1. A.C. No.

L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement;
but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing
circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations
were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of
the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
2. G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion
filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1One of the grounds for such a
motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on
Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The
denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was
due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case."2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had
already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former
category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It
cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could
ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is,
however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken
seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of
them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the
responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he
continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not
now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain
in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he
commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case
pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did
respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficiofor the two
defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed
to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require
full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent
him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of
November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he
instituted this certiorariproceeding.3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw
as counsel de oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly
committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of
Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which
reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October
15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without
the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution
there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest,
the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election
Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed
today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused,
he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements
on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February
11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964."4 Reference was
then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma,
alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9,
1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been
postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way
from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility
between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as
an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served
by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution
has already rested its case."6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation
as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession,
being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come
as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even
more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere
trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so
designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7"There is need anew
in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the
bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not
a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of
the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de
oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing
matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance
possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either
to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must
be fulfilled."8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent was de oficio
counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its
officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when
negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of
criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11 reiterated such a view in these
words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de
oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself.
Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in
behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-
defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer
who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience
and a little less of self-interest."12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension
that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the
welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered
nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in
these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no
skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise
an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid
of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present Constitution is even more
emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence."16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an
accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted
to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar.
Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and
in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed,
considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to
perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as
to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever
timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of
them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner

3. G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office
in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was
rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the
defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña
Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239
of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties
by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on
2 January 1926. Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly
and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in
the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro
legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo
en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino
Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a
nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores,
la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera
el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o
medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor
impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare
persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI
pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica,
Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al
Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death
in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first
died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies
and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they
are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano
Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February
1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui
pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The
next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no
prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the
demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui
later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another
one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances
would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age
may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds
the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a
member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui,
on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957
(administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960,
about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of
donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a
strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor
of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means
not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after
due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined
as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de
la Lengua Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as
follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra,
los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos
legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed
and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers
of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being
his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little
to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an
applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however,
possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be
shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil
Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were
allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required
possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect
to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a
doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act
No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of
said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and
incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it
that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of
the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be
presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a
distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to
the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his
office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant
was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is
also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office
of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less
than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of
the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the
public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant
must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral
character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the
applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge
for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p.
443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding
the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for
reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the
court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney &
Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good moral
character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit
and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his
mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and
the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications.
(7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the
office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation
as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to
the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were
wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section
216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to
hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On
January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and
Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance
upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further
proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as
indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui
continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui
accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he
informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the
previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of
the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had
taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office
before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2
March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the
position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was
referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950
(op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff,
not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the
Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The
Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had,
as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of
recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party
complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of
the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he
was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon
afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it
said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive
Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The
motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of
appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as
party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954.
Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540),
which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the
appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties,
who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in
quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying
the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was
issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action
in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid
motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the
Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor,
pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of
Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his
acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue
as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July
1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion
of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an
action — all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule
that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold
the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after
31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period.
And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in
September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his
own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be
counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v.
Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson
of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed
of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son
of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o
incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola
persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo
de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo
Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are
otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the
administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed,
in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui,
who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente
Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of
the deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed
and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs
equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

