Sacredand Secular

RELIGIONAND POLITICSWORLDWIDE

PippaNorris
Hat'uanl Uniaersit_y

RonaldInglehart
Uniaersitl of Mihi.qut

ffiCavBRTDGE
uurvERSrrYPRESs
QjP
r10 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S

o.75 {
il
r$
0.7 0

0.65
A ReligiousRevival in Post-Communist
Europe?
0. 60

0.55

0.50

0.45 HAsA srEADv erosion of religion taken place in post-Communist nations,

0.40
^q-
6$
v-
P r a Yd a i l Y Religion "very" lmPortant
- L i n e a r ( P r a yd a ily) - - - Linear (Beligion "very" important)
Figure 4.9. Religiosityby Incomein the united states.Note:Lineartrendsin the
percentageof the American public who pray daily and who regardreligion as
very importantby decilehouseholdincomegroup (countingall wages,salaries'
pensioni and other incomes,beforetaxesand other deductions)' Source:World
ValuesStudy,Pooled1981-2001.
patrerns of denominational and church competition, the levels of societal
and individual securiry in any sociery seem to provide the most persuasive
and parsimonious explanation. But does this explanation continue to hold
elsewhere,even in rhe Muslim v.orld? we go on to test this thesis.
similar to the secularizationprocessexperiencedin Western Europe? Or,
as suppl,v-sidetheory in-rplies,has the last decadebrought a resurgence of
religiositv in this region, follov'ing the fall of communism? The literature
a\
remainsdirided about these issuesin part becausethe limitations of the
i'O""-
availableevidence make it dif6cult to resolve this debate. As one corn-
mentator rernarked, the former Communist states vr'ereuninterested in
collecting any offrcial statisticsconcerning religious affiliation and church
attendanceapart fron.rinteiligence to be used in its dismanding.' The oc-
casionalsurv-evsthat rvere conducted during the Soviet era were not based
on representativenational samples.During this period, responsesto survey
questionsabout religiosiq'mav also have been constrained by fear oI gor-
ernmentai sanctions.As a result, prior to the early r99os, we lackreliable
cross-nationalsun'evsallowing us to comparelong-term trends in religious
attitudes and behavior. Among the twenty-seven post-Communist Euro-
pean nations that exist todal', Hungary was the only one included in the
r98r World Values Srudy, although Wave z conducted during the early
r99os covered a dozen post-Conmunist states,Wave 3 during the mid-
r99os erpanded to twenry-two countries, and fourteen u'ere surveyed in
Wave 4 during rggg-zoor.In the absenceof reliable representativesur-
vevsconducteddurins the Communist era tlat would enableus to examirre

