Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA
P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC.,Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are concerned, and
Resolution2 dated July 4, 2013 denying petitioner's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. The CA nullified the preliminary injunction issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City ("intestate court"),
Branch 57 in Sp. Proc. No. M-2629 and reversed said court's Order
dated August 18, 2011 declaring the sales and derivative titles over
two properties subject of intestate proceedings as null and void.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized
by the CA, are as follows: The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without
leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived by her legal heirs,
namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio
(son), Edgardo S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia
S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter).
Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-2629) for
the settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions
and appeal challenging several orders ofthe intestate court that went
all the way up to the Supreme Court. To better understand the myriad
of factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant
consolidated case, this court will resolve the petitions in seriatim.
The Petitions
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R. SP No.
121172 wherein petitioner, RICARDO S. SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO
JR.") assails the Order ofthe intestate court dated 16 June 2011
reinstating RICARDO SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as
administrator to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO
SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated
3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the
motion to withdraw as administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved
by the intestate court and in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was appointed
as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings
to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued between
SILVERIO SR. and SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping appointment of
administrator is summarized below:
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR. was removed as
administrator and in his stead, SILVERIO, JR. was designated as the
new administrator. A motion for reconsideration was separately filed
by SILVERIO SR. and Nelia Silverio-Dee ("SILVERIO-DEE") and on
31 May 2005, the intestate court issued an Omnibus Order affirming
among others, the Order of 3 January 2005. Inthe same Order, the
intestate court also granted the motion of SILVERIO JR. to take his
oath as administrator effective upon receipt of the order and
expunged the inventory report filed by SILVERIO SR.
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the motion filed by
SILVERIO SR. recalled the Order granting letters of administration to
SILVERIO JR. and reinstated SILVERIO SR. as administrator. Then
again, the intestate court acting on the motion for partial consideration
to the Order dated 12 December 2005 filed by SILVERIO JR. issued
an Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006 upholding the grant of
Letters of Administration to SILVERIO JR. and removed SILVERIO
SR., ad administrator for gross violation of his duties and functions
under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
SILVERIO SR. moved for reconsideration of the above Order whereas
SILVERIO-DEE on the other hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. On 28
August 2008, the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered a
decision reinstating SILVERIO, SR. as administrator, the decretal
portion of the Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the
Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and
the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well
as the removal of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate
of Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued is MADE PERMANENT in regard
to the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio.
Costs against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on Certioraribefore the
Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 185619 challenging the 28
Augsut 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11 February 2009,
the Supreme Court issued a resolution denying the petition for failure
to sufficiently show any reversible error inthe assailed judgment to
warrant the exercise by the Court of discretionary appellate
jurisdiction. Acting on SILVERIO JR.’s motion for reconsideration, the
Supreme Court on 11 February 2011, denied the motion with finality.
An entry of judgment was made on 29 March 2011.
On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed before the intestate court, an
urgent motion to be reinstated as administrator of the estate. Acting
on the motion, the intestate court issued the now challenged Order
dated 16 June 2011, the pertinent portion of the Order reads:
xxxx
"WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the sum of TEN MILLION
PESOS, the same to be approved by this Court, Mr. Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. is hereby ordered reinstated as the Administrator to the
estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and to immediately take his oath as
such, and exercise his duties and functions as are incumbent under
the law upon the said position. xxx."
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
xxxx
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and LIGAYA
represented by her legal guardian moved for the disqualification
and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. based on the following
grounds: (1) Absence of the written consent of all parties in interest
allowing JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. to continue hearing the case
considering that he appeared once as counsel in the intestate
proceedings; (2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and
partiality in favor of SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue
several motions and even issued a TRO in violation of the rules
against forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYA’s Petition for Support and
Release of Funds for Medical Support has not been resolved; and (4)
It is in the best interest of all the heirs that the proceedings be
presided and decided by the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying
the Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition. The movants filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated
14 June 2011. Hence, the instant petition.
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
xxxx
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006,
ordered among others, the sale of certain properties belonging to the
estate. The portion of the order which is pertinent to the present
petition reads:
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the
foregoing reasons resolves to grant the following:
(1) xxx
 (2) xxx
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82
Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City, covered by T.C.T.
No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of Makati City; (2)
No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T.
No. 4137154 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City;
and (3) No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City covered
by TCT No. 137156 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati
City to partially settle the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S.
Silverio, and authorizing the Administrator to undertake the
proper procedure or transferring the titles involved to the name
of the estate; and
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in Number 3
above to the payment of taxes, interests, penalties and other
charges, if any, and todistribute the residue among the heirs
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S.
Silverio represented by Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced
II, Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S. SilverioDee in accordance
with the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED."
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October 2007
executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS,
Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner
thereof on 06 September 2010 as evidenced by TCT No. 006-
201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P.
Ocampo (notarized on September 16, 2010) for the lot located at No.
82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City. On 23 December
2010, TCT No. 006-2011000050 was issued toMonica P. Ocampo.
The latter subsequently sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc.
(ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was issued on 11 February
2011 under its name.
In the interim, or on 12 December 2006 SILVERIO-DEE filed a
petition for certioraribefore the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 97196 with prayer for injunctive relief. As prayed for, the Court
of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 5
February 2007. On 4 July 2007, the Court issueda Writ of Preliminary
Injunction conditioned upon the posting of the bond in the amount of
two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00). SILVERIO-DEE posted the
required bond on February 5, 2007 but in an order dated 3 January
2008, the Court ruled that the bond posted by SILVERIO-DEE failed
to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court, however, did not
reverse the ruling granting the injunction but instead ordered
SILVERIO-DEE to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court also
increased the bond from two million to ten million. On 29 February
2008, the Court issued a Resolution approving the ten million bond
and issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Eventually, on 28
August 2008 the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) issued a
decision reinstating SILVERIO SR. as administrator and declaring the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction permanent in regard to the appointment
of administrator.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Application for
the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction (With Motion For the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among others,
that a TRO be issued restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR.,
MONICA OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-
in-interest from committing any act that would affect the titles to the
three properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
(a) To Declare as Null and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16
September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2236121 in the name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the Intestate
Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining SILVERIO JR., their agent or
anybody acting in their behalf from committing any act that would
affect the titles to the properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds
of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering,
annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever deeds,
instruments or any other documents involving voluntary or involuntary
dealings which may have the effect of transferring, conveying,
encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating, or disposing in favor of any
individual or any entity of the subject properties. Subpoena ad
testificandumand duces tecumwas also issued by the intestate court
requiring SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO and ALEXANDRA
GARCIA of CITRINE to testify and bring with them any books and
documents under their control to shed light on the circumstances
surrounding the transaction involving the properties in question.
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr. filed a Supplement to the Urgent
Omnibus Motion dated 14 February 2011. On 18 August 2011, the
intestate court rendered the now assailed Order the decretal portion of
the Order is quoted hereunder:
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010 as
VOID:
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050 in the
name of defendant MONICA OCAMPO or any of her
successors-in-interestincluding all derivative titles, as NULL
AND VOID;
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. 006-2011000190
in the name of ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC. or any of its
successors-in-interest including all derivative titles, as NULL
AND VOID;
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati City to CANCEL Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 006-2011000190 and all of its derivative titles; and 5.
Reinstating the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the
name of RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. AND THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and AS TO THE
INTSIA PROPERTY:
1. The Register of Deeds ofMakati City to CANCEL
Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 006-2010000063, in the
name of CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and all of its
derivative titles; and
2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
223612 in the name of RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR.
and the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ
SILVERIO.
SO ORDERED."
x x x x3
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.") before the CA questioned the following
issuances of the intestate court: CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 – Order
dated June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio, Sr. as Administrator; CA-
G.R. SP No. 121173 – (1) Order dated March 23,2011 granting
Silverio, Sr.’s application for preliminary injunction enjoining Silverio,
Jr. or anyone acting on their behalf from committing any act that
would affect the titles to the subject properties and enjoining the
Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving,
registering, annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever
deeds, instruments or any other documents involving the Cambridge
and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March 23, 2011 which denied
Silverio, Jr.’s motion or disqualification and/or inhibition of Judge
Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated June 14, 2011 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the March 23, 2011 Order (granting application
for preliminary injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 – Order
dated August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and
all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsiaproperties as null
and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the falloof which
reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Court hereby
disposes and orders the following:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172is DENIEDfor lack of
merit. Accordingly, the 16 June 2011 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 reinstating MR.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. as Administrator is AFFIRMED.
 2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173is partly DENIEDfor
lack of merit insofar as it questions the 23 March 2011 Order
denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JR’s Motion for Disqualification
and/or Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. The petition
is partly GRANTEDin that the Preliminary Injunction issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 is
herebydeclared NULL and VOID for being issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the 18 August 2011 Order declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all derivative
titles over the Cambridge and Intsia Property null and void is
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.4
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration5 "insofar as its ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024"
praying that the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court be
affirmed. By Resolution dated July 4, 2013, the CA denied his motion
for partial reconsideration.
Hence, this petition contending thatthe CA committed a reversible
error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and Cambridgeproperties
upon the ground that the intestate court cannotannul the sales as it
has a limited jurisdiction only and which does not includeresolving
issues of ownership. It is asserted that the CA should nothave
stopped there and looked into the nature of the properties sold, which
formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and
Beatriz S. Silverio.
Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order of the intestate court
annulling the sales of the Cambridge and Intsia properties. In the
alternative, should the said sales be upheld, petitioner prays that this
Court (1) declare the sales to be valid only to the extent of 50% net
remainder share of the late Beatriz less the corresponding shares
therefrom of petitioner and the other legal compulsory heirs, and (2)
order respondent Silverio, Jr. to account for the proceeds of sales for
distribution of the residue among the legal/compulsory heirs.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo and
Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued that the intestate court should not have
ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject properties to third parties
after it itself had authorized their disposal in partial settlementof the
estate, especially so when separate actions assailing the new titles
issued to said third parties were already instituted by petitioner.
As to the issue of alleged lack ofprior consent of petitioner to the
aforesaid sales as the surviving spouses with a 50% conjugal share in
the subject properties, respondents point out that such is belied by the
October 31, 2006 Order of the intestate court, which clearly showed
that counsels of all the heirs were present at the hearing of June 16,
2006 and no objection was made by them to the sale of the properties
and the partial settlement of the Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio, together
with the transfer of titles of these properties in the name of the Estate
as prayed for in petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion dated April 19,
2006. Petitioner had not challenged or appealed the said order
authorizing the sale of the subject properties. Thus, it is too late in the
day for petitioner to raise this factual issue before this Court, not to
mention that it cannot be ventilated in the present appeal by certiorari
as thisCourt is not a trier of facts.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its Comment
contending that the intestate court improperly nullified the titles
despite the fact that the present registered owners, who are
indispensable parties, were not impleaded. Indeed, a Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked and may be cancelled only in a direct
proceeding brought for the purpose. Respondent points out that
petitioner himself recognized thata direct action is required to annul a
Torrens title ashe initially instituted two civil complaints before the
RTC of Makati City seeking to annul, among others, the TCT’s issued
to respondent Ocampo for the Cambridge property. After failing to
secure restraining orders in these two civil cases, petitioner filed in the
intestate court his Urgent OmnibusMotion dated February 14, 2011 to
annul the said titles, including that of ZEE2. In any case, respondent
maintains that it is a buyer of good faith and for value, of which the
intestate court never made a determination nor did the aforesaid
Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Omnibus Motion
dated March 4, 2011 contain allegations indicating that respondent
ZEE2 was not a buyer in good faith and for value.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioner’s act of filing a separate
complaint with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction on January 31, 2011 in another court (Civil
Case Nos. 11-084 of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143) constitutes
willful and deliberate forum shopping asthe former also prayedsimilar
primary reliefs and setting up the alleged nullity of the subject deeds
of absolute sale as those raised in the Urgent Omnibus Motion and
Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the intestate court.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction
over properties under administration has the authority not only to
approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an
unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator. Thus we
held in Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 856:
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the
estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is
necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate.
In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the
sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order
of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. And
in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that: x x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval
of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized
disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. Asearly as
1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down
the rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased,
which is not authorized by the probate court is null and void and title
does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and
void the disposition of the property under administration, made by
private respondent, the same having been effected without authority
from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize
and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it
is said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the
proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s
contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale,
would render meaningless the power pertaining to the said court.
(Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics ours) Our jurisprudence is
therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires
court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property
can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a
separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by
respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the intestate court under
its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently, however,
the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject
properties, the CA noted that said ruling is anchored on the fact that
the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in
effect. It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case
making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect
to the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant
of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed
at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in
effect.
The CA’s ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is: Whether the
authority to sell the properties in question granted under the October
31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. A look at the dispositive portion of
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably
conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still good and valid. The
fallo of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the
Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and
the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well
as the removal of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate
of Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued is made permanent in regard to
the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs
against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so
far as it authorizes the saleof the three properties in question was not
declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and void.It
is axiomatic that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that finally
invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of
those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the intestate court when it ordered the sale of
the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as NULL and VOID citing
as justification the decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division
in CAG.R. SP No. 97196. To reiterate, the injunction order which was
made permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was
declared to be limited only to the portion ofthe Omnibus Order that
upheld the grant of letters of administrationby SILVERIO, JR. and the
removal of SILVERIO, SR. as administrator and nothing else.
Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court in its
Order dated 23 March 2011 and challenged by SILVERIO JR. in CA-
G.R. SP No. 121173, we find that it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion as it was directed against acts which were already
[fait]accompli. The preliminary injunction sought to: 1) restrain
SILVERIO JR., their agents, or anybody acting in their behalf or any
person from committing any act that would affect the titles to the
subject properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz
Silverio and (2) enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from
accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any
giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other
documents involving voluntary or involuntary dealings which may
have the effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding,
waiving, alienating or disposing in favor of any individual or any entity
the above-enumerated properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of
the late Beatriz Silverio. However, the records show that when the
preliminary injunction was issued on 23 March 2011 new titles over
the disputed properties were already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS,
INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES INC.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
We affirm the CA.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order was
issued by the intestate court acting upon pending motions filed by
petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., father and son, respectively,
who are the central figures in the now decade-old controversy over
the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court
flip-flopped in appointing as administrator of the estate petitioner and
respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts becoming more
evident to the intestate court as the proceedings suffered delays. At
the hearing of the urgent motion filed by Edmundo Silverio to sell the
subject properties and partially settle the estate, the much awaited
opportunity came when the heirs represented by their respective
counsels interposed no objection to the same.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as
Administrator pursuant to the August 28, 2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), weagree
with the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said
decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions
of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters
of administration to and taking of an oath of administration by
respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly
set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing
the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained
finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court denied with finality
respondent Silverio, Jr.’s motion for reconsideration of the February
11, 2009 Resolution denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No.
185619).1âwphi1
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of
the intestate court annulling the sale of the subject properties
grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.
Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by
the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate court,
having relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior
approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October
31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the
aforesaid sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 8,
2013 and Resolution dated July 4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SO ORDERED. Manila

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. THIRD DIVISION

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February

4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647,
which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January
31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T.

San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of
Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee

Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister
of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico
Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children
of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed
that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined
her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two
motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on
March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his
public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that
the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her
by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying
their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony
E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification
was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending
the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on
which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting
the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134
presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal
capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth
in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and
June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was
without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab
initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines
and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s
legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
27
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January
31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the
records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition
for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article
26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn,
Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O.
No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
— sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2
of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against
divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the
law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to
the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws".
For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner
should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition
for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and
motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the
venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our
rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any
given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was
void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence
of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2,
Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo;
hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in
the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the
time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make
a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence
to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However,
for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence"
of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed
on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue,
we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both
from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature
of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that
she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still marriedto private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where
the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the
said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in
filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that
"the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce
in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions
were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling
has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a
mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending
Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof,
our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino
spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that
the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts
are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to
file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee
and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person
who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce
and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code
by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who,
as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her
status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21,
SUPREME COURT 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. During his
Manila lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia
(Lucia),5 and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on
SECOND DIVISION April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died
without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children,
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011 namely, Gloria,6 Joseph, and Teresa7). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926. They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian,
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his
vs. death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254)
WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents. and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing
and improving the said realties and had been appropriating for himself
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x ₱26,000.00 per month since April 1994.

G.R. No. 177192 Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint
him as special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be issued
vs.
(a) confirming and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA
who would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and
AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in
DAGORO, Respondents.
accordance with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right to
receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate individually
DECISION awarded to them.
NACHURA, J.: On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition
for initial hearing and directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of
petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap (Sebastian)1 and Eduardo G. On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally
Agtarap (Eduardo),2 assailing the Decision dated November 21, admitting the allegations in the petition, and conceding to the
20063 and the Resolution dated March 27, 20074 of the Court of appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73916.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged
The antecedent facts and proceedings— that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin
with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their
(RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose,
settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap and the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by
(Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055. Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was
built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the
following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) which was duly approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July 28,
his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the 1998 – the deceased JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real properties
desire to earn. They claimed that the best interests of the estate consisting of the following:
dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular administrator.
I LAND:
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing
Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquin’s estate. Consequently, it Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030
issued him letters of administration. Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
38254 and 38255 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in City, Metro Manila, described as follows:
intervention, alleging that Mercedes is survived not only by her
daughter Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He also averred that
there is a need to appoint a special administrator to the estate, but TCT LOT AREA/SQ. ZONAL
AMOUNT
claimed that Eduardo is not the person best qualified for the task. NO. NO. M. VALUE

38254 745-B- 1,335 sq. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,675,000.0

After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit 1 m. 0
their respective proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on October
23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition,8 with the following 38255 745-B- 1,331 sq. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,655,000.0
disposition— 2 m. 0

In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed

projects of partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due the TOTAL---------------------------------------------------- ₱13,330,000.
estate as early as 1965, and there being no claim in Court against the --------- 00
estate of the deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now
consequently – ripe – for distribution among the heirs minus the
surviving spouse Caridad Garcia who died on August 25, 1999. II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:

Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ---------------------
the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) ₱350,000.00
---------
and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) -------------------- 320,000.00
by evidence other than their negative allegations, the greater part of ---------
the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. Building Improvements --------------------------- 97,500.00
-----------
The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just
accounting of his administration from his date of assumption up to the Restaurant ------------------------------------------- 80,000.00
year ending December 31, 1996 per Financial and Accounting Report -----------
dated June 2, 1997 which was approved by the Court. The accounting
report included the income earned and received for the period and the TOTAL ------------------------------------------------ ₱847,500.00
expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and allowance of ---------
the widow. In accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report
 TOTAL NET WORTH ----------------------------- ₱14,177,500.00 SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
------------
EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN
AGTARAP with a total value of ₱14,177,500.00, together with Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:
whatever interest from bank deposits and all other incomes or
increments thereof accruing after the Accounting Report of December COMPULSORY HEIRS:
31, 1996, after deducting therefrom the compensation of the
administrator and other expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby
ordered distributed as follows: 1) GLORIA – (deceased) – represented by Walter de Santos –

- ₱295,364.57
TOTAL ESTATE – ₱14,177,500.00
2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
CARIDAD AGTARAP – ½ of the estate as her conjugal share –
₱7,088,750.00, the other half of ₱7,088,750.00 – to be divided among 3) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
the compulsory heirs as follows:
4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
1) JOSE (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30
Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit ₱295,364.57.
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30
Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30 first marriage stand to receive the total amount of:

4) SEBASTIAN - ₱1,181,548.30
HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
5) EDUARDO - ₱1,181,548.30
1avvphi1
6) CARIDAD - ₱1,181,548.30 1) JOSEPH AGTARAP ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros
- Agtarap
The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of
₱1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and ₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half brothers Eduardo and
Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions. ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

2) TERESA AGTARAP ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros

TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 - Agtarap
JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 ₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236,291.66
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
 2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
3) WALTER DE ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)
SANTOS - Agtarap
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
inherit:
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
SEBASTIAN ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad
– ₱1,181,458.30 Garcia
HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
₱ 236,291.66 - as compulsory heir
- share from Milagros
a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999 ₱5,522,854.06

₱7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share EDUARDO – ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad

₱1,181,458.30 Garcia
₱1,181,458.30 - as compulsory ₱ 236,291.66 – as compulsory heir
heir – share from Milagros
₱5,522,854.06
Total of ₱8,270,208.30

b) SEBASTIAN ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory SO ORDERED.9

AGTARAP - heir
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their
₱ 236,291.66 – share from respective motions for reconsideration.
Milagros
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution10 denying the
c) EDUARDO ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory motions for reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting
AGTARAP - heir that of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that the real estate
properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia.
₱ 236,291.66 – share from It also directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of
Milagros Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before
the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian
d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro both appealed to the CA.
as the
surviving spouse of a compulsory On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive
heir portion of which reads—
₱1,181,458.38
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated August
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP: 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto, the subject properties
(Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No.
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP 38255]) and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby
partitioned as follows:
The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced
by TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be
distributed among the following:
Lucia Mendietta - ½ of the property. But since she is deceased, her
share shall be inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal
shares.
Joaquin Agtarap - ½ of the property and ¼ of the other half of the
property which pertains to Lucia Mendietta’s share.
Jesus Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he is already
deceased (and died without issue), his inheritance shall, in turn, be
acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.
Milagros Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since she died in
1996 without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of
Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by
Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he died in
1967, his inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and
children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and
her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa in equal shares.
Then, Joaquin Agtarap’s estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the
subject properties and its improvements, shall be distributed as
follows:
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her
share shall be inherited by her children namely Mercedes Agtarap
(represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter
Cecilia), Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996
without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of
Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by
Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile), Sebastian and Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his
inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in equal shares.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her
inheritance shall be acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and
her daughter Cecile in equal shares.
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions.
Hence, these petitions ascribing to the appellate court the following
errors:
G.R. No. 177192
1. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the
aforementioned important facts12 which alter its Decision;
2. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the
necessity of hearing the issue of legitimacy of respondents as
heirs;
3. – The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law
and in not applying the doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel,
and res judicata.13
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID
NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS
G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE
FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING
THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN
VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED
IN DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF
MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED
AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING THAT THE
PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.)
38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF PASAY
BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR
EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS REGISTERED IN THE
NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA.
UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE COURT HAS
NO POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE
ACTION FOR A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED
WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE
MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF.14
As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian
contends that Joseph and Teresa failed to establish by competent
evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of their father Jose, and
thus of their grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate
of title (TCT No. 8026) they submitted, stating that the wife of their
father Jose is Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their mother
is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph
and Teresa do not qualify as the best evidence of Jose’s marriage
with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not authenticated and formally
offered in evidence. Sebastian also asseverates that he actually
questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in
his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their
opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the failure of
Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to
exclude them as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations
therein. He points out that his motion was denied by the RTC without
a hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the
certificates of title of real estate properties subject of the controversy
are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and
as such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they
are not subject to collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a
separate proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues that
estoppel applies against the children of the first marriage, since none
of them registered any objection to the issuance of the TCTs in the
name of Caridad and Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must
have already been settled in light of the payment of the estate and
inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to the
issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros’ name and of TCT No. 8026 in
the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is
applicable as the court order directing the deletion of the name of
Lucia, and replacing it with the name of Caridad, in the TCTs had long
become final and executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error,
Eduardo alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with the
settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of
settling only one estate in one proceeding. He particularly questions
the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings
despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for
the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo
whatever share that she would receive from Joaquin’s estate. He
states that this violated the rule on precedence of testate over
intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA
gravely erred when it affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of
this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia,
notwithstanding that the certificates of title were registered in the
name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
According to him, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited
jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and authority to determine
questions of ownership, which properly belongs to another court with
general jurisdiction.
The Court’s Ruling
As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue on the ownership of
the subject real properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate
court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with
the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for
this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.16 As held in several cases,17 a probate court or one in
charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses
no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action.18 Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.19 Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.20
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case
considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights
of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership
issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject
properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s
jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.1auuphi1
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition
for judicial settlement of Joaquin’s estate, he alleged that the subject
properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state
that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married
to Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior
to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with
Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were
able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255
were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17,
1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN
AGTARAP, el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con
Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN
AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married
to Lucia Garcia Mendietta).21 When TCT No. 5239 was divided
between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was
issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record
No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was
covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184)22 issued on April 23, 1937, also in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24,
1924, and subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married
Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained an
annotation, which reads—
Ap-4966 – NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo,
tal como aparece, tanchando las palabras "con Lucia Garcia
Mendiet[t]a" y poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en tinta encarnada,
las palabras "en segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia", en
complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el
Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Rizal, en el expediente cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No.
1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada con el No. 4966 del
Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. 32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con
Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en
segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second
marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that
prior to the replacement of Caridad’s name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia,
upon her demise, already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal
share in TCT No. 32184. Lucia’s share in the property covered by the
said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the certificates
of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255.
And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived by her
compulsory heirs – Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated,
and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings
of either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the
properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal partnership
to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and
Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of
Lucia, the same should be consolidated with the settlement
proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s spouse.24 Accordingly, the CA
correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her
compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the
RTC and the CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos.
38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the owners of the properties
covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration
in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad
Garcia, deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a
collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a
certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of a holder’s true
ownership of property.25 A certificate of title under the Torrens system
aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the
deprivation of ownership.26 Thus, the fact that the properties were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia,
is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the
spouses’ coverture.27The phrase "married to Caridad Garcia" in the
TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the
registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are
their conjugal properties.28
Neither can Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have
already been settled in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax
be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the
estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court—
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance
to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of
the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate,
and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive share to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after
the payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The
records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in
1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph
and Teresa, suffice it to say that both the RTC and the CA found them
to be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that Sebastian
did not present clear and convincing evidence to support his
averments in his motion to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside
from his negative allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph
and Teresa being the children of Jose was never questioned by
Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two even admitted this in their
petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21, 1995
hearing.29 Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of fact in its
November 21, 2006 Decision.30
Also, Sebastian’s insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de
Santos are not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per
its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria
Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in
the proceedings below by her husband Walter de Santos. Gloria
begot a daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de
Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995,
Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene, alleging
that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father of
Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later
granted the motion, thereby admitting his answer on October 18,
1995.31 The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the motion to
intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not
interpose any objection when the intervention was submitted to the
RTC for resolution.32
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no
compelling reason to hold that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph,
Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated
in the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present
competent evidence to refute his and Eduardo’s admissions that
Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of
Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos
and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so.
Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to
participate in the estate in representation of the Joaquin’s compulsory
heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.33
This Court also differs from Eduardo’s asseveration that the CA erred
in settling, together with Joaquin’s estate, the respective estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the November
21, 2006 CA Decision would readily show that the disposition of the
properties related only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited above,
the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the
lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after the
payment of the obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said
provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria
in the distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence
of the settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardo’s position that the CA erred in
distributing Joaquin’s estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of
Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was
instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros
before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City.34 While there has been no
showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share
from Joaquin’s estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated
and approved, prudence dictates that this Court refrain from
distributing Milagros’ share in Joaquin’s estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010,
per his Certificate of Death.35 He is survived by his wife Teresita B.
Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap
(Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006
Decision and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be
affirmed with modifications such that the share of Milagros shall not
yet be distributed until after the final determination of the probate of
her purported will, and that Sebastian shall be represented by his
compulsory heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of
merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY
GRANTED, such that the Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the
Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: that the share
awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until the
final determination of the probate of her will, and that petitioner
Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on January 15, 2010,
shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children
Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.

