On Reading Collingwood's Principles of Art

Author(s): John Grant

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Winter, 1987), pp.
239-248
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 JOHN GRANT

On Reading Collingwood's Principles

of Art

PERHAPS NO WORK of English aesthetics in this
century has been more disputed than Colling-
wood's Principles of Art. 1 On one extreme it is
insisted that Collingwood's chief and leading
doctrine is that the work of art is something
exclusively mental in nature, something whose
physical and publicly accessible embodiment is
aesthetically extraneous. On the other extreme,
while it is granted that Collingwood believed
the work of art to be something "mental," it is
denied that he believed it to be something
"exclusively" mental. Art, for Collingwood, it
is held, is something which is "unintelligible"
apart from physical and publicly accessible
behavior.
The sharp divergence of opinion suggests
what is true, i.e., that the text of the Principles, the end of it we can say not only 'that and that
while enviable for its precocity, is rife with
chaos and confusion. Yet regrettably it may also
be thought to suggest what is false, that the
controversy about what Collingwood meant is
insoluble. Collingwood's thesis is obscured by
frequent changes of mind, to be sure. But as I
shall endeavor very shortly to show, the
changes are not in every case indiscriminate and
unwitting. We read in Book I that the work of
art is something "(as we commonly say) 'ex-
isting in his [the artist's] head' and there only"
(PA, 37); and in what has become the usual way
of reading the Principles, the trick has been to
square this assertion with Collingwood's evi-
dent approbation in Books II and III for the
doctrine that the work of art is in some sense a
"bodily" and "publicly accessible" thing or
activity. But this way of reading the Principles,
I wish to insist, is entirely wrong. Whatever
Collingwood's "definition" or "theory" of
art, and however plausible or implausible that
JOHN GRANT is a graduate of the Department of
History and Philosophy of the Ontario Institute for
Studies in Education.
definition may be, it is most certainly not a
definition that is stated in Book I. I wish now to
examine this and other related assumptions.
I.
It is well known that Collingwood begins his
famous work with the question, "What is art?"
(PA, 1). In his Autobiography Collingwood
calls the question-form a "vague portmanteau-
phrase covering a multitude of questions but not
precisely expressing any of them."3 But in the
Principles the question is immediately divided
into two "stages." The purpose of the first
stage, says Collingwood, is to "review the
improper senses of the word 'art' . . . so that at
and that are not art,' but also 'that is not art
because it is pseudo-art of kind A' and 'that,
because it is pseudo-art of kind B.'" The
purpose of the second stage is to address "the
problem of definition." "Definition," Colling-
wood particularly notes, "must come second,
and not first, because no one can even try to
define a term until he has satisfied himself that
his own personal usage of it harmonizes with
the common usage." "Definition," he goes on
to say, "means defining one thing in terms of
something else . . . " "constructing . . . a
'theory' of something . . . " and "having a
clear idea of the thing" and "its relations to
other things as well" (PA, 1-2).
The avowed purpose of this strategy is first to
settle on the sense or senses in which the word
"art" is to be used and second, having done
this, to investigate the nature of the activity to
which "art" so defined refers. It is not imme-
diately clear how "proper" and "improper"
usages are to be distinguished or what sort of
investigation into the nature of art Collingwood
envisages. But for the present let us notice a