4. A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a DistrictCourt, Marawi City, respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa
& Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments
by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply
Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate
the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your
Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de
Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void
ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded
to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by
the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I
am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said
onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your
sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore
no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words,
"Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed. On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also
wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing
loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00
a month. Among other things, he said: . . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I
hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into between me
and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated
by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no
meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me. And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi. Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the
NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same
reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of
deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms.
Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance
Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the
contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa &
Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the
letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD
26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing
his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular
and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice,
or be appropriately desciplined (sic) ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court.2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge,
the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the
result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk
of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family
. . ."4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within
the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying
his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted
with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the
envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the
comment as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of
the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail
of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous"
with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or
the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does
not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she
would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;
despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of
his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day,
she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract
with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding
the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of
which he ever saw.
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations."
and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the
fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996,
he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . .
(his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his)
will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense
of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who
had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees .
. at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than
once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all
times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep
the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy,
or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely
— to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The
law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court,
Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers.
As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing,
or otherwise improper. 20As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he
had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors,"
in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree
in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only
who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title
of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety
or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
5. A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979
SANTA PANGAN, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio
Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979,
the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for
postponement. These motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he
had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v.
Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused
in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila."
Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection
with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate
(Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his
other given name and maternal surname.
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is
"Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name
other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an officer
in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and
frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every
stage. This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth.
In representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos",
respondent has violated his solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. These
injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated
in a case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case,
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office
,when he resorts to deception or permits his client to do so." 2
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was
authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first
aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspencion
or disbarment from the practice of law.
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court
is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request
of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U.
Lontoc, is hereby granted. SO ORDERED
6. B.M. No. 1222 April 24, 2009
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by
petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and
compassion, grant petitioner’s plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement
as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the
dispositive portion of which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby
resolves to —
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;
xxxx
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar
Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of
Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law
during the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating
Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions from
the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner
in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the
petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father’s childhood dream
to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure
the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of
rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when
he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City.
During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and
eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the
President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here,
he spearheaded various activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well as
the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed
to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his
graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a
Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered
free legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal
assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez
Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and
developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued to render free legal services to
his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing career was cut short as
he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the
2003 Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather
unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a
consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the
Secretariat of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner
concentrated mainly on rendering public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately,
compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the
investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took personal responsibility
for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well
as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling
experience to make him a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and
endorsements of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De
Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be
Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated 4 June 2007 of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;
2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong
Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association,
Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran
at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga
Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast People’s Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong
Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc.
(SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran
at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga
Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek,
Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong
Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI)
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan
ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of
Taguig;
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman
as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine
Bar" dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law
Offices;
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly
Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas,
Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;
7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern
University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong
Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA)
kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga
Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran,
Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of Danilo
G. De Guzman to the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig City, Attesting to his
Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other Purposes"
dated 11 July 2008 of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of Danilo
G. De Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San
Sebastian College – Recoletos;
11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De
Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of
Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High School,
Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig
Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and
14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice, Court
of Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).
Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness
and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually
foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the
Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable
M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two
years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was
affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.
xxxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court,
we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the
respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the
limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly
ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged
to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may
be applied in the instant case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
xxxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No.
2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five (5)
years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a
promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court stripping off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as
attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in
the community and society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense
desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several
social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which
could be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue
extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This only proves petitioner’s
strength of character and positive moral fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the examination questions from
Atty. Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and which questions later
turned out to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations,
is not at all commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause
the damage that his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the
integrity of the bar examinations as well as of this Court.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his
transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations,
the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however,
that petitioner had already been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be
considered as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume
practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant
Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO
G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which
suspension is considered as served in view of the petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence,
petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part.1avvphi1.zw+ We
deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years
suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his
disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.2 While the
Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.3
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed
on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer4 and the conduct
of his public life during his years outside of the bar.5 For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:
However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance
to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of
every member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than
fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show
that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.6
And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its
eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure
in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia.
Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has
shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment
has lasted long enough. x x x
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of
his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment
towards public service, particularly with the People’s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations
submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession,
such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor
Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul
Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.
Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were
to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to
the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is
warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample
them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office
and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."8
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is
hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of
law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.
SO ORDERED.

