST) on loans voided because of the defective LOA exemptions may also be granted to proprietary educational institutions, these exemptions may be subject to
G.R. No. 198841. November 9, and lease contracts. limitations imposed by Congress.
2016.* The BIR demanded the payment of P17,303,001.12, inclusive of surcharge, interest and penalty for The tax exemption granted by the Constitution to non-stock, nonprofit educational institutions, unlike the
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY taxable years 2001, 2002 and 2003. exemption that may be availed of by proprietary educational institutions, is not subject to limitations imposed
INC., petitioner, vs. DLSU protested the assessment. The Commissioner failed to act on the protest; thus, DLSU filed petition by law.
COMMISSIONER OF for review with the CTA Division Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that the revenues and income must have also been sourced from
INTERNAL REVENUE, CTA Division and CTA En Banc: DST assessment on the loan transactions but retained other deficiency educational activities or activities related to the purposes of an educational institution. The phrase all
respondent. taxes. CTA En Banc ruled the ff: revenues is unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues. Thus, so long as the revenues
G.R. No. 198941. November 9, Tax on rental income DLSU was able to prove that a portion of the assessed rental income was used and income are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes, then said revenues
2016.* actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes; hence, exempt from tax. Rental income had and income shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
COMMISSIONER OF indeed been used to pay the loan it obtained to build the university's Physical Education - Sports Complex. Court laid down the requisites for availing the tax exemption under Article XIV, Section 4 (3), namely: (1)
INTERNAL REVENUE, However, other unsubstantiated claim for exemption must be subjected to income tax and VAT. the taxpayer falls under the classification non-stock, nonprofit educational institution; and (2) the income it
petitioner, vs. DE LA SALLE DST on loan and mortgage transactions Contrary to the Commissioner's contention, DLSU proved its seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.
UNIVERSITY, INC., respondent. remittance of the DST due on its loan and mortgage documents, evidenced by the stamp on the
documents made by a DST imprinting machine.
Admissibility of DLSU's supplemental evidence Supplemental pieces of documentary evidence were
admissible even if DLSU formally offered them upon MR. Law creating the CTA provides that proceedings
before it shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence. (Affirmed by SC)
On the validity of the Letter of Authority LOA should cover only one taxable period and that the practice
of issuing a LOA covering audit of unverified prior years is prohibited. If the audit includes more than one
taxable period, the other periods or years shall be specifically indicated in the LOA. In the present case,
the LOA issued to DLSU is for Fiscal Year Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years. Hence, the
assessments for deficiency income tax, VAT and DST for taxable years 2001 and 2002 are void, but the
assessment for taxable year 2003 is valid.
On the CTA Division's appreciation of the evidence. The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Division's
appreciation of DLSU's evidence. It held that while DLSU successfully proved that a portion of its rental
income was transmitted and used to pay the loan obtained to fund the construction of the Sports Complex,
the rental income from other sources were not shown to have been actually, directly and exclusively used
for educational purposes. (Affirmed by SC)
130. Guingona v. Carague,
supra.
131. Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.
132. PHILIPPINE COCONUT In 1971, RA 6260 was enacted, creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the
PRODUCERS FEDERATION, Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The fund was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every
INC. (COCOFED) vs. 100 kg of copra. ·
REPUBLIC Under the regime of Marcial Law, PD 276 and 582 were enacted creating more funds , specifically the
CCSF (Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund) and CIDF (Coconut Industry Development Fund).·
G. R. Nos. 177857-58. January PD 755 was enacted to provide credit facilities to coconut farmers.
24, 2012.* - The Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA) is authorized to handle the funds
- The PCA were authorized to use the funds to acquire a bank and to deposit the portion of fund
levies. They purchased the First United Bank (FUB), later renamed UCPB, but reimbursed the money
from the funds.
- The funds were for the benefit of coconut farmers. The funds were used to pay for the financial
commitments of farmers and provided them with free shares of the bank.
- The stock certificates for the farmers were in the name of the PCA but were supposed to be
distributed to the farmers who possessed COCOFUND receipts (PCA Administrative Order No. 1) ·
Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. was one of the mediators of the PCA funds and it was discovered that he caused
the issuance of PD 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code) through collaboration with Marcos. ·
The Aquino Administration initiated the recovery of ill-gotten gains through the implementation of the
following executive orders
- EO 1 – establishment of the Presidential Committee on Good Governance (PCGG)
- EO 2 – “Ill-gotten gains” included shares of stocks
- EO 14 – The Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction ·
The Sandiganbayan ordered the sequestration against stocks in banks owned by more than a million
coconut farmers and CIIF companies.
133 FIRST LEPANTO This is a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division 1 sustaining the jurisdiction
CERAMICS VS CA of the Court of Appeals over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments and, consequently,
OCTOBER 7, 1994 dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.
Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the BOI was originally provided for in the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1981 (P.D. No. 1789), 2 art. 78 of which stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ART. 78. Judicial Relief. — All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this
Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party
adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly with
the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision.
WON the coconut levy funds are public
funds
YES
Whether Art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus
Investments Code, by providing for direct
appeals to the Supreme Court from the
decisions and final orders of the BOI,
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court without its advice and concurrence
and therefore, unconstitutional
We find that unlike Article VI, Section 28 (3) of the Constitution (pertaining to charitable institutions, churches,
parsonages or convents, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries), which exempts from tax only the assets, i.e.,
"all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes...," Article XIV, Section 4 (3) categorically states that "all revenues and assets... used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties."
No. The LOA issued to DLSU is not entirely void. The assessment for taxable year 2003 is valid.
A LOA is the authority given to the appropriate revenue officer to examine the books of account and other
accounting records of the taxpayer in order to determine the taxpayer's correct internal revenue liabilities and
for the purpose of collecting the correct amount of tax, in accordance with Section 5 of the Tax Code, which
gives the CIR the power to obtain information, to summon/examine, and take testimony of persons. The LOA
commences the audit process and informs the taxpayer that it is under audit for possible deficiency tax
assessment.
What this provision clearly prohibits is the practice of issuing LOAs covering audit of unverified prior years.
RMO 43-90 does not say that a LOA which contains unverified prior years is void. It merely prescribes that
if the audit includes more than one taxable period, the other periods or years must be specified.
In the present case, the LOA issued to DLSU is for Fiscal Year Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years. The
LOA does not strictly comply with RMO 43-90 because it includes unverified prior years. This does not mean,
however, that the entire LOA is void. As the CTA correctly held, the assessment for taxable year 2003 is
valid because this taxable period is specified in the LOA. DLSU was fully apprised that it was being audited
for taxable year 2003. Corollarily, the assessments for taxable years 2001 and 2002 are void for having been
unspecified on separate LOAs as required under RMO No. 43-90.
The levy implemented takes on the nature of taxes since they utilized the taxing power and police power of
the State, thereby making it a public fund.
- The funds were intended for the exclusive benefit of private persons.
- Article VI, Section 29 (3) – “All money collected on any tax levied for a special prupose shall be treated as
a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.”
- The Court also considered the fact that the enactment of the decrees were facilitated by Conjunago Jr. as
a tool for his own economic empire
PD 755 did not specify the means of distributing the bank shares not claimed by beneficiaries and did not
specifically define “coconut farmers”. The PCA assumed authority to define who “coconut farmers” (intended
beneficiaries) are and decided that those who did claim shall also be given “gift of bank shares” since the
law failed to provide guidelines regarding undistributed shares. The laws failed the completeness test in the
sense that they failed to provide guidelines for rules and regulations (the delegate may only implement rules
and regulations that enforce the law).
We have ruled time and again that taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. “They cannot be used for
purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons.” When a law imposes taxes or levies
from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of
private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. The coconut levy
funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, with
the endgoal of developing the entire coconut industry. Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that the
revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned
by private individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the
imposition of taxes or levies.
YES. The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, Sec. 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." This
provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can
unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its
most profound national aspects. Now, Art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct
appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision

134.Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No.
129742, September 16, 1998
135. Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416. September
26, 1996
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs COMELEC, Enrique Garcia
and Catalino Calimbas
Art. 78 was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg. 129, 3 by granting in § 9 thereof exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) over the decisions and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was
promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the
Supreme Court was again granted. Thus, the present Code provides:chanrob1esvirtual 1aw library
ART. 82. Judicial Relief. — All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this
Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party
adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly with
the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision.
By then, however, the present Constitution had taken effect. The Constitution now provides in Art. VI,
Sec. 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." This provision is intended to give the
Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the
Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national
aspects.
Teresita Fabian filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct against Nestor Agustin committed by
him as then DPWH Assistant Regional Director of Region IV-A. The said complaint sought the dismissal
of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and
Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his
preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the
category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct. The Ombudsman found Agustin
guilty but upon reconsideration, he was exonerated.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act
of 1989) provides that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone.
In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al. by promulgating
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain
provisions of RA 7227, particularly those concerning the matters of giving back the Virgin Forest to
Bataan, separating Grande Island from Subic Special Economic Freepost Zone (SSEFZ) and returning it
to Bataan, among others.
Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents, Garcia and
Calimbas, resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. On July 1993,
COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution denied the petition for local initiative on the ground
that the subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance.
Garcia and Calimbas instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court against the
COMELEC and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec En Banc Resolutions
in disallowing the conduct of a local initiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993,
and Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 and in preventing the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan from
Whether or not administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman be
appealed to the Supreme Court without
its advise and concurrence.
Issues:
1. WON a Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution can be the subject of a valid
initiative or referendum.
2. WON COMELEC committed a grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848
never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed to have amended BP Blg. 129, Sec. 9.
Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it from the BOI must be
deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91. Indeed, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the
BOI must be directly appealed to this Court. As already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose
of Sec. 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final
orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those
rendered by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the
Constitution, had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final orders of the BOI
directly to the Supreme Court.
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitutionagainst a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The
constitutional prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate Jurisdiction.Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 was declared INVALID.
1. Yes.
Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local Government Code of 1991 only
an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on Section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides: ‘Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters
of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.’
The Court ruled that the Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate
subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: ‘The Congress shall,
as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby
the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed
by the Congress, or local legislative body x x x.’ “ An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as ‘an
expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done. . . as a legislature, including not merely
physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations”.
2. Yes. The process started by private respondents, Garcia and Calimbas, was an INITIATIVE but COMELEC
made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the
footnote below, the word “referendum” is repeated at least 27 times, but “initiative” is not mentioned at all.
The Comelec labeled the exercise as a “Referendum” the counting of votes was entrusted to a “Referendum
Committee;” the documents were called “referendum returns;” the canvassers, “Referendum Board of
Canvassers” and the ballots themselves bore the description “referendum.” To repeat, not once was the word
“initiative” used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the
proceeding with the authentication of the required number of signatures in support of the initiative and the
gathering of signatures.
On February 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation
No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. Said proclamation included in the SSEZ all the lands
within the former Subic Naval Base, including Grande Island and that portion of the former naval base
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. On June 1996, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 2845, adopting therein a “Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan,” and which indicated, among others, the
scheduled Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the
assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for “the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan.”
SBMA instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution No.
2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent “is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes an amendment of a national law.
“Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus:
(a)“Initiative” is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
“Referendum” is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for
the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress; and
2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the “power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact
or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly.” On the other hand, he explains that
referendum “is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed
by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.”
Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly
either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they
desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local
legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30)
days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the
proponents be able to collect the number of signed conformities within the period granted by said statute,
the Commission on Elections “shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition
shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned x x x.”
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the lawmaking body submits to the registered voters of its
territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved
by such lawmaking authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of the
COMELEC.
initiative Referendum
entirely the work of the electorate is begun and consented to by the lawmaking body
a process of law-making by the people themselves consists merely of the electorate approving or
without the participation and against the wishes of rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a
their elected representatives legislative body
the process and the voting in an initiative are the voters will simply write either “Yes” or “No” in
understandably more complex than in a the ballot.
referendum
Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as “powers” or “legal
processes,” these can also be “rights,” as Justice Cruz terms them, or “concepts,” or “the proposal” itself (in
the case of initiative) being referred to in this Decision.

136 Defensor-Santiago
COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
137 Lambino v COMELEC
(digest from the net, di nako keri
basahon 300++ pages)
v In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution, to lift term limits of
elective officials, by people’s initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution.
Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over
the country. The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials,
amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article
8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the
people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of
hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
appeared as intervenors-oppositors.
Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by
the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several
arguments, such as the following:
(1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented
by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;
(2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of
the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme
Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
On August 25, 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of RA 6735.
The Lambino Group claims that their petition has the support of 6,327,952 individuals satisfying the
requirement that the signatories of the petition constitute 12% of all registered voters with each legislative
district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition modifies Sections 1-7 of Article VI and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
of the Constitution and adds Article XVIII entitled ‘Transitory Provisions” to it shifting the country’s form of
government from Bicameral-Presidential to Unicameral-Parliamentary.
Days later, the Lambino Group filed an amended petition with the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC
issued its resolution denying due course to the Lambino Groups’s petition invoking Santiago v.
Commission on Elections, which found RA 6735 as inadequate, in stating that there is no enabling law
governing initiative petitions such as that of the Lambino Group to amend the Constitution.
The Lambino Group is petitioning for the issuance of writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
COMELEC Resolution of August 31, 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their
initiative petition. The petitioners and supporting intervenors hold the view that COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago.
Opposing intervenors maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent and they also challenge:
Whether or not it is proper for the
Supreme Court to take cognizance of the
petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative
petition complied with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution – NO.
2. Whether the Court should revisit its
ruling on Santiago v. COMELEC which
declared RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
and conditions” to implement the initiative
clause proposals to amend the
Constitution – NO
3. Whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Group’s petition –
NO.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin
to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise
of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and
rules for the orderly exercise of these “people-power” features of our Constitution.
YES. The SC can take cognizance of the petition even if there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This
being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of
Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy. The writ of prohibition is an
extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for
the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.
In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental
consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal
confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on
the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition.26 The COMELEC
made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at
the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda.27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the
Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition
for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
COMELEC’s failure to act on Roco’s motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered
ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man,
only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, Jr. A party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise
of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities
of procedure.
1. The Lambino Group failed to comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
a. The petition is not directly proposed by the people.
The Lambino Group’s Initiative does comply with the requirement that the amendment be “directly proposed
by the people upon a petition” because the Lambino group failed to present the full text of the proposed
changes to the Constitution to the signatories and thus it cannot be assumed that the signatories had
knowledge of the full nature and effect of the changes they were supporting. Given that the Initiative first
gathered signatures without showing the full text of the proposed amendments, it can be seen as a “gigantic
fraud on the people.”
While Section 2, Article XVII does not explicitly state that the full text of proposed amendments to the
constitution should be presented to the people before they sign the petition, as shown on the record of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it was the intent of the framers that an amendment is “directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments.
A signature requirement would be meaningless if the signatories have not first been informed of the full extent
of the proposal he/she is signing, and that the attachment of the full text proposal would provide the
assumption that people would be informed in their decision whether to sign or not.
Moreover, the signature sheet submitted by the Lambino Group to the Court does not contain the full text of
the proposed changes to the Constitution; instead, the signature sheet merely asks whether the people
approve a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government.
The petitioners alleged that they circulated the draft of their 30 August 2006 amended petition during the
signature gathering from February to August 2006, having the Court believe that they prepared their
amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 and even before they filed their 25 August
2006 petition. While Aumentado gives as evidence ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, as proof that the amended
petition was circulated six months before the petitions were filed, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
 authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the petitions, rather, it only states that ULAP “supports the
proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter Change” which are vastly different from the proposals
● The Lambino Group’s standing to file the petition
of the Lambino Group, thus the ULAP Resolution does not establish that the Lambino Group circulated the
● The validity of the signature gathering and verification process
draft of the petition.
● The Lambino Group’s compliance with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution The nature
There is inconsistency in the story of the Lambino Group as it was first stated that they circulated both the
of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments.
25 August 2006 petion and the 30 August 2006 amended petion; however, Atty. Lambino later changed the
● The Lambino Group’s compliance with RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
story stating that only the amended petition was circulated.
Even with the assumption that the amended petition was indeed circulated while the signatures were being
gathered it could still be concluded that there would not be enough copies of the petition for all the signatories
to see. As per Atty. Lambino’s own admission only 100,000 copies could be confirmed to have been printed
as these were printed by Lambino himself. Assuming that each signature sheet, which had space for 10
signatures, was attached with a copy of the petition, there would be enough copies for only 1 million people,
far from the 6,327,952 signatures gathered by the Lambino Group.
Having proved that majority of the signatories were not able to see the full text of the of the proposed changes
proposed signing, they could not have known the full nature and effect of the proposed changes which include
three controversial amendments:

