SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018

IRENEO CAHULOGAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ELEMENTS OF FENCING:---COCA COLA CASE – 210 CASES MALI PINAGDILEVERAN – AYAW IBALIK NI PET-
SC: LIABLE TO FENCING UNG PINAGBENTAHAN NG NAKAW.

Facts
On April 18, 2011, an Information6 was filed before the RTC charging petitioner with the crime of Fencing

Johnson Tan (Tan), a businessman engaged in transporting Coca-Cola products, instructed his truck driver and helper,
Braulio Lopez (Lopez) and Loreto Lariosa (Lariosa), to deliver 210 cases of Coca-Cola products (subject items) worth P52,476.00
to Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that contrary to his instructions, Lopez and Lariosa delivered the subject items
to petitioner's store.

Tan then went to petitioner and informed him that the delivery to his store was a mistake and that he was pulling out the
subject items. However, petitioner refused, claiming that he bought the same from Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not
present any receipt evidencing such transaction.

**Tan insisted that he had the right to pull out the subject items as Lariosa had no authority to sell the same to petitioner, but
the latter was adamant in retaining such items. Fearing that his contract with Coca-Cola will be terminated as a result of the
wrongful delivery, and in order to minimize losses, Tan negotiated with petitioner to instead deliver to him P20,000.00 worth of empty
bottles with cases, as evidenced by their Agreement 8 dated January 18, 2011.

Nonetheless, Tan felt aggrieved over the foregoing events, thus, prompting him to secure an authorization to file cases from
Coca-Cola and charge petitioner with the crime of Fencing. He also claimed to have charged Lariosa with the crime of Theft but
he had no update as to the status thereof.9

The RTC RulingIn a Judgment13 dated October 4, 2013, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period often (10) years and
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed16 to the CA.
The CA Ruling--the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.18 It held that Lariosa's act of selling the subject items to petitioner without
the authority and consent from Tan clearly constituted theft. As such, petitioner's possession of the stolen items constituted prima
facie evidence of Fencing - a presumption which he failed to rebut.19

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for the crime of Fencing.
YES!

The Court's Ruling

Section 2 of PD 1612 defines Fencing as "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft."23

The same Section also states that a Fence "includes any person, firm, association, corporation or partnership or other
organization who/which commits the act of fencing."24

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (a) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
(b) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
(c) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and ‘
(d) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. 25

Notably, Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of Fencing from evidence of
possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or
theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. 26

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the crime of Fencing, as it was shown that: (a) Lariosa sold to petitioner the subject items without authority and consent from his
employer, Tan, for his own personal gain, and abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him as a truck helper;27 (b) petitioner
bought the subject items from Lariosa and was in possession of the same; (c) under the circumstances, petitioner should have been
forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source, as his transaction with Lariosa did not have any accompanying
delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common
practice among dealers of soft drinks;28 and (d) petitioner's intent to gain was made evident by the fact that he bought the subject
items for just P50,000.00, lower than their value in the amount of P52,476.00. "

G.R. No. 146584 July 12, 2004

ERNESTO FRANCISCO y SPENOCILLA, petitioner,

vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

element of knowledge. (HERE MAY THEFT INDEED- PERO DI IBIG SABIHIN MAY FENCING NA SINCE EVID SA CASE NA
UN CANNOT BE USED MATIC SA FENCING CASE. AS TO THE CHARGE OFFENSEINCE NO KNOWLEDGE.- KASI NO
PROOF HOW MUCH KAYA ACCUSED CANNOT BE SAID NA DAPAT ALAM NYA NA NAKAW KASI MURA,

The petitioner was charged of violating P.D. No. 1612 under the Information filed on June 23, 1993, the accusatory

Jovita Rodriguez was engaged in business as a general contractor Macario Linghon was one of her workers. She and her husband, the
former Municipal Mayor of Rodriguez, Rizal, acquired several pieces of jewelry which were placed inside a locked cabinet in a
locked room in their main house. Jovita hid the key to the cabinet inside the room. The couple and their son resided inside a
compound. They hired Pacita Linghon, Macario’s sister, as one of their household helpers us sometime in February
1989.5 Pacita swept and cleaned the room periodically. Sometime in May 1991, she left the employ of the Rodriguez family.

Sometime in the third week of October 1991, Pacita contacted her brother Macario, and asked him to sell some pieces of jewelry.
She told Macario that a friend of hers owned the jewelry. 7 Macario agreed. He then went to the shop of petitioner Ernesto
"Erning" Francisco located at Pacheco Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan,8 which had a poster outside that said, "We
buy gold." Macario entered the shop, while Pacita stayed outside. Macario offered to sell to Ernesto two rings and one bracelet.
Ernesto agreed to buy the jewelry for P25,000, and paid the amount to Macario. He also gave Macario P300 as a tip.9

Sometime in November 1991,10 Pacita asked Macario anew to sell a pair of earrings. He agreed. He and a friend of his went to
the shop of Ernesto and offered to sell to Ernesto the pair of earrings for P18,000. The latter agreed and paid Macario the amount.
Ernesto gave a P200 tip to Macario. After these transactions, Macario saw the petitioner in his shop for about five to six more times
and received some amounts.11

Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was asked to be a principal sponsor at a wedding. She was shocked when she opened the locked
cabinet containing her jewelry, and found that the box was empty. She noticed that the lock to the cabinet was not broken. Among the
pieces of jewelry missing were one pair of diamond heart-shaped earrings worth P400,000; one heart-shaped diamond ring
worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000; and one ring with a small diamond stone
worth P5,000. She suspected that it was Pacita who stole her jewelry.

On August 19, 1992, Jovita filed a complaint for theft against Pacita and her mother Adoracion Linghon

Counter-Intelligence Group, invited Pacita and Adoracion to Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation in connection with
Jovita’s complaint. Pacita arrived in Camp Crame without counsel and gave a sworn statement pointing to the petitioner as
the person to whom she sold Jovita’s jewelry. On August 23, 1992, Pacita gave a sworn statement to PO1 Roldan, Jr.,
admitting that she sold one pair of heart-shaped earrings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped diamond
ring, and one ring "with big and small stones" to "Mang Erning" of Meycauayan, Bulacan, for the total price of P50,000 to cover
the cost of her father’s operation and for food.
Pacita was charged with qualified theft in the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76.14 The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2005. Adoracion (mother of pacita) was also charged with violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), docketed
as Criminal Case No. 1992. The cases were consolidated and

Jovita succeeded in convincing Macario to testify against the petitioner, assuring him that he would not be prosecuted for violation of
P.D. No. 1612. Macario agreed to testify against the petitioner.

On September 1, 1992, Jovita executed a sworn statement in the office of the police station of Meycauayan, Bulacan, charging
the petitioner of buying stolen jewelry worth P655,000.15 A criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of P.D. No.
1612 was filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-13841.

In the meantime, on August 20, 1993, judgment was rendered by the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1992 and 2005, finding Pacita guilty of theft and Adoracion guilty of fencing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond reasonable
doubt.

The Case for the Petitioner

The petitioner testified that he was a resident of Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. He had a shop located at Pacheco Street, Calvario,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, where he bought and sold jewelry. He had been in this business since 1980.18 He did not transact with
Pacita regarding Jovita’s missing jewels.19 . He, likewise, denied knowing Pacita Linghon, and claimed that he first saw her when
she accompanied some policemen in civilian clothes to his shop, where he was thereafter invited to Camp Crame for
investigation.20 The petitioner also averred that he had no transaction with Macario of whatever nature. 22

On November 29, 1995, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating P.D.
No. 1612]

On December 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.28

. The appellant argues that assuming that Macario sold the subject jewelry to him, Macario had no personal knowledge that
the same belonged to Jovita. The petitioner avers that the testimony of Macario, the principal witness of the prosecution, is
inconsistent on substantial matters; hence, should not be given credence and probative weight.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of
the crime charged.

Issue: WON The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of the (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law.

YES CA ERRED.

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the
accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown
that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and,
(4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. 32

Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by
the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. 33 The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable
to prove fencing. It is merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the
crime of fencing.

ON PACITA

We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the
testimony of Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of her then employer. Jovita
testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing the pieces
of jewelry.
ON PETITIONER

We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting
Pacita of theft does not constitute proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the jewelry. There is no showing
that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005 was already final and executory when the trial court rendered its decision in the
instant case.

Assuming, for the nonce, that the petitioner purchased the said jewelry from Macario, there is no evidence on record that the
petitioner knew that they were stolen. Significantly, even Macario did not know that the jewelry was stolen. He testified that
his sistzr Pacita told him before he sold the jewelry to the petitioner that they belonged to a friend of hers.

Why not di valid ung argue na you should have known?

The prosecution cannot even validly argue that the petitioner should have known which pieces of jewelry were stolen,
considering that Macario was selling the same for P50,000 when the said pieces stolen from Jovita were alleged to be
worth P655,000. This is so because the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove the value of the said
stolen articles. The prosecution relied solely on the bare and uncorroborated testimony of Jovita, that they were worth P655,000:

When required by the petitioner, through counsel, to bring to the court any receipts reflecting the price of the pieces of jewelry to
show that she purchased the same, Jovita answered that she had no such receipts. Thus:

In People v. Paraiso,43 we cited our ruling in People v. Marcos44 that an ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry,
nor may the courts take judicial notice of the value of the same:…[A]nd as we have ruled in the case of People vs. Antonio
Marcos, an ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods
which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry is not a matter of
public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration and in the absence of receipts or any other competent
evidence besides the self-serving valuation made by the prosecution, we cannot award the reparation for the stolen jewelry. 45

It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the
prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known
that the property sold to him were stolen.

This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court
to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court will fix
the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v. Dator:46

In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00
based on the attendant circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes, this Court held that if there is no
available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00.47

The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior
State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO
MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

1829 IS ABSORBED IN REBELLION. SC: YES

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with
murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's
Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of
PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds
that: (c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-
conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the
Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:II. The alleged
harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a
component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col.
Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for
alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due
process.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the
petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

Issue:The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

NO.

The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component
offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court
recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as
a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the
greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or
component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.

Here, the petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos
or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following
acts:

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe
or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and
conviction.
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and
comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do
anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and
conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the
Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the
mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3)
particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby
concluded that:In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence
of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December
coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which
gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex
A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be
101 separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No.
1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in
conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the
crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime
of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes
as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and
plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though
crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People
v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act
of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.

OK NA, THIS IS AN OPTIONAL READ.

The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a
deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is,
in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it
becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution
for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a
defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the
rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This
argument is specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether
punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance
thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by
the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People
v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to
all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant
circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself
to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his
allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD
No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was
committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with
the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and
charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It
should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In
such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion
and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the
act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it
should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000

ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.

No PD1829 IN ILLEGAL ARREST.- kas in the first place no right to arrest ung mga suspect ng killing ng frat member- kasi
no inflagrante delicto and no warrant

Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and
another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P.
Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons
responsible for the crime.

In response to the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to
U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica
and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the
Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P.
Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.

Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the
suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them.

*Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of their intervention,
Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. 1 However, criminal charges were filed later against the
two student suspects.2

*Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col.
Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, 3 which makes
it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We answer these
questions in the negative.
For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that their attempt to arrest
Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.

The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty. The question is whether the
suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant issued by a court, considering that, as already explained, the attempted
arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule 113, §5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have
authorized the arrest without warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide the question of
probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto.

Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino,
Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829.

Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has
been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules
of Court).

The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that
the students had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all show
that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that
the accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law. 10

Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:

SEC. 1. The-penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall
be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects
and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect,
has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;

In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c)
without rendering it unconstitutional.

Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.

Indeed, they could not have interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the
NBI for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because petitioners had asked for assistance
from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard constitutional requirements.

The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in the escape of the student suspects as
petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor failed in their undertaking to surrender the students the following day. 14 Hence, the information
against them charged that petitioners willfully obstructed the apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the
successful escape of these students and another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta.. but, the fact remains that the NBI
agents could not have validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have a warrant at that time. Hence,
only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI believed the information
given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a warrant before making the attempted arrest instead of
taking the law into their own hands. That they chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their
responsibility alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015

JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y

JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Illegal possession of lumber. 1829

The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. According to the Information, the petitioners took away the
truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture.

Prosecution's evidenceon November 15, 2002, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Officer (DENRO) Felimon
Balico (Balico) approached a truck loaded with lumber, which was parked at a national highway in Dingalan, Aurora
(Dingalan)3 Balico requested from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck helper, Mostera, the lumber's supporting documents but
they failed to produce any.

The DENRO group - composed of Balico, Tarcila Vivero (Vivero) and Rodolfo Tumagan (Tumagan) - and the policemen, Gamboa
and Romulo Derit, guarded the truck loaded with lumber. 4
---The DENRO group decided to transfer the truck and the lumber to the police station at Poblacion. They transferred the lumber first
from November 15 to November 16, 2002, and left the truck at the national highway in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and
some police officers.5

On November 16, 2002, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos arrived at the place where the
truck was being held in custody.6

Santiago, who claimed ownership of the truck,7 agreed with the DENROs and the police officers to bring the truck to the
police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina who volunteered to drive the truck; while Padiernos asked Balico where
the seized lumbers were.8

Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police station, Balico thought that Mesina would maneuver the
truck so that they could proceed to the police station. To their surprise, Mesina increased the truck's speed and headed
towards the direction of Nueva Ecija, leaving behind their two policemen escorts9 who chased the truck and fired three
warning shots.1
As the truck passengers alighted, petitioner Padiernos uttered bad words to them, saying that they had no right to apprehend
the truck and the lumber.12

Police officers Gamboa, Joemar Balmores, Sagudang, Fajardo, and Mendoza 13 immediately proceeded to Brgy. Bagting where they
found the DENRO group, Padiernos, and Roxas. The DENROs and the policemen proceeded back to Dingalan, with police officer
Gamboa driving the truck to the police station compound.