ln
tt2 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S
a long time-series, we think that the best alternarive way to probe into
long-term trends is to examinesurveyscarried out during the rggos using
generational comparisons, based on the assumption that the artitudes to-
ward religion that were instilled during a given generation'sformative years
will leavelasting tracesin subsequentyears.If we find substantialintergen-
erational differences within given countries, they suggest (although they
do not prove) the direction in which prevailing rends are moving. \4rhere
important cross-national differencesare evident, such as contTastsbetween
a relatively religious Romania and a reladvely secularEstonia, then we need
to explore their causesat the societal level, examining the role of such fac-
tors as state reguladon of religious insdrutions, and the impact of human
development indicators.
The Secularization versus Supply-Side Debate
Theories of demand-side secularization and of supply-side religious mar-
kets haveboth been used to explain developmentsin the region, but previous
studieshave been unable to resolvewhich is most clearly supported.On one
hand, the tradidonal secularizationthesisimplies that religiosity has gradu-
ally decayedin Central and Eastern Europe over successivedecades,for the
samereasonsthat operate in other industrialized societies.[n particular, the
salienceofreligious values and habituai churchgoing would be expectedto
erode as a society experiencesthe long-term transition from poorer agrar-
ian to more affluent industrial states. Social policies in the Soviet Union
emphasizedthe expansion of ttre welfare state, emplo),rnent securiry and
widespreadaccessto public servicesin healthcare,housing, unempiol'rnent
benefits, childcare, and pensions.The state invested heavily in broadening
accessto schoolsand universities,so that by the early r98os levelsofpartic-
ipation in higher education in Soviet bloc nations r,r'ereonly slighdy behind
those in the West.' Oflicial repressionof religion u'ould be expectedto have
reinforced these factors, although its impact varied videly from one coun-
try to anottrer: in Poland, for example, Sor-iet-ledattempts at repressionof
religion \{'ere counter-productive, Ieading the Polish people to emphasize
their attachment to religion as a way to preserl'etheir Polish identity. After
the collapseof communism, the tendency toq'ard secularizationlinked with
development should have acceleratedin counffies that experienceda suc-
cessful uansition to democracv, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, and more secureexternal relationshipsrvherestatesare becoming
integrated into the European lJnion and NATO. ln those post-Communist
societieswhere people'slives gradually becamemore secureduring the late
A RELIGIOUS
REVIVALIN POST.COMMUNIST
EUROPE? ll3
rwentieth century',a simple version of the modernization thesiswould lead
us to expect a linear relationship between age and religious values(such as
the importance anached to religion), as well as berween age and religious
participation (such as aftendance at religious services and daily prayer): in
both cases,we would expect to find that the young were less religious than
the old. Conversely, religion would be expected to remain sftong among
both young and old in post-Communist agrariansocietiesthat remain poor
and underdeveloped (such as Albania, Moldova, and Azerbaijan), for the
samereasonsrhat apply to other low-income sociedesaround t}le world.
Countries such as Turlrnenistan, Kazakhsran, and lJzbekistan in Central
Asialost ground markedly during the r99os, with economiescharacterized
bv large numbers of peasantfarmers, faltering healy manufacruring indus-
try, structural underemplolmlent, negative growth, poor basic healthcare,
shrinking averagelife spans,social inequality, and widespread poverty (with
per capita Gross National Incomes in zooo below $5,ooo).
Support for the traditional secularization thesis can be found in the lit-
erature.For example,Need and Evans compared pafterns of religiosity in
t9g3-r994in ten post-Commulist societiesthat they classifiedaspredomi-
natelyCatholic (the Czech Republic, Hungary Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia)
and Orthodox (Belarus,Bulgaria, Romania, Russia,and Ukraine). Tested
with both linear and logged age regressionmodels, the study reports that
ratesof church participarion usuallyshoweda paftern of linear decline asone
moved from older to younger generations,precisely as secularizationthe-
ory implies.: Qualitative casesrudiesalso support these findings; Borowik
arguesthat the break-up of the Soviet Union brought a radical shift in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe when the legal position of the churches changed
dramatically,with the new regimes recognizing freedom of relision as a
basichuman right.+ In Russia,Belarus, and Ukraine, the number of those
who declaredtheir belief in God and their adherenceto t-heOrthodox tra-
dition rose in the short-term, immediately after the fall of communism, but
the srudv found that commirment to the Church, and the level of religious
practice, are as low today as in the most secularizedWestern Europcan
societies.Borowik concludes that the conremporary picrure of religiosiry
in these countries, where atheism was imposed for many ye.ars,remains
quite similar to that in W'estern Europe, where secularizationdeveloped
spontaneously.Kaariainen also concludesthat a brief religious resurgence
occurredin Russiaat the beginning of the r99os, but after that the situation
stabilized.By the late r99os, he found, only one-third of the Russianpopu-
lation consideredthemselvesbelievers,the majority remaining irrdifferent
towardreligion. Furthermore, becauseof their atheistheritage,most people
ll4 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIC ION A N D P OLITIC S
have only a cursory knowledge of common Orthodox beliefs and many also
believein astrologl',magic, reincarnation, and so on. The RussianOrthodox
Church is respectedbut only a minoriry of the people describethemselves
as Orthodox. Despite the grou.ing number of churchesand parishesacross
the country Kaariainen found that Russiansgo to church less often than
other Europeans.SSome have also einphasized that new forms of "indi-
vidualized" spiriruaiiq' outside the church are emerging in Cenual and
Eastern Europe.6
If the processof secularizationis relatedto human developmentand exis-
tential securi6', as the evidence presentedearlier in this book suggests,then
we might expect the long-term erosion of religiosiq' acrossa broad range
of post-Communist societiesto be more complex than simpler versions of
modernization theory suggest.\\here living standardshave gradually risen
in the region, this should tend to erode religiosity gradually over succeed-
ing birth cohorts, astradidonal secularizationtheory suggests.On the other
hand, the collapseof liring standrrds and the disappearanceof the welfare
state tiat occurred during the past decadewould lead us to expect a short-
term rez,iaalof religiosiw in low- to moderate-income societies,especially
for the more mlnerable seg:nentsof the population such as the elderly liv-
ing on dwindling state pensionsrvhile facing hyperinflation in food and fuel
costs.Widespread feelings of existentialinsecurity were also engenderedby
the sudden inroducdon of neo-liberal free markets,which produced severe
recessions,throwing millions of public sector employeesout of work; and
where household savingsare threatened by hyperinfladon (asin Azerbaijan
and Belarus);where political stability and government leadershipis under-
mined by scandalsover corruption or a banking crisis;and where etlrnic con-