● The lifting of term limits on the members of the legislature.

● The interim Parliament will continue to function indefinitely until it decides to call for parliamentary
elections thus enabling its members to determine when they will end their term.
● Within 45 days after the proposed changes, the interim Parliament will convene to propose further
amendments to the constitution.

This provision is determined by the Court to be totally unrelated to the stated objective of the initiative and is
considered logrolling.
Logrolling refers to the incorporation of an unrelated subject matter in the same petition thus creating two
propositions within one petition thus putting the people in a dilemma where since they can only say yes or
no to the whole petition they cannot agree to one proposition without also agreeing to the other.
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.
While Atty. Lambino states that this provision is not necessary and should thus be ignored, the Court does
not agree since this provision could effectively invalidate the whole exercise of the people’s initiative as
through this provision the interim Parliament could, in theory, propose amendments not agreed upon by the
signatories of the initial petition.
b. People’s initiative can only be done for constitutional amendments and not revisions.
Based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the framers intentionally made a distinction
between amendments and revisions. It was the intent, as is written, that only Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose revisions while a people’s initiative is limited only to the proposal of amendments.
A revision implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution while amendment refers to a
change that adds, reduces, or deletes, without altering the basic principle of the constitution. A change in a
single word could already be considered a revision as long as it overhauls the structure of government and
the ideological basis of the Constitution.
There are two tests to determine whether a change is an amendment or a revision:

● Quantitative test – examines the number of provisions, not the degree of change, in order to test
how extensive the proposed changes are.
● Qualitative test – based on qualitative effects, asks whether the proposed changes create far
reaching changes in the nature of the basic governmental plan thus amounting to a revision.

The prosed changes by the Lambino Group significantly alter the basic plan of government as it would
effectively alter the separation of powers through the abolition of the Office of the President and merging of
the legislative and executive, and alter the system of checks and balances within the legislature through the
abolition of one chamber of Congress.
Under both quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes constitute a revision
and not simply an amendment as it “radically alters the framework of government set forth in the Constitution.
The Court states that since the proposed changes constitute a revision and would require far-reaching
amendments in not just the specified articles and provisions but also in several others, a deliberative body
with recorded proceedings would be the best vehicle to undertake them, as was intended by the framers and
is stated in the constitution, and not a people’s initiative.

2. There is no need to revisit the Court’s ruling in Santiago since an affirmation or reversal of the said ruling
would not change the outcome of this petition.
Even if it is assumed RA 6735 is valid, contrary to the ruling in Santiago, the outcome of the Lambino Group’s
petition would not change since before referring to RA 6735 a petition must first comply with Section 2, Article
XVII, and as was previously established, it does not.
The Lambino Group’s petition also does not comply with RA 6735. Indeed, It violates Section 5(b) of RA
6735 requiring that the signatories, consistitng of 12% of the total number of registered voters, sign the
petition since it has already been established that the 6 million signatories only signed a signature sheet and
not the petition itself.
It also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735, which states that no more than 1 subject can be embraced by a
petition, through its provision which mandates the interim Parliament to propose further amendments which
as determined earlier is unrelated to the subject of a shift from presidential to parliamentary form of
government.

3. The COMELEC did not commit a grave of abuse of discretion in dismissing the Lambino Group’s Initiative
petition.
Since the COMELEC merely followed the Court’s ruling in Santiago, the Commission did not gravely abuse
its discretion.

DISSENTING OPINION:
Puno, J.
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the examination of Santiago on the following grounds:

● In the Santiago ruling, the court ruled RA 6735 as insufficient but if did not strike it down as
unconstitutional, by doing so the Court “usurped the exclusive right of legislators to determine
how far laws implementing constitutional mandates should be crafted,” defying the principle that
courts cannot dictate on Congress the style on writing laws and in doing so rendered an
intolerable ruling.
● The ruling in Santiago involves the sovereignty of the people.
● The ruling should not impede the will of the 6.3 million signatories.

RA 6735 is sufficient to implement the people’s initiative.

● The intent of the legislators in enacting RA 6735 was the implementation of the right of the people
to propose amendments to the Constitution through direct action.
● The court has the duty to give effect to the intent.
● Only implementing details were omitted from RA 6735 and not fundamental principles. The
implementing details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC.
● The proposed changes are amendments and can be undertaken through people’s initiative

Using the same quantitative test it could be argued that since only 2 out of the 18 articles of the 1987
constitution will be changed and thus the big bulk of the 1987 Constitution would remain unaffected.

● Based on the work of Garner, who says that a good constitution is composed of the constitution
of liberty, constitution of government, and constitution of sovereignty, the proposed changes only
affect the constitution of government and even then the changes do not change the fundamental
nature of our state as a democratic and republican state.
● According to Dean Vicente G. Sincon, revision refers to a consideration of the entire constitution
while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or altered in a constitution.
This traditional distinction guided our people when they effected changes in the 1935 and 1975
Constitutions.

The court should let the voice of the people be heard.

● The petition for people’s initiative is but the first step towards the amendment of the constitution.
The petition, if approved, does not constitute already the amendment of the constitution. It will
still require debate and deliberation of the people, as well as ratification by majority of the people.
Every step of the way it is the people who should decide, the court should not prohibit them from
doing so.