1.

RES IPSA LOQUITOR

a. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, GR No 137873

FACTS:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction

worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower,
Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria,
filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer
raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the

decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of

negligence.

2. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death

have a right of selection or choice of action between availing
themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil
Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,

RULING:

1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for
itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the
following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality
or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence
arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the
inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application
of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
incident.
 2. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s
Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other
laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the
Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have
waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came
under exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she
would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she
already had.

b. Dra Batiquin v. CA, GR No 118231

FACTS:

In September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, with the assistance of Dr. Doris
Teresita Sy and O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses
performed a simple caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas at the Negros
Oriental Provincial Hospital. After leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas
began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish.
The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered Mrs.
Villegas despite the medications administered by Dr. Batiquin. When
the pains became unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight she
consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete
City on January 20, 1989, blood test shown that Mrs. Villegas had an
infection inside her abdominal cavity. Thereafter Dr. Kho suggested to
Mrs. Villegas to submit to another surgery to which the latter agreed.

When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found a
"foreign body" looked like a piece of a "rubber glove". . . and which is
[sic] also "rubber-drain like". . . . It could have been a torn section of a
surgeon's gloves or could have come from other sources. And this
foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries and
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her
delivery on September 21, 1988.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a doctor may be held liable for damages for alleged
negligence in the conduct of an operation on the ground of finding a
foreign object inside the body of the patient in a subsequent
operation.

HELD:
Yes. The rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This Court has had
occasion to delve into the nature and operation of this doctrine:

This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen in those who have the management use proper care, it
 affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are
present. First, the entire proceedings of the caesarean section were
under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private
respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or
the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private
respondent Villegas's body, which, needless to say, does not occur
unless through the intersection of negligence. Second, since aside from
the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no
other operation which could have caused the offending piece of
rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only
have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr.
Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a
piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas's abdomen and for all
the adverse effects thereof.

c. Professional Services, Inc v. Agana, GR No 126297

FACTS

Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of

bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her
to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an
anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy
spread on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband,
Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After
the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who
examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave
the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure
when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of
Operation: “sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure” (two pieces of gauze were
missing). A “diligent search” was conducted but they could not be
found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.

A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but
the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the
surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to
examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the
operation. After months of consultations and examinations in the US,
she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back,
her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her
vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that
the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she sought
treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was
found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.

Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of

Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are
 liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body,
and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique
Agana also filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and
malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the
case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad).
Pending the outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by
her children). RTC found PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence
and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA
dismissed only the case against Fuentes.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

1. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and
malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil’s negligence. YES

RATIO

1. DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE

His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American
doctors were the ones who put / left the gauzes; did not submit
evidence to rebut the correctness of the operation record (re: number
of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes’ alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil
examined his work and found it in order].

Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed
is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it
has been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his
patient’s abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay,
still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by
advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek
relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her
condition might permit. What’s worse in this case is that he misled her
by saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her
operation.

Medical negligence; standard of diligence

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must
only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something [or
did something] which a reasonably prudent health care provider
would have done [or wouldn’t have done], and that the failure or
action caused injury to the patient.

Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of
the incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient
about it

Breach – failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient

Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination and another

surgery
Proximate Causation – breach caused this injury; could be traced from
his act of closing the incision despite information given by the
attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing; what
established causal link: gauze pieces later extracted from patient’s
vagina

2. DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE

The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas’
does not convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this
doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence.

Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur

1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management
of the defendant [DR. FUENTES] — LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS
WITH DR. AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would
not have happened if those who had control or management used
proper care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant

Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person
in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected
with the operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from
the following:
 He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
 He examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order
 He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
 He ordered the closure of the incision

3. HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180],
AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]

Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence

of its professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts
came to realize that modern hospitals are taking a more active role in
supplying and regulating medical care to its patients, by employing
staff of physicians, among others. Hence, there is no reason to exempt
hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the
Court’s bases for sustaining PSI’s liability:

Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship

For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR LESSON:
power to hire, fire, power of control]

Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in
somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or
the authority exists [see NCC 1869]
 PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and
specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from
passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly
paraded in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it
vouched for their skill and competence.

If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars

the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape
liability for its agents’ acts.

Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital’s liability

for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support
the application of respondeat superior.

This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI
failed to perform the duty of exercising reasonable care to protect
from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment.
PSI failed to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the
note of the count nurse, and this established PSI’s part in the dark
conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.

PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the

report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was carried
on with the assistance of various hospital staff
It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls and take an active step in fixing the
negligence committed

PSI also liable under NCC 2180

It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of
a good father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr.
Ampil.

2. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

a. ABS-CBN v CA, GR No 128690

FACTS

 Viva, through Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN through its vice-

president Charo Santos-Concio, a list of 3 film packages or 36
titles from which ABS-CBN may exercise its right of first refusal
 Mrs. Concio informed Vic through a letter that they can only
purchase 10 titles to be schedules on non-primetime slots
because they were very adult themes which the ruling of the
MTRCB advises to be aired at 9:00 p.m
 February 27, 1992: Del Rosario approached ABS-CBN's Ms.
Concio with a list consisting of 52 original movie titles as well
as 104 re-runs proposing to sell to ABS-CBN airing rights for
P60M (P30M cash and P30M worth of television spots)
  April 2, 1992: Del Rosario and ABS-CBN general manager,
Eugenio Lopez III met wherein Del Rosario allegedly agreed to
grant rights for 14 films for P30M
 April 06, 1992: Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS
Senior vice-president for Finance discussed the terms and
conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films, after the
rejection of the same package by ABS-CBN
 April 07, 1992: Ms. Concio sent the proposal draft of 53 films
for P35M which Viva's Board rejected since they will not
accept anything less than P60M
 April 29, 1992: Viva granted RBS exclusive grants for P60M
 RTC: Issued TRO against RBS in showing 14 films as filed by ABS-
CBN.
 RBS also set up a cross-claim against VIVA
 RTC: ordered ABS-CBN to pay RBS P107,727 premium paid by
RBS to the surety which issued their bond to lift the injunction,
P191,843.00 for the amount of print advertisement for "Maging
Sino Ka Man" in various newspapers, P1M attorney's fees, P5M
moral damages, P5M exemplary damages and costs. Cross-
claim to VIVA was dismissed.
 ABS-CBN appealed. VIVA and Del Rosario also appealed
seeking moral and exemplary damages and additional
attorney's fees.
 CA: reduced the awards of moral damages to P2M,
exemplary damages to P2M and attorney's fees to P500,000.
Denied VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal because it was RBS
and not VIVA which was actually prejudiced when the
complaint was filed by ABS-CBN
ISSUE
1. W/N RBS is entitled to damages. -YES
2. W/N VIVA is entitled to damages. - NO

HELD

REVERSED except as to unappealed award of attorney's fees in

favor of VIVA Productions, Inc.

1. YES.

One is entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such

pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The
indemnification shall comprehend not only the value of the loss
suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to obtain.
In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may be
awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with good
faith or otherwise, It case of good faith, the damages recoverable
are those which are the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitution of
the obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or
wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for all damages which may
be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of, whether or not such damages
has been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant. Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or
impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or
permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff's business
standing or commercial credit.

The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract,
quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. It arose from the fact of filing
of the complaint despite ABS-CBN's alleged knowledge of lack of
cause of action. Needless to state the award of actual damages
cannot be comprehended under the above law on actual
damages. RBS could only probably take refuge under Articles 19,
20, and 21 of the Civil Code.

In this case, ABS-CBN had not yet filed the required bond; as a
matter of fact, it asked for reduction of the bond and even went to
the Court of Appeals to challenge the order on the matter, Clearly
then, it was not necessary for RBS to file a counter bond. Hence,
ABS-CBN cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS paid for
the counter bond.

Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print advertisements for

"Maging Sino Ka Man" for lack of sufficient legal basis.
Article 2217 thereof defines what are included in moral damages,
while Article 2219 enumerates the cases where they may be
recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral damages may be
recovered in breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral damages could
possibly fall only under item (10) of Article 2219
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.

The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a

corporation because, being an artificial person and having
existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical
suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by
one having a nervous system. A corporation may recover moral
damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in
social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the
award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as
part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances in quasi-contracts, if the
defendant acted with gross negligence and in contracts and quasi-
contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner
 It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not
based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence,
the claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based
on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or
bad faith. If damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is
damnum absque injuria.

b. Saba v CA GR No 189550
Restated the doctrine of Qui Jure Suo Utitur Nullum Damnum = one
who exercise his right does no injury and if damage result, it is
damnum absque injuria. The case made the distinction between
damage and injury.

FACTS

Pedro de la Cruz is a grantee of a lease of a portion of marshy land

in Laoang, Northern Samar awarded to him by the Bureau of Lands
under Miscellaneous Lease Application No. 810 for 2,050 square
meters. The award of lease was granted in 1934 (TSN, Nov. 8, 1976,
p. 5). The award of lease to Pedro de la Cruz was not presented in
court but its existence was not disputed by the parties. In 1939,
Gregoria Nalazon, wife of Pedro de la Cruz, died and the estate
became the subject of an intestate estate proceeding in Special
Proceedings No. 2 of the CFI of Laoang, Northern Samar. The
leasehold (MLA No. 810) was included in this special proceeding
wherein 50% thereof was adjudicated pro-indiviso to Pedro de la
Cruz while the other 50% was adjudicated pro-indiviso to the
children, namely: Jesus, Alfredo, Lourdes, Amada, Josefa, Genaro,
Eufemio and Ramon, all surnamed de la Cruz.

The improvements introduced by Pedro de la Cruz consisted of rock

fillings and three warehouses. In 1953, private respondent Jose
Ongchuan leased the warehouse from Pedro de la Cruz (Exhibit
“K”). In 1959 or so, the seven children of Pedro de la Cruz, namely:
Jesus, Alfredo, Amada, Josefa, Genaro, Eufemio and Ramon, all
surnamed de la Cruz sold their leasehold rights (7/8 of the 50% of
MLA 810) to private respondent Emil Ong, while Lourdes C.
Agbayani sold her leasehold right (1/8) pro-indiviso to petitioner
Isidro V. Saba in March 1966 (Exhibit “J”). In 1961, the warehouse
which was being leased by private respondent Jose Ongchuan was
levelled to the ground by fire. After the fire, private respondent Emil
Ong constructed a new building on the same area formerly
occupied by the burned warehouse.

Later, Lourdes C. Agbayani sent a letter to private respondents

notifying them of the sale of her 1/8 share in the leasehold to
petitioner and requested that payment of rentals be given to the
new owner instead of her. Private respondents did not heed the
request. Petitioner reiterated the demand of Lourdes C. Agbayani
several times yet private respondents ignored said demand.

ISSUE
 Whether or not (1) petitioner has a cause of action against private
respondents and (2) the award of damages is proper.

HELD

As aforestated, the award of lease was granted to Pedro de la Cruz

in 1934. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce set the
maximum period of his lease at fifteen (15) years (Exhibit “16″).
Therefore, the period of lease was up to 1949 only. There is no
evidence on record of renewal of the term of the lease. Evidently,
when Lourdes C. Agbayani sold her “leasehold right” (1/8) pro-
indiviso to petitioner in 1966, there was no longer a leasehold right
that she conveyed.

Corollarily, petitioner did not acquire any right from her that can be
enforced against the private respondents or anybody for that
matter. In this regard, the affirmance of the dismissal of the
complaint was correct. Moral damages may be awarded to
compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It
is however not enough that such injuries have arisen; it is essential
that they have sprung from a wrongful act or omission, fraud,
malice, or bad faith which was the proximate cause thereof.

The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages, for
the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate (Rubio v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 50911, March 12,
1986, 141 SCRA 488). One who exercises his rights does no injury. Qui
jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results from a
person’s exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.

3. VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA

a. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden & Ruby Lim v Roberto Reyes, GR No
154259

FACTS

In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the

lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to
join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s
manager. During the party and when respondent was lined-up at
the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive
Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and
embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart,
who was herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman
approached him and escorted him out of her party.

Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but
not under the ignominious circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that
she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the
celebrant to keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to
 the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet table with
no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave
the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the
latter screamed and made a big scene.

Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that
she invited Mr. Reyes to the party.

Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary

damages and attorney’s fees. The lower court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of
the trial court, consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this
instant petition for review.

ISSUES

Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as
the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.

RULING

The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts.
There was no proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr.
Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’ version
of the story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back
his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable
for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employees.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with

the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be responsible. Article 21 states that any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act cannot
amount to abusive conduct.

The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury) was upheld
by the Court, that is, to which a person assents is not esteemed in
law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of
damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed
himself to danger.

b. Republic v Luzon Stevedoring Corp., GR L-21749

 Facts

Barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation(defendant, LSC for

brevity) was being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats
belonging to the same corporation.`
The barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the
Nagtahan Bailey Bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bright
to list. The river, at that time, was swollen and the current swift, on
account of the heavy downpour of Manila and the surrounding
provinces.
Republic of the Philippines (PH) sued LSC for actual and
consequential damages caused by its employees.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the collision of LSC’s barge with the supports or piers
of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or
force majeure.

Ruling:

No. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and

stationary object and uncontrovertibly provided with adequate
openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of
NSC’s, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge,
exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports
raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its
employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the
ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper
case is used. Res ipsa loquitur.
NLS stresses the precautions (due diligence) taken by it: (1) that it
assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its
barge, and (2) that it assigned to the task the more competent and
experienced among its patrons, (3) had the towlines, engines and
equipment double-checked and inspected; (4) that it instructed its
patrons to take extra precautions. These very precautions,
completely destroy the NLS’defense.

Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary

events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.” It is,
therefore, not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be
one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The more difficulty to foresee
the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. The very
measures adopted by NSC prove that the possibility of danger was
not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso
fortuito.

LSC, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen

steam and its swift current, voluntarily entered into a situation
involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and cannot
 shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted
turned out to be insufficient.

c. Diokno v Laureano, GR L-25906

FACTS

• Atty. Dioquino, a practicing lawyer of Masbate, owns the car

• Dioquino went to the office of the MVO, Masbate to have his
car registered
• Plaintiff met defendant Federico Laureano, a patrol officer of
said MVO office, who was waiting for a jeepney to take him to the
office of the Provincial Commander (P.C.), Masbate
- Dioqunio requested defendant to introduce him to one of the
clerks in the MVO offive who could facilitate the registration of his
car
• Laureano rode on the car of Dioquino on his way to P.C.
Barracks
- car, driven by Dioquino’s river and with Laureano as the sole
passenger, was stoned by some ‘mischievous boys’ —> windshield
was broken
• Laureano was only able to catch one of the boys
- boy admitted to having thrown the stone
- the father of the boy was called but no satisfactory
arrangements were made about the damage to the windshield
• Laureano refused to file charges against the boy and his
parents believing that the stone-throwing was merely accidental
and that it was due to force majeure
- defendant Laureano also refused to pay the windshield
himself
• Plaintiff now holds defendant Federico Laureano
accountable for the loss sustained
- also included in the action filed were the defendant’s wife,
Aida Laureano, and his father, Juanito Laureano
• Lower court granted plaintiff’s action for damages but
absolved defendant’s wife and father of any responsibility
• all 3 Laureanos’ appealed, raising the following:
1. lower court failed to dismiss such a suit as no liability could
have been incurred as a result of fortuitous event
2. lower court failed to award damages against plaintiff for the
unwarranted inclusion of the wife and the father in this litigation

ISSUE(S) + RULING

1. WON the lower court erred in not dismissing the suit against
Laureano — YES
• Art. 1174, Civil Code: "Except in cases expressly specified by
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be, foreseen,
or which, though foreseen were inevitable.”
• In obligations arising from contract that some extraordinary
circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his
employees —> essential element in fortuitous events
- if the above situation happens, there is no liability
- the law does not require diligence beyond what human are
and foresight can provide
• Caso fortuito or force majeure are extraordinary events not
forseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable (must be impossible to
foresee or to avoid)
• What happened to the car was clearly unforeseen — it was a
fortuitous event resulting in a loss which must be borne by the owner
of the car

2. WON damages could be awarded for the unwarranted

inclusion of defendant’s wife and father in the litigation — NO
• Plaintiif included the wife and the father because, according
to him, the father was the administrator of the inheritance of an
undivided property to which defendant could lay claim and the
wife for the conjugal partnership would be made to respond for
whatever liability would be adjudicated against the husband
• Plaintiff was merely propmted by the desire to inflict needless
and unjustified vexation on them (wife and father)
• Since plaintiff already suffered a pecuniary loss which was the
result of a fortuitous event (would have not occured if defendent
Laureano had not borrowed his car), court feels that he is not to be
penalized further by his mistaken view of the law in including them
in his complaint