1. Pagpalain Hauler, Inc. v. Trajano, G.R. No.
that such submission of verified books is
133215, July 15, 1999
AUTHOR: Aguilar
DOCTRINE: The Department Order No. 9-
1997 is a valid issuance by the SOLE,
pursuant to its rule-making powers.
Under the Labor Code (Article 5), the
SOLE may promulgate IRRs necessary
for the implementation thereof. For an
administrative order to be valid, it must (i)
be issued on the authority of law and (ii)
must not contravene the Constitution or
laws. In this case, Department Order No.
9-1997 was issued on the authority of law
and does not contravene the Labor
Code. The Labor Code DOES NOT
prescribe any such requirement to submit
books of accounts for purposes of
chapter registration.
ER: In opposition to ILO’s PCE, Pagapalain
challenged its standing as a LLO. Pagapalain
argues that there is a requirement to submit
books of accounts, pursuant to the old
Implementing Rules and SC Jurisprudence;
and that ILO failed to comply. ILO opposed
such contention by arguing that the new
Department Order No. 9-1997 of the SOLE
did not require such requirement for the
purposes of chapter registration. SC ruled in
favor of ILO and held that SOLE’s rule-making
power was validly exercised in the
promulgation of Department Order No. 9-
1997. There is no requirement to submit
books of accounts.
FACTS: • ILO, in a bid to represent the rank-
and-file drivers and helpers of Pagpalain,
filed a Petition for Certification Election
(“PCE”). Attached to its PCE were copies of
its charter certificate, constitution and by-
laws, books of account, and list of officers.
• Pagpalain filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that ILO was not a legitimate labor organization
(“LLO”) due to its failure to have the books of
account verified under oath by its treasurer and
attested to its by president. Pagpalain argues
required under the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the LC and under Jurisprudence
(Protection Technology v. SOLE; Progressive
Development Corporation v. SOLE). In its reply,
the ILO argued that SOLE Department Order No.
9-1997 had dispensed with such requirement
that a local or chapter must submit books of
account in order to be registered.
• The Med-Arbiter granted the PCE, as it
recognized ILO as a LLO. The Med-Arbiter
appreciated that SOLE Department Order No. 9-
1997 dispensed with the old requirement under
the Implementing Rules. Upon appeal to SOLE
Trajano, SOLE affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s
decision. SOLE held that the Department Order
No. 9-1997 had dispensed with the old
requirement under the Implementing Rules.
Further, the SC Jurisprudence cited by
Pagpalain was premised upon the effectivity of
the said Implementing Rules. As the
Implementing Rules have been changed by the
Department Order No. 9-1997, SOLE argues
that there is no requirement to submit books if
account.
Pagpalain thus filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the SC. Pagpalain questioned the
SOLE Resolution that affirmed the Med-
Arbiter’s grant of PCE. Pagpalain contends
Department Order No. 9-1997 is VOID for
being contrary to public policy and for being
against SC Jurisprudence (part of the law
of the land).
ISSUE: W/N the Department Order No. 9-
1997 is valid.
HELD: YES. Department Order No. 9-1997
was validly issued pursuant to SOLE rule-
making power. It does not contravene law as
the Labor Code does not require the
submission of books of accounts for the
registration of local chapters. Further, the SC
Jurisprudence cited by Pagpalain is not law,
as the SC has no legislative powers. As
 Department Order No. 9-1997 is valid, ILO is
a valid LLO. PCE was properly granted.
The SC Jurisprudence (Protection
Technology v. SOLE; Progressive
Development Corporation v. SOLE) was
based on the old Implementing Rules that
required submission of verified books of
accounts for registration. It is not law. It is an
interpretation of Implementing Rules. Thus,
SC is not bound by its former rulings,
especially in light of the fact that
Department Order No. 9-1997 already
amended the old Implementing Rules.
• Under Department Order No. 9-1997, only
requirements for registration of chapter:
chapter certificate, list of officers, constitution
and by-laws (all sworn and attested)
• Courts cannot create law through
Jurisprudence. The rulings in Protection
Technology v. SOLE; Progressive Development
Corporation v. SOLE are interpretations of the
law. When the law changes, necessarily will the
interpretation. Pagpalain cannot insist that ILO
comply with the requirements under the said
rulings, for the current Department Order No.
9-1997 have deleted the same.
• The Department Order No. 9-1997 is a valid
issuance by the SOLE, pursuant to its rule-
making powers. Under the Labor Code (Article
5), the SOLE may promulgate IRRs necessary for
the implementation thereof. For an
administrative order to be valid, it must (i) be
issued on the authority of law and (ii) must not
contravene the Constitution or laws. In this
case, Department Order No. 9-1997 was issued
on the authority of law and does not
contravene the Labor Code. The Labor Code
DOES NOT prescribe any such requirement to
submit books of accounts for purposes of
chapter registration.
• Neither can Pagpalain invoke public policy as
basis for the SC to nullify Department Order No.
9-1997. Public policy is within the province of
the legislative and executive branches. And
indeed, the SOLE issued Department Order No.
9-1997 in light of public policy objectives.
Pagpalain argues that the non-submission of
books of accounts risks fraud and diversion of
union funds. However, such fears are addressed
through the rights and conditions of union
membership (Article 241, LC). Union members
can inspect funds, request reports, etc. to
ensure against fraud and diversion.
Furthermore, SOLE or his authorized
representative can inquire into the union’s
financial activities upon filing of complaint
under oath supported by written consent of
20% of union members (Article 274, LC).
2. Phil. Asso. of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1998
AUTHOR: Abalos
DOCTRINE: Protection to labor" does not
signify the promotion of employment alone.
What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be
above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad
enough that the country has to send its sons
and daughters to strange lands because it
cannot satisfy their employment needs at
home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that
our toiling expatriates have adequate
protection, personally and economically,
while away from home.
ER: PASEI assailed the validity of a DOLE DO
which suspended the deployment of
domestic and household workers for being
discriminatory and violative of right to
travel, among others. Court ruled that the
DO
FACTS:
PASEI, a firm engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female, for overseas placement, challenges
the validity of DOLE’s Department Order
No.1 (1988), “Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of
Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.
PASEI is assailing the Guidelines of being:
1. Discriminatory against males or females,
2. Inapplicable to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills;
3. Violative of the Right to Travel;
4. Passed without prior consultation; and
5. In violation of the Charter’s non-
impairment clause, to the great and
irreparable injury of the PASEI members.
SOLGEN: filed a Comment informing the
Court that the Labor Secretary lifted the
deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan,
Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States,
Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland; and
invoked the police power of the Philippines
State.
ISSUE: W/N the Department Order No.1
prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment thus impairing the right to full
employment.
HELD:
It is evident that such a total ban has not
been contemplated. Department Order No.
1 is a valid implementation of the Labor
Code, in particular, its basic policy to “afford
protection to labor.” (See doctrine)
The reliance of the petitioner on the
Constitutional Provision Art II, Sec 9, which
provides, “The State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas
organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all,” must
submit to the demands and necessities of
the State’s power of regulation.
3. SEAFDEC v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86773, February
14, 1992
AUTHOR: Bayona
DOCTRINE: An intergovernmental
organization, enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of
the state in whose territory its office is
located.
ER: (Topic: B. Recruitment and Placement)
Upon SEAFDEC-AQD’s failure to pay private
respondent his separation pay, the latter
filed a complaint against SEAFDEC-AQD for
non-payment of separation benefits plus
moral damages and attorney’s fees with the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. SEAFDEC-
AQD, an international agency, challenged
the NLRC’s jurisdiction. SC ruled that NLRC
has no jurisdiction.
FACTS: Lacanilao, Chief of Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture
Department [SEAFDEC-AQD], sent a Notice
of Termination to Juvenal Lazaga (employed
as a Research Associate on a probationary
basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was
appointed Senior External Affairs.
Thereafter, he was appointed to the position
of Professional III and designated as Head of
External Affairs Office with the same pay and
benefits), informing him that due to the
financial constraints being experienced by
the department, his services shall be
terminated at the close of office hours of
May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to
separation benefits equivalent to one (1)
month of his basic salary for every year of
service plus other benefits.
Upon SEAFDEC-AQD’s failure to pay private
respondent his separation pay, the latter
filed a complaint against SEAFDEC-AQD for
non-payment of separation benefits plus
moral damages and attorney’s fees with the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
SEAFDEC-AQD in their Answer with
counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the
SEAFDECAQD is an international
organization and that private respondent
must first secure clearances from the proper
departments for property or money
accountability before any claim for
separation pay will be paid, and which
clearances had not yet been obtained by the
private respondent. SEAFDEC-AQD’s
instituted this petition for certiorari, alleging
that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide respondent Lazaga’s complaint since
SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to
its international character and the complaint
is in effect a suit against the State which
cannot be maintained without its consent.
ISSUE: WON NLRC has jurisdiction to hear
and decided a case against an international
agency.
HELD: NO. Finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an
international agency beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of
the Philippine government, the questioned
decision and resolution of the NLRC are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having
been rendered without jurisdiction.
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center- Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-
AQD) is an international agency beyond the
jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. It
was established by the Governments of
Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of
Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia,
Republic of the Philippines, Republic of
Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and
Republic of Vietnam. The Republic of the
Philippines became a signatory to the
Agreement establishing SEAFDEC. Being an
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC
including its Departments (AQD), enjoys
functional independence and freedom from
control of the state in whose territory its
office is located.
Estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over
a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by
law. Where there is none, no agreement of
the parties can provide one.
4. Postigo v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc.,
G.R. No. 155146, January 24, 2006
AUTHOR: Cabral
DOCTRINE: *nothing related to recruitment
and placement idk why*
ER: Postigo et al being employees of a gocc
is entitled to retirement benefits granted to
private employees. For the reason that, PTSI
is a gocc w/o own charter and thus not
covered by the CSC law. Thus, LC/its special
laws govern.
FACTS:
1. Postigo et al are employees of PTSI.
They retired and claimed benefits under
GSIS.
2. They however applied for additional
benefits under RA 7641 or the
Retirement Pay Law
3. PTSI denied giving benefits under the
act, claiming that the act applies only to
private employees. Since Postigo et al
are employees of government, they are
not entitled.
4. Postigo et al sought opinion from
Bureau of Working Conditions - DOLE
which confirmed their entitlement
5. Hence, Positigo et al lodged complaint
with LA
6. LA favored Postigo et al
7. Upon appeal to NLRC: reversed because
of failure to post the appeal bond
ISSUE: Whether Postigo et al are entitled
retirement benefits under RA 7641
HELD: YES
1. PTSI is a private corporation having
been created under the general
 corporation law and not of special
charter.
