A.C. No.

L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio.1One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the
Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of
such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted
that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being
precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow
withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however,
the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should
tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities
incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be
very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in
good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar
for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to
discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala
of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny
such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficiofor the two defendants. Subsequently, on
November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the
volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A
motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorariproceeding.3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as
counsel de oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on
February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11,
1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of
the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that
counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are
ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is
denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964,
he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to
prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de
oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June
14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964
July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11,
1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial
of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded
that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government
witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that
there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the
performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of
justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio,
since the prosecution has already rested its case."6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being
appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a
surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more
manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is
understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7"There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those
enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services
are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.
This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he
has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a
lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is
incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent was de
oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its
officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when
negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of
criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It
is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as
high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case
of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person
assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him
due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the
bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-
interest."12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of
the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its
importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard
by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented
that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic.
For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.
Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put
matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good
faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate
future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been
set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel
with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the
profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal
practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitione

G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on
27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio
Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna
Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to
them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro
legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare
residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro
dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu,
designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos
administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o
 incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui,
Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o
contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare
persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia
Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu,
y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in
1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died
on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and
court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are
pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui,
one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the
then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a
"convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28
February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of
either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand
not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the
nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances
would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age
may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o
a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the
degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of
the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other
hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative
case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks
before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation
and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict
interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws.
This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not
mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as
"testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la
Lengua Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows:
"Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los
derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos
legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed
and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of
the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his
license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do
with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant
to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession
of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in
some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure,
where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take
the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the
necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such
persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor
of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a
doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No.
3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said
institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and
destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall
administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the
office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his
office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was
disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact,
however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than
that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
 Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it
decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be
conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law.
The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and
the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,

notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to
the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original
admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good
moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law
and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney,
and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his
duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from
his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the
office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as
a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll
of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section
216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold
the office arose.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On
January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed
the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma.
Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer
by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60
Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this
Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano
Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant
administrator.

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he
informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous
1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio."
He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the
administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary
public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the
Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in
his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the
Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S.
1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer,
was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950,
the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein.
The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had,
as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of
recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint
on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the Hospicio.
The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take
another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a
second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning
that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he)
was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted
nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal.
The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court
again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted
a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May
1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after
it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of
administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be
initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right
to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the
incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by
plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the
Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor,
pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui
took his oath of office.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui
v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance
instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as
administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956,
when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the
parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action —
all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action
in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956
because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that
this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does
not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and
it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the
incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs.
Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of
Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of
donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of
Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o
incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona
que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En
igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia
ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma.
Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The
intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and
successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named.
Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui
line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs.
This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and
set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs
equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a DistrictCourt, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to

terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said
sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He
then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our
 contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am
terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went
through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul,

cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into
between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,
1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan
"effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his)
payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January
25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage -
PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

 4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be
appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court.2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result
of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was
he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co.
he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying
that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some
other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and
as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao
term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate
and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous
letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until
after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he
does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his)
rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of
his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all
times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this
Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of
the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to
be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language.
Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires
that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone;
in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to
a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law,
he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. 20As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights
of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record contains
no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

SANTA PANGAN, complainant

vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
 RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos
for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the
hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for
postponement. These motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he
had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v.
Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused
in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila."
Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection
with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate
(Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other
given name and maternal surname.

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is
"Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name
other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an officer in
the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and
frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every
stage. This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In
representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent
has violated his solemn oath.

The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. These
injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in
a case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and
to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he
resorts to deception or permits his client to do so." 2

In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was
authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first
aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED

and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspencion or disbarment from
the practice of law.

It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court is
directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request of
complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U.
Lontoc, is hereby granted. SO ORDERED
B.M. No. 1222 April 24, 2009

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by
petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and
compassion, grant petitioner’s plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as
a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar."1

To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the
dispositive portion of which reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby
resolves to —

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;

xxxx

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar
Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos
& Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the
said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which
identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of
Balgos and faxed them to other persons.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in
the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the
petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father’s childhood dream to
become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the
same in order to pay tribute to his parents.

Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of
rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he
was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City.
During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay.

Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and
eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the
President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he
spearheaded various activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well as the
holding of bar operations for bar examinees.

Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to
excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in
Bachelor of Laws.

Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a
Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free
legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law
Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed.
Despite having entered private practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow
Taguigeños.

Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing career was cut short as he
was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar
Examinations.

Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather
unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.

On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a
consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the
Secretariat of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner
concentrated mainly on rendering public service.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised
the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he
cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also,
he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar
examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.

Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling
experience to make him a better person.

Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and endorsements
of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character:

1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De
Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to
be Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated 4 June 2007
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;

2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang

Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People’s Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran
ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik
sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast
People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek,
Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa
Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahang
Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;

4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang

Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG
KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado"
dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;

5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De
Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of
the Philippine Bar" dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses
and Llantino Law Offices;

6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly

Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G.
Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;

7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern
University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);

8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang

Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc.
(SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa
Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig
Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);

9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of
Danilo G. De Guzman to the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig City,
Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and
for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);

10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of
Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of
Law, San Sebastian College – Recoletos;

11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G.
De Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight,
Knights of Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National
High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;

12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President,
Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
 13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and

14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice,
Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness
and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually
foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the
Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with
the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V.
De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,
eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a
judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.

xxxx

When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we
do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent
attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our
compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to
exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.

There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be
applied in the instant case, the Court said:

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

xxxx

Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No.
2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:

The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.

Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five (5) years
when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a promising
future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court stripping off his license.

Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as attested
to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in the
community and society.

Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense
desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several
social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which could
be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue extending
his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This only proves petitioner’s strength of
character and positive moral fiber.

However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the examination questions from Atty.
Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out
to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all
commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that
his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar
examinations as well as of this Court.

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his
transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the
penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that
petitioner had already been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as
proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Petition

for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which
suspension is considered as served in view of the petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence,
petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem petitioner
1avvphi 1.zw+

worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the
practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.2 While the Court
is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when
the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.3

In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on
the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer4 and the conduct of his
public life during his years outside of the bar.5 For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:

However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to
purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of
every member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than
fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show
that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.6

And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:

Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its
eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in
allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since
his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown
remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted
long enough. x x x

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his
transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards
public service, particularly with the People’s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by
his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval
and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his
positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to
reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the
general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is
warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning:

"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample
them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office
and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."8

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is
hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is
hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW,
reckoned from February 4, 2004.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his
province for a vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he
had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing
in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the
Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to
the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of
law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most
serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this
Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own
lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took
him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to
come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere
to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While 1âwphi1

the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this
privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of
the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his
acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment."22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-
taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed
was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to
the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of
liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice
of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the
Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend
him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine
him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed
to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of
law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice
of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 35 September 30, 1949

In re Attorney FELIX P. DAVID, petitioner.

REYES, J.:

The respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a Philippine Bar, is charged with the malpractice for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by his client, the complainant Briccio S. Henson.
Respondent having answered denying the charge, the complaint was referred to the Solicitor
General for investigation. After the investigation the Solicitor General rendered his report finding the
respondent guilty of professional misconduct and recommending disciplinary action. The Solicitor
General reports the following facts to have been conclusively established:

. . . that on February 15, 1947, respondent obtained P840 from his client Briccio Henson to
be applied to the payment of inheritance and real estate taxes due from the estate of
Esteban Henson for 1945, 1946 and 1947 (p. 3, t. s. n.), for which he signed a receipt
(Annex 'A'; p. 3, t. s. n.). On several occasions, complainant asked the respondent to show
him the official tax receipt evidencing the payment of said taxes, to which the latter answered
that he had already paid them, but the receipts were left with his friend in San Fernando.
Respondent promised to give the receipt later. Complainant waited patiently for it but it was
never delivered. After the respondent had failed to deliver the receipt, complainant became
suspicious and inquired from the provincial treasurer of Pampanga about the matter. Said
official gave the information that the taxes were never paid. Consequently, complainant
requested the respondent to refund the money given him for the payment of said taxes (p. 7,
t. s. n., OSG), but he failed to do so. Respondent made several promises to return the
money which he never complied. Neither had he done anything to transfer the titles of the
land in the name of the heirs of Esteban Henson up to the present (p. 9, t. s. n.). In view of
this failure of the respondent, the complainant was ultimately forced to pay the taxes out of
his own pocket (p. 8, t.s.n.).

Required to answer the complaint formulated by the Solicitor General on the basis of his report,
respondent failed to do so. And despite due notice he likewise failed to appear at the hearing before
this Court. Indeed, we note from the Solicitor General's report that respondent, instead of welcoming
every opportunity for hearing, seems to have wanted to avoid it. On this point the report says:

At the hearing held on May 26, 1948, both parties appeared and the complainant had
testified, the hearing was set for continuance the following day. Both parties agreed in the
presence of the investigator to postpone said hearing for June 5, 1948. On June 5, 1948,
complainant appeared, but respondent did not show up, so to give the respondent a chance,
the investigator postponed the continuation of the hearing to June 17. Both parties were duly
subpoenaed (attached to the records). On June 15th, respondent sent a letter (attached to
the records) to Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, asking that the hearing be
postponed to June 25, 1948. According to the request, both parties were again duly
subpoenaed for June 25, 1948 (attached to the record). In the subpoena sent to respondent,
his attention was invited to Rule 127, section 28, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if
he fails to appear and answer the charge, the Solicitor in charge will proceed to hear the
case ex parte. In spite of this, on the morning of June 25, he again sent another letter
(attached to the records) to Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, asking that the hearing be
transferred to July 7, or 8, 1948. In order that the respondent be given all the chances to
defend himself, his request was granted. In the subpoena sent him setting the hearing for
July 8, 1948, as requested, the following remark was stated:
 Failure on your part to appear will cause the investigator to proceed with the investigation
and to file the corresponding recommendation to the Supreme Court. No further
postponement will be entertained.

It is worthwhile mentioning that every time the case was set for hearing the complainant
made his appearance.

On the morning of July 8, 1948, both parties appeared; respondent made a formal request in
person to the investigator asking that the hearing be postponed to 2 o'clock p.m. of the same
day. Out of consideration to him, even to the discomfiture of complainant, respondent's
request was again granted. But contrary to his assurance, the respondent again failed to
appear.

There is no question that respondent received from complainant the sum of P840 for the
specific purpose of applying the same to the payment of taxes due from the estate which he
was engaged to settle. The receipt which he issued for said amount as well as for the sum of
P110 and a sack of rice paid to him for his expenses and fee reads as follows: . . .

February 15, 1947.

Received from Mr. Briccio S. Henson the sum of eight hundred and forty (P840)
pesos to be paid as follows:

P210 -Inheritance tax of the heirs of the late Don Esteban

Henson.
P630 -Land taxes for 1945-1947.

Failure on my part to deliver to him the official receipts corresponding to the above
mentioned amount, I promise to return to him the whole amount of P840 not later
than April 16, 1947 without any obligation on his part.

A separate amount of one hundred and ten (P110) pesos and a sack of rice was paid
to me for my expenses and fee.

(Sgd.) Atty. FELIX DAVID.

Respondent did not care to testify. But through his unverified answer, he would make it appear that
he was entitled to and had been promised a legal fee for his services and that, as this promise was
not complied with, he "saw it fit to withhold said amount (the P840 for taxes) until he is paid." This
explanation is obviously an afterthought and clearly unfounded. For the established fact is that
respondent at first made complainant believe that the sum in question had already been applied by
him to the payment of taxes, and, as testified to by complainant, for the little that respondent was
able to do in connection with the case entrusted to him, he has already received his fee as shown by
the above-copied receipt. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that respondent misappropriated
the money of his client. This makes him guilty of unprofessional conduct.

In view of the gravity of the misconduct committed, the respondent Felix P. David is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years from the date this decision become
final, without prejudice to a more severe action if the sum misappropriated is not refunded within one
month from the same date.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
 ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in
the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
 such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.
 MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers[VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and
every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado

de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eurekaand Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental
and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today
to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain
 a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer(such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. (
Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution.Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
 No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,

vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano
with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together
with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice
dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been
scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the
case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file
his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated
homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up
in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver
overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not
just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the
influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn
at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and
held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the
accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he
smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to
help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the
taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a
second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and
turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then
released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle
was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed
the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the
accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held
by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so
the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose
testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the
latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his
neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a
spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as
a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions.
These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended
party, Roberto Soriano."10

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this
particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.11

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be

disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the
latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter,
driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back
to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who
was unarmed;

"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
 "5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he
had shot Complainant;

"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one
mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,

"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied
his civil liabilities to Complainant."12

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become
unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final
judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer
open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime
of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."14

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee who
was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer’s contention and held that
homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of
the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained
that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that
was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime
involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis
supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:

"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket
of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the
latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the
victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of
self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust."17

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the
moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was
hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable
actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.

We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under
the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so
doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like
a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate
reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in
any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not
the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to
assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm18 and his unjust refusal to
satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of
the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney’s oath20 and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of
justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted
him probation. And yet, it has been four years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to
complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his
extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation,
he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty.
Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter
has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of
lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending
or removing them from that office.23
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character,
which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found
by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court
settlement with complainant’s family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete
lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a conference with him to
obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of
having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:

"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon]
does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in
kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do
so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident
particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important
than truthfulness.29The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and
condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled
by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the
privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral
flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by
the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and
vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of
odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment
should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant
case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably
and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out
a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every
lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good
moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not the
mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In
the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent
clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.