Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 172132 July 23, 2014

THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, ACTING THROUGH ITS OWNER, GRAND PLAZA HOTEL
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; MED-ARBITER TOMAS F. FALCONITIN; and
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT and ALLIED INDUSTRIES-
HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAINHHMSC), Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Although case law has repeatedly held that the employer was but a bystander in respect of the
conduct of the certification election to decide the labor organization to represent the employees
in the bargaining unit, and that the pendency of the cancellation of union registration brought
against the labor organization applying for the certification election should not prevent the conduct
of the certification election, this review has to look again at the seemingly never-ending quest of
the petitioner employer to stop the conduct of the certification election on the ground of the
pendency of proceedings to cancel the labor organization's registration it had initiated on the
ground that the membership of the labor organization was a mixture of managerial and
supervisory employees with the rank-and-file employees.

Under review at the instance of the employer is the decision promulgated on December 13, 2005,
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed its petition for certiorari to assail the resolutions of
respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment sanctioning the conduct of the certification
election initiated by respondent labor organization.

Antecedents

On October 11, 1995, respondent National Union of Workers in Hotel Restaurant and Allied
Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) filed a petition for
certification election, seeking to represent all the supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel Manila.
The petitioner filed its opposition, but the opposition was deemed denied on February 14, 1996
when Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando issued his order for the conduct of the certification
election.

The petitioner appealed the order of Med-Arbiter Fernando, but the appeal was also denied. A
pre-election conference was then scheduled. On February 20, 1998, however, the pre-election
conference was suspended until further notice because of the repeated non-appearance of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.

On January 29, 2000, NUWHRAIN-HHMSC moved for the conduct of the pre-election conference.
The petitioner primarily filed its comment on the list of employees submitted by NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC, and simultaneously sought the exclusion of some from the list of employees for
occupying either confidential or managerial positions. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on
April 17, 2000, raising the prolonged lack of interest of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to pursue its petition
for certification election.

On May 12, 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s
registration as a labor union for failing to submit its annual financial reports and an updated list of
members as required by Article 238 and Article 239 of the Labor Code, docketed as Case No.
NCROD-0005-004-IRD entitled The Heritage Hotel Manila, acting through its owner, Grand Plaza
Hotel Corporation v. National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries-
Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHSMC). It filed another motion on
June 1, 2000 to seek either the dismissal or the suspension of the proceedings on the basis of its
pending petition for the cancellation of union registration.

The following day, however, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued a notice
scheduling the certification elections on June 23, 2000.

Dissatisfied, the petitioner commenced in the CA on June 14, 2000 a special civil action for
certiorari, alleging that the DOLE gravely abused its discretion in not suspending the certification
election proceedings. On June 23, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The certification election proceeded as scheduled, and NUWHRAINHHMSC obtained the majority
vote of the bargaining unit. The petitioner filed a protest (with motion to defer the certification of
the election results and the winner), insisting on the illegitimacy of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.

Ruling of the Med-Arbiter

On January 26, 2001, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin issued an order, ruling that the petition for
the cancellation of union registration was not a bar to the holding of the certification election, and
disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent employer/protestant’s protest with motion to

defer certification of results and winner is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Accordingly, this Office hereby certify pursuant to the rules that petitioner/protestee, National
Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisory
Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHSMC) is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all supervisory
employees of the Heritage Hotel Manila acting through its owner, Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation
for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to wages, and hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment.

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner timely appealed to the DOLE Secretary claiming that: (a) the membership of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC consisted of managerial, confidential, and rank-and-file employees; (b)
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC failed to comply with the reportorial requirements; and (c) Med-Arbiter
Falconitin simply brushed aside serious questions on the illegitimacy of NUWHRAINHHMSC. It
contended that a labor union of mixed membership of supervisory and rank-and-file employees
had no legal right to petition for the certification election pursuant to the pronouncements in Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union (Toyota
Motor) and Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.) v. Secretary of Labor and Employment (Dunlop Slazenger).

Ruling of the DOLE Secretary

On August 21, 2002, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas issued a resolution denying the
appeal, and affirming the order of MedArbiter Falconitin, viz:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The order of the Med- Arbiter dated 26 January 2001 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO RESOLVED.

DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas observed that the petitioner’s reliance on Toyota Motor and Dunlop
Slazenger was misplaced because both rulings were already overturned by SPI Technologies,
Inc. v. Department of Labor and Employment, to the effect that once a union acquired a legitimate
status as a labor organization, it continued as such until its certificate of registration was cancelled
or revoked in an independent action for cancellation.

The petitioner moved for reconsideration.

