G.R. No.

L-45987 May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
CAYAT

MORAN, J.

Facts: Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,
Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following information was
filed against him: That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-
Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and
under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No.
1639.

At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons
adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the possession of any member of a non-Christian
Philippine Islands who is a member of a non- tribe.
Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act
Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of
to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink section one or section two of this Act shall,
any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or upon conviction thereof, be punishable for
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the each offense by a fine of not exceeding two
so-called native wines and liquors which the hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term
members of such tribes have been not exceeding six months, in the discretion of
accustomed themselves to make prior to the the court.
passage of this Act, except as provided in
section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of
any police officer or other duly authorized
agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal
or township government to seize and forthwith
destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the

The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal (3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of
protection of the laws; the state.

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the

Constitution: and.

Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less
civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with
discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As
the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to
examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes
adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but
always with conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants,
and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been
persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life.
Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience
and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the
moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."
(Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during
the American period. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:

In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed
by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.

Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those
practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.)
"Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization," the present government
"has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience."
(Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this
end, their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network of highways
and communications; the benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right of
suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639
undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and
steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and applied.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Issue: Whether or not Act No. 1639 is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws

Ruling: No. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living
in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian
tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality
with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession,
or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this
Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the
sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating
liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all
times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the
assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature
understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of
protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair
in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument
against the equality of its application.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove
all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the
rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a
greater Philippines. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the
police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly described as
a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to
promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state,
develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise
of the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual,
the same must be upheld.

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary,
all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their
inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can
be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by
appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the
ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying
that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world," as
appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in
the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in
the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community
life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines.
But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which
rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our
government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the
power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions
of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the
application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-
comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the
discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from
providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The
private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila

LABRADOR, J.

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” filed to obtain
a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act
is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage
in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law
Ruling: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is
there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient
foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with
private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is
the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and
that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and
this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered
into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B.

ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T.
GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA
J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C.
ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S.
FERRER
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

CRUZ, J.

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:
 G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS

vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA

FERNANDEZ, J.

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco
Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents,
declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made
permanent. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.

(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA

Judge

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed
by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968.

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE

PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY
KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST
SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position
or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the
diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious
orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.

Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or
fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction.

On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment
declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.

In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null
and void:

1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is
discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;

2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations,
imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and
that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the
fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:
 3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of
their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.

On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered
judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge further committed a serious and patent error of law in ruling that Ordinance
No. 6537 violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution

Ruling: Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien
is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.
It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide
or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for
its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation
of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.

In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, where a law granted a government agency
power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation
of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy,
rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.

It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes
conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion
to be exercised within the limits of the law.

Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the
exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR.

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J

Facts: This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their
own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner,
Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter,
and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory
and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution
and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any
of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for
the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove
mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of
March 1980.

.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for
any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.

... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials — ... The election shall be held on January 30, 1980.
(Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)

Section 6. Election and Campaign Period — The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on
Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall
commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some
political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary
to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it.
from any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in
that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,

Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative
of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the equal protection clause and thus, should
be declared null and void
Ruling: No. The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption
of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except
in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office
on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before
one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty
of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the
sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet.
there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one
charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to
the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated.
It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand
by itself.

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said
paragraph reads:

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the

Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective
provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he
is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term
of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office
from which he has retired.

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "...
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void,
for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
 G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC.

vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C.
CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY

BENGZON, J.P., J.

Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing
"on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal
tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."

Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for
P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of
a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board
and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
(Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from
being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax
is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of
Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to
a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both
the sale and export of sugar.

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under
the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and
submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld
the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the
Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same
statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.

Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one
per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as
a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not
taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.

Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of Section
2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax.
Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever,
upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import
or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall
be void."

Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities,
municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.
Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas held the former to have been repealed by the latter.
And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will
have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative
until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule
of uniformity of taxation were infringed

Ruling: Yes. The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons
or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but
also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies
only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still,
the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as
plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected
(Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to
preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid
under protest. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),

PARAS, J.

Facts: A TV ad proudly announces:

"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals,
public policy and order, and because —

A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the
Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;

B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local
government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy;

C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;

D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and
toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of
the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have
a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section
3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).

The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the
Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869
on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January
1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally
conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved
to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed
on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.

Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy
—

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate
all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the
following objectives:

(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one
corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.

(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools,
(basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of
chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1)
generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control
programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs,
Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities
which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally
eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation
of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)

To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing
clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed,
amended or modified.

It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National
Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund
and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in
cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years
of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of
December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting
the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being
"contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative
of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in
Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized
PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices"

Ruling: No. P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause,
PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity —
the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much
needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected
gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869).
With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that
go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment
of PD 1896.The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws."
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have
to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS
v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which
are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly
explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A.
306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under
certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)

The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same
name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and
stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would
insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).

Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies
and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this
Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive
Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.

The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law
should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of
1âwphi1

government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,
170 SCRA 256).

Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling
resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler
and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons
may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean
that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not
necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise,
work, and even sex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI

vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT

PARAS, J

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

G.R. No. 106724 February 9, 1994

THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its Acting Chairman, Cesar Sarino, Teodolo C.
Natividad, Vice-Chairman and Executive Officer, Brig. Gen. Virgilio H. David, Edgar Dula Torre, Guillermo P.
Enriquez, Commissioners, and Chief Supt. Levy D. Macasiano Director for Personnel
vs.
Honorable Judge Salvador de Guzman, Jr., Chief Supt. Norberto M. Lina, Chief Supt. Ricardo Trinidad, Jr.,
Sr. Supt. Manuel Suarez, Supt. Justito B. Tagum, Sr. Supt. Tranquilino Aspiras, Sr., Supt. Ramon I. Navarro,
Sr. Supt. Ramon I. Navarro, Sr. Supt. Jose P. Suria, Sr. Supt. Agaton Abiera, Chief Insp. Bienvenido Torres,
and the National (ROTC) Alumni Association Inc. (NARRA), represented by its President Col. Benjamin
Gundran, and Director Hermogenes Peralta, Jr.

BIDIN, J.

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994

ISHMAEL HIMAGAN
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City

KAPUNAN, J.

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling: