G.R. No.

91649 May 14, 1991

Basco
v.
PAGCOR

FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the
government, “ to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized
by existing franchise or permitted by law.” This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the
government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the
cash-strapped Government.

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and public order, among others.

ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;

2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that the
exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy;

3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR
while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and

4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and crony
economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:
1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the prohibition of
gambling does not mean that the government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power,
wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare.

2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its
charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments have no power
to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does
not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate.

4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political branches of
government and the people themselves as the repository of all state power.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds raised by petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 199439 April 22, 2014
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R. ANTONINO-
CUSTODIO Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:

NATURE:
This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by the city of General Santos asking to find grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Commission on Audit (COA).which affirmed the findings of its Legal Services Sector in its Opinion
No. 2010-021 declaring Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as illegal.

FACTS:
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and regulations, designed "to
entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein
by way of early retirement package."6
This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not contested by respondent
Commission on Audit.

In response to the endorsement of the city audit team leader, respondent Commission’s regional director agreed that
the grant lacked legal basis and was contrary to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He
forwarded the matter to respondent Commission’s Office of General Counsel, Legal Services Sector.
The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. Respondent Commission on Audit observed
that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and
approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor. 26 Moreover, nowhere in Section
76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does it provide a specific power for
local government units to establish an early retirement program.

ISSUE:
WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
CONSIDERED ORDINANCE NO. 08, SERIES OF 2009, IN THE NATURE OF AN EARLY RETIREMENT
PROGRAM REQUIRING A LAW AUTHORIZING IT FOR ITS VALIDITY

HELD:
The Court agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as the invalidity of Section 5 of the ordinance
is concerned.
Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and
PAG-IBIG Benefits – Any personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be entitled
to whatever retirement benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government employee.
Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement incentive provided under this program at the rate of
one and one-half (1 1/2) months of the employee’s latest basic salary for every year of service in the City
Government.9
Section 5 refers to an "early retirement incentive," the amount of which is pegged on the beneficiary’s years of service
in the city government. The ordinance provides that only those who have rendered service to the city government for
at least 15 years may apply.75 Consequently, this provision falls under the definition of a retirement benefit. Applying
the definition in Conte, it is a form of reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to the city government, and it is
intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his or her life by lessening his or her financial worries.
Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan –
other than the GSIS – for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous
proliferation of such plans. x x x. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other
government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such
"financial assistance.71

The Court declares Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Commission on Audit decision dated January 20,
2011 and resolution dated October 17, 2011 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as Section 6 of Ordinance
No. 08, series of 2009, as amended by Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, is declared as VALID.
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

Ganzon
v.
Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local
Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the
said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of
authority and grave misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to
suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through
the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution
contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority
because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary
authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that
the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan,
found little difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a
legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively,
and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon
is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all
intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Limbona vs. Mangelin

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner
accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no
session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on
November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from
his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he
was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from
the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed
a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become
"moot and academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is
the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization

of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only
to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is
subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If
the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond
the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our
jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power).
PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of
the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by
direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still
invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled
matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that
a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under
the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good
faith.
Disomangcop v. Datumanong-444 SCRA 203 [2004]

FACTS:

Respondents also contend that the petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing to assail theconstitutionality of
the law and the department order. They note that petitioners have no personalstake in the outcome of the
controversy.

Petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer IV. When he filed this petition, he wasthe Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur. On the other
hand, petitioner Dimalotang is an Engineer II and President of the rank andfile employees also of the
First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Both are charged with the duty and responsibility of
supervising and implementing all public works projects to beundertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is
the area of their jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners has legal standing to institute the suit;

RULING: the creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the
creation of an appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed
under R.A. 8999will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As
the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their
duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the
enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the
validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.

MAIN POINT: The party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.

But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court
has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity
as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S.
LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating
hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC
prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its
ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of
police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial
establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent
of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of
the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights
a violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community.
Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the
means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be achieved through means less
restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and
transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a
motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a
house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable
regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may
exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In
other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference
itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to
“wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds
of business allowable within the area.” The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an
“allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the
Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for
use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the
Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of
police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such
property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be
destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of
local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular
taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as
this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid.
The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does
not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community.”
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying
out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These
lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for
the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the
purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not
outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the
Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in
prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare.
The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of
such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it
may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement
without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by
MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the
establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard,
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an
ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must
not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and
explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no
power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.