In denying the motion on October 21, 2002, the DOLE Secretary declared that the mixture or co-
mingling of employees in a union was not a ground for dismissing a petition for the certification
election under Section 11, par. II, Rule XI of Department Order No. 9; that the appropriate remedy
was to exclude the ineligible employees from the bargaining unit during the inclusion-exclusion
proceedings; that the dismissal of the petition for the certification election based on the legitimacy
of the petitioning union would be inappropriate because it would effectively allow a collateral attack
against the union’s legal personality; and that a collateral attack against the personality of the
labor organization was prohibited under Section 5, Rule V of Department Order No. 9, Series of
1997.

Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner elevated the matter to the CA by
petition for certiorari.

Ruling of the CA

On December 13, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, giving its following
disquisition:

The petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner is, in essence, a continuation of the debate on the
relevance of the Toyota Motor, Dunlop Slazenger and Progressive Development cases to the
issues raised.

Toyota Motor and Dunlop Slazengerare anchored on the provisions of Article 245 of the Labor
Code which prohibit managerial employees from joining any labor union and permit supervisory
employees to form a separate union of their own. The language naturally suggests that a labor
organization cannot carry a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees. Thus, courts
have held that a union cannot become a legitimate labor union if it shelters under its wing both
types of employees. But there are elements of an elliptical reasoning in the holding of these two
cases that a petition for certification election may not prosper until the composition of the union is
settled therein. Toyota Motor, in particular, makes the blanket statement that a supervisory union
has no right to file a certification election for as long as it counts rank-and-file employees among
its ranks. More than four years after Dunlop Slazenger, the Court clarified in Tagaytay Highlands
International Golf Club Inc vs Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO that while Article
245 prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rank-and-file union, it does not provide what
the effect is if a rank-and-file union takes in supervisory employees as members, or vice versa.
Toyota Motor and Dunlop Slazenger jump into an unnecessary conclusion when they foster the
notion that Article 245 carries with it the authorization to inquire collaterally into the issue wherever
it rears its ugly head.

Tagaytay Highlands proclaims, in the light of Department Order 9, that after a certificate of
registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collateral attack. It
may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation. In fine, Toyota and Dunlop
Slazengerare a spent force. Since Tagaytay Highlands was handed down after these two cases,
it constitutes the latest expression of the will of the Supreme Court and supersedes or overturns
previous rulings inconsistent with it. From this perspective, it is needless to discuss whether SPI
Technologiesas a mere resolution of the Court may prevail over a full-blown decision that Toyota
Motor or Dunlop Slazenger was. The ruling in SPI Technologies has been echoed in Tagaytay
Highlands, for which reason it is with Tagaytay Highlands, not SPI Technologies that the petitioner
must joust.

The fact that the cancellation proceeding has not yet been resolved makes it obvious that the legal
personality of the respondent union is still very much in force. The DOLE has thus every reason
to proceed with the certification election and commits no grave abuse of discretion in allowing it
to prosper because the right to be certified as collective bargaining agent is one of the legitimate
privileges of a registered union. It is for the petitioner to expedite the cancellation case if it wants
to put an end to the certification case, but it cannot place the issue of the union’s legitimacy in the
certification case, for that would be tantamount to making the collateral attack the DOLE has
staunchly argued to be impermissible.

The reference made by the petitioner to another Progressive Development case that it would be
more prudent for the DOLE to suspend the certification case until the issue of the legality of the
registration is resolved, has also been satisfactorily answered. Section 11, Rule XI of Department
Order 9 provides for the grounds for the dismissal of a petition for certification election, and the
pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration is not one of them. Like Toyota Motor
and Dunlop Slazenger, the second Progressive case came before Department Order 9.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the disputed resolutions of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment are AFFIRMED, and the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner sought reconsideration,24 but its motion was denied.

Issues

Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner insisting that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDSAPPLIES TO

THE CASE AT BAR

II

[THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS] SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION – PIZZA HUT V. LAGUESMA WHICH HELD
THAT IT WOULD BE MORE PRUDENT TO SUSPEND THE CERTIFICATION CASE UNTIL THE
ISSUE OF THE LEGALITY OF THE REGISTRATION OF THE UNION IS FINALLY RESOLVED

III

BECAUSE OF THE PASSAGE OFTIME, RESPONDENT UNION NO LONGER POSSESSES

THE MAJORITY STATUS SUCH THAT A NEW CERTIFICATION ELECTION IS IN ORDER25

The petitioner maintains that the ruling in Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club Inc v.
Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union PTGWO26 (Tagaytay Highlands) was inapplicable
because it involved the co-mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor
organization, while the issue here related to the mixture of membership between two employee
groups — one vested with the right to selforganization (i.e., the rank-and-file and supervisory
employees), and the other deprived of such right (i.e., managerial and confidential employees);
that suspension of the certification election was appropriate because a finding of "illegal mixture"
of membership during a petition for the cancellation of union registration determined whether or
not the union had met the 20% representation requirement under Article 234(c) of the Labor
Code;27 and that in holding that mixed membership was not a ground for canceling the union
registration, except when such was done through misrepresentation, false representation or fraud
under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239(a) and (c) of the Labor Code, the CA
completely ignored the 20% requirement under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code.