These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 114, Pasay City, for further proceedings in the settlement of
the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION
G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched
imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued.
We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find
a need to replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No.
183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of
administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a
bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make
a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by
the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject
estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the
parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4
June 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay
(Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren,
including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and
Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his
parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared
from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived
with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of
Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents,
along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic
relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel
Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his
wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared
as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel
Cojuangco on the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the
Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of
parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the
hospital, he continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves
manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time,
until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-
psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked
progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and
wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was
effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in.
This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under
Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew
about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff
continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very
complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist
handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in
reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico
and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with
Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The
Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC)
granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which
was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped,
because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in court that her
grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition,
pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he
should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2) as part
owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he
must be accorded preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel
and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more
than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition was
incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III
and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had
administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to
protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of
the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7)
Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of
usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation
to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the
latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and
void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically
declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable
marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article
85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all
represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the
decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to
administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of
administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an
Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better
equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the
decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court
rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent
Cristina’s intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED
and the Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby
appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned
as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts,
legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of
Administration be issued in his favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III,
and appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision
dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to
Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the
intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of
administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱ 200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and
set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include
Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his
interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between
Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina,
and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as
their grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the
estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their
conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their
marriage;
3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still
commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because her
share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and
unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to
share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir,
one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of
his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of
Appeals’ Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her
status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks
to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code
must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had
demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he
does not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate
grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary
thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no
interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator
thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations since his appointment as
administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically
demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for
joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be
represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as
between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator
of the decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his
demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III
should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother,
Cristina, as a co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to
make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June
2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed,
if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of
preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of
preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the
next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator,
has been reinforced in jurisprudence.8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s
interest in the estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6,
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind
the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer
the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have
the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s
estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an
interest therein greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse
in the administration of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving
spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership or community property
forming part of the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is
a compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from
her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the
appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an
exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be
issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In addition
and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies,
resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, x x x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more
than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those
interested therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a
person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a
great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power
of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the
appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests
represented;15 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of
the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the
best interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the
appointment of special co-administrators during the pendency of the
appeal for the probate of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate
thereof, we recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s
estate as universal heir and executrix designated in the instrument
who should not be excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we
held that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions among
the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted
heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be
represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held
that "inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal
properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the
probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.
Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse
and legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators.
However, we drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next
of kin, the nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has
been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is
generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is
more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.
‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the
amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the
nearest of kin is to be preferred.’" (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court,
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano.
Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled
to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura,
namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated
preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to
be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving
spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or
Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion
of the Court, in order to represent both interests.22 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the
legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually
as regular administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the
surviving spouse who the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating
Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for
appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of
heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason
to set aside the probate court’s refusal to appoint as special co-
administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the
estate of the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs,
because the evidence weighed by the probate court pointed to Diaz’s
being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein
the early part of his administration. Surveying the previously
discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified,
thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales,
Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in
the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not
establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to
appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective
interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents
for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also
two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now
whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs
are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound
discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge
upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of
the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias
this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator
because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix
designated in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest"
deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite
significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it
best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave
abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the
applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special
administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice
of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and
the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for
this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is
also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of
conflicting interests among the heirs therein was not per se the key
factor in the designation of a second special administrator as this fact
was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to
"overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of
"impracticality and lack of kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the
decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered
opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal
properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the
probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The
special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we
held that the widow would have more interest than any other next of
kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she
possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal
partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate may
affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership
thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the
distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular
administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the
probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the
exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona
and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary
interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that were not
necessarily related to the demand for representation being repeatedly
urged by respondents.26 (Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the
mandatory character of the rule on the order of preference for the
issuance of letters of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and
requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator.
It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to
imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without
any valid and sufficient reason therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the
legal contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks
of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the
statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose
relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of
whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an
heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and
pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within
bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship
of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size
of, and benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed
as co-administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or,
from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the
appointment of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of
preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny
of the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration
thereof. We are led to a review of such position by the foregoing
survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the
estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to
co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs
nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment
of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in
the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and
undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a
matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends
on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances
of this case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent
greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity
between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other,
traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were
alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of some
kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately
interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and
Emilio III working harmoniously as co-administrators may
result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying
settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management
of Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare
and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-
administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned
out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel
points out that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the
subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice
thereof as evidenced by the following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a
complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed
therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of
land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor
vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section
1,36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against
Federico’s settlement of the decedent’s estate which
adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly
belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and
which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave
any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to
succeed to her estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio
III to respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14,
2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties
of the decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to
different individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay
himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason
of falsified documents;38
Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in
assuming and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina’s
estate:
1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as
administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had
vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office,
arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001
is not among the judgments authorized by the Rules of Court
which may be immediately implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to
Isabel’s vociferous objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as
administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the
Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent
in the nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy
process of settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that it
cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s
properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges
where Isabel, as private complainant, has been unwilling to
appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn
the prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the
cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the
blamed delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the
nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the
settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on
Isabel’s accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties
in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew existed and
which he claims to be knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability
as administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true
and complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually
filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on
two occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory
heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and
executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the
decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if
any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s
omission and inaction become even more significant and speak
volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his
interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and
the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and
respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To
our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two
to work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The
allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other
witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were
estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that
Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears
detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator
(Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately
interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply
a preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate,
we here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his
interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of
Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable participation of
"any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" in
either testate or intestate proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment,
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of
evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place
of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to
persons interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to
the persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition
seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the
estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the
estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the
estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or
provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy
found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. – If
an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle
the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the
court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or
becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge
the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit
him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him.
If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may
be granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial
restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the
decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or
the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is
better qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to
refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and
Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the
properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains
good law:
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature,
although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed
the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the
proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the
estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there
is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental
Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which
issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the
operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional
and void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated
its Decision on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in
Baguio, acting separately from the Second Division of the Supreme
Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the
Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and
another Special Second Division acting independently of the Second
Division of the Supreme Court in Manila.47
For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in
Baguio is not a different division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on
16 June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now
has a different composition, with the advent of Justice Nachura’s
retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of
decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents
subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. – Motions for
reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution
and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case
shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the
Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the
motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced
through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new
Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the
decision or signed resolution and who concurred therein. If only one
Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition
of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be
designated as the new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the
decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the
Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on
the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be
replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be
chosen from the other Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as
replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new
Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement
Member of the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by
raffle from among the other Members of the Court to constitute a
Special Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the
Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court,
the case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion
shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other
Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial
of the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be
acted upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the other
Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said
pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a
change in venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last
April.48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010
is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan
is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as
President and Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippines
International Life Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN
ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85
presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF
COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G.
RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be
Special Administratrix, and other persons/ public officers acting
for and in their behalf, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, First Division, dated July 26, 2000, in CA G.R. 59736, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Jose C. Lee
and Alma Aggabao (in their capacities as president and secretary,
respectively, of Philippine International Life Insurance Company) and
Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
The antecedent facts follow.
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the
company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of
the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana
Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio
Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein
private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings
Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).2
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Dr. Ortañez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which petition
to date remains pending at Branch 85 thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed
an opposition to the petition for letters of administration and, in a
subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a
special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding judge of
Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortañez joint special
administrators of their father’s estate. Hearings continued for the
appointment of a regular administrator (up to now no regular
administrator has been appointed).
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and
Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which
included, among other properties, 2,0293 shares of stock in Philippine
International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife),
representing 50.725% of the company’s outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming
that she owned 1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal
share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor
of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG),
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana
Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated
period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in
its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in
his personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining
1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the
estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein
petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose
C. Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the
ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortañez failed
to repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency
of the intestate proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortañez and her two children, Special
Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum
of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate (including
the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the
basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortañez on
April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortañez on October 30,
1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez–
Enderes and her siblings (hereafter referred to as private respondents
Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special administrator
of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of
private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed private respondent
Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an
urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement
dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to
declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the
decedent’s estate. These motions were opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent
motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares
of stock, which move was again opposed by Special Administrator
Jose Ortañez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion for (1)
the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock
and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as special
administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that
there were no longer any shares of stock for her to administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez for the approval of the deeds of
sale for the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a
property of the estate without an Order of the probate court is void
and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales in question were
entered into by Juliana S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez in their
personal capacity without prior approval of the Court, the same is not
binding upon the Estate.
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the approval of the sale of
Philinterlife shares of stock and release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-
Enderes as Special Administratrix is hereby denied.6
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting
the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the
March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of
estate. The court reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court dated August 11, 1997
DENYING the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stocks and
release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as Special Administratrix, the
"Urgent Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Memorandum of Agreement"
dated December 19, 1995. . . is hereby impliedly partially resolved
insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of
stock are concerned, in particular, No. 5, 9(c), 10(b) and 11(d)(ii) of
the Memorandum of Agreement.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the Memorandum of
Agreement dated March 4, 1982 executed by Juliana S. Ortañez,
Rafael S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez as partially void ab
initio insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife
shares of stocks are concerned.7
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose
Ortañez filed, on December 22, 1997, a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied his petition, however,
ruling that there was no legal justification whatsoever for the
extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose Ortañez, his brother Rafael
Ortañez and mother Juliana Ortañez during the pendency of the
settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, without the requisite approval
of the intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to
the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale
made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez to FLAG of the
shares of stock they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without
approval of the intestate court, was void.8
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. He elevated the
case to the Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45 which
the Supreme Court dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality.
His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on January 13,
1999. On February 23, 1999, the resolution of the Supreme Court
dismissing the petition of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez became
final and was subsequently recorded in the book of entries of
judgments.
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, with the
rest of the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the
authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the
50.725% controlling interest of the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, in
the insurance company.9 This became the subject of a separate
action at the Securities and Exchange Commission filed by private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes against petitioner Jose
Lee and other members of the FLAG-controlled board of Philinterlife
on November 7, 1994. Thereafter, various cases were filed by Jose
Lee as president of Philinterlife and Juliana Ortañez and her sons
against private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes in the SEC
and civil courts.10 Somehow, all these cases were connected to the
core dispute on the legality of the sale of decedent Dr. Ortañez’s
Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioner FLAG, represented by its
president, herein petitioner Jose Lee who later became the president
of Philinterlife after the controversial sale.
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes
and her siblings filed a motion for execution of the Orders of the
intestate court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997 because the
orders of the intestate court nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court) had long became final. Respondent-
Special Administratrix Enderes served a copy of the motion to
petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary,
respectively, of Philinterlife,11 but petitioners ignored the same.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution,
the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution issue as
follows:
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife
shares in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez to
Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG);
2. Commanding the President and the Corporate Secretary of
Philinterlife to reinstate in the stock and transfer book of
Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock in the name
of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez as the owner thereof
without prejudice to other claims for violation of pre-emptive
rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of
Philinterlife to issue stock certificates of Philinterlife for 2,029
shares in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez as
the owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for
violations of pre-emptive rights pertaining to the said 2,029
Philinterlife shares and,
4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma. Divina
Ortañez-Enderes, has the power to exercise all the rights
appurtenant to the said shares, including the right to vote and
to receive dividends.
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons
claiming to represent it or otherwise, to acknowledge and allow
the said Special Administratrix to exercise all the aforesaid
rights on the said shares and to refrain from resorting to any
action which may tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct
or bar the free exercise thereof under pain of contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible
officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other person or persons
claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed to
comply with this order within three (3) days from receipt hereof
under pain of contempt.
 7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are
hereby directed to implement the writ of execution with
dispatch to forestall any and/or further damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.12
In the several occasions that the sheriff went to the office of
petitioners to execute the writ of execution, he was barred by the
security guard upon petitioners’ instructions. Thus, private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes filed a motion to cite
herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and
secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife) in contempt.13
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate court gravely abused its
discretion in (1) declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the
Philinterlife shares of stock was null and void; (2) ordering the
execution of its order declaring such nullity and (3) depriving the
petitioners of their right to due process.
On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright:
We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the light of the following
considerations:
1. The assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the
respondent judge had long become final and executory;
2. The certification on non-forum shopping is signed by only
one (1) of the three (3) petitioners in violation of the Rules; and
3. Except for the assailed orders and writ of execution, deed of
sale with right to repurchase, deed of sale of shares of stocks
and omnibus motion, the petition is not accompanied by such
pleadings, documents and other material portions of the record
as would support the allegations therein in violation of the
second paragraph, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.14
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and Aggabao
of the above decision was denied by the Court of Appeals on October
30, 2000:
This resolves the "urgent motion for reconsideration" filed by the
petitioners of our resolution of July 26, 2000 dismissing outrightly the
above-entitled petition for the reason, among others, that the assailed
Order dated August 11, 1997 of the respondent Judge had long
become final and executory.
Dura lex, sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.15
On December 4, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme
Court through a petition for review under Rule 45 but on December
13, 2000, we denied the petition because there was no showing that
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 59736 committed any
reversible error to warrant the exercise by the Supreme Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.16
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and
Aggabao, the Supreme Court granted the motion and reinstated their
petition on September 5, 2001. The parties were then required to
submit their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes, on
July 19, 2000, filed a motion to direct the branch clerk of court in lieu
of herein petitioners Lee and Aggabao to reinstate the name of Dr.
Ortañez in the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife and issue the
corresponding stock certificate pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides that "the court may direct the act to be
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person
appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have the effect
as if done by the party." Petitioners Lee and Aggabao opposed the
motion on the ground that the intestate court should refrain from
acting on the motion because the issues raised therein were directly
related to the issues raised by them in their petition for certiorari at the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59736. On October 30,
2000, the intestate court granted the motion, ruling that there was no
prohibition for the intestate court to execute its orders inasmuch as
the appellate court did not issue any TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction.
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and Aggabao filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
62461, questioning this time the October 30, 2000 order of the
intestate court directing the branch clerk of court to issue the stock
certificates. They also questioned in the Court of Appeals the order of
the intestate court nullifying the sale made in their favor by Juliana
Ortañez and Jose Ortañez. On November 20, 2002, the Court of
Appeals denied their petition and upheld the power of the intestate
court to execute its order. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao then filed
motion for reconsideration which at present is still pending resolution
by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary,
respectively, of Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise the following errors
for our consideration:
The Court of Appeals committed grave reversible ERROR:
A. In failing to reconsider its previous resolution denying the
petition despite the fact that the appellate court’s mistake in
apprehending the facts had become patent and evident from
the motion for reconsideration and the comment of respondent
Enderes which had admitted the factual allegations of
petitioners in the petition as well as in the motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, the resolution of the appellate court
denying the motion for reconsideration was contained in only
one page without even touching on the substantive merits of
the exhaustive discussion of facts and supporting law in the
motion for reconsideration in violation of the Rule on
administrative due process;
B. in failing to set aside the void orders of the intestate court
on the erroneous ground that the orders were final and
executory with regard to petitioners even as the latter were
never notified of the proceedings or order canceling its
ownership;
C. in not finding that the intestate court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction (1) when it
issued the Omnibus Order nullifying the ownership of
petitioner FLAG over shares of stock which were alleged to be
part of the estate and (2) when it issued a void writ of
execution against petitioner FLAG as present owner to
implement merely provisional orders, thereby violating FLAG’s
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due
process;
D. In failing to declare null and void the orders of the intestate
court which nullified the sale of shares of stock between the
legitimate heir Jose S. Ortañez and petitioner FLAG because
of settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that an heir has the right
to dispose of the decedent’s property even if the same is
under administration pursuant to Civil Code provision that
possession of hereditary property is transmitted to the heir the
moment of death of the decedent (Acedebo vs. Abesamis, 217
SCRA 194);
E. In disregarding the final decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 128525 dated December 17, 1999 involving
substantially the same parties, to wit, petitioners Jose C. Lee
and Alma Aggabao were respondents in that case while
respondent Ma. Divina Enderes was the petitioner therein.
That decision, which can be considered law of the case, ruled
that petitioners cannot be enjoined by respondent Enderes
from exercising their power as directors and officers of
Philinterlife and that the intestate court in charge of the
intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate title to properties
claimed to be part of the estate and which are equally
CLAIMED BY petitioner FLAG.17
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and
FLAG, assail before us not only the validity of the writ of execution
issued by the intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also the validity of
the August 11, 1997 order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of
the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez and
Jose Ortañez, in their personal capacities and without court approval,
in favor of petitioner FLAG.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of
the Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor because this was already
settled a long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated
June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was
effectively upheld by us in our resolution dated October 9, 1998 in
G.R. No. 135177 dismissing the petition for review on a technicality
and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on January 13,
1999 on the ground that there was no compelling reason to reconsider
said denial.18 Our decision became final on February 23, 1999 and
was accordingly entered in the book of entry of judgments. For all
intents and purposes therefore, the nullity of the sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose
Ortañez in favor of petitioner FLAG is already a closed case. To
reopen said issue would set a bad precedent, opening the door wide
open for dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable decisions no end.
This is completely inimical to the orderly and efficient administration of
justice.
The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342
affirming the nullity of the sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother
Juliana Ortañez of the Philinterlife shares of stock read:
Petitioner’s asseverations relative to said [memorandum] agreement
were scuttled during the hearing before this Court thus:
JUSTICE AQUINO:
Counsel for petitioner, when the Memorandum of Agreement
was executed, did the children of Juliana Salgado know
already that there was a claim for share in the inheritance of
the children of Novicio?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Your Honor please, at that time, Your Honor, it is already
known to them.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
What can be your legal justification for extrajudicial settlement
of a property subject of intestate proceedings when there is an
adverse claim of another set of heirs, alleged heirs? What
would be the legal justification for extra-judicially settling a
property under administration without the approval of the
intestate court?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Well, Your Honor please, in that extra-judicial settlement there
is an approval of the honorable court as to the property’s
partition x x x. There were as mentioned by the respondents’
counsel, Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
No…
JUSTICE AQUINO:
The point is, there can be no adjudication of a property under
intestate proceedings without the approval of the court. That is
basic unless you can present justification on that. In fact, there
are two steps: first, you ask leave and then execute the
document and then ask for approval of the document
executed. Now, is there any legal justification to exclude this
particular transaction from those steps?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
None, Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
With that admission that there is no legal justification, Your
Honor, we rest the case for the private respondent. How can
 the lower court be accused of abusing its discretion? (pages
33-35, TSN of January 29, 1998).
Thus, We find merit in the following postulation by private respondent:
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the
decedent without securing court approval have appropriated as their
own personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the exclusion
and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other words,
these heirs, without court approval, have distributed the asset of the
estate among themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third
parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by the Estate
Court. As admitted by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no
legal justification for this action by the heirs. There being no legal
justification, petitioner has no basis for demanding that public
respondent [the intestate court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife
shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortañez in favor of the
Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the Memorandum of
Agreement dated March 4, 1982 (see Annex 7 of the Comment). . .
are not the only heirs claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortañez. The records of this case. . . clearly show that as
early as March 3, 1981 an Opposition to the Application for Issuance
of Letters of Administration was filed by the acknowledged natural
children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez with Ligaya Novicio. . . This claim
by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez is
admittedly known to the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement
before they executed the same. This much was admitted by
petitioner’s counsel during the oral argument. xxx
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable jurisprudence, public
respondent can never be faulted for not approving. . . the subsequent
sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortañez] and his mother [Juliana Ortañez]
of the Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortañez." (pages 3-4 of Private Respondent’s Memorandum; pages
243-244 of the Rollo)
Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction committed by respondent
judge.19
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her
three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly
entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning
the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that
there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final
settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation
of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose,
Rafael and Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof
by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval,
was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent.20 However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the
estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the
probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all
debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have
been given their shares.21 This means that an heir may only sell
his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property
therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold
specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in
Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do
pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court
because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to
the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the
estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is
necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate.
In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano,22 we laid down the rule that
the sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the
order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,23 we ruled that:
[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned properties (fishpond)
were included in the inventory of properties of the estate submitted by
then Administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera on November 14, 1974.
Private respondent was appointed as administratrix of the estate on
March 3, 1976 in lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1,
1978, the questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed
between petitioner and private respondent without notice and
approval of the probate court. Even after the sale, administratrix
Aurora Carreon still included the three fishponds as among the real
properties of the estate in her inventory submitted on August 13,
1981. In fact, as stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner, at the time
of the sale of the fishponds in question, knew that the same were part
of the estate under administration.
xxx xxx xxx
The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the
probate court which according to our settled jurisprudence has the
authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under
administration. . . More emphatic is the declaration We made in Estate
of Olave vs. Reyes (123 SCRA 767) where We stated that when the
estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (149
SCRA 174), We held that the sale of an immovable property
belonging to the estate of a decedent, in a special proceedings, needs
court approval. . . This pronouncement finds support in the previous
case of Dolores Vda. De Gil vs. Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797)
wherein We emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a probate
court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval
of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized
disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As early as
1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil 347), We laid down
the rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased,
which is not authorized by the probate court is null and void and title
does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and
void the disposition of the property under administration, made by
private respondent, the same having been effected without authority
from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize
and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it
is said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the
proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s
contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale,
would render meaningless the power pertaining to the said court.
(Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (emphasis ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court,
there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its
order nullifying the invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to
execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of
estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or
fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In
other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or
probate court’s power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions
to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the
sale was affirmed by the appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23, 1998 and subsequently by the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135177 dated October 9, 1998). The
finality of the decision of the Supreme Court was entered in the book
of entry of judgments on February 23, 1999. Considering the finality of
the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as affirmed by the
appellate courts, it was correct for private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move for a writ of execution and
for the intestate court to grant it.
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG, however, contend
that the probate court could not issue a writ of execution with regard
to its order nullifying the sale because said order was merely
provisional:
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to determine
provisionally whether said shares are included or excluded in the
inventory… In ordering the execution of the orders, respondent judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction and grossly violated settled law and
jurisprudence, i.e., that the determination by a probate or intestate
court of whether a property is included or excluded in the inventory of
the estate being provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of
execution.24 (emphasis ours)
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced. There is no question, based on
the facts of this case, that the Philinterlife shares of stock were part of
the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez from the very start as in fact these
shares were included in the inventory of the properties of the estate
submitted by Rafael Ortañez after he and his brother, Jose Ortañez,
were appointed special administrators by the intestate court.25
The controversy here actually started when, during the pendency of
the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, his wife Juliana Ortañez
sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock in favor petitioner FLAG
without the approval of the intestate court. Her son Jose Ortañez later
sold the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG
without the approval of the intestate court.
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of
properties in the inventory of the estate because there is no question
that, from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock were owned
by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez. Rather, we are concerned
here with the effect of the sale made by the decedent’s heirs,
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the required approval
of the intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners
that the determination of the intestate court was merely provisional
and should have been threshed out in a separate proceeding is
incorrect.
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that the
writ of execution should not be executed against them because they
were not notified, nor they were aware, of the proceedings nullifying
the sale of the shares of stock.
We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein petitioner
FLAG can be struck down by the intestate court after a clear showing
of the nullity of the alienation. This is the logical consequence of our
ruling in Godoy andin several subsequent cases.26 The sale of any
property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir
without order of the probate or intestate court is void and passes
no title to the purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao et al. vs. Hon. Melencio
Geneto, G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the probate court
to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued to the vendees at the
instance of the administrator after finding that the sale of real property
under probate proceedings was made without the prior approval of the
court. The dispositive portion of our decision read:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed
Order dated February 18, 1981 of the respondent Judge approving
the questioned Amicable Settlement is declared NULL and VOID and
hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the sale in favor of Sotero
Dioniosio III and by the latter to William Go is likewise declared NULL
and VOID. The Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the latter is
hereby ordered cancelled.
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlife’s authorized
capital stock, approved on the vote of petitioners’ non-existent
shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it difficult for Dr.
Ortañez’s estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife,
was likewise void ab initio.
Petitioners next argue that they were denied due process.
We do not think so.
The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only to them, did
not appeal the decision of the intestate court nullifying the sale of
shares of stock in their favor. Only the vendor, Jose Ortañez,
appealed the case. A careful review of the records shows that
petitioners had actual knowledge of the estate settlement proceedings
and that they knew private respondent Enderes was questioning
therein the sale to them of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
It must be noted that private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes filed before the intestate court (RTC of Quezon City, Branch
85) a "Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Deeds of Sale of Philinterlife
Shares of Stock" on March 22, 1996. But as early as 1994, petitioners
already knew of the pending settlement proceedings and that the
shares they bought were under the administration by the intestate
court because private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and
her mother Ligaya Novicio had filed a case against them at the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 1994,
docketed as SEC No. 11-94-4909, for annulment of transfer of shares
of stock, annulment of sale of corporate properties, annulment of
subscriptions on increased capital stocks, accounting, inspection of
corporate books and records and damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.27 In said
case, Enderes and her mother questioned the sale of the aforesaid
shares of stock to petitioners. The SEC hearing officer in fact, in his
resolution dated March 24, 1995, deferred to the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to rule on the validity of the sale of shares of stock sold
to petitioners by Jose Ortañez and Juliana Ortañez:
Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife shares of Dr. Juvencio
Ortañez who died, in 1980, are part of his estate which is presently
the subject matter of an intestate proceeding of the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 85. Although, private respondents [Jose Lee et al.]
presented the documents of partition whereby the foregoing share of
stocks were allegedly partitioned and conveyed to Jose S. Ortañez
who allegedly assigned the same to the other private respondents,
approval of the Court was not presented. Thus, the assignments to
the private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] of the subject shares of
stocks are void.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares of stock
owned by the late Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, we rule that the matter
properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the regular court where the
intestate proceedings are currently pending.28
With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer dated as early as
March 24, 1995 recognizing the jurisdiction of the intestate court to
determine the validity of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Dr.
Ortañez and the subsequent sale by the heirs of the decedent of the
Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioners, how can petitioners claim
that they were not aware of the intestate proceedings?
Furthermore, when the resolution of the SEC hearing officer reached
the Supreme Court in 1996 (docketed as G.R. 128525), herein
petitioners who were respondents therein filed their answer which
contained statements showing that they knew of the pending intestate
proceedings:
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not within the jurisdiction of
the SEC but with the Regional Trial Court; Ligaya Novicio and children
represented themselves to be the common law wife and illegitimate
children of the late Ortañez; that on March 4, 1982, the surviving
spouse Juliana Ortañez, on her behalf and for her minor son Antonio,
executed a Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons Rafael
and Jose, both surnamed Ortañez, dividing the estate of the
deceased composed of his one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal
properties; that in the said Memorandum of Agreement, Jose S.
Ortañez acquired as his share of the estate the 1,329 shares of stock
in Philinterlife; that on March 4, 1982, Juliana and Rafael assigned
their respective shares of stock in Philinterlife to Jose; that contrary to
the contentions of petitioners, private respondents Jose Lee, Carlos
Lee, Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of
Philinterlife on March 23, 1983 when Jose S. Ortañez, the principal
stockholder at that time, executed a deed of sale of his shares of
stock to private respondents; and that the right of petitioners to
question the Memorandum of Agreement and the acquisition of
shares of stock of private respondent is barred by prescription.29
Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes offered
additional proof of actual knowledge of the settlement proceedings by
petitioners which petitioners never denied: (1) that petitioners were
represented by Atty. Ricardo Calimag previously hired by the mother
of private respondent Enderes to initiate cases against petitioners
Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao for the nullification of the sale of the
shares of stock but said counsel made a conflicting turn-around and
appeared instead as counsel of petitioners, and (2) that the deeds of
sale executed between petitioners and the heirs of the decedent
(vendors Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez) were acknowledged
before Atty. Ramon Carpio who, during the pendency of the
settlement proceedings, filed a motion for the approval of the sale of
Philinterlife shares of stock to the Knights of Columbus Fraternal
Association, Inc. (which motion was, however, later abandoned).30 All
this sufficiently proves that petitioners, through their counsels, knew of
the pending settlement proceedings.
Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such as libel (Criminal
Case No. 97-7179-81), grave coercion (Criminal Case No. 84624) and
robbery (Criminal Case No. Q-96-67919) against private respondent’s
mother Ligaya Novicio who was a director of Philinterlife,31 all of which
criminal cases were related to the questionable sale to petitioners of dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and affirming the July 6,
the Philinterlife shares of stock. 2000 order of the trial court which ordered the execution of its (trial
court’s) August 11 and 29, 1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept petitioners’ claim
of denial of due process. The essence of due process is the SO ORDERED.
reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where the opportunity to be
heard has been accorded, there is no denial of due process.32 In this Vitug, (Chairman), and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
case, petitioners knew of the pending instestate proceedings for the Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., no part.
settlement of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez’s estate but for reasons they alone
knew, they never intervened. When the court declared the nullity of
the sale, they did not bother to appeal. And when they were notified of
the motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court, they
ignored the same. Clearly, petitioners alone should bear the blame.

Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our ruling in G.R. No.
128525 entitled Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes vs. Court of
Appeals, dated December 17, 1999, where we allegedly ruled that the
intestate court "may not pass upon the title to a certain property for
the purpose of determining whether the same should or should not be
included in the inventory but such determination is not conclusive and
is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding ownership
which may be constituted by the parties."

We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No. 128525. The issue
therein was whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
resolution of the SEC that Enderes et al. were not entitled to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. We ruled that the Court
of Appeals was correct in affirming the resolution of the SEC denying
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because injunction is
not designed to protect contingent rights. Said case did not rule on
the issue of the validity of the sale of shares of stock belonging to the
decedent’s estate without court approval nor of the validity of the writ
of execution issued by the intestate court. G.R. No. 128525 clearly
involved a different issue and it does not therefore apply to the
present case.

Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under them are hereby
warned not to further delay the execution of the Orders of the intestate
court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26, 2000,
 On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional
Republic of the Philippines Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval
SUPREME COURT of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Manila Edmond Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the
ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
SECOND DIVISION
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the
G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996 house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the
testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Angeline4 — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
Executor, petitioner,
vs. On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments
MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle
ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent
PASIG, respondents. after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on
the estate.5
DECISION
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay
PUNO, J.: the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate
court approved the release of P7,722.00.6
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
decision dated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of
5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045. the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted
the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a
P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and
his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of
The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with
real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.2 the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion
and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs"
and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will."
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash
Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria
component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution
private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For
of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and
unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any
the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the
action for the probate of his father's holographic will.
holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for
release of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of
petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent
payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered
the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties
bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes
upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his
opposition to respondent Montes's motion for release of rent
payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner
likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that
he was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact
that the lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been
renewed for another year.7
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22,
1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such
amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration
and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters
subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.
The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. 8 The
court stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the
parties the court resolves to allow Administrator Edmond M.
Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited with
the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such
amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn
Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are
subject to collation and deductible from the share in the
inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed the fruits
or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria
Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-named heirs, the same is
hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of
six (6) months from the date of first publication of Notice to
Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby
ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses necessary
for administration including provisions for the support Of Maria
Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria
Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be withdrawn and
cause the publication of the notice to creditors with reasonable
dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge, the
appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate
court's order in a decision dated November 10, 199410 and a
resolution dated January 5, 1995.11
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN
GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1)
DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE
POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT,
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN
ESTATE, TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED
THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND
DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE
ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND
 DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting
the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and
obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds
of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to
order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant
possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during
the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the
minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive
allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings.
He contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for
an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer
minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition,
the provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which
excludes the latter's grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83
should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the
deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides
that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or
gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to
support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the
age of majority.15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support
from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the
allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain
the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of
the testator pending settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the
titles of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months
after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order
releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the following
conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. —
Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may,
in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper
and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the
heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set
forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable
to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the
court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of
a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon
notice shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor
or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who
are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the
law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum
 to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax
have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to
the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of
"notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario
Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate
had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is
one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the
estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a
bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in
proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at
the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet
been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the
release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The
probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity21 and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy
of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may
be raised even after the will has been authenticated.23
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by
petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition
to his motion for release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration
of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner
assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees
inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and
allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The
Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful
heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the
probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in
ordinary cases.26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order
deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and
personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised
Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay
debts, and to administer estate not willed. — An executor or
administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with
the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate
court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the
properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon.
But petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the
same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court
to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for
administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had
deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the
Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents
after renewal of the lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of
such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the
properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has
not been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere
trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are
trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee
of the highest order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and
possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination
by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.32

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated
December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in
SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those
portions of the order granting an allowance to the testator's
grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private
respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.

Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the

proceedings below.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831
affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No.
18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC)
and Efraim M. Santibañez entered into a loan agreement3 in the
amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of
the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose
Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed
a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in
five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981
and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another
loan agreement,4 this time in the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was
intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories,
and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in
favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed
a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13,
1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic
will.6 Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced
before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs,
was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent.7 During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola,
executed a Joint Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1)
tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of
their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively
taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities9 was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the
latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February
5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of money against
the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there
was no information on his address or the date of his return to the
Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer13 and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since
she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the
petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits
ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the
RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of merit.15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been
filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late
Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed
was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also
found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs,
Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of
the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void,
considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and
that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been
probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove
that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to
which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also
agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list
of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling
that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the
trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action against respondent
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case
to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the
trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED
BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE
CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the
deceased had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case,
Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint
agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S.
Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document;
as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their personal
capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the
probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement
was not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the
deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was
tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the
money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the
probate court.17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and
held that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate
court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null
and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has
been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the
holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic
terms when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties."
Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in
the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to
the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN
BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM
RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE
EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING
GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF
₱128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF
₱123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT
THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM
SANTIBAÑEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were
transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code;
there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint
agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the
deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since
respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any
condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary
thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the
deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of
the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The
active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in
the ordinary civil action against the petitioner’s claim amounts to a
waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate
proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint
agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under
consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich
themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S.
Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all
establishing the vinculum jurisor the legal bond between the late
Efraim Santibañez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary
obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980
and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibañez,
together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the
obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The
petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the
continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by
the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and
severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to
file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner
stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective
personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola
maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from
the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been
filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the
execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing
probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However, to
avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the
obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said
agreement.1a\^/phi1.net
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in
declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even
if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother
Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the
court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her
answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the
probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she
is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed
any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document
presented as evidence to show that she had caused herself to be
bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not
the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b)
whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the
deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs
liable on the obligation of the deceased.1awphi1.nét
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered.20 The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution
of the estate.21
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs
until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a
will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
a will.22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are
the same properties embraced in the will.23 In the present case, the
deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will24 which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund
and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-
encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the
decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was
making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any
partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The
joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of
its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate
of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three
(3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s
approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise,
or any other transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in
the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just
divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine
the identity of the heirs of the decedent.28 In the instant case, there is
no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only
heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will
was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine
who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and
respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three
(3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible
heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of
the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption
of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the
negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as
parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as
herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit
Corp."29 The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were
each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the
heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the
assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
decedent.l^vvphi1.net The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late
Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the
probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed
barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may
bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator
commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced
by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the
claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may
be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is
rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at
their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py
Eng Chong v. Herrera:31
… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation
and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts
and distribute the residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by
her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son
Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the
probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of
the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as
against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter
further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not
sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets
and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of
the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and
between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the
Philippines…"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects
that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities
were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the
conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the
petitioner’s participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no
documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to
show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its Republic of the Philippines
decision: SUPREME COURT
Manila
… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that
plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union SECOND DIVISION
Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines.
Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
is to [be] exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that
the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36 vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES
This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus,
the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in DECISION
affirming the same.
PEREZ, J.:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008
SO ORDERED. Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion of which states:
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated
March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas
City are AFFIRMED in toto.2

The Facts

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the

Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are
Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by
herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo
was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon
(Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise),

represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-
3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration
her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the
same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order
to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its
value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late
father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the
issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion
to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las
Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s
estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas
City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of
Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond.
The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid
in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the
petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as
hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of
any disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let
letters of administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo
Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise
Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of
₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of
Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes
lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common
residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the
Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF
LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED
WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT
LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST
IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the
RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where
the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As
thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals
cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for
the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas
City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may
be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners
harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of
Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the
recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is
not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves
as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995.
This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an
action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void
for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his
marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac
with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of
the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to
be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab
initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place,
thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It
must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage
of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the
Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-
square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death
of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has
taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to
Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the
death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by
filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it
as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the
death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to
Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s
marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a
previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the
Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of
San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the said
marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record
of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the
interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the
absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the
time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void
ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention
that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the
preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the
names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
 (c) The probable value and character of the property of the
estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration

are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be

benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be

benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced
by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on
her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is
just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of
the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded
on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack

of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November
2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150175 February 5, 2007
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES,
namely: ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA
SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO
MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S.
BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR., ANITA
TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES,
FUGURACION MEDALLE and MERCEDES LAGBAS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision1 in the above-
entitled case, ruling in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive
portion2 reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming
the Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, dated
28 September 1986, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed
by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby
DISMISSED.
On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration3 of the foregoing
Decision was filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of the Reales Law Office
on behalf of the respondents, heirs of Maximino R. Briones. On 19
May 2006, petitioners Erlinda Pilapil and the other co-heirs of Donata
Ortiz Vda. de Briones, through counsel, filed an Opposition to
Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration,4 to which the respondents
filed a Rejoinder5 on 23 May 2006. Thereafter, Atty. Amador F. Brioso,
Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office entered his appearance as
collaborating counsel for the respondents.6 Atty. Brioso then filed on
11 June 2006 and 16 June 2006, respectively, a Reply7 and
Supplemental Reply8 to the petitioners’ Opposition to respondents’
Motion for Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed a Rejoinder9 to
the respondents’ Reply and Supplemental Reply on 5 July 2006.
The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision,10 are as follows –
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata),
consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina);
Rizalina’s daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews
and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who
had also passed away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs
of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of his nephews
and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of
the deceased siblings of Maximino.
xxxx
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted
intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate with the Cebu
City Court of First Instance (CFI), 14th Judicial District, designated as
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued
Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of
Maximino’s estate. She submitted an Inventory of Maximino’s
properties, which included, among other things, the following parcels
of land x x x.
xxxx
The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952,
awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata.
On 27 June 1960, Donata had the said CFI Order recorded in the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof,
received new TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces,
instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate
estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed
by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate.
Controversy arose among Donata’s heirs when Erlinda claimed
exclusive ownership of three parcels of land, covered by TCTs No.
21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds of Donation, both
dated 15 September 1977, allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt
Donata. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlinda’s claim. This
Court, however, was no longer informed of the subsequent
development in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Donata; and
as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata, including
Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of
Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration
for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the
RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985,
allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximino’s properties. But
then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order,
dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties were
already under his and his wife’s administration as part of the intestate
estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the
RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of real property, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-5794. They later filed an Amended Complaint, on 11 December
1992. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of
Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust,
and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering
in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino.
xxxx
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April
1986, in favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x.
xxxx
x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to ½
of the real properties covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544,
21545, 21546, and 58684. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the
heirs of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of
the fruits thereof.
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986,
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision,
promulgated on 31 August 2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.
xxxx
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals,
the heirs of Donata filed the present Petition, x x x.
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition
meritorious and, reversing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the Complaint for partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real property filed by the
heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. This Court summed up
its findings,11 thus –
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the
real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino,
registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was
established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real
properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to
an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and
regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive
heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the
entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not
merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband.
There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in
Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.
Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this
Court raising still the arguments that Donata committed fraud in
securing the Court of First Instance Order, dated 2 October 1952,
which declared her as the sole heir of her deceased husband
Maximino and authorized her to have Maximino’s properties
registered exclusively in her name; that respondents’ right to
succession to the disputed properties was transmitted or vested from
the moment of Maximino’s death and which they could no longer be
deprived of; that Donata merely possessed and held the properties in
trust for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this Court’s ruling
in Quion v. Claridad12and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los
Angeles,13 respondents’ action to recover title to and possession of
their shares in Maximino’s estate, held in trust for their benefit by
Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the latter’s successors-in-
interest, is imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a fresh
contention that the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, being based on
the fraudulent misrepresentation of Donata that she was Maximino’s
sole heir, was a void order, which produced no legal effect. Lastly,
respondents asseverate that, by relying on certain procedural
presumptions in its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court has
sacrificed their substantive right to succession, thus, making justice
"subservient to the dictates of mere procedural fiats."14
While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some points in
its previous Decision in this case, it does not find any new evidence or
argument that would adequately justify a change in its previous
position.
On the finding of fraud
As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust
relations between petitioners and respondents shall be examined in
the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides that,
"[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes." Hence,
the foremost question to be answered is still whether an implied trust
under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently
established in the present case.
In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was
insufficient evidence to establish that Donata committed fraud. It
should be remembered that Donata was able to secure certificates of
title to the disputed properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R (the proceedings she instituted to settle
Maximino’s intestate estate), which declared her as Maximino’s sole
heir. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the Court accorded to
Special Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of regularity and
validity. Reproduced below are the relevant portions15 of the Decision
–
At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure
the TCTs covering the real properties belonging to the estate of
Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is
undisputed that the said CFI Order was issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted by Donata herself, to settle the
intestate estate of Maximino. The petitioners, heirs of Donata, were
unable to present a copy of the CFI Order, but this is not surprising
considering that it was issued 35 years prior to the filing by the heirs
of Maximino of their Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 on 3
March 1987. The existence of such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot
be denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register
of Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. It was
annotated on the TCTs covering the real properties as having
declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino.
The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the
cause of the heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and
contents were never questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs
of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or
procedure by which it was issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the
non-presentation of the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration by the
RTC, does not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would
give rise to the presumption that it would be adverse to the heirs of
Donata if produced. x x x.
xxxx
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R, effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by
declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her
deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as
well as its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy
the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced below –
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the
absence of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, that the
CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the parties, and to have rendered a judgment valid in
every respect; and it could not give credence to the following
statements made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision.
xxxx
There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing
pronouncements. First of all, the Petition filed by Donata for Letters of
Administration in Special Proceedings No. 928-R before the CFI was
not even referred to nor presented during the course of the trial of
Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the RTC. How then could the Court
of Appeals make a finding that Donata willfully excluded from the said
Petition the names, ages, and residences of the other heirs of
Maximino? Second, there was also no evidence showing that the CFI
actually failed to send notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to
the heirs of Maximino or that it did not require presentation of proof of
service of such notices. It should be remembered that there stands a
presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his duties in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included sending out of notices
and requiring the presentation of proof of service of such notices; and,
the heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient evidence to debunk
such presumption. They only made a general denial of knowledge of
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until 1985. There was no
testimony or document presented in which the heirs of Maximino
categorically denied receipt of notice from the CFI of the pendency of
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The only evidence on record in
reference to the absence of notice of such proceedings was the
testimony of Aurelia Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs of Maximino, x
x x.
xxxx
Aurelia’s testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was not
testifying on matters within her personal knowledge. The phrase "I
don’t think" is a clear indication that she is merely voicing out her
opinion on how she believed her uncles and aunts would have acted
had they received notice of Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was
proceeding from an evaluation of the evidence on record, which did
not include an actual copy of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R. Respondents only submitted a certified true copy thereof
on 15 June 2006, annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners’
opposition to their motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision.
Respondents did not offer any explanation as to why they belatedly
produced a copy of the said Order, but merely claimed to have been
"fortunate enough to obtain a copy" thereof from the Register of
Deeds of Cebu.16
Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so
late into the proceedings of this case. Parties should present all their
available evidence at the courts below so as to give the opposing
party the opportunity to scrutinize and challenge such evidence during
the course of the trial. However, given that the existence of the CFI
Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and was,
in fact, admitted by the petitioners; that the copy submitted is a
certified true copy of the said Order; and that the said Order may
provide new information vital to a just resolution of the present case,
this Court is compelled to consider the same as part of the evidence
on record.
The CFI Order17 in question reads in full as –
ORDER
This is with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix, dated
January 5, 1960, that she be declared the sole heir of her deceased
husband, Maximino Suico Briones, the latter having died without any
legitimate ascendant nor descendant, nor any legitimate brother or
sister, nephews or nieces.
At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist the
motion, and based on the uncontradicted testimony of Donata G. Ortiz
that she was the nearest surviving relative of the deceased Maximino
Suico Briones at the time of the latter’s death, and pursuant to the
pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, the Court
hereby declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and
exclusive heir of the estate of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones,
and she is hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate after
paying all the obligations thereof, which properties are those
contained in the Inventory, dated October 2, 1952.1awphi1.net
Cebu City, January 15, 1960.
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to
deduce that the CFI Order was in fact issued on 15 January 1960 and
not 2 October 1952, as earlier stated in the Decision. It was the
inventory of properties, submitted by Donata as administratrix of
Maximino’s intestate estate, which was dated 2 October 1952.18 Other
than such observation, this Court finds nothing in the CFI Order which
could change its original position in the Decision under consideration.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still
had surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that
these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings,
it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether
testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem,19 and that the publication
in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for
the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice
to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The
publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for
the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the
deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most
especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the
petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of
the intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial court.
As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which
the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order of
publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the
records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also
failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the
intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance
therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to
why Maximino’s siblings could have missed the published notice of
the intestate proceedings of their brother.
In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official
duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the
questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as
counsel for respondents allege, sacrificing the substantive right of
respondents to their share in the inheritance in favor of mere
procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the establishment of rules of
procedure, as amply explained by this Court in De Dios v. Court of
Appeals20 –
Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious
administration of justice by providing for a practical system by which
the parties to a litigation may be accorded a full and fair opportunity to
present their respective positions and refute each other's submissions
under the prescribed requirements, conditions and limitations.
Adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law. In fact, there is
a symbiotic relationship between them. By complying faithfully with
the Rules of Court, the bench and the bar are better able to discuss,
analyze and understand substantive rights and duties and
consequently to more effectively protect and enforce them. The other
alternative is judicial anarchy.
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and
abandonment thereof should only be done in the most exceptional
circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by this Court in the
instant case are disputable presumptions, which are satisfactory,
unless contradicted or overcome by evidence. This Court finds that
the evidence presented by respondents failed to overcome the given
presumptions.
Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she was her
husband’s sole heir, it was not established that she did so knowingly,
maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court to conclude that she
indeed committed fraud. This Court again brings to the fore the delay
by which respondents filed the present case, when the principal actors
involved, particularly, Donata and Maximino’s siblings, have already
passed away and their lips forever sealed as to what truly transpired
between them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R
took place when all these principal actors were still alive and each
would have been capable to act to protect his or her own right to
Maximino’s estate. Letters of Administration of Maximino’s estate
were issued in favor of Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI
Order in question was issued only on 15 January 1960. The intestate
proceedings for the settlement of Maximino’s estate were thus
pending for almost eight years, and it is the burden of the respondents
to establish that their parents or grandparents, Maximino’s surviving
siblings, had absolutely no knowledge of the said proceedings all
these years. As established in Ramos v. Ramos,21 the degree of proof
to establish fraud in a case where the principal actors to the
transaction have already passed away is proof beyond reasonable
doubt, to wit –
"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human
evidence; and as it thus removes from the parties all the
immediate means to verify the nature of the original transactions,
it operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and
against imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a great
length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute circumstances
of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory explanation of every
difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be encumbered. The
most that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are
living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the
material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if
the parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol
agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive at probable
conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact
knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be
imputed to the living; for, the legal presumption is the other way;
as to the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it
would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their
ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence
of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6
Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).
Moreover, even if Donata’s allegation that she was Maximino’s sole
heir does constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of
the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,22 considering the nature of
intestate proceedings as being in rem and the disputable
presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful
exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order,
dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata’s misrepresentation
constitutes fraud that would impose upon her the implied trust
provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still cannot
sustain respondents’ contention that their right to recover their shares
in Maximino’s estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in
jurisprudence that an implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is
subject to prescription and laches.
The case of Ramos v. Ramos23 already provides an elucidating
discourse on the matter, to wit –
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by
the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into
being by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts
concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by
oral evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid;
Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust,
it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid; Art. 1444;
Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-
19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are
those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties,
by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J. S. 122).
"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or
which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as
matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the
parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting
and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or
created by the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted
sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to
have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to
be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the
deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of
resulting trusts are found in Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code.
See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53
SCRA 168, 179).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by
construction of law, or arising by operation of law." In a more
restricted sense and as contradistinguished from a resulting trust, a
constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either expressly
or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It
does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law." (89
C.J.S. 726-727). "If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or
concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party." A constructive trust
is not a trust in the technical sense (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the
P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the
ownership of property entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil.
712), or that an action to compel a trustee to convey property
registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui qui trust
does not prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal vs.
Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the defense of prescription cannot be
set up in an action to recover property held by a person in trust for the
benefit of another (Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that
property held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless
of the lapse of time (Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil. 64; Bancairen vs.
Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan vs. Zuñiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA
1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs.
Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37).
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is
that the possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he
does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust. Thus,
Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law of prescription does not
apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust" (Diaz vs.
Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71
Phil. 566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of
Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos, 63 O.G.
1956, 10 SCRA 691).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in
trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has
not repudiated the trust (Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil.
500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Graño, 42 Phil. 35; Buencamino vs. Matias,
63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive
trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153.
Compare with Cuison vs. Fernandez and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135,
139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, 407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against
the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in
trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui
trust and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna vs.
Levantino, supra; Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the
rule regarding co-owners found in the last paragraph of Article 494,
Civil Code; Casañas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De Guzman,
L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The
prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on constructive
trust is now settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L-10228, February 28,
1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De Guzman, supra; Claridad vs.
Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-19073, January 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boñaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason &
Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA
84). Prescription may supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs. Reyes,
L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449,
January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may
be barred by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs.
Gorricho and Aguado, supra; Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100
Phil. 277). [Emphases supplied.]
A present reading of the Quion24 and Sevilla25 cases, invoked by
respondents, must be made in conjunction with and guided
accordingly by the principles established in the afore-quoted case.
Thus, while respondents’ right to inheritance was transferred or
vested upon them at the time of Maximino’s death, their enforcement
of said right by appropriate legal action may be barred by the
prescription of the action.
Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties
based on implied trust is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil
Code, which reads –
ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in
this case, by Article 1456 of the New Civil Code), then respondents
had 10 years within which to bring an action for reconveyance of their
shares in Maximino’s properties. The next question now is when
should the ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned from. The general
rule is that an action for reconveyance of real property based on
implied trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or issuance of
the title to the property,26 not only because registration under the
Torrens system is a constructive notice of title,27 but also because by
registering the disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata
had already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same.
By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, Donata was able to register and secure
certificates of title over the disputed properties in her name on 27
June 1960. The respondents filed with the RTC their Complaint for
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed real
properties, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794, only on 3 March
1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said properties in
the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents’ action for recovery of
possession of the disputed properties had clearly prescribed.
Moreover, even though respondents’ Complaint before the RTC in
Civil Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the disputed
properties, it does not make their action to enforce their right to the
said properties imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action for
partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-
ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, as provided for in
Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to emphasize that Donata
had never recognized respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either
expressly or impliedly.28 Her assertion before the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximino’s sole heir necessarily
excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir to the
inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of
action for partition of property owned in common does not apply to the
case at bar.
On laches as bar to recovery
Other than prescription of action, respondents’ right to recover
possession of the disputed properties, based on implied trust, is also
barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a question of
inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced, applies independently of
prescription, which is a question of time. Prescription is statutory;
laches is equitable.29
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which
requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.30
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis
for barring respondents’ action for recovery of the disputed properties
because of laches. This Court pointed out therein31 that –
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of
Maximino even emphasized that Donata lived along the same street
as some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet, she failed to inform
them of the CFI Order, dated [15 January 1960], in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in her name of new TCTs
covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino.
This Court, however, appreciates such information differently. It
actually works against the heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived
nearby, Maximino’s siblings had ample opportunity to inquire or
discuss with Donata the status of the estate of their deceased brother.
Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate of
Maximino, were also located within the same area as their residences
in Cebu City, and Maximino’s siblings could have regularly observed
the actions and behavior of Donata with regard to the said real
properties. It is uncontested that from the time of Maximino’s death on
1 May 1952, Donata had possession of the real properties. She
managed the real properties and even collected rental fees on some
of them until her own death on 1 November 1977. After Donata’s
death, Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and continued to
manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and,
subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of
ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all others, which
must have already put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly
believed that they still had rights thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even
attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they
had waited 33 years from Maximino’s death before one of them,
Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After learning that the
intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two years, before
instituting, on 3 March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the Complaint
for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property belonging to
the estate of Maximino. x x x
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as
well as respondents’ conduct before this Court, particularly the
belated submission of evidence and argument of new issues,
respondents are consistently displaying a penchant for delayed
action, without any proffered reason or justification for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and
diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.
The law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or
ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations
of the courts, he must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid
failings.32
On void judgment or order
Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental Reply
to the petitioners’ Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration the
argument that the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R is void and, thus, it cannot have any legal
effect. Consequently, the registration of the disputed properties in the
name of Donata pursuant to such Order was likewise void.
This Court is unconvinced.
In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents,33 an order or
judgment is considered void when rendered by the court without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of a mandatory duty,
circumstances which are not present in the case at bar.
Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a voidable
one, thus –
"* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a mere nullity, is
liable to be made void when a person who has a right to proceed in
the matter takes the proper steps to have its invalidity declared. It
always contains some defect which may become fatal. It carries within
it the means of its own overthrow. But unless and until it is duly
annulled, it is attended with all the ordinary consequences of a legal
judgment. The party against whom it is given may escape its effect as
a bar or an obligation, but only by a proper application to have it
vacated or reversed. Until that is done, it will be efficacious as a claim,
an estoppel, or a source of title. If no proceedings are ever taken
against it, it will continue throughout its life to all intents a valid
sentence. If emanating from a court of general jurisdiction, it will be
sustained by the ordinary presumptions of regularity, and it is not
open to impeachment in any collateral action. * * *"
But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. "A void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights
can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All
acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The
parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers.
The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without
title and without redress." (Freeman on Judgments, sec. 117, citing
Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush, 295,
Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418;
Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549; Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex.,
345; Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester
vs. Martin, 9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See
also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and Another vs. Wells, 3
Ind., 399; Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs. Nunnally, 47
Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)

It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void

judgment and a voidable one, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction
over the subject-matter is essential to the validity of a judgment and
that want of such jurisdiction renders it void and a mere nullity. In the
eye of the law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55;
Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247;
Beverly and McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia
vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis
and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co.,
111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6
Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)34

The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R did not
deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate of
Maximino. Donata’s fraud and misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said Order, which already became final and executory, can only
be set aside by direct action to annul and enjoin its enforcement.35 It cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack as is being done in this case. Note that respondents’ Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794 was one for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed properties. The annulment
sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the certificates of title
over the properties issued in Donata’s name. So until and unless respondents bring a direct action to nullify
the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment
therein, the assailed Order remains valid and binding.

Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul an order or judgment based on fraud must be
brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.36 If it is conceded that the respondents came to
know of Donata’s fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of the RTC proceedings which they instituted
for the settlement of Maximino’s estate, then their right to file an action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by Donata for the settlement of Maximino’s
estate), has likewise prescribed by present time.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

EN BANC
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25, 2013

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P)
Associate Justice
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant,
vs.
NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV), Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The present administrative case stemmed from a sworn letter-
complaint1 dated May 29, 1999 filed before this Court by Rodolfo C.
Sabidong (complainant) charging respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of
Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City with grave and
serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression and abuse of authority.
The Facts
Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the longtime
occupants of a parcel of land, designated as Lot 11 (Lot 1280-D-4-11 of
consolidation-subdivision plan [LRC] Pcs-483) originally registered in the
name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo
City.2 The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of
the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was occupied
by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by
the Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo
City, Branch 4 ("Rosita R. Natividad in her capacity as Administratrix of
C.N. Hodges Estate, plaintiff vs. Priscila Saplagio, defendant"). On May
31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to
immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the
plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs.3 At the time,
respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase
on installment Lots 11 and 12. In a letter dated January 7, 1986, the
Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s offer in view of
an application to purchase already filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12,
"in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to the actual
occupants in awarding approval of Offers". While the check for initial
down payment tendered by respondent was returned to him, he was
nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and
that if he could put up a sufficient down payment, the Estate could
immediately endorse it for approval of the Probate Court so that the
property can be awarded to him "should the occupant fail to avail of the
priority given to them."4
The following day, January 8, 1986, respondent again submitted an Offer
to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square meters for the amount of
₱35,100. Under the Order dated November 18, 1986 issued by the
probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special
Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late Charles Newton
Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"), respondent’s Offer to
Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the court’s observation that the
occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to
purchase the lots they are occupying up to this date and considering time
restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x x x
offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x". On January 21, 1987, the
probate court issued another Order granting respondent’s motion for
issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The writ of possession over
Lot 11 was eventually issued on June 27, 1989.5
On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11
was executed between respondent and the Hodges Estate represented
by its Administratrix, Mrs. Ruth R. Diocares. Lot 11 was thereby
conveyed to respondent on installment for the total purchase price of
₱50,000.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11836 in the
name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT
No. T-107519 in the name of respondent was issued on December 5,
1994. Lot 11 was later subdivided into two lots, Lots 11-A and 11-B for
which the corresponding titles (TCT Nos. T-116467 and T-116468), also
in the name of respondent, were issued on February 28, 1997.6
On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of the Hodges Estate, a
writ of demolition was issued on March 3, 1998 by the probate court in
favor of respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot 11.7
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint
asserting that as court employee respondent cannot buy property in
litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit deception,
dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority. Complainant
specifically alleged the following:
3. Complainant and his siblings, are possessors and occupants of
a parcel of land situated at Brgy. San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City,
then identified as Lot No. 1280-D-4-11, later consolidated and
subdivided and became known as Lot 11, then registered and
titled in the name of Charles Newton Hodges. The Sabidong
family started occupying this lot in 1948 and paid their monthly
rentals until sometime in 1979 when the Estate of Hodges
stopped accepting rentals. x x x
4. Upon knowing sometime in 1987 that the property over which
their house is standing, was being offered for sale by the Estate,
the mother of complainant, TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG
(now deceased), took interest in buying said property, Lot 11;
5. TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG, was then an ordinary
housekeeper and a laundrywoman, who never received any
formal education, and did not even know how to read and write.
When Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, together with her children and
the complainant in this case, tried to negotiate with the Estate for
the sale of the subject property, they were informed that all
papers for transaction must pass through the respondent in this
case, Nicolasito Solas. This is unusual, so they made inquiries
and they learned that, Nicolasito Solas was then the Clerk of
Court 111, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City and
presently, the City Sheriff of Iloilo City;
6. The respondent Nicolasito Solas, then Clerk of Court III,
MTCC, Iloilo City, has knowledge, by reason of his position that in
1983 Hodges Estate was ejecting occupants of its land. x x x
Taking advantage of this inside information that the land subject
of an ejectment case in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo
City, whom respondent is a Clerk of Court III, the respondent
surreptitiously offered to buy the said lot in litigation. x x x
7. Complainant nor any member of his family did not know that as
early as 1984, the respondent had offered to purchase the
subject lot from the estate x x x. After receiving the notice of
denial of his offer to purchase, dated January 7, 1986,
respondent made a second offer to purchase the subject property
the following day, January 8, 1986, knowing fully well that the
subject property was being occupied. x x x
8. Because of this denial, respondent met with the family of the
complainant and negotiated for the sale of the property and
transfer of the title in favor of the latter. Respondent made the
complainant and his family believed that he is the representative
of the estate and that he needed a downpayment right away. All
the while, the Sabidong family (who were carpenters,
laundrywomen, a janitor, persons who belong to the
underprivileged) relied on the representations of the respondent
that he was authorized to facilitate the sale, with more reason that
respondent represented himself as the City Sheriff;
9. That between 1992-1993, a sister of the complainant who was
fortunate to have worked abroad, sent the amount of Ten
Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos to complainant’s mother, to be
given to respondent Nicolasito Solas. x x x After receiving the
money, respondent assured the Sabidong family that they will not
be ejected from the lot, he being the City Sheriff will take care of
everything, and taking advantage of the illiteracy of Trinidad
Claverio Sabidong, he did not issue any receipt;
10. True enough, they were not ejected instead it took the
respondent some time to see them again and demanded
additional payment. In the meanwhile, the complainant waited for
the papers of the supposed sale and transfer of title, which
respondent had promised after receiving the downpayment of
₱10,000.00;
11. That sometime again in 1995, respondent again received
from the mother of complainant the amount of Two Thousand
(₱2,000.00) Pesos, allegedly for the expenses of the
documentation of sale and transfer of title, and again respondent
promised that the Sabidong family will not be ejected;
12. To the prejudice and surprise of the complainant and his
family, respondent was able to secure an order for the approval of
his offer to purchase x x x in Special Proceedings No. 1672 x x x;
13. Worse, respondent moved for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession in his favor, which the probate court acted favorably x
x x. A writ of possession was issued on June 27, 1989 x x x;
14. x x x respondent took advantage of the trust and confidence
which the Sabidong family has shown, considering that
respondent was an officer of the court and a City Sheriff at that.
The complainant and his family thought that respondent, being a
City Sheriff, could help them in the transfer of the title in their
favor. Never had they ever imagined that while respondent had
been receiving from them hard-earned monies purportedly for the
sale of the subject property, respondent was also exercising acts
of ownership adverse to the interest of the complainant and his
family;
15. Being an officer of the court and supposed to be an
embodiment of fairness and justice, respondent acted with
malice, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit when he
represented that he can facilitate the sale and titling of the subject
property in favor of the complainant and his family;
16. That when several thousands of pesos were given to the
respondent as payment for the same and incidental expenses
relative thereto, he was able to cause the transfer of the title in his
favor. x x x;
17. After the death of Trinidad Claverio Sabidong x x x the
respondent received from the complainant the amount of Five
Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos x x x When a receipt was
demanded, respondent refused to issue one, and instead
promised and assured the complainant that they will not be
ejected;
xxxx
19. The complainant again, through his sister-in-law, Socorro
Sabidong, delivered and gave to the respondent the amount of
Three Thousand (₱3,000.00) Pesos as expenses for the
subdivision of the subject lot. The respondent facilitated the
subdivision and after the same was approved, the complainant
did not know that two (2) titles were issued in the name of the
respondent. x x x;
20. Meanwhile, respondent prepared a Contract to Sell, for the
complainant and his neighbor Norberto Saplagio to affix their
signatures, pursuant to their previous agreement for the buyers to
avail of a housing loan with the Home Development Mutual Fund
(PAG-IBIG). Complainant attended the seminar of the HDMF for
seven (7) times, in his desire to consummate the sale. However,
when the complainant affixed his signature in the contract, he
was surprised that the owner of the subject property was the
respondent. When complainant raised a question about this,
respondent assured complainant that everything was alright and
that sooner complainant will be the owner of the property.
Complainant and his family, all these years, had believed and
continued to believe that the owner was the estate of Hodges and
that respondent was only the representative of the estate;
21. The Contract to Sell, appeared to have been notarized on
June 3, 1996, however, no copy thereof was given to the
complainant by the respondent. Respondent then, took the
papers and documents required by the HDMF to be completed,
from the complainant allegedly for the purpose of personally filing
the same with the HDMF. Complainant freely and voluntarily
delivered all pertinent documents to the respondent, thinking that
respondent was helping in the fast and easy release of the loan.
While the said documents were in the possession of the
respondent, he never made any transaction with the HDMF,
worse, when complainant tried to secure a copy of the Contract to
Sell, the copy given was not signed by the Notary Public, x x x;
22. The complainant [was] shocked to learn that respondent had
canceled the sale and that respondent refused to return the
documents required by the HDMF. Respondent claimed that as
Sheriff, he can cause the demolition of the house of the
complainant and of his family. Respondent threatened the
complainant and he is capable of pursuing a demolition order and
serve the same with the assistance of the military. x x x;
23. After learning of the demolition order, complainant attempted
to settle the matter with the respondent, however, the same
proved futile as respondent boasted that the property would now
cost at Four Thousand Five Hundred (₱4,500.00) Pesos;
24. The threats of demolition is imminent. Clearly, complainant
and his family were duped by the respondent and are helpless
victims of an officer of the court who took advantage of their good
faith and trust. Complainant later was informed that the subject
property was awarded to the respondent as his Sheriff’s Fees,
considering that respondent executed the decisions in ejectment
cases filed by the Hodges estate against the adverse occupants
of its vast properties;
25. A civil case for the Annulment of Title of the respondent over
the subject property is pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 37 and a criminal complaint for Estafa is also
pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the City
 Prosecutor of Iloilo City, known as I.S. No. 1559-99, both filed [by]
the complainant against the respondent.8
Acting on the complaint, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a
1st Indorsement9 dated July 8, 1999, requiring respondent to file his
comment on the Complaint dated May 29, 1999. On October 21, 1999,
respondent submitted his Comment.10
In a Resolution11 dated July 19, 1999, Public Prosecutor Constantino C.
Tubilleja dismissed the Estafa charge against respondent for insufficiency
of evidence.
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo issued an
Evaluation and Recommendation12 finding respondent guilty of violating
Article 149113 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the purchase by
certain court officers of property and rights in litigation within their
jurisdiction. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended that:
1. this administrative complaint be treated as an administrative
matter;
2. respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, OCC,
MTCC, Iloilo City be SUSPENDED for six (6) months, with
warning that a repetition of the same offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely;
3. inasmuch as there are factual issues regarding the delivery of
substantial amounts which complainant alleged and which
defendant denied, this issue should be investigated and the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City should
be designated to hear the evidence and to make a report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt.14
In a Resolution15 dated January 22, 2001, this Court adopted the
recommendation of the Court Administrator to treat the present
administrative action as a regular administrative matter and to designate
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City to hear the evidence of the
parties.
The Court, however, noted without action the Court Administrator’s
recommendation to suspend respondent for six months.
On March 13, 2001, Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño
forwarded the records of this case to Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo of
the Iloilo City RTC.16 In a Resolution17 dated July 18, 2001, the Court
referred this case to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City for
investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from notice. By
Order18 dated August 30, 2001, Executive Judge Gustilo set the case for
reception of evidence.
On March 19, 2004, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 37, dismissed the case for
annulment of title, damages and injunction against respondent for lack of
merit.19
In a Resolution20 dated June 15, 2005, the Court resolved to reassign the
instant administrative case to Executive Judge Rene S. Hortillo for
investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from notice. In a
Letter21 dated September 15, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo informed the
Court that per the records, the parties have presented their testimonial
and documentary evidence before retired Executive Judge Tito G.
Gustilo.
On September 12, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo required the parties to
file their respective memoranda within 60 days from notice, upon
submission of which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.22
In his Memorandum,23 respondent maintained that his purchase of the
subject land is not covered by the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the Civil Code. He pointed out that he bought Lot 11-A a decade after
the MTCC of Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the ejectment of Priscila
Saplagio and Trinidad Sabidong from the subject lot. He insisted that
public trust was observed when complainant was accorded his right of
first refusal in the purchase of Lot 11-A, albeit the latter failed to avail said
right. Asserting that he is a buyer in good faith and for value, respondent
cited the dismissal of the cases for Estafa and annulment of title and
damages which complainant filed against him.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from service.
Prior to this, he wrote then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepaño, requesting for the release of his retirement benefits pending
resolution of the administrative cases against him.24 In a
Memorandum25 dated September 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court
Administrator Elepaño made the following recommendations:
 a) The request of Nicolasito S. Solas, former Clerk of Court,
MTCC, Iloilo City for partial release of his retirement benefits be
GRANTED; and
b) Atty. Lilian Barribal Co, Chief, Financial Management Office,
Office of the Court Administrator be DIRECTED to (1)
WITHHOLD the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) from the retirement benefits of Nicolasito S. Solas
to answer for any administrative liability that the Court may find
against him in A.M. No. P-01-1448 (Formerly Administrative
Matter OCA IPI No. 99-664-P); OCA IPI No. 99-659-P; OCA IPI
No. 99-670-P; and OCA IPI No. 99-753-P; and (2) RELEASE the
balance of his retirement benefits.26
Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio, the new
Executive Judge of the Iloilo City RTC for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and
Recommendation27 finding respondent liable for grave misconduct and
dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. Based on the evidence presented, Judge Patricio concluded
that respondent misappropriated the money which he received for the
filing of complainant’s loan application. Such money could not have been
used for the partition of Lot No. 1280-D-4-11 since the same was already
subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B when respondent presented the
Contract to Sell to complainant. And despite respondent’s promise to
keep complainant and his family in peaceful possession of the subject
property, respondent caused the issuance of a writ of demolition against
them. Thus, Judge Patricio recommended the forfeiture of respondent’s
salary for six months to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
In a Resolution28 dated September 29, 2008, the Court noted Judge
Patricio’s Investigation Report and referred the same to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum29 dated January 16, 2009, then Court Administrator
Jose P. Perez found respondent liable for serious and grave misconduct
and dishonesty and recommended the forfeiture of respondent’s salary
for six months, which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
The Court Administrator held that by his unilateral acts of extinguishing
the contract to sell and forfeiting the amounts he received from
complainant and Saplagio without due notice, respondent failed to act
with justice and equity. He found respondent’s denial to be anchored
merely on the fact that he had not issued receipts which was belied by his
admission that he had asked money for the expenses of partitioning Lot
11 from complainant and Saplagio. Since their PAG-IBIG loan
applications did not materialize, complainant should have returned the
amounts given to him by complainant and Saplagio.
On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution30 requiring the
parties to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings and records already filed with the
Court. However, the copy of the Resolution dated February 11, 2009
which was sent to complainant was returned unserved with the postal
carrier’s notation "RTS-Deceased." Meanwhile, in a Compliance31 dated
August 24, 2009, respondent expressed his willingness to submit the
case for decision and prayed for an early resolution of the case.
Our Ruling
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such
as clerks of court from acquiring property involved in litigation within the
jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at
a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon
an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows
the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the
relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by
these persons.32"In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or
more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can
and must be done."33
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must
take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property.34 Where the property is acquired after the termination of the
case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code
attaches.35
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November
21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated
on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it can not be
said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering
that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or
litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes
subject to the judicial action of the judge.36 A property forming part of the
estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until
the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed
and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated.37 The probate court loses jurisdiction
of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts
and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same.38 Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the
RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and terminated at the
time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November
21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the
operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of
respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to purchase
property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another
court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for dishonesty
and grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence
by a public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct
must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling.
The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office.39
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness."40
In this case, respondent deceived complainant’s family who were led to
believe that he is the legal representative of the Hodges Estate, or at
least possessed of such power to intercede for overstaying occupants of
the estate’s properties like complainant. Boasting of his position as a
court officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainant’s family completely relied
on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from the
premises. Upon learning that the lot they were occupying was for sale
and that they had to negotiate for it through respondent, complainant’s
family readily gave the amounts he demanded and, along with Saplagio,
complied with the requirements for a loan application with PAG-IBIG. All
the while and unknown to complainant’s family, respondent was actually
working to acquire Lot 11 for himself.
Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the Hodges Estate for the
sale of the property to him, he collected as down payment ₱5,000 from
complainant’s family in July 1986. Four months later, on November 18,
1986, the probate court approved respondent’s offer to purchase Lot 11.
The latter received further down payment from complainant in the amount
of ₱10,000 between 1992 and 1993, or before the Deed of Sale with
Mortgage41 dated November 21, 1994 could be executed in respondent’s
favor.
Thereafter, respondent demanded ₱3,000 from complainant supposedly
for the subdivision of Lot 11 between the latter and the Saplagios. Yet, it
was not until respondent obtained title over said lot that the same was
subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B. The records42 of the case show that
the Subdivision Plan dated April 25, 1996, duly approved by the Land
Management Services (DENR) subdividing Lot 11 into sublots 11-A and
11-B, was inscribed on February 28, 1997 – two years after TCT No. T-
107519 covering Lot 11 was issued in respondent’s name on December
5, 1994.
Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount of ₱2,000 to defray the
expenses for documentation and transfer of title in complainant’s name.
In the latter instance, while it may be argued that respondent already had
the capacity to sell the subject property, the sum of all the circumstances
belie an honest intention on his part to convey Lot 11-A to complainant.
We note the inscription in TCT No. T-1183643 in the name of C.N. Hodges
that respondent executed a Request dated February 19, 1997 "for the
issuance of separate titles in the name of the registered owner."44 Soon
after, TCT No. T-11646745 covering Lot 11-A and TCT No. T-
11646846 covering Lot 11-B were issued in the name of respondent on
February 28, 1997 – only eight months after he executed the Contract to
Sell47 in favor of complainant on June 3, 1996.
Respondent’s bare denials were correctly disregarded by the Court
Administrator in the light of his own admission that he indeed asked
money from both complainant and Saplagio. The evidence on record
clearly established that by misrepresenting himself as the estate’s
representative and as a court officer having the power to protect
complainant’s family from eviction, respondent was able to collect sums
totaling ₱20,000 from complainant’s family. Even after the latter realized
they were duped since respondent was already the owner of Lot 11, they
still offered to buy the property from him. Respondent, however, changed
his mind and no longer wanted to sell the property after nothing
happened to the loan applications of complainant and Saplagio. This
subsequent unilateral cancellation by respondent of the contract to sell
with complainant may have been an afterthought, and plainly unjustified,
based merely on his own assumption that complainant could not make
full payment. But it did not negate the deception and fraudulent acts
perpetrated against complainant’s family who were forced into
submission by the constant threat of eviction. Such acts constitute grave
misconduct for which respondent should be held answerable.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes,
Court Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes,
Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,48 the Court
stressed that to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel
must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to
high ethical standards. In that case, we said that court employees are
expected to be paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in
their official conduct but also in their personal dealings, including
business and commercial transactions to avoid becoming the court’s
albatross of infamy.49
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
mandates that public officials and employees shall remain true to the
people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall
not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and
1âw phi 1
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
Under Section 52,51 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and grave misconduct are
classified as grave offenses with the corresponding penalty of dismissal
for the first offense. Section 58(a) states that the penalty of dismissal
shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service.
Section 53 further provides that mitigating circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense should be considered in the determination of
the penalty to be imposed on the erring government employee. However,
no such mitigating circumstance had been shown. On the contrary,
respondent had been previously held administratively liable for
irregularities in the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court. In A.M.
No. P-01-1484,52 this Court imposed on respondent a fine of ₱5,000 for
acting imprudently in notarizing documents and administering oath on
matters alien to his official duties. And in A.M. Nos. P-08-2567 (formerly
OCA IPI No. 99-670-P) and P-08-2568 (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-753-
P),53 respondent was found liable for simple misconduct and ordered to
pay a fine equivalent to his three (3) months salary to be deducted from
his retirement benefits.
Since respondent had compulsorily retired from service on September
10, 2007, for this additional administrative case he should be fined in an
amount equivalent to his salary for six months which shall likewise be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, retired
Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, LIABLE FOR
GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY. Respondent is FINED in an
amount equivalent to his salary for six (6) months to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M.
SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in
the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991,
survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five
children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and
his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L.
Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He
owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and
Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He
assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir
Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu
City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of
Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB).1 The RTC
granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters
of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of
Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the
RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio
had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth
₱6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of ₱32,141.20; furniture and
fixtures worth ₱20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at ₱15,000.00;
44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth ₱6,585,585.80; and 30
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded
from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend
the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted
Thelma’s motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of
January 8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three
certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock;4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991
involving real properties with the market value of ₱4,440,651.10 in
exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of
₱4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979
for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed
30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the
inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for
the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable
the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.7
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and
asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court on the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded
from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.8
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued
on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory
submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included,
and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations,
the Court hereby denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of
inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re-do the
inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of
the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties
mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and
then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this
order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had
come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty
(60) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.9
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely
sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground
that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian,
Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of
land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the
possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.10 Thelma
opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for the
reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to
the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded from
the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to
pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to
include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty,
Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed
the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH
WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS
LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE
OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH
ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE
NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE
OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW
ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING
UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED
IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO
MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari,
disposing as follows:13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is
GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of
parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an
area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject
matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January
10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is
concerned and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for
certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of
properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil
Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold "shall be
transferred to the vendee" upon its "actual and constructive delivery," and
to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through
a public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the
sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of
Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale
executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had
thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had
assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17,
1989 "for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference
that in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven
(7) parcels of land were included"; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed
of assignment, Mervir Realty had been "even at the losing end
considering that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of
Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary
consideration through shares of stock"; that even if the assignment had
been based on the deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the
parcels of land could not be included in the inventory "considering that
there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate planning
scheme"; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the
name of third persons or corporation; that a property covered by the
Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of
title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the
clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter;
and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that
Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of
their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties
should be included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that
petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that
they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of
determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a
reading of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001
filed before public respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not
questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for
which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that
there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14,
2001 denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of
properties which were already titled and in possession of a third person
that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the
law possessed a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders,
and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty
Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no
authority to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely
acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, private respondent
nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have
justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to
disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot
be presumed.14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of
Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the
inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such
properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate
shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the
resort to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the
RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy
depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or
interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court
distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well
known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be
done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but
the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something
else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the
order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for
the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order,
and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an
appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on
the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case
for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to
incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as
many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as
there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order
being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the
approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her
motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the
inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion
or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming
the decision of the CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court
excluding certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and
could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a
final but an interlocutory order "in the sense that it did not settle once and
for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots." The Court observed there
that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is
not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473;
Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court
declared that a "probate court, whether in a testate or intestate
proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally," and
reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the "patent reason is
the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
of the property, can only be settled in a separate action." Indeed, in the
cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a
dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
(Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for
Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule
embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of
Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates
that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law
"that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may be the subject of an
appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or
resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that
the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is
expressly made non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical
recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally
determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule
109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which
multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or
the distributive share of the estate to which such person is
entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the
estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of
the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or
guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or
guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of
the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from
the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects
the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an
order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come
under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion for including properties in the inventory
notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio
during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the properties
in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in
reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully
warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the
surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person
dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving
spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. –
Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or
administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all
the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court
may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or
their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of
all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has
come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent
or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no
exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties
appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory,
regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and
appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the
accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the
administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of
the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate."23Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an
estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties
should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the
CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on
the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the
inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the
administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy
ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere
with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown
that there has been a positive abuse of discretion."25 As long as the RTC
commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate
court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to
third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court
can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still
revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do
with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As
held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed
to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its
directive for the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order
of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio
Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death,
left several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in
Court in Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be
divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being
examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not
include in the inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of
Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said
properties constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties required to be
submitted to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
also admitted in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of
stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were
paid by her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and
her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares
of stock partake of being conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the
value thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her
husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union
Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the
money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and
so, one-half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties
constituting as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case
that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in Badian, Cebu containing an
area of 53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now.
When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB-12690 which was decided
on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which
claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never
intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was
admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So
the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the
inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land
by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January
10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said
day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a
transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died
on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one
prompted by the thought that the transferor has not long to live and made
in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909).
Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that
the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in
contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case
should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were
transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties
actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S.
Mercado at least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the
certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31,
1991 (Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and
the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by
the administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the
directive to include the properties in question in the inventory rested on
good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or
capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did
not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime
was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of
Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in
the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific
property acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the
conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party
must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical,
and convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation
of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be
provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected
properties were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the
estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio
must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the
name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in
dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that had involved the
ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio,
and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in
Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001,
1âwphi 1
or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the
name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-
12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB-12692 was
susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect that the
heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out their differences with
the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable
considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by
respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In
other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor
of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the
exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed
of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution,
but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the
transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The
presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court
of Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its
favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function
of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in
the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties
thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of
Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have
to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two
days prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested
party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a
finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the
time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the
exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be
validated by the facts to be established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the
name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately
excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances
admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is
because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely
a system of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity
1âwphi1
demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence
of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land
and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except
claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that
may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens
system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of
assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the
inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of
the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the
assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court
might have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties
arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court
from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of
that deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only
with special and limited jurisdiction, was still "deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective."37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and
submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of
collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code
required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita
herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of
the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir Associate Justice
"may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90
thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of
the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated
or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.38

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or

included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority
and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under
the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in
the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no
patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of
the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39

In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion

on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;

REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15,
2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18,
2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-
CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma
Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES
MARIA FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA
ALARAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and
Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009·, respectively, of
the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, Which affirmed the
Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several
heirs, including his_ children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia
R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a
resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No.
51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the
land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both
located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Possession 5 dated September 15, 1993, respondents
alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs,
Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B.
Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about
the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a
document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which,
however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtoiined
by Pedro and Benita from a bank. 6 The document actually evidenced
receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of ₱87, 352.62 releasing her
and her late husband’s indebtedness therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no
record of any transaction involving the subject properties, giving them
certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to
the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the
resort had been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as
the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an
extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was published in a
tabloid called Balita. Because of this, They caused the annotation of their
adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds
of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the
annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the
petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto. 8
In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on
the groun_d of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the
subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial, petitioner
Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only the
resort. 10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which
provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home
to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a
Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for ₱650,
000.00. 11
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject
Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the
Documents of conveyance offered by petitioner’s .as well as the
circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the
Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not
duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed. 12 The Deed of
Sale was Undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left
blank, and the Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left
side of the document Was not signed. 13 The trial court also observed that
both documents were Never presented to the Office of the Register of
Deeds for registration and That the titles to the subject properties were
still in the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita. In addition, the
supposed notaries and buyers of the Subject properties were not even
presented as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the signing and
execution of the documents of conveyance. 14 On The basis thereof, the
triaI court ruled in favor of respondents, in its Judgment, the pertinent
portions of its fallo provide:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is Hereby
rendered as follows:
xxxx
4. A) Declaring as a nullity the ~'Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Ex. "l ",
Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public Antonio G.
Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No. IXII, Series of
1991. .
b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Ex.
"2", Villafria), purportedly executed by Benita T. Rifioza in
favor of spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong,
purportedly notarized by one Alfredo de Guzman marked
Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141, and Book. No. XXX, Series
of 1991.
c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements
introduced By defendants Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong in the properties Covered by TCT No. 40807,
40808, 51354 and 51355 of the Register of Deeds for
Nasugbu, Batangas. .
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose
Occupancy within the premises of the four- (4) parcels of land described
in Par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest of defendant
Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver possession thereof, and all
improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the estate
of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza.
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended
Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza, each in
the capacity and degree established, as well as their direct successors-in
interest, and ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds to issue the
co1Tesponding titles in their names in the proportion established by law,
pro in division, in TCT Nos. 40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353
(after restoration) within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision, 4pon
payment of lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which shall be exempt
from all expenses for its restoration.
With no costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial ‘court’s Judgment in its
Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006 in the following wise:
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo de
Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to July 3,
1991, the date the certification was issued. Such being the case, the
resort deed is not a public document and the presumption of regularity
accorded to public documents will not apply to the same. As laid down in
Tigno, et al. v. Aquino, et al.:
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the
authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public docs net have the
capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document
should be treated as A. Unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh,
and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on
the proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be
one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate
process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a
notarial commission. Without such a rule,
The notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public will
have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer
engaged in pretense. The notarization of a document carries
considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document converts
such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty
routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree
and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not
qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the
public and the courts and administrative offices generally.
Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be considered a
public document. This is because the following cast doubt on the
document's authenticity, to wit: J.
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas
for annotation; and
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or the
purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were
presented as witnesses. · Concededly, the absence of notarization in the
resort deed and/or the lacking details in the settlement/family home deed
did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced by the said
documents. However, since the said deeds are private documents,
perforce, their due execution and authenticity becomes subject to the
requirement of proof under the Rules on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132
of which provides: Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any
private. Document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution a"Q.d. authenticity must be proved either:
(a). By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the
resort deed are void, as their signatures thereon are forgeries as
opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds' enforceability. After the
Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that their
signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to
disprove the ~ame2 or conversely, to prove the authenticity and due
execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in this regard.
As forestalled, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary
public who purportedly notarized the questioned instrument, (b) the
witnesses who appear [Ed] in the instruments as eyewitnesses to the
signing, or (c) an expert to prove the authenticity and genuineness of all
the signatures appearing on the said instruments. Verily, the rule that,
proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary
evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be
reasonably established as a pre requisite to its admission, was prudently
observed by the lower court when it refused to admit the
settlement/family home and the resort deeds as their veracity are
doubtful. 17
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for
Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession
was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as
to the nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of
legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the
intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary· jurisdiction when the action filed
was for Judidal Partition. Considering that the instant action is really one
for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its
probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the
issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that. Said ruling
is void and has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
The Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate
court on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for
Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the petition, a
certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that failed to
comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent
evidence of affiant' s identities. 18 In its Resolution 19 dated September
26, 2007, this Court also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in
the absence of any compelling reason to warrant a modification of the
previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became final and
executors on October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry of Judgment
issued by the Court. 20 On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied
petitioner' s motion for leave to admit a second motion for reconsideration
of its September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that the same is a
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section 4,
Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthennore,
petitioner's letter dated December 18, 2007 pleading the Court to take a
second. Look at his petition for review on certiorari and that a decision
thereon be rendered based purely on its merits was noted without
action. 21
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to
then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the case
be rendered based on the. Merits and not on formal requirements "as he
stands to lose everything his parents had left him just because the
verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective." However,
in view of the Entry of Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007,
the Court likewise noted said letter without action. 22
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Part Writ of
Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the portions
disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 200 a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment and· Order before the CA assailing
October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27, 2008 Order of the
RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In Decision
dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition a affirmed
the rulings of the trial court in the following wise: Although the assailed
Decision of the Court a quo has already become final and executory and
in fact entry of judgment was issued on 31 October 2007, supra,
nevertheless, to put the issues to rest,·We deem it apropos to tackle the
same.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the Court a
quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded.
xxxx
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment of a
judgment may "be based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho Magdato, the High Tribunal
stressed that: There is extrinsic fraud when "the unsuccessful party had
been ·prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, ...
or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; ... "
Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud, which
prevents the aggrieved party ·from having a trial or presenting his case to
the court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair submission of
the controversy. This refers to acts intended to keep the unsuccessful
party away from the courts as when there is a false promise of
compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit. The pivotal
issues before us are (1) whether. There was a time during the
proceedings below that the Petitioners ever prevented from exhibiting
fully their case, by fraud or deception, practiced on them by
Respondents, and (2) whether the Petitioners were kept away from the
court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent?
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what we deduced as We carefully
delved. Into the evidentiary facts surrounding the instant case as well as
the proceedings below as shown in the 36-page Decision of the Court a
quo, is that the Petitioners were given ample time to rebut the allegations
of the Respondents and had in fact addressed every detail of.
Respondent's cause of action against them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation
of the Court a quo ‘s lack of jurisdiction is misplaced.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling of
the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus: It is
elementary that' the active participation of a party in a case pending
against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's
jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which
will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction. ' In fine,
under the circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are
stopped from assailing the Court a quo 's lack of jurisdiction. Too, We do
not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, supra. As mentioned
earlier, entry of judgment had already been made on the assailed
Decision and Order as early as 31 October 2007.
xxxx
It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain
equitable remedies such as a petition for annulment. But the I. Rules are
clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders
and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts is resorted to
only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, supra.
If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate
remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court, that is their own look out.
The High Tribunal has emphatically pointed out in Mercado, et al. v.
Security Bank Corporation, thus:
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of
judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of·appeal." A
party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition
for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale
is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence.
Also, the action for annulment of judgment must be based either on (a)
extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Having
failed to avail of the remedies and there being 'a Clear showing that
neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be dismissed. Only
a disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition unacceptable. 23
When the appellate court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
in its Resolution dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009, invoking the following ground:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14,
NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDCITION IN
ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF PEDRO RINOZA AND THE CIVIL
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND THIRD
PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING. 24
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was
captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of action is
actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that
settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court
of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of
general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining
the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in
view of the prohibition found in the Rules on the joiner of special civil
actions and ordinary civil actions. 25 Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling
of the trial court is void and has no effect for having been rendered in
without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court
that since the finding of forgery relates only to the signature of
respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented to the conveyance,
the transaction should be considered valid as to them. Petitioner also
denies the indings of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad
faith for they only took possession of the subject properties after the
execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the consideration
on the sale.
The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since.
Respondents’ complaint alleged the following causes of action, the same
is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition: FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu,
Batangas at the time of his death, died intestate on November 16,
1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto attached as Annex
"A";
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated from
paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only known heirs of the above-
mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants Rolando,
Rafael, Antonio, Angelita, Loma all surnamed Rifioza, and Myrna
R. Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifania Belo and Ma. Theresa
R. Demafelix are the decedent’s legitimate children with his first
wife, while Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedent’s widow and
Bernadette Rifioza, the decedent's daughter with said widow. As
such, said parties are co-owners by virtue of an intestate
inheritance from the decedent, of the properties enumerated in
the succeeding paragraph; ‘
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located in
Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no known
legal indebtedness;
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will
be to the best interest of all heirs that it be partitioned judicially. 26.
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of
action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his
known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall
under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of
the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit,
the llegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one
for udicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court proyides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age5 or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds.
The parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or
by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public
instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the
office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in
an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as
certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It
shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a
petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of
the decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof. 27
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent
of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
interested in the property. 28
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of
respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a
complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged:
(1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-
heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by
a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs
enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an
account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that
Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as
rightful heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in
accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on
the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That
the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not
perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies
intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. Fails to furnish
the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall
be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left
no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate either
extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without submitting the
same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. 30The reasons that where the deceased dies
without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of
an administrator to administer the. Estate for hem and to deprive the real
owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled. 31
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not
isputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without any
ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents
were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the
estate of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are,
in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
extrajudicially, by ereira v. Court of Appeals: 32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no· debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the
heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, qr. to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course
of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs
have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where
partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly 4eld that when a person dies without leaving
pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not
bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always
long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the
Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
and unnecessary proceedings. 33
Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial
partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate as
law expressly permits the same. That the complaint contained
1avv phi 1
allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not. Mean
that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action for questions as to
the estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their status
as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate, may also
be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone.34 In fact, a complete
inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the partition
proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.~5 Indeed, where
the more expeditious remedy 9f partition is available to the heirs, then
they may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings,
dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated. 36
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the
annulment of title and recovery of possession does not strip the trial court
off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the
annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in
an action for partition, 37 as can be seen in cases where 1-ourts determine
the parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only for the partition
of estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership
and possession of property. 38 In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas, 39·wherein a
complaint for annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial
court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment as it constituted a
collateral attack on the certificates of title of the respondents therein, this
Court found the dismissal to be improper in the following manner:
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action. For partition
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue
of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed
realties 'to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot
be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As
pronounced in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The'
certificate referred to is that -document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means
ownership, which is, more often than not, represented by that document.
Petitioner c.pparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title
as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for annulment
of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was
actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's title to the subject lands and not
any Torrens certificate oftitle over the same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the
issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the existence of the
same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as held in
Municipality of Bifzan·v. Garcia: 40
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have
a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is_
legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that
a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and
an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event [,]
partition shall be done for the parties by the [c] ourt with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]
ourt after the. Parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard
Thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto
entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question. xx x. 41 ·
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties. 42 Unless and until the
issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to
effect a partition of an estate. 43
In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial court acted
without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of settlement of estate and
annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for the
instant complaint is precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of
title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable law
and jurisprudence. Under Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA
7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein
was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership but also for
annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the
trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the instant
petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone,
without the prayer for judicial partition, the requirement of instituting a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status and rights
of the respondents as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in light of the
fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court
and had already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship. 46 In
Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, 47 the Court explained:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule
74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to
the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.
xxxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject
it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the evil case - subject of
the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject · Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial
and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial,
x x x. 48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes of
action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the trial court, in arriving at
its decision, gave petitioner more than ample opportunity to advance his
claims, petitioner cannot now be permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction
just because the judgment rendered was adverse to them. To repeat, the
action filed herein is one for judicial partition and not for settlement of
intestate estate. Consequently, that respondents also prayed for the
annulment of title and recovery of possession in the same proceeding
does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction for asking for 'the annulment
of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action
for partition.
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid as to
the heirs who assented to the conveyance as well as their allegation of
good faith, this Court does not find any compelling reason to deviate from
the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently found by both courts
below, the authenticity and due execution of the documents on which
petitioner’s claims are based were inadequately proven. They were
undated, forged, and acknowledged before a notary public who was not
commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They were never
presented to the Register of Deeds for registration. Neither were the
supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties presented as
witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the estate,
actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the circumstances
surrounding the same militate against the fact of its occurrence. Not only
was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by Benita undated and
unsigned by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly
evidencing her receipt of her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of
sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court’s observations
as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the transactions alleged herein are
concerned. First, they were seemingly uncertain as to the number and/or
identity of the properties bought by them. 49 In their Answer, they gave the
impression 'that· they bought both the resort and the family home and
yet, during trial, Francisco Villafria claimed they only bought the resort. In
fact, it was only then that they presented the subject Extra Judicial
Settlement and Deed of Sale. 50 Second, they never presented any other
document which w0uld evidence their actual payment of consideration to
the selling heirs. 51 Third, in spite of the. Blatant legal infirmities of the
subject documents of conveyance, petitioners still took possession of the
properties, demolished several cottages, and introduced permanent
improvements thereon.
after a consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case
at hand, the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts
below in the absence of any showing that the same were rendered with
fraud or lack of jurisdiction. ·
WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009,
respectively, of the Court Appeals for CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which
affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it
conce1ns the resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 513 54
and No. 51355, and family home covered by TCT No. 40807 and 40808,
are AFFIRMED.

In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that petitioners failed to SO ORDERED.
adequately substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact, purchased the subject DIOSDADO M.PERALTA
properties. The circumstances surrounding the purported transfers cast Associate Justice
doubt on whether they actually took place. In substantiating their claim,
petitioners relied solely on the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of
Sale, who utterly failed to prove their authenticity and due execution.
They cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim. Absolute ownership of the
subject lands based on the same.

Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and

builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of title builder that
the land the latter is building on is one's own without knowledge of any
defect or flaw in one's. Title. 52 However, in view of .the manifest defects
in the instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have been
placed on guard. Yet, they still demolished several cottages and
constructed improvement on the properties. Thus, their claim of. Good
faith cannot be given credence.

Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and

unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except to
correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties
being deemed resolved and. laid to rest. 53 it is a fundamental principle in
our judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. 54 Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment is allowed
only under the most extraordinary of circumstances. 55 Yet, when
petitioner is given more than • ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled
access to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased judgments rendered