? 1987 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

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240 G R A N T

distinction that we are likely to overlook. An Collingwood promises that his account of usage
attempt to state the meaning of a word, whether will tell us not merely in what senses the word
by description, stipulation, or some other "art" is and ought to be used, but also in what
method, is ordinarily called a "definition." By senses it ought not to be used and, most
"definition" in other words we commonly important, why. Contrary to Donagan, an ac-
mean the definition of words, and what count of "proper usage" for Collingwood con-
Collingwood describes as settling on a proper sists not merely of a brief lexical or historical
usage of the word "art" we are inclined to thinkdescription of various usages, but of something
a "definition" of "art." But particular atten- else as well: a critical examination of the theory
tion must be drawn to the fact that Collingwood or theories of art that underlie these usages.
himself uses the word "definition" in a differ- Now if Collingwood's account of usage is, in
ent sense, not as a statement of the meaning of its nature, something that cannot be brief, then
a word but as an investigation into the nature of it seems unlikely that it can be contained in the
the thing (activity, process, concept, word, brief space of Collingwood's introduction to the
etc.) to which a word may refer. Wherever Principles. Indeed, Donagan shows himself
ambiguity threatens, let us call definition inaware
this of this. "Despite his historical narrative
sense "real definition," a definition whose of how the aesthetic usage of the word 'art'
purpose it is to state in one way or another-by emerged, he [Collingwood] did not explain how
a whole range of methods that philosophers do he discriminated that usage from its fellows."6
not always distinguish (analysis, synthesis, di- Donagan then devotes considerable space to
vision, classification, etc.)4-the nature of a supplying what he takes to be the missing
thing. The quite different activity of defining explanation, an explanation which, evidently,
words we may call "verbal definition." he thinks implicit in what for him is
I shall have reason, very shortly, to modify Collingwood's "definition" of art in Book I.7
and to make more precise this tentative descrip- But here arises my second objection; for the
tion of the two stages into which Collingwood assumption that Collingwood's account of us-
divides his answer to "What is art?" But setting age is confined to the introduction prior to Book
aside for the moment this task, let us consider a I and that his "definition" of art begins in Book
much simpler matter: the precise locations in I seems to me entirely dubious. No feature of
the text of the Principles of what I have defined the Principles has more entirely escaped notice
in a preliminary way as Collingwood's than the one to which I am about to draw
"'verbal" and "real" definitions of art. Alan attention. The argument of Book I, I submit, is
Donagan's answer, which I take to be the not Collingwood's attempt to construct a "defi-
generally accepted one (certainly it is the only nition" or "theory" of art, as virtually all
explicit one), is that Collingwood's verbal defi- Collingwood's readers have supposed, but
nition, or account of "proper usage," consists nothing more nor less than the promised ac-
of a brief history of the word "art" up to the count of "proper usage" itself. The poihiis
present usage "in the modem European critical \na'e frequetny-throfghout Book I, but for
tradition" and comes in the introduction prior reasons of space I shall cite only one instance of
to Book I. What Collingwood calls his "defi- it.
nition" of art (and what I have called, tenta-
tively, a "real" definition) is then presumed to [Wie are still dealing with what are called questions of
begin at the outset of Book I. fact, or what in the first chapter were called questions
This reading seems to me open to two objec- of usage, not questions of theory. We shall not be trying
tions, the second of which is fatal. First, the to build up an argument which the reader is asked to
examine and criticize, and accept if he finds no fatal
brevity of Collingwood's verbal definition, as
flaw in it.... We shall be trying as best we can to
Donagan construes it, is incompatible with remind ourselves of facts well known to us all: such
Collingwood's declared purpose. Admittedly, facts as this, that on occasions of a certain kind we
an account of usage or verbal definition need actually do use the word art or some kindred word to
designate certain kinds of things . . . (PA, 105).8
not be a lengthy affair. It may consist for
example of an arbitrary assignment of meaning
or of a brief report of established usage. But The work of constructing a "definition" or

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 On Reading Collingwood's Principles of Art 241

"theory" of art, in turn, comes not in Book I of we must appreciate that it is an essential feature of the
the Principles but in Books II and III. Croce-Collingwood thesis that not only can the artist
make works of art to himself, but that he may be in the
situation in which he can only make works of art to
The empirical and descriptive work of Book I left us
himself. 12
with the conclusion that art proper, as distinct from
amusement or magic, was (i) expressive (ii) imagina-
tive. Both these terms, however, awaited definition: we
might know how to apply them (that being a question of
And-here is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic
usage, or the ability to speak not so much English as the
of the Croce-Collingwood theory-when the part pro-
common tongue of European peoples), but we did not
cess is completed in the artist's mind; when the final
know to what theory concerning the thing so designated
artistic intuition is present to his consciousness, the
this application might commit us. It was to fill this gap
process of expression is also complete: for the intuition
in our knowledge that we went on to the analytical work
is the expression. 1
of Book II (PA, 273; italics mine).

Citing as conclusive evidence Collingwood's For evidence of what Wollheim and Hospers are
contention in Book I that the work of art is saying it is only necessary to turn to Book I
something made "in the mind, and there only," itself where, in spite of admitting, for example,
many writers, perhaps the majority, have de- the existence of "colours there in painting,"
fended what may be called the "Croce- Collingwood insists that all such "sensuous
Collingwood" interpretation of the Principles.9
parts" do not exist "objectively" in the work of
But others, attempting to reconcile Books IIart,andwhich is to say independently of a perceiv-
III with Book I, have insisted, on the contrary, ing subject, but are always "imagined" or, as
that Collingwood specifically denies that art has
he is wont to say, "solely in the artist's head"
no "bodily" and "publicly accessible" exis- (PA, 109, 113, 129, 151). Therefore, it may
tence. "Assimilating Collingwood's views to confidently be asserted, let us simply assume
those of Croce," writes one commentator, that Book I is a "definition" of art. Indeed, let
"runs the risk of seriously misreading The us assume that it is a "definition" in precisely
Principles of Art (and very likely Colling- the sense that Collingwood himself defines the
wood's major works as well)."'0 But if what Iword "definition" in his Essay on Philosophi-
have said is true, all such quibbles and disputescal Method, that is to say, as a "real definition"
may be seen to rest, at least in part, on a as opposed to analysis of a word, term, or
premise that is demonstrably unwarranted; for if
expression. 14
Book I is not a definition of art in the first place,
How should I reply to this way of reading
it is obviously false to suppose that everythingCollingwood? Should I abandon my thesis that
said in the later books needs to be shown to be there is nonetheless a good reason for thinking
compatible with Book 1. Book I an account of usage as opposed to a
"definition"? Certainly not. The distinction
II. between Collingwood's account of usage in
Book I and his definition of art in Books II and
The traditional reading of Collingwood's III, I suggest, may be cogently and faithfully
Principles may, however, be resurrected on reconstructed as a distinction between two spe-
another point. It will not have escaped the cies of verbal definition: one essentially restric-
reader's notice that even if, as I have argued, tive and based on established critical usages,
what Collingwood calls his "definition" or the other essentially nonrestrictive and based on
"theory" of art does not come until Books II established philosophical usage. Turning first to
and III, Collingwood's actual strategy is quite Collingwood's account of usage in Book I, the
different. For a theory is propounded in Book I,notoriously indefinite and confusing meaning of
surely. An aesthetic doctrine-we may call it "art," Collingwood tells us, is not to be legis-
the "mental-only" doctrine-is implied more lated according to a "private" rule, but is to be
or less directly in Collingwood's analysis of adopted by an analysis of conceptions underly-
what he calls "proper usage."" It is thus that ing the word in established critical usage. We
the following commentators, for example, havemust, as Collingwood expresses it, settle on a
written: meaning that both "fits onto common usages'

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242 G R A N T

and, at the same time, "clarifies" and "sys- Collingwood, "and both ways of thinking tend
tematizes" ideas we already possess. Note, to subsume the philosophy of art under the
especially, that "clarification" and "systemi- philosophy of craft..." Old usages "cling to
zation" mean, in this instance, arriving at a our minds like drowning men, and so jostle the
stipulation the application and logical conse- present meaning that we can only distinguish it
quences of which are at least clear (even if from them by the most careful analysis" (PA,
queried in Collingwood's later account) and 19, 7).
which does not transgress the usage of art critics More important for present purposes, the
and other knowledgeable persons (PA, 1-7). foregoing brings clearly to light the distinction
Proceeding in this way Collingwood ousts Collingwood means to draw between his ac-
from the entangled set of usages of which the count of usage in Book I and his definition of art
established critical usage of "art" consists what in Books II and III. In contrast to the argument
he calls the "distorting" idea that a work of art of Book I, the argument of Book II is,
is something susceptible to an exhaustive analy- precisely, unrestricted by the established usage
sis per genus et differentiam and adopts pre- of critics and the like. The verbal and concep-
cisely the opposite idea, i.e., that art is some- tual territory in which Book II operates,
thing whose individuality defeats analysis in Collingwood tells us, is bounded only by estab-
this sense. And all this is done, again, without lished philosophical usage and conceptions.
at any point stepping outside of what is in
Collingwood's view the realm of established
critical usage. The argument of Book I may In Book II, therefore, I shall make a fresh start. I
thus, to this extent, be likened to a disjunctive shall try to work out a theory of imagination and of its
place in the structure of experience as a whole, by
syllogism based on-or "restricted" to-vari-
developing what has already been said about it by
ous established usages of the word art. The well-known philosophers. In doing this I shall make no
syllogism begins with the disjunctive premise use whatever of anything contained in Book I (PA,
"we mean by 'art' in established critical usage 152-53).

one of two things-'craft' or 'expression.' "

The craft alternative is then eliminated, leaving
only one other established usage, that according Indeed, in "developing what has already been
to which art is ""expression."15 said," Collingwood frequently has cause to go
Now if this description of Book I is roughly quite beyond the realm of established philo-
true, then Donagan's explanation of what sophical usage to stipulate entirely new mean-
makes critical usage the "proper" usage for ings for old words and even to invent entirely
Collingwood cannot be correct. To be sure, new words. Thus the word "imagination" is
Collingwood begins by assuming the existence wrenched from its established range of mean-
of an established critical usage, as Donagan ings in philosophy to denote an "act of atten-
tion"
insists. 16 But it is certainly false to say that he in which the momentary flux of immedi-
assumes such usage to be "'aesthetically ate and undifferentiated sensation, "charged
proper," leaving the way open, as it were, to with emotion" is fixed long enough to form, for
construct (in Book I) what Donagan calls a example, an idea of this particular grief, this
"definition of the word 'art' " when it is used particular warmth, this particular pain, and so
"aesthetically." Collingwood's approach is ex- on (PA, 203). Similarly, the word "language"
is completely redefined to denote the "bodily
actly the opposite: it is assumed, precisely, that
critics are not exempt from the ambiguities andexpression of emotion" that accompanies all
false implications that plague the common us- such acts of attention or "imagination" (PA,
age of "art." Only once various kinds of "art 235ff). Last but not least, the term "psychical
falsely so called" are "cleared away," Col- expression" is freshly minted to denote the
lingwood tells us, can the proper usage of "involuntary" and '"wholly unconscious"
the word art be brought to light. "We [critics bodily acts, the "distortions of the face" ex-
and the like] are apt nowadays to think about pressing "pain," "slackening of the muscles
most problems including those of art, in and cold pallor of the skin" expressing "fear,"
terms of economics or psychology," writes and so on, that are said to accompany the

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On Reading Collingwood's Principles of Art
sentient being's immediate experience of sen-
suous flux (PA, 229).
Fortunately, I am under no obligation to
unravel the intricacies of this elaborate home-
spun terminology. My purpose is merely to
show that there is an obvious and legitimate
distinction between Collingwood's account of
proper usage" and his "definition." The
former, I suggest, aims at narrowing or "re-
stricting" an established and already relatively
specialized critical usage; the latter, at refining
and even at altering established philosophical
usage to the end of constructing a philosophical This passage obviously lends considerable
theory of art. There is no deadly rivalry between
these "theories"; indeed, neither counts as
Collingwood's definitive position. Book I iden-
tifies what is the established usage of "art," at Principles. Against this, what have I to say in
least, what is that part of it for which no
demonstrable falsehoods can be found; Book II
analyzes the word from a philosophical per-
spective (PA, 109); Book III is then, as
Collingwood puts it, the "union" of these
153). That is to say, it is an account of what,
light of philosophical analysis, the established
usage of "art" ought to look like. 17 Thus
III, we may say, is a new, improved "theory"
of art: not a "philosophical" theory exactly,
but an attempt to provide, in light of philosoph-
ical analysis, a new conceptual underpinning
for the work of artists, performers, and audi-
ences in England "here and now" (PA, vi, vii).
Essentially, then, established usages and con-
ceptions undergo revision twice: first in Book I
in which demonstrable falsehoods (vestiges of
craft theory) are removed; second in Book III in
which the philosophical implications of Book II
are brought to bear. And it is the result of these
revisions that counts as Collingwood's defini-
tive theory. It is perhaps, more than anything
else, I suggest, in failing to appreciate this fact
that readers have fallen prey to the imprecision
and ambiguity in Collingwood's use of the
words "definition" and "theory" and have
mistaken his account of usage in Book I for his total bodily gesture (PA, 235, 243-44. 246).
"definition" or "theory" of art.
Ill.
The misconception to which I have called explicit criticism of Book 1.
attention, however, is by no means fatal to
traditional assumptions. For it will be insisted
that even if Books II and III are independent of
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243
Collingwood's analysis of established usage in
Book I, ultimately they serve merely to confirm
and to perfect tendencies of thought already
implicit in that analysis. The trump is the
following passage from Book llI.
1A] work of art in the proper sense of that phrase is not
an artifact, not a bodily or perceptible thing fabricated
by the artist, but something existing solely in the
artist's head. . . . No reader, I hope, has been
inattentive enough to imagine that . this doctrine has
been forgotten or denied (PA, 305).
weight to the view that it is Collingwood's
purpose to defend without possibility of appeal
the "mental only" theory of art throughout the
defense of my interpretation?
I should begin by noticing, quite apart from
this passage, that I am not alone in the view that
Collingwood changes his mind in Book III. "In
Book (PA,
III Collingwood quietly relinquished the
sense inof 'imaginary' in which an imaginary
object exists only in the head." writes
Book l But I should want to go further than
Donagan.
Donagan here. I should want to say, first, by
reference to Book II, not merely that the mental
only line is "relinquished," but also that it is
replaced by almost the contrary position. Art is
"language," argues Collingwood in Books II
and III, and "language' he particularly stresses
is something which is "bodily" in nature.
[Lianguage is simply bodily expression of emotion,
dominated by thought in its primitive form as con-
sciousness.
Every kind of language is in this way a specialized form
of bodily gesture, and in this sense it may be said that
dance is the mother of all languages.
IElvery kind or order of language (speech, gesture, and
so forth) was an offshoot from an original language of
total bodily gesture. . . . each one of us, whenever he
expresses himself, is doing so with his whole body. and
is thus actually talking in this 'original' language of
And I should want to say, second, in reference
to Book III, that far from being "quiet," the
change is explicitly avowed in the following
On the theory of art propounded in this book, the
audience seems at first sight to become inessential. It
244
[the audience] seems to disappear altogether from the
province of art as such.... If the implications of the
expressive theory had been completely grasped in the
case of the artist, there would have been no need to fall
back on the technical theory in discussing his relation
with his audience (PA, 300, 302).
In Book I the process by which emotions are
clarified and expressed is said to be an entirely
internal affair: "a work of art may be com-
pletely created when it has been created as a
thing whose only existence is in the artist's
mind...." "The actual making of the tune is
something that goes on in the head, and no-
where else.." (PA, 130, 134). Its physical
and publicly accessible counterpart is thus con-
ceived of as something which is not the work of
art, but merely something that conveys the
work of art to the outside world by standing for
it: "what is written or printed on the music
paper is not the tune," we are told. "It is only
something which when studied intelligently will
enable others (or himself, when he has forgot-
ten it) to construct the tune for themselves in
their own heads" (PA, 135). And since it is not
necessary to the existence of a work of art that
it be made public, the artist has an audience
"only in so far as people hear him expressing
himself, and understand what they hear him
saying" (PA, 118).
But all this changes in Book II and ipso facto
in Collingwood's translation of the results of
Book II into the more ordinary nomenclature of
artists, performers, and audiences in Book III.
The making of a work of art, says Collingwood,
is a bodily activity from its inception. Art is
language and language "'simply bodily expres-
sion of emotion," "a specialized form of
bodily gesture," and so on. There is no ques-
tion of having to "externalize" it in order to
make it publicly accessible. "9 As Collingwood
expresses it, there is no need "to fall back upon
the technical theory" in order to explain how
works of art are made publicly accessible (PA,
302). And elsewhere: "There is no question of
'externalizing' an inward experience which is
complete in itself and by itself. There are two
experiences, an inward and imaginative one
called seeing and an outward or bodily one
called painting, which in the painter's life are
inseparable, and form one single and indivisible
experience . ." (PA, 304-5).
Of course this hardly settles matters.
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G R A N T
Collingwood changes his mind to be sure. But
what of the puzzling passage I cited at the
outset? The fact of the matter is that it is
precisely having asserted the "indivisibility" of
the imaginative and the bodily experience that
Collingwood goes on to insist that the mental-
only doctrine from Book I has "not been
forgotten or denied." Thus we should say not
that Collingwood changes his mind in a manner
that is conscious and deliberate but, quite the
opposite, that he changes it in a manner that
renders his theory inconsistent. Richard
Wollheim writes:
In book I of the Principles of Art Collingwood asserts
that the work of art is something imaginary: it exists in,
and only in, the artist's head or mind. In book III he
denies that the relation of the audience is non-existent
or inessential. Collingwood goes on to say that these
two views--one an assertion, the other a denial-
which jointly constitute his aesthetic, are not inconsis-
tent: though superficially they might seem so.20
But let us read further. The important ques-
tion, Collingwood goes on to say, is whether
the "solely" mental-only work may yet be
"somehow necessarily connected" with the
bodily work (PA, 305). And in the pages that
follow, Collingwood reviews his definition of
art (Book II) and is drawn ineluctably to the
conclusion that there is indeed a "connection"
and, what is more, that it is a connection in light
of which the mental-only doctrine cannot be
sustained.
The work of artistic creation is not a work performed in
any exclusive or complete fashion in the mind of the
person whom we call the artist. That idea is a delusion
bred of individualistic psychology together with a false
view of the relation not so much between body and
mind as between experience at the psychical level and
experience at the level of thought (PA, 323-24 [italics
mine]).
Thus, significantly, Collingwood's attempt to
resurrect the mental-only doctrine proves abor-
tive. But more needs to be said than this, surely,
lest Collingwood's argument should appear
only more perversely erratic and irremedably
inconsistent than before. Why, having defended
throughout Book II the view that art is some-
thing bodily in nature, should Collingwood
even contemplate the idea that it is something
"solely" in the head? And why, having con-
templated it, does he then abandon it?
On Reading Collingwood's Principles of Art
The answer to the first question is this: that
Collingwood's description of art as something
both "bodily" and "inward" or "imagina-
tive" in nature is equivocal, and equivocal in a
way that lends superficial plausibility to the
doctrine that the work of art exists "in the
head." The "bodily" work and its "imagina-
tive" counterpart, Collingwood insists, are
"indivisible" and yet, curiously, are "two
experiences," not one. The work of art, he
says, is something that "exists solely in the
head" and yet, at base, something that is
"necessarily connected with" its bodily coun-
terpart. Collingwood seems to want to have it
both ways. He wants to say (and this is espe-
cially clear in the second example) that the
"bodily" work is a necessary condition for the
occurrence of the mental work but is not the
mental work (or work of art proper) itself-an
interpretation which echoes the doctrine of
Book L.21 But he also wants to say something
quite different: that far from belonging to two
quite separate worlds, res cogitans and res
extensa, the mental and bodily work are two
aspects-the "psychical" and the "imagina-
tive"' -of one and the same thing-"experi-
ence" -a position that is consistent with
Collingwood's definition of art in Book II.
Collingwood, I say, is not immediately
aware of the difference between these two sorts
of statements; and it is in this unfortunate
context that the opportunity presents itself to
suggest that there is yet a grain of truth in
"common usage," a sense in which it is com-
patible with the philosophical work of Book II.
Certainly there is such a sense. We should not
identify the work of art with "fabrication" or
mere physical exemplification; nor should we
suppose that "imagination" is an activity in
any sense directed towards an end which is
known in advance, as in craft. These two things
remain quite true in Book Ill, but they do not
justify, obviously, the assertion that the work of inconsistent with the fact that he initially sees a
art is something "solely" mental in nature.
But turning now to the second question,
ultimately Collingwood is aware of an incon-
sistency in his position. As he expresses it, the sure, Collingwood may be justly criticized for
idea that the work of art is something "solely"
or "exclusively" mental implies "a false view
of the relation not so much between body and
mind as between experience at the psychical
level and experience at the level of thought"
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245
(PA, 323-24). The reference here is, of course,
to the definition of art as "language" and, as
such, as something intrinsically "sensuous" or
"bodily." What is "sensuous" or "bodily" at
the "psychical level"'--our immediate experi-
ence of the world-Collingwood reminds us in
Book III, is not "left behind," as it were, by
the act of attention which makes us aware of it.
Rather, the bodily component is retained at the
higher "imaginative" level, but now in the
form of "language" or "art" (PA, 234-35,
305-8). It is thus, I suggest, that we are urged to
think of the work of art not as an amalgam or
interaction of two separate worlds, the "men-
tal" work existing in the artist's head and its
exemplification existing somewhere else in an
entirely distinct physical mode, but as a rela-
tionship holding between the "sensuous" and
"imaginative" levels of experience, which in
respect to their "matter," as Collingwood ex-
presses it, are one and the same thing (PA,
305-7, 323-24).22 We may say with Colling-
wood and, what is more, in agreement with
Book I, that the work of art is "wholly and
entirely imaginative," that it is something
which is made "deliberately and responsibly"
and yet without a plan. But as Collingwood
ultimately stresses, this does not entitle us to
say that it is something made "exclusively" in
the head.
We continue to feel of course that a distinc-
tion between the mental and the physical is in
some sense warranted-indeed Collingwood
himself continues to suppose it-and it is by no
means clear on Collingwood's monistic account
of "experience" how this distinction is to be
made, if at all. But I do not think my thesis is
dented. The contention that Collingwood con-
sciously and deliberately changes his mind
about the mental-only doctrine of Book I is not,
after all, incompatible with the fact that his new
theory is not precisely worked out. Nor is it
partial or superficial consistency between the
provisional doctrine of Book I and the more
definitive doctrine of Books II and III. To be
being vague and imprecise and, as a result, for
providing grist for the mills of numerous irrec-
oncilable interpretations. But if my reading has
warrant, in one important respect all these
interpretations may be called into question. For
246
it is clear that the dualistic tendency to see the
mental and bodily aspects of the work of art as
completely different entities is consciously and
deliberately abandoned, and with it the doctrine
that the work of art or imagination is something
done exclusively in the head.
IV.
My account of Collingwood's argument may
be thought open to one final objection. I have
suggested that Collingwood rules out entirely
the place of technique in art. But the opposite
view is widely held. As one commentator
expresses it: "Collingwood always stressed that
technique was necessary to art, where technique
is understood as the control which enables an
artist to create exactly what he wants. "23
Donagan advocates a qualified version of the
view, saying that Collingwood believed craft to
be "necessary" for the "best" art. 24 This
interpretation, I wish briefly to show, is un-
doubtedly false.
To be sure, Collingwood appears in his com-
mentary on the theory of "poetic" or "artistic"
technique to concede that technique or skill is,
at the very least, a necessary condition of the
best art if not, indeed, a necessary condition of
any work of art "whatever" (PA, 27-29). It
should be clear on closer examination, how-
ever, that the matter is not quite as simple as
this. When proponents of the theory of poetic
technique say that craft or technique is neces-
sary, what they are really saying, according to
Collingwood, is two things. In one sense they
are using the words "technique," "craft," and
"skill" to mean a "directed process" or "an
effort . . . directed upon a certain end," saying
that these things are necessary to art. But in
another sense, which in Collingwood's view
they do not clearly distinguish from the latter,
craftsman, we are told, knows the specifica-
they mean to say that "craft" is an activity in
which specific plans are laid out in advance and
precisely followed, and that craft in this sense is
necessary to art (PA, 28-29).
Now when Collingwood writes that it is quite
true that craft or skill is a necessary condition of
art, initially he does not say to which sense of
the word craft he means to give his approval.
And this perhaps has misled many readers. The
key word "skill" in this context must be
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G R A N T
allowed "to pass for the moment un-
challenged," he writes; and the assertion that
"craft" is necessary, he says, is true, but
"true" when "properly understood" (PA,
26-27). But the matter is soon cleared up.
Collingwood goes on to argue against the
doctrine that craft or skill is necessary in the
second sense, that is, as a means of achieving a
specific end, and for the proposition that it is
necessary in the first sense, that is to say, as an
"effort" or "directed process" which is con-
scious and deliberate but unplanned. "What he
[the artist] wants to say," Collingwood con-
cludes, "is not present to him as an end towards
which means have to be devised; . . ." (PA, 29).
But further qualification needs to be made.
Properly speaking, we are told, "craft," "tech-
nique,' "skill," and the like are words which
should not be used to refer to the "directed" but
"unplanned" nature of art. The latter is "no
doubt a thing worthy of our attention; but we are
only frustrating our study of it in advance if we
approach it in the determination to treat it as if
it were the conscious working-out of means to
the achievement of a conscious purpose, or in
other words technique" (PA, 29). "Technique"
used in its proper sense must, in other words,
refer to something which is planned. We are
compelled to conclude, therefore, that "tech-
nique" in its proper sense, or "the control
which enables an artist to create exactly what he
wants," is not, for Collingwood, a necessary
condition of art.
But there is yet a further point in need of
clarification. '"[The description of the unwrit-
ten poem as an end to which his technique is a
means is false," writes Collingwood, except in
those instances where "the work of art is also a
work of craft" (PA, 28-29). Just as the joiner
"knows the specifications of the table he is
about to make" so the artist, where he is also a
tions of the work of art he is about to make (PA,
28-29). Collingwood seems to be admitting
here the necessity of technique-at least in
those cases where, as he puts it, "the work of
art is also a work of craft." But we should
examine this position more closely. Col-
lingwood sharply distinguishes between "mak-
ing" in the sense in which the craftsman makes,
which he calls "fabricating," and "making"
which is unique to the production of works of
On Reading Collingwood's Principles of Art 247

art. Making in the latter sense is not "fabricat- he has established the truth, adequacy, and
ing" but "creating," that is, making without relevance of its premises-Collingwood is later
foreknowledge of the outcome (PA, 128) or compelled to revise it. We read in Book 1, for
making which is ''conscious and voluntary" example, that '"the actual making of the tune is
but "non-technical." Now, to be sure, the artist (as we commonly say) something that goes on
who typically makes in the latter sense can also, in his Ithe artist's] head and there only." But all
if he is competent to do so, "make" in the quite this is revised in Book II, and it is not until
different sense in which the craftsman does. But Book III that we are given-again in the no-
an artist who chooses to specify exactly how a menclature of artists, audiences, and perform-
work of art is to be made must be presumed, iners-what Collingwood thinks a definitive and
Collingwood's view, already to have created it: practically applicable theory of art. There we
"the artist has no idea what the experience is read that the work of art is, precisely, not
which demands expression until he has ex- something that is "performed in any exclusive
pressed it" (PA, 129). Fabrication, or making or complete fashion in the mind of the person
in the sense in which the craftsman makes, whom we call the artist" (PA, 323, 324). It is to
therefore, is extraneous to "creating" and statements such as these, not to the argument of
should on no account be thought necessary to it. Book 1, that readers who wish to understand
No doubt things 'created" can also be, in a Collingwood's "definition" or "theory" of art
manner of speaking, things "fabricated," but must give their unaccustomed attention.
we must conclude that what makes such things Of course, above all else we should want to
the one, for Collingwood, is a separate matter know whether Collingwood is right, a question
from what makes them the other. "Expres- that I have not here sought to address. But if my
sion,'" as Collingwood puts it, "is an activity of argument has warrant, most of the criticisms
which there can be no technique" (PA, I I 1). offered by critics against Collingwood's theory
Collingwood is open to criticism, no doubt, miss the mark, being not criticisms of his
because we surely do use "craft," "tech- definitive position, but criticisms of the various
nique," and like terms quite legitimately to tentative positions that precede it. To that extent
refer to things which cannot be made according my reading may be viewed as urging that the
to exact specifications. This is obvious, for key question, whether Collingwood was right,
example, where the thing being made is a be examined afresh.
dugout canoe, an apple pie, or a leather shoe.
No one tree, apple, or piece of leather is R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford,
1938). Page references to be cited in the body of the text:
identical to any other; so we can never know
(PA, 99), for example, means Collingwood, Principles, p.
precisely, that is, we can never specify exhaus- 99.
tively, what the end result of working with such 2 Perhaps the most recent instance of this debate is in
material will be. We are very often compelled to Richard Sclafani's, "Wollheim on Collingwood," Philoso-
revise our plans in midstream. But to return to phY 51 (1976), in which it is argued against Richard
Wollheim's interpretation of the Principles in Art and its
the point at issue, if we feel such criticisms apt,
Objects (New York, 1968) that Collingwood never meant to
it is only because Collingwood uses the word deny the public accessibility of the work of art. The debate
"technique" in a sense that obliges him pre- has taken many other forms, but these are too numerous to
cisely to deny that it is a necessary condition of mention here.
- R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Oxford,
art.
1939), p. 122; see also An Essa yv on Metaphysics (Oxford,
1940), p. 26; and Benedetto Croce, Guide to Aesthetics
V. trans. Patrick Romanell (South Bend, 1965), pp. 3-4. The
question "What is art?" writes Croce in his Guide to
In his Essay on Philosophical Method, Aesthetics, "has always, in fact, a circumstantial mean-
Collingwood writes that philosophical thinking ing-referring as it does to the particular difficulties that
is a "dialectical process where the initial posi- come to life at a specific moment in the history of thought."
4 Admittedly, Collingwood is not always clear, as for
tion is modified again and again as difficulties
example when he speaks of "defining' the term art. What
in it come to light."25 Certainly, we can say he really means when he speaks of "defining' the term, as
this much about the Principles, that having in all instances where he uses the word "definition," is an
stated his position in a provisional way-before analysis of the thing to which it refers, not verbal definition.