7. B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that
what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the
Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of
signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he
be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers
during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in
signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject
to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice
of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called
this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant
why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to
come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted
as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to
adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown
that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral
fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing
his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences
of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-
taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as
a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the
act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose
to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney
or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt
of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding
of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring
members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot
suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to
suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this
Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we
likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is
warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing
any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of
this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized
practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

8 A.M. No. 35 September 30, 1949

In re Attorney FELIX P. DAVID, petitioner.
REYES, J.:
The respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a Philippine Bar, is charged with the malpractice for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by his client, the complainant Briccio S. Henson.
Respondent having answered denying the charge, the complaint was referred to the Solicitor
General for investigation. After the investigation the Solicitor General rendered his report finding
the respondent guilty of professional misconduct and recommending disciplinary action. The
Solicitor General reports the following facts to have been conclusively established:
. . . that on February 15, 1947, respondent obtained P840 from his client Briccio Henson to be
applied to the payment of inheritance and real estate taxes due from the estate of Esteban Henson
for 1945, 1946 and 1947 (p. 3, t. s. n.), for which he signed a receipt (Annex 'A'; p. 3, t. s. n.). On
several occasions, complainant asked the respondent to show him the official tax receipt
evidencing the payment of said taxes, to which the latter answered that he had already paid them,
but the receipts were left with his friend in San Fernando. Respondent promised to give the receipt
later. Complainant waited patiently for it but it was never delivered. After the respondent had failed
to deliver the receipt, complainant became suspicious and inquired from the provincial treasurer
of Pampanga about the matter. Said official gave the information that the taxes were never paid.
Consequently, complainant requested the respondent to refund the money given him for the
payment of said taxes (p. 7, t. s. n., OSG), but he failed to do so. Respondent made several
promises to return the money which he never complied. Neither had he done anything to transfer
the titles of the land in the name of the heirs of Esteban Henson up to the present (p. 9, t. s. n.).
In view of this failure of the respondent, the complainant was ultimately forced to pay the taxes
out of his own pocket (p. 8, t.s.n.).
Required to answer the complaint formulated by the Solicitor General on the basis of his report,
respondent failed to do so. And despite due notice he likewise failed to appear at the hearing
before this Court. Indeed, we note from the Solicitor General's report that respondent, instead of
welcoming every opportunity for hearing, seems to have wanted to avoid it. On this point the
report says:
At the hearing held on May 26, 1948, both parties appeared and the complainant had testified,
the hearing was set for continuance the following day. Both parties agreed in the presence of the
investigator to postpone said hearing for June 5, 1948. On June 5, 1948, complainant appeared,
but respondent did not show up, so to give the respondent a chance, the investigator postponed
the continuation of the hearing to June 17. Both parties were duly subpoenaed (attached to the
records). On June 15th, respondent sent a letter (attached to the records) to Assistant Solicitor
General Ruperto Kapunan, asking that the hearing be postponed to June 25, 1948. According to
the request, both parties were again duly subpoenaed for June 25, 1948 (attached to the record).
In the subpoena sent to respondent, his attention was invited to Rule 127, section 28, of the Rules
of Court, which provides that if he fails to appear and answer the charge, the Solicitor in charge
will proceed to hear the case ex parte. In spite of this, on the morning of June 25, he again sent
another letter (attached to the records) to Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, asking that the
hearing be transferred to July 7, or 8, 1948. In order that the respondent be given all the chances
to defend himself, his request was granted. In the subpoena sent him setting the hearing for July
8, 1948, as requested, the following remark was stated:
Failure on your part to appear will cause the investigator to proceed with the investigation and to
file the corresponding recommendation to the Supreme Court. No further postponement will be
entertained.
It is worthwhile mentioning that every time the case was set for hearing the complainant made his
appearance.
On the morning of July 8, 1948, both parties appeared; respondent made a formal request in
person to the investigator asking that the hearing be postponed to 2 o'clock p.m. of the same day.
Out of consideration to him, even to the discomfiture of complainant, respondent's request was
again granted. But contrary to his assurance, the respondent again failed to appear.
There is no question that respondent received from complainant the sum of P840 for the specific
purpose of applying the same to the payment of taxes due from the estate which he was engaged
to settle. The receipt which he issued for said amount as well as for the sum of P110 and a sack
of rice paid to him for his expenses and fee reads as follows: . . .
February 15, 1947.
Received from Mr. Briccio S. Henson the sum of eight hundred and forty (P840) pesos to be paid
as follows:
P210 -Inheritance tax of the heirs of the late Don Esteban Henson.
P630 -Land taxes for 1945-1947.
Failure on my part to deliver to him the official receipts corresponding to the above mentioned
amount, I promise to return to him the whole amount of P840 not later than April 16, 1947 without
any obligation on his part.
A separate amount of one hundred and ten (P110) pesos and a sack of rice was paid to me for
my expenses and fee.
(Sgd.) Atty. FELIX DAVID.
Respondent did not care to testify. But through his unverified answer, he would make it appear
that he was entitled to and had been promised a legal fee for his services and that, as this promise
was not complied with, he "saw it fit to withhold said amount (the P840 for taxes) until he is paid."
This explanation is obviously an afterthought and clearly unfounded. For the established fact is
that respondent at first made complainant believe that the sum in question had already been
applied by him to the payment of taxes, and, as testified to by complainant, for the little that
respondent was able to do in connection with the case entrusted to him, he has already received
his fee as shown by the above-copied receipt. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that
respondent misappropriated the money of his client. This makes him guilty of unprofessional
conduct.
In view of the gravity of the misconduct committed, the respondent Felix P. David is hereby
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years from the date this decision
become final, without prejudice to a more severe action if the sum misappropriated is not refunded
within one month from the same date.

10. A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto
Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude,
together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a
Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing
had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was
submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD
directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and
Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated
homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing
up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver
overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is
not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under
the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make
a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi
driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door
causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking
because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got
out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and
was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The
accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter
caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be
pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making
sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his
vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up
intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was
met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck.
He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the
latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his
neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained
a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his
job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the
offended party, Roberto Soriano."10
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with
this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.11
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the
latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a
taxi, had overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his
car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had
shot Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his
civil liabilities to Complainant."12
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become
unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by
final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is
no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1)
whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt
warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."14
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee
who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer’s
contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime
would have been violative of the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the
employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to
determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the
courts, as explained thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may
be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x."16
(Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left
pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only
after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not
to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile,
immoral or unjust."17
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince
the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter
least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that
he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were
reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.
We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals
of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact,
under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely
returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters
worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted
like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the
legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm18 and his
unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed
the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney’s oath20 and in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of
justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and
granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil
liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation.
By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic
altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim.
Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore
what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession
of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing them from that office.23
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character,
which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.24
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found
by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court
settlement with complainant’s family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a conference
with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of
having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon]
does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in
kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could
do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident
particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important
than truthfulness.29The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and
condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession.
They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and
the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the
legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers
in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate
and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our
profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired.
In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions
so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are
convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the
legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good
moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not the
mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession.
In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent
clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
11) A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995

WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal
of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.

I On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal
of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival.
According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of
P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M.
that day in respondent's office at the City Hall.

An entrapment was set up by the NBI.

Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper
bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to
complainant for the use in the entrapment.

When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until
around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there
were other persons doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes.
When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba
ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent
replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked
money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent
and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands
were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money.
Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI
where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a
sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.

On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section
3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.

On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative
charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him.

On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and
disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74).

Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier
filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one
Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was
recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola
Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution.

In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant
surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent.

He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance
of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In
connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for
incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against
complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.

In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were
motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the investigating fiscal had
recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him.

In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of
Governors for investigation and disposition.

On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said
recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26,
1994.

II
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked
money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in
his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his
defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money
was planted by complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos
Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged,
it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that
he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him
(Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81
SCRA 393 [1978]).

Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member
of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]).

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule
138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty
to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics 66-67 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

12) A.C. No. 5161 April 14, 2004

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali
charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in,
consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting
from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial
ethics.

The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting.
Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to
herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several
parcels of land, to wit:

a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 43,908
square meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite;

b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square meters,
more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite;

c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131 square meters,
more or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her
brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved
the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the
following acts or omissions:

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury
committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that
they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well
that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the
transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold
to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima
and Miriam.

2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of
complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract
worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer
the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery
or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was
received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.

3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy
and Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant’s sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October
1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that
Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting
and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted
title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to
sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of
their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.

4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the
purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release
the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released
within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the
reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used
the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.

In his Comment,2 the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did
not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by
his parents-in-law.

Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not
motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution
of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had
no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting
sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant’s signature was
affixed on that document, it was done in good faith.

The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case
No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case
that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could
not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel
Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through his signature
was pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent
his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released
by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court,
Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted
by courts.

Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with
numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of
Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents.

In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her
mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following
circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total
disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was still alive; (2) when their
mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including respondent’s wife herself; (3) on 5
February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima,
Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent
was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the
Ting spouses.

On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.3

On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties,
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule
10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.4

In its Resolution No. XV-2003-3335 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved
and adopted Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for six years.

We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of
culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to
remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a
lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court
inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:

LAWYER'S OATH

I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent
to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.

This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to
the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten
afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and
keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, they become guardians of truth and
the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice.6 This oath
is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

...

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

...

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the
respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so
stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.

The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated
11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only
between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings.7 There was concealment of
the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the
respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainant’s sister, he knew
of his wife’s siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in
the Philippines.8 Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of
General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife
and his sister-in-law Miriam.

It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted9 regarding the falsification of complainant’s
signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement10 dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which
contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the property. Marcelina admitted
that she signed complainant’s name in that document.11 Such act of counterfeiting the
complainant’s signature to make it appear that the complainant had participated in the execution
of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document.12

Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing
falsification, he presented13 such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the
lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife.14 He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly
using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs.15 Notably,
he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the
transfer of Lot 1603.16

Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to
law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the
land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by providing
as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for law and legal processes.17 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a
profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice.18 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.19 He should
not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.20 He makes himself
unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct.21

Respondent’s argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of
the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a
mere oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the
petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six
siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.22 Second, during the hearing of said case when
the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the
latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads:

ATTY. TORRES:

Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr.
and Julita Reynante?

WITNESS:

A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.

Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?

A None, sir.23
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony24 in court, and he
never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the
case.25 Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be
punished as guilty of false testimony.26

Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor,
fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice."27 This Rule was
clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that
she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for
reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.

The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon
to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its
cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice
constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.28

It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence
an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing
of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was
in her possession was false, as she was never in possession of the title29 and would not,
therefore, know that the same was lost.

Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent
requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel
Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing
the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within the month.30 Respondent’s
information was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a
year after he sent the letter.31 Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part
of the respondent.

Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor
to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or
suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into
account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable,
and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 While the assessment of
what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should
neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should
ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of
the bar.33

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers where the evidence calls for it.34 Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances
prevailing in this case, we find that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the severance of his
privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the
legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is
ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith
record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

13) A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant

vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member
of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon
her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of
jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition
that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms.
Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of
returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued
three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated
23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for
the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their
issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no
arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no
effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and
85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;

to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the
costs in all three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent
portion of the decision read as follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense
for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from
the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme
Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this
decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.

SO ORDERED. 1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and
advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum."
On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice
of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final
and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16
December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal
by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the
reglementary period.

In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating
the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during
the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that
she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-
appellee.

We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as
a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced,
she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon
respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the
Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law
is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by
the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public
order.

xxx xxx xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold,
can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 3(Italics supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation
of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was
bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as
in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted
of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.
A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.

14) A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR.,
President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association,
Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S.
Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following lame
explanation:

1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court
En Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid
his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ...
paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, ...
and also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
as shown by Official Receipt No. 83740,... .

2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme
Court, included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar
as shown by a Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, ...

3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take my
Oath as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief
Justice, the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy
(Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to
answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *

4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable
Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;

5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon
my Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the
respondent of an Annual General Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the year
1980-1981, ... .

6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge
Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my
name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member
in Good Standing, I paid my membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt
No. 0948, ... . Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official Receipt
No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... .

7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also included
the name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the
year 1981-1982, ... .

8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981,
Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and
Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with
a prayer that herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;

9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982
membership due and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official
Receipt No. 132734 and Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .

10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official Receipt
No. 3195776, ... .

11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
as well as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, ....

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute
his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath
to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17
and 19, Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e),
Rules of Court.)
WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this
Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days
imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.