flict sharplv worsensor where domestic securiryis threatenedby secessionist
movements,asin the Chechnya conflict.7 In the most dramatic case,the dis-
integration of the tbrmer Yugoslar.ianrepublic led to the outbreak of bloody
civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,heightening ethno-religious identities and
the salienceof religiosity among the Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim com-
munities co-existing in the Balkans.The tieory of secularizationbasedon
existential security therefore predicts tlat the processof societalmodern-
ization in post-Communist Europe would tend to generatea long-term lin-
ear decline ofreligiosiry over successivebirth cohorts, but that this gradual
ffansformation w'ould tend to be offset by short-term factors linked u'ith the
collapseof communism. Thus (r) itwill onlvoccur in those Cenual and East
European countries that have experienceda long-term processof human
development and economic equaliry (z) it will be clearestamong the most
secureand affluent social sectors,and also(3) specificcountries in the region
A RELICIOUS
REVIVALIN POST.COMMUNIST
EUROPE? ll5
are likely experience a shoft-tenn revival of religiosity if conditions since
the fall of communism generatewidespreadfeelings of sharply diminished
existentialsecurity.
In conuast to this interprerarion, a very different set of expectations
is generated by theories of supply-side religious markets. The evidence
considered eariier threrv serious doubt on the capacity of this theory to
ri
explain variations within Western Europe, but it might be that this ac-
count provides a more convincing caseunder the conditions operating in
post-Communist states.Supply-sidetheory emphasizesthat panerns oFre-
ligrosiryin post-Communist sratesare determined by the role of religious tl
organizationscompeting activelv for "hearts and minds," and in panicu-
lar the degree of state regulation of the church. During the Soviet era, iii
I
religious organizations were strongly constrained or persecuted through- t,
out most of Central and Eastern Europe, with the "Godless" Communisr t;
party actively promoting atheist beliefs and practice.EReligion was nor de- ri
stroyed,but it rvas strongly discouragedin most of these societies.eThe
dissolutionof the Soviet Union and the collapse of comrnunism brought
'i1
a radical change in the relationship berween chorch and state, with free- LI
i.i
dom of religion becoming officially recognized as a basic human right and
a multitude of denominations becoming free to compere for followers. If
the poliry of atheism under the Soviet srate discouraged religiosiry, then
rilii
we might expect a curvilinear pattern of age differences in religiosity. We
might expect to find a U-shaped curve, with religiosity being relatively
strong among the older generation that grew up in pre-Communist soci-
eties,and also the youngest cohort that came of age under more liberal
conditions, while by contrast the middle-aged generation should prove the
leastreligious. This can be tested by seeing v'hether age is most closeh.
relatedto indicators of religiosity in either a linear (monotonic) or a logged
(curvilinear)fashion.
Somestudieshave detectedsupport for this thesis;for example,Greeley
cornparedpublic opinion toward religion in nine former Communist coun-
tries,mosdy located in the Baltics and Central Europe (Russia,Hungary
Siovenia,Slovakia,East Germany, Poland, Lan'ia, Bulgaria, and the Czech
Republic),derived from analvsisofthe r99r and r998 International Social
SurveyProgram.'o Greeley found that common Christian beliefs, such as
faith in God and in reincarnation, are quite widespreadin this region. He
arguesthat generational comparisonsof these beliefs suggesta curvilinear
U-shapedcun'e, with the oldest and the post-r96os generationbeing more
likely to expressfaith than the middle-aged. Greeley concludes that a revival
in religious convictions has occurred among the younger generation in the
. 16 CASE ST UDIES OF RELIGTONA N D P OLITIC S
, cgion, especiallyin Russia,although he acknowledgesthat this has not, as
, ct, been accompanied by a rise in church attendance.Other dimensions
.t'religious behar-ior,including affiliation to the Orthodox Church and
:rgagementin prayer, remain relatively lou'and show clear erosion over
,ccessivebirth cohorts.'' Arother study bv Froese also concludesthat the
rpply-side theory fits the casesof Hungary Poland, and East Germany,
here a religious resurgence occurred after independence,driven, he be-
eves,by a revival ofchurch organizations."
.lditional Relevant Factors
'he debate between seculzrrizationdemand-siders and religious market
rpply-siders has been difficult to resolve, in part becauseof the limited
ine-seriessun.ey data that is available,but also becausepreviousstudies
rve focused on different periods and compararive frameworks. One clas-
c danger in the casestudv approach, focusing on historical studies of the
, ,le of the church in given counfties such as Poland or dre United States,
that specific countries can be selected to fit almost any given theory
he ten-nation comparative study by Need and Evans was more wide-
nging, but it r,l'asbased on surveys conducted during the early I99os,
st a few years after independence,when many societiesremained in the
idst of democratic and neo-liberal market economic transitions. Gener-
ronal changes emerge too slorvly to be captured so quickly. .{ny gener-
ional shifts in religious values and beiiefs that did occur after indepen-
ncervould take manl vears to become apparent.Ifost comparativesurvey
rurkhas also analyzedreligiosiry among Catholic Central European coun-
res,with lessattention given to developmentsin Eastern Orthodox and in
;uslim societies.
This limits the generalizationsthat can be drawn about post-Communist
.rrope, as dramatic contrasts are er,-identwithin this vast region, stretch-
g longitudinally from the Baltic to the Bering Strait and latitudinally
.xn the Arctic to t}re Caucuses.Societiesin Central and Eastern Europe
l'f'er significantly in numerous factors that could plausibly act as in-
rvening variables conditioning the relarionship between age and reli-
r.,n.These factors include a society's experiencesduring the transition
,cl consolidation of democracl', as well as in its historical religious cul-
re, the duration of Soviet rule, the relationship between church and
.rte under Communism, the successof its economrc adfustrnent to t}re
':c market during the last decade, its integration into international or-
,nizations such as NATO and the EuroDean Union, as well as in its
A RELIGIOUS
REVIVALIN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE? tt7
degreeof ethno-religious homogeneity and fractionalization.Any system-
atic study therefore will need to utilize multivariate analysiscontrolling
for tle intervening factors that could affect the relationship betu'een agJe
and religiosin'.
The most successful post-Communist societies, such as Poland,
Hungary Siovakia,Slovenia,and the Czech Repubiic, havedevelopedstable
representativedemocracieswith multiparty competition, free elections,and
thriving civic societies.Wtth economiesthat adjustedrelativel,vsuccessfully
to the free market, and positive ratesof economic growth, by the end of z ooo
thcscnrtions achieied per capitaincomesranging from $8,oooto $r6,ooo.
Just over a decadeafter achieving independence,these countries entered
dre European Union and NATO. The Baltic states,Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia also engineered a fairlv rapid transition from a Soviet-swle com-
mand economl.to the free market and integration with M/estern Europe.
By contrast, econornic groilth and progress on human rights and politi-
