PETITIONER: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.

RESPONDENT/S: HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PONENTE: SARMIENTO, J.

Facts: The petitioner, engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement, challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,” in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the
measure is assailed for “discrimination against males or females;” that it “does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;” and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation “in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.” 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence
of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter’s non-impairment clause, in addition to the “great and irreparable injury” that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.

Issue: Whether the Department Order of the Respondent is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Discriminatory against Sexes

Held: No, the petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies
only to “female contract workers,” but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that “equality before the law” under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same
class. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working
conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional
rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government’s efforts. The State through the labor
Secretary Exercise the police power which is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the “law of overwhelming necessity.” It may be
said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”
PETITIONER: LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by Republic
Act No. 1180
RESPONDENT: JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
PONENTE: LABRADOR, J.

Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act
are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned
by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged
in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an
exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on
nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the
retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail
business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under
him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process?

Held: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the equal protection of laws and
due process.
We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business
and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which
it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.
The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other
calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful
groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State,
and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country,
the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise
of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of
the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes
of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police
power.
DUE PROCESS The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in
the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a
matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.

The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the subject sought to be attained.

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . .

To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the
exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in
which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and
privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry
out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have
infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
PETITIONER: WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma
RESPONDENT: J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as the Collector of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. L-7859 December 22, 1955
PONENTE: REYES, J.B L., J.

Facts: Appellant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover
from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under
section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section
2 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the
owners or persons in control of the land devoted to the cultivation of sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the
difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. It was
alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are unconstitutional.
Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its
export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in the fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the important
source of foreign exchange needed by our government and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection
and advancement, therefore, redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the
sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be
readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.
The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act
is primarily a valid exercise of police power.
PLAINTIFF: SEBASTIAN LOZANO
DEFENDANTS: CARMEN MARTINEZ and JOSE DE VEGA
APPELLEE: CARMEN MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-12834 October 10, 1917
PONENTE: JOHNSON, J.

Facts: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the
ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one
case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

Issue/s:

1. Does BP 22 is violating the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?

2. Does it impair freedom of contract?
3. Does it contravene the equal protection clause?

Held: 1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The
gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It
is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the
drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of
certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and
commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis
or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may
become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade
circles and the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand-fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful” contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful.
Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check,
but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the
payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the
swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
PETITIONER: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT
RESPONDENT: ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.

Facts: Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S. Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests
and was applying to take another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the test. After three successive failures, a
student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The Regional Trial Court held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality education.

Ruling: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education. The regulation of practice of medicine is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. This regulation includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means of achieving the country’s objective of “upgrading the selection of
applicants into medical schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education in the country” It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirement. The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal protection if some
applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.

The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been reversed.
PETITIONER: RESTITUTO YNOT
RESPONDENT: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.

Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos
except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment,
which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
PETITIONERS: CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY
RESPONDENT: HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG
PILIPINO, INC.
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer required the
respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to
donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is
intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, ”
to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held: No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law’
(Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property
rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision
granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business,
trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted
in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy
in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace,
safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that
every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is
possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive
inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong
and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining
a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject
to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q)
that a Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the
city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring
owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with
salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
home-owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
PETIOTIONERS: ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO,
FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J.
SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA,
EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE &
NAPOLEON S. FERRER
RESPONDENT: HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.

Facts: The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7
hectares as long as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by tenants who re
actually cultivating such lands. Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed
from his farm holding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned the court for a
writ of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
2. Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is violative of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well-accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting the landowner of his property even before actual
payment to him in full of just compensation
Rulings:
1. Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject.
However, objection is raised to the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in
the provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still
have the right to review with finality the said determination.
2. No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise
of the power and eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially intended amount
of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the entire
program.
3. No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full
payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on the receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title
also remains with the landowner.
PETITIONER: MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC.
RESPONDENT: SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts: On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 or the Seniors Citizens Act was passed into law granting 20% discounts from all establishments relative to utilization of
transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country, Provided,
That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit.
On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued to implement RA 7432. Sections 2(i) of which provides for the definition of a Tax credit
which refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to a qualified senior citizen by all establishments which discount shall be deducted by the said
establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes and Section 4 of RR
No. 02-94 which provides for the recording/bookkeeping requirements for private establishments requiring them to keep separate and accurate records of sales made
to senior citizens. In CIR v. Central Luzon Drug Corp, 496 Phil 307 (2005), the Court declared Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 as erroneous because these
contravene RA 7432 that specifically allow private establishments to claim a tax credit the amount of discounts they grant. In turn the IRR issued pursuant thereto
provide for the procedures for its availment. To deny such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law and the regulations carrying out that mandate, is indefensible.

In effect, the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales discount. This contrived definition is improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted from
gross sales in order to compute the gross income in the income statement and cannot be deducted again, even for purposes of computing the income tax. When the
law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount when claimed shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability,
plain and simple. The option to avail of the tax credit benefit depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but to limit the benefit to a sales discount which is not
even identical to the discount privilege that is granted by law does not define it at all and serves no useful purpose. The definition must, therefore, be stricken down.

The law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation that "operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity;" it cannot
prevail. It is a cardinal rule that courts "will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to
enforce it x x x."

In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 a meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. The
intent of Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount. In case of conflict, the law must prevail. A "regulation adopted pursuant to law is law."
Conversely, a regulation or any portion thereof not adopted pursuant to law is no law and has neither the force nor the effect of law.

On February 26, 2004, RA 9257 or the Expanded Senior Citizens Act amended certain provisions of RA 7432, granting 20% discount to qualified senior citizens
and the establishments may claim the discounts granted as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation
and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. The Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006 and the DSWD issued its own IRR for
their implementation of the tax provision of RA 9257. Petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic corporations engaged in
the business of providing funeral and burial services, feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners prayed that Section 4 of RA 9257 and the IRR issued
by DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax
deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a)
of RA 7432 be reinstated.

Issues:
1. Whether the petition presents an actual case or controversy

2. Whether Section 4 of RA No. 9257 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, insofar as they provide that the 20% discount to Senior Citizens may be claimed
as tax deduction by the private establishments are invalid and unconstitutional.

Rulings: The Petition lacks merit.

POLITICAL LAW - actual case or controversy. We shall first resolve the procedural issue. When the constitutionality of a law is put in issue, judicial review
may be availed of only if the following requisites concur: "(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest
on the part of the party raising the question of constitutionality; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the question of
constitutionality is the lis mota of the case." General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011. In this case, the tax deduction scheme challenged by petitioners has
a direct adverse effect on them. Thus, there exists an actual case or controversy.

POLITICAL LAW tax deduction scheme is an exercise of police power of the State. Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does
not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense
that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso
basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private
establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A.
No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that,
this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden
of partly subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens
to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society.

The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities
of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the
process.

Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This being
the case, the means employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and
directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably
detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act. Carlos Superdrug Corp v. DSWD, 553 Phil. 120 (2007). When we ruled that
petitioners in Carlos Superdrug case failed to prove that the 20% discount is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a financial
report, to establish the impact of the 20% discount on the overall profitability of petitioners was presented in order to show that they would be operating at a loss due
to the subject regulation or that the continued implementation of the law would be unconscionably detrimental to the business operations of petitioners. In the case
at bar, petitioners proceeded with a hypothetical computation of the alleged loss that they will suffer similar to what the petitioners in Carlos Superdrug Corporation
did. We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Hence, the Law is valid and
constitutional.
PLAINTIFF: SILVESTER M. PUNSALAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
DEFENDANT: THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-4817 May 26, 1954
PONENTE: REYES, J.

Facts: The municipal board of the City of Manila on July 25, 1950, imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and
penalizes non-payment of the tax “by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court.” Among the professions taxed were those to which plaintiffs belong. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to paragraph
(1) of section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (as amended by Republic Act No. 409), which empowers the Municipal Board of said city to impose
a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons engaged in the various professions above referred to.

Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, plaintiffs, upon being required to pay the additional tax prescribed
in the ordinance, paid the same under protest and then brought the present suit for the purpose already stated. The lower court upheld the validity of the provision of
law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance but declared the ordinance itself illegal and void on the ground that the penalty there in provided for non-payment of
the tax was not legally authorized. From this decision both parties appealed to this Court, and the only question they have presented for our determination is whether
this ruling is correct or not, for though the decision is silent on the refund of taxes paid plaintiffs make no assignment of error on this point.

Issue: whether double taxation of certain classes is authorized by law?

Held: Yes, the Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for
taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed.

Separate Opinion: PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the decision of the majority upon the ground that the Municipal Board of Manila cannot outlaw what Congress of the Philippines
has already authorized. The plaintiffs-appellants — two lawyers, a physician, an accountant, a dentist and a pharmacist — had already paid the occupation tax under
section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code and are thereby duly licensed to practice their respective professions throughout the Philippines; and yet they had
been required to pay another occupation tax under Ordinance No. 3398 for practicing in the City of Manila. This is a glaring example of contradiction — the license
granted by the National Government is in effect withdrawn by the City in case of non-payment of the tax under the ordinance. I fit be argued that the national
occupation tax is collected to allow the professional residing in Manila to pursue his calling in other places in the Philippines, it should then be exacted only from
professionals practicing simultaneously in and outside of Manila. At any rate, we are confronted with the following situation: Whereas the professionals elsewhere
pay only one occupation tax, in the City of Manila they have to pay two, although all are on equal footing insofar as opportunities for earning money out of their
pursuits are concerned. The statement that practice in Manila is more lucrative than in the provinces, may be true perhaps with reference only to a limited few, but
certainly not to the general mass of practitioners in any field. Again, provincial residents who have occasional or isolated practice in Manila may have to pay the city
tax. This obvious discrimination or lack of uniformity cannot be brushed aside or justified by any trite pronouncement that double taxation is legitimate or that
legislation may validly affect certain classes.
My position is that a professional who has paid the occupation tax under the National Internal Revenue Code should be allowed to practice in Manila even without
paying the similar tax imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The City cannot give what said professional already has. I would not say that this Ordinance, enacted by the
Municipal Board pursuant to paragraph 1 of section 18 of the Revised Charter of Manila, as amended by Republic Act No. 409, empowering the Board to impose a
municipal occupation tax not to exceed P50 per annum, is invalid; but that only one tax, either under the Internal Revenue Code or under Ordinance No. 3398, should
be imposed upon a practitioner in Manila.
PETITIONER: REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC, petitioner,
RESPONDENT: The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and The COURT of TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965
PONENTE: PAREDES, J.

Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction
of a new Catholic Church in the locality, as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donor’s gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment for donee’s
gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof.

Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.

Held: The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes
assessed on such properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the
transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the
privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.

The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.
PETITIONER: ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC., represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA
RESPONDENT: HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra; ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V.
BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS OF PATERNO MILLARE
G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988
PONENTE: PARAS, J.

Facts: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a
complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate
taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued
for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding
that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation,
a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the
instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
Issue: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.
Ruling: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Reasonable
emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first
floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test
of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived
from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the
director).
PETITIONER: ANTERO M. SISON, JR.
RESPONDENTS: RUBEN B. ANCHETA, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; ROMULO VILLA, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of
Internal Revenue; TOMAS TOLEDO Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO
TANTUICO, Chairman, Commissioner on Audit, and CESAR E. A. VIRATA, Minister of Finance
G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984
PONENTE: FERNANDO, C.J.

Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer, alleged that its provision (Section 1) unduly discriminated against him by the imposition of higher rates
upon his income as a professional, that it amounts to class legislation, and that it transgresses against the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution
as well as the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

Issue: Whether BP 135 violates the due process and equal protection clauses, and the rule on uniformity in taxation.

Held: There is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to a conclusion that there was a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses.
Absent such showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the
differentitation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity, similar to the standards of equal protection, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of the
clause and is therefore uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories, such as recipients of compensation income as against professionals. Recipients
of compensation income are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes as there is no practically no overhead expense, while professionals and
businessmen have no uniform costs or expenses necessaryh to produce their income. There is ample justification to adopt the gross system of income taxation to
compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring: I concur in the result. The petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting: This is a frivolous suit. While the tax rates for compensation income are lower than those for net income such circumstance does
not necessarily result in lower tax payments for these receiving compensation income. In fact, the reverse will most likely be the case; those who file returns on the
basis of net income will pay less taxes because they claim all sort of deduction justified or not I vote for dismissal.
PETITIONER: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO
RESPONDENT: THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.

Facts: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on
various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No.
1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in
its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

Ruling: No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives
initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate
days.
PETITIONERS: PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO
RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD
RESPONDENTS: PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PONENTE: MAKASIAR, J.

Facts: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to
express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M.
and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO after learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting,
the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in
factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts
should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The lower court decided in
favor of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issues:

1. Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as a violation of freedom expression in general and of their
right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances

2. Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition of the employers
Ruling:

1. Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then
the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities,
of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein
private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition
for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm
to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence
perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.

2. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent means of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on
the workers the “duty … to observe regular working hours.” The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the
workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and
deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to
join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional
restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice
defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees
to the employees the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual aid or protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three.

The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of Industrial Relations. The Supreme Court also directed the re-instatement of the herein eight (8)
petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re-instated, minus one day’s pay and whatever earnings they might have realized
from other sources during their separation from the service.
PETITIONERS: BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
PONENTE: VITUG, J.

Facts:

Separate Opinions: PADILLA, J., dissenting: I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No.
96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status
quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations
involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by
the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private
respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate
(Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what
count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is
transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into
and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.
PLAINTIFF: EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO
DEFENDANT: VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
PONENTE: STREET, J.

Facts: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng secured a debt with various parcels of real property in Manila. The debt amounted to P218,294.10 at 8% per
annum, payable quarterly. Property's estimated value was about P292,558. After the instrument's execution, mortgagor returned to Amoy, China and
died on January 29, 1810. The foreclosure proceeding needed publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Publication was
made in a newspaper of Manila and an order of the court deposited in the post office in a stamped envelope of the summons and complaint directed
to defendant. The clerk, however, failed to comply with the mail publication requirement.
The bank was able to foreclose the property without the defendant.
After seven years, the administrator of the estate, Vicente Palanca, appeared and requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908,
and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the
motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action. His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal.
His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the procedural aspect of the right to due process has been prejudiced.

Held: xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant
must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the
proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer
this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence
is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the
owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to
protect it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The
periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight.
Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which
it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the
mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's
residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be
considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this:
Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be
affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute denial of due process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is
not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment
in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our
opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or
as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has
jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction,
there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of
due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law
thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly
unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect
upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these
proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law has not been infringed.

Separate Opinion: MALCOLM, J., dissenting: I dissent. It will not make me long to state my reasons. An immutable attribute — the fundamental
idea — of due process of law is that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity of being heard in his
defense. Protection of the parties demands a strict and an exact compliance with this constitutional provision in our organic law and of the statutory
provisions in amplification. Literally hundreds of precedents could be cited in support of these axiomatic principles. Where as in the instant case the
defendant received no notice and had no opportunity to be heard, certainly we cannot say that there is due process of law. Resultantly, "A judgment
which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of vitality is a dead limb upon the
judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so to do exists. It can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but is a constant menace to the defendant."
(Mills vs. Dickons, 6 Rich [S. C.], 487.)
PETITIONERS: HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor. DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO of Pasig, Rizal; THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PNP P/SR. SUPT. RICARDO F. DE LEON, Camp Commander and Head of the PNP Custodial Group, Camp
Crame, Cubao, Quezon City
G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.

Facts:
COPMPLAINANTS: STATE PROSECUTORS
RESPONDENTS: JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
PER CURIAM

Facts: Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C.
Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the
Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the
judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.

The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed
the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.

The petitioners stressed that this is not just a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge
in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least
giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

Moreover, Petitioner’s alleged that the judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the
President in the newspaper (Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe)which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the
law.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the
foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

Held: YES. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable
demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and
it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident
order of dismissal was issued.

When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent judge admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353
thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public
knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge
where the personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by the law where
the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and
one that involves unquestioned demonstration.

This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua
sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic
opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed with more than ordinary credentials and
qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of
Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would
want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof.

The SC cited several cases where judges were ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law and
the Court after considering such premises, it thus, finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

Separate Opinion: DISSENTING OPINION: BELLOSILLO, J.:

In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or discipline for their official acts, even if clearly
erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision may seem so erroneous as
to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a case against
the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence
requirement, might become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the inferences to be drawn from an
erroneous decision.

In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that -

. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to exercise his judgment or discretion is not criminally liable
for any error he commits provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be held
administratively responsible . . . for no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
 infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be
nothing short of harassment or would make his position unbearable.

A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good
faith. He cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. As a matter of
public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts are erroneous. It is a general principle of the highest importance to proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity
rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary." This being settled doctrine, there is
no choice but to apply it to the instant case.

In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt
intent to do a disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the records that the respondent's
assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a deliberate twisting of facts
to justify the assailed order, dismissal of respondent judge from the service is not proper.

Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail the independence of judges and send the wrong signals to them who are
supposed to exercise their office without fear of reprisal, merely for expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain eventual
justice only after costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but these are necessary evils which must be endured to some extent lest
judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.

Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his decisions must brave the loneliness of his
solitude and independence. And, while this Court may slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession,
it must also step forward and take the lead to defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only the magistrate on trial
but the entire judicial system as well. As champion — at other times tormentor — of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the
judiciary of unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which serve no other purpose than to harass them. In
dismissing judges from the service, the Court must be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent judgments handed
down in good faith.

Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials which, experience shows, are no longer easy to recruit for the judicial service.
Above all, he has served the judiciary with creditable distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic evidence of bad faith and then
shatter his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.

I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.