PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS

MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express
their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of
the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right
to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may
result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they
pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate,
those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it
was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of
the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith.
Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issue:

Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?

Held:

No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority
"gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute
when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shall be governed.”

Simon vs. Comm. on Human Rights G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994

Facts :

Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition case" on vendors of North EDSA.
Constitutional Issue :
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt.
Ruling :
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights".
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the same in all parts of the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic
freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public
office, and to form political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment and social
services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity...Because they are
inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and
inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization or administration of the
government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the government.
human rights; civil rights; political rights –

Human rights – generic term;

civil rights – those rights thatbelong to every citizen or inhabitant of the state or country [by virtue of his citizenship in the
country] and are not connected with the organization or administration of government (marriage, equal protection, freedom of
contract etc.);

Political rights – right to participate, directly or indirectly in the establishment or administration of government (suffrage, run
for public office);

CHR – focus on SEVERE cases of human rights violations (right of political detainees, treatment of prisoners, fair and public
trials etc.);

CHR can cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt but not order them to desist

republic v sandiganbayan GR104768---phone

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

J. Fernando

Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of
Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were
not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void
for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first
class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels
such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process
on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the
lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the
city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare
of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties,
however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform
in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity?
It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out
and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed
a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due
process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by
law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The
policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and the “full rate of
payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), petitioner,

vs.
JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, respondent.

Ross and Lawrence for petitioner.

Attorney-General Paredes for respondent.

MALCOLM, J.:

A writ of mandamus is prayed for by Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.), against Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of
Cebu, Philippine Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate of Philippine registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato.
The Attorney-General, acting as counsel for respondent, demurs to the petition on the general ground that it does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. While the facts are thus admitted, and while, moreover, the pertinent provisions
of law are clear and understandable, and interpretative American jurisprudence is found in abundance, yet the issue submitted
is not lightly to be resolved. The question, flatly presented, is, whether Act. No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid — or,
more directly stated, whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessels
in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders.

FACTS.

Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands. A majority of its
stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in
1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of
Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the
stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant
action is the result.

LAW.

The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, repealing the Shipping Act of April 30, 1906 but reenacting a portion of section 3 of this
Law, and still in force, provides in its section 1:

That until Congress shall have authorized the registry as vessels of the United States of vessels owned in the Philippine
Islands, the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized to adopt, from time to time, and enforce
regulations governing the transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or places in the Philippine
Archipelago. (35 Stat. at L., 70; Section 3912, U. S. Comp Stat. [1916]; 7 Pub. Laws, 364.)

The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, still in force, provides in section 3, (first paragraph,
first sentence), 6, 7, 8, 10, and 31, as follows.

SEC. 3. That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws. . . .

SEC. 6. That the laws now in force in the Philippines shall continue in force and effect, except as altered, amended, or
modified herein, until altered, amended, or repealed by the legislative authority herein provided or by Act of Congress
of the United States.
 SEC. 7. That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by due
enactment to amend, alter modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from
time to time see fit

This power shall specifically extend with the limitation herein provided as to the tariff to all laws relating to revenue
provided as to the tariff to all laws relating to revenue and taxation in effect in the Philippines.

SEC. 8. That general legislative power, except as otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted to the Philippine
Legislature, authorized by this Act.

SEC. 10. That while this Act provides that the Philippine government shall have the authority to enact a tariff law the
trade relations between the islands and the United States shall continue to be governed exclusively by laws of the
Congress of the United States: Provided, That tariff acts or acts amendatory to the tariff of the Philippine Islands shall
not become law until they shall receive the approval of the President of the United States, nor shall any act of the
Philippine Legislature affecting immigration or the currency or coinage laws of the Philippines become a law until it has
been approved by the President of the United States: Provided further, That the President shall approve or disapprove
any act mentioned in the foregoing proviso within six months from and after its enactment and submission for his
approval, and if not disapproved within such time it shall become a law the same as if it had been specifically
approved.

SEC. 31. That all laws or parts of laws applicable to the Philippines not in conflict with any of the provisions of this Act
are hereby continued in force and effect." (39 Stat at L., 546.)

On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761. The first section of this law amended section 1172 of the
Administrative Code to read as follows:

SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than
fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of
fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.

"Domestic ownership," as used in this section, means ownership vested in some one or more of the following classes of
persons: (a) Citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the United States residing in the
Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the
United States or of both, created under the laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, or of thereof, or the
managing agent or master of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands

Any vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February eighth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, had a certificate
of Philippine register under existing law, shall likewise be deemed a vessel of domestic ownership so long as there shall
not be any change in the ownership thereof nor any transfer of stock of the companies or corporations owning such
vessel to person not included under the last preceding paragraph.

Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2761 amended sections 1176 and 1202 of the Administrative Code to read as follows:

SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be
approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be
engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven
hundred and seventy-two of this Code.

The collector of customs may at any time inspect a vessel or examine its owner, master, crew, or passengers in order
to ascertain whether the vessel is engaged in legitimate trade and is entitled to have or retain the certificate of
Philippine register.

SEC. 1202. Limiting number of foreign officers and engineers on board vessels. — No Philippine vessel operating in the
coastwise trade or on the high seas shall be permitted to have on board more than one master or one mate and one
engineer who are not citizens of the United States or of the Philippine Islands, even if they hold licenses under section
one thousand one hundred and ninety-nine hereof. No other person who is not a citizen of the United States or of the
Philippine Islands shall be an officer or a member of the crew of such vessel. Any such vessel which fails to comply with
the terms of this section shall be required to pay an additional tonnage tax of fifty centavos per net ton per month
during the continuance of said failure.

ISSUES.

Predicated on these facts and provisions of law, the issues as above stated recur, namely, whether Act No 2761 of the Philippine
Legislature is valid in whole or in part — whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the
registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders .

OPINION.
1. Considered from a positive standpoint, there can exist no measure of doubt as to the power of the Philippine Legislature to
enact Act No. 2761. The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, with its specific delegation of authority to the Government of the
Philippine Islands to regulate the transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or places therein, the liberal
construction given to the provisions of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, by the courts, and the grant by
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, of general legislative power to the Philippine Legislature, are certainly superabundant
authority for such a law. While the Act of the local legislature may in a way be inconsistent with the Act of Congress regulating
the coasting trade of the Continental United States, yet the general rule that only such laws of the United States have force in
the Philippines as are expressly extended thereto, and the abnegation of power by Congress in favor of the Philippine Islands
would leave no starting point for convincing argument. As a matter of fact, counsel for petitioner does not assail legislative
action from this direction (See U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; Sinnot vs. Davenport [1859] 22 How., 227.)

2. It is from the negative, prohibitory standpoint that counsel argues against the constitutionality of Act No. 2761. The first
paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights of the Philippine Bill, repeated again in the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of
Rights as set forth in the Jones Law, provides "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." Counsel says
that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the
corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their
stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without due process of law because by
the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with
the naked title to a boat it could not use .

The guaranties extended by the Congress of the United States to the Philippine Islands have been used in the same sense as like
provisions found in the United States Constitution. While the "due process of law and equal protection of the laws" clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights is couched in slightly different words than the corresponding clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, the first should be interpreted and given the same force and effect as the latter. (Kepner vs. U.S.
[1904], 195 U. S., 100; Sierra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S.,.470; U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7.) The meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been announced in classic decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Even at the expense of
restating what is so well known, these basic principles must again be set down in order to serve as the basis of this decision.

The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their
application to all person within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The
word "person" includes aliens. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33.) Private
corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. (Santa Clara
County vs. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. [1886], 118.U. S., 394; Pembina Mining Co. vs. Pennsylvania [1888],.125 U. S., 181 Covington
& L. Turnpike Road Co. vs. Sandford [1896], 164 U. S., 578.) Classification with the end in view of providing diversity of
treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary
selection (Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. Ellis [1897],.165 U. S., 150.) Examples of laws held unconstitutional
because of unlawful discrimination against aliens could be cited. Generally, these decisions relate to statutes which had
attempted arbitrarily to forbid aliens to engage in ordinary kinds of business to earn their living. (State vs. Montgomery [1900],
94 Maine, 192, peddling — but see. Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass., 262; Templar vs. Board of Examiners of Barbers
[1902], 131 Mich., 254, barbers; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S.,.356, discrimination against Chinese; Truax vs. Raich
[1915], 239 U. S., 33; In re Parrott [1880], 1 Fed , 481; Fraser vs. McConway & Torley Co. [1897], 82 Fed , 257; Juniata
Limestone Co. vs. Fagley [1898], 187 Penn., 193, all relating to the employment of aliens by private corporations.)

A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause the inevitable deduction that Act No.
2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a corporation, some of whole members are foreigners, of the equal protection
of the laws. Like all beneficient propositions, deeper research discloses provisos. Examples of a denial of rights to aliens
notwithstanding the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment could be cited. (Tragesser vs. Gray [1890], 73 Md., 250, licenses to
sell spirituous liquors denied to persons not citizens of the United States; Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass , 262,
excluding aliens from the right to peddle; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S. , 138, prohibiting the
killing of any wild bird or animal by any unnaturalized foreign-born resident; Ex parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442, discriminating
in favor of citizens with reference to the taking for private use of the common property in fish and oysters found in the public
waters of the State; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U. S.,.175, and Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195, limiting employment
on public works by, or for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States.)

One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence is, that neither the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to
interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having
these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts." (Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27; New Orleans Gas
Co. vs. Lousiana Light Co. [1885], 115 U.S., 650.) This is the same police power which the United States Supreme Court say
"extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people."
(Bacon vs. Walker [1907], 204 U.S., 311.) For quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine Organic Law could
could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to
exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest. (U. S. vs. Toribio [1910], 15 Phil., 85; Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580;
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.) Another notable exception permits of the regulation or distribution of
the public domain or the common property or resources of the people of the State, so that use may be limited to its citizens.
(Ex parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442; McCready vs. Virginia [1876], 94 U. S., 391; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
[1914], 232U. S., 138.) Still another exception permits of the limitation of employment in the construction of public works by, or
for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States or of the State. (Atkin vs. Kansas [1903],191 U. S., 207;
Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U.S., 175; Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195.) Even as to classification, it is admitted that a
State may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented; the question is a practical one, dependent upon experience.
(Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S., 138.)

To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain a certificate of Philippine registry only
on condition that they be composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, as not infringing
Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under some one of the exceptions here mentioned This must be done, moreover, having
particularly in mind what is so often of controlling effect in this jurisdiction — our local experience and our peculiar local
conditions.

To recall a few facts in geography, within the confines of Philippine jurisdictional limits are found more than three thousand
islands. Literally, and absolutely, steamship lines are, for an Insular territory thus situated, the arteries of commerce. If one be
severed, the life-blood of the nation is lost. If on the other hand these arteries are protected, then the security of the country
and the promotion of the general welfare is sustained. Time and again, with such conditions confronting it, has the executive
branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands, always later with the sanction of the judicial branch, taken a firm stand
with reference to the presence of undesirable foreigners. The Government has thus assumed to act for the all-sufficient and
primitive reason of the benefit and protection of its own citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its dominion. (In
re Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Forbes vs. Chuoco, Tiaco and Crossfield [1910], 16 Phil., 534;.228 U.S., 549; In re McCulloch
Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41.) Boats owned by foreigners, particularly by such solid and reputable firms as the instant claimant,
might indeed traverse the waters of the Philippines for ages without doing any particular harm. Again, some evilminded
foreigner might very easily take advantage of such lavish hospitality to chart Philippine waters, to obtain valuable information
for unfriendly foreign powers, to stir up insurrection, or to prejudice Filipino or American commerce. Moreover, under the
Spanish portion of Philippine law, the waters within the domestic jurisdiction are deemed part of the national domain, open to
public use. (Book II, Tit. IV, Ch. I, Civil Code; Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, arts 1, 2, 3.) Common carriers which in
the Philippines as in the United States and other countries are, as Lord Hale said, "affected with a public interest," can only be
permitted to use these public waters as a privilege and under such conditions as to the representatives of the people may seem
wise. (See De Villata vs. Stanley [1915], 32 Phil., 541.)

In Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ([1913], 232 U.S., 138), a case herein before mentioned, Justice Holmes
delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court said:

This statute makes it unlawful for any unnaturalized foreign-born resident to kill any wild bird or animal except in
defense of person or property, and `to that end' makes it unlawful for such foreign-born person to own or be possessed
of a shotgun or rifle; with a penalty of $25 and a forfeiture of the gun or guns. The plaintiff in error was found guilty
and was sentenced to pay the abovementioned fine. The judgment was affirmed on successive appeals. (231 Pa., 46; 79
Atl., 928.) He brings the case to this court on the ground that the statute is contrary to the 14th Amendment and also is
in contravention of the treaty between the United States and Italy, to which latter country the plaintiff in error belongs
.

Under the 14th Amendment the objection is twofold; unjustifiably depriving the alien of property, and discrimination
against such aliens as a class. But the former really depends upon the latter, since it hardly can be disputed that if the
lawful object, the protection of wild life (Geer vs. Connecticut, 161 U.S., 519; 40 L. ed., 793; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 600),
warrants the discrimination, the, means adopted for making it effective also might be adopted. . . .

The discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult question. But we start with reference to the evil to be
prevented, and that if the class discriminated against is or reasonably might be considered to define those from whom
the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The
question is a practical one, dependent upon experience. . . .

The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say that the legislature of Pennsylvania was not
warranted in assuming as its premise for the law that resident unnaturalized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil
that it desired to prevent. (Barrett vs. Indiana,. 229 U.S., 26, 29; 57 L. ed., 1050, 1052; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 692.)

Obviously the question, so stated, is one of local experience, on which this court ought to be very slow to declare that
the state legislature was wrong in its facts (Adams vs. Milwaukee, 228 U.S., 572, 583; 57 L. ed., 971,.977; 33 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 610.) If we might trust popular speech in some states it was right; but it is enough that this court has no such
knowledge of local conditions as to be able to say that it was manifestly wrong. . . .

Judgment affirmed.

We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the
protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights,
nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to
register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always
be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not
offend against the constitutional provision.
This opinion might well be brought to a close at this point. It occurs to us, however, that the legislative history of the United
States and the Philippine Islands, and, probably, the legislative history of other countries, if we were to take the time to search
it out, might disclose similar attempts at restriction on the right to enter the coastwise trade, and might thus furnish valuable
aid by which to ascertain and, if possible, effectuate legislative intention.

3. The power to regulate commerce, expressly delegated to the Congress by the Constitution, includes the power to
nationalize ships built and owned in the United States by registries and enrollments, and the recording of the
muniments of title of American vessels. The Congress "may encourage or it may entirely prohibit such commerce, and it
may regulate in any way it may see fit between these two extremes." (U.S. vs. Craig [1886], 28 Fed., 795;
Gibbons vs. Ogden [1824], 9 Wheat., 1; The Passenger Cases [1849], 7 How., 283.)

Acting within the purview of such power, the first Congress of the United States had not been long convened before it enacted
on September 1, 1789, "An Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes."
Section 1 of this law provided that for any ship or vessel to obtain the benefits of American registry, it must belong wholly to a
citizen or citizens of the United States "and no other." (1 Stat. at L., 55.) That Act was shortly after repealed, but the same idea
was carried into the Acts of Congress of December 31, 1792 and February 18, 1793. (1 Stat. at L., 287, 305.).Section 4 of the Act
of 1792 provided that in order to obtain the registry of any vessel, an oath shall be taken and subscribed by the owner, or by
one of the owners thereof, before the officer authorized to make such registry, declaring, "that there is no subject or citizen of
any foreign prince or state, directly or indirectly, by way of trust, confidence, or otherwise, interested in such vessel, or in the
profits or issues thereof." Section 32 of the Act of 1793 even went so far as to say "that if any licensed ship or vessel shall be
transferred to any person who is not at the time of such transfer a citizen of and resident within the United States, ... every
such vessel with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the cargo found on board her, shall be forefeited." In case of alienation
to a foreigner, Chief Justice Marshall said that all the privileges of an American bottom were ipso
facto forfeited. (U.S. vs. Willings and Francis [1807], 4 Cranch, 48.) Even as late as 1873, the Attorney-General of the United
States was of the opinion that under the provisions of the Act of December 31, 1792, no vessel in which a foreigner is directly or
indirectly interested can lawfully be registered as a vessel of the United. States. (14 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U.S.], 340.)

These laws continued in force without contest, although possibly the Act of March 3, 1825, may have affected them, until
amended by the Act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat. at L., 188) which extended the privileges of registry from vessels wholly owned by
a citizen or citizens of the United States to corporations created under the laws of any of the states thereof. The law, as
amended, made possible the deduction that a vessel belonging to a domestic corporation was entitled to registry or enrollment
even though some stock of the company be owned by aliens. The right of ownership of stock in a corporation was thereafter
distinct from the right to hold the property by the corporation (Humphreys vs. McKissock [1890], 140 U.S., 304;
Queen vs. Arnaud [1846], 9 Q. B., 806; 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U.S.],188.)

On American occupation of the Philippines, the new government found a substantive law in operation in the Islands with a civil
law history which it wisely continued in force Article fifteen of the Spanish Code of Commerce permitted any foreigner to
engage in Philippine trade if he had legal capacity to do so under the laws of his nation. When the Philippine Commission came
to enact the Customs Administrative Act (No. 355) in 1902, it returned to the old American policy of limiting the protection and
flag of the United States to vessels owned by citizens of the United States or by native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Sec.
117.) Two years later, the same body reverted to the existing Congressional law by permitting certification to be issued to a
citizen of the United States or to a corporation or company created under the laws of the United States or of any state thereof
or of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 1235, sec. 3.) The two administration codes repeated the same provisions with the
necessary amplification of inclusion of citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Adm. Code of 1916, sec. 1345;
Adm. Code of 1917, sec. 1172). And now Act No. 2761 has returned to the restrictive idea of the original Customs Administrative
Act which in turn was merely a reflection of the statutory language of the first American Congress.

Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761, which deny to foreigners the right to a certificate of Philippine registry, are thus found
not to be as radical as a first reading would make them appear.

Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The
ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building. This, without doubt, has, likewise, been the
intention of the United States Congress in passing navigation or tariff laws on different occasions. The object of such a law, the
United States Supreme Court once said, was to encourage American trade, navigation, and ship-building by giving American ship-
owners exclusive privileges. (Old Dominion Steamship Co. vs. Virginia [1905], 198 U.S., 299; Kent's Commentaries, Vol. 3, p.
139.)

In the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Gibbons vs. Ogden ([1824], 9 Wheat., 1) is found the following:

Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses,
retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an
extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the
shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting
trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the
United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect
has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as
contradistinguished from foreign; and to preserve the. Government from fraud by foreigners, in surreptitiously
intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise,
that this whole system is projected.
The United States Congress in assuming its grave responsibility of legislating wisely for a new country did so imbued with a spirit
of Americanism. Domestic navigation and trade, it decreed, could only be carried on by citizens of the United States. If the
representatives of the American people acted in this patriotic manner to advance the national policy, and if their action was
accepted without protest in the courts, who can say that they did not enact such beneficial laws under the all-pervading police
power, with the prime motive of safeguarding the country and of promoting its prosperity? Quite similarly, the Philippine
Legislature made up entirely of Filipinos, representing the mandate of the Filipino people and the guardian of their rights,
acting under practically autonomous powers, and imbued with a strong sense of Philippinism, has desired for these Islands safety
from foreign interlopers, the use of the common property exclusively by its citizens and the citizens of the United States, and
protection for the common good of the people. Who can say, therefore, especially can a court, that with all the facts and
circumstances affecting the Filipino people before it, the Philippine Legislature has erred in the enactment of Act No. 2761?

Surely, the members of the judiciary are not expected to live apart from active life, in monastic seclusion amidst dusty tomes
and ancient records, but, as keen spectators of passing events and alive to the dictates of the general — the national — welfare,
can incline the scales of their decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. All the
presumption is in favor of the constitutionally of the law and without good and strong reasons, courts should not attempt to
nullify the action of the Legislature. "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission (Legislature), we deem it our
duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly
susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law." (In re Guariña [1913], 24. Phil., 36; U.S. vs. Ten Yu
[1912], 24 Phil., 1.) That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect.

With full consciousness of the importance of the question, we nevertheless are clearly of the opinion that the limitation of
domestic ownership for purposes of obtaining a certificate of Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the
Philippine Islands, and to citizens of the United States, does not violate the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916 No treaty right relied upon Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held valid and constitutional
.

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)

February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of
religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of
Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100
to P200, or both.

Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.

Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been
cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among
aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.

[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)

G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660

FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that
the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions
are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under
the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their
habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial
board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such
a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine
Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial
governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be
made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts,
final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with
the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is
necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine
Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

GREGORIO F. AVERIA, et al. v. DOMINGO AVERIA, et al.

436 SCRA 459 (2004)

The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts which are either partially or totally performed

Macaria Francisco (Macaria) was married to Marcos Averia in which they had six children namely: petitioners Gregorio and
Teresa and respondents Domingo, Angel, Felipe and Felimon. Upon the death of Marcos, Macaria contracted a second marriage
with Roberto Romero in which they had no children. Upon the death of Roberto, he left three adjoining residential lots. In a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Summary Settlement of the Estate of Romero, a house and lot (Extremadura property) was
apportioned to Macaria.

Macaria then filed an action for annulment of title and damages alleging that fraud was employed by her co-heirs in which she
was represented by Atty. Mario C.R. Domingo. The case lasted for 10 years until the Court of Appeals (CA) decided in favor of
Macaria entitling her to an additional 30 square meters of the estate of Romero. Her son Gregorio and his family and Teresa‘s
family lived with her in the Extremadura property until her death. After six years, respondents Domingo, Angel, Felipe and
Filemon filed an action for judicial partition against petitioners Gregorio and Teresa.

In their defense Gregorio contends that Macaria verbally sold ½ of her Extramadura property to him and his wife Agripina
because they were the ones who spent for the litigation expenses in the former civil case and that Agripina took care of her.
Gregorio and co-petitioner Sylvana claimed that Domingo sold to Gregorio and Agripina his 1/6 share in the remaining ½ portion
of the property. Upon hearing, Gregorio presented oral evidence to establish their claim of the sale of the property to them by
Macaria and also the sale of Domingo of his share. The Regional Trial Court of (RTC) decided in favor of Gregorio. The CA
however, reversed the decision of the RTC on the ground that since the sale executed by Macaria in favor of Gregorio was in
violation of the statute of frauds and it cannot be proven by oral evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not parol evidence may be admitted in proving partial performance

Held:

With respect to the application by the appellate court of the Statute of Frauds, Gregorio contends that the same refers only to
purely executory contracts and not to partially or completely executed contracts as in the instant case. The finding of the CA
that the testimonies of Gregorio‘s witnesses were timely objected to by Domingo is not, as Gregorio insist, borne out in the
records of the case except with respect to his testimony.

Indeed, except for the testimony of petitioner Gregorio bearing on the verbal sale to him by Macaria of the property, the
testimonies of Gregorio‘s witnesses Sylvanna Vergara Clutario and Flora Lazaro Rivera bearing on the same matter were not
objected to by respondents. Just as the testimonies of Gregorio, Jr. and Veronica Bautista bearing on the receipt by respondent
Domingo on July 23, 1983 from Gregorio‘s wife of P5,000.00 representing partial payment of the P10,000.00 valuation of his
(Domingo‘s) 1/6 share in the property, and of the testimony of Felimon Dagondon bearing on the receipt by Domingo of
P5,000.00 from Gregorio were not objected to. Following Article 1405 of the Civil Code, the contracts which infringed the
Statute of Frauds were ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of parol evidence, hence, enforceable.

Contrary then to the finding of the CA, the admission of parol evidence upon which the trial court anchored its decision in favor
of respondents is not irregular and is not foreclosed by Article 1405.

In any event, the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts which are either partially or totally
performed. In the case at bar, petitioners claimed that there was total performance of the contracts, full payment of the
objects thereof having already been made and the vendee Gregorio having, even after Macaria‘s death in 1983, continued to
occupy the property until and after the filing on January 19, 1989 of the complaint subject of the case at bar as in fact he is still
occupying it.

However it is not enough for a party to allege partial performance in order to render the Statute of Frauds inapplicable; such
partial performance must be duly proved. But neither is such party required to establish such partial performance by
documentary proof before he could have the opportunity to introduce oral testimony on the transaction. The partial
performance may be proved by either documentary or oral evidence.

ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN, MUNICIPAL BOARDS OF CANVASSERS OF
TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN AND EMILIANO MICU, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the candidates in the synchronized
elections of May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth
Legislative District.

Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.

During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten (10) municipalities by respondent Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground
that it contained false statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass.
On May 21, 1992, the PBC rules against the objection of private respondent. 1 From the said ruling, private respondent Micu
appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as SPC No. 92-208.

On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution which reads:

Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, the Commission en banc tabulated the votes obtained by
candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu and Atty. Alfonso C. Bince for the position of Sangguniang Panlalawigan
member of the province of Pangasinan, using as basis thereof the statement of votes by precinct submitted by
the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said examination, the Commission rules, as
follows:

1. That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the
municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant Atty.
Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.

Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan is directed to CREDIT in favor of
petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535 votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes
in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan.2

Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9) municipalities was completed on May 20, 1992, private
respondent Micu together with the Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with the PBC petitions
for correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) earlier prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in the computation
thereof.

In view of the motion of herein petitioner to implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992 which was alleged to have become final,
the PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and private respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said
resolution and on the basis of the COCs for San Quintin and the other nine (9) municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370
votes while the private respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote was not, however, proclaimed
winner because of the absence of authority from the COMELEC.

Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority.

On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental Order3 directing the PBC "to reconvene, continue with the
provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other
candidates for provincial offices who have not been proclaimed 4 as of that date.

In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of Tayug and San Manuel filed by
private respondent and the MBCs of the said municipalities, rules "to allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan to correct the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass and on the
basis of the corrected documents, the Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate.5

On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from the above ruling allowing the correction alleging that the PBC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The appeal was docketed as SPC No. 92-384.

On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an urgent motion for the issuance of an order directing the
PBC to reconvene and proceed with the canvass. He alleged that the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on June 29,
1992 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince filed an urgent petition to cite Atty.
Felimon Asperin and Supt. Primo. A. Mina, Chairman and Member, respectively, of the PBC, for Contempt with alternative
prayer for proclamation as winner and Injunction with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

On July 9, 1992, the PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon Asperin, filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking a "definitive ruling and a
clear directive or order as to who of the two (2) contending parties should be proclaimed" 6 averring that "there were corrections
already made in a separate sheet of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation, candidate Emiliano will win by 72
votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote. 7 On
even date, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the
municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;

(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the
basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules
and guidelines on canvassing and proclamation.8

As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty. Felimon Asperin dissenting, proclaimed
candidate Bince as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of
Bince, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amended Urgent Petition for
Contempt and Annul Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992, respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the
COMELEC in its resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution on July 29, 1992, the decretal
portion of which reads:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:

1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman and secretayr,
respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause why they should not be
declared in contempt of defying and disobeying the Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July 1992,
directing them to RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes as corrected,
of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan; and to
PROCLAIM the winning candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the
completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the corrected Certificated
of Canvass of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;

2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers (dissented by
Chairman Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;

3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to recovene immediately and proclaim the winning candidate
for the second position of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and
corrected Certificates of Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in
the 6th District of Pangasinan, in accordance with law.9

Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before this Court seeking to set aside the foregoing resolution
of the COMELEC, contending that the same was promulgated without prior notice and hearing with respect to SPC No. 92-208
and SPC No. 92-384. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 106291.

10
On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc granted the petition ratiocinating that:
Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the petitioner's
proclamation without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of due process.
Moreover, there was no valid correction of the SOVs and COCs for the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel
to warrant the annullment of the petitioner's proclamation.

1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the position of the second
elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative
District. Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling of the majority of the
PBC to proclaim the petitioner is based on its interpretation of the 9 July 1992 Resolution of respondent
COMELEC which does not expressly single out the corrected COCs of Tayug and San Manuel; since, as of that
time, the only corrected COC which existed was that for San Quintin, which was made by the PBC on 18 June
1992, the majority of the PBC cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992 Resolution (Rollo, p.
51) merely directed it:

(1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as
corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising the 6th
District of Pangasinan;

(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6th District of
Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid;
in accordance with the law, the rules and guideline on canvassing and proclamation.
(Emphasis supplied)

The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected" COCs could only refer to
the nine 99) COCs for the nine municipalities, canvass for which was completed on 21 May 1992, and that of
San Quintin, respectively. Verily, the above resolution is vague and ambiguous.

Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is
not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution), and one
cannot acquire a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is,
nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987
ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432 [1924]). Due process
in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and
hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or
suspend the proclamation of any candidate (Section 248, Omnibus Election Code [B.P. Blg. 881]), We had ruled
in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on Elections G.R.
No. 81856, 3 March 1988) and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989) that the
COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation
without notice and hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation was treated by the respondent COMELEC as a Special Case
(SPC) because its ruling therein was made in connection with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. Special
Cases under the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the pre-proclamation controversies (Rule 27 in
relation to Section 4(h)l Rule 1, and Section 4, Rule 7). We have categorically declared in Sarmiento
vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105628, and companion cases, 6 August 1992) that pursuant to Section
3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, . . . the commission en banc does not have jurisdiction to hear and
decide pre-proclamation cases at the first instance. Such cases should first be referred to a division

Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to decide on the aforesaid to annul the proclamation;
consequently, its 29 July 1992 Resolution is motion is null and void. For this reason too, the COMELEC en
banc Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 92-2()8 resolving the private respondent's appeal from the ruling of
the PBC with respect to the COC of San Quintin is similarly void.

2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner, that there are no valid corrected Statements of
Votes and Certificates of Canvass for Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any reference to such would be clearly
unfounded. While it may be true that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on simultaneous petitions to correct
the SOVs and COCs for Tayug and San Manuel ordered the MBCs for these two (2) municipalities to make the
appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and their corresponding COCs, none of said Boards convened to the
members of actually implement the order. Such failure could have been due to the appeal seasonably
interposed by the petitioner to the COMELEC or the fact that said members simply chose not to act thereon. As
already adverted to the so-called "corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass consist of sheets
of paper signed by the respective Election Registrars of Tayug (Annex "F-l" of Comment of private respondent;
Annex "A" of Consolidated Reply of petitioner) and San Manuel (Annex "F-2, Id.; Annex "B", Id.). These are not
valid corrections because the Election Registrars, as Chairmen of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for their
Section 225 of the respective Board. Section 225 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides that
"[A] majority vote of all the members of the board of canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision." That
majority means at least two (2) of the three (3) members constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) provides that the "municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of
the election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice-
chairman, and the most senior district school supervisor or in his absence a principal of the school district or
the elementary school, as members"). As to why the Election Registrars, in their capacities as Chairmen, were
7th only ones who prepared the so-called correction sheets, is beyond Us. There is no showing that the other
members of the Boards were no longer available. Since they are from the Province of Pangasinan, they could
have been easily summoned by the PBC to appear before it and effect the corrections on the Statements of
Votes and Certificates of Canvass.

Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these sheets of paper be considered as the corrected SOVs and
COCs. Corrections in a Statement of Vote and a Certificate of Canvass could only be accomplished either by
inserting the authorized corrections into the SOV and COC which were originally prepared and submitted by
the MBC or by preparing a new SOV and COC incorporating therein the authorized corrections. Thus, the
statement in the 29 July 1992 Resolution of the COMELEC referring to "the Certificates of Canvass of the
municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel" (Last clause, paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion,
Annex "A" of Petition: Rollo 15), is palpably unfounded. The Commission could have 7 been misled by Atty.
Asperin's ambiguous reference to "corrections already made in separate sheets of paper of the Statements of
Votes and Certificate of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan" (Quoted in the Resolution of 9 July
1992; Id., 50-51), in his petition asking the COMELEC to rule on who shall be proclaimed. However, if it only
took the trouble to carefully examine what was held out to be as the corrected documents, respondent
COMELEC should not have been misled.

Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument that these sheets of paper constitute sufficient corrections,
they are, nevertheless, void and of no effect. At the time the Election Registrars prepared them — on 6 July
1992 — respondent COMELEC had not yet acted on the petitioner's appeal (SPC No. 92-384) from the 24 June
1992 ruling of the PBC authorizing the corrections. Petitioner maintains that until now, his appeal has not
been resolved. The public respondent, on the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General, claims
that the same had been:

. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29, 1992, where COMELEC affirmed
respondents (sic) Board's correction that petitioner only received 2,415 votes in Tayug and
2,179 in San Manuel (see p. 2, Annex "A", Petition) (Rollo, p. 71)

On the same matter, the private respondent asserts that:

This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated and the ruling of the PBC is likewise
deemed affirmed by virtue of the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No. 7166, supra and Comelec en
banc Resolution No. 2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992 (Id., 36);

If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention to its logical conclusion, it was only on 29 July 1992 that
SPC No. 92-384 was resolved; consequently, the so-called "correction sheets" were still prematurely prepared.
In any event, the COMELEC could not have validly ruled on such appeal in its 29 July 1992 Resolution because
the same was promulgated to resolve the Urgent Motion For Contempt and to Annul Proclamation filed by the
private respondent. Furthermore, before the resolution of SPC No. 92-384 on the abovementioned date, no
hearing was set or conducted to resolve the pending motion. Therefore, on this ground alone, the 29 July 1992
Resolution, even if it was meant to resolve the appeal, is a patent nullity for having been issued in gross
violation of the requirement of notice and hearing mandated by Section 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and for
having been resolved by the COMELEC en banc at the first instance. The case should have been referred first
to a division pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 constitution and Our ruling in Sarmiento
vs. Commission on Elections. Moreover, the COMELEC's claim that the questioned resolution affirmed the
correction made by the Board is totally baseless. The PBC did not make any corrections. It merely ordered the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make such corrections. As earlier stated, however,
the said MBCs did not convene to make these corrections. It was the Chairmen alone who signed the sheets of
paper purporting to be corrections.

For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent COMELEC, private respondent
COMELEC private respondent's theory of termination under the second paragraph of Section 16 of R.A. No.
7166, and the consequent affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the correction of the number of votes,
must necessarily fail.

The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent on, 13 August 1992 by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections of 29 July 1992 and the proclamation of the private respondent on 13 August 1992 as the second
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan, representing its Sixth Legislative
District ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and respondent Commission on Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the pending
incidents conformably with the foregoing disquisitions and pronouncements.

No costs.
 SO ORDERED.11

On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion before the COMELEC praying that the latter hear
and resolve the pending incidents referred to by this Court. Private respondent was obviously referring to SPC No. 92-208 and
SPC No. 92-384, both cases left unresolved by the COMELEC.

Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC set the cases for hearing on March 8, 1993. During the hearing, both Micu and
Bince orally manifested the withdrawal of their respective appeals. Also withdrawn were the petitions to disqualify Atty. Asperin
and to cite the Board for contempt. The parties agreed to file their respective memoranda/position papers by March 15, 1993.

Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March 12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal of SPC No. 92-208 affirmed the ruling of
the PBC dated May 21, 1992 and even if it were not withdrawn, Section 16 of R.A. 7166 would have worked to terminate the
appeal. Bince likewise asserts that his appeal in SPC No. 92-384 became moot and academic in view of this Court's ruling
nullifying the June 24, 1992 order of the PBC granting the petitions for correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel
aside from being superseded by the PBC ruling proclaiming him on July 21, 1992.

On the other hand, private respondent Micu, in his Position Paper filed on March 15, 1993 postulated that the petitions filed on
June 11, 1992 for the correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel under Section 6 of Rule 27 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure, as well as the ruling of the PBC of June 24, 1992 granting the same were valid so that the withdrawal of Bince's
appeal in SPC No. 92-384 firmly affirmed the PBC ruling of June 24, 1992 allowing the corrections.

On July 15, 1993, the First Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Commission (First Division) holds that the petitioner Alfonso C.
Bince Jr. is entitled to sit as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sixth District of Pangasinan.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM the proclamation
of petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan on 21 July 1992 as the
duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth District of the Province of Pangasinan. 12

On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a Motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution.

On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc granted the private respondentls motion for reconsideration in a resolution which
dispositively reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Emiliano S. Micu is
granted. The Resolution of the Commission First Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The proclamation of petitioner
Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July 21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers is hereby directed to reconvene, with proper notices, and to order the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Manuel and Tayug to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in the said
municipalities. Thereafter, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to include the results in the said
municipalities in its canvass.

The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Sixth Legislative District of Pangasinan.

13
SO ORDERED.

This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.

We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly rule against petitioner.

Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of
petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of
Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said municipalities and to
proclaim the winner in the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan.

At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent COMELEC when it resolved the "pending
incidents" of the instant case pursuant to the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC on February
9, 1993 Petitioner's contention that his proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed by this Court in the aforesaid case is
baseless. In Bince, we nullified the proclamation of private respondent because the same was done without the requisite due
notice and hearing, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In so doing, however, we did not affirm nor
confirm the proclamation of petitioner, hence, our directive to respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the
case so as to ascertain the true and lawful winner of the said elections. In effect, petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity and validity of an official act. It was not categorically declared valid.
Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a
mathematical error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes received by both petitioner and
private respondent.

The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation on July 21, 1992. The
petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of still, the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still,
private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992,
respectively, definitely well within the period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Section 6 clearly provides that the petition for correction may be filed at any time before proclamation of a winner,
thus:

Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the board of canvassers. — (a) Where it is
clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of
election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of
one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of
the election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the
adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes, or (4) so-called
election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may, motu propio, or
upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due
notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.

(b) The order for correction must be in writing and must be promulgated.

(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by said order may
appeal therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the promulgation.

(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning candidates, unless their
votes are not affected by the appeal.

(e) The appeal must implead as respondents all parties who may be adversely affected thereby.

(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons, together with a
copy of the appeal, to the respondents.

(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.

(h) The appeal shall be heard an decided by he Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).

The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other interpretation contrary to petitioner's protestation.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of
validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will cannot be countenanced.
In Benito v. COMELEC, 14 categorically declared that:

. . . Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently observed by
this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes vs. Commission on
Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare that:

Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities
and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And
also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269;
Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No.
L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalanang, G.R. No.
L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27,
1967). In an election case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-
17512, December 29, 1960). . . . (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819).
(Emphasis ours)

In the later case of Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was reiterated and
the Court went on to state that:

Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only
 the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment
of the results, This bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).

The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws
should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.

Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of what are purely
mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening
of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private
respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical addition.
Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs
involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and diligent addition of the votes in the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.

In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it should only have been 2,415.
Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more.

In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV reflected the total
number of votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he
actually received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 votes.

Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption into public office was therefore
flawed from the beginning, the same having been based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation.

As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such as the one at
issue should not, as much as possible, reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious judicial time and waste valuable
taxpayers' money, if they can be settled below without prejudice to any party or to the ends of justice.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, petitioner,

vs.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA and PEDRO T. WYCOCO, respondents.

Bernardo P. Abesamis for petitioner.

Cecilio F. Wycoco for respondents.

PADILIA, J.:

Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an
administrative complaint was filed against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and
oppression. 1 As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with administrdatively, with
the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. 2

On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the
aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence,
testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the respondent Provincial Board passed
Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. 3

In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set
aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public
respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the
administrative case.

According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51 issued by the Provincial Board is
arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing
and investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of preventive
suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and elementary principles of
due process. 4
On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. 5 We agree with the petitioner that he was denied due process by
respondent Provincial Board.

In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court held:

It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's
employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful interference therewith is an
actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of
due process of law. 7

Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert
the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum,
contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the
Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the
usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner
mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." 8

The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in the
proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written
explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence
presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.

In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said:

From the earliest inception of instutional government in our country, the concepts of notice and hearing have
been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without the right to notice
and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due process
clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was initially concerned with fair
procedure. Every law student early learns in law school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the
land which means "The general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society.

A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly
neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due process.

We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA 392), which, unlike the case before us now, was
only a summary action for ejectment that:

In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence dictate that a judgment, based only on
plaintiffs evidence adduced ex parte and rendered without hearing defendant's evidence,
should be avoided as much as possible. In order that bias may not be imputed to the judge,
he should have the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to
present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proof might not be adequate to
overthrow the case for the plaintiff. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of
the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge". 10

The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in the last local elections held on 18 January
1988, petitioner was elected to any public office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on 3 May 1971 is LIFTED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals

Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other
destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later
proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the
secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing artist must
acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said
regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights.
JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns
government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or
the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon
petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the
issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to “”high
risk”” destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least
rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and
limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists
abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and
agencies.

Repubic vs. Rosemoor Mining (2004) 426 SCRA 517

Facts:
The four (4) petitioners after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-
na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount
Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range. The petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and
Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. License No. 33 was issued by
the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the
DENR, petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled by him through his letter to ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION dated September 6, 1986.

CA Ruling:
Cancellation of respondents’ license without notice and hearing was tantamount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law. It added that under the clause in the Constitution dealing with the non-impairment of obligations and
contracts, respondents license must be respected by the State.

Petitioners Argument:
The license was validly declared a nullity and consequently withdrawn or terminated. In the said issued letter,
respondents were informed by then Minister Maceda that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69
of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter
reason, they added, was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public interest would be
served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of
the Biak-na-Bato national park.

*Section 69. Maximum Area of Quarry License Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof, a quarry license
shall cover an area of not more than one hundred (100) hectares in any one province and not more than one thousand (1,000)
hectares in the entire Philippines.

The license in question, QLP No. 33, is dated August 3, 1982, and it was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining
Development Corporation. The terms of the license allowed the corporation to extract and dispose of marbleized limestone from
a 330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan. The license is, however, subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463, the
governing law at the time it was granted;

Issue:

Whether or not Proclamation no. 84 violated the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

Held:

NO.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause.

Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. As pointed out earlier,
respondents license is not a contract to which the protection accorded by the non-impairment clause may extend. Even if the
license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it
concerns a subject impressed with public welfare. As it is, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state.

In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when
the national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.

Pedro vs Provincial Board of Rizal

APRIL 9, 2014 | KAAARINA
 Pedro vs Provincial Board of Rizal
G. R. No. 34163, September 18, 1931
Facts: Gregorio Pedro argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on December 29, 1928, by the
temporary councillors appointed by the provincial governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval, on the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired
rights of said appellant; (2) it was enacted on account of prejudice, because it was intended for a special and not a general
purpose, namely to prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said petitioner-
appellant; and (3) it provides for special committee composed of persons who are not members of the council, vested them
with powers which of their very nature, cannot be delegated by said council to that committee.
He further contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain, exploit, and open to the public the cockpit in
question, having paid the license fee and fulfilled all the requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, he
has acquired a right which cannot be taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, which was subsequently
approved.

Issue: Whether a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit falls under property rights which a person may
not be deprived of without due process of law
Held: No.
The court held: (1) That a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder
may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when the public interests so
require; (2) that the work entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a study of the sanitary
effects upon the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in character, but only informational, and may
be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance, approved by a municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of
another which had been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.

Chavez vs. Romulo

on 12:19 PM in Case Digests, Political Law
0

G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

o A mere license is always revocable

FACTS:

This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner
questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional

o Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD:

Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists.
The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property
right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or
a property right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:

“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.”
xxx

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right
protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be
reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the
statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a
contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of
these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power
to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always
revocable.”

LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
233 SCRA 163
Petitioner: Marcelino Libanan
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN and Agustin B. Docena
Ponente: J. Vitug

FACTS:

Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
prior to the 1992 elections.

He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a qualified replacement of a
deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body.

In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their respective public position and office for ninety (90) days.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed shall affront the
petitioner’s right for due process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the people of Samar as their vice-governor;
and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension no longer exist.

Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is valid?

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently
be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.

The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office is "a public agency or
trust,"and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which petitioner invokes.

Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYAN’s decision is affirmed.

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed a complaint

for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila.

Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of

articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court.

The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It

unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property

rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the

foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The police power of

the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as

amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity,

and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its

inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and

to protectcustomers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese charactersfrom being defrauded. (Considering that in the

year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no

personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The

ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction,

whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of

them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is

based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and

occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but

mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if

private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of

the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the

police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs

against the appellants.

Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad

 Yu Cong Eng et al vs. Trinidad
GR No. L-20479 | Feb. 6, 1925

History:
The sales tax has been in force in the Philippines for a number of years. Our law provides for privilege taxes to be levied on
certain businesses and occupations. These percentage taxes on business are payable at the end of each calendar quarter in the
amount lawfully due on the business transacted during the past quarter. It is made the duty of every person conducting a
business subject to such tax, within the same period as is allowed for the payment of the quarterly installments of the fixed
taxes without penalty, to make a true and complete return of the amount of the receipts or earnings of his business during the
preceding quarter and pay the tax due thereon. All merchants not specifically exempted must pay a tax of one and one-half per
cent on the gross value in money of the commodities, goods, wares, merchandise sold, bartered, exchanged, or consigned
abroad by them, such tax to be based on the actual selling price or value of the things in question at the time they are disposed
of or consigned
The income tax has also been established here for sometime, first pursuant to an Act of Congress and later pursuant to an Act
of the Philippine Legislature (Act No. 2833, as amended by Act No. 2926). The customary returns are required from individuals
and corporations. The tax is computed and the assessments are made by the Collector of Internal Revenue and his agents.
The Spanish Code of Commerce, which was in force at that time, requires that merchants shall keep: A book of inventories
and balances; (2) a daybook; (3) a ledger; (4) a copying book for letters and telegrams; and (5) the other books required by
special laws. However, it was silent as to the language which the books must be kept
CIR issued a Circular Letter requiring that the record of sales of merchants subject to the merchant’s tax must either be in
English or Spanish
- Challenged in the case of Young vs. Rafferty
- SC: CIR is not empowered to designate the language which the entries in the books should be made. Such initiative should not
be taken by the CIR, arguing that it is to protect the govt against evasion

Facts:
On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law was passed, regulating that the account books should not be in any
other language exc. English, Spanish or any dialect, otherwise a penalty of fine of not more than 10K or imprisonment for not
more than 2 years will be imposed
- fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of the government agents and to prevent fraud in the returns of merchants, in
conformity with the sales tax and the income tax
On March 1923, BIR inspected the books of account of Yu Cong Eng where it was found out that it is not in accordance with
Act 2972
A criminal case was filed against Yu Cong Eng before the CFI Manila for keeping his books of account in Chinese
Yu’s defense:
Yu Cong Eng et al are Chinese merchants, claiming that they represent the other 12K filed a petition for prohibition and
injunction against the CIR, questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law

Issue: W/N Act No. 2972 is constitutional?

Ruling:
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised in the lower court and that court must be given an
opportunity to pass upon the question before it may be presented to the appellate court for resolution
Power of taxation
- strongest of all the powers of government, practically absolute and unlimited
- It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within the control of the legislature. It is the Legislature which must questions of
state necessarily involved in ordering a tax, which must make all the necessary rules and regulations which are to be observed in
order to produce the desired results, and which must decide upon the agencies by means of which collections shall be made
The power to tax is not judicial power and that a strong case is required for the judiciary to declare a law relating to taxation
invalid. If, of course, so great an abuse is manifest as to destroy natural and fundamental rights, it is the duty of the judiciary to
hold such an Act unconstitutional
The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights of the most favored nation
Their constitutional rights are those accorded all aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property of these persons
cannot be taken without due process of law, and that they are entitled to the equal protection of the laws, without regard to
their race
Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to prohibit not only the Chinese but all merchants of whatever nationality from
making entries in the books of account or forms subject to inspection for taxation purposes in any other language than either
the English or Spanish language or a local dialect
the law only intended to require the keeping of such books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection
for tax purposes
The Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation since there are other aliens
doing business in the Phils. There will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or arbitrary spoliation of property. There will be no
unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. The law will prove oppressive to the extent that all
tax laws are oppressive, but not oppressive to the extent of confiscation
Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or corporation, engaged in commerce, industry, or any other
activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its account books, consisting of sales books and other
records and returns required for taxation purposes by regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action
was begun, in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, thus valid and constitutional

Johns, J. Dissenting
Both in the title and the body of the act, the legislature has said that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
engaged in certain lines of business to keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect,
and has expressly imposed a penalty for a violation of the act. There are no exceptions or limitations in the language, and it is
not confined or limited to any specific purpose. It is broad and general and applies to any and all account books which may be
kept or used in connection with the business.
Assuming, as the majority opinion does, that Act No. 2972 should read that account books, for taxation purposes, should be kept
in their English, Spanish or any local dialect, the act does not specify or define what books shall be kept or how and in what
manner they shall be kept. Neither does it delegate that power to anyone else

Layno vs Sandiganbayan
APRIL 9, 2014 | KAAARINA

Layno vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 65848, May 24, 1985
Facts:Layno was charged with violating paragraph (e), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. was then arraigned on
October 3, 1983, and was suspended pendente lite, by respondent Sandiganbayan on October 26, 1983.
The validity of the mandatory provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, suspending from office any public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under such statute, is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Issue: Whether or not the provision is violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Held: Yes.
It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of
elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a
criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its
continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice
suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of
the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted
continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due
process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.

GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR Nos. 86899-903, 1989-05-15

Facts:

petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While he occupied the
position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the

Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the
award of licenses to operate fish corrals... and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals
allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals... complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish
corrals was dismissed. As regards the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations,... DELOSO, a public
officer being then the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of

Botolan, Zambales, taking advantage of his public and official position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the... discharge of his official
functions by issuing to him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the
Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of... rentals... motion to
quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan... we dismissed the petition for lack of merit... petitioner was
arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. He pleaded NOT GUILTY

Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the petitioner pendente lite

Deloso is suspended pendente lite from his position as Provincial Governor of Zambales and from any other office that he may
now be... holding.

day following his receipt of the resolution, or on February 16, 1989, the petitioner filed the instant petition... urgent motion
with the Sandiganbayan requesting that the execution and implementation of the February 10, 1989 suspension order be held in
abeyance pending determination of the merits of the... petition. The motion was denied prompting the petitioner to ask the
Court for an earlier setting of the trial of the cases which was denied in an order

Issues:

petitioner questions the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law

Ruling:

We limit ourselves to ascertaining whether or not, under the circumstances of this case, an indefinite suspension becomes
unreasonable... the penalty of suspension is definitely much lower than that of removal and it would be incongruous if we give
to the penalty of suspension more serious consequences than are attached to the... penalty of removal.' Senator Padilla opted
for the immediate restoration of the respondent to his position once the favorable result of the election is known.

He was, however, ordered suspended from performing his duties as governor by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019 by... virtue of the criminal charges filed against him. The order of suspension does not have a definite
period so that the petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An
extended suspension... is a distinct possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for earlier dates
of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other cases set earlier which... have a right to expect priority.

the preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable thus raising a due process question... whether
or not the ruling in the Garcia case where the suspension was ordered by no less than the President of the Philippines is
applicable to an elective official facing criminal charges under the Anti-Graft Law and suspended under Section 13... thereof.

guarantee to an equal protection of the law necessitates the application of the ruling in the Garcia v. Executive Secretary.

most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command if they are
deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term...
simply because the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten, wealth, murder, malversation of public funds and other more serious
offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited determination of his
innocence or... guilt.

The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic application of Section 13
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

petition is GRANTED.

preventive suspension imposed on petitioner Amor D. Deloso by virtue of the February 10, 1989 resolution of the Sandiganbayan
should be limited to only ninety (90)... days

GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004

FACTS:

Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married Milagros Orbiso, who was then 43 years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas filed
with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits under the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977.

In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole beneficiary. GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement
effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity after.

Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146 but was denied the
claim because, under section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.

Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on 17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the
trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Sec. 18 of PD 1146.

The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the
benefits including interest. Citing Articles 115and 117 of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits, which
the pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through monthly salary deductions,
are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are
conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent
with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.

The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the Family Code, a later law. GSIS appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this appeal.

In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from
receiving survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. However, the Court will still resolve the
issue despite the manifestation of Milagros because social justice and public interest demand the resolution of the
constitutionality of the proviso.

ISSUE:

Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional.

HELD:

NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under Section 18 of PD 1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from
receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified
for the pension. The Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.

The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent
spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period.

There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be
heard.
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance
benefits to government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the
government employees.

A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the
law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who
contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if
the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would
still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for
pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is
to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the
pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial
distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for
pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic
Act No. 8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of
GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member immediately before the
members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage solely to receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or death of a
member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the
survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the members
retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive
survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the
legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146 is void for being violative of the constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection of the law.
Javier v. COMELEC

144 SCRA 194

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former
appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now
facing trial for these murders. Petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns.
His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because it was only made by a division and not
by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, the private respondent took his oath as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa. The case was still being considered by this Court when the petitioner was gunned down.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections isauthorized to promulgate its decision proclaiming the
private respondent the winner in the election

HELD:

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution. As the Court sees it, the effect of
this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two.: (1) over matters arising before
the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over
matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power.
Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-
proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still
another way, the Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was competent to do. Moreover, a mere division of
the Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including pre-
proclamation controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then judicial
powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was made and a
contest was filed and not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power. All these
came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.

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GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the

Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The

military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to

be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts

gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day

period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to

the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have

shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the

two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case

involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it,

the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-

day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of

his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO

issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners'

motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which

apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action

and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them

innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of
acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for

reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed

serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of

the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be

conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the

allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan

prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent

that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the

former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that

the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room

of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were

told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the

reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them

'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group

and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a

scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in

the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which

proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the

twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over

television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a

source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory

thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the

assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently

acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after

Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power.

The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a

regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their

confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang

and by Malacañang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of

the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring

the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the

prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers

to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at

its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any

judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases

by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)

completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if

they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in

the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at

stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction.

No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It

neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt

dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken

cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no

restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total

absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse

of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased

prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an

unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public
posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the

public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and

honor.

LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997

ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, respondents.

Facts:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president’s office and in cash what the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7
January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena
received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986
reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum,
Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of
three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed
by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a
manager’s check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao
and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in
cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money
received. Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16
January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to
the letter- request for a manager’s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena
requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car.
Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that
Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena
and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan
actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked
were more the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the
Resolution of 20 December 1991.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

Held:
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the
MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself,
the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum
is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its
execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in the nature of cross
examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an
error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the
settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to
correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error
or not.

GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the resolution, dated 25 March 1993, of respondent Civil Service Commission ("CSC") relative
to an administrative case, entitled "Land Bank of the Philippines vs. George I. Rivera," as well as its resolution, dated 03 March
1994, denying the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis
of the affidavits of William Lao and Jesus C. Perez, petitioner was charged, on 01 February 1988, by the LBP President with
having committed the following offenses:

(1) Dishonesty;

(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in
connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or
expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons;

(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws;

(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and
regulations;

(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.1

Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan application with LBP, that he could
facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said
to have subsequently received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who
had substantial investments in Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the amount of approximately P20,000.00 pocket
money for his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money
for still another trip to Hongkong.

Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and acted, without prior authority required by Civil Service
Rules and Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the President of the Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and
as consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances approximately
P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation.

Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension (effective 19 February 1988). After a formal
investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting
employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of
the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without separation
benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera.

On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which held. 2

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby modified that respondent-appellant George I.
Rivera is considered guilty only of committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Considering
that this is his first offense on record, the penalty of Forced Resignation without separation benefits and
gratuities to which he may be otherwise be entitled under the laws is reduced to one (1) year
suspension.3

The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision. In its resolution, 4 promulgated on 08 June 1992, the MSPB
denied the motion.

Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-1189,5 the CSC resolved only the appeal of Rivera
(rejecting that of the LBP pursuant to the rule laid down by his Court in Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission [215 SCRA 398]).
The resolution, in part, read:

The Commission is inclined to sustain the original decision of the Land Bank of the Philippines. Committing an
act punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) is considered a Grave Misconduct. It is
a wanton and/or blatant violation of law. As an officer of the Bank, respondent Rivera should know better that
it was illegal and improper for him to accept regular monthly allowances from a private firm which is a client
of his Bank. More so, that such act is prohibited and punishable under Sec. 3(d) of RA 3019.
 WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolves to dismiss the appeal of Respondent
George Rivera. Moreover, the Commission finds him guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he is meted out the
penalty of dismissal from the service. Accordingly, the MSPB decision is hereby set aside. 6

Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 94-1276.7

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of
unsubstantiated finding and conclusions.

On 26 May 1994, this Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the
petition, now strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her
capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took
part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC. The Court, in its
resolution of 05 July 1994, resolved to grant the motion, to reinstate the petition and to require respondents to comment
thereon.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its comment, dated 15 September 1994, sided with petitioner and suggested that the CSC
be given an opportunity to submit its own comment. CSC did in due time.

This is not the first time that the Court has been confronted with this kind of prejudicial issue.

In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals,8 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous
decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of
administrative justice," the Court said:

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there
could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer
would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case.

The Court similarly struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service
Commission, in which he, then concurrently its chairman, had earlier "concurred."9

Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any
participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due
process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is
not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for
reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990.

WHEREFORE, CSC Resolution No. 94-1276 is SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to respondent Civil Service Commission for the
resolution, sans the participation of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, of herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration of CSC
Resolution No. 93-1189. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, and ZENAIDA LIWANAG, Respondents.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR. J.:

Petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) seeks to reverse the 26 February 1997 decision1 of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 41976 which granted private respondent Zenaida Liwanag compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626,
as amended, and in the process, set aside the 27 December 1995 decision 2 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in
ECC Case No. 7633.

As found by respondent Court of Appeals, the facts of this case were as follows:

[Private respondent] Zenaida Liwanag is the surviving spouse of the late Jaime Liwanag who died on September 14, 1994. He
was 48 years old and had served the police force continuously for 27 years. At the time of his death, he was [a] Senior
Superintendent of the Philippine National Police.
On August 28, 1994, the late P/Sr. Supt. Jaime Liwanag was admitted at the Medical Center of Manila due to complaints of
Ascites, Poor Appetite. [The] CT Scan showed Cirrhosis with probable Hepatocellular CA, HB 5A3 positive. Despite medical
intervention, Jaime Liwanag succumbed to Upper GI Bleeding, Cirrhosis Secondary to Hepatitis B; Hepatocellular Carcinoma on
September 14, 1994.

As a consequence, [private respondent] filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for compensation
benefits. The claim was denied for not being an occupational disease under the law neither was the risk of contracting the
ailment of the deceased increased by his employment as a member of the police force.

On appeal pursuant to Section 5, Rule XVIII of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the xxx Employees Compensation
Commission affirmed the GSIS ruling and ultimately dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. xxx 3cräläwvirtualibräry

In denying private respondents claim, the ECC ruled:

Section 1(B), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines when a disability or death resulting from
illnesses is considered compensable. It provides:

Section 1. x x x ;

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex A of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

The late P/Sr[.] Supt. Liwanags ailments, Upper GI Bleeding; Cirrhosis secondary to Hepatitis B; Heptatocellular Carcinoma,
cannot be made compensable inasmuch as the said ailments are not among those listed as occupational diseases, nor has
appellant shown proofs [sic] that the risk of contracting said diseases were [sic] increased by her late husbands working
conditions and employment as a member of our countrys police force.

A study on the etiologies of P/Sr. Supt. Liwanags ailments reveal that, to wit:

Cirrhosis is a disorganization of liver architecture by widespread fibrosis and nodule formation. It may be due to the following:

a.) Congenital Causes: hemorrhagic telagiectaria

galactosemia
b.) Chemicals: alcohol
methotrexate
halothane
c.) Infection: Viral Hepatitis B
congenital Syphilis

(Mercks Manual, 14th ed. P. 831)

Hepatocellular Carcinoma grievously somitinus called a hepatoma. It may be due, to wit:

a.) underlying cirrhosis: alcoholic postneurotic, hemochromatotic.

b.) environmental carcinogen: Blood contaminated with fungal aflatoxin

Chronic infection with Hepatitis B

(Mercks Manual 14th ed., p. 859)

Apparently, P/Sr. Supt. Liwanags ailments are not inherent among policemen and everybody is susceptible to the said diseases
regardless of one[]s job.

It is well settled under the Employees Compensation Law that when the ailment is not the direct result of the covered
employees employment, like the instant case, and the appellant failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the disease
was increased by the covered employees employment and working conditions the claim for compensation benefits cannot
prosper.

Thus, finding no causal relation between P/Sr. Supt. Liwanags ailments with his employment and working conditions, or the
nature of appellants work had increased the risk of contracting said diseases, xxx GSIS is correct in denying [private
respondents] application for compensation benefits under PD NO. 626, as amended. 4cräläwvirtualibräry

In her petition5 filed before the Court of Appeals, private respondent relied heavily on two (2) documents as proof of the causal
relation between P/Sr. Supt. Liwanags ailments and his employment and working conditions: first, the Investigation Report Re
Death of the Late P/SSUPT JAIME M. LIWANAG dated 14 September 1994 submitted by Cristeto Rey R. Gonzalodo, Police Chief
Inspector, Investigator on Case; and second, the REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF LOD BOARD TO DETERMINE THE LINE OF DUTY
STATUS OF THE LATE P/SSUPT JAIME J. LIWANAG PNP. Moreover, private respondent argued that the requirement of proof of a
causal relation between a claimants ailments and his employment and working conditions admits of exceptions and must yield to
the higher interests of justice. In closing, private respondent advocated for a liberal interpretation of social legislation statutes,
citing jurisprudence which, however, dealt with the relaxation of the procedural requirements as regards the late filing of
pleadings and/or belated appeals.

As these documents from the Philippine National Police (PNP) are of importance to the resolution of this dispute, they are
hereunder quoted in full. The Investigation Report6 reads as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

Department of the Interior and Local Government
National Police Commission
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS
Camp Crame, Quezon City
14 September 1994

ODPL-A

SUBJECT: Investigation Report Re Death of the late

P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG

TO: Officer-In-Charge, DPL

Post

I. AUTHORITY:

Verbal Order of the Officer-In-Charge, DPL.

II. MATTERS INVESTIGATED:

To determine the causes surrounding the death of the late P/SSUPT JAIME M. LIWANAG, Deputy Director for Plans and the Line
of Duty Status thereof.

III. FACTS OF THE CASE:

xxx
IV. DISCUSSION:
1. The late late P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG had been vigorously/mentally examined before he was called to Active Duty as
Second Lieutenant in the defunct Philippine Constabulary on 16 January 1969 which was repeated when he was appointed as
Regular Officer (Direct Commission) on 1 Aug. 1971. From that initial rank he gradually rose to Police Senior Superintendent with
Physical/Medical examination as a matter of requirement for promotion. All the while, P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG was
physically/mentally fit for the service.
2. It [is] highly believed that the late P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG acquired his illness in the course of his employment with the
Philippine National Police considering that there are some personnel in his office who are positive to [sic] Hepatitis B (Reactive)
virus.
IV. CONCLUSION:
The death of the late P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG was in Line of Duty and not attributable to his own misconduct or negligence.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Recommend that the death benefits due to the legal heirs/beneficiary (ies) of the late P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG be granted to
them.
(signed)
CRISTETO REY R GONZALODO
Police Chief Inspector
Investigator on Case

The Report of Proceedings7 reads as follows:

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF LOD BOARD TO DETERMINE THE LINE OF DUTY STATUS OF THE LATE P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG PNP

UNIT/ORGANIZATION: Directorate for Plans, NHQ PNP

Camp Crame, Quezon City

DATE/TIME: 040900 October 1994

AUTHORITY: Letter Order Nr 454 dtd 04 October 1994

PRESENT:

P/SSUPT FRANCISCO F CABACCANG, MDS Chairman

P/SUPT REYNALDO R. ALBERTO, LS Member
P/CINSP CRISTETO REY R GONZALODO Mbr/Recorded
P/INSP SERVILLANO B. RITUALO, PHPGH Member
P/INSP LYDIA M DAVID, BFAD Member

ABSENT: P/SINSP EMMA S LACANDULA DPRM Member

040900 Oct 94

CHAIRMAN - - - There being a quorum, I hereby declare that the Board will come to order. Mr. Member/Recorder, what is the
order for today?

Member/Recorder: Mr. Chairman, we have been convened pursuant to Letter Order Nr 454 NHQ PNP dtd 04 Oct 94 to determine
the Line of Duty (LOD) Status of the late P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG, then Deputy Director for Plans who died at Medical Center
Manila Manila located along Taft Ave corner UN Ave. Manila on or about 132210 Sep 94. xxx

Chairman: So, [t]herefore (referring to all the members) having been detailed as members and member/recorder, do you swear
and affirm to thoroughly examine todays proceeding, the evidence now available in your possession without partiality, favor,
affection, prejudice or hope of any reward?

Member/Recorder: Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do.

Member: On the otherhand [sic], P/SSUPT FRANCISCO F CABACCANG, having been detailed as Chairman of this Board, do you
swear and affirm to thoroughly examine todays proceeding, the evidence now available in your possession without partiality,
favor, affection, prejudice or hope of any reward?

Chairman: Yes, I do.

Chairman: Mr. Member/Recorder, what are the evidence now in the possession of [the] LOD Board?

Member/Recorder: Chairman, the available evidences [sic] are as follows:

Appointment Order

Death Certificate

Medical Certificate

Abstract Clinical Record of

P/SSUPT LIWANAG JM

Spot Report

Investigation Report

Result of Hepatitis B Lab Test of

all ODPL Personnel

Statement of Service

Chairman: Based on the record, the immediate cause of death of the late P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG, then Deputy Director for
Plans was due to Cardio-Respiratory Arrest Secondary to Gastro-Intestinal bleeding as a result of fulminating Hepatitis. How was
he infected by this Virus?

P/SINPS RITUALO: It is highly possible that he got infected just recently in the Directorate for Plans since there were five (5)
other ODPL pers[onnel] out of the total strength of forty five (45) who are reactive to Hepatitis B Antigen Test. Modes of
transmittal are through body fluids and secretion. Another proof is that all the immediate members of his family are negative
[for the] Hepatitis B Virus.

P/CINSP GONZALODO: ODPL received an undated report on Hepa B Test finding from the Chief, Laboratory Section, PNPGH on 15
June 1994, when did P/SSUPT LIWANAG actually know that he was positive [for] Hepatitis B?

P/SINSP RITUALO: He came to know about it as early as 19 Apr 94 when he visited my office at the Laboratory Section, PNPGH.
On 20 June 1994 when he came to my office again, I advised him to go slow with his work as I observed something unusual in his
Liver Profile.

P/SUPT ALBERTO: Where did P/SSUPT LIWANAG g[e]t this Hepatitis B?

P/SINSP RITUALO: I strongly believe that he got this while working [at] Headquarters since this is [sic] already endemic in this
camp. You can get infected anywhere? [sic]

P/SUPT ALBERTO: So, do you want to say that this kind of disease was acquired by the late P/SSUPT LIWANAG while serving the
Philippine National Police?

P/SINSP RITUALO: Yes, sir.

P/CINSP GONZALODO What type of Hepatitis [did] the late P/SSUPT LIWANAG acquired [sic]?

P/SINSP RITUALO: It was of Acute Fulminant Type. The effect is so immediate that one out of ten usually dies.

P/SINSP DAVID: I would like to inform the Board that under Ministry of National Defense Department Order Nr 162 dtd 15 Jan 65,
a military personnel who died while in the Active Service is presumed to have died in [the] Line of Duty and not as a result of his
own misconduct unless there is substantial evidence to rebut such presumption.

P/CINSP GONZALODO: Is this still binding [upon] PNP Personnel?

P/SINSP DAVID: Yes, sir. We are still using this as a reference.

P/SUPT ALBERTO: Based on the records and the foregoing discussions, it is hereby resolved that P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG died
in [the] Line of Duty. Mr Chairman, I therefore move that all the benefits due the late P/SR JAIME M LIWANAG be granted to his
legal heirs/beneficiary(ies) and henceforth, be likewise cleared from money and property accountabilities.

Member/Recorder: I second the motion.

CHAIRMAN: After a judicious appreciation of all evidences [sic] and after hearing the members of the Board, I personally favor
the motion, hence, I now declared [sic] it as carried, voted upon affirmatively and duly resolved unanimously by the LOD Board.
Do we have other more business to transact?

MEMBER/RECORDER: No more other business, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: There being no other business to transact, upon motion duly made and seconded, this LOD proceeding is hereby
adjourned.

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing are true and correct records of the LOD (P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG, PNP) Board
proceeding.

(signed)
P/SSUPT F[R]ANCISCO F. CABACCANG, PNP
Chairman
P/SUPT REYNATO R ALBERTO, PNP
Member
P/CINSP CRISTETO REY R GONZALODO, PNP
Member/Recorder
P/SINSP SERVILLANO B RITUALO, PNP
Member
P/SINSP LYDIA M DAVID, PNP
Member

In its Comment8 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that since the ailments of P/Sr. Supt. Liwanag were not
among those listed as occupational diseases, the burden then lay on herein private respondent to prove that the risk of
contracting the disease was increased by her late husbands working conditions and employment as a member of the PNP. As
regards private respondents reliance on the Investigation Report, petitioner pointed out that said Report fallaciously concluded
that the deceased contracted Hepatitis B in the course of his employment as some of his co-workers in his office tested positive
for Hepatitis B. Petitioner deemed this reasoning as mere allegations which were inadmissible. In fact, petitioner contends that
the ailments of the deceased were not inherent among policemen and everybody was susceptible to the disease regardless of
ones work. At bottom, petitioner asserted that there was no substantial evidence pointing to a reasonable connection, much
less, a direct causal relation, between the deceaseds ailments and the nature of his employment; and that while social
legislation statutes had to be interpreted liberally in favor of the intended beneficiaries, undue compassion for victims of
diseases not covered by the law would endanger the integrity of the State Insurance Fund and deprive beneficiaries truly
deserving of benefits.

In its Comment9 filed with the Court of Appeals, the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), represented by the office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), expectedly echoed the arguments of petitioner herein. The ECC merely added that as regards the
nature of Hepatitis B and the need for substantial evidence proving that the risk of contracting the same was increased by ones
working conditions: It is a sickness that strikes people in general. The nature of ones employment is irrelevant. It makes no
difference whether the victim is employed or not, [a] white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban
dweller or a resident of a rural area.

Respondent court, in ruling for private respondent, held:

In the case at bench, the [ECC] ruled that the ailment[s] of the deceased xxx are not among those listed as compensable
occupational diseases. [The ECC] furthermore said that xxx there is no showing of any causal relation between the sickness of
the late P/Supt. Liwanag with his employment or working condition[s]. We disagree.

Records of this case reveal that proceedings were conducted by the Directorate for Plans, National Headquarters, PNP, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, to determine the line of duty status of the late P/Supt. Jaime M. Liwanag (Annex F, Petition). Submitted as
well is the investigation report thereof (Annex E, Petition).

In said exhibits, it is clearly shown that prior to the employment of the deceased to active duty as [a] 2 nd Lieutenant in the
defunct Philippine Constabulary up until his appointment as [a] regular officer (Direct Command) to his position at the time of
his death as Senior Police Superintendent, he was found to be physically, medically and mentally fit for the service. It was also
concluded that it [was] highly believable that the late S/Supt. Liwanag acquired his illness in the course of his employment with
the PNP considering that there are some personnels [sic] in his office who [tested] positive [for] Hepatitis B (reactive virus). In
conclusion, it was recommended that death benefits due to the legal heirs be granted. Conformably, said evidences [sic] are
sufficient under P.D. 626.

The degree of proof required under PD 62[6] is merely substantial evidence, which means relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Besides under the law, it is not required that the employment [is] the
sole factor in the growth, development and acceleration of his illness. It is enough if his employment had contributed, even in a
small degree, to the development or acceleration of the disease. (Magistrado vs. ECC, 174 SCRA 605 [1989])

The above proofs were not rebutted. No contrary evidence was presented to counter-attack the conclusions arrived at that the
cause of death of P/Supt. Jaime Liwanag is work-connected and acquired from his said employment. After all, the policy of
Presidential Decree 626 is to provide a [sic] meaningful and appropriate compensation to workers in the event of work related
contingencies. As the law is social in character for the promotion and development of a tax exempt employees compensation
program whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of work related disability of death, may promptly secure
adequate income or medical benefits, it is only fitting and proper that all doubts be interpreted in favor of labor. In this way,
the very essence and creation of employment compensation laws will be given more meaning.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring
[private respondent] entitled to the death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. No pronouncement as to
costs.10cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner now takes respondent court to task for taking into consideration only the records of the proceedings conducted by the
xxx PNP, as what the Court of Appeals seems to have forgotten was that the investigation was [only] for the purpose of
determining the line of duty status of the [deceased] and if his ailment was work connected. Moreover, petitioner argues that
Hepatitis B cannot be acquired by mere mingling with other people who test positive for the illness, hence reliance by
respondent Court on the PNP investigation constituted reversible error as the same, by itself, did not constitute substantial
evidence. Petitioner likewise hastens to add:

It should be remembered that Hepatitis B is not just acquired by simple association. There was no medical
proof/evidence presented how the [deceased] could have acquired his illness. Hepatits B. [sic] According to the
medical view point (Merk [sic] Manu[a]l p. 100) HBV is often transmitted parenterally, typically by contaminated
blood or blood products. Routine screening of donor blood for H B s Ag has dramatically diminished posttransfusion
HBV infection but transmission via needles shared by drug abusers remain[s] an important problem. There is an
increased risk in patients in renal dialysis and oncology units and to hospital personnel in contact with blood. HBV is
associated with a wide spectrum carrier state to acute-hepatitis, chronic hepatitis, cirrhosis, and hepatocellular
carcinoma. While it was mentioned that there were some personnel in the office of the [deceased] who [were]
positive with Hepatitis B, it was not medically shown or proven that he had any association with them that might have
transferred the disease to him in a medically proven means as stated above. 11cräläwvirtualibräry

We grant the petition.

At the outset, certain basic postulates governing employees compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 need be reviewed. First,
said Decree abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmens Compensation
Act.12 Second, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove either of two (2)
things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules on Employees
Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimants
working conditions. Third, the claimant must prove this causal relation between the ailment and working conditions by
substantial evidence, since the proceeding is taken before the ECC, an administrative or quasi-judicial body. Within the field of
administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing
evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be
disregarded.13 Finally, in case of doubt in construction and interpretation of social legislation statutes, the liberality of the law
in favor of the working man and woman prevails in light of the Constitutions social justice policy. 14cräläwvirtualibräry

On the other side of the coin, however, there is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in passing upon undeserving
claims for compensation. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or
recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered
by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their
families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. 15 This stems from the development in
the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence the
necessity of affording all kinds of favorable presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the
trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The
employer joins the employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative
proposition that the disease was not caused by employment.16 Moreover, the new system instituted by the new law has
discarded, among others, the concept of presumption of compensability and aggravation and substituted one based on social
security principles. The new system is administered by social insurance agencies the GSIS and the SSS under the ECC. The
purpose of this innovation was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employers obligation to pay workmens
compensation and the employees right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.17cräläwvirtualibräry

Applying these principles to the instant case, there is no dispute that Hepatitis B, the disease which caused the demise of the
decedent, is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation. As such, private
respondents burden of evidence before the ECC was to prove, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her
deceased husbands illness and his working conditions. This she failed to do, as will be discussed below. In the same vein and for
the same reasons, respondent court, in reversing the ECC, committed an error of law by misappreciating the legal standard of
what constitutes substantial evidence; and in according full credence to the proceedings before the PNP Board and thus shifting
the burden of evidence to petitioner to rebut private respondents claim, when private respondents evidence was sorely wanting
to justify the award of compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended.

What is striking as regards private respondents advocacy was that throughout the course of this dispute, private respondent
merely relied on the PNP Reports, and nothing more, to substantiate her claim. However, the PNP Reports, as quoted above in
full, merely contained sweeping statements and conclusions and treated the matter in a most perfunctory manner.

Notably, the Result of Hepatitis B Lab Test of all ODPL Personnel was made available to the PNP Investigation Board, but the
details of the lab test were not disclosed and there was merely the general averment that five (5) out of 45 ODPL personnel
contracted Hepatitis B. Likewise noteworthy was the statement of P/SInsp. Ritualo before the PNP Board that Hepatitis B is
transmitted through body fluids or secretion, but there was no showing whatsoever as to the degree of contact, if any, between
the deceased and his office mates who contracted Hepatitis B. In this light, petitioner properly maintains in its Reply: Further,
the report on the investigation on the ailment of the [deceased] merely stated it is highly believable that his illness was
acquired in the course of his employment. This statement was not based on medical findings but on a laymans point of view
which should not be given weight by the Honorable Court for such is tantamount to hearsay. 18 On this score, as early as 1940, in
the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations,19 this Court already declared that as regards the standard
of substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings, [m]ere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence.

As to the definition, nature and workings of substantial evidence in administrative proceedings, Ang Tibay declared:

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. 20cräläwvirtualibräry

While the PNP Reports may have sufficed to grant private respondent whatever benefits were due her under PNP Rules and
Regulations, clearly, the dearth of evidence adduced by private respondent militates against the grant of compensation benefits
under P.D. No. 626, as amended. On this note, what is worth mentioning is that the PNP Boards conclusions were founded upon
the Ministry of National Defense Department Order Number 162 dated 15 January 1965, i.e., that a member of the military who
died while in active service is presumed to have died in the line of duty and not as a result of his own misconduct unless there is
substantial evidence to rebut such presumption.

This only buttresses our observation that the proceedings before the PNP Board and the ECC are separate and distinct, treating
of two (2) totally different subjects; moreover, the PNP Boards conclusions here may not be used as basis to find that private
respondent is entitled to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended. The presumption afforded by the Order relied upon by
the PNP Board concerns itself merely with the query as to whether one died in the line of duty, while P.D. No. 626 addresses the
issue of whether a causal relation existed between a claimants ailment and his working conditions. Plainly, these are different
issues calling for differing forms of proof or evidence, thus accounting for the existence of a favorable presumption in favor of a
claimant under the Defense Department Order, but not under P.D. No. 626 when the disease is not listed under Annex A of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.

It would likewise not be remiss to point out that Police Chief Inspector Gonzalodo, having prepared the Investigation Report
dated 14 September 1994 wherein he recommended the grant of benefits to private respondent, should have inhibited himself
from the proceedings subsequently conducted by the PNP Board on 4 October 1994. Having already pre-judged the matter by
way of his recommendation that the deceased passed away while in the line of duty and to grant benefits to his heirs or
beneficiaries, Police Chief Inspector Gonzalodo could hardly have been said to have been able to subsequently act in an
impartial and unbiased capacity as a member of the PNP Investigating Board.

On the imperative of ensuring due process in administrative proceedings, Ang Tibay21 laid down the guidelines for administrative
tribunals to observe. However, what Ang Tibay failed to explicitly state was, prescinding from the general principles governing
due process, the requirement of an impartial tribunal which, needless to say, dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute
may not sit as judge and jury simultaneously, neither may he review his decision on appeal.

In Rivera v. Civil Service Commission,22 this Court, sitting en banc, unanimously set aside a Resolution issued by respondent
Commission as it was shown that Civil Service Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, who took part only in the deliberations for the
assailed Resolution (but not the deliberations prior to promulgation of respondent Commissions Decision), had earlier
participated in the case as Board Chairman of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). As it was the MSPBs decision which
was appealed to respondent Commission, then even the mere participation of Commissioner Gaminde, at the appellate level, in
issuing the questioned Resolution (but not the Decision) violated procedural due process. Thus the Court there declared that
Commissioner Gaminde should have inhibited herself totally from participating in the resolution of the appeal and remanded the
case to respondent Commission, sans the participation of Commissioner Gaminde, in order to give full meaning and consequence
to a fundamental aspect of due process. This Court moreover noted:

This is not the first time that the Court has been confronted with this kind of prejudicial issue.

In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals [94 SCRA 261], the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the
Secretarys own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Caling the act of the
Secretary a mockery of administrative justice, the Court said:

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would
be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same
view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

The Court similarly struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil
Service Commission, in which he, then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred. [Anzaldo v. Clave, 119 SCRA 353
(1982)]23cräläwvirtualibräry

In fealty then to due process and this Courts rulings, and in absence of any showing that Police Chief Inspector Gonzalodo acted
in the capacity of a Board-designated commissioner merely tasked to receive evidence on behalf of the PNP Board, it should
have behooved Police Chief Inspector Gonzalodo to recuse himself from the proceedings before the PNP Board. While this
matter was not assigned as error, we have taken it upon ourselves to comment on this irregularity, if only for the guidance of
PNP Investigating Boards constituted in the future.

To further evince the paucity of evidence extant on the record to support private respondents cause, in both her Comment to
the Petition and Memorandum24 filed with this Court, in lieu of any discussion of the issues, private respondent merely adopted
the following pleadings and/or documents to convince this Court to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeals: her Petition for
Review filed with the Court of Appeals; petitioners Comment filed with the Court of Appeals; the Comment of the Employees
Compensation Commission filed with the Court of Appeals; and the Notice of Judgment and Decision of respondent court. The
total absence of any semblance of discussion on the issues betrays a deplorable degree of want of industry on the part of private
respondents counsel, both as far as his client and the courts are concerned.