The petitioner posits that the grounds for dismissing a petition for the certification election under
Section 11, Rule XI of Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997, were not exclusive because the
other grounds available under the Rules of Courtcould be invoked; that in Progressive
Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,28 the Court ruled
that prudence could justify the suspension of the certification election proceedings until the issue
of the legality of the union registration could be finally resolved; that the non-submission of the
annual financial statements and the list of members in the period from 1996 to 1999 constituted a
serious challenge to NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s right to file its petition for the certification election;
and that from the time of the conduct of the certification election on June 23, 2000, the composition
of NUWHRAINHHMSC had substantially changed, thereby necessitating another certification
election to determine the true will of the bargaining unit.

In short, should the petition for the cancellation of union registration based on mixed membership
of supervisors and managers in a labor union, and the non-submission of reportorial requirements
to the DOLE justify the suspension of the proceedings for the certification elections or even the
denial of the petition for the certification election?

Ruling

We deny the petition for review on certiorari.

Basic in the realm of labor unionrights is that the certification election is the sole concern of the
workers,29 and the employer is deemed an intruder as far as the certification election is
concerned.30 Thus, the petitioner lacked the legal personality to assail the proceedings for the
certification election,31 and should stand aside as a mere bystander who could not oppose the
petition, or even appeal the Med-Arbiter’s orders relative to the conduct of the certification
election.32 As the Court has explained in Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc.33
(Kawashima):
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition
for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the
purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the
employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much
less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere
allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually
managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election.
The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.

The petitioner’s meddling in the conduct of the certification election among its employees unduly
gave rise to the suspicion that it intended to establish a company union.34 For that reason, the
challenges it posed against the certification election proceedings were rightly denied.

Under the long established rule, too, the filing of the petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC’s registration should not bar the conduct of the certification election.35 In that respect,
only a final order for the cancellation of the registration would have prevented
NUWHRAINHHMSC from continuing to enjoy all the rights conferred on it as a legitimate labor
union, including the rightto the petition for the certification election.36 This rule is now enshrined
in Article 238-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9481,37 which reads:

Article 238-A. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of Registration. – A petition for cancellation of
union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it prevent
the filing of a petition for certification election.

xxxx

Still, the petitioner assails the failure of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to submit its periodic financial
reports and updated list of its members pursuant to Article 238 and Article 239 of the Labor Code.
It contends that the serious challenges against the legitimacy of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC as a union
raised in the petition for the cancellation of union registration should have cautioned the Med-
Arbiter against conducting the certification election.

The petitioner does not convince us.

In The Heritage Hotel Manila v. National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied
Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC),38 the Court
declared that the dismissal of the petition for the cancellation of the registration of NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC was proper when viewed against the primordial right of the workers to self organization,
collective bargaining negotiations and peaceful concerted actions, viz:

xxxx

[Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code] give the Regional Director ample discretion in dealing
with a petition for cancellation of a union's registration, particularly, determining whether the union
still meets the requirements prescribed by law. It is sufficient to give the Regional Director license
to treat the late filing of required documents as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
law. After all, the law requires the labor organization to submit the annual financial report and list
of members in order to verify if it is still viable and financially sustainable as an organization so as
to protect the employer and employees from fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With the submission
of the required documents by respondent, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though
belatedly.
We cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary in
denying the petition for cancellation of respondent's registration. The union members and, in fact,
all the employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a
bargaining agent, merely because of the negligence of the union officers who were responsible
for the submission of the documents to the BLR.

Labor authorities should, indeed, act with circumspection in treating petitions for cancellation
ofunion registration, lest they be accused of interfering withunion activities. In resolving the
petition, consideration must be taken of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article XIII, Section
3 of the Constitution, i.e., the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities. Labor authorities should bear in mind that
registration confers upon a union the status of legitimacy and the concomitant right and privileges
granted by law to a legitimate labor organization, particularly the right to participate inor ask for
certification election in a bargaining unit. Thus, the cancellation of a certificate of registration is
the equivalent of snuffing out the lifeof a labor organization. For without such registration, it loses
- as a rule - its rights under the Labor Code.

It is worth mentioning that the Labor Code's provisions on cancellation of union registration and
on reportorial requirements have been recently amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481, An Act
Strengthening the Workers’ Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007. The
amendment sought to strengthen the workers’ right to self-organization and enhance the
Philippines' compliance with its international obligations as embodied in the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention No. 87, pertaining to the non-dissolution of workers’ organizations
by administrative authority. Thus, R.A. No. 9481 amended Article 239 to read:

ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration.--The following may constitute grounds
for cancellation of union registration:

(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of
the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of
members who took part in the ratification;

(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes
of the election of officers, and the list of voters;

(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.

