REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK I

CRIMINAL LAW>Book I>Felonies>Criminal liabilities and felonies>Complex crimes and

composite crimes

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON,

RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS,
and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014
(Second Division)

FACTS: One morning at a gym in Caloocan City, a bloodied Edwin Navarro was seen being forcibly
dragged by men and pushed inside a car. The following day, the kidnappers called Edwin’s brother to
demand for payment of ransom for the release of Edwin. However, during the meet-up, no exchange
happened, and the kidnappers drove away. Days later, Rodolfo Larido, an employee of the gym,
confessed to the police of his part in the plan to kidnap Edwin and gave information on the whereabouts
of his cohorts leading to their arrest. In the early morning of the following day, the dead body of Edwin
was found. Armando Dionaldo, Renato Dionaldo, Mariano Gariguez, Jr., and Rodolfo (accused-appellants)
were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. However, the RTC only convicted the accused-
appellants of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. It did not consider the subsequent
death of Edwin, albeit alleged and evidenced by a death certificate. The Court of Appeals affirmed said
decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention was proper?

HELD: No. The crime committed does not merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. Where the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought
or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed
under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under
the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659. Thus, further taking into account the fact
that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction
must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book I>Felonies>Circumstances affecting criminal liability>Mitigating

Circumstance

ADINA B. MANANSALA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 215424, December 9, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Kathleen Siy, former Vice President for UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation, instructed her
secretary, Marissa Bautista, to withdraw via ATM cash from her bank accounts. However, Bautista was
not able to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so she took it upon herself to get such amount
from Adina Manansala, the petty cash custodian of UMC. Siy issued two checks to reimburse UMC's petty
cash account. However, UMC Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao instructed Manansala to re-
insert the entry relating to Siy's alleged cash advance therein, reprint the same on a scratch paper, and
repeatedly fold the paper to make it look old. Later, Siy was administratively charged for using office
funds for personal use and was then terminated from her job. Lacanilao succeeded the former in the

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position she left vacant which prompted Siy to file criminal charges against Lacanilao, and Manansala for
Falsification of Private Documents. In her defense, Manansala maintained that she was just following
Lacanilao's orders as the latter is her superior who approves her work. The MeTC both found Lacanilao
and Manansala guilty of committing the crime of Falsification of Private Documents. Nonetheless, the
MeTC appreciated the mitigating circumstance of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear in favor
of Manansala.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “mitigating circumstance" of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear in
favor of Manansala should be appreciated?

HELD: No. To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating
circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under
Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an
accused, the following elements must concur: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the
fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that
committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.

In this case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in committing a falsity in the
preparation of the subject report as she did not know the repercussions of her actions, nothing would
show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of
employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and imminent threat,
intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do what she did, such a circumstance
cannot be appreciated in her favor.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book I>Felonies>Circumstances affecting criminal liability>Aggravating

circumstances

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

ROGER RINGOR UMAWID, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014
(Second Division)

FACTS: Vicente was holding his two-year-old daughter Maureen at their house when Roger Umawid
appeared and started attacking him with a panabas with neither reason nor provocation. While Vicente
was able to evade Umawid’s blows, the latter hit Maureen in her abdomen, causing her death. Vicente’s
nephew Jeffrey, aged 15, who lived nearby, was likewise attacked by Umawid. Jeffrey used his hands to
block the latter’s blows which resulted in the mutilation of the former’s fingers. Two Informations for
Murder and Frustrated Murder were filed against Umawid. He set up the defense of insanity relying solely
on the testimonies of his doctors on his psychiatric conditions, six months prior to the acts complained of,
and three and four months after. However, they could not tell with certainty whether Umawid was
psychotic at the time of the commission of the crimes. RTC found him guilty of the charges, and that
those were done in a treacherous manner. It did not lend credence to the alleged insanity defense for
failure to show unsoundness of mind at the time of the commission of the crimes. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE#1: Whether or not Umawid should be exonerated on the ground of insanity?

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HELD#1: No. The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused
invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of
such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the
burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on this matter must
relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense/s with
which he is charged.

In this case, records reveal that Dr. Quincina’s testimony only showed that he only examined Umawid six
months before the latter committed the crimes and three months and four months thereafter. Notably, he
admitted that his findings did not include Umawid’s mental disposition immediately before or at the very
moment when he committed such crimes. As such, Dr. Quincina’s testimony cannot prove Umawid’s
insanity.

ISSUE#2: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated?

HELD#2: Yes. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Likewise, it has been held that the killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of
the assault is not shown because the weakness of the victim due to her tender age results in the absence
of any danger to the accused. This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor.
Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when
an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.

ISSUE#3: Whether or not the case of Maureen’s death an aberratio ictus?

HELD#3: Yes. Maureen’s death is a case of aberratio ictus, given that the fatal blow therefor was only
delivered by mistake as it was actually Vicente who was Umawid’s intended target. In this regard,
Umawid’s single deed actually resulted in the: (a) Attempted Murder of Vicente; and (b) Consummated
Murder of Maureen. This may be classified as species of complex crime defined under Article 48 of the
RPC, particularly, a delito compuesto, or a compound crime where a single act produces two (2) or more
grave or less grave felonies.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book I>Felonies>Circumstances affecting criminal liability>Aggravating

circumstances

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EUGENE SAMUYA, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 213214, April 20, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Eugene and Rudy were charged with the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the RPC. In his
defense, Eugene admitted shooting Gabriel but claimed that he merely acted in self-defense. Eugene
claims that he saw Gabriel rushing towards his direction, armed with a knife. Fearing that Gabriel was
going to attack him, he pulled his own gun and shot the victim. The RTC convicted Eugene as charged,
while Rudy was acquitted on the account of the prosecution’s failure to prove that he conspired with
Eugene in shooting Gabriel. Further, it appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance since the attack
was so sudden and unexpected, without warning on the victim and, thus, made it impossible for him to
defend himself even if the attack was frontal. Dissatisfied, Eugene appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is treachery despite the fact that the attack was frontal?

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HELD: Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked. A frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery.
The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that
the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Eugene's attack on Gabriel was so swift and sudden,
and without any warning. Eyewitnesses testified that immediately upon his arrival and without any
exchange of words, Eugene pulled out his gun and shot Gabriel. Although the attack was frontal, it was
so sudden and unexpected which made it impossible for Gabriel to defend himself. The gunshot wound
on Gabriel's chest caused massive bleeding which led to his death not long after.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book I>Extinction of criminal liability

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALLAN EGAGAMAO, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 218809, August 3, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: The RTC found Egagamao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of one count of Rape
and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole,
and ordered him to pay AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. Aggrieved,
Egagamao appealed to the Court of Appeals and during the pendency of the appeal, Egagamao died.

ISSUE: Whether or not Egamamao’s death extinguished his criminal liability?

HELD: Yes. The following are the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the
civil liability, based solely thereon.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases, where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription.

Thus, upon Egagamao's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
However, it is well to clarify that Egagamao's civil liability in connection with his acts against AAA may be

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based on sources of obligation other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action
against the estate of Egagamao, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book I>Civil Liability in Criminal Cases

LEONORA B. RIMANDO, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES WINSTON AND ELENITA ALDABA and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014
(First Division)

FACTS: Leonora Rimando was charged with the crime of estafa through the use of false manifestations
and fraudulent representations. She allegedly enticed Spouses Aldaba to invest in Multitel International
Holding Corporation (Multitel) under the assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8%
monthly interest. Convinced, the Spouses gave Rimando a check amounting to PHP500,000.00, and in
turn, Rimando issued three postdated checks in favor of the former. Upon presentment, the checks were
dishonored due to insufficient funds. Rimando failed to make good of the said checks. Hence, the filing of
estafa case against her, and subsequently, a criminal case for violation of BP 22. Rimando posited the
defense that she only issued the checks as an accommodation party on behalf of Multitel. Rimando was
acquitted in the BP 22 case on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the act or
omission from which liability may arise does not exist. The RTC acquitted Rimando in the estafa case,
finding that there was no element of deceit as the Spouses were fully aware that they would be investing
their money in Multitel. Nonetheless, Rimando was held civilly liable to the Spouses Aldaba in the amount
of PHP500,000.00. Rimando appealed the RTC Decision contending that her acquittal from the civil
liability in the BP 22 case should have barred her civil liability in the estafa case. The CA affirmed the RTC
holding that prosecution for violation of BP 22 is distinct, separate, and independent from that of estafa.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rimando may be held civilly liable in the estafa case despite her acquittal and
exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 case?