Evidence for the defense: Mesina testified that on November 16, 2002, he was watching television with his wife and children when
his former employer, Santiago, arrived and asked him to bring the latter's truck to Cabanatuan City. He refused Santiago's request
because he knew that the truck had been engaged in illegal activities; particularly, the truck had been previously loaded with lumber
that were confiscated.14

Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of everything and that there was really no problem with the truck. Mesina
finally agreed and rode in Santiago's car. Santiago asked him to fetch Roxas to accompany them. 15

Roxas was resting in his house when Santiago and Mesina arrived. Santiago asked Roxas if he could drive his truck to Cabanatuan
City.16 Roxas refused because he had already heard of the truck's apprehension, 17 but he finally relented after Santiago assured him
that there was no problem with the truck.

On their way to Caragsacan, Dingalan, they saw Padiernos at the waiting shed of Aplayang Malaki, Dingalan.20 According to
Padiernos, he had been waiting for a ride to Cabanatuan City from 12:30 to 1:30 p.m. but only Santiago's group came by.21 Padiernos
hitched a ride with them after learning that they would bring Santiago's truck to Cabanatuan City. 22

The petitioners unanimously testified that they did not hear people shouting or tapping on the truck to stop them. 28 They also
did not notice any motorcycle following them as the truck's side mirrors were broken. They did not reach Cabanatuan City
because the Philippine Army flagged them down. 29

The RTC's ruling

The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705. 31 The RTC
ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had been used in violating P.D. No. 705 or
the Forestry Reform Code.

The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had been used in violating P.D. No. 705 or
the Forestry Reform Code.32

The CA's rulingThe CA affirmed the RTC's decision

The Parties' Arguments:The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705 because
the DENROs and the police authorities had already discovered the crime and had, in fact, control over the truck when the
petitioners drove it towards Nueva Ecija.43 because!!!!! Article 19 of the RPC only punishes accessories who prevent the
discovery of the crime.44

On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the petitioners' acts were aimed at preventing the discovery of the crime.
The respondent alleges that without the truck, the accused in the present case could easily produce the necessary
transportation documents to account for the entire volume of the confiscated lumber.45 The respondent refers to the testimony of
James Martinez of CENRO Dingalan who tried to make it appear that the seized lumber had the proper transportation permit for 8,254
board feet and 261 pieces of lumber. This transportation permit did not tally, however, with the actual volume of the confiscated
lumber of 10,253 board feet, totaling 818 pieces.46

The Court's Ruling

WON LIABLE UNDER PD1829? YES!

the facts alleged in the Information and the crime proved in the present case do not make the petitioners liable as accessories for
violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.

The factual allegations in the Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829

In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously
and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence
and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense
committed by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of
justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."

P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the following acts:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:chanRoblesvirtu

alLawlibrary(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair
its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in
criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]

The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the petitioners' acts actually constituted a
violation of Section 1(b) above.

First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b).

The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away the truck so that it could not be
used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as a tool or instrument of the crime.

In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence that is indispensable in the criminal
investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the
illegal possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the permit for the transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck
and the lumber. According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna, 53 the transport of lumber should be covered with supporting
documents that should be in the possession of the transporter.

Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The term "suppress" means to subdue or
end by force.54

Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and prevent its
use as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial.

It is undisputed that Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal possession/transport of the seized lumber. Santiago
had every reason and motive to take his truck after its confiscation. Without the truck, Santiago could be exculpated and the
forthcoming criminal investigation or proceedings for violation of P.D. 705 would be frustrated.

The petitioners' intent to take and carry away the truck is established by their knowledge of the status of the truck and their
commission of the crime at Santiago's prompting.

Notably, both the RTC and the CA correctly considered the testimonies of the witnesses and the petitioners' admissions in ruling that
the petitioners knew that the truck had been involved in the illegal transportation/possession of the seized lumber.Mesina admitted that
he knew the truck's involvement in illegal activities as it had been previously loaded with lumber that was confiscated.According
to Mesina, Roxas also initially refused to go with them because he already heard the news of the truck's apprehension. Roxas
admitted that he only agreed to join Santiago and Mesina, after being assured that there was no problem with the truck.