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 248 G R A N T

' Alan Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R. G. '7 In this regard, Francis Sparshott's observation that
Collingwood (Oxford, 1964), pp. 96-99. the Principles contains, in fact, three distinct theories of art
6 Ibid., p. 96. should come as no surprise. Francis Sparshott, The Theory
7 Ibid., pp. 96-99. of the Arts (Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 629-30.
8 See also Collingwood, Principles, pp. 109, 125, 131, 18 Donagan, The Later Philosophy, p. 118.
136, 152. 19 Indeed, again contrary to the usual interpretation, I
9 The nomenclature seems to have originated with Johnthink there is a case to be made for the view that
Hospers, "Croce-Collingwood Theory of Art," Philosophy Collingwood abandons what is, essentially, an "idea theory
31 (1956). of meaning" for the rival theory that meaning is established
10 Richard Sclafani, "Wollheim on Collingwood," by or bound up with language and, in particular, with the
Philosophy 51 (1976): 359. See also Donagan, The Later role of an individual act of expression and clarification
Philosophy, pp. 94-113; Peter Charmichael, "Collingwood within a language. But that is another matter which there is
and Art Media," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 2 not space here to address. See Collingwood, Principles, pp.
(Spring-Summer 1971): 37-42; Peter Jones, "A Critical 244 47, 250-53.
Outline of Collingwood's Philosophy of Art," in Critical 20 Richard Wollheim, "On An Alleged Inconsistency
Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, ed., In Collingwood's Aesthetic," Critical Essays, p. 69.
Richard Krausz, (Oxford, 1972), pp. 42-65; Donald S. 21 There is no reason in principle why the artist whose
Taylor, "R. G. Collingwood: Art, Craft, and History," aim it is to make a work, "entirely in the head," as it were,
Clio 2 (June 1973): 239-78. should not have recourse along the way, perhaps necessar-
" Collingwood is annoyingly equivocal on this point. ily, to pencil and paper, clay, canvas, paintbrush, and so
"We have finished at last with the technical theory of art," on.
he writes at the outset of his discussion of "art proper." Yet 22 I speculate that Collingwood's division of experi-
in the next paragraph we read: "we are still dealing with ence is based on the theory of "overlapping classes" which
questions of fact, or what in the first chapter were called he sets forth in his Philosophical Method. In accordance
questions of theory." Collingwood, Principles, p. 105. with the apparata criticus of that theory, Collingwood may
12 Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, p. 100. be construed as classifying expression as "sensuous,"
13 Hospers, "The Croce-Collingwood Theory of Art," "imaginative," "intellectual," according to the differentia
p. 293. "increasing degrees of freedom." Thus imaginative expres-
14 R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Philosophical sion (language, or art), for example, Collingwood defines
Method (Oxford, 1933), p. 92. as "a manifestation of freedom, intermediate between the
15 Anyone can see that the argument construed in this less free activity of mere feeling and the more free activity
sense is valid; but whether it is cogent is quite another of what is generally called thought. . ." (Collingwood,
matter. It may be doubted. for example, whether common Principles, p. 208). See also Philosophical Method, pp.
usage consists essentially of only two strains; whether the 26-91.
conceptions implied by craft usage are, in fact, false; and 23 Peter Jones, "A Critical Outline of Collingwood's
whether the conceptions that underlie "proper usage" are Philosophy of Art," Critical Essays, p. 63.
true or plausible. 24 Donagan, The Later Philosophy, p. 112.
16 Donagan, The Later Philosophy, pp. 96-99. 25 Collingwood, Philosophical Method, p. 210.

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