DIB DA

US is still dominant in the arms sale industry – increased its share last year
SIPRI, 12/10 [SIPRI = Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Global
arms industry: US companies dominate the Top 100; Russian arms industry moves
to second place,” https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-arms-industry-
us-companies-dominate-top-100-russian-arms-industry-moves-second-place, AC]
US companies increase their share of total Top 100 arms sales With 42 companies listed in 2017,
companies based in the United States continued to dominate the Top 100 in 2017. Taken together, the arms
sales of US companies grew by 2.0 per cent in 2017, to $226.6 billion, which accounted for 57
per cent of total Top 100 arms sales. Five US companies were listed in the top 10 in 2017. ‘US companies
directly benefit from the US Department of Defense’s ongoing demand for weapons,’ says Aude Fleurant, Director of SIPRI’s Arms and Military
Expenditure Programme. Lockheed Martin remained the world’s largest arms producer in 2017, with arms sales
of $44.9 billion. ‘The gap between Lockheed Martin and Boeing—the two largest arms producers in the world—increased from $11 billion
in 2016 to $18 billion in 2017,’ says Fleurant.

Russia and China are closing the gap

Frank A. Rose 18, Brookings Senior Fellow, Security and Strategy, 10-23-2018, "As Russia and
China improve their conventional military capabilities, should the US rethink its assumptions on
extended nuclear deterrence?," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2018/10/23/as-russia-and-china-improve-their-conventional-military-capabilities-should-
the-us-rethink-its-assumptions-on-extended-nuclear-deterrence/
As part of this competition, over the past decade Russia and China have dramatically improved their
conventional and asymmetric military capabilities. Though the United States currently possesses unmatched
global military power projection capabilities, and spends substantially more on defense than Russia and China, there is little doubt that
Russia and China have achieved conventional military parity or local superiority with the United
States in certain regional contingencies in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific. A recent RAND Corporation report notes
that Russian military investments over the past decade have significantly reduced the “once-gaping
qualitative and technological gaps between Russia and NATO.” The report also asserts that Russia currently enjoys a favorable balance-of-
forces, in short warning regional conflicts on its borders. The same can be said for Chinese conventional military capabilities in the Western Pacific. For example, during testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2018, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley highlighted that China is continuing “to develop capabilities to
And an increasing number of
dissuade, deter, or defeat potential third-party intervention during a large-scale theater campaign, such as a Taiwan contingency.”