cal liberties proved sluggish, or even failed outright, in many other former
Communist nations. Russianper capita GDP fell by 6% per year during
the r99os, while economic inequality (measuredby the GINI coefficient)
roseto the highest level in the region, and the averagelife expectanry de-
clined sharply.Belarusunder PresidentLukashenko experiencedeconomic
stagnationand decline, experiencing a 3"/o fall in per capita GDP fiom
tggo-rggg, together with hyperinflation of consumer prices, and rigged
elections.The countries of the South Caucusesand Central Asia are char-
acterizedby failing economies,repressiveregimesrvith no transition to even
competitive elections, and endemic poverty and hardship. Azerbaijan has
considerablereservoirsof oil and gas,but GDP fell by a massiveg.6o/"an-
nually during the rg9os, and the ruling regime has often been criticized for
extensivecorruption and vote rigging. K)'rgyzstan has experienced flawed
parliamentaryand presidentialelections,the harassmentand imprisonment
of opposition leaders,and the closure of dissident newspapers,as well as
negativeanlual economic gror.rth during the last decade.In this country
nith averageper capitaincome around $z,4zo, the economy has failed: fac-
tories remain closed, unemployrnent has soared, and malnutrition is rife.
After the breakdoun of Soviet control, Balkan societieswithin the former
Yugoslaviadescendedinto chaos and the bloody Bosnian war, fueled by
deep-rootedethnic conflict.
In short, post-Communist societieshave shown very diverse rates of
progFesstoward democratizarion and economic development, and the
historical reladonships between church and srate also differed radically.
Johnston suggeststhat public religiosity continues to be relatively high
n8 CASE ST UD]ES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S
in nations where the church u'as actively involved in resistlnce againstthe
Sovietregime and the struggle for independence.'l In Poland and the Czech
Republic, for example, t}re role of the Catholic Church in opposing the
Communist state, and the Western orientation and organizational links of
Roman Catholicism, meant that the Church rnaintained or even strength-
enedits roie after independence.Strassbergarguesthat the Catholic Church
has been involved in politics throughout the history of Poland, and after
1945 it functioned as the main opposition to the Communist party.Ia [n
this regard, Polish Catholicism became associatedwith nationalism, free-
dom, human rights, and democracy.'s By contrast, in Hungary the state
establisheda policy of a "church within socialism," where the credibility
of the Catholic Church was eroded by collaboration with the Communist
government. Religious freedoms expandedafter Hungarian independence,
but nevertheless peopie did not flock back to the Church.'6 In Croatia,
by contrast, during the Bosnian war religion played a key syrnbolic role
in reinforcing a senseof disdnct national identity, distinguishing between
the Catholic Croats, the Orthodox Serbs,and the Islamic groups in Bosnia
and elsev'here.t7
Comparisons also need to take account of the historically predominant
religious culture in each nation, since the Soviet Union included Catholic,
Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim societies.In previous chapterswe found
that beliefs and values differed in \A/estern Europe by the type of pre-
dominant faith, and Need and Evans also found that Catholics in Cen-
tral and Eastern Iiurope are generally more regrrlar churchg;oersthan Or-
thodox Christians.'8 The post-Communist counffies in the World Values
Survey include seven Catholic societies - Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,and Slovenia.From 7oo/oto 95o/oof
the population is Catholic in these countries, with a substantialProtestant
minoriqy in Hungary. The survey also covers eleven Eastern Orthodox soci-
eties,including Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia,Moldova,
Montenegro, Rornania, Russia,Ukraine, and Serbia. Some of these coun-
tries contain more homogeneous populations than others, u'ith substantial
religious minorities (of rcY" or more) coexisting in Belarus (Catholics),
Bulgarian (,Nluslims),Nlacedonia (Muslims), and Montenegro (Muslims
and Catholics), as well as smaller populations of Muslims and Catholics
living elsewhere. The Protestant ex-Communist societies in the survey
include Estonia, East Germany, and Lawia, and there are three Muslim
ex-Communist nations, Nbania, Azerbaijan, and Bosnia-H erzegovina,al-
though both Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina contain substantialCatholic
and Orthodox minorities.
A R E LIGIOU SR E V IV A L IN POS T-C OMMU N IS TE U R OP E ? ll9
GenerationalChangein Religiosity
il
Becausetime-seriesdata covering a reasonablylong period of time (suchas
the five decadesthat were used to test secularization in Western countries)
arenot availablefrom the ex-Communist countries,we will usegenerational
comparisonsof the nvenw-two post-Communist societiescovered in the
World Values Sun'ey 04"V.S)as a proxy indicator of long-tenn change. We
will compare linear and logged regressionmodels to seewhich provides a
better fit to the data. Our revised version of secularization tieory implies
that we should find a linear relationship between age and religious par-
ticipation, with religiosity falling through successivebirtl cohorts, in the
economically more developed societies. If, however, we find no significant
age-relateddifferences;or that the young are more religious than the old; or
a cun'ilinear relationship between age and religiosity, it wiil tend to refute
our theory (and we will we need to explore further the causesof any appar-
ent religious revival among the younger generation). We will also compare
patternsof religiosiryin given societies.to seeu-hetherpost-Communist
countriesvary systen-ratically accordingto their level of human development
andeconomic equaliq', as predicted by the theory of secularizationand ex-
istentialsecuriry- or u'hether state regulation of religious institutions and
religiouspluralism provesa more conl'incing explanation,asthe supply-side
thesiscontends.As in previous chapters,our core dependentvariableswill
be religious ualues,measured by the importance of religion, and religious
particiPation,as indicated by frequency of attendance at servicesof worship,
and by frequency of prayer. For comparison with the work of Greeley, we
will also determine rvhether any generational differences exist in a range
of common religious beliefs.Ingeneralwe anticipate that generationaldif-
ferenceswill be sftongestwith religious aalues,although if they exist, these
will also tend to be linked with one's patterns of religious behaaior-
Thble 5.r presentsthe results of the fitted regressionmodels for age in
vears,using all the pooled surveysin post-Communist Europe from r995
to 2oor. The resultsof the models show that for all the dependentvariables
exceptone (belief in life after death) dre linear models provide a slightly
betterfit than the logged ones.Among all post-Communist societies,across
nearlyallindicators,we find that (r) religiositywas stronger among the older
generationthan among the young; and (z) the age-relateddifferencestend
to be linear, rather than curvilinear.'e This is precisely the pattern that is
predictedby the theory ofsecularization and existentialsecurity.
To illustrate these patterns graphically, and to help examine variadons
acrossthese counries, the trends by birth cohort are shown for religious
 gKH""ru
t20 CASE ST UDIE S OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S A R E LIGIOU SR E V IV A L IN P OS T.C OMMU N IS TE U R OP E S r2l

Table 5.1. Age and Religiosityin Post-CommunistEurope,Without Controls

Linear Age Effects Logged,Age Effects

RZ slg. srg.

RELIGIOUSPARTICIPAIION
Religiousparticipation .006 .000 .005 .000
Frequencyof pr.ryer .0 3 9 .000 .032 .000
RELIGIOUS VALUES 0,4
Importanceof religion .026 .000 .022 .000 4.2
r-^^-+-^^^
ttllPUI tdttLt ^t
ul
a^:
uuu .0 1 6 .000 .013 .000 0.0
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS Lithuania Macedonia

ENN
Believe in God .0 0 8 .000 .006 .000
Believe in life after death .0 0 1 .000 .002 .000
Believe in hell .0 0 1 .000 .000 N/s
Believe in heaven .0 0 1 .000 .000 .000
Believe in soul .0 0 0 N/s .000 N/s
Poland Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia

NE NK
NorEs: The models represent the results of individual-level regression analysis models
where age (in ve.rrs) was regressed as a linear or logged variable on indicators of
r e l i g i o s i t y , w i t h o ut a n y p r io r co n tr o ls, u sin g cu r ve fi t. The coeffi ci ents represent the
a m o u n t o f v a r i . r n ce ( Rr ) in r e lig io sity, a n d th e sig n ificanceof the rel ati onshi p,expl ai ned
b y a g e . N : 1 S ,5 9 5 ; N/s : No t sig n ifica n t; Sig . : 51gn1i 1.ance. R el i gi ous val ues:
" H o w i m p o r r a n r r s r e ftg lo n L n yo u r life i" Ye r y [4 ) , rather [3). not very (2) or not
Ukraine Yuooslavia
at all (t). Religious participation: "Do you attend reliSious selices severol times a
week. once o rpeek, a few times during, the year. onae a year or |ess, or never?" The tttl
h |I
percentage that repoiled attending religious services "several times o week" or "once c I
raeek." Frequency of prayer: QI99: 'Hour often do yolt pray to God outside of reLigious l\ ll: : _l
s e r u r c e s /t \ / o u l d yo u sa y...Eu e r y d a y ( 7 ) . m o r e th un once a w eek (6). once a w eek
( 5 ) . a t l e a s tt > n c ea m o n th 1 4 ) . se ve r a ltim e s a ye a r ( J), l ess often (2). never (1)." Mean
lrttl\l 1 -l
2.0 4.0 6,0 8.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
frequency per type of societl'. Importance of God scale: "How important is God in your Cohort ol birth Cohort of birth
life? Please u.setlzls scole to Lndicate - 10 means uery [mportant ond 1 means not ot aII
important." Mean per nation. Religious beliefs: Whether respondents expressed belief in
Iigure 5.1. ReligiousValuesby Cohort of Birth. Note: The proportion saying
G o d , i n h e a v e n , i n h e ll, in life a fte r d e a th , a n d in wh ether peopl e have a soul . thatreligion was "very important" to their lives, with the regressionline of the
S o u r c e : W o r l d V a l u e s Su r ve v, p o o le d 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 1 .
hend.Source:World ValuesSurvey,pooled 1990-2001.

values(in liizure 5.r) and for religious participation (Figure 5.2). Linear
and logged reqression models fbr the effectsof age on religious valuesand
participation ll'ere also run for each nation. Regardlessof whether we fo-
cus on religious values or religious participation, the resultsshow two clear
patterns. First, there is a clear overall decline in all indicators ofreligiosity
acrosssuccessivebirth cohorts; the older generationsare almost alwayssig-
nificandy more religious than the young. Second,there are important dif-
ferencesin levelsof religiosiq'in post-Communist societiestoday,similar to
tiose we have already observedin Western Europe. Poland, Romania, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, tend to be consistendy more religious
than East German\', Estonia, and Montenegro. For the moment, we will
leaveasidet}re causesof these cross-nationalcontrasts(which could be due
. to such factors as the historical relationship between church and state, or
i
differences in levelsof human develop*..r} These cross-nationalcontrasts
. areinteresting in themselves: the countries where the older generation is
'most seculargenerally display relatively flat patterns acrosssuccessivebirth
gohorts- while in those countries in which the older generation is rela-
tively religious, we find a more dramatic decline in religiosiry among tlre
younger cohorts. In other words, we find much stronger indications of
 il
t22 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S A RELIGIOUS IN POST-COMMUNIST
REVIVAL EUROPE? r23

n
osnia & Heueoovin Table 5.2. ExplainingIndividual ReligiousParticipationin
0 .6 {-----l Post-Communist Europe
0 .4 l>\ I
\-=l s.e. (io

I3 ti )l
Beta ".o
o .2

0 .0 ]^:-==l Societallevel of human derrelopment 3t 4 016 .002

t
n
Esionia (H D r1ee8)

c;
06

0 .4

o .2

0 .0
ffi
l :' l
1l
l.-= -l
SOCIALBACKGROUND
Age (linearin yearsJ
Malegender(0 women/i men)
Education(4-pointscalelow to high)
Income(l0-pointscalelow to high)
. 001
- . 164
. 207
- . 018
. 001
. 0r 7
. 0\ 2
. 003
.008
-.04i
.074
- . 023
.050
.000
.000
. 000
Lithuania Macedonia

i
vq)
f
0 .6

[-l N---l
1\ |
RELIGIOUSVALUESAND BELIEFS
Importance of religion( -pointscale
Iow to highj
. 594 . 010 . 308 . 000
= o 02 1\l l-\ I
0 .0 r_-l I >>l Reiigiousbeliefs(5-pointscale)
TYPEOF RELIGIOUSFAITH
.3t2 .006 . 232 . 000
Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenis

1> IN N
>t
=9
g3
0 .6

0 .4
[--l Protestant
Catholic
Orthodox
1. 10
1. 67
.56s
. 046
. 025
.023
.10_s
. 377
. 130
.000
. 000
. 000
0 .2
Muslim - . 080 . 080 - . 004 N/ s
0 .0
Constant - ) , . 097

3E 0 .4
g8
0 .6

1-= R2 . 453

NorE: Models use ordinary ieast squares regression analysis with religious partici-

l:l
0 .2
0 .0
'a'J"'. :ir'';"
:ir'lon'a'J.'^
Figure 5.2. ReligiousParticipationby Cohort of Birth. Note: Religiouspartici
pation fthe proportion that attendedchurch at leastweekly) by cohort of birth,
with the regressionline of the trend. Source:World Values Survey,pooled
I 990-2001.
historical change in some countries than in others. The generationalcon-
trastsare most marked in Hungary Nloldova, and Romania, and lessevident
in some otier nations rvith a more secularolder generation, such asin East
Germany, Estonia, and Lawia. These trends are strikingly similar whether
the comparisons are based on the importance of religious values, aften-
dance at servicesof worship, or the frequenry of prayer, which enhances
our confidencethat we are dealing v'it}r a robust and reliable phenomenon.
To control for the many other factors that could affect the relationship
between age and religiosity, we will use multivariate analysisto confirm
pation (7-point scale measuring frequency of attendance at services of worshipJ as
the dependent variable measured at individual level in 22 post-Communist societies.
The table lists the unstandardized regression coefficient (BJ, the standard error
(s.e.),the standardi zedregres s tonc oeffi c i ent [B eta), and the s i gni fi c anc e(S i g.1of
the coefficients. N : 32,348. Religious participation: "Dct you attend religious serulces
seueraltimes cLveek, once a veek, a few times dtLing the year, once a year or Less,
or neuerl" The percentage that reported attending religious services "several iimes a
week" or "once a rveek." Importance of religion scale: "Hou' important ls rellglon ln
your Ltfe?' 4-point scale. Religious beliefs: Whether respondents expressed belief in
God, in heaven, in hell, in life after death, and in whether people have a soul. Type
of religious faith: Dummy variables (0/i) for whether the respondent belonged to
each type of major world religion.
Source: World Vaiues Survev. oooled 1990-2001.
whetherthesepatterns hold up - or seemto reflect the influence of specific
variables.The regression models in Table 5.2 control for the society's
level of human development as well as for the standard social and atti-
tudinal variablesthat Chapter 3 demonstrated tend to influence pafterns
of churchgoing, such as gender, education, and income, in addition to the
impact of religious values and beliefs, and belonging to different world
124 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S
religions. The pooled World Values Survey r990-2oor is used to analyze
patterns acrossthe twenty-rwo post-Communist societies.The resultsshow
that the linear effectsof age continue to be significant even with thesemul-
tiple controls, with religiosity continuing to be srronger among rhe older
generations.A similar regressionnlodel was replicatedusing logged ageand
the beta coetficientsfor age proved slighdy v'eaker and statisticallyinsignif-
icant (at the conventional .o5 level). The other social and attitudinal factors
performed as expected,with religious attendancein post-Communist soci-
eties being reladvely strong among women, the less educated,and the less
affluent, as well as (unsurprisinglv) among those who held religious values
and beliefs. Catholics vv.erethe most regular churchgoers,u,'ithProtestants
and Orthodox being moderate in attendance,and Muslims in this region
the least likelv to attend sen-icesof rvorship. The anaiysisof indir"idualreli-
giosity in post-Communist Europe therefore largely confirms the patterns
found earlier in Western Europe, meaning that we do not need to resort to
particularistic explanationsbasedon factors distinctive to the history of the
church under the Soviet state, whether the traditional beliefs and pracrices
of the Eastern Orthodo.r church, the repressionor persecuuon of Carholic
leaders,or the culnrral legary of the Comrnunist Party. Neverthelessthere
remain important national contrasts within the region, such as between
religious Poland and secular Russia,which require further exploration.
The Impact of Religious Markets versus the Impact
of Human Development
To examinethe societal-levelfactors that could be causingthe cross-national
differences,we can compare how f-arreligiosiw is systematicallyrelared to
religious markets and societal development. Four indicators are compared
to seehow stronglv these correlated with the indicators of religious values,
beliefs, and participation that we have used throughout this book.
Religious Pluralism
The supply-side theory of Stark and Finlce suggeststhat the degree of
competition among religious insdrudons plays a crucial role in crearing
religious vigor; and above all, that religious pluralism increasesreiigious
participation.'o Religious pluralism is gaugedhere by the Herfindahl Index
used in earlier chapters, as calculated by Alesina and colleaguesusing the
data on the major religious populations derived from the Enryclopaedia
BritannicaBookof the Yearzoo t ." The religious pluralism index is calculated
A RELIGIOUS
REV]VAL
IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE' I25 il
as the standard Herfindahl indicator for each country, ranging from zero
to one.
StateRegulation of Religion
A related hypothesis developedby Greeley argues rhat state regulation of
ru
religion in the Soviet union restricted the churches, but that a religious
.ii
,
revival occurred after the fall of communism in countries where there is
a srong constitutional division between church and state, protecting reli-
giousfreedom of worship and toleration of different denominations,with-
out hindrance to particular sectsand faiths (which, of course,would tend
to enhancethe degree of religious pluralism). In Communist China, for ex-
ample,observerssuggestthar the statecontinues to activelvrepress,ban, or
ff
'fi
deterreligious practices,exemplified by the prosecutions,killings, torrure,
andarrestspracticed since r999 againstmembers of the Falun Gong cult.,' rf
To examinethis argument, we need to make a systematiccomparison of
state-churchreladons, and the degree of religious tolerance that now ex-
,l
liff
ists.To generatesuch a comparison,the degreeof religious freedorn in the
twenty-sevennation statesin post-communist Europe was classifiedbased lf
on information for each country contained in the U.S. State Department :;i
report on lTtternatiznal ReligiousFreedom,zoo2, comprehensive compari-
^
sonof stateregulation and restrictions of all world faiths.'l As discussedin
Chapter 2,,the Religious Freedom Index that w.edeveloped focusesupon
the relationship of the state and church, including issuessuch aswhether the
constirudon limits freedom of religion, whether the government restricrs
some denominations, cults, or sects,and whether there is an established
church.The index v'as classifiedaccording to the rwenq criteria listed in
AppendixC, with eachitem codedo/r. The zo-poinr scalewas then reversed
so that a higher score representsgreater religious freedom. ;
ifi
SocietalDevelopment
For comparison, we also examined how far the indicators of reiigiosiry
correlatedwith the Human Development Index and also with change in
per capitaGDP from r99o ro zooo (measuredin Purchasing Power parity
estimatesin u.S. dollars), both of which are regarded as core indicators of
societalmodernization and human security.
The simple correlarions in Table 5.3, without any prior controls, show
that,despitethe legacyof sevendecadesof Soviet repressionof the church,
fie Religious Freedom Index was .,ot4[\..nt1y relared (at rhe .o5
level)to any of the indicators of religioqity ,rs.d in this srudy,whether of
d
$
$
 rif
t26 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIC ION A N D P OLITIC S A RELIGIOUS
REVI\AL IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE] t27

Europe
Table 5.3. ExplainingSocietal-LevelReligiosityin Post-Communist stronglyand signihcantly related to religious participation and frequencyot
d
ReligiousMcrket
Indicators
Re&gious
SocietalDevelopment

Hum-an Changein Per

Freedom Religious Development caPito GDP
lndicotors

Scale Pluralism In d e x .1 9 98 1990-2000

R Slg. R Slg. R Slg. R Sig.
N.
Nctrons
prayer,but aeain,contrary to religious market theory \nanegatiuedirection.
Post-Communistcountrieswith more heterogeneousreligious culturesand
institutionspro'l'edto be more secular,not more religious,than thosewhere
religion is more homogeneous.The other indicators of religiosity showed
insignificantcorrelations,but all but one wasneglttiael!related to pluralism.
Our findings not only fail to support supply-sidereligious markets theory -
f
they have the opposite sign from that which religious market theory would
ITELIGIOUS predict:in post-Communist Europe, religious pluralism is linked with rel-
PARTICIPATION anvelylow levelsof religiosiry.
lieligiousparticipation .011 -.466- - . 069 -.118 22 By contrast, the indicators ofsocietal securiry show that religious values
I{ow oftenpray? -.305 -.747-- - . 060 -.r23 14
are negatively related to both human development and ievels of affluence,
I{ELIGIOUSVALUES asimplied by the theory of secularizationand existential security. People
irnportanceof religion -.335 -.285 -.467- -.468- 20
living in post-Communist countries that had achievedthe most successful
irnportanceof God -.333 '032 -.62r-. -.590.. f1

transition, with higher standardsof living, longeviry, and education, also

I{ELIGIOUSBELIEFS
-.6 8 4 " - 2l regardedreligion as lessimportant to their lives than the publics living in
l3elieve in god -.3 1 ,3 .0 3 5 -.693"
llelieve in life -.2 7 5 -.0 9 1 .070 - .102 20 poorer and less secure statesin the region. Sirnilar pafterns were evident
after death for belief in God. The other coefficients proved statisticaliy insignificant,
Believe in hell -.3 9 6 -.0 9 8 -.3 9 9 -.489- 21 giventhe limited number of cases,although again their direction usually
i3elieve in heaven -.3 5 6 -.1 2 9 -.-+ u -.332 z0 pointedin the expecteddirection.
iielieve in soul -.2 2 8 .3 9 9 -.5 9 5 .- -.673-- 20
To explore this further the results ra'ereexamined in multivariate mod-
els(in Thble 5.4) monitoring the combined effects of human development
NSTE:Macro-level regression models of the impact of the reiigious market and societal
development indicators on the dependent variables in 22 posfCommunist societies, and religious markets on the mean level of religious values (the impor-
.Co r r e la tio n is sig n ifica n t ( Sig.) at the 0.05 Ievel [2-tai l ed).
wit hou t a n y p r i o r c o n t ro ls. tanceof God scale) measured at societal-level, and some scafter grams
**Correlatior.r is significant at the 0.01 level (Z-tailed). Rehgious Freedom Index, 2002:
illustrating the relationships under comparison. Figure 5.3 tests the ex-
see the Technical Appendix at the end of Chapter 6, Table A6.1, and text for details.
This is ar-rexpanded and updated version of the Chaves and Cann (1992) scaie. Religiow tent to which religious values (the ro-point importance of God scale)can
plrLralism: The Herfind-altl Ind.ex of religious pluralism or fractionalization, flom Alesina be predicted in post-Communist Europe using standard indicators of hu-
et al. 2003. See Chapter 4 note 32 for details of its construction. Humon DeveLopment man securiry including the Human Development Index and the rate of
Index, 1998: Index based on longevity, literacy, and education, and per capita GDP (in
PPP), UNDP Humon Deuelopment Repoft 2002, New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press.
economicgrowth during the last decade.These factors predict the vital-
Change in Per Capita Gross Dornestlc Product, i990-2000: world Bank, world Deuelopment iry of religion in people's lives in this region so successfullythat we do
[ndicators. 2002. not need to resort to institutional explanationsbasedon the history of the
Source: World Values Survev, pooied 1990-2001. relationshipberw'eenthe church and state,the persecution ofreligious au-
thorities,levels of rivalrv and competition among religious orpganizations,
participation, values, or beliefs. (Jf course this could be due in part to the
limited number of cases,but even if this conventional testis relaxed,the cor-
relation coefhcients that did emerge rvere usually negatiue,which is in the
or whether a particular culture is mainly Catholic or Protestant, Orthodox
or Muslim. The sharp contrast in the scatter grams between the secu-
lar valuesevident in Czech Republic and Estonia, and the spiritual values
manifestedin Romania and Albania, can larsely be attributed simpl.v to
i
I|[
opposite direction to that suggestedby religrousmarket theory. The results
suggestthat greater religious lieedom in post-Communist nations is asso-
ciated with louet., not higher, levels of religiosiqy.Religious pluralism was
different levels of human development and thus the social conditions of
greatersecuriw'
ii
'll
,d
il
 tfr
t28 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S A RELIGIOUS
REVIVALIN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE] 129 ;lt
Table 5.4. ExplainingSocietalReligiousValuesin Post-Communist
Europe 10
s.e. Beta sig.
Aze
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Levelof humandevelopment(HDI 1998) -1 7 .9 9 5.97 -.602 .008
Geo
RELIGIOUSMARKETS
ReligiousFreedomtnde.x(20 points -.022 .024 -.176 .381
from low to high)
Religiouspluralismscale -1 .4 1 6 1.86 - .146 .459 Uk.
Mac
Cro
.
i$
Pol Religious
culture
Conslant
R2
2 2 .2
.3 3 2
HUS

sI
a
frung
. tlovk
Slov
a . Muslim i.i
o
Lirh .,|;
NorE: Models use ordinary least squares regression analysis with mean religious values 34 a
' Orthodox f:

(the lO-point scale measuring importance of God) as the dependent variable measured (\
^ Protestant
at societal level in 19 post-Communist societies. The table lists the unstandardized
regression coefficient (Bl, the standard error (s.e.), the standardized regression
=J

o
Esl
Czech
I
r RomanCatholic
it
c oef f i c i e n t [ B e t a ) , a n d th e sig n ifica n ce o f th e co e fficie nts (S i g.). The smal l number
of cases (19) created problems of multi-collineanty and instability when the type of
6Z
E rf
religious culture was introduced (because of the close association between Catholicism
and the societies which were highest in human development and in religiosityl, so this
variable was excluded from the final model. See Figure 5.3. The growth in per capita
F1

o ./
Rsq= 9.4264
ii
f
HumanDevelopment
Index1998
GDP was also closely correlated with the Human Development lndex, so this was also
dropped to avoid problems of multi-collineairy. lmportonce of religion scole: "How
important ls God in your lifel" ]0-point scale. Human Deuelopment lndex, 1998'.Index
based on lon8evity, literacy, and education, and per capita GDP (in PPP); UNDP Human
DeveLopment Report 2002. New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press. ReLgious Freedom
rlili
Ind.ex'. 2}-point measure explained in the text and in the Technical Appendix, Table
A6.1, at the end of Chapter 6. Relryious pLuroLism: The Herfindahl index of relSious
ili

W
pLuralism or fractionalizotion, from Alesina et al. 2003. See Chapter 4 note 32 for details
of its c o n s t r u c t i o n .
Source: World Values Survey, pooled 1990-2001.