HELD: Yes. It is well-settled that the acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.

In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the crime of estafa
as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to
invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an accommodation
party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to
Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and as such, she may be held directly liable for the
value of the issued check. Verily, Rimando’s civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of PHP500,000.00
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime she is charged with. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case
concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the
criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.

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CRIMINAL LAW>Book I>Civil Liability in Criminal Cases

ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, Petitioner, vs. MARLA OLIVA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 210148, December 8, 2014
(First Division)

FACTS: Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette ran her over. While Marina Oliva
was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter,
herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide against Antonio Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle. Daluraya was charged in an
Information for a criminal case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. However, the MeTC
granted Daluraya’s demurrer and the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. With respect to
the civil liability, both the MeTC and the RTC denied the same finding that the act from which the criminal
responsibility may spring did not at all exist. The CA reversed the MeTC and RTC holding that Daluraya’s
acquittal was based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As
such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not Daluraya is civilly liable for Oliva’s death despite his acquittal in the criminal case
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence?

HELD: No. Daluraya is not civilly liable. The RPC provides that every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability.

There are two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability
of the accused are:

1. Acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
2. Acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may
be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

Here, records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently
establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should
be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.

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CRIMINAL LAW>Book I>Civil liability in criminal cases

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. OSCAR PARBA y SOLON, Accused-

Appellant.
G.R. No. 214506, October 19, 2015
(First Division)
FACTS: Oscar Parba (accused) pulled a gun from his belt bag, and shot Mark Navaja at the back of the
head while the latter was helping his daughter disembark from a motorcycle. At that instance, Navaja fell
to the ground, while Parba and a companion exited towards the highway. Buenavista and Cuizon, who
were then security guards in a school near the incident, immediately chased Parba after the shooting and
further encountered him face-to-face when he turned around and pointed a gun at them. The RTC
convicted Parba for Murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him
to pay the heirs of Navaja P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages. Although the CA affirmed the conviction, it modified the awards of damages to
P17,000.00 as actual damages which was amply supported by receipts, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE: What are the damages to which the heirs of the victim are entitled when death results from the
commission of the crime?

HELD: When death results from the commission of a crime, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the
following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim without need of evidence other
than the commission of the crime; (b) actual or compensatory damages to the extent proved, or
temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with
certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances.

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 REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK II

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes Against Public Interest>Falsification of public document

HILARIO LAMSEN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 227069, November 22, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: The prosecution alleged that Aniceta dela Cruz (Aniceta) owned a parcel of land, and registered
under the name of "Aniceta dela Cruz, married to Nestor Tandas". Aniceta passed away, leaving behind
her nieces and surviving heirs, Teresita and Carmelita. After Aniceta's death, Teresita went to the
former's house to look for the owner's duplicate title of the subject property, but the same was allegedly
nowhere to be found. Accordingly, Teresita executed an affidavit of loss, which was annotated on the title
on file with the Registry of Deeds. Concurrently, Teresita and Carmelita executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Aniceta. Teresita also filed a petition for the issuance of second owner's
duplicate copy. The said petition, however, was dismissed on the basis of the opposition of Hilario
Lamsen (accused), who claimed that the original copy of the owner's duplicate title could not have been
lost because it was with him. Meanwhile, the RD informed Teresita through a letter that somebody [it
turned out that it was the accused] requested for the registration of a deed of sale (subject deed)
involving the subject property. Thus, she proceeded to the RD but was informed that the requesting
party had withdrawn all the papers; hence, she asked for the Book of the RD to photocopy the
withdrawal aforementioned. Thereafter, she went to the Notarial Section of Manila to get a certified true
copy of the subject deed but was given a mere photocopy thereof, since the original was no longer on
file. She then submitted the photocopy of the deed to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination, as the signatures of Aniceta and Nestor Tandas thereon appeared to be
forged. Upon examination, the document examiner (Batiles) confirmed that the subject deed was indeed
falsified. He revealed that there were dissimilarities between the questioned and standard signatures of
Aniceta and Nestor, and that they were not written by one and the same person. Lamsen was then
charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of Falsification of Public Document?

HELD: No. In the crime of falsification of public document, the prosecution must establish the fact of
falsification or forgery by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, as the same is never presumed. The
fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the
authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.

In this case, the prosecution presented an expert witness, Batiles, to prove its allegation of falsification or
forgery. While Batiles testified during cross-examination that the questioned signatures were not written
by one and the same person, and that there is a certainty that the subject deed was falsified, the Court,
however, finds this declaration unreliable and inconclusive, as it is inconsistent with the Questioned
Document Report No. 130-03. In the said Report, which Batiles himself issued after examining the
allegedly falsified subject deed, Batiles found that no definite conclusion can be rendered because the
documents submitted by the prosecution were mere photocopies of the original. Since mere photocopies
of the subject deed were used to examine the questioned and standard signatures of spouses Tandas, no
valid comparison can be had between them, thereby rendering Batiles’ declaration inconclusive to support
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Lamsen.

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CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes committed by Public Officers>Open Disobedience

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 183014, August 7, 2013
(Second Division)

FACTS: For allegedly openly refusing without any legal justification to obey the order of the court in Civil
Case 03-110 (RTC of Muntinlupa Branch 203) in issuing a writ of execution, an Information was filed
against Atty. Josefina Fria, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, for the crime of Open
Disobedience under Article 231 of the RPC. In her defense, Atty. Fria posited that the Court had rendered
a Decision in Reyes vs. Balde II (an offshoot of Civil Case 03-110) wherein it held that Branch 203 had no
jurisdiction over Civil Case 03-110. Thus, the judgment rendered by said court was null and void and
thereby justifying her refusal to issue a writ of execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Fria is guilty of Open Disobedience?

HELD: No. While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a judicial or executive officer, concurs in view
of Atty. Fria’s position as Branch Clerk of Court, the second and third elements of the crime evidently
remain wanting. The second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment,
decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal
formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been
regarded as null and void due to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction over the said case. The third element of
the crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal justification, openly refuses to execute the said
judgment, decision, or order, which he is duty bound to obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably, without
any jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to implement or, conversely, disobey.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Persons>Homicide

GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent,

G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015
(First Division)
FACTS: Elner Aro was sprawled on the ground. While in that position, a witness saw Guillermo Wacoy
(accused) kick Aro's stomach twice. As Aro stood up, Quibac (accused) punched him on the stomach,
causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital, however, on the next
day, Aro died. Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide but RTC found Wacoy and
Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under
Article 251 of the RPC and not for Homicide. On appeal, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not
be convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there were only 2 persons who
inflicted harm on the victim, and that there was no tumultuous affray involving several persons. Instead,
they were convicted of the crime of Homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only
to maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Wacoy and Quibac were properly convicted for homicide instead of Death Caused
in a Tumultuous Affray?
HELD: Yes. Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is
killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.

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In this case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro
died. On the contrary, there were only two persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless
individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor
victim. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in
that fateful incident. Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was
the proximate cause of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefore,
specifically for the crime of Homicide.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Persons>Murder

MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 218466, January 23, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA

a.k.a. “JOHN,” “KONYONG” SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL “INONG” DIONISIO
NACIONAL, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 221425, January 23, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: The prosecution alleged that an eyewitness, Reynaldo, chanced upon Manny Ramos, Roberto
Salonga, and Servillano Nacional (accused-appellants) having an altercation with the victim, Rolando
Necesito. From his vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos yell, "Okinam patayan ka!" (Son of a bitch! I
will kill you!) and saw accused-appellants chase and eventually surround Rolando at an area around
seven meters away from where Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo then heard four successive gunshots,
making him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree for fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the fourth
shot when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall face down on the ground. To ensure Rolando's demise,
Ramos approached Rolando and shot him again. Thereafter, accused-appellants fled the scene. The next
day, Rolando's body was found near the duhat tree. Accused-appellants were then charged of the crime
of Murder Aggravated with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act (RA) No. 8294. The RTC found
accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed accused appellants’ conviction for the
crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellants were properly convicted for the crime of Murder with the Use
of an Unlicensed Firearm?

HELD: No. Under Section 1 of RA No. 8294, “if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.” There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the
corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these
elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.

In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five gunshot wounds which led to his demise, it
is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to recover the firearm used
as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered, whether or not such
firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the courts a quo were silent regarding this
matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando,
the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation. Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot

10
simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance. Hence, the conviction
should only be for simple murder.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Persons>Rape

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GUILLERMO B. CADANO, JR.,

Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 207819, March 12, 2014
(Second Division)

FACTS: AAA was a minor aged 8 years and 12 months. She lived with her mother BBB and the latter’s
common-law spouse, Guillermo Cadano. Three Informations were filed before the RTC charging Cadano
of raping AAA on three separate incidents: the first two in 1996, for which he was charged under the old
rape provision, i.e., Article 355 of the RPC and the latter one in 2000, for which he was charged under
the amended rape provision, i.e. Article 266-A as amended by RA 8353 otherwise known as the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997. The RTC convicted the accused as it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that he had
carnal knowledge with AAA, and without her consent as she was below 12 years old. The accused was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision. Hence, this appeal where Cadano argues that there must be proof of force, intimidation and/or
consent for him to be convicted of the crime of statutory rape.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not proof of force, intimidation, or consent is necessary in cases of statutory
rape?

HELD #1: No. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age
regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is
unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is
conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the
victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus,
to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a)
the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the
accused and the complainant.

Here, the victim was below 12 years old when the rape incidents happened and the prosecution proved
that Cadano indeed had carnal knowledge of AAA on three (3) separate occasions through the latter’s
positive, categorical, and spontaneous testimony, as corroborated by the medico-legal report.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape
was proper?

HELD #2: Yes. Cadano should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of statutory rape.
On this matter, it is apt to discuss that RA 8353 introduced various qualifying circumstances that would
increase the penalty for the crime of rape from reclusion perpetua to death, e.g., when the offended
party is a minor under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim – a circumstance that was not present under the old rape provision, i.e., Article 335 of the
RPC. Thus, the aforementioned circumstance could not qualify the first two (2) rape incidents which
occurred prior to the enactment of RA 8353, but it could be properly appreciated in the third one.
Nevertheless, in light of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant to RA 9346, the imposable penalty for

11
the third rape incident is lowered to reclusion perpetua, with the offender being rendered ineligible for
parole.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Persons>Rape

IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO and BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, Petitioners,

vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL
ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 182130 & 182132, June 9, 2013
(Second Division)

FACTS: On separate occasions, Gil Anthony Calianga allegedly raped Iris Kristine Alberto, who was then
a minor. Calianga raised the sweetheart defense and consent on the part of Iris. The DOJ charged Gil for
Rape in relation to Child Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ properly charged Gil of Rape in relation to Child Abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610?

HELD: No. Existing jurisprudence proscribes charging an accused for both crimes. If the victim is 12
years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or
rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender
cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape
cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal
Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed
with an offense penalized by a special law.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Persons>Rape

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

RICKY ARGUTA alias "JOEL" and WILSON CAHIPE alias "SIWIT," Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 213216, April 20, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: At around 8 o’clock in the evening, AAA was instructed by her father to fetch her sister in school.
However, AAA failed to find her sister and decided to go back home. On her way home, Ricky Arguta and
Wilson Cahipe (accused-appellants) intercepted AAA, threatened her with a bladed weapon, dragged her
to a cottage at a nearby beach resort, and bound her hands and feet. Thereafter, they removed her
clothes and placed her on the floor. Arguta then mounted AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina.
After Arguta satisfied his lust, Cahipe took over and raped her. Thereafter, accused-appellants left AAA at
the cottage. An hour later, Cahipe returned and dragged AAA to a store owned by a certain Lino Ostero.
There Cahipe undressed her again, mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Afterwards, AAA
was returned to the cottage. The next day, AAA’s father found her crying at the cottage. Consequently,
two criminal Informations were filed charging Cahipe with two counts of Rape, and Arguta of one count
of the same crime. Both the RTC and the CA convicted the accused-appellants of simple rape. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arguta and Cahipe’s conviction for Simple Rape should be upheld?

12
HELD: No. It should be modified to Qualified Rape. In this case, the rape occurred during the effectivity
of the old rape provision of the RPC, i.e., Article 335, and, thus, the latter provision is controlling in this
case, to wit:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

The presence of either circumstance - "use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons" - qualifies
the crime. If one is present, the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a generic aggravating
circumstance because there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a generic
aggravating circumstance for either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
enumerating what are aggravating circumstances.

In this case, records reveal that accused-appellants threatened AAA with a bladed instrument and tied
her up before having carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Jurisprudence holds that force or
intimidation, as an element of Rape, need not be irresistible; as long as the assailant's objective is
accomplished, any question of whether the force employed was irresistible or not becomes irrelevant.
Intimidation must be viewed from the lens of the victim's perception and judgment and it is enough that
the victim fears that something will happen to her should she resist her assailant's advances. In this
regard, case law provides that the act of holding a bladed instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of
force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with the same is sufficient to bring her into
submission. Considering that the crime was committed by two (2) persons with the use of a bladed
weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II> Crimes against Persons>Rape

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RICO NIERBES y REGINALDO, Accused-

Appellants.
G.R. No. 230975, December 4, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: Rico Nierbes (accused) was charged of Rape for allegedly having carnal knowledge with AAA, a
sixteen (16) year-old lass, who is suffering from mild mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9)
year-old, and which was allegedly known to the accused. The RTC found Nierbes guilty of the crime of
Simple Rape in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7160. On appeal, the CA upgraded the conviction to
Qualified Rape considering that: (1) the state of mental retardation of AAA was competently established
on account of the testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Laguidao; and (2) failure of Nierbes to
dispute AAA’s mental retardation during trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nierbes is guilty of Qualified Rape?

HELD: No. Nierbes should only be convicted for the crime of Simple Rape. Although the elements of the
crime of rape are present in this case, the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of

13
Niebres's knowledge of AAA's mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime, there being no
sufficient and competent evidence to substantiate the same.

Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of
rape is a special qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable by death. Such qualifying
circumstance, however, must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved during trial to be
properly appreciated by the trial court. It must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form.

In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA's mental retardation was
specifically alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by the prosecution. The fact
that Niebres did not dispute AAA's mental retardation during trial is insufficient to qualify the crime of
rape, since it does not necessarily create moral certainty that he knew of her disability at the time of its
commission. It is settled that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. On that score,
the prosecution cannot simply profit from Niebres' omission, as it must rely on its own evidence to prove
his knowledge of AAA's mental disability beyond reasonable doubt.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security>Kidnapping and

Serious Illegal Detention

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BRAHIM LIDASAN, NHOKIE MOHAMAD,

et al., Accused, OMAR KAMIR, ALEX DALIANO, et al., Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 227425, September 4, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: Michelle Ragos was being guarded by security guards Bauting and Daliano when Roy Bansuan
and two men entered her bedroom and declared “kidnapping ito.” The other men took cash and personal
items amounting to P200,000.00. Ragos was brought and detained in Las Piñas City. They demanded a
ransom of P30 Million, which was later reduced to P4.83 million. The Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Task Force formed a team who monitored the activities of the kidnappers until the agreed pay-off date.
On the date of pay-off, the said team arrested the accused and was able to rescue Ragos.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged as principals and were
sentenced to suffer death penalty; while the other accused were found guilty of the crime charged as
accomplices and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed the convictions with modification lowering the sentence of the principals to reclusion perpetua
and that of the accomplices to reclusion temporal. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the convictions for Kidnapping for Ransom should be upheld?

HELD: Yes. Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, defines and penalizes the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The elements of the crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a
private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances is present: i) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; ii) it is
committed by simulating public authority; iii) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or iv) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer. Notably, the duration of detention is immaterial if the victim is a minor, or if
the purpose of the kidnapping is to extort ransom. Otherwise stated, the prosecution must establish the

14
deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the above mentioned circumstances coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.

In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid
elements as it is undisputed that accused-appellants, among others, illegally detained Ragos against her
will for the purpose of extorting ransom from her family. Moreover, the collective testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, such as Ragos and state witness Bauting, positively identified the perpetrators to
the kidnapping — including accused-appellants Adil, Daliano, and Kamir — as well as narrated in detail
the events that transpired from Ragos’ abduction up to her rescue.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Property>Robbery with Homicide

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARNEL BALUTE y VILLANUEVA,

Accused-Appellant.
G.R. Nos. 212932, January 21, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois (SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife
Cristita and daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a
stop position at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two male persons, later on identified as Arnel Balute
(accused) and a certain Leo Blaster suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney, with Balute poking
a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying “putangina, ilabas mo!” Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1
Manaois’s mobile phone from the latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1
Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to fire at
the assailants as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he died despite
undergoing surgical operation and medical intervention. The RTC found Balute guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of treachery. It found that the prosecution was
able to establish the existence of all the elements of Robbery with Homicide, as it proved that Balute
poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois’s side, took his mobile phone, and shot him, resulting in the latter’s
death. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Balute’s conviction with modification. Hence, the instant
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Balute is guilty of Robbery with Homicide?

HELD: Yes. A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed
either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to
another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of
the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. Homicide is said to
have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
(c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the
commission of the crime.

In this case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was able to establish the fact
that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him,
resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention.

15
CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Property>Theft

CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Cherry Ann Benabaye (accused) was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank authorized to collect
and/or accept loan payments of Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional receipts therefor, accomplish a
cash transfer slip at the end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money that she has received,
and remit such payments to Tupag, her supervisor. Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation and
thereby found out that fraud and certain irregularities attended the same, having discovered the non-
remittance of some loan payments received from its clients based on the provisional receipts issued by its
account officers, as well as the daily collection reports corresponding to the said provisional receipts.
Benabaye claimed, among others, that the discrepancies could be clarified by her supervisor, Tupag, to
whom she had submitted her daily cash transfer slips together with the corresponding provisional
receipts. Tupag admitted his accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees were privy
to the acts which resulted in the discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities. Siam Bank filed a
criminal case for estafa against Benabaye and Tupag before the RTC which found both guilty. On appeal,
Benabaye maintains that the first element of estafa through misappropriation has not been established,
insisting that her possession of the collected loan payments was merely material and not juridical;
therefore, she cannot be convicted of the said crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Benabaye’s possession of the collected loan payments were juridical, thereby
sustaining her conviction for estafa through misappropriation?

HELD: No. It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is
considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. The material possession of an
employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the
employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-
perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, conversion of
personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property
constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have
been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa.

In this case, records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's
clients. At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments received together
with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money merely passes
into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an
employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller,
she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or material possession.
Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent who could have
asserted a right against Siam Bank over the same, Benabaye had only acquired material and not juridical
possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa as charged.

16
CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Property>Qualified Theft

MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 209386, December 8, 2014
(First Division)

FACTS: Viron Transit Corporation ordered diesel fuel from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a
company owned by Jessielyn Valera Lao. Mel Candelaria (accused), a truck driver employed by Lao, was
dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel in Laon Laan, Manila. However, in the afternoon of the same day,
Viron informed Lao through a phone call that it had not yet received its order. Upon inquiry, Lao
discovered that Candelaria, with his helper Mario Romano left the company premises at 12:50 in the
afternoon of the same day on board a lorry truck to deliver Viron’s diesel fuel order. When Lao called
Candelaria on his mobile phone, she did not receive any response. Thereafter, or at around 6 o’clock in
the evening of the same day, Romano returned alone to Unioil’s office and reported that Candelaria
poked a balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the incident to the Manila Police District, as well as to
Camp Crame. After a few days, the NBI agents found the abandoned lorry truck in Calamba, Laguna,
emptied of the diesel fuel.

Lao then filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Candelaria. Candelaria demurred to the
prosecution’s evidence, arguing that there was no direct evidence that linked him to the commission of
the crime, as Lao had no personal knowledge as to what actually happened to the diesel fuel. Moreover,
the information relayed by Romano is considered hearsay due to his untimely demise.

ISSUE: Whether or not Candelaria is guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft?

HELD: Yes. Candelaria is guilty of Qualified Theft. The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under
Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the RPC, as amended, are:
(a) the taking of personal property;
(b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain;
(d) it be done without the owner’s consent;
(e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things; and
(f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with
grave abuse of confidence.

All elements are present in this case. Through the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it was
sufficiently established that the diesel fuel loaded into the lorry truck driven by Candelaria for delivery to
Viron was taken by him, without the authority and consent of Lao, the owner of the diesel fuel, and that
Candelaria abused the confidence reposed upon him by Lao as his employer.

Criminal Law>Book II>Crimes against Property>Qualified Theft

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ERNESTO L. DELOS SANTOS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 220685, November 29, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: Ernesto Delos Santos (respondent) undertook the construction of the CTTL Building, adjacent to
the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn (BPTI) which is a business establishment owned and operated by the
University of Manila (UM). His father, Virgilio Delos Santos (Virgilio), who was the President and Chairman

17
of the Board of Trustees (BOT) of UM, allegedly ordered the employees of BPTI to assist respondent in all
his needs in the construction. Respondent was permitted to tap into BPTI's electricity and water supply.
When Virgilio died and was succeeded by Emily Dodson De Leon (De Leon) as President of UM; UM,
represented by De Leon, filed a criminal complaint against respondent for qualified theft of the electricity
and water supply of BPTI for the construction of the CTTL Building. An Information charging respondent
with qualified theft was filed before the Regional Trial Court. When the case reached the Court of
Appeals, the CA held that Virgilio, as majority stockholder, President, and Chairman of the BOT of the
UM, had apparent authority to give consent to respondent’s use of the electricity and water supply of
BPTI. Hence, the element of lack of owner’s consent was absent. Even if Virgilio was not, in fact, duly
authorized by the BOT to give his consent to respondent’s acts, the latter nonetheless acted in good faith
on the basis of the permission given to him by his father, which negated another element of the crime,
i.e., the intent to gain.

ISSUE: Whether or not the element of lack of consent is present in this case?

HELD: No. The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and
309, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are as follows: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said
property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the
owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor
of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the
RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.

The elements of lack of owner's consent and intent to gain are evidently absent in this case. To recount,
UM, which owns BPTI, is an educational institution established and owned by respondent's family. His
father, Virgilio, owned 70.79% of the entire shares of stock of the UM, and respondent himself claims
9.85% share thereof. Virgilio was the President and Chairman of the BOT of UM at the time material to
this case, and respondent himself was a board member and stockholder. Records disclose that
respondent was permitted by Virgilio to tap into BPTI's electricity and water supply. As such, respondent
had no criminal intent - as he, in fact, acted on the faith of his father's authority, on behalf of UM - to
appropriate said personal property.

It has been held that in cases where one, in good faith, “takes another’s property under claim of title in
himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be.
And the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. The gist of
the offense is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain or out of
wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the taker
honestly believes the property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take possession of
it for himself or for another,” as in this case.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Property>Estafa

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PALMY TIBAYAN AND RICO Z. PUERTO,
Accused-Appellants.
G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Private complainants were enticed to invest in Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI)
due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will recover their investments.
After giving their money to TGICI, private complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated
checks. Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, as the account was already closed, prompting

18
private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to demand payment. At the office,
the TGICI employees reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would be paid. However,
the TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid. The RTC convicted Palmy
Tibayan of 13 counts and Rico Puerto of 11 counts of simple estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article
315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689. On appeal, the CA modified the conviction to that of
Syndicated Estafa, and accordingly, increased their respective penalties to life imprisonment for each
count. It held that TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on
subsequent investors to pay its earlier investors – and is what PD 1689 precisely aims to punish. Thus,
the CA concluded that as incorporators/directors of TGICI, accused-appellants and their cohorts conspired
in making TGICI a vehicle for the perpetuation of fraud against the unsuspecting public. The CA then
concluded that since the TGICI incorporators/directors comprised more than five persons, accused-
appellants’ criminal liability should be upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and
penalized under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689?

HELD: Yes. The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the
RPC are the following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that
such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage.

In this case, records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of inducing the public to invest in it on the
undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very high monthly interest rate ranging from
three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%). Under such lucrative promise, the investing public are
enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start
that TGICI is operating without any paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the
assured profits to its investors, they cannot comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with
their investors’ money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other accused
who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI
investors.

It is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi scheme, are present in
this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5) people,
including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and representations to the investing public – in
this case, the private complainants – regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in
order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their
hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with
the private complainants’ investments, obviously to the latter’s prejudice.
CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Property>Estafa
PAZ CHENG y CHU, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174113. January 13, 2016
(Second Division)

FACTS: Rowena Rodriguez and Paz Cheng (accused) entered into an agreement whereby Rodriguez shall
deliver pieces of jewelry to Cheng for the latter to sell on commission basis. Upon delivery of the last

19
batch of jewelry, Cheng issued a check as full security for the first two (2) deliveries and as partial
security for the last. When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to return the unsold jewelry on due
date, Rodriguez presented the check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored due to insufficient
funds. Upon assurance of Cheng, Rodriguez re-deposited the check, but again, the same was dishonored
because the drawee account had been closed. Rodriguez then decided to confront Cheng, who then
uttered “Akala mo, babayaran pa kita?” Thus, Rodriguez was constrained to file the charges of estafa
against Cheng.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cheng is liable for estafa?

HELD: Yes. Under Article 315 the elements of estafa provision are as follows: (1) the offender's receipt
of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or
property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand
by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received. The essence of this kind
of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the entity
to whom a return should be made. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal
presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to
return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.

In this case, the elements of estafa, as defined and penalized by the afore-cited provision, are present,
considering that: (a) Rodriguez delivered the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of selling them on
commission basis; (b) Cheng was required to either remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the
jewelry after one month from delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what was required of her despite the lapse
of the aforesaid period; (d) Rodriguez attempted to encash the check given by Cheng as security, but
such check was dishonored twice for being drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account;
(e) Rodriguez demanded that Cheng comply with her undertaking, but the latter disregarded such
demand; (j) Cheng's acts clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its value.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Chastity>Acts of Lasciviousness

RIZALDO L. ORSOS, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 214673, November 20, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: AAA, a fourteen-year-old minor at the time of the offense, was a third year high school student
while Rizaldo Orsos (accused) was then working as a teacher and CAT commandant. AAA was one of
Orsos’ students. While the CAT trainees were at a cleanup drive, Orsos called AAA and asked if she had
decided on becoming a CAT officer, to which AAA answered yes. Orsos then instructed her to go to his
house for her supposed initiation. As she did not know where Orsos’ house was located, she went back to
the school instead and waited for him to arrive. When Orsos saw AAA, he told her to follow him to his
house and keep a little distance between them. Upon arrival, AAA noticed that they were only two in the
house. Thereafter, he emerged from the bathroom and asked her if she was really determined to become
a CAT officer, to which she replied yes. Orsos then told her that he had a crush on her, that he wanted
her to become his mistress, and that he will give her all her needs. Then, he pulled her to his lap and
asked her to kiss him. Thinking it was part of the initiation rites, AAA kissed his right cheek. Thereafter,
Orsos asked her to sit on the sofa and proceeded to kiss her on the lips, leading her to cry. Orsos then
instructed her to lie down on the sofa, lifted her shirt and underwear, and sucked her right breast for
about two minutes. AAA was frightened and could not complain. After the incident, AAA told her friend

20
about the incident but not her family. Instead, she told her parents that she wanted to rest and quit
school. After a year in Manila, she went back and enrolled in fourth year high school.

Sometime in July 2008, several female CAT officers in their school revealed that Orsos had molested
them and filed cases against him in court. Prompted by her mother's inquiry if Orsos had also molested
her, AAA finally disclosed the details of the incident. Orsos was charged with acts of lasciviousness in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The RTC convicted the accused with the crime charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in
relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610?

HELD: No. The proper charge should be that of "lascivious conduct'' under Section 5 (b) of RA
7610, considering that the victim was 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. RA
7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children or those
"persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.”

The requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 are as follows: (1) the accused commits
the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age. "Lascivious conduct" is defined in Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7610, as follows:

The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Crimes against Honor>Slight Oral Defamation

DIGNA RAMOS, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 226454, November 20, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: Patrocinia Dumaua was watering her plants in her yard, when suddenly, she noticed five
schoolchildren pick up dried leaves and throw them into her yard. When Dumaua called the attention of
the schoolchildren, the latter ran towards the direction of Sto. Nino Elementary School, where Digna
Ramos (accused) works as a public school teacher. A little later, Ramos arrived, picked up dried banana
leaves, and allegedly threw them into Dumaua's yard, while saying "ta sinnu ti pabasulem nga agilappak
ti bulung, siguro dakayo ta nagpabirthday kayo" which means "Whom do you blame throwing leaves?
Maybe you did because you hosted a birthday party." This prompted a quarrel between Ramos and
Dumaua, during the course of which Ramos uttered to the latter, "Ukininam, puta, awan ad-adalmo,
nagbalay kayo ti nagdakkelan, magaburan daytoy balay kon" which translates to "Vulva of your mother,
prostitute, illiterate, you built a very big house, it overshadows my house." Because of this, Ramos was
charged with the crime of Grave Oral Defamation. The MCTC, RTC and CA convicted him of the crime
charged. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos should be convicted of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation?

21
HELD: No. Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon
the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the
case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended party. The gravity depends upon: (1)
the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the
special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that
uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party
constitutes only a light felony.

In this case, Ramos indeed uttered the words "ukininam, puta, awan ad-adal mo," against Dumaua.
However, the Court is inclined to lend more credence to Ramos' narration that she was just passing
through a pathway adjacent to Dumaua's house when the latter got mad at her; started blaming her for
the garbage in her yard; and warned her not to use the pathway anymore or else something will happen
to her - all of which resulted in the two of them hurling invectives against one another. Thus, it may
safely be concluded that while Ramos indeed said defamatory words against Dumaua, the utterances
were made in the heat of anger and were with some sort of provocation on the part of the latter. As
such, Ramos is only guilty of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation.

CRIMINAL LAW>Book II>Quasi-Offenses/Reckless Imprudence

ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. Nos. 195671. January 21, 2015.
(First Division)

FACTS: While on board a motorcycle Dionesio Inguito, Sr. with his two minor children and ascending the
curving road going to Bocboc, Bukidon on their proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land
Cruiser driven by Rogelio Gonzaga was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction.
Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but
the Land Cruiser remained. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the
Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and collided head-on with the motorcycle
causing the death of Dionesio, Sr. and the serious physical injuries of the latter’s children. Rogelio was
then charged of Reckless Imprudene Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property. The RTC found Rogelio guilty of the crime charged. The RTC held that Rogelio’s act
of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to
the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to his children. Considering further that Rogelio
failed to offer any help to the victims, the RTC sentenced him to suffer a higher indeterminate penalty.
Upon Rogelio’s motion, the RTC reconsidered its earlier conclusion. On appeal, the CA reinstated the
RTC’s initial Decision. The CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence of the limiting
element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degree
upon the offender who “fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands
to give.” Hence, this petition.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property?

HELD #1: Yes. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a
mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences
is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless
driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another,

22
either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would
disclose the danger to any reasonable person.

Here, Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the
collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to his children. Notably, the
road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos
were bound and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very
fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. Consequently, the Court
finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the
road while approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable,
as well as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph of Article 365 of the
RPC is present?

HELD #2: No. The obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in the hands of the
offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is
capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof. The Court has perused the records and found
contradictory testimonies presented by the prosecution and the defense on this matter. Considering
however, that Cherry herself admitted that the victims were first loaded on the Land Cruiser before they
were transferred to Kgd. Dadivas’s vehicle, the Court is inclined to sustain Rogelio’s claim that he tried to
extend help to the victims, but when he started the engine with the intention to go to the hospital, he
discovered that the vehicle had no brakes. Hence, in imposing the proper penalty on the accused, the
qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph of Article 365of the RPC should not be considered.

23
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act

ROBERTO P. FUENTES, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 186421, April 17, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela is the sole proprietor of Triple A Ship Chandling and General
Maritime Services (Triple A), which was operating in the Port of Isabel, Leyte since 1993 until 2001
through the Business Permits issued by the Local Government Unit of Isabel (LGU) during the said period.
However, in 2002, Roberto Fuentes, then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign Triple A’s Business Permit.
Initially, Triple A was able to carry out its business despite the lack of the said Business Permit by
securing temporary permits with the Port Management Office as well as the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
However, Triple A’s operations were shut down when the BOC issued a Cease and Desist Order and
required Valenzuela to secure a Business Permit from the LGU in order to resume Triple A’s operations.
Because of the Fuentes refusal to renew the business permit of Valenzuela without any legal reason, he
was charged with violation of Article 3(e) of RA 3019.

In this defense, Fuentes averred that as early as 1999, 2000, and 2001, he has been hearing rumors that
Valenzuela was engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling and drug trading, but he did not act on the
same. However, in 2002, he received written reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and Progress and
Isabel Chief of Police Tamse allegedly confirming the said rumors, which prompted him to hold the
approval of Valenzuela’s Business Permit for Triple A, and to issue the unnumbered Memorandum
addressed to port officials and the BOC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fuentes is guilty for the violation of Article 3(e) of RA 3019?

HELD: Yes. The elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that the accused
must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual
acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including
the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions.

Anent the first element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of
Isabel, Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of. As to the second element, it is worthy to
stress that the law provides three modes of commission of the crime, namely, through “manifest
partiality,” “evident bad faith,” and/or “gross negligence.” In the instant case, Fuentes’ acts were not only
committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith. As can be gleaned from the records, Fuentes
himself testified that according to the rumors he heard, all five ship chandlers operating in the Port of
Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading. Yet, it was only Valenzuela’s chandling
operations through Triple A that was refused issuance of a Business Permit. The third and last element,
suffice it to say that Fuentes’ acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela’s favor, coupled
with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its
ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of
Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of Triple A’s ship chandling operations prevented Valenzuela
from engaging in an otherwise lawful endeavor. The acts of Fuentes clearly constitutes a violation of
Article 3(e) of RA 3019.

24
CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws> Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act
of 2004

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH
59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T.
PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA);
AND ABC, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013
(Second Division)

FACTS: Karlo Dabalos (accused) was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC
for inflicting physical injuries against ABC, his girlfriend. She narrated that when she sought payment of
the money she had lent to Dabalos, the latter could not pay. She then inquired from Dabalos if he was
responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, ABC slapped Dabalos causing
the latter to inflict on her physical injuries. ABC also admitted that her relationship with Dabalos had
ended prior to the subject incident. Dabalos filed a Motion to Quash averring that at the time of the
alleged incident, he was no longer in a dating relationship with ABC; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable. He
further claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under RPC because its
proximate cause was not their dating relationship.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls under RA 9262?

HELD: Yes. The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

While it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman,
for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such
relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the
punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship. It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is
sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and
the victim when the physical harm was committed.

CRIMINAL LAW> Special Penal Laws>Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act of
2004

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR. Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: AAA had a romantic relationship with Celso Melgar (accused), which resulted in the birth of BBB,
an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the latter's
Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's
relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was
just about one year old, Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which

25
was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and BBB. As
such, AAA charged Melgar with violation of Section 5 of RA 9262 (for economic abuse).

ISSUE: Whether or not Melgar should be convicted for violation of Section 5(e) of RA 9262?

HELD: Yes. "Economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support of a common child of the man-
accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not. The deprivation or
denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children.

In this case, all the elements of violation of Section 5(e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established
that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely
acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter
was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a
third party his property which was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.

CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. CAMALODING LABA y SAMANODING, Appellant.

G.R. No. 199938, January 28, 2013
(Second Division)

FACTS: Camaloding Laba (accused) was bound for Davao when 3 plastic sachets of alleged shabu were
found in his white rubber shoes while being physically searched by Villocillo in the initial check-in area of
Manila Domestic Airport. Villocillo called the attention of PO2 Peji who apprehended Laba. Laba was
brought to their office and investigated by PO2 Caimoso, who thereafter indorsed Laba, together with the
confiscated plastic sachets, to PDEA agents who had eventually arrived at the scene. On the same day,
the PDEA requested that a laboratory examination on the 3 plastic sachets be conducted. Upon
qualitative examination by forensic chemist, the same tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Laba was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 (Sale,
Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals).

ISSUE: Whether or not Laba was guilty of Transportation of Dangerous Drugs?

HELD: Yes. Laba was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound for
Davao City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in
his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversized Spicer rubber shoes. While it may
be argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs in his
possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the
purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another. "Transport" as used
under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or convey from one place to another." The
essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. It
may be reasonably inferred from the deliberations of Congress that if a person is found to have more
than five (5) grams of shabu in his possession, then his purpose in carrying them is to dispose, traffic, or
sell it.

26
CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARCELINO VITERBO y REALUBIT AND

RONALD VITERBO y REALUBIT, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 203434, July 23, 2014
(Second Division)

FACTS: Through a buy-bust operation, Marcelino and Ronald Viterbo (accused-appellants) were charged
with illegal sale of dangerous drugs (drug pushing) under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. The police seized shabu worth P500.00, contained in two plastic sachets. SPO4 Cardona kept the
two sachets in his possession and, together with the rest of the buy-bust team, brought accused-
appellants, the marked money, and the plastic sachets to the PDEA Office. At the PDEA Office, SPO4
Cardona marked the plastic sachets while PS/Insp. Vargas prepared the request for laboratory
examination of the substance in the plastic sachets. SPO4 Cardona and another policeman brought the
laboratory request and the plastic sachets to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory, but since no chemist
was available that time, they returned to the PDEA Office. The following day, the plastic sachets together
with the laboratory request were brought by another policeman to the same crime laboratory for
examination. The RTC convicted accused-appellants as charged. On appeal to the CA, accused-appellants
argued that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the illegal drugs seized. Hence,
casting a serious doubt on the identity of the same. The CA affirmed the conviction finding that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs were properly preserved. Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165?

HELD: No. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must concur:
(a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti
of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody
over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was
presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.

RA 9165 provided the procedural requirements in the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs. While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements
will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when
(a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved.

In this case, the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from
the accused-appellants. Based on the testimonies, while the custodial link began and ended with SPO4
Cardona, there were substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items, particularly the events
that transpired from the time the items left the hands of SPO4 Cardona and turned over to the
possession of “Captain Vargas,” as well as the identity of the PDEA agent who brought them together
with the laboratory request to the receiving clerk of the crime laboratory. While the laboratory request
was prepared and signed by PS/Insp. Vargas, whom the Court reasonably presumes to be the same
“Captain Vargas” referred to in SPO4 Cardona’s testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that he
was the same person who brought the items to Garcia, taking into consideration the fact that the
laboratory request accompanying the items was signed/delivered by “PO2 Zamora.” These are crucial
missing links in this case which should have been clearly accounted for in order to establish the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items. Hence, there exists reasonable doubt on the integrity and

27
evidentiary value of the confiscated item. Consequently, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of
reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right.

CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

CHARLIE SORIN y TAGAYLO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 212635, March 25, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: After a successful buy-bust operation, Charlie Sorin (accused) was charged for the crime of
violation of Sec. 5 & 15 of Article II of RA No. 9165. In convicting Sorin, the RTC gave credence to the
straightforward and categorical testimonies of the police officers that a buy-bust operation took place
where the seized items and the marked money were recovered and marked, and that when the seized
sachets were transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory, the same tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Moreover, Sorin’s hands and the marked money similarly tested positive for ultraviolet
fluorescent powder. The RTC also declared that the prosecution was able to account for every link in the
chain of custody of the seized items. However, the RTC declared the results of the laboratory
examination of Sorin’s urine inadmissible as evidence, considering that his consent to the examination
was obtained without the assistance of counsel. Consequently, Sorin was acquitted of the charge of
violating Section 15, Article II of RA 9165. Sorin appealed his conviction for violation of Sec. 5, Article II
of RA 9165.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sorin should be acquitted of the charge for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of RA
9165 because of failure to establish the chain of custody?

HELD: Yes. The chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller,
object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. As the dangerous
drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was
seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.

In this case, the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from
Sorin due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus warranting his acquittal. Records bear out that
PO2 Dador, the apprehending officer who seized the sachets from Sorin during the buy-bust operation,
failed to mark the same and, instead, turned them over unmarked to SPO1 Mugot who conducted the
marking; prepared the request for laboratory examination of the seized sachets, Sorin’s urine, and the
marked money; delivered the said request, together with the seized sachets and marked money, to the
PNP Crime Laboratory; and later received the examination results. PO2 Dador had, in fact, admitted that
the sachets he seized from Sorin were not even marked in his presence.

It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which
constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they
are the same seized items. The lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
the accused strongly militates against a finding of guilt, as in this case. Therefore, as reasonable doubt
persists on the identity of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, the latter’s acquittal should come
as a matter of course.

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CRIMINAL LAW> Special Penal Laws>Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROMEO LINTAG Y LAUREOLA, Accused-

Appellant.
G.R. No. 219855, September 6, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: A buy-bust operation was conducted which resulted in Romeo Lintag's (accused) arrest, as well
as the seizure of two plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance from Lintag. PO3
Dimacali had custody of the seized items from the time of seizure until their arrival at the police station.
Thereupon, PO3 Dimacali marked the seized items and, subsequently, turned them over to SPO2
Gonzales. The items were then delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory for a confirmatory test on their
contents. An examination of the records, however, reveals that as indicated in the PNP Crime
Laboratory's receiving stamp on the request for laboratory examination, it was SPO3 Valdez - and not
SPO2 Gonzales - who delivered such request and presumably, the seized plastic sachets as well, to
Forensic Chemical Officer PI Mariano. The RTC found Lintag guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug that would convict Lintag for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165?

HELD: No. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides for a "chain of custody rule," or a standard protocol
which the police officers must adhere to in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized contraband. While strict adherence to the said rule is desired, any deviation from the same is
acceptable so long as there is ample justification for the same and that the evidentiary value of the
seized contraband is preserved, viz.:

To expand, Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the "chain of custody rule" outlining the procedure that the
apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and
evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial custody over the
seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the same in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or of the accused's or the person's
representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected
public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to
the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes. While the
"chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as jurisprudence nevertheless provide that
non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody
of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and
(b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the
prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items.

In this case, the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from
Lintag due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Absent any adequate explanation on the matter, there arises a substantial gap in the
chain of custody of the plastic sachets seized from Lintag. Undoubtedly, this compromises the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the crime charged. It is settled that in criminal prosecutions
involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls
for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items.

29
CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PLACIDO GOCO Y OMBROG, Accused-

Appellant.
G.R. No. 219584, October 17, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: P02 Emano was designated as the poseur-buyer for the entrapment operation and was provided
with marked money. P02 Emano met with Placido Goco (accused), who handed him a sachet containing a
white crystalline substance in exchange for the buy-bust money. With the sale consummated, Goco was
arrested and the seized drugs were transported to the police station for investigation. P02 Emano turned
over the seized items to the investigator who, in turn, handed them over to the PDEA Provincial Office.
The records failed to show who handled the seized items after P02 Emano took hold of them, how their
custody was transferred to another, who marked the seized sachets of drugs, and when and how they
were marked. The RTC found Goco guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug that would convict Goco for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165?

HELD: No. In order to fulfill the chain of custody requirement, the prosecution must identify the persons
who handled the seized items from seizure until their presentation in court as evidence. To do so, the
prosecution must present testimonies about every link in the chain, in such a way that every person who
touched the illegal drugs would describe how and from whom they were received, where they were and
what happened to them while in his or her possession, the condition in which he or she received them,
and their condition upon delivery. The witnesses must describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there was no change in the condition of the illegal drugs and no opportunity for someone not in the chain
to have possessed the said items. Also, crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the
seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.

In this instance, the prosecution failed to show who handled the seized items after P02 Emano took hold
of them, how their custody was transferred to another, who marked the seized sachets of drugs, and
when and how they were marked. Verily, marking the drugs or other related items immediately upon
seizure from the accused is crucial in proving the chain of custody as it is the starting point in the
custodial link. The marking upon seizure serves a twin purpose, first is to give the succeeding handlers of
the specimen a reference, and second to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the moment of seizure until their disposition at the end of criminal
proceedings, thereby obviating switching, "planting", or contamination of evidence. The police officers’
failure to mark the seized items may lead to the acquittal of the accused based on reasonable doubt.

CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition

JOSELITO PERALTA y ZARENO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: A team of police officers responded to a telephone call received by their desk officer-on-duty
that there was a man firing a gun at the back of the PLDT Building in Pantal District, Dagupan City. Upon
arrival thereat, the police officers saw two men walking, later identified as Joselito Peralta (accused) and
his companion, Calimlim, holding a gun and a knife respectively. Upon seeing the police officers, the men

30
became uneasy, which prompted the police officers to swoop in. Upon apprehension, they recovered a
caliber .45 pistol with Serial Number 4517488 containing a magazine with five live ammunitions from
Peralta and a knife from Calimlim. The men were then brought to the Region I Medical Center, and later,
to the community precinct for paraffin and gun powder residue test. Meanwhile, the pistol and the
magazine with live ammunitions were endorsed to the duty investigator. Peralta denied the accusation
against him and presented a different narration of facts. RTC found Peralta guilty of the crime of Ilegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and the CA affirmed Peralta’s conviction in toto. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition?

HELD: Yes. He was charged of a crime as defined and penalized under Section 1 of PD 1866, as
amended by RA 8294, pertinent portions of which read:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition

or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.—The penalty
of x x x shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or
possess any x x x firearm, x x x part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition x x x.

The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused’s lack of license or permit to
possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti,
the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same.

In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid
elements, considering that: (a) the police officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding a .45
caliber pistol with Serial Number 4517488 with magazine and live ammunitions, which was seized from
him and later on, marked, identified, offered, and properly admitted as evidence at the trial; and (b) the
Certification dated August 10, 2011 issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine
National Police which declared that Peralta “is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and
calibre, specifically Caliber .45 Pistol, make (unknown) with Serial Number 4517488 per verification from
the records of this office as of this date.”

CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Obstruction of Justice Law

NOEL NAVAJA, Petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO or his successor, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna,
Bohol, and ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017
(Second Division)

FACTS: Ana Navaja, wife of Noel Navaja, was charged with the crime of falsification of a private
document. When Marilyn Magsigay was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing to shed light on the official
receipt allegedly falsified by Ana, Noel allegedly went to Magsigay’s workplace and told her that as per
instruction of Atty. Bonghanoy, Ana’s lawyer, her attendance in the hearing is no longer needed (March
9, 2004 incident). Thus, she no longer attended the said hearing where Atty. Bonghanoy presented an
affidavit purportedly executed by Magsigay (March 15, 2004 incident), and it resulted to the case’s
dismissal.

31
Atty. Edgardo Borje, DKT’s (private complainant) counsel, found out from Magsigay herself that she
would have attended the hearing were it not for Noel’s misrepresentation that her presence was no
longer required and she was merely told by her superior in work to sign the affidavit and did not
personally prepare the same. Atty. Borje filed several complaints: the first one, charging Noel of
Obstruction of Justice, specifically, for violation of Section 1(a) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1829 in
connection with the March 9, 2004 incident; and the second one, charging Noel and Atty. Bonghanoy of
Obstruction of Justice as well, specifically, for violation of Section 1(f) of the same law in connection with
the March 15, 2004 incident. Noel filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash Information before the MCTC-Jagna,
arguing that the charge of violation of Sec. 1(a) of PD 1829 should have been absorbed by the charge of
violation of Sec. 1(f) of the same law. His Motion was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be separately tried for different acts constituting violations of
PD 1829 allegedly committed during the pendency of a single proceeding?

HELD: No. Sec. 1 of PD 1829 provides that: “The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period,
or a fine ranging from P1,000 to P6,000, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or
willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts: (a) preventing witnesses from
testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of
any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats; (f) making,
presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to
affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases.”

The elements of the crime are: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under Sec. 1 of PD
1829; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or
delaying the successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.

In this case, two separate Informations were filed against Noel: (a) an Information charging him of
violation of Sec. 1(a) of PD 1829 for allegedly preventing Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a
preliminary investigation hearing; and (b) an Information charging him of violation of Sec. 1(f) of the
same law for allegedly presenting a false affidavit. While the Informations pertain to acts that were done
days apart and in different locations, the accused should only be charged and held liable for a single
violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single
criminal impulse — that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding. Such
conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado. For delito continuado to exist, there should
be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of
criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are
united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose
or aim.

CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,

Exploitation, and Discrimination Act (R.A. No. 7610)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOVER MATIAS y DELA

FUENTE, Accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 186469, June 13, 2012
(Third Division)

FACTS: AAA, a minor, was on her way to the vegetable stall when, all of a sudden, Jover Matias
(accused) pulled her towards a house that was under construction. There, he forced her to lie on a

32
"papag", removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted first, his finger, and then his penis into her
vagina. Matias threatened to kill her if she should report the incident to anyone. When AAA arrived home,
she narrated to her mother and aunt what Matias did to her. Matias was charged with rape under Article
266-A of RPC. The RTC convicted Matias for rape under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Matias was properly convicted of rape under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610?

HELD: Yes. Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory
rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of RPC and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the
victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610 penalized or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of RPC. However, the offender
cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under
Section 48 of RPC (on complex crimes), a felony under the RPC (such as rape) cannot be complexed with
an offense penalized by a special law.

Record shows that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Thus, Matias can
be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under
Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d). It bears pointing out that the penalties
under these two laws differ: the penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is
reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized
with reclusion perpetua. In this case, the RTC concluded that AAA was the "victim of sexual abuse
labeled 'rape'," considering the established fact that there was sexual intercourse between him and AAA.
Thus, Matias’ conviction was clearly under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 or sexual abuse and not for
rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.

CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,

Exploitation, and Discrimination Act (R.A. No. 7610)

CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013
(Second Division)

FACTS: Christian Caballo, 23 years old, and AAA, 17 years old were sweethearts. AAA got pregnant.
Caballo was then charged with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610. The prosecution asserted
that Caballo was only able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due to promises of marriage and his
assurance that he would not get her pregnant due to the use of the “withdrawal method.” Moreover, it
claimed that Caballo was shocked upon hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy and consequently advised
her to have an abortion. AAA heeded Caballo’s advice but her efforts were unsuccessful. Opposed to the
foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a virgin. He
further posited that he and AAA were sweethearts and that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but
was always rejected because she was still studying. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged
but the CA modified the said ruling finding Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
Hence, this petition where Caballo argues that his promise to marry or his use of the “withdrawal
method” should not be considered as “persuasion” or “inducement” sufficient to convict him for the
aforementioned offense, asserting that these should be coupled with some form of coercion or
intimidation to constitute child abuse.

33
ISSUE: Whether or not there was “sexual abuse” within the purview of RA 7610 as well as the Rules on
Child Abuse cases?

HELD: Yes. Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 reads, “Children… who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult… indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.”

The elements of the foregoing offense are:

1. Accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. Said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains undisputed. It is undisputed that AAA
was a minor (17 years old) at the time of the commission of the crime. Jurisprudence settles that
consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of RA 7610; as such, the
argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. Second, Caballo was an adult at the
time of the commission of the offense (6 years older than AAA), which placed him in a stronger position
over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter.

The second element is also present in this case. A child is also deemed “exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse” when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
“under coercion or influence of any adult.” Caballo’s actuations constitute overt acts of “coercion” and
“influence.” He repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her and even promised to marry her. He also
guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would be using the “withdrawal method” for safety.
These were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with
him, with which he succeeded.

Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law,
and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she
is deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of
the subject offense exists.

CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,

Exploitation, and Discrimination Act (R.A. No. 7610)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOMINADOR LADRA, Accused-

Appellant.
G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: AAA, lived with her family in a remote area in Dumarait, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. When AAA
was around five years old, she and her siblings were left at home with Dominador Ladra (accused). AAA
was awakened when she felt Ladra, who was already naked, on top of her, forced his penis into her
vagina, and made push and pull movements, causing her pain. Ladra threatened to kill her if she told
anyone. Thereafter, Ladra repeatedly molested her, each time bringing his bolo with him. The sexual
abuse ceased when Ladra left their house.

Years later, AAA who was already twelve years old at the time was surprised when she saw Ladra in their
kitchen. To her shock, Ladra squeezed her vagina and told her that they were going to visit his house.

34
Scared, AAA cried and told her cousin, DDD, about the incident. Eventually, AAA told BBB about her
traumatic experiences in the hands of Ladra. Together, they filed two criminal cases against Ladra, one
for violation of Sec. b of Republic Act No. 7610, and the other for acts of lasciviousness. RTC convicted
Ladra of Rape and unjust vexation (for the incident in the kitchen). In finding unjust vexation, the RTC
ruled that the prosecution failed to establish the element of lasciviousness or lewdness as would justify
Ladra’s conviction for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness. The overt act of squeezing AAA’s vagina did not
show that he intended to gratify his sexual desires nor was it demonstrative of carnal lust. The CA
affirmed the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of squeezing the victim’s vagina only constitutes unjust vexation?

HELD: No. Ladra should be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness, as charged in the Information, in relation
to Section 5(b) of RA 7610. In its Decision, the RTC pointed out that the accused could not have intended
to lie with AAA at that moment considering that she still had her underwear on, and the act of
“squeezing” her private part was not demonstrative of carnal lust. However, the Court finds that the mere
fact of “squeezing” the private part of a child — a young girl 12 years of age — could not have signified
any other intention but one having lewd or indecent design. It must not be forgotten that several years
prior, the accused had raped AAA in the same house, for which act he was appropriately convicted.
Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching — more so, “squeezing,” in this case, which strongly
suggests that the act was intentional — of AAA’s genitalia clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. It could
not have been done merely to annoy or vex her, as opined by the courts a quo. That AAA was fully
clothed at that time, which led the courts a quo to believe that the accused could not have intended to lie
with her, is inconsequential. “‘Lewd’ is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies
that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton
manner.” As such, Ladra’s act of squeezing AAA’s vagina was a lewd and lascivious act within the
definitions set by law and jurisprudence.

CRIMINAL LAW>Special Penal Laws>Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,

Exploitation, and Discrimination Act (R.A. No. 7610)

CHRISTOPHER FIANZA A.K.A. "TOPEL," Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 218592, August 02, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: AAA, who was then 11 years old, was called by Christopher Fianza (accused) to his house and
thereupon, was asked to wash his clothes. After AAA was finished with the laundry, Fianza asked her to
go with him to the kamalig. Thereat, they proceeded to the second floor where Fianza removed his pants
and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to hold his penis and masturbate him. After ejaculating, Fianza
put on his clothes, and gave P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter, went home.

In another instance, while AAA was home, Fianza called her to his house, and asked her to clean the
same. After she was done sweeping the floor, they proceeded to the second floor of the kamalig.
Thereat, Fianza again removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to fondle his penis. After
the deed, he gave P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter, went home. After the second incident, AAA related the
matter to her cousin, CCC, who, in turn, told BBB, AAA's mother, who reported the matter to the police.
Which led to the filling of two criminal charges of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. RTC found Fianza
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610,
which decision was upheld by the CA. Hence, this petition.

35
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of child abuse through lascivious conduct?

HELD: Yes. The requisites for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. The elements of
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done under any of the following circumstances: (i) by
using force or intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or (iii) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age; and (c) the offended party is another
person of either sex.

On the other hand, sexual abuse, as defined under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 has three (3)
elements: (a) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child is
below eighteen (18) years old.

In the present case, the existence of all the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC, as well as the first and third elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610,
are present. Records disclose that on two occasions Fianza induced AAA, an 11-year-old minor, to hold
his penis and masturbate him. The only point of dispute is with regard to the existence of
the second element of sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child
indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Case law further clarifies that
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will.
Corollary thereto, Section 2 (g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the
element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. Here, Fianza’s acts were attended by coercion
or influence within the contemplation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. AAA was only 11 years old at
the time of the incidents, hence, considered a child under the law. Case law states that a child, such as
AAA in this case, is presumed to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act. Records
likewise indicate that Fianza was about 35 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, or 24
years older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between them clearly placed Fianza in a stronger
position over AAA which enabled him to wield his will on the latter.

36