independent defense analysts, including retired U.S. Admiral and former NATO Supreme Commander
James Stavridis, argue that China has essentially achieved military parity with the United States in East
Asia. Russia and China are also devoting significant resources to develop disruptive technologies like
offensive cyber and anti-satellite weapons, which are designed to exploit perceived gaps and vulnerabilities in U.S. defenses. As Director of National
Intelligence Daniel Coats testified before the Senate Select Committee in February 2018: “Both Russia and China continue to pursue anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce U.S. and
allied military effectiveness…Military reforms in both countries in the past few years indicate an increased focus on establishing operational forces designed to integrate attacks against space
systems and services.” Coats also noted that both nations were continuing to develop offensive cyber capabilities designed to disrupt, degrade, and destroy U.S. and allied critical infrastructures.
Most importantly, the United States’ long-term technological advantage is eroding. From the 1950s through the mid-1980s
the United States retained an overwhelming technological advantage in the development of key technologies such nuclear weapons, computer chips, and precision-guided munitions. This began
to change in the late 1980s. As a recent New York Times article notes: “In the late 1980s, the emergence of inexpensive and universally available microchips upended the Pentagon’s ability to
control technological progress. Now, rather than trickling down from military and advanced corporate laboratories, today’s new technologies increasingly come from consumer electronic firms.”
And Russia and China are investing heavily in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, cyber,
and hypersonics. Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that whoever becomes the world leader in the artificial intelligence sphere will “become ruler of the world.”
Russian and Chinese objectives are clear: Create a more favorable military balance in Eastern Europe and
the Western Pacific. Indeed, the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) concedes that in the face of
improving Russian and Chinese military capabilities, the U.S. “competitive military advantage has been
eroding.” The NDS recommends a number of specific steps the United States could take to improve its
conventional capabilities, such as: building a more lethal force; modernizing key systems like space,
cyber, and missile defense; developing innovative operational concepts; and cultivating workforce talent .
While implementing the proposals in the NDS would certainly improve U.S. conventional forces, they are unlikely to restore the overwhelming conventional military superiority that the United
States once enjoyed.
Relations
Arms sales define the relationship---ending them spills over to all security cooperation
Christopher M. Blanchard 9/21/18, a Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the CRS, "Saudi
Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations", Congressional Research Service,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33533
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s relations with the United States, its stability, and its future trajectory
are subjects of continuing congressional interest. In particular, Saudi leadership transitions, trends in
global oil prices, Saudi budget pressures and reform plans, aggressive transnational terrorist threats,
assertive Saudi foreign policies, and Saudi-Iranian tensions have fueled recent congressional discussions.
U.S.-Saudi security cooperation and U.S. concern for the continuing global availability of Saudi energy supplies continue to anchor official
bilateral relations as they have for decades. In this context, the Trump Administration’s efforts to reinvigorate U.S.-Saudi relations have drawn
increased public attention and have generated debate. Previously, the Obama Administration had differed with Saudi leaders over Iran, the Iranian
nuclear program, and conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
Amid some continuing differences on these issues, bilateral ties have been defined since 2017 by arms sale
proposals, Yemen-related security cooperation, and shared concerns about Iran, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State organization (IS, aka
ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da’esh). From
2012 through 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of
proposed Foreign Military Sales to Saudi Arabia with a potential value of more than $45 billion. President
Donald Trump and Saudi officials announced agreement on some of these sales and others during the
President’s May 2017 trip to the kingdom, as part of a package that may potentially be worth more than
$110 billion. This package of previously discussed and newly proposed defense sales is intended to
address Saudi needs for maritime and coastal security improvements, air force training and support,
cybersecurity and communications upgrades, missile and air defenses, and enhanced border security and
counterterrorism capabilities (see “Arms Sales, Security Assistance, and Training” below and Appendix B).
King Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud (age 82) succeeded his late half-brother King Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz following the latter’s death in January 2015. King Salman later announced dramatic changes to succession arrangements
left in place by King Abdullah, surprising observers of the kingdom’s politics. King Salman first replaced his half-brother Crown Prince Muqrin bin Abd al Aziz with their nephew, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abd al Aziz, who
was then Interior Minister and counterterrorism chief. The king then named his own son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abd al Aziz, then 29, as Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister.
In June 2017, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef was relieved of his positions and Prince Mohammed bin Salman (age 33) was elevated further to the position of Crown Prince, placing him in line to succeed his father (see Figure 1, Figure
2, and “Leadership and Succession” below). Both princes are members of the generation of grandsons of the kingdom’s late founder, King Abd al Aziz bin Abd al Rahman Al Saud (aka Ibn Saud). The succession changes and Crown
Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s efforts to assert his role as the shaper of the kingdom’s national security and economic policies have resulted in an apparent consolidation of authority under one individual and sub-branch of the
family that is unprecedented in the kingdom since its founding.
Shifts in Saudi foreign policy toward a more assertive posture—typified by the kingdom’s military operations in neighboring Yemen and a series of regional moves intended to counteract Iranian initiatives—have accompanied the
post-2015 leadership changes. Saudi leaders launched military operations in Yemen following the early 2015 ouster of Yemen’s transitional government by the Zaydi Shia Ansar Allah (aka Houthi) movement and backers of the late
former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (see “Conflict in Yemen” below). A U.S.-facilitated, Saudi-led coalition air campaign has conducted strikes across the country since late March 2015, coupled with a joint Saudi and
Emirati ground campaign aimed at reversing Houthi gains and compelling them to negotiate with U.N.-recognized transition leaders.
Concerns about Yemeni civilian deaths in Saudi airstrikes, the operation’s contribution to grave humanitarian conditions, and gains by Al Qaeda and Islamic State supporters have led some Members of Congress and U.S. officials to
urge all parties to seek a prompt settlement. President Obama maintained U.S. logistical support for Saudi operations in Yemen but decided in 2016 to reduce U.S. personnel support and limit certain U.S. arms transfers. President
Trump has chosen to proceed with precision guided munition technology sales that the Obama Administration deferred. In September 2018, the Trump Administration certified conditions set by Congress on Saudi actions in Yemen
and renewed calls for a political solution. A U.S. State Department travel advisory issued in April 2018 warns that “rebel groups operating in Yemen have fired long-range missiles into Saudi Arabia, specifically targeting populated
areas and civilian infrastructure” and that “rebel forces in Yemen fire artillery at Saudi border towns and launch cross-border attacks against Saudi military personnel.” 1

U.S. support to the kingdom’s operations in Yemen and Saudi use of U.S.-origin weaponry has drawn
new attention to congressionally reviewed arms sales and questions of authorization. In the 114th Congress, some
Members scrutinized proposed sales of thousands of guided air-to-ground munitions and tanks to Saudi Arabia in the context of concerns about
the Saudi military’s conduct in Yemen (see Appendix D below).
In the 115th Congress, legislation has been enacted that prohibits the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that are not conducting select types of operations
if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained (Section 1290 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 115-232, Appendix D). 2 The provision is subject to an Administration national security waiver.
A similar measure would place conditions on the transfer of any air-to-ground munitions to Saudi Arabia (S.J.Res. 40), and, in June 2017, the Senate narrowly voted to reject a motion to further consider a joint resolution of
disapproval (S.J.Res. 42) on proposed sales of precision guided munitions to the kingdom. The House and Senate also have considered resolutions (H.Con.Res. 81 and S.J.Res. 54) that would direct the President to end U.S. military
support for Saudi operations in Yemen unless Congress specifically authorizes the continuation of such support.
Inside the kingdom, arrests of Islamic State (IS) supporters have continued since 2014, as Islamic State affiliates have claimed responsibility for a series of deadly attacks against Saudi security forces and members of the kingdom’s
Shia minority across the country (see “The Islamic State’s Campaign against the Kingdom” below). Saudi authorities report having disrupted planned IS attacks on government targets in 2017 and counted 34 terrorist attacks in 2016,
including an attempted IS-claimed suicide bombing against the U.S. Consulate General in Jeddah. Saudi leaders and their IS adversaries have reiterated their hostility toward each other since 2015, with Saudi leaders proposing new
transnational counterterrorism cooperation and IS leaders redeclaring war against the royal family, condemning official Saudi clerics, and urging attacks inside the kingdom (see “Terrorism Threats and Bilateral Cooperation”). The
current U.S. State Department travel advisory for Saudi Arabia warns that “terrorist groups continue plotting possible attacks” and that “terrorists may attack with little or no warning.”
Since 2011, significant shifts in the political and economic landscape of the Middle East have focused international attention on Saudi domestic policy issues and reinvigorated social and political debates among Saudis (see “Domestic
Issues” below). These regional shifts, coupled with ongoing economic, social, and political changes in the kingdom, may make sensitive issues such as political reform, unemployment, education, human rights, corruption, religious
freedom, and extremism more prominent in U.S.-Saudi relations than in the past. U.S. policy initiatives have long sought to help Saudi leaders address economic and security challenges in ways consistent with U.S. interests. Recent
joint U.S.-Saudi diplomatic efforts to strengthen economic, educational, and interpersonal ties have focused on improving opportunities for the kingdom’s young population. Tens of thousands of Saudi students continue to pursue
higher education in the United States, although numbers have declined in response to Saudi government funding changes.
Some nongovernment observers have called for a reassessment of U.S.-Saudi relations amid the kingdom’s ongoing military campaign in Yemen. 3 They cite concern about human rights conditions in the kingdom, as well as
resurgent questions about the relationship between religious proselytization by some Saudis and the appeal of violent Islamist extremism. U.S. officials have called publicly for the kingdom to seek a negotiated settlement in Yemen,
allow peaceful expressions of dissent at home, and help fight extremism abroad. Any more strident official U.S. criticisms of the kingdom’s policies traditionally remain subjects of private diplomatic engagement rather than official
public discussion.
Saudi concerns about U.S. leadership and policies in the Middle East grew during the Administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, in parallel to U.S. concerns about Saudi priorities and choices. In particular,
Saudi leaders at times signaled their displeasure with U.S. policy approaches to Egypt, Israel and the Palestinians, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Saudi officials also opposed the changes to U.S. sovereign immunity law that were made
by the 114th Congress through the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (S. 2040, P.L. 114-222, aka JASTA) and have sought their amendment or repeal.4
Saudi official public responses to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran were initially relatively neutral, emphasizing elements of an agreement with Iran that Saudi Arabia would support rather
than expressing Saudi endorsement of the JCPOA as negotiated and agreed. King Salman eventually endorsed the JCPOA during his September 2015 visit to Washington, DC, but later called for the agreement to be reexamined and
welcomed President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the agreement. Saudi officials have engaged in civil nuclear cooperation talks with the United States and other countries since 2017 (see “Potential U.S.-Saudi
Nuclear Cooperation”).

Policy differences and specific current disagreements notwithstanding, U.S. and Saudi officials have long
favored continuity over dramatic strategic shifts, despite some Saudis’ and Americans’ calls for
fundamental changes to the bilateral relationship. The Trump Administration, like its predecessors,
engages the Saudi government as a strategic partner to promote regional security and global economic
stability. The Saudi government appears to view the United States as an important security partner. At the
end of President Trump’s May 2017 visit, the U.S. and Saudi governments agreed to “a new Strategic
Partnership for the 21st Century in the interest of both countries by formally announcing a Joint Strategic
Vision.”5
With a new generation of Saudi leaders assuming prominent positions in the kingdom and chaotic conditions persisting in the Middle East region,
some change in U.S.-Saudi relations may prove inevitable. The Trump Administration has thus far partnered with King Salman and Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman on their domestic policy initiatives and their approaches to Iran, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. The success or failure
of these initiatives may have considerable significance for the bilateral relationship and
consequences for international security for years to come.

Saudi will overreact and cut off the US

Beevor, 18 - Dr Eleanor Beevor is a Research Analyst on the Conflict, Security and
Development programme at IISS. She oversees the Institute’s research and analysis of conflict
and terrorism in Central and East Africa and the Horn of Africa. PhD in Anthropology at Oxford
(“Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? Washington is Intimidated by Saudi Arabia” 9/25, Al-
Bawaba News, factiva)
True, it's not unreasonable for Pompeo to fear backlash from the Saudis. But it goes to show that Washington has become deeply afraid
of Saudi Arabia under Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. Prince Mohammed's relationships with his international allies are not "alliances" in the typical sense.
He does not want cooperation and trade as and when possible. He wants total deference to his wishes from world powers, on
matters both great and extremely small. Germany was the first to find out just how fragile the Prince's pride is. Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said last November
that Germany could not tolerate the adventurism” that had grown in the Middle East. This was soon after the shock resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad
Hariri, which was apparently forced by Saudi Arabia. Prince Mohammed was reportedly deeply offended” and responded by recalling the Saudi Ambassador to Berlin
(who has still not returned) and severing masses of business ties with Germany.// Lest anyone think this was an isolated incident, Riyadh kicked off an extraordinary
spat with Canada last month over a pro-human rights tweet by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland. Freeland urged Saudi Arabia to release
detained women’s rights activists. Her tweet – hardly unusual – would probably have passed unnoticed if it had been left alone. Instead, an epic tantrum followed.
Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador, suspended all trade deals with Ottowa, pulled thousands of Saudi students and patients out of Canadian universities and
hospitals and forced them to come home, sold off all Canadian assets, and even seemingly threatened Canada with a 9/11 style attack. Yet Canada’s western allies,
who would be expected to come to Ottowa’s defence, responded with a deafening silence. More recently, Spain
tried to halt the sale of 400 laser
guided bombs to Saudi Arabia over concerns that they would be used in Yemen. But the decision was overturned after fears that
the Saudis would cancel a $1.8 billion deal to buy warships from Spain as well if the bomb sale was halted. This fear was
probably well founded. Riyadh no longer sees arms sales as just a transaction, but as a litmus test of
whether a country is with or against it.// The grim truth is that this international bullying seems to be working for the moment.
Given current Saudi willingness to
Washington’s major foreign policy decisions are now being swayed by fears of retaliation from Riyadh.

blow up otherwise functional alliances over anything from arms sales to trivial swipes, it’s not surprising that
the US is anticipating backlash. No question there would be plenty if Washington suspended support to
the coalition.

Arms sales are uniquely key

Knights ‘18 (Michael Knights is a Boston-based senior fellow of The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs
of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states. (“U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage” 11/5,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev)
The U.S.-Saudi strategic relationship is built on a simple premise: Washington provides physical security
for the Saudi state, while Riyadh serves as a cooperative counterterrorism partner and an apolitical, responsive

supplier to global energy markets. Arms sales are integral to this relationship: the task of
maintaining the large Saudi military binds Washington and Riyadh together, while the kingdom’s massive purchases of
U.S. armaments and related services strengthen the American defense industry and general economy. Traditionally, the relationship was also based on the
expectation that the United States would take the lead on foreign and security policies to protect Saudi Arabia. Under the Obama administration, however, this
formula was replaced by a partner-based approach that encouraged the kingdom to develop more forces capable of providing security on their own. Riyadh
subsequently begun to take unforeseen unilateral action on its self-perceived security interests, leading to crises such as the brutal war in Yemen, the isolation of
Qatar, the abduction of Lebanese prime minister Saad al-Hariri, and the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. These developments have heightened the
sentiment within Congress that U.S. security cooperation with Saudi Arabia should be reviewed—an attitude that will likely grow stronger after the November 6
midterm elections. The push for such scrutiny will become particularly urgent if the parties involved in the Yemen war fail to establish the lasting ceasefire called for
by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis last week.
Cutting off arms sales is perceived as a calculated insult and status denial
Spindel, 18 – Jennifer Spindel – PhD candidate at the time of writing this; currently an assistant
professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma and the associate director of the
Cyber Governance and Policy Center (Jennifer, A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, “BEYOND
MILITARY POWER: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
TRANSFERS” May,
https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/199011/Spindel_umn_0130E_19187.pdf?s
equence=1&isAllowed=y italics in original
weapons can be used as political signals. Arms can be part of a reciprocal agreement for some other good, or they can
There is, however, a sense that

be a means of gaining influence in the receiving state.59 As I show later, weapons are long-term investments and
providing (or denying) new technologies to a state is a central process in the development of status
hierarchies. Unlike iPads, new fighter jet models are not released every year. The transfer of high-tech weapons thus creates durable status hierarchies between and within groups of
states. Additionally,arms can send signals ranging from “gestures of political support,” to friendship and trust, to
signals of technological modernity.60 In sum, arms can do things, but there is no consensus about which arms or what things. There is also a startling lack of attention to the decision not to sell
withholding arms can be an act of great political import. Freedman is a rare exception, accurately observing that, “though only
arms, even though

refusing to sell arms is a major political

limited political benefits can normally be expected from agreeing to sell arms, since this is seen in commercial terms,

act. It appears as a calculated insult, reflecting on the stability, trust, and credit-worthiness, or technical competence
of the would-be recipient.”61 However, other researchers have not pursued this line of thinking, perhaps because the usual databases focus on the arms transfers that come to
fruition. Since withholding arms means a transfer does not appear in these databases, the act is usually ignored.62

they have existing stocks

Knights, 18 - Michael Knights is a Boston-based senior fellow of The Washington Institute,
specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states. (“U.S.-
Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage” 11/5,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-
conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev
PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS Sales of air-delivered precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are another lightning rod issue in the bilateral security relationship.
Following the 2009-2010 round of hostilities with the Houthis, the kingdom sought to refresh its stock of antipersonnel bombs with a large order of 1,300 U.S.-built
CBU-105 sensor-fused weapons (a higher-reliability submunition that manufacturers say does not qualify as a cluster bomb due to its low malfunction rate). Yet by
November 2015, eight months into the current war, the Saudis had used up nearly 2,600 PGMs, according to strike metrics compiled by The Washington Institute. In
response, the Saudis requested a $1.29 billion package comprising around 19,000 air-delivered PGMs, an order that began delivery in July 2017. In addition to that
package, the Senate narrowly approved a new $500 million commercial sale of PGMs to Riyadh in June 2017—the first installment in a mammoth $4.46 billion series
Riyadh may be accelerating its
of air-launched munition deals that would provide the Saudis with 104,000 U.S. PGMs in the next half decade.
purchases in anticipation of a prolonged war in Yemen and the potential loss of U.S. sales down the road.
According to Washington Institute data collected in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the kingdom’s forces have used around 14,500
munitions since March 2015, almost all PGMs, with the average rate gradually declining from 333 PGMs per
month in 2015 to 270 per month this year. The U.S. munitions currently arriving in Saudi Arabia were ordered in November 2015, when
Riyadh recognized it might need new PGMs by 2019, but the intervening years have seen few signs of a PGM shortfall. Based on a rough sense of prewar
stocks and a constant dribble of replacements, Riyadh could probably keep bombing at its current rate for
several years even if all new U.S. PGM deals were rejected. Thus, while cutting off such sales may be a
good way to signal U.S. displeasure or publicly distance Washington from the war, the data indicates that it would not
meaningfully slow the air campaign anytime soon.

We have like 50 troops and they aren’t key

Fraker 14 ― Ford Fraker, former president of the Middle East Policy Council, B.A. from
Harvard University, 2014. (“U.S. Commitments To The Gulf Arab States: Are They Adequate?”,
American Power & Interests, June 5th, 2014, Available Online at:
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/mepo.12067 Accessed 8-28-2018)
The other thing I would comment about is the nature of U.S. engagement in the region. Mark made a
comment about everyone measuring the U.S. commitment to the region over the last few years on the
basis of how many boots are on the ground. That's not traditionally the measure. The measure really
is how much behind-the-scenes, ongoing diplomatic engagement and involvement there is. John
Kerry made this point in Davos when he was being challenged about the United States retreating
from the region. He said: Don't measure it on the basis of boots on the ground. We're back to the
situation that preceded the invasion of Iraq, to an engagement that is a lot more diplomatic, a lot
more private, very much behind the scenes, which is traditionally how we've been engaged in the
Middle East. And our engagement at that level is as intense, if not more intense, these days than
ever before.

Cutting off arms sales is perceived as a calculated insult and status denial
Spindel, 18 – Jennifer Spindel – PhD candidate at the time of writing this; currently an assistant
professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma and the associate director of the
Cyber Governance and Policy Center (Jennifer, A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, “BEYOND
MILITARY POWER: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
TRANSFERS” May,
https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/199011/Spindel_umn_0130E_19187.pdf?s
equence=1&isAllowed=y italics in original
weapons can be used as political signals. Arms can be part of a reciprocal agreement for some other good, or they can
There is, however, a sense that

be a means of gaining influence in the receiving state.59 As I show later, weapons are long-term investments and
providing (or denying) new technologies to a state is a central process in the development of status
hierarchies. Unlike iPads, new fighter jet models are not released every year. The transfer of high-tech weapons thus creates durable status hierarchies between and within groups of
states. Additionally,arms can send signals ranging from “gestures of political support,” to friendship and trust, to
signals of technological modernity.60 In sum, arms can do things, but there is no consensus about which arms or what things. There is also a startling lack of attention to the decision not to sell
arms, even though withholding arms can be an act of great political import. Freedman is a rare exception, accurately observing that, “though only
limited political benefits can normally be expected from agreeing to sell arms, since this is seen in commercial terms, refusing to sell arms is a major political

act. It appears as a calculated insult, reflecting on the stability, trust, and credit-worthiness, or technical competence
of the would-be recipient.”61 However, other researchers have not pursued this line of thinking, perhaps because the usual databases focus on the arms transfers that come to
fruition. Since withholding arms means a transfer does not appear in these databases, the act is usually ignored.62

Weapons transfers are the most important political symbol of relations between
states
Spindel, 18 – Jennifer Spindel – PhD candidate at the time of writing this; currently an assistant
professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma and the associate director of the
Cyber Governance and Policy Center (Jennifer, A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, “BEYOND
MILITARY POWER: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
TRANSFERS” May,
https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/199011/Spindel_umn_0130E_19187.pdf?s
equence=1&isAllowed=y
 weapons
Weapons transfers are intimately linked to foreign policy and grand strategy because they reveal information about the political relationship between the sender and receiver. To actors in the international system,

are credible signals of alignment and intentions, even when the weapon does not affect the relative
balance of power. State leaders and policymakers have long observed that weapons transfers have effects beyond the military balance. Scholarly assessments of the consequences of arms transfers have not
incorporated this insight, and thus reaches contradictory conclusions: arms might increase the likelihood of conflict, or decrease it; arms might build alliance trust, or they might undermine it; or, they might have no independent effect

The signals sent by weapons

on state behavior whatsoever.54 I argue that weapons affect a state’s military power and send signals about the relationship between the sending and receiving state.

transfers help states differentiate between close friends, acquaintances, and opponents in a manner that is
clear and comprehensible in an otherwise noisy international system. These political signals have observable effects
on a state’s foreign policy behavior. Weapons are intimately linked to grand strategy and foreign policy because they create two types of power.55 Weapons most clearly provide material
power, enabling a state to more credibly make coercive threats or undertake forceful diplomatic actions because of increased capabilities. Weapons transfers are also signals of political ties, which creates a more diffuse, relational

power. Weapons transfers signal the extent and depth of states’ political alignments, and can even sort states
in intra-group status hierarchies. Weapons transfers are bright lines against the noisy (and sticky)
background that is state’s broader political networks. They affect the shape of and tensions in the network. State leaders use the ties
created by weapons transfers as a convenient shortcut for understanding how states are related to one
another, where the center of power is located, and the relative power of one group of states compared to another. In focusing on the signals sent by weapons transfers, I show, for example, that some transfers facilitate
cooperation, while other transfers incentivize prevention or aggression. These foreign policy outcomes, determined by the signal sent by weapons transfers, more generally show the

importance of the symbols and signals that make and unmake relations that constitute world politics.

Nationalism means prior resilience no longer holds

Hannah ‘19, - senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on U.S.
strategy. He served as Vice President Dick Cheney’s national security advisor from 2005 to
2009. During the first term of President George W. Bush (2001 to 2004), he was Vice President
Cheney’s deputy national security advisor for the Middle East. Hannah worked as a senior
advisor to Secretary of State Warren Christopher during the Bill Clinton administration, and as a
member of Secretary of State James Baker’s Policy Planning Staff during the presidency of
George H. W. Bush. Hannah has also served as deputy director and senior fellow at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and has practiced law, specializing in international
dispute resolution. (John, "Trump Should Salvage U.S.-Saudi Relations" Foreign Policy, 3-27-
19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/27/trump-should-salvage-u-s-saudi-relations/) //AL
there’s a lot of ruin in U.S.-Saudi ties. The relationship has endured oil boycotts, the 9/11 attacks (15 of
It’s true that

the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals), and more than 70 years of constant clashing of cultures and values. The national

interests that have bound Washington and Riyadh together through the decades, despite their deep differences, remain formidable.
But real changes are now afoot in the underlying dynamics of the relationship. They should at minimum
give pause to anyone who blithely assumes that there’s no amount of public derision that the United States could heap on the kingdom that
might put the broader U.S.-Saudi partnership at risk, and the Trump administration should take notice. One such change is the rapid
rise of Saudi nationalism—especially among the country’s large youth population. As part of his reform agenda for transforming the kingdom, Mohammed bin Salman has
consciously sought to build a new sense of identity among Saudis, grounded in nationalism rather than Wahhabism, the fundamentalist religious sect that served as an ideological gateway for
terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State. While largely a positive development, the nationalist tide could have a double edge, as I learned on an Atlantic Council trip to Riyadh in
February. It was striking how many researchers, activists, and government officials in Riyadh seemed defensive, resentful, and even angry when asked about the United States. “We’re getting
sick and tired of having our country reduced to its worst mistakes,” one woman said, referring to the Khashoggi tragedy. Another said, “Thanks to the crown prince, the lives of millions of
women are being positively transformed in ways that our mothers couldn’t even dream of. If the United States can’t appreciate the historical importance of what’s happening here, and chooses to
the sense of hurt, of being
focus only on our faults and trying to change our leadership, then you’re hurting our cause—and I’ll oppose you.” Whether justified or not,

misunderstood and unfairly attacked, even humiliated, appeared genuine. It’s not hard to see how that
kind of raw populist emotion, sufficiently stoked, could result in overreaction, miscalculation,
and counterproductive policies. At a minimum, it’s a new variable in the equation that U.S. policymakers, in both the administration and Congress, should be
taking into account as they calculate how best to pressure the kingdom to change its most problematic behaviors.
The political symbol of a weapons cutoff matters more than the weapon’s actual
utility – the plan severs relations
Spindel, 18 – Jennifer Spindel – PhD candidate at the time of writing this; currently an assistant
professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma and the associate director of the Cyber
Governance and Policy Center (Jennifer, A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, “BEYOND MILITARY POWER: THE
SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TRANSFERS”
May, https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/199011/Spindel_umn_0130E_19187.pdf?sequ
ence=1&isAllowed=y

weapons serve dual functions in international politics. They affect military capabilities but also send signals about political
This example shows that

relationships. I argue that weapons transfers are credible signals of political relationships, and that these
signals matter because they affect the foreign policy behavior of states. Weapons transfers are an
essential tool for producing, sustaining, and severing political ties, even when the weapon does
not affect the relative balance of power. These signals sent through weapons transfers help explain why war does or does not occur, why states pursue
cooperative or belligerent foreign policies at various times, and are tools for establishing hierarchies within alliances