2. Even though Postigo et al are covered by
GSIS, it does not negate the fact that
they are employees of a gocc w/o own
charter.
3. Thus, they are not covered by CSC law.
4. Postigo et al are entitled to benefits
5. *As to the appeal bond: There is
substantial compliance here. It was
noted by the court that PTSI deferred
the payment of the bond because it
moved for its reduction. While appeal
bond is necessary to perfect appeal,
court allows relaxation of the rule in this
case, to prevent further delay of the
proceedings.
5. Hidalgo v. Republic, G.R. No. 179793, July 5,
2010
AUTHOR: CARO
DOCTRINE: The regulation or the law
creating the Service determines the position
of the employee. 2.
ER: Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal after AFPCES failed to recall them
to work. LA and NLRC ruled in their favor.
However, those were nullified by CA which
held that CSC had jurisdiction over their
complaint. SC ruled that they were indeed
gov’t personnel as provided under PD 807
which provides that gov’t agencies are w/in
the scope of CSC. Here, petitioners were 3.
employed by a government agency that is
attached to the AFP and is performing
proprietary functions. Such fact cannot be
negated by AFPCES’ failure to follow
appropriate civil service rules in their hiring,
appointment, discipline and dismissal. Their
complaint was referred pro hac vice to CSC
instead of being dismissed due to the
peculiar situation where AFPCES claimed
they were government employees while CSC
disavowed jurisdiction over them. 4.
FACTS:
1. History of Armed Forces of the
Philippines Commissary and Exchange
Services (AFPCES):
a. The commissary Exchange
Service was organized
pursuant to Marcos’ LOI
No. 31 to benefit veterans,
their widows, orphans,
AFP members and their
dependents. P5m was set
aside from the Philippine
Veterans Claims
Settlement Fund for
AFPCES’ capital to manage
commissary facilities in
military establishments.
b. To socialize its services,
Gen Order No. 920
reorganized it as an AFP-
Wide Service Support Unit
which was a regular unit
under the direct control of
the AFP chief.
The 65 petitioners were AFPEC’s
regular employees who had worked for
4-31 yrs as food handlers, computer
technicians, auditors, record clerks,
cashiers, canvassers, bookkeepers and
warehousemen. They were enrolled
with SSS and AFPCES paid their
monthly contributions since the start
of their employment.
They were advised to undergo an
indefinite leave w/o pay upon a
promise that they would be allowed to
return to work as soon as AFPCES’ tax
subsidy is released and upon
resumption of its store operations.
However, AFP failed to recall
petitioners to their work. So, they filed
a complaint for constructive illegal
dismissal with damages before the
NLRC.
LA ordered AFPCES to pay their
backwages, 13th month pay and
separation pay.
 5. NLRC denied AFPCES’ plea to be
exempted from posting an appeal
bond and its MR.
6. AFPCES filed a petition before CA for a
TRO to enjoin NLRC from dismissing its
appeal and granting execution. Denied.
7. NLRC dismissed its appeal for failure to
post the required appeal bond.
Petitioners moved for execution.
8. Sheriffs’ progress report indicated that
writs of execution and garnishment
were already issued against the
AFPCES funds with Land Bank. Further,
AFPCES reinstated petitioners to their
former positions with no assurance
regarding their salaries.
9. CA granted AFPCES’ motion to lift writ
of garnishment and stay execution.
Nonetheless, petitioners were able to
secure an alias writ of execution after
due hearing with LA. This was then
brought before the CA which nullified
the earlier rulings on the ground that
petitioners are civil service employees
whose complaints should be lodged
with the CSC.
ISSUE: Which body has jurisdiction over their
complaint for illegal dismissal?
HELD: CSC. By clear implication of law,
AFPCES personnel should be classified as
government employees and any
appointment, promotion, discipline and
termination of its civilian staff should be
governed by appropriate civil service laws
and procedures.
● PD No. 807 (Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines) declares that the
CSC is the central personnel agency
to set standards and enforce laws
governing the discipline of civil
servants.
● The scope of civil service embraces
every branch, agency, subdv and
gov’t instrumentality, including
GOCCs whether performing
governmental or proprietary
functions.
● Agency: Any bureau, office,
commission, admin, corp
performing governmental or
proprietary function, or any other
unit of the government except as
otherwise provided.
● EO No. 180- Government
Employees: All employees of all
branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including GOCCs
w/ original charters. It provided
that the Civil Service and labor laws
shall be followed in the resolution
of complaints, grievances and cases
involving government employees.
● Philippine Refining Company v. CA:
AFPCES is a gov’t agency is not
immune from suit since it is
engaged in proprietary activities.
There is no reason to deviate from
this pronouncement.
● AFPCES is a mere entity of the AFP.
It is w/o any corporate features as
it is merely an agency performing
proprietary functions not only for
those in the AFP but for the public
in general.
● Unlike Duty Free Philippines,
AFPCES committed acts which
created an impression upon
petitioners that they fall w/in the
coverage of pertinent labor laws
and not the civil service law.
AFPCES enrolled petitioners with
SSS (private sector) instead of GSIS.
This lasted for 3 decades. Also, their
hiring never went through the
proper procedure under civil
service laws.
● It is the regulation or the law
creating the Service that
 determines the position of the
employee. Petitioners are
government personnel because
they are employed by AFPCES, a
government agency attached to the
AFP and performing proprietary
functions.
● Upon request, the CSC issued a
Resolution, finding that AFPCES was
NOT a GOCC w/ an original charter.
LOI 31 was not the charter of
AFPCES since it did not specify its
compositions, functions, powers
and limitations. Neither were they
appointed nor their civilian
employee positions included in the
plantilla of personnel approved by
the DBM.
● Notwithstanding CSC’s finding, it
cannot be denied that petitioners
are gov’t employees. Such fact
cannot be negated by AFPCES’
failure to follow appropriate civil
service rules in their hiring,
appointment, discipline and
dismissal.
● Absence/presence of required
appointment or membership in the
GSIS does not determine their
status.
● SC referred their complaint to the
CSC pro hac vice given their peculiar
situation where the AFPCES insisted
they were gov’t employees while
CSC itself disavowed jurisdiction
over them.
● Records do not show the validity of
the complaint as well as the
amount of their claim and salary
although the case has been pending
for a decade. CSC is directed to
promptly resolve w/n they were
illegally dismissed and w/n they are
entitled to their monetary claims.
CSC is also cautioned not to use
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
AFPCES’ inefficiency to prejudice
petitioners.
6. Juco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98107, August 18,
1997
AUTHOR: CARPIO
DOCTRINE: National Housing Corporation is
now within the jurisdiction of DOLE - it being
a GOCC without an original charter.
ER: Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
in several agencies. He have been tossed
from one forum to another on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. SC ruled that NHC is
within the jurisdiction of the DOLE.
FACTS:
● Juco was hired as a project engineer
of respondent National Housing
Corporation. Then, he was
separated from the service for
having been implicated in a crime of
theft and/or malversation of public
funds.
● Juco filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the NHC with the
DOLE. -- LA dismissed on the ground
that NLRC has no jurisdiction.
● NLRC reversed LA’s decision.
● SC reversed and reinstated LA’s
decision.
● Then, Juco filed with the Civil
Service Commission a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
● CSC dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
● Then, Juco filed at NLRC a complaint
for illegal dismissal. -- LA ruled that
he was illegally dismissed.
● NLRC reversed the decision on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s complaint is within
the jurisdiction of the Labor Code
HELD: Yes.
“The civil service embraces all branches,
Government, including government owned or ER:
controlled corporations with original charter.” FACTS:
(Article IX-B, Section 2[1]) ● PNOC-EDC is subsidiary of PNOC. It
filed with MOLE a clearance for
Relevant Case (NASECO v. NLRC): The new application to terminate services of
phrase “with original charter” means that respondent Vicente Ellelina, a
government -owned and controlled corporations contractual EE for alleged
refer to corporations chartered by special law as commission of a crime (Alarm or
distinguished from corporations organized under Public Scandal) during a Christmas
the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been party.
organized under the general incorporation statute ● Granted but later revoked and
and a subsidiary of the National Investment petitioner was ordered to reinstate
Development Corporation, which in turn was a Ellenila, without loss of seniority
subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded rights.
from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. ● PET appealed to Ministry of Labor.
The latter affirmed.
In the case at bench, the National Housing ● Hence, this petition. Petitioner
Corporation is a government- owned corporation argues:
organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order ○ Under LC 227, the MOLE
No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of has no jurisdiction over
Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. PET because it is a GOCC;
Its shares of stock are and have been one ○ Dismissal is valid and just.
hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government ● Meanwhile, RES contends that:
from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former ○ While PET is a subsidiary of
corporation law. PNOC, it still covered by
LC, thus, within
The NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner’s jurisdiction of Ministry of
complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule Labor inasmuch as
now is that the Civil Service covers only government petitioner was organized
-owned or controlled corporations with original as a private corporation
charters. Having been incorporated under the under Corp. Law and SEC
Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are registered.
governed by the Labor Code and come under the ○ PET is estopped from
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations assailing jurisdiction,
Commission. having subjected itself to
the latter when it filed
7. PNOC v. Leogardo, G.R. No. L-58494, July 5, application for clearance;
1989 ○ Dismissal is too harsh a
AUTHOR: CASTILLO penalty.
DOCTRINE: Test to determine whether
employees of GOCC are subject to Civil ISSUE
Service Law is the manner of its creation: Whether PET’s employees are governed by
● Special charter – Civil Service Law the Labor Code
● General corporation law – Labor
Code HELD
Yes.

Under laws then in force, EEs of GOCCs were
governed by Civil Service Law and not by
Labor Code, as provided in Art. 277 of the
Labor Code. In turn, 1973 Constitution
provides that Civil Service embraces GOCCs.
NHC vs. Juco (1985): Employees of GOCCs,
whether created by special law or formed as
subsidiaries under the Corporation Law, are
governed by Civil Service Law and not by
Labor Code.
However, the above doctrine has been
supplanted by the 1987 Constitution: “The
Civil Service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
of the Government, including GOCCs with
original charters.” (Article IX-B, Section 2 [1])
Thus, under present law,test to determine
whether GOCC is subject to Civil Service Law
is the manner of its creation:
● Special charter – Civil Service Law
● General corporation law – Labor
Code
Thus, having been incorporated under the
general Corporation Law, employees of
PNOC-EDC are subject to the provisions of
the Labor Code.
Dismissed.
8. PERT/CPM Manpower Exponent Co. v.
Vinuya, G.R. No. 197528, September 5,
2012
DADOR
DOCTRINE: Contract substitution, is a
prohibited practice as provided in Art. 34 of
LC and engaged in illegal recruitment, as
provided in Art.38 of LC.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Respondents had an employment contract
with petitioner for work in Dubai, said
contract indicated term of employment,
salary, allowance, and housing. During the
course of their work, they received an
appointment later from petitioners
indicating changes in the contract wherein
their salary, allowance, and employment
term were different from the original
contract. Furthermore, their housing was
found to be below suitable standards.
Subsequently, respondents were required to
sign a new contract which reflected the
terms in the appointment letter. Because of
the working conditions and change in
contract during the course of their work,
respondents filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner. Petitioners
were found to be guilty of constructive
dismissal through the form of contract
substitution and breach of contract based on
Article 34 and 38 of the Labor Code (this is
indicated in the footnotes found in the
facts).
FACTS.
● Respondents filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against the
petitioner and its President Romeo
P. Nacino.
○ An agency deployed them
between March- May
2007 to work as aluminum
fabricator/installer for the
agency’s principal,
Modern Metal Solution
LLC/MMS Modern Metal
Solution LLC (Modern
Metal) in Dubai, United
Arab Emirates.
● The respondents’ POEA-approved
employment contracts, provided
for a two-year employment, 9
hours a day, salary of 1,350 AED
with overtime pay, food allowance,
free and suitable housing (four to a
room), free transportation, free
 laundry, and free medical and
dental services. They each paid a P
15,000.00 processing fee.
● Modern Metal gave the
respondents, except Era,
appointment letters with terms
different from those in the
employment contracts which they
signed at the agency’s office in the
Philippines.
o Under the letters of
appointment, their employment
was increased to 3 years at 1,000 to
1,200 AED and food allowance of
200 AED.
● The respondents were shocked to
find out what their working and
living conditions in Dubai.
o They were required to work from
6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., with a break
of only one hour to one and a half
hours.
o When they rendered OT work,
they were most of the time either
underpaid or not paid at all.
o Their housing accommodations
were cramped and were shared
with 27 other occupants. The
lodging house was in Sharjah, which
was far from their jobsite in Dubai,
leaving them only three to four
hours of sleep a day because of the
long hours of travel to and from
their place of work; there was no
potable water and the air was
polluted. (damn)
● When the respondents received
their first salaries (at the rates
provided in their appointment
letters and with deductions for
placement fees) and because of
their difficult living and working
conditions, they called up the
agency and complained about their
predicament but nothing
happened.
● On May 5, 2007, Modern Metal required the
respondents to sign new employment
contracts. The contracts reflected the terms
of their appointment letters.
o Burdened by all the expenses
and financial obligations they
incurred for their deployment, they
were left with no choice but to sign
the contracts. They raised the
matter with the agency, which
again took no action.
● Subsequently, the respondents expressed to
Modern Metal their desire to resign.
o Out of fear that Modern Metal
would not give them their salaries
and release papers, the
respondents, except Era, cited
personal/family problems for their
resignation. Era mentioned the real
reason – "because I dont (sic) want
the company policy" – for his
resignation.
o It took the agency several weeks
to repatriate the respondents to
the Philippines. They all returned to
Manila in September 2007. Except
for Ordovez and Enjambre, all the
respondents shouldered their own
airfare.
● The agency countered that the respondents
were not illegally dismissed; they voluntarily
resigned from their employment to seek a
better paying job.
o It claimed that the respondents,
while still working for Modern
Metal, applied with another
company which offered them a
higher pay. Unfortunately, their
supposed employment failed to
materialize and they had to go
home because they had already
resigned from Modern Metal.
o It further alleged that the
respondents even voluntarily
signed affidavits of quitclaim and
release after they resigned.
 ● Labor Arbiter Ancheta rendered a Decision
dismissing the complaint, finding that the
respondents voluntarily resigned from their
jobs.
● The respondents appealed to the NLRC
which granted the appeal
o It ruled that the respondents had been
illegally dismissed.
o It stressed that it is illegal for an employer
to require its employees to execute new
employment papers, especially those which
provide benefits that are inferior to the
POEA-approved contracts.
● The NLRC rejected the quitclaim and release
executed by the respondents in Dubai.
o It believed that the respondents executed
the quitclaim documents under duress as
they were afraid that they would not be
allowed to return to the Philippines if they
did not sign the documents.
● Consequently, the NLRC ordered the agency,
Nacino and Modern Metal to pay, jointly and
severally, to pay respondents their
respective underpaid salaries, placement
fees, and salary for the unexpired portion of
the contract along with exemplary damages
plus attorney’s fees. MR denied.
● The CA dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Affirmed NLRC.
● Lastly, the CA found nothing legally wrong in
the NLRC correcting itself by adjusting the
respondents’ salary award on the basis of
the unexpired portion of their contracts, as
enunciated in the Serrano case.
ISSUE.
W/N the CA erred in:
1. Affirming the NLRC’s finding that the respondents
were illegally dismissed; - NO. CA was correct in
affirming
2. Holding that the compromise agreements before
the POEA pertain only to the respondents’ charge of
recruitment violations against the agency - NO
3. Affirming the NLRC’s award to the respondents of
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts, pursuant to the Serrano
ruling. – NO.
RATIO
1. The CA committed no reversible error and neither
did it commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the NLRC’s illegal dismissal ruling.
● The agency and its principal, Modern Metal,
committed flagrant violations of the law on
overseas employment, as well as basic
norms of decency and fair play in an
employment relationship, pushing the
respondents to look for a better
employment and, ultimately, to resign from
their jobs.
● First, the agency and Modern Metal are
guilty of contract substitution.
o The respondents entered into a POEA-
approved two-year employment
contract,with Modern Metal for a monthly
salary of 1350 AED.
o On April 2, 2007, Modern Metal issued to
them appointment letters whereby the
respondents were hired for a longer three-
year period and a reduced salary, from 1,100
AED to 1,200 AED, among other provisions.
o Then, on May 5, 2007, they were required
to sign new employment contracts reflecting
the same terms contained in their
appointment letters, except that this time,
they were hired as "ordinary laborer," no
longer aluminum fabricator/installer.
● Clearly, the agency and Modern Metal
committed a prohibited practice and
engaged in illegal recruitment under Article
34 of the Labor Code[1] and Article 38[2] of
the same
● Second, the agency and Modern Metal
committed breach of contract.
o Both the original contracts the
respondents signed in the Philippines and
the appointment letters issued to them by
Modern Metal in Dubai provided for free
housing and transportation to and from the
jobsite. The original contract mentioned
free and suitable housing. Although no
description of the housing was made in the
letters of appointment except:
 "Accommodation: Provided by the
company," it is but reasonable to think that
the housing or accommodation would be
"suitable."
o Based on the facts of the case, such
conditions are deemed to be “not suitable”
● Based on these conditions, the respondents’
decision to resign is not surprising. They
were compelled by the dismal state of their
employment to give up their jobs;
o Effectively, they were constructively
dismissed. A constructive dismissal or
discharge is "a quitting because continued
employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as, an offer
involving a demotion in rank and a
diminution in pay."
2. The compromise agreements (with quitclaim and
release) between the respondents and the agency
before the POEA did not foreclose their employer-
employee relationship claims before the NLRC.
● On the surface, the compromise agreements
appear to confirm the agency’s position, yet
a closer examination of the documents
would reveal their true nature
o Under the heading "Post-Deployment,"
the agency agreed to pay Era and Alcantara
P 12,000.00 each, purportedly in satisfaction
of the respondents’ claims arising from
overseas employment, consisting of unpaid
salaries, salary differentials and other
benefits, including money claims with the
NLRC
o The last document was signed by (1)
Anipan, (2) Lumanta, (3) Ladea, (4) Vinuya,
(5) Jonathan Nangolinola, and (6) Zosimo
Gatchalian (the last four signing on the left
hand side of the document; the last two
were not among those who filed the illegal
dismissal complaint).49
● The agency agreed to pay them a total of P
72,000.00. Although there was no
breakdown of the entitlement for each of
the six, but guided by the compromise
agreement signed by Era and Alcantara, we
believe that the agency paid them P
12,000.00 each, just like Era and Alcantara.
● The uniform insubstantial amount for each
of the signatories to the agreement lends
credence to their contention that the
settlement pertained only to their claim for
refund of the airfare which they shouldered
when they returned to the Philippines.
● The compromise agreement, apparently,
was intended by the agency as a settlement
with the respondents and others with similar
claims, which explains the inclusion of the
two (Nangolinola and Gatchalian) who were
not involved in the case with the NLRC.
o Under the circumstances, we cannot see
how the compromise agreements can be
considered to have fully settled the
respondents’ claims before the NLRC —
illegal dismissal and monetary benefits
arising from employment.
3. The agency’s objection to the application of the
Serrano ruling in the present case is of no moment.
● The Court sustained the retroactive
application of the Serrano ruling which
declared unconstitutional the subject clause
in Section 10, paragraph 5 of R.A. 8042,
limiting to three months the payment of
salaries to illegally dismissed Overseas
Filipino Workers.
● The agency posits that in any event, the
Serrano ruling has been nullified by R.A. No.
10022[3]
o It argues that R.A. 10022, which lapsed
into law (without the Signature of the
President) on, restored the subject clause in
the 5th paragraph, Section 10 of R.A.
8042[4].
● This argument fails to persuade us. Laws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
o The amendment introduced by R.A. 10022
cannot be given retroactive effect, not only
because there is no express declaration of
retroactivity in the law, but because
retroactive application will result in an
impairment of a right that had accrued to the
respondents by virtue of the Serrano ruling -
entitlement to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.
o All statutes are to be construed as having
only a prospective application, unless the
purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them a retrospective effect are
expressly declared or are necessarily implied
from the language used.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated May 9, 2011 and the Resolution dated
June 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 114353 are AFFIRMED. Let this
Decision be brought to the attention of the
Honorable Secretary of Labor and
Employment and the Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration as a black mark in the
deployment record of petitioner Pert/CPM
Manpower Exponent Co., Inc., and as a
record that should be considered in any
similar future violations.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
9.
[1] Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for
any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
xxxx
(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor from
the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to
and including the periods of expiration of the same
without the approval of the Secretary of Labor.
[2] Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A.
8042,35 defined "illegal recruitment" to include the
following act:
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker,
employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor and Employment from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including
the period of the expiration of the same without the
approval of the Department of Labor and Employment.
Second. The agency and Modern Metal committed
breach of contract. Aggravating the contract
substitution imposed upon them by their employer, the
respondents were made to suffer substandard
(shocking, as they put it) working and living
arrangements. Both the original contracts the
respondents signed in the Philippines and the
appointment letters issued to them by Modern Metal in
Dubai provided for free housing and transportation to
and from the jobsite. The original contract mentioned
free and suitable housing.36 Although no description of
the housing was made in the letters of appointment
except: "Accommodation: Provided by the company," it
is but reasonable to think that the housing or
accommodation would be "suitable."
[3] An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8042, Otherwise
Known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, As Amended, Further Improving the
Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of
Migrant Workers, Their Families and Overseas Filipinos
in Distress, and For Other Purposes
[4] The amendment, contained in Section 7 of R.A.
10022, reads as follows:
In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the
migrant worker’s salary, the worker shall be entitled to
the full reimbursement "of" his placement fee and the
deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%)
per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less
Sto. Tomas v. Salac, G.R. No. 152642,
November 13, 2012
AUTHOR: DEL CASTILLO
DOCTRINE: Illegal recruitment under the law
is clear and unambiguous, and actually
makes a distinction between licensed and
non-licensed recruiters. By its terms,
persons who engage in canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting utilizing, hiring or
processing workers without the appropriate
government license or authority are guilty of
illegal recruitment whether or not they
committed the wrongful acts enumerated in
that section. On the other hand, recruiters
who engage in the canvassing, etc, of OFWs,
although with the appropriate government
license or authority are guilty of illegal
 recruitment only if they commit any of the
wrongful acts enumerated.
ER: This is a consolidated case wherein
several parties are attacking the
constitutionality of certain sections of the
Overseas and Migrant Workers Act. It is
alleged that Sec 6 is unconstitutional for it is
vague in defining what illegal recruitment i,
and that it unfairly gives an advantage to
those who are not recognized by the gov’t.
The court however held that section 6 is
clear and unambiguous and actually makes a
distinction between licensed and
unlicensed. See doctrine.
FACTS: This is a consolidated case pertaining
to the constitutionality of the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
First Case: Constituionality of Sec 29 and Sec
30
Salac et al were opposing the application Sec
29 and 30 of the Act commanded the DOLE
to being deregulation within one year of its
passage the business of handling the
recruitment and migration of overseas
Filipino workers and phase out within 5 years
the regulatory functions of the POEA.
However, since PGMA subsequently signed
into law RA 9422 which expressly repealed
Sc 29 and 30 and adopted the policy of close
government regulation of the revruitment
deployment of OFWs, the case was
dismissed for being moot and academic.
1 person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring
workers and includes referring, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or
non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f)
of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That
such non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or
more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise
include the following acts, whether committed by any
2nd case: Constitutionality of sec 6,7, and 9
Respondent Philippine Association fo Service
Exporters Inc, (PASEI) filed a petition for
declaratory relief and prohibition seeking to
annul 6 1,72 , and 9 for being
unconstitutional.
Sec 6 defines the crime of ollegal
recruitment and enumerated the acts
constituting it, whil Sec 7 provides for the
penalties. And Sec 9 allows the filing of
criminal actions arising from illegal
recruitment before the RTC of the province
where the offense was committed or where
the offended party actually resides at the
time of commission.
RTC: declared Sec 6 is unconstitutional on
the ground that the definition of illegal
recruiment is vague as it fails to distinguish
between licensed and non-licensed
recruiters, and for that reason gives undue
advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in
violation of the right to equal protection of
those that operate with gov’t licenses.
3rd Case: COnstitutionality of Section 10, last
sentence of 2nd paragraph.
In this case, Sps Cuaresmas filed a claim for
death and insurance benefits against
Becmen Services and White Falcon Services
for the death of their daughter while
working as a nurse in RIyadh. The Court ruled
holder of authority:
2
SEC. 7. Penalties. – (a) Any person found guilty of illegal
recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12)
years and a fine not less than two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00). (b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor
more than one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if
illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined
herein. Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be
imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18)
years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority.
that Jasmin’s death was not work-related
since her rape and death did not occur while
she was on duty at the hospital, thus the
award for damages were deleted but ruled
that Becmen’s corporate directors and
officers should be solidarily liable with their
company for its failure to investigate the
true nature of her death.
Corporate officers thenquestioned the
constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence
of the second paragraph which hold the
corporate directors, officers, and partners
jointly and solidarily liable with their
company for money claims filed by OFWs
against their employment and recruitment
firms
ISSUE: 1) W/N Section 6 is is void for being
vague
2) W/N Sec 10 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1) NO.Illegal recruitment under the
law is clear and unambiguous, and
actually makes a distinction
between licensed and non-licensed
recruiters. By its terms, persons
who engage in canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting
utilizing, hiring or processing
workers without the appropriate
government license or authority
are guilty of illegal recruitment
whether or not they committed the
wrongful acts enumerated in that
section. On the other hand,
recruiters who engage in the
canvassing, etc, of OFWs, although
with the appropriate government
license or authority are guilty of
illegal recruitment only if they
commit any of the wrongful acts
enumerated.
*section 7 was upheld because it
Congress laying down stiff penalties
is within the State’s police
powers.to protect the general
welfare of the state.
2) No, Section 10 is constitutional.
Court cannot inquire into the
wisdom of the legislative in the
absence of a clear and
unmistakable case that the statue is
inconstitutional.
As to the liability of the directors,
the court has already previously
held that the liability of directors
and officers are not automatic.
There must be a finding that they
were remiss in directing the affairs
of the company such as sponsoring
or tolerating the conduct of illegal
activities. In this case, evidence of
their personal involvement with
Jasmin’s was given. Thus, they are
not liable.
10. People v. Panis, G.R. No. L-58674, July 11,
1990
AUTHOR: Domingo
DOCTRINE: The number of persons dealt
with is not an essential ingredient of the act
of recruitment and placement of workers.
Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule
in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment
and placement even if only one prospective
worker is involved.
ER: 4 informations were filed alleging that
Abug is engaged in illegal recruitment. Abug
filed a motion to quash contending that to
constitute recruitment and placement, all
the acts mentioned in the article should
involve dealings with 2 or more persons as
an indispensable requirement while the
petitioner contends that the requirement of
two or more persons is imposed only where
the recruitment and placement consists of
an offer or promise of employment to such
persons and always in consideration of a fee.
The Supreme Court held that neither
interpretation is acceptable. The number of
 persons dealt with is not an essential
ingredient of the act of recruitment and
placement of workers. Any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b)
will constitute recruitment and placement
even if only one prospective worker is
involved.
FACTS:
● 4 informations were filed alleging that
Serapio Abug (private respondent) "without
first securing a license from the Ministry of
Labor as a holder of authority to operate a
fee- charging employment agency, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
operate a private fee-charging employment
agency by charging fees and expenses (from)
and promising employment in Saudi Arabia"
to 4 separate individuals named therein, in
violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39
of the Labor Code.
● Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground
that the informations did not charge an
offense because he was accused of illegally
recruiting only one person in each of the four
informations.
● ABUG’S CONTENTION: to constitute
recruitment and placement, all the acts
mentioned in this article should involve
dealings with two or more persons as an
indispensable requirement.
● PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: private
respondent is being prosecuted under
Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the
Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not
applicable. Also, the requirement of two or
more persons is imposed only where the
recruitment and placement consists of an
offer or promise of employment to such
persons and always in consideration of a fee.
The other acts mentioned in the body of the
article may involve even only one person and
are not necessarily for profit.
ISSUE: What is the correct interpretation of
Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, reading as
follows:
'Recruitment and placement' refers
to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting,
contracting, transporting, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged
in recruitment and placement."
HELD: The proviso was intended neither to
impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to
create a presumption. The presumption is
that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever he or
it is dealing with two or more persons to
whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or
promise of employment is made in the
course of the "canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an
essential ingredient of the act of recruitment
and placement of workers. Any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b)
will constitute recruitment and placement
even if only one prospective worker is
involved. The proviso merely lays down a
rule of evidence that where a fee is collected
in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective
workers, the individual or entity dealing with
them shall be deemed to be engaged in the
act of recruitment and placement. The
words "shall be deemed" create that
presumption.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted
should give more force to the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement,
 which has victimized many Filipino workers
seeking a better life in a foreign land, and
investing hard-earned savings or even
borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream,
only to be awakened to the reality of a
cynical deception at the hands of their own
countrymen.
The four informations against the private
respondent is reinstated.
11. People v. Sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9,
2017
AUTHOR: Montaner
DOCTRINE: Illegal recruitment may be
undertaken by either non-license or license
holders. Non-license holders are liable by
the simple act of engaging in recruitment
and placement activities, while license
holders may also be held liable for
committing the acts prohibited under
Section 6 of RA 8042 (Migrant Workers Act).
ER: Sison represented herself to Castuera as
someone who could help her get
employment in Australia. Castuera paid
Sison for processing his papers. When Sison
failed to secure Australian visa for Castuera,
Sison along with 2 others, convinced
Castuera to continue the application. She
was further asked to pay for the getting of
US Visa by one of Sison’s companions which
turned out to Indonesian passport bearing
an Indonesian name. So, Castuera decided to
just return to the Philippines. SC held that
Sison is guilty of illegal recruitment. Illegal
recruitment may be undertaken by either
non-license or license holders. Non-license
holders are liable by the simple act of
engaging in recruitment and placement
activities. Sison had no license or authority
to undertake recruitment and placement
activities. Having represented to Castuera
that she could send him abroad for
employment, even without the authority or
license to do so, she committed illegal
recruitment.
FACTS:
Sison met with certain Castuera and briefed
him on the requirements for working as a
fruit picker in Australia. She introduced
Castuera to another man who related that
he was able to go to Australia with her help.
She also showed Castuera pictures of other
people she had supposedly helped to get
employment in Australia. Sison further
narrated that a couple she had helped had
given her their car as payment. Because of
her representations, Castuera believed in
her promise that she could send him to
Australia. Appellant asked Castuera for
₱180,000 for processing his papers.
Sison, however, failed to secure an
Australian visa for Castuera. Together with
Dedales and Bacomo, Sison convinced
Castuera that it was difficult to get an
Australian visa in the Philippines so they had
to go to Malaysia or in Indonesia to get one.
Subsequently, Castuera's application for an
Australian visa in Indonesia was denied.
Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the
processing of his U.S. visa, which he paid.
However, when his U.S. visa came, Castuera
saw that it was in an Indonesian passport
bearing an Indonesian name. Because of
this, Castuera decided to just return to the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether Sison is guilty of Illegal
recruitment.
HELD: Yes.
Illegal recruitment is "committed by persons
who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they
have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes." It may be
undertaken by either non-license or license
holders. Non-license holders are liable by
 the simple act of engaging in recruitment
and placement activities, while license
holders may also be held liable for
committing the acts prohibited under
Section 6 of RA 8042.
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority commits illegal
recruitment for overseas employment in two
ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising
for employment abroad, whether for profit
or not; or (2) by undertaking any of the acts
enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042.
In this case, Sison herself admits that she has
no license or authority to undertake
recruitment and placement activities. An
accused who represents to others that he or
she could send workers abroad for
employment, even without the authority or
license to do so, commits illegal recruitment.
Further, Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by a syndicate carried out by a
group of 3 or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. Since it was
proven that the three accused were acting in
concert and conspired with one another,
their illegal recruitment activity is
considered done by a syndicate, making the
offense illegal recruitment involving
economic sabotage.
Sison is GUILTY of violation of Section 6, in
relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No.
8042 or illegal recruitment involving
economic sabotage.
12. People v. Abellanosa, G.R. No. 214340, July
19, 2017
AUTHOR: Pioquinto
DOCTRINE:
(1) Illegal recruitment when
committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof
(2) Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme
defined under the first paragraph hereof.
(3) Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
ER: Abellanosa was charged with crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale for
representing herself as licensed recruiter for
employment in brunei to 7 complainants
herein. SC held that prosecution was able to
prove that Abellanosa is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
FACTS
1. Abellanosa was charged with Illegal
Recruitment in large scale under RA
8042 for falsely representing to possess
authority to recruit job applicants for
employment abroad without first
having secured the required authority
and having illegally collected placement
fees for overseas employment from 8
individuals which is an offense involving
economic sabotage.
2. Prosecution: Abellanosa met with the
complainants in Ilo-ilo and introduced
herself to the complainants as a
recruiter and asked for processing fee in
exchange for her processing the
complainants’ documents for
employment in Brunei. Despite
payment, she failed to give their visa
and other papers. Abellanosa also
 represented herself as a relative of the
labor attache in Brunei.
- The several complainants were Pomar,
Pastolero, Cathedral, Orias, Suobiron,
Bueron, and Pelipog
3. Abellanosa denied meeting any of the
private complainants while she was in
Ilo-ilo and she was there only to assist
certain Shirley in processing the latter's
business license. She also denied that
she received money from the private
complainants; she claimed that it was
Shirley who was engaged in recruitment
activities.
4. RTC: guilty
5. CA: affirm RTC
6. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in finding that
her guilt for illegal recruitment in large scale
had been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
despite her claim that she never met any of
the private complainants during her short
stay in Iloilo.
HELD
No, RTC did not err. Abellanosa is proven
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime illegal recruitment in large scale.
Article 13(b) Labor Code: Recruitment is any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not; Provided, That any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
Recruitment becomes illegal when
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders
of authority.
Prosecution was able to establish that
appellant was engaged in illegal recruitment
in large scale. It was proved that:
a. appellant was a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority to recruit workers for
deployment abroad as proven by
certification issued by POEA;
b. she offered or promised employment
abroad to private complainants;
c. she received monies from private
complainants purportedly as placement
or processing fees;
d. that private complainants were not
actually deployed to Brunei;
e. that despite demands, appellant failed to
reimburse or refund to private
complainants their monies; and
f. that appellant committed these
prohibited acts against three or more
persons, individually or as a group.
The penalty of life imprisonment shall apply
collectively to all seven cases lumped
together, and not individually.
13. David v. Marquez, G.R. No. 209859, June 5,
2017
AUTHOR: Tolentino
DOCTRINE: (1) An alternative venue for
criminal actions arising from illegal
recruitment is the place of residence of the
offended party (Sec. 9, RA 8042).
(2) Generally, the prosecution cannot appeal
or bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case. Despite acquittal, however,
the offended party or the accused may
appeal, but only with respect to the civil
aspect of the decision.
ER: David approached Marquez in
Kidapawan City for recruitment to work
abroad and later on collected processing
fees. Marquez filed Informations for illegal
recruitment and Estafa against David in the
RTC of Manila. In an MR, David questioned
the validity of the Informations stating that
RTC Manila did not have jurisdiction since
the alleged crimes occurred in Kidapawan
City where it should have been filed. RTC
Manila granted David’s MR. Marquez filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA, to which was
granted. The SC held that RTC Manila had
jurisdiction over the case because Sec. 9 of
RA 8042 provided an alternative venue for
criminal actions arising from illegal
recruitment wherein it can be filed where
the offended party resides (i.e. Manila:
Marquez’s residence). The SC also held that
Marquez had legal personality to file the
petition for certiorari in the CA even if
generally, the prosecution cannot appeal or
bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case. Despite acquittal, however,
the offended party or the accused may
appeal, but only with respect to the civil
aspect of the decision.
FACTS:
● Eileen David approached Glenda
Marquez in Kidapawan City, and
representing that she (David) could
recruit her (Marquez) to work
abroad. Payment of placement fees
and other expenses for the
processing of Marquez's
application were given by Marquez
upon David’s request. Marquez's
application was, however, denied
and worse, the money that she put
out was never returned.
● David averred that it was physically
impossible for her to commit the
said acts because she was in Canada
at the time of the alleged
recruitment. As to the money
deposited in her account, David
said that the money was coursed
through her to be given to her
friend in Canada who processed
Marquez’s application. David
further argued before the
Prosecutor that assuming arguendo
that the allegations of recruitment
were true, the case should be filed
in Kidapawan City and not in
Manila.
● On December 9, 2008, two
separate Informations were filed
against David for Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa,
respectively.
● RTC Manila found that it had no
jurisdiction to try the cases since
the crimes of Illegal Recruitment
and Estafa were not committed in
its territory but in Kidapawan City.
It also issued an Order recalling the
warrants of arrest issued against
the David.
● Marquez filed an MR through the
public prosecutor averring that
while it appears in the POEA pro-
forma complaint affidavit that the
alleged recruitment activities took
place in Kidapawan City, it also
appears in her Reply- Affidavit, that
she deposited certain amounts in
several banks in Manila for the
name and account of David as
payments for employment
processing and placement fees.
Thus, part of the essential elements
of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa
took place in Manila. Section 9 of
RA 8042 states that an illegal
recruitment case may also be filed
with the RTC of the province or city
where the offended party actually
resides at the time of the
commission of the crime. Marquez
averred that the records show that
at the time of the incident up to the
present, she resides in Sampaloc,
Manila.
 ● RTC denied Marquez’s MR.
● Marquez filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA.
● CA - On the issue of legal
personality, Marquez, having an
interest in the civil aspect of the
case, thus, may le such action in
his/her name to question the
decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds.
● On jurisdiction, the CA ruled that
the RTC Manila has jurisdiction over
the cases of Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa, citing Section 9 of RA 8042.
● David files a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 assailing the decision
of the CA.
ISSUE:
(1) W/N RTC Manila had jurisdiction over the
case? – Yes.
(2) W/N Marquez had legal personality to file
a petition for certiorari before the CA? – Yes.
HELD:
(1) At the risk of being repetitive, Sec. 9 of RA
8042, however, fixed an alternative venue
from that provided in Section 15 (a) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., a criminal
action arising from illegal recruitment may
also be led where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense and that the court
where the criminal action is first led shall
acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts.
Despite the clear provision of the law, the
RTC of Manila declared that it has no
jurisdiction to try the cases as the Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa were not committed
in its territory but in Kidapawan City.
We are, thus, one with the CA in finding that
the RTC of Manila committed grave abuse of
discretion and in fact, a palpable error, in
ordering the quashal of the Informations.
The express provision of the law is clear that
the ling of criminal actions arising from
illegal recruitment before the RTC of the
province or city where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense is allowed.
It has been found by both the RTC and the
CA that the Marquez resides in Manila;
hence, the filing of the case before the RTC
of Manila was proper.
(2) There is no question that, generally, the
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant in a criminal case due
to the final and executory nature of a
judgment of acquittal and the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy. Despite
acquittal, however, the offended party or
the accused may appeal, but only with
respect to the civil aspect of the decision
In all, since it is established that the RTC of
Manila has jurisdiction over the Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa cases, and there
being no violation of the double jeopardy
doctrine, the prosecution of the case may
still resume in the trial court as held by the
CA.
14. Abosta Ship Management v. Hilario, G.R.
No. 195792, Nov. 24, 2014
AUTHOR: Aguilar
DOCTRINE: The contract was already
perfected on the date of its execution, which
occurred when petitioner and respondent
agreed on the object and the cause, as well
as on the rest of the terms and conditions
therein. Naturally, contemporaneous with
the perfection of the employment contract
was the birth of certain rights and
obligations, a breach of which may give rise
to a cause of action against the erring party.

ER: Short facts lang
FACTS:
24 October 2002: an employment contract
was executed by petitioner, on behalf of its
foreign principal Panstar Shipping Co., Ltd.,
and respondent. In this contract, the latter
was hired as a boatswain of the foreign
vessel Grand Mark for a period of nine
months, with a monthly salary of USD566.
25 October 2002: The contract was duly
approved by the POEA.
27 November 2002: upon reporting to the
office of petitioner, respondent was
informed that the latter's deployment had
been postponed. It appears that the foreign
principal decided to promote an able
seaman on board the vessel instead of hiring
respondent.
Petitioner thus requested respondent to
wait for another two to three months for a
vacancy to occur.
In the meantime, respondent was allowed to
make cash advances as financial assistance.
28 January 2003: respondent filed a
Complaint with the POEA against petitioner
for violation of Section 2(r), Rule I, Part VI of
the 2002 POEA Rules by failing to deploy
respondent within the prescribed period
without any valid reason.
15. Santiago v. C.F. Sharp Crew Management,
6 February 2003: Respondent filed a
Complaint with the Labor Arbiter based on
the same ground and sought actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: WON the respondent has a cause of
action against the petitioner
HELD: The contract was already perfected on
the date of its execution, which occurred
when petitioner and respondent agreed on
the object and the cause, as well as on the
rest of the terms and conditions therein.
Naturally, contemporaneous with the
perfection of the employment contract was
the birth of certain rights and obligations, a
breach of which may give rise to a cause of
action against the erring party. Also, the
POEA Standard Contract must be recognized
and respected. Thus, neither the manning
agent nor the employer can simply prevent a
seafarer from being deployed without a valid
reason
True, the promotion and choice of personnel
is an exercise of management prerogative.
However, there are limitations on the
exercise of management prerogatives, such
as existing laws and the principle of equity
and substantial justice.
The unilateral and unreasonable failure to
deploy respondent constitutes breach of
contract, which gives rise to a liability to pay
actual damages. The sanctions provided for
non-deployment do not end with the
suspension or cancellation of license or the
imposition of a fine and the return of all
documents at no cost to the worker. They do
not forfend a seafarer from instituting an
action for damages against the employer or
agency that has failed to deploy him.
G.R. No. 162419, July 10, 2007
AUTHOR:
DOCTRINE:
ER:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
16. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, G.R.
No. 167614, March 24, 2009
AUTHOR: Bayona
DOCTRINE: (Topic: b. Money claims) The
‘subject clause’ of R.A. 8042 violates
petitioner’s right to substantive due process,
for it deprives him of property, consisting of
monetary benefits, without any existing
valid governmental purpose.
ER: With the enactment of Republic Act
8042, specifically the adoption of the subject
clause, illegally dismissed Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs), with an unexpired portion
of one year or more in their employment
contract have since been differently treated
in that their money claims are subject to a 3-
month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term
employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply
any definitive governmental purpose; and it
is for that precise reason that the clause
violates not just petitioner’s right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive
due process under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution. The subject clause being
unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his
salaries for the entire unexpired period of
nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence
- prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired
by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. & Marlow
Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-approved ‘Contract
of Employment’. On the date of his
departure, Serrano was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract
for the position of Second Officer upon the
assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief
Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their
promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.
Hence, petitioner refused to stay and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May 26,
1998. Petitioner’s employment contract was
for a period of 12 months, but at the time of
his repatriation he had served only two (2)
months and seven (7) days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days.
LA rendered a Decision declaring the
dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding
him monetary benefits. In awarding
petitioner a lump-sum salary, the LA based
his computation on the salary period of 3
months only —rather than the entire
unexpired portion of nine months and 23
days of petitioner’s employment contract.
Serrano appealed to the NLRC on the sole
issue that the LA erred in not applying the
ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission that in case of illegal dismissal,
OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts. Serrano
eventually filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, but this time he
questioned the constitutionality of the
subject clause. Serrano then filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject
clause.
[Subject clause = R.A. 8042, Sec. 10. Money
Claims.—x x x In case of termination of
overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee
with interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less. x x x x]

ISSUE: WON the subject clause is
constitutional.
HELD: NO. The Court concludes that the
subject clause contains a suspect
classification in that, in the computation of
the monetary benefits of fixed-term
employees who are illegally discharged, it
imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs
with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their contracts, but none on the
claims of other OFWs or local workers with
fixed-term employment. The subject clause
singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
The subject clause does not state or imply
any definitive governmental purpose; and it
is for that precise reason that the clause
violates not just petitioner’s right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive
due process under Section 1,137 Article III of
the Constitution. The subject clause being
unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his
salaries for the entire unexpired period of
nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence
prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
17. Sameer Overseas Placement v. Cabiles, G.R.
No. 170139, Aug. 5, 2014
AUTHOR: Cabral
DOCTRINE: Sec. 10 par 5 of RA 8042 which
was reinstated by RA 10022 is deemed
unconstitutional
ER:
FACTS:
1. Cabiles was deployed by Sameer to
work as a cutter for Wacoal in Taiwan.
2. She was then informed of her
termination without prior notice, and
directed her to prepare for repatriation
- Sameer claimed that termination
was due to inefficiency and
negligence in duties
3. Upon return to PH, she filed Illegal
Dismissal Complaint against Sameer
and Wacoal with prayer for the return
of her placement fee, repatriation
costs, payment of her salary for
unexpired portion (23 months) and
damages
4. NLRC ruled that she was illegally
dismissed. But only granted 3 months
worth of salary and reimbursed only
the repatriation costs
5. Sameer appealed to CA but the latter
only affirmed NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether the award is proper
HELD: NO
1. Cabiles was illegally dismissed and so
under RA 8042 Sec. 10, illegally
dismissed employees are entitled to
their salaries for the unexpired portion
of the employment contract.
2. It was noted that this case occurred
prior RA 10022 which reinstated the “or
3 months per year of service whichever
is lower”. That is why the award is for
the unexpired portion. YET the court
decided to resolve the constitutionality
of such reinstated clause to avoid
confusion. SC again reiterated principles
in Serrano v. Gallant, holding such
clause to be unconstitutional for
violating EPC and DP.
- Putting a cap on money claims for
certain overseas workers does not
increase the standard of
protection afforded to labor while
seemingly, the employers are
being incentivized by their
wrongdoings.
- THUS, unconstitutional
3. Aside from the salary of unexpired
portion, Cabiles is also entitled to the
following:
- Placement fee plus 12% interest p.a.
- Costs of repatriation because under
Sec 15 RA 8042 repatriation shall be
the primary responsibility of the
 recruitment agency who deployed the
workers.
- Monetary awards (including salary)
where no interest rate is stipulated
shall be subject to 6% interest from the
time of judgment
- Attorneys fees = 10% of the withheld
wages
4. Liability of Wacoal and Sameer: solidary
as expressly provided by Sec. 10 RA
8042. Thus, either one of them
impleaded is sufficient for final
determination of the case.
Ratio: assurance of immediate relief
PETITION DENIED.
18. Sealanes Marine Services v. dela Torre, G.R.
No. 214132, February 18, 2015
AUTHOR: CARO
DOCTRINE: Every applicant for license to
operate a seafarers’ manning agency shall, in
the case of a corporation or partnership,
submit a written application together with,
among others, a verified undertaking by
officers, directors and partners that they will
be jointly and severally liable with the
company over claims arising from employer-
employee relationship.
Laws are deemed incorporated in
employment contracts and the contracting
parties need not repeat them. They do not
even have to be referred to. Every contract,
thus, contains not only what has been
explicitly stipulated, but also the statutory
provisions that have any bearing on the
matter.
ER: Respondent, after being hired by
Petitioner, figured in an accident. He injured
his back, which required treatment for more
than 240 days. Court held that Petitioner is
liable because subject claim is joint and
several, which is incorporated in the
contract for overseas employment.
FACTS:
● Respondent was hired by
Petitioner, a local manning agency,
through its President, in behalf of
its foreign principal, Arklow
Shipping Netherlan, as an able
seaman on board M/V Arklow
Venture for a period of 9 months at
a basic monthly salary of
US$545.00.
● An overriding CBA called “CBA for
Filipino Ratings on Board
Netherlands Flag Vessels” (Dutch
CBA), also covered Respondent’s
contract.
● The respondent embarked and
during the crew’s rescue boat drill
at the port of Scotland he figured in
an accident and injured his lower
back. An X-ray of his spine was
taken, but while according to his
attending physician he sustained no
major injury, the pain in his back
persisted and he was repatriated.
● Respondent’s series of x-rays of his
spine showed, that he sustained
“lumbar spine degenerative
changes with associated L1
compression fracture.” Also, a MRI
scan of his lumbar spine revealed
an “acute compression fracture
body of L1; right paracentral disc
protrusion at L5-S1 causing minimal
canal compromise; L4-L5 and L5-S1
disc dehydration.”
● Respondent underwent several
physical therapy sessions, and
finally the company-designated
physician assessed him with a
Grade 11 disability for slight rigidity
or one-third loss of motion or lifting
power of trunk.
● Nonetheless, he was informed of
the assessment only more than 240
days since the accident.
Respondent filed a complaint.
 ● LA awarded disability benefits,
medical reimbursement, underpaid
sick leave, damages and attorney’s
fees in favor of the Respondent.
● NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision.
● CA ruled that the seafarer’s right to
disability benefits is determined
not solely by the company’s
assessment of his impediment but
also by law, contract and medical
findings.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is liable as
determined by law? YES.
HELD:
● The liability of the
principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for
any and all claims shall be joint and
several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be
a condition precedent for its
approval.
● The performance bond to [be] filed
by the recruitment/placement
agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or
damages that may be awarded to
the workers.
● If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors
and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the
aforesaid claims and damages.
● Such liabilities shall continue during
the entire period or duration of the
employment contract and shall not
be affected by any substitution,
amendment or modification made
locally or in a foreign country of the
said contract.
19. APQ Shipmanagement v. Caseñ as, G.R. No.
197303, June 4, 2014
AUTHOR: CARPIO
DOCTRINE:
ER:
FACTS:
● Caseñ as was hired by APQ, acting
for and in behalf of its principal,
Crew Management, as Chief Mate
for vessel MV Perseverance for a
period of eight (8) months starting
from June 16, 2004 to Feb. 16,
2005.
● Caseñ as filed a complaint for
permanent total disability benefits,
reimbursement of medical
expenses, sickness allowance,
nonpayment of salaries
representing the extended portion
of the employment contract,
damages, and attorney’s fees.
○ He alleged that he left
Manila to join his assigned
vessel in USA. However,
the vessel could not leave
because of incomplete
documents. He was
transferred to another
vessel, although it was not
able to leave again
because of incomplete
documents.
○ He, together with other
crew, was not provided
with food and water. He
suffered extreme stress
and anxiety because of the
uncertainty of the
situation.
○ His employment contract
was extended by APQ
from original 8 months to
26 months.
○ When the vessel left for
Bahamas, he became
 weaker. He was diagnosed
with hypertension.
○ He was repatriated and
arrived in the Philippines
on August 30, 2006.
○ He reported to APQ for
post-employment
examination. He was then
declared unfit for sea
service.
● APQ alleged that it did give mutual
consent for the extension of
Casenas’ employment contract.
● LA dismissed the complaint.
● NLRC reversed and found that the
employment contract was
extended. However, it reversed
itself and set aside its initial
decision.
● CA nullified NLRC’s decision. Ruled
that the the contract was
extended.
ISSUE: WON the employment contract of
Caseñ as was extended with the consent of
APQ/Crew Management.
HELD: YES.
Employment contracts of seafarers on board
foreign ocean-going vessels are not ordinary
contracts. They are regulated and an
imprimatur by the State is necessary. While
the seafarer and his employer are governed
by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules
and Regulations require that the POEA-SEC
be integrated in every seafarer’s contract. In
this case, there is no dispute that Caseñ as’
employment contract was duly approved by
the POEA and that it incorporated the
provisions of the POEA-SEC.
APQ’s primary argument revolves around
the fact of expiration of Caseñ as’
employment contract, which it claims was
not extended as it was without its consent.
While the contract stated that any extension
must be made by mutual consent of the
parties, it, however, incorporated
Department Order (DO) No. 4 and
Memorandum Circular No. 09, both Series of
2000, which provided for the Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board
Ocean Going Vessels:
SECTION 2. COMMENCEMENT/DURATION
CONTRACT
A. xxxxxIt shall be effective until the
seafarer’s date of arrival at the
point of hire upon
termination of his employment
pursuant to Section 18 of this
Contract.
xxx
SECTION 18. TERMINATION OF
EMPLOYMENT
A. The employment of the seafarer
shall cease when the seafarer
completes his period of
contractual service aboard the
vessel, signs off from the vessel
and arrives at the point of hire.
In a nutshell, there are three (3) requirements
necessary for the complete termination of the
employment contract:
1] termination due to expiration or other
reasons/causes;
2] signing off from the vessel; and
3] arrival at the point of hire.
In this case, there was no clear showing that Caseñ as
signed off from the vessel upon the expiration of his
employment contract, which was in February or April
2005. He did not arrive either in Manila, his point of
hire, because he was still on board the vessel MV
Haitien Pride on the supposed date of expiration of
his contract. It was only on August 14, 2006 that he
signed off from MV Haitien Pride and arrived in
Manila on August 30, 2006.

As to allegation that MV Haiten Pride was not
operated by Crew Management:
APQ did not argue that MV Haitien Pride was
not operated or managed by Crew Management. It
did not claim either that said vessel was not
accredited by it. The logical conclusion, therefore, is
that MV Haitien Pride was operated/managed by
Crew Management and accredited by APQ.
As to allegation that Caseñ as’ contract already
expired and that he had a new employer during the
alleged extension of the contract by relying on the
December 16, 2005 Letter of the POEA: What
was clearly stated therein was that Caseñ as was not
allowed repatriation by his employer for some
reason. Insofar as Philippine law is concerned, the
employer referred to in the said letter remains to be
the foreign principal/manning agency as stated
in the POEA- approved employment contract.
Also, there was no showing as to why he was not
repatriated to the Philippines upon expiration of his
contract.
20. Becmen Service Exporter and Promotions,
Inc. v. Sps. Cuaresma, G.R. Nos. 182978-79,
April 27, 2009
AUTHOR: CASTILLO
ER
Jasmin Cuaresma was deployed by Becmen
as Assistant Nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in Saudi
Arabia (KSA), for 3 years. One year later, she
allegedly died of poisoning. Becmen (later
substituted by White Falcon) alleged suicide.
But based on evidence, Jasmin did not
commit suicide but a victim of murderous
aggression. Spouses Cuaresma (parents)
filed a complaint against Becmen and its
principal Rajab, claiming death and
insurance benefits plus damages, claiming
that death was work-related. Who are
liable? HELD: Becmen and White Falcon are
solidarily liable. Private employment
agencies are held jointly and severally liable
with the foreign-based employer for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or
contract of employment. This joint and
solidary liability imposed by law against
recruitment agencies and foreign employers
is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of
immediate and sufficient payment of what is
due him. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate
officers and directors and partners as the
case may be, shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.White Falcons assumption of
Becmen’s liability does not automatically
result in Becmen’s freedom or release from
liability. Instead, both Becmen and White
Falcon should be held liable solidarily,
without prejudice to each having the right to
be reimbursed under the provision of the
Civil Code that whoever pays for another
may demand from the debtor what he has
paid.
FACTS
● Jasmin Cuaresma was deployed by
Becmen as Assistant Nurse in Al-
Birk Hospital in Saudi Arabia (KSA),
for 3 years. One year later, she
allegedly died of poisoning. But
when repatriated to Manila,
autopsy showed that she died
under violent circumstances, not
poisoning.
● Spouses Cuaresma (parents) filed a
complaint against Becmen and its
principal Rajab, claiming death and
insurance benefits plus damages.,
claiming that death was work-
related.
● Becman and Rajab insist that
Jasmin committed suicide. Rajab
later substituted by White Falcon.
● LA dismissed complaint. Death was
not service-connected, did not
 occur while on duty. Also, parents
already received benefits.
● NLRC reversed, relying on the
autopsy. It declared that Jasmin’s
death was the result of an accident
occurring within the employers
premises that is attributable to her
employment, or to the conditions
under which she lived, and thus
arose out of and in the course of her
employment as nurse.
● CA affirmed NLRC. Death was
compensable having occurred in
the dormitory provided by ER. Thus,
occurred within ER’s premises.
ISSUES
1. Whether death of Jasmin is work-
connected and thus compensable
2. Who are liable?
HELD
1. No.
The evidence indicates that it is not. At the
time of her death, she was not on duty. She
was at her dormitory room on personal time
when she died. It is reasonable to suppose
that all her work is performed at the Al-birk
Hospital, and not at her dormitory room. We
cannot expect that the foreign employer
should ensure her safety even while she is
not on duty.
Based on evidence, Jasmin did not commit
suicide but a victim of murderous
aggression.
2. Becmen and White Falcon are
jointly and solidarily liable to pay
moral damages plus exemplary
damages for wanton and
oppressive behavior, and by way of
example for the public good.
Private employment agencies are held
jointly and severally liable with the foreign-
based employer for any violation of the
recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.This joint and solidary liability
imposed by law against recruitment
agencies and foreign employers is meant to
assure the aggrieved worker of immediate
and sufficient payment of what is due him.
If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for
the aforesaid claims and damages.
White Falcons assumption of Becmen’s
liability does not automatically result in
Becmen’s freedom or release from liability.
This has been ruled in ABD Overseas
Manpower Corporation v. NLRC. Instead,
both Becmen and White Falcon should be
held liable solidarily, without prejudice to
each having the right to be reimbursed
under the provision of the Civil Code that
whoever pays for another may demand from
the debtor what he has paid.
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local
recruitment agencies, miserably failed to
abide by the provisions of R.A. 8042.
Recruitment agencies are expected to
extend assistance to their deployed OFWs,
especially those in distress. Instead, they
abandoned Jasmin’s case and allowed it to
remain unsolved to further their interests
and avoid anticipated liability which parents
or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact
from them. They willfully refused to protect
and tend to the welfare of the deceased
Jasmin, treating her case as just one of those
unsolved crimes that is not worth wasting
their time and resources on. The evidence
does not even show that Becmen and Rajab
lifted a finger to provide legal representation
and seek an investigation of Jasmin’s case.
Worst of all, they unnecessarily trampled
upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by
standing pat on the argument that Jasmin
committed suicide, which is a grave
accusation given its un-Christian nature.
Thus, more than just recruiting and
deploying OFWs to their foreign principals,
recruitment agencies have equally
significant responsibilities. In a foreign land
where OFWs are likely to encounter uneven
if not discriminatory treatment from the
foreign government, and certainly a delayed
access to language interpretation, legal aid,
and the Philippine consulate, the
recruitment agencies should be the first to
come to the rescue of our distressed OFWs
since they know the employers and the
addresses where they are deployed or
stationed. Upon them lies the primary
obligation to protect the rights and ensure
the welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed
or not.
Court cited Arts. 19, 21 and 24 of NCC.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all
Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle
of Philippine labor and social legislation,
contract stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in
keeping with the basic public policy of the
State to afford protection to labor, promote
full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. This ruling is
likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of
the Civil Code which states that laws which
have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
21. Sunace International Manpower Services v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 161757, January 25, 2006
AUTHOR: DADOR
Doctrine: There was an implied revocation
of its agency relationship with its foreign
principal when, after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign
principal directly negotiated with Divina and
entered into a new and separate
employment contract in Taiwan. Article
1924 of the New Civil Code reading “The
agency is revoked if the principal directly
manages the business entrusted to the
agent, dealing directly with third persons.”
thus applies.
Emergency Recit: Respondent Divina
Montehermozo is a domestic helper
deployed to Taiwan by Sunace International
Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-
month contract. Such employment was
made with the assistance of Taiwanese
broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration
of the contract, Montehermozo continued
her employment with her Taiwanese
employer for another 2 years. When
Montehermozo returned to the Philippines,
she filed a complaint before NLRC alleging
that she was underpaid and was jailed for
three months in Taiwan. She further alleges
that the 2-year extension of her employment
contract was with the consent and
knowledge of Sunace. SC ruled that there
being no substantial proof that Sunace knew
of and consented to be bound under the 2-
year employment contract extension, it
cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such,
it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily
liable for any of Montehermozo’s claims
arising from the 2-year employment
extension. Also, there was an implied
revocation of its agency relationship with its
foreign principal when, after the termination
of the original employment contract, the
foreign principal directly negotiated with
Montehermozo and entered into a new and
separate employment contract in Taiwan.
FACTS:
● Petitioner, Sunace International
Management Services (Sunace),
deployed to Taiwan Divina A.
Montehermozo (Divina) as a domestic
helper under a 12-month contract. The
deployment was with the assistance of
a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang,
President of Jet Crown International Co.,
Ltd.
● After her 12-month contract expire,
Divina continued working for her
Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui Xiong,
for two more years, after which she
returned to the Philippines.
● Shortly after her return, Divina filed a
complaint before NLRC against Sunace,
one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese
broker, and the employer-foreign
principal alleging that she was jailed for
three months and that she was
underpaid.
○ She claimed that under
her original one-year
contract and the 2-year
extended contract which
was with the knowledge
and consent of Sunace,
the amounts representing
income tax and savings
were deducted. While the
amounts deducted in 1997
were refunded to her,
those deducted in 1998
and 1999 were not
● .Sunace, by its Proprietor/General
Manager Maria Luisa Olarte, thereafter
claim that complainant has NO cause of
action against respondent SUNACE for
monetary claims, considering that she
has been totally paid of all the monetary
benefits due her under her Employment
Contract to her full satisfaction.
○ Divina already took back
her saving and the
employer did not deduct
any money from her
salary. There was also no
basis for grant of tax
refund as she was not
illegally dismissed and
such tax deduction was in
compliance with the
Taiwanese law.
○ Sunace alleged that
Divina’s 2-year extension
of her contract was
without its knowledge and
consent, hence, it had no
liability attaching to any
claim arising therefrom,
and Divina in fact executed
a Waiver/Quitclaim and
Release of Responsibility
and an Affidavit of
Desistance.
● Labor Arbiter: rejected Sunace’s claim
as it shows that Sunace and Edmund
Wang have not stopped communicating
with each other and yet the matter of
the contract’s extension and Sunace’s
alleged non-consent thereto has not
been categorically established. What
Sunace should have done was to write
to POEA about the extension and its
objection thereto. And because it did
not, it is presumed to have consented to
the extension and should be liable for
anything that resulted thereform.
○ Sunace’s argument that it
is not liable on account of
Divina’s execution of a
Waiver and Quitclaim and
an Affidavit of Desistance
was also rejected.
○ A compromise agreement
entered into by the parties
 not in the presence of the
Labor Arbiter shall be
approved by him, if after
confronting the parties, he
is satisfied that they
understand the terms and
conditions of the
settlement and that it was
entered into freely
voluntarily by them and
the agreement is not
contrary to law, morals,
and public policy.
○ And because no
consideration is indicated
in the documents, we
strike them down as
contrary to law, morals,
and public policy.
● NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
decision. CA dismissed Sunace’s
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is liable for payment
of Divina’s claims – NO
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The challenged resolutions of the
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent
Divina A. Montehermozo against petitioner
is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
● CA affirmed finding that Sunace
knew of and impliedly consented to
the extension of Divina’s 2-year
contract. It went on to state, "It is
undisputed that Sunace was
continually communicating with
Divina’s foreign employer." It thus
concluded, "as agent of the foreign
principal, petitioner cannot profess
ignorance of such extension as
obviously, the act of the principal
extending complainant
employment contract necessarily
bound it."
● Contrary to the CA finding, the
alleged continuous communication
was with the Taiwanese broker
Wang, not with the foreign
employer Xiong. The February 21,
2000 telefax message from the
Taiwanese broker to Sunace, the
only basis of a finding of continuous
communication, reads
verbatim:Regarding to Divina, she
did not say anything about her
saving in police station. As we
contact with her employer, she took
back her saving already last years.
And they did not deduct any money
from her salary. Or she will call back
her employer to check it again. If
her employer said yes! we will get it
back for her.Thank you and best
regards.Edmund Wang, President
● The finding of CA solely on the basis
of the above-quoted telefax
message is misplaced. The message
does not provide evidence that
Sunace was privy to the new
contract executed after the
expiration of the original contract.
That Sunace and the Taiwanese
broker communicated regarding
Divina’s allegedly withheld savings
does not necessarily mean that
Sunace ratified the extension of the
contract.
● As Sunace points out, it was just an
information given to the petitioner
that the private respondent had
taken already her savings from her
foreign employer and that no
deduction was made on her salary.
It contains nothing about the
extension or the petitioner’s
consent thereto.
● As agent of its foreign principal,
Sunace cannot profess ignorance of
 such an extension as obviously, the
act of its principal extending
Divina’s employment contract
necessarily bound it, it too is a
misapplication, a misapplication of
the theory of imputed knowledge.
● The theory of imputed knowledge
ascribes the knowledge of the
agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer Xiong, not the other way
around. The knowledge of the
principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent
Sunace.
● There being no substantial proof
that Sunace knew of and consented
to be bound under the 2-year
employment contract extension, it
cannot be said to be privy thereto.
As such, it and its "owner" cannot
be held solidarily liable for any of
Divina’s claims arising from the 2-
year employment extension. As the
New Civil Code provides, Contracts
take effect only between the
parties, their assigns, and heirs,
except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law.
● Furthermore, as Sunace correctly
points out, there was an implied
revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign
principal when, after the
termination of the original
employment contract, the foreign
principal directly negotiated with
Divina and entered into a new and
separate employment contract in
Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New
Civil Code reading “The agency is
revoked if the principal directly
manages the business entrusted to
the agent, dealing directly with
third persons.” thus applies.
● In light of the foregoing
discussions, consideration of the
validity of the Waiver and Affidavit
of Desistance which Divina
executed in favor of Sunace is
rendered unnecessary.
22. Century Canning Corp v CA
Century Canning Corporation v CA
Topic: Labor Standards; Apprentice, Learner, Disabled
Workers, Invalid Agreements
ER: Century Canning hired Gloria Palad on an
apprenticeship agreement on July, however Century
only had its apprenticeship program approved with
TESDA on September. Subsequently, Palad was
dismissed based on a performance evaluation and
that she was always tardy or absent. Gloria filed for
illegal dismissal. The court held that 1) Gloria was a
regular employee since the apprenticeship
agreement was void for not meeting the condition
sine qua non, that is prior approval of TESDA. 2) Gloria
was illegally dismissed since the claims for her
termination are unsubstantiated and that she was
never given notive.
Doctrine:
- prior approval of the apprenticeship
program is a condition sine qua non before
an apprenticeship agreement can be validly
entered into.
Facts:
- On July 15, 1997, petitioner Century Canning
Corp (Century) hired respondent Gloria
Palad as a fish cleaner at Century factory.
Palad signed on July 17 an apprenticeship
agreement.
- On July 25, Century submitted its
apprenticeship program for approval of
TESDA. On Sept. 26, TESDA approved the
apprenticeship program.
- Subsequently, nn Nov 1997, Century issued
a termination notice informing Palad that
she has been terminated based on the
performance evaluation conducted where
 Palad scored only 27/100, and that she
incurred numerous tardiness and absences.
- Palad filed for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages, and non-payment
of pro-rated 13th month pay.
- LA: dismissed the complaint but ordered
Century to pay 13th month pay. NLRC
affirmed.
- CA: reversed NLRC and ruled that Palad was
illegally dismissed, citing Nitto Enterprises v
NLRC where it was held that prior approval
of the apprenticeship program is a condition
sine qua non before an apprenticeship
agreement can be validly entered into.
Issue:
W/N Palad was an apprentice (NO)
W/N Palad was illegally terminated. (YES)
Held
1) Palad was not an apprentice. The LC defines
an apprentice as a worker who is covered by
a written apprenticeship agreement with an
employer. Art 60 provides that only
employers in the highly technical industries
may employ apprentices and only in
apprenticeable occupations approved by the
Ministy of Labor and Employment. Thus, an
apprenticeship program should first be
approved by the DOLE before an apprentice
may be hired, otherwise,the person hired
will be considered a regular employee.
In this case, the apprenticeship agreement
was entered into between the parties before
Century filed it apprenticeship agreement
with the TESDA for approval. Thus, the
apprenticeship agreement is void. Prior
TESDA approval is required to ensure the
protection of apprentices and to obviate
possible abuses by prospective employers
who may want to take advantage of the
lower wage rates and circumvent the right of
the employees to be secure in their
employment.
2) Palad was illegally dismissed. Though
habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of
performance are among the valid causes for
which the employer may terminate the
apprenticeship agreement, the NLRC was
correct in ruling that there were no clear and
sufficient evidence to warrant her dismissal
as an apprentice during the agreed period.
The indecipherable and unauthenticated
xerox of the performance evaluation
allegedly conducted on complainant is of
doubtful credibility and was only made
belatedly, after filing the case.
It was also not show that Century failed to
prove its claim that Palad was terminated for
valid reason, the authenticity of the
performance evaluation, and that Palad was
ever apprised of the company standards set.
Lastly, even if a valid evaluation was
conducted, Palad never received the notice
of termination because Palad allegedly
stopped reporting for work. Thus, requisites
for a valid dismissal are not present.
23. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC vs. SEBOLINO,
G.R. No. 187320, July 26, 2011
AUTHOR: Domingo
DOCTRINE: Even if we recognize the
company's need to train its employees
through apprenticeship, we can only
consider the first apprenticeship agreement
for the purpose. With the expiration of the
first agreement and the retention of the
employees, Atlanta had, to all intents and
purposes, recognized the completion of
their training and their acquisition of a
regular employee status. To foist upon them
the second apprenticeship agreement for a
second skill which was not even mentioned
in the agreement itself, is a violation of the
Labor Code's implementing rules and is an
act manifestly unfair to the employees, to
say the least. This we cannot allow.

ER: The respondents filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal. In petitioners’ answer, they
alleged that the respondents were
apprentices under a government-approved
apprenticeship program. The LA ruled in
favor of the respondents but was reversed
by the NLRC. After the denial of the MR of
the respondents by the NLRC, they filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA who
held that they were illegally dismissed
because the apprenticeship programs were
executed in violation of the laws since it did
not indicate the trade or occupation in which
the apprentice would be trained. SC upheld
the decision of the CA.
FACTS:
● 13 Complainants filed several
complaints for illegal dismissal,
regularization, underpayment,
nonpayment of wages and other
money claims against Atlanta
Industries.
● COMPLAINANTS: they had attained
regular status as they were allowed
to work with Atlanta for more than
6 months from the start of a
purported apprenticeship
agreement between them and the
company. They claimed that they
were illegally dismissed when the
apprenticeship agreement expired.
● ATLANTA: workers were not
entitled to regularization and to
their money claims because they
were engaged as apprentices under
a government-approved
apprenticeship program.
● LA only found 9 out of 13 to have
been illegally dismissed and was
awarded backwages, wage
differentails, holiday pay and SIL
pay.
● NLRC: modified ruling of LA, as
follows: (1) withdrawing the illegal
dismissal finding with respect to
Sagun, Mabanag, Sebolino and
Pedregoza; (2) affirming the
dismissal of the complaints of 3; (3)
approving the compromised
agreement entered into by 5; and
(4) denying all other claims.
● Sebolino, Costales, Almoite, and
Sagun (respondents) filed an MR
but denied by NLRC. The 4 sought
relief from the CA through a
petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
● CA:
1. The respondents were
already employees of the
company before they
entered into the first and
second apprenticeship
agreements.
2. The first and second
apprenticeship
agreements were
defective as they were
executed in violation of
the law and the rules. The
agreements did not
indicate the trade or
occupation in which the
apprentice would be
trained; neither was the
apprenticeship program
approved by TESDA.
3. The positions occupied by
the respondents –
machine operator,
extruder operator and
scaleman – are usually
necessary and desirable in
the manufacture of plastic
building materials, the
company’s main business.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the respondents are employees of
Atlanta
2. W/N the CA erred in ruling that the first were dismissed without just or
and second apprenticeship agreements authorized cause, without notice, and
were defective. without the opportunity to be heard,
their dismissal was illegal under the law.
HELD: Petition is denied for lack of merit.
1. YES. First. Based on company operations
at the time material to the case,
Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun
were already rendering service to the
company as employees before they
were made to undergo apprenticeship.
The company itself recognized the
respondents' status through relevant
operational records — in the case of
Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly
report for December 2003, which the
NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and
Sagun, the production and work
schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 cited
by the CA.

The Master List (of employees) that the

petitioners heavily rely upon as proof of their
position that the respondents were not
Atlanta's employees, at the time they were
engaged as apprentices, is unreliable and
does not inspire belief.

2. NO. The fact that Costales, Almoite,

Sebolino and Sagun were already
rendering service to the company when
they were made to undergo
apprenticeship (as established by the
evidence) renders the apprenticeship
agreements irrelevant as far as the four
are concerned. This reality is highlighted
by the CA finding that the respondents
occupied positions such as machine
operator, scaleman and extruder
operator — tasks that are usually
necessary and desirable in Atlanta's
usual business or trade as manufacturer
of plastic building materials. These tasks
and their nature characterized the four
as regular employees under Article 280
of the Labor Code. Thus, when they