R.A. No. 9481 also inserted inthe Labor Code Article 242-A, which provides:

ART. 242-A. Reportorial Requirements.--The following are documents required to be submitted

to the Bureau by the legitimate labor organization concerned:

(a) Its constitution and by-laws, or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of
members who took part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws within thirty (30) days
from adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto;

(b) Its list of officers, minutesof the election of officers, and list of voters within thirty (30) days from
election;
(c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every fiscal year; and

(d) Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by the Bureau.

Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for cancellation of union
registration but shall subject the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from
membership, or any appropriate penalty.

xxxx

The ruling thereby wrote finisto the challenge being posed by the petitioner against the illegitimacy
of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.

The remaining issue to be resolved is which among Toyota Motor, Dunlop Slazenger and
Tagaytay Highlands applied in resolving the dispute arising from the mixed membership in
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.

This is not a novel matter. In Kawashima,39 we have reconciled our rulings in Toyota Motor,
Dunlop Slazengerand Tagaytay Highlands by emphasizing on the laws prevailing at the time of
filing of the petition for the certification election.

Toyota Motorand Dunlop Slazenger involved petitions for certification election filed on November
26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively. In both cases, we applied the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (also known as the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules), the
prevailing rule then.

The 1989 Amended Omnibus Ruleswas amended on June 21, 1997 by Department Order No. 9,
Series of 1997. Among the amendments was the removal of the requirement of indicating in the
petition for the certification election that there was no co-mingling of rank-and-fileand supervisory
employees in the membership of the labor union. This was the prevailing rule when the Court
promulgated Tagaytay Highlands, declaring therein that mixed membership should have no
bearing on the legitimacy of a registered labor organization, unless the co-mingling was due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud as provided in Article 239 of the Labor Code.40
Presently, then, the mixed membership does not result in the illegitimacy of the registered labor
union unless the same was done through misrepresentation, false statement or fraud according
to Article 239 of the Labor Code. In Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations,41
we categorically explained that—

Clearly, then, for the purpose of de-certifying a union, it is not enough to establish that the rank-
and-file union includes ineligible employees in its membership. Pursuantto Article 239 (a) and (c)
of the Labor Code, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in
connection withthe adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto,
the minutes of ratification, or in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of
officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly
elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.

We note that NUWHRAIN-HHMSC filed its petition for the certification election on October 11,
1995. Conformably with Kawashima, the applicable law was the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules,
and the prevailing rule was the pronouncement in Toyota Motorand Dunlop Slazenger to the effect
that a labor union of mixed membership was not possessed with the requisite personality to file a
petition for the certification election.
Nonetheless, we still rule in favor of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. We expound.

In both Toyota Motorand Dunlop Slazenger, the Court was convinced that the concerned labor
unions were comprised by mixed rank-and-file and supervisory employees. In Toyota Motor, the
employer submitted the job descriptions of the concerned employees to prove that there were
supervisors in the petitioning union for rank-and-file employees. In Dunlop Slazenger, the Court
observed that the labor union of supervisors included employees occupying positions that
apparently belonged to the rank-and-file. In both Toyota Motorand Dunlop Slazenger, the
employers were able to adduce substantial evidence to prove the existence of the mixed
membership. Based on the records herein, however, the petitioner failed in that respect. To recall,
it raised the issue of the mixed membership in its comment on the list of members submitted by
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, and in its protest. In the comment, it merely identified the positions that
were either confidential or managerial, but did not present any supporting evidence to prove or
explain the identification. In the protest, it only enumerated the positions that were allegedly
confidential and managerial, and identified two employees that belonged to the rank-and-file, but
did notoffer any description to show that the positions belonged to different employee groups.

Worth reiterating is that the actualfunctions of an employee, not his job designation, determined
whether the employee occupied a managerial, supervisory or rank-and-file position.42 As to
confidential employees who were excluded from the right to self-organization, they must (1) assist
or act in a confidential capacity, in regard(2) to persons who formulated, determined, and
effectuated management policies in the field of labor relations.43 In that regard, mere allegations
sanssubstance would not be enough, most especially because the constitutional right of workers
to selforganization would be compromised.

At any rate, the members of NUWHRAIN-HHSMC had already spoken, and elected it as the
bargaining agent.1âwphi1 As between the rigid application of Toyota Motorsand Dunlop
Slazenger, and the right of the workers to self-organization, we preferthe latter. For us, the choice
is clear and settled. "What is important is that there is an unmistakeable intent of the members of
[the] union to exercise their right to organize. We cannot impose rigorous restraints on such right
if we are to give meaning to the protection to labor and social justice clauses of the
Constitution."44

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on December 13, 2005 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice