1

SECTION 2 - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP)
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND

PADILLA, J.

Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter
of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region.1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning
the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their
safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several
occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up
without a court order or search warrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or
seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a
citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are
not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right
against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.

Issue: Whether or not military and police check points violates their constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures

Ruling: No. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures
to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take
judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
 2

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner,
that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from
a consideration of the circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant
by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount
to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether
there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Hence, petition dismissed.

G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990

EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, et. Al.

vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers represented
by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.

The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers
and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that they have a common or general interest in the
preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human rights and the reign of peace and order in their communities.
They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before this Court."

The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petition contending inter alia that petitioners
lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action. According to the
petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted in Metro Manila:

1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, 7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension,
Kagitingan, and Magdalena Streets, Tondo, Manila. Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.

2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street,
Panday Pira Extension and San Sebastian Street,
Tondo, Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street,
Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00
AM in six blocks along Aroma Beach up to Happy Land,
Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension,
Quirino Street, and Pacheco Street, Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-
dagatan Navotas, Metro Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz
Compound, Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street,
Tondo, Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive,
Manila International Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila.
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower
Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
 3

According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the
military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the
July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on
November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a
common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged that the following were committed:

1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead
of the night or early morning hours, police and military
units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest
cordon an area of more than one residence and
sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in
Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep
by banging on the walls and windows of their homes,
shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in
the process), and then ordering the residents within to
come out of their respective residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are
herded like cows, the men are ordered to strip down to
their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other
imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are
being conducted by the raiders, some of the members
of the raiding team force their way into each and every
house within the cordoned off area and then proceed
to conduct search of the said houses without civilian
witnesses from the neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have complained
that the raiders ransack their homes, tossing about the
residents' belongings without total regard for their
value. In several instances, walls are destroyed,
ceilings are damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish'
for incriminating evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have
complained with increasing frequency that their money
and valuables have disappeared after the said
operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these
illegal and unwelcome intrusions are arrested on the
spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take them
to detention centers where they are interrogated and
'verified.' These arrests are all conducted without any
warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the
conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some
hooded men are used to fingerpoint suspected
subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released
after the expiration of the period wherein they can be
legally detained without any charge at all. In other
instances, some arrested persons are released without
charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons
and point them at the residents during these illegal
operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-
spotbeatings, maulings and maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by
the raiders are subjected to mental and physical torture
to extract confessions and tactical information. (Rollo,
pp. 2-4)

The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as their Memorandum after the
petition was given due course. First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second,
they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.

First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege that the
accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.

Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is
concerned, the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17
of the Constitution which provides:
The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied )
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which
provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

Issue: Whether or not the police action, "areal target zonings" or saturation drives", described by the petitioners would
be illegal and blatantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
 4

Ruling: No. If the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements,
such drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such actions.

There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the
Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which would
bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy
in the name of security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights.
The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the
left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still
be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which are
their distinguishing features. It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is impermissible and which
should be prohibited. Rather, it is the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which "offend even
hardened sensibilities."

The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements particularly
because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the
communities where the "drives" were conducted.

It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or criminal
activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There
is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the
rights of squatter and low income families are fully protected.

Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to
stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of
the individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition where the
petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the thousands of
alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the
Court is convinced that the event actually happened.

The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged
pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal
verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted by the
respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses.
However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing
wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent
demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the
rights of people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit
all police actions to one on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific
individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices
because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.

The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim complains
and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the
executive departments and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events
cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court
as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an
orderly procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed. If our policy makers sustain the contention of
the military and the police that occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of government and
to insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved,
they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying violators is necessary.
 5

The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference should bring together the
heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies
and institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.

Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted.
In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time.
Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard look by administration officials at the policy implications of
the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
ANDRE MARTI

BIDIN, J.

Facts: On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes,
went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila,
carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes)
attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number,
the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052
Zurich, Switzerland"

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused,
assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In
view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages
were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom
and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment.

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and
husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers
and took several grams of the contents thereof

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of
the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by
the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office.
Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents,
opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried
marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package
contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was
also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars
 6

The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being
the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987,
appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to
the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering
tops as certified by the forensic chemist.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized objects
contained in the four parcels

Ruling: No. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the
same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence
later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.

The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument
stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery
of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI
and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the
shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and
seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be
emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of
either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven
v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The
modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search
and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private
 7

individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

[G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.]

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN
v.
HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO,
JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE

VILLAMOR, J.

Facts: On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for
violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein
respondents, to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.

In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: respondent Vera’s
aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon;
an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished
but still unsigned by respondent Judge.

At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent
Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent
Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the
oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s
deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.

Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners
at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on
the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.

On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant
be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the
search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally,
damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the
petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing
the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was validly issued

 8

Ruling: No.

1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant
(respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainant’s application
for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent
Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for
determining whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem
to have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge
were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic
notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case in the court below
shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court,
took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by
Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was
through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness
Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions.
Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209."
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is
the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The
second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec.
208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a
return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon).
Even in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a),
53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on
Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not
applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation
of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent than real, because
it was precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of
Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the phrase
"in connection with one specific offense," and adding the sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that
this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense.’"

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books,
customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory
notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business
records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."cralaw virtua1aw library

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.

The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as claimed by petitioners — at least
partly — as in effect admitted by respondents — based on the documents seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-
 9

M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half months after the search and
seizure on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis for the
assessments. Those assessments should therefore not be enforced.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent
Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said search warrant; the
documents, papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments
mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and
effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal
or other proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal
Court of Quezon City

CONCEPCION, C.J.

Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different
dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were
officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with
the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors,
their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the
documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3)
 10

that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution
dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized
from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards
the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since
the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate
to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by
one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional
rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if
any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows,
therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was
taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect,
restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid
or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things
may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. 1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
 11

Issue: Whether ot not the search warrant issued is valid

Ruling: No. Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant
has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not
lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners
allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in
said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations
above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession
and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned
records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or
amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962.
In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of
alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of
the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962,
are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and
other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the
writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places,
offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered
 12

PROBABLE CAUSE

G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937

NARCISO ALVAREZ
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD

IMPERIAL, J.

Facts: The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering
the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents and
papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date,
authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and
prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice,
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit
alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious
rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that
his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition,
ordering the search of the petitioner's house at nay time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents
above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said
warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the
night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years
1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two
memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories,
two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages
of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers
many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The search for and a seizure of said articles were
made with the opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents
seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued
the search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that the agent Emilio
L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of
court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the
court issued an order directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within twenty-four hours from the
receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court. On June 10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed
a motion praying that the order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to
retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation. The attorney for the petitioner,
on June 20th, filed another motion alleging that, notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said month, the officials of the
Anti-Usury Board had failed to deposit the articles seized by them and praying that a search warrant be issued, that
the sheriff be ordered to take all the articles into his custody and deposit of the Anti-Usury Board be punished for
contempt of court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an ex parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L. Siongco
had deposited some documents and papers in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to file an inventory
duly verified by oath of all the documents seized by him, to return the search warrant together with the affidavit it
presented in support thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings taken by him; and prayed that said agent be
directed to filed the documents in question immediately. On the 25th of said month the court issued an order requiring
agent Emilio L. Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings
taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the
attorney for the petitioner filed another petition alleging that the search warrant issue was illegal and that it had nit yet
been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be
 13

cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to the petitioner, that the agent who
seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On
September 10, 1936, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in
accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled, and that
agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the
chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show case, if any, within the unextendible period of two (2) days from the
date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to
the petitioner. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the
reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation of
the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by the petitioner. In view of the opposition of the attorney for the
petitioner, the court, on September 25th, issued an order requiring the Anti-Usury Board to specify the time needed
by it to examine the documents and papers seized and which of them should be retained, granting it a period of five
(5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said month the assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying
that he be granted ten (10) days to comply with the order of September 25th and that the clerk of court be ordered to
return to him all the documents and papers together with the inventory thereof. The court, in an order of October 2d
of said year, granted him the additional period of ten(10) days and ordered the clerk of court to send him a copy of
the inventory. On October 10th, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed sixty (60) days to
examine the documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 1016,
23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of sixty
(60) days. In an order of October 16th, the court granted him the period of sixty (60) days to investigate said nineteen
(19) documents. The petitioner alleges, and it is not denied by the respondents, that these nineteen (19)documents
continue in the possession of the court, the rest having been returned to said petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the requirements to find probable cause was sufficiently made by the judge

Ruling: No. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed
by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court (section 95, General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all
the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and
scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson,
38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to
search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basis principles of government (People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant
or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in
proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding
or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically
denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of
criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the
respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such
was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient
inventory furnished him by the agents.

Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie because he can appeal
from the orders which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his petition. Section 222 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in fact provides that mandamus will not issue when there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. We are of the opinion, however, that an appeal from said orders would have to lapse
before he recovers possession of the documents and before the rights, of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are
restored to him (Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6 Phil., 426; Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz Herrera
de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14 Phil., 641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).

Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:

 14

1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search and seizure, should
be given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the constitutional guaranties whole
and in their full force;

2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict the enjoyment of
the ownership, possession and use of the personal property of the individual, they should be strictly construed;

3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based
solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and
(b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the
criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;

4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in the affidavit that
the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could the search and
seizure be made at night;

5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a
complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts, when the applicant's or
complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of other
witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists;

6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is necessary,
but whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, but is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue;

7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or settlement
attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search and seizure; and

8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not be an effective,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently, the petition for mandamus filed
by him, lies.

For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of the respondent
court authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are declared illegal and are set aside, and it is ordered that
the judge presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas direct the immediate return to the petitioner of the
nineteen (19) documents designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25,26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
ET AL.

ESCOLIN, J.
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-
Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged
 15

to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the
aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this
manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court without
having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before
impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court
that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search
of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The
existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the
words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever
the purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that
while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only
on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated
by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly
keeping and concealing the articles listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services,
Inc. were seized although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles, instruments, etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they conducted surveillance of the premises
could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause.

Issue: Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of search warrant

Ruling: No. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of
probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In
mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less
 16

than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being
used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion
of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of
the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further,
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating
with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will
not suffice.

PERSONAL DETERMINATION

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS

vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35,
UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process
when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still
under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional
rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the
President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through
the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining
the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have
been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process
of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance
of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
 17

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced
petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance
of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
cannot be sustained.

Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under
the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit,
as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the
trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press
freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as
to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
 18

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to
maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the
Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

G.R. No. 81756 October 21, 1991

NICOMEDES SILVA @ " Comedes", MARLON SILVA, @ "Tama" and ANTONIETA SILVA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, BRANCH XXXIII,
DUMAGUETE CITY

FERNAN, C.J
Facts: On June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City,
Negros Oriental, filed an "Application for Search Warrant" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete
City against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva. 1 This application was accompanied by a
"Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo, also dated June 13, 1986. 2
On the same day, Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII,
Dumaguete City, pursuant to the said "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", issued Search
Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the
residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended. Pertinent portions of Search Warrant No. 1 read as follows: prLL
"It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining oath (sic) MSGT. Ranulfo T.
Villamor, Jr. and his witnesses (sic) Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo that there is
probable cause to believe that possession and control of Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes,
joint has been committed or is about to be committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons
to believe that marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control at Tama's
Room (Rgt. side 1st Floor) located at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay, Neg. Or. which is/are:
"X (Subject of the offense stated above
(Stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense;
"X (Used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense.
"You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day
(night) of the room of Tama Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open (sic) aparadors,
lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and take possession of the following
property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring the said property to the undersigned to
be dealt with as the law directs." 3
In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the
amount of P1,231.40.
On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds that the search
warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers
failed or refused to make a return of the said search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. 4
Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order dated July 1, 1986, stating that the court "holds in abeyance the
disposition of the said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search
warrant." 5
On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it was issued on
the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which were
accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and
witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 6
 19

On August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Eugenio M. Cruz, who, by then, had replaced
retired Judge Ontal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit, finding the requisites necessary for the
issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied with.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is validly issued by Judge Ontal
Ruling: No. In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the "Application
for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal
requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in
order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and
Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part,
suggestive questions answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon.

The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded to
the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all
that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.

Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that
he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta
Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the
warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search
warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used
as means of committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of
the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of
petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money. Petition granted.

G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991

VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM

vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate
Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr.
and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were
attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived
the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.

An investigation of the incident then followed.

Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of
the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners
in G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim
and Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that:
 20

. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary
examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles,
Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana
Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R.
Nos. 94054-57)

xxx xxx xxx

In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of P200,000.00 as
bail for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.

Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of bail which was granted by the
court and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of P150,000.00 each. Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest
of the accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.

On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261) pages were transmitted
to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the
case.

On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against
the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only
be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four
victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H",
Comment of Fiscal Alfane, p. 186, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57) A motion to reconsider the Resolution filed by
petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim was denied.

On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of
murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.

On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of
venue. (Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-90)

Issue: Whether or not a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying
solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest

Ruling: There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where there is no
duplication of work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in
metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over
the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of
applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial
functions.

At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires ". . . probable
cause to be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or person.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation
are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the
existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not
possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent
 21

Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence.
However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these
should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each
case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge
1âwphi1

has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It
can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.

It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent Judge documents
of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. Although, the
general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new
trial (Tan Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA
298 [1972]) the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over
the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the
concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General
recognized the significance of the recantations of some witnesses when he recommends a reinvestigation of the
cases, to wit:

It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition are affidavits of
recantation subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano and an affidavit executed by one,
Camilo Sanano, father of the complainant's witnesses, Renato and Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the
strength of these earlier written statements of these witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate found
the existence of a prima facie case against petitioners and accordingly recommended the filing of a Criminal
Information. Evidently, the same written statements were also the very basis of the "Fiscal's Certification",
since the attached affidavits of recantation were not yet then available. Since the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses is now assailed and put in issue and, since the petitioners have not yet been arraigned, it would be
to the broader interest of justice and fair play if a reinvestigation of this case be had to secure the petitioners
against hasty prosecution and to protect them from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive trials (Salonga
v. Paño G.R. No. 59524, February 18,1985). (Rollo of G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)

We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence
earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and
is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before
him, he issues a warrant of arrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and
issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S.
Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.
The Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made
PERMANENT. SO ORDERED.
 22

G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984

SORIANO MATA
vs.
HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc, BERNARDO
GOLES and REYNALDO MAYOTE
DE CASTRO, J
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner
for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on
the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged
subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure
on the part of respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to
the records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306,
the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by
"selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." 1
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the
said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same,
so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it
is with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. prcd
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was
denied by respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of
352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that
documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of
no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.
2 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to this Court, with
the instant petition, praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the
articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the
matter.
We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules
of Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of
the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid. cdll
The judge's insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioner's
claim that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance of the
questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the
records, he did not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier,
 23

before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished,
upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do
not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit
obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes
more confirmed by respondent Judge's own admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the
applicants, that "she did not take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold
a judicial proceeding which will be open and public", 3 such that, according to her, the persons subject of the
intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may,
there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory
prohibition heretofore quoted.
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures every man,
woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her action. She
claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to
conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court room.
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe
any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is
limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or
hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or
affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross
interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching questions propounded to the applicants
of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as
long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the
applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in
public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or
investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must
be under oath and must be in writing. LexLib
The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal
requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:
"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential
to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of
his private affairs, books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to
search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government." 6
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution
and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. 7 No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. 8
While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered. In
Castro vs. Pabalan, 9 it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things
seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979 denying the motion to annul
the search warrant as well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby
reversed, the search warrant, being declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such illegality, the things seized
under such warrant, such as stock of "masiao" tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money; control pad or "masiao"
numbers; stamping pad with rubber stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai," cannot be returned as sought by
petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 24

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION

G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988

20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE LEDESMA

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts: In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel
sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection
with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all
over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which
constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property).

Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the
private respondents. The applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132.

On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants.

Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized
the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with the private respondents.

Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by the private respondents, the lower
court issued an order dated October 8, 1985, lifting the three (3) search warrants issued earlier against the private
respondents by the court. The dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that Search Warrants Nos. SW- 85-024; issued against
Eduardo M. Barreto of the Junction Video, etc., Paranaque, Metro Manila; SW No. 85-025, issued
against Raul M. Sagullo of South Video Bug Center, Inc., etc., also of No. 5355 Pres. Avenue BF
Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila; and SW No. 85-026, issued against Fortune A. Ledesma of Sonix
Video Services of San Antonio Plaza, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, be lifted.

Consequently, the articles listed in the returns of the three search warrants which could not be a basis
of any criminal prosecution, now in the possession of the National Bureau of Investigation which under
the law must be delivered to this Court, but which the NBI failed to do, are hereby ordered to be
returned to their owners through their lawyer, Atty. Benito Salazar or his agents or representatives,
against proper receipt, to be forwarded to this Court for record purposes, as proof that said properties
have been returned to the possession of the rightful owners." (p. 34, Rollo)

The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner in its order dated January 2, 1986.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the October 8, 1985 and January 2, 1986
orders of the lower court. The petition was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is valid

Ruling: No. The government's right to issue search warrants against a citizen's papers and effects is circumscribed
by the requirements mandated in the searches and seizures provision of the Constitution. In the instant case, the
lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private respondents on the ground that it acted on
the application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI
 25

and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower
court stated in its questioned order dated January 2,1986:

According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the application for the three
search warrants testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated
that the counsel or representative of the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video
cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The
witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated without stating the manner it was pirated
and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge of that fact.

On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated tapes was from master
tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because, according to him, it is of his personal
knowledge.

At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that
when the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the allegedly pirated
tapes were shown to him and he made comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man
Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown
to the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bare statement of the
NBI agent on the witness stand. "

Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under PD
49, the copyright infringement law, and although what is required for the issuance thereof is merely
the presence of probable cause, that probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time-
honored precept that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our laws should be
interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of the alleged offender.

xxx xxx xxx

This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of
Rights in our 1973 Constitution.

So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were
compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the respondents' establishments, it should
be dismissed as not supported by competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause hovers
in that grey debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of respondents herein.

But the glaring fact is that 'Cocoon,' the first video tape mentioned in the search warrant, was not even
duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of Opposition p. 152 record). So, that
lacking in the requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison
with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents,
there was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the film of the
complainant Twentieth Century Fox." (pp. 37-39, Rollo)

xxx xxx xxx

The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the
private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have
personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the
private respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of
the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not
give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not
shown to the court during the application.
 26

All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it lifted the three questioned search warrants.
There is no truth, therefore, to the petitioner's allegation that the lower court based its January 2, 1986 order only "on
the fact that the original or master copies of the copyrighted films were not presented during the application for search
warrants, thus leading it to conclude that it had been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses." (p. 17, Rollo)

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was
necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause
exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or
copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.

The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of much needed revenues but is also an
indication of the widespread breakdown of national order and discipline. Courts should not impose any unnecessary
roadblocks in the way of the anti-film piracy campaign. However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional
safeguards. To say that the problem of pirated films can be solved only by the use of unconstitutional shortcuts is to
denigrate the long history and experience behind the searches and seizures clause of the Bill of Rights. The trial court
did not commit reversible error.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F.
APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS
ALTUNA

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

Facts: The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated.
The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.

1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the
accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison,
et al." She was then still at large.

2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group
(CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of
petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen
issued against NOLASCO.

3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The
stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however,
respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.

4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from
respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No.
 27

239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:

(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque,
Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was
Branch 88.

(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno
to Judge Paño.

(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by
Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal
knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA
and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for
rebellion. 1

5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:

(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably
without a warrant of arrest.

(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2
wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3

(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was made in
the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was
made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed
by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.

6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before
the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."

(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.

(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE
and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.

7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter
alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that are
presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5

(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return, which
AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to
the Search Warrant.

(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall
be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."
 28

8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying
that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the
Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity
of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the
Order of Judge Paño of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is a general warrant

Ruling: Yes. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to
make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to
the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding
what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the
nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring the particular description of the things
to be seized.

Moreover, the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant
thereof.

u Out of the 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th pertain to Identity.
u The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions.
u The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search
Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity.

The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of the said witness. Mere
generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may
issue. The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person
who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the
arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of
the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of
general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises
which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's
interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13

Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the
warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general
vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the
opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this,
for possible effective results in the interest of public order.

Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the
Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission
No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby made
permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as
evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to
petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all
irrelevant documents and articles. SO ORDERED.
 29

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT

PADILLA, J.

Facts: In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the
accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case
No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a
tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following
day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.

At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch
the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City,
then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took
a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer
of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs.2

The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint
at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region.

At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who
was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to
be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply,
the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be
a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped
to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
 30

Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling
the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was
only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain
hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the
same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a
derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search
of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and
that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple
whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but
because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take
charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other Identification papers,
he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his passport,
return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside
the bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get
off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence
to accused's defense.

The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise
such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not
inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2)
months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling
bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure

Ruling: Yes. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
person: the person to be arrested has committed it; and

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporary
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another”

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by
the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely
under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
 31

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way
to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian
travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search
warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located
at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on
information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an
informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused
was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the
officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to
present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed
to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an
innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required
to do so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession,
plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM
officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these
circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects
of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and
in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the
two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's
own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of
the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances,
would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69803. January 30, 1987

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO

v.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. SERGIO F.
APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS
ALTUNA

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

For resolution are petitioners’ and public respondents’ respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration of this Court’s
Decision of October 8, 1985, which decreed that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from
 32

introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents Case hereby made
permanent, the personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction
as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military Commission No. 1, without prejudice to
petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all
irrelevant documents and articles." (Rollo, p. 154; 139 SCRA 165)

In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, public respondents maintain that the subject Search Warrant meets the
standards for validity and that it should be considered in the context of the criminal offense of Rebellion for which the
Warrant was issued, the documents to establish which are less susceptible of particularization since the offense
does not involve an isolated act or transaction.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In their own Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners assail that portion of the Decision holding that, in so far
as petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque is concerned, the search made in her premises was incident to her arrest and could
be made without a search warrant. Petitioners submit that a warrantless search can be justified only if it is an
incident to a lawful arrest and that since Mila Aguilar was not lawfully arrested a search without warrant could not be
made.

On April 10, 1986, we required the parties to MOVE in the premises considering the supervening events, including
the change of administration that have transpired, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Rule 3 in so far as
the public respondents are concerned (which requires the successor official to state whether or not he maintains the
action and position taken by his predecessor-in-office).

In their Compliance, petitioners maintain that the arrest of petitioners and the search of their premises thereafter are
both illegal and that the personalities seized should be ordered returned to their owners.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of public respondents, "in deference to the dissenting opinion of then Supreme
Court Justice (now Chief Justice) Claudio Teehankee," now offer no further objection to a declaration that the
subject search is illegal and to the return of the seized items to the petitioners. Respondents state, however, that
they cannot agree to having the arrest of petitioners declared illegal.

The pertinent portion of the dissenting opinion referred to reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court’s decision as a general
warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that ‘the right of the people to be secure on their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated’ (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally
obtained evidence: ‘Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding’ (Sec. 4[21). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by
historical experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of
state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is
beyond the power of the courts to change or modify.

"All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any
of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman v. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09,
August 30, 1985) . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

ACCORDINGLY, considering the respective positions now taken by the parties, petitioners’ Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of October 8, 1985 is GRANTED, and the dispositive portion thereof is
hereby revised to read as follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents Case hereby made
permanent. The personalities seized by virtue of the illegal Search Warrant are hereby ordered returned to
petitioners. SO ORDERED.
 33

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU

ROMERO, J.
Facts: On 14 December 1989, the accused sold 2 wrappers containing marijuana leaves to Sgt. Amado Ani in a buy-
bust operation in Zamboanga City.
The said buy-bust operation was planned since a civilian informer told that Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana and therefore, a test-buy was conducted the day prior to the said buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust
operation, after Sgt. Ani handed the money to Musa, Musa entered his house to get the wrappings. Upon his return
and with the inspection of the wrappings, Musa was arrested, but the marked money used as payment cannot be
found with him, prompting the NARCOM agents to go inside his house. There, they could not find the marked money,
but they found more marijuana leaves hidden in a plastic bag inside the kitchen.
The leaves were confirmed as marijuana by the forensic chemist of the PC crime laboratory, who later on served as
a witness, along with T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-bust operation and Sgt. Ani.
The defense gave a different version of what happened on 14 December 1989 wherein he and his wife, Ahara Musa,
served as witnesses. They said that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside their house since the
door was open, and upon entering, declared that they were NARCOM agents and searched the house, despite
demands of the couple for a search warrant. The agents found a red bag whose contents were unknown to the Musas.
Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court.
On appeal, Musa contests that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He also questioned the credibility
of the witnesses, as well as the admissibility of the seized plastic bag as evidence since it violates his constitutional
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures provided in Art. III, Sec. 2.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible
as evidence.

Ruling: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless
search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view"
doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where
a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the
doctrine:

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.46
 34

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify
the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the
marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag
in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify
its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic
bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and
from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious
intention of fishing for more evidence.

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as
to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they
opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's
eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag
had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic
bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent
from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.48

We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the
marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article
III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other
pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga
and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the
appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

”STOP AND FRISK”

Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1

Argued December 12, 1967 Decided June 10, 1968

A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years, observed two
strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth
along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each
completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined
by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them
and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three,
identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden
spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove,
a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered
the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a
revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he
discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments
until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution
 35

theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to
suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that petitioner
and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for his own protection,
had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court
distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons
and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court
affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional
question" was involved.

Held:

1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places," and therefore applies as much to the citizen on the streets as
well as at home or elsewhere. Pp. 392 U. S. 8-9.

2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of
the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. P. 392 U. S. 12.

3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate and restrained police
investigative techniques, and this Court's approval of such techniques should not discourage remedies other than the
exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective sanction. Pp. 392 U.S. 13-15.

4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed here. Pp. 392 U. S. 16-20.

(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16.

(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find weapons is a "search" under
that Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16.

5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or
that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person believed by him to be
armed and dangerous

Page 392 U. S. 3

regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the
individual is armed. Pp. 392 U. S. 20-27.

(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure
cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat is required.
P. 392 U. S. 20.

(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances
against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the action taken was
appropriate. Pp. 392 U. S. 21-22.

(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating suspicious conduct when he decided to
approach petitioner and his companions. P. 392 U. S. 22.

(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take necessary measures to determine whether that person is
carrying a weapon. P. 392 U. S. 24.
 36

(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
of the situation. Pp. 392 U. S. 25-26.

(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable apprehension of danger before being
possessed of information justifying arrest. Pp. 392 U. S. 26-27.

6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the limited search which he made were
reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. Pp. 392 U. S. 27-30.

(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's hypothesis that they were
contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. P. 392 U. S. 28.

(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the men were armed,
and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to
ascertaining the presence of weapons. Pp. 392 U. S. 29-30.

7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence against him, since the search which led to
its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 392 U. S. 30-31.

Affirmed.