;
To confirm the finding of negative correlations between religiosiry and Religiousculture
religious markets we can also examine the scatter gram to seewhat is un- . Muslim
derlying this reladonship. Contrary to religious market theory Figure 5.4 o

r
shows how the salienceof religious valuesis related to both the Herfindahl 64 ' Orthodox
measureof religious pluralism and the Religious Freedom Index. The most (r^ " Protestant
secularcountries (such asthe Czech Republic and Estonia) havethe greatest
bJ

o . RomanCatholic
religious pluralism and fieedom of the church from state regulation. This o
6Z
is no accident;the reason,we believe, is that human development generates E

more secular values among the general population - and also greater 91
Rsq= 0.4040
religious freedoms, social tolerance, and democrary. Religion not only 0 2000 4000 6000 Sooo 10000
becomelless important to people'slives in securesocieties,but freedom of EconomicArowth1990-2000(Changein per capitaGDp in US$)

Figure5.3. ReligiousValuesand societalIndicatorsof Human Development.

130 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S A R E LIGIOU SR E V IV A L IN P OST-C OMMU N IS TE U R OP E ? l3l

worship is also expandedaspart of human rights and democratic liberaliza-

tion. In poorer and lessder.elopedpost-communist societies,by conrasr,
religion remains a vital force in people'slives, and aurhoritarian statesin
the region limit religious liberties, just as they consistentiyresrrict hurnan
rights in other spheres.

Religious
culture Conclusions
o
. Muslim
a There are manv reasonswhv patterns of secularizationin post-Communist
' Orthodox Furope mighr plausiblv be expectedto dil1-erfrom those we have already
rn +
found in the west. The role of the statein restricti'g religion under com-
^ Protestant
o3 munism is u'ell establishedand rve do not need to documenr its history
()
. BomanCatholic here.'4But the kev question for us is whether this repressionactuallv gen-
-
E, erated the erosion of mass spirirualiw in the soviet bloc, or whether it
o-
o_
may have exacerbated,but not necessarilycaused,a long-term growth of
L'I R s q= 6 . 1 2 6 1
50 60 70 80 90 100
secularizationin this region which parallelssimilar developmentsin other
Low -- Religious
FreedomIndex-- High countries.The fact that \A/esternEuropean democracieshave a long his-
tory of religious tolerance, human rights, and civic liberties during the
Aze
twentieth cenrury means that the comparison of these regions provides an
exceptionallvu'ell-designed"narural experiment" to rest the "bottorn-up"
Rom
and "top-down" claims in the sociology of religion.
Geo
The generational comparisonssuggestthat there has been a rong-term
Alb Mol Bc
decline of reiigiosiw across succeeding generations in post-communist
Cro'
rArm
w N4ac Europe,and rve found no convincing evidenceof a cun ilinear pattern from
o
the generadonalcomparisons,suggestingthat the younger generarion has
------ Likr
Pol --_ --------Edlel
Religious
culture not experienceda significanrrer.ivalof religious r-alues,beliefs,or behanor.
I
6 r{oreover, the cross-nationalcomparisonsindicate that the cross-national
O<
ar Slov Rus
Hung t . Muslim
' ]- . Slovk
r differencesthat do remain important today can be satisfactorilyexplained
' a But
/11 LIIN ' Orthodox by levels of human development among post-communist narions, just as
=4 a
^ Protestant
thesefactors explain pafterns elsewhere.The supplv-side tl-resisthat reli-
o
()
c
giousmarkets are crirical, so rhat participadon is determined by reliqious
t:' r RomanCatholic
L czech piuralism and the lack of state regulation of church institutions, is given
o t
o- no positivesupport from the evidence;instead,the opposite position seems
F^
B s q= 0 . 0 1 3 3 to be the case.It is the more homogenous religious cultures, exemplified
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7
by the role of catholicism in Poland, which have best-preservedfaith in
Low - - R e l i g i o u sp l u ra l i s m-- h i g h
God and habirual church aftendance,not rhe most plural. And todav the
Figure 5.4. ReligiousValues,ReligiousPluralism,and the ReligiousFreedom post-communisr stareswith the greatesrregulation of the church *.n or.,
Index. NotqiSee the text for details of the 2O-pointReligiousFreedomIndex. to be the most religious, not the least. we argue that this is no accident;
Source:WorlihValuesSurvey,pooled I 981-2001.
r32 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S

it reflects the fact that human security encouragessecularization'together

with the political rights and civil liberties associatedwith religious freedom
in transitional and consolidating democracies.But what about valueselse-
where in the world in other types of religious culrure, particularly Muslim
states?It is to examine these issuesthat we now rurn.

Religion and Politics in the Muslim

World

ro
rN sEEKTNG understand the role of religion in the Muslim world, many
popular commentators have rurned to Samuel P. Huntington's provocative
and controversial thesis of a "clash of civilizations." This account empha-
sized that the end of the Cold War brought new dangers. Huntington
argued:

In the nez;;uorld,...the most pervasive,important and dangerous conllicts

u'ill not be berween social classes,rich and poor, or other economically de-
6ned groups. but berween people belonging to different culrural entities.
Tiibal s'ars and ethnic conflicts u'ill occur within cir,'ilizations . . . And the
most dangerous culrural conflicts are those along the fault lines betqeen
ciriiizations. . . For forty-five years the Iron Curtain was the central dividing
line in Europe. That line has moved severalhundred miles east. It is now
the line separatingpeoples of \Vestern Christianiry',on the one hand, fiorn
rj
Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the otier.' .;
l:li
For Huntington, Marxist class warfare, and even the disparities between
nch and poor nations, have been overshadowed in the tv!'eni)*-first cenrury I
i
by Weberian culrure.
This influential account appeared to offer insights into the causesof
violent ethno-religious conflicts exemplified by Bosnia, the Caucuses,the
Middle East, and Kashmir. It seemed to explain rhe failure of politicai

133