All told, what the Court of Appeals should have done here was to respect the findings of the ECC on the technical matter
concerning the nature of the deceaseds illness, Hepatitis B. As likewise quoted above, plainly, the ECCs rejection of private
respondents claim was not unfounded, in fact, the ECC even took the pains to quote from a medical manual in order to
substantiate its holding. This is one instance when, pursuant to prudence and judicial restraint, a tribunals zeal in bestowing
compassion should have yielded to the precept in administrative law that in absence of grave abuse of discretion, courts are
loathe to interfere with and should respect the findings of quasi-judicial agencies in fields where they are deemed and held to
be experts due to their special technical knowledge and training.25cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 26 February 1997 in CA
G.R. SP No. 41976 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated 27
December 1995 in ECC Case No. 7633 is hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
VICENTE BASQUEZ Y MANZANO, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Judges are not mere boxing referees, whose only task is to watch the bout and decide the results. They are duty-bound to
conduct an orderly trial and an expeditious presentation of the evidence. In the performance of their responsibility, they may
ask questions that would elicit the facts of the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points
that are overlooked by counsel.1

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal by Vicente Basquez, challenging the April 10, 2000 Judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City (Branch 17), in Criminal Case No. 42148-98. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, which found him guilty of rape,
reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than sufficient, to prove the guilt of accused beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, pursuant to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep. Act 7659
as amended, it being established from the evidence of the prosecution, the complainant is only 7 years old or exactly 6
years[,] 7 months and 24 days, the extreme penalty of Death notwithstanding, cannot be imposed for want of
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense charged but accused, Vicente Basquez y Manzano is
sentenced, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with all accessory penalty as provided for by law and
to pay complainant by way of civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 and another amount of P50,000.00, by way of
moral damages, for the injury suffered by complainant in her young life, inhumanely committed with and
unnecessar[ily] resulting from the odious crime of rape by accused to warrant per se an award of moral damages,
without the requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering. (PP vs. Prades GR No. 127759, promulgated on July
30, 1998) with cost de oficio."3

The Information,4 dated November 11, 1998, charged appellant as follows:

"That on or about x x x November 4, 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] the complainant Jiggle Jilt R. dela Cerna, who is seven (7) years
old, against her will."5

When arraigned on February 4, 1999, appellant pleaded6 not guilty after the Information was read and interpreted to him in the
Visayan dialect, which he fully understood.7 On pretrial, he manifested through counsel that he would not plead guilty to a
lesser offense or enter into any stipulations or admissions. 8 After the prosecution rested its case, he filed a Demurrer to
Evidence with prior leave of court. This plea was subsequently denied.9 Trial continued and the lower court, thereafter,
promulgated its assailed Decision.

The Facts

Prosecution's Version

In its Brief,10 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecution's version of the facts as follows:

"[O]n the afternoon of November 4, 1998, around 4:00 o'clock, Jiggle Jilt dela Cerna, six (6) years 7 months and 24 days
old, was on her way home from Dumanlas Elementary School, Buhangin, Davao City where she was a Grade One (1)
student.

"While casually walking, Jiggle was waylaid by a man wearing x x x short pants and white T -shirt (whom she later
identified as the appellant) who was drinking outside a store along her way.

"The appellant blocked her way and pulled her by the belt of her dress. She was then dragged towards the direction of
the houses at the back of the school and was brought inside an unoccupied dilapidated house. Upon reaching the said
house, her hands, feet and body were tied with a tieback.
 "Jiggle, young as she [was], could do nothing but to struggle and cry.

"At this point, her attacker undressed himself, untied Jiggle, had her lie down and put himself on top of her. The
appellant's hands then started groping allover her young and fragile body and forced himself inside her. Jiggle, despite
the excruciating pain, kicked appellant repeatedly in an effort to free herself from him. Appellant, however, continued
forcing his penis inside xxx her vagina.

"Around 5:00 p.m. or an hour after when the appellant had consummated his vile and lewd act of raping the innocent
child, he (appellant) left her with her body still tied. With her school bag just beside her, Jiggle mustered enough
courage and strength to take a pair of scissors from it and cut the remaining tiebacks tied at her body.

"The following day, Jiggle, traumatized by the assault and rape committed by the appellant, refused to go to school for
fear of seeing the appellant again. She later narrated her horrifying experience to her grandmother Segundina dela
Cerna with whom she was living. She could do nothing but to cry her anger out upon learning of her granddaughter's
fate. She then reported the incident to the Buhangin Police and submitted her granddaughter to a medical
examination.

"The Medical Examination conducted on Jiggle by Or. Danilo Ledesma, Medico Legal of the City Health Office, disclosed
that the hymen [was] intact and its orifice small as to preclude complete penetration by an average sized male organ in
erection without causing hymen[al] injury. The same medical report stated that the patient was positive for
spermatozoa in the opening of the vagina including the parts surrounding the urethra.

"On November 9, 1998, SPO2 Miguel Foma, together with another member of the PN P and several members of the
Buhangin Barangay Police headed by Jose Despe, conducted a follow up investigation of the alleged rape. The group,
through the initiative of the barangay police, proceeded to the house of a certain Virgie dela Corta where the appellant
was reported to be living.

"The appellant was subsequently invited by the police at the Police station No. 5 of Buhangin, Davao.

"Unknown to the appellant, while the investigation was going on, he was subsequently identified by Jiggle who was
then present but was covered by a piece of plywood in order to hide her."11 (citations omitted)

Defense's Version

The defense of appellant, on the other hand, consisted of alibi and denial. The trial court summed up his version of the
facts,12 as follows:

"On November 4, 1998, he was at Guerrero St., particularly at the vulcanizing shop of one named Jeck Jeck Pinsoy at
Guerrero Street, Davao City.

"On November 4, 1998, he was helping in the store of his sister but Jeck-Jeck Pinsoy requested him, to help in the
butchering and roasting of a pig, in preparation [for] her birthday.

"They started butchering the pig at 3:00 p.m., and finished the roasting of the pig at 6:00 p.m., along with his other
companions in the butchering and roasting of the pig[. D]uring said period, he saw Jeck-Jeck Pinsoy, who used to go
down to the place where they were working and verified their problem, in the butchering and roasting of the pig for
her birthday.

"The party started at 7:00 p.m. up to dawn, the following day November 5, 1998.

"Meanwhile on November 9, 1998 at about 9:00 p.m., at Guerrero Street, Davao City, there were policemen who
arrived looking for him, accompanied by his in-Iaw, a certain Mike Vidanes, who told him, a case of rape was filed
against him.

"His in-Iaw told him, to [go] along with the policemen of Buhangin Police Station[. D]espite his hesitation, he finally
agreed to [go] with them, in compliance with the advise of his in-Iaw.

"Upon arrival at Buhangin Police Station, he was required to sit down without any counsel and he was confronted with a
little girl who was asked, whether he was the one who raped her[. T]he girl answered, no.

"He [was] only about [t]hree (3) meters away from the girl, who was confronted with him.

"He identified pictures, showing the place he was brought [to] marked Exh. 5 and [with] submarkings for the accused[.
L]ater after the grandmother of the girl asked the girl, whether accused [was] the one who raped her, complainant
answered, [n]o.

"Thereafter he was handcuffed and put inside the detention cell but later his handcuff was removed.
 "Since November 8, 1998, he was detained, up to the present."13

Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It gave superior
weight to the positive identification given by the victim who had pointed to him as the person who had raped her. Furthermore,
it deemed as biased the testimony of the witness whom appellant had relied upon to prove that the victim's identification of the
latter was erroneous.14

Hence, this appeal.15

The Issues

Appellant submits that the court a quo committed the following errors:

"I

That the trial Judge showed manifest bias and partiality against the accused by virtually acting as PROSECUTOR, and
using the authority of his position in making up for the shortcomings of the prosecutor;

"II

That the trial Court ERRED in holding that prosecution witness, Purok Leader and Barangay Policeman Jose Despe, was
'patently bias[ed] and partial in favor of accused;'

"III

That the trial Court erred in not holding that the 'rapist' as described by the victim, did not match the description of
accused;

"IV

That the trial Court erred in convicting the accused."16

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is devoid of merit.

First Issue:

Bias and Partiality of the Trial Judge

Appellant contends that the trial judge showed manifest bias and partiality against him by acting as a virtual prosecutor. We
differ.

The participation of judges in the conduct of trials cannot be condemned outrightly. They cannot be expected to remain always
passive and stoic during the proceedings. After all, they are not prohibited from asking questions when proper and necessary. In
fact, this Court has repeatedly ruled that judges "must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking questions to witnesses as may
be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth."17

Stated differently, "questions designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. Also, the
judge, being the arbiter, may properly' intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of
time."18

Very illuminating on this point is the ruling of this Court in 1914 in United States v. Hudieres, which we quote:

"The first assignment of error has its basis in the claim of counsel that the trial judge went to unjustifiable lengths in
examining some of the witnesses called for the defense. It is very clear, however, from a review of the whole
proceedings that the only object of the trial judge in propounding these questions was to endeavor as far as possible to
get at the truth as to the facts which the witnesses were testifying [to]. The right of a trial judge to question the
witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over
which he presides is too well established to need discussion. The trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the
law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of
justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material fact upon
which the judgment in the case should turn. So in a case where a trial judge sees that the degree of credit which he is
to give the testimony of a given witness may have an important bearing upon the outcome, there can be no question
 that in the exercise of a sound discretion he may put such questions to the witness as will enable him to formulate a
sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. The questions asked by the trial judge
in the case at bar were in our opinion entirely proper, their only purpose being to clarify certain obscure phases of the
case; and while we are inclined to agree with counsel that some of the observations of the trial judge in the course of
his examination might well have been omitted, there is no reason whatever to believe that the substantial rights of the
defendants were in [any wise] prejudiced thereby."19

Appellant alleges that the trial judge "took up the cudgels for the prosecution virtually assuming the role of a prosecutor." 20

On the contrary, a trial judge may examine some of the witnesses for the defense for the purpose of ferreting out the truth and
getting to the bottom of the facts, That he does so would not justify the charge that he assisted the prosecution with the
evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he intimidated the witnesses, 21

Verily, trial magistrates are judges of both the law and the facts, They would be negligent in the performance of their duties if
they permit a miscarriage of justice through their failure to propound questions that have some material bearing upon the
outcome, In the exercise of sound discretion, they may ask such questions as will enable them to formulate sound opinions on
the ability or the willingness of witnesses to tell the truth, They may even examine or cross-examine these witnesses,22 They
may seek to draw out relevant and material testimonies, even if such evidence may tend to support or rebut the position taken
by one or the other party.23 Even if the clarificatory questions they propound happen to reveal certain truths that tend to
destroy the theory of one of the parties, bias is not necessarily implied. 24

In the present case, there was an effort by the trial judge to arrive at the truth and to do justice to both parties. It would be a
distorted concept of due process if, in pursuance of that valid objective, he is to be accused of unfairness. His inquisitiveness
did not unduly harm appellant's substantial rights. Rather, the questions he propounded to the witnesses showed his intention to
elicit the truth. This conduct is expected of judges who, conscious of their responsibilities as magistrates, propound questions to
witnesses who give incomplete and obscure answers.

Second Issue:

Partiality of Prosecution Witness

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in declaring as biased Prosecution Witness Jose Despe's testimony which favored the
defense.

We are not persuaded. We find no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of the testimony of Despe. Its
declaration that he was biased and partial to appellant was neither arbitrary nor baseless. The age-old rule is that the task of
assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court, which had firsthand
impressions of their demeanor and conduct.25 The trial court observed:

"The transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings from pages 35 up to 42 on clarificatory questions of the court
on Jose Despe, revealed said witness was evasive in trying to hide his apparent predilection in favor of accused by going
around the bush, in answer to the questions of the court, glaringly declarative of his apparent intention, to exonerate
the accused of the offense charged.

"In fact although presented as witness for the prosecution, the extent and tenor of his testimony can be considered[. H]
he is indeed a witness for accused disguise[d] as prosecution witness, to divert his true and correct inclination, in favor
of accused.

"It was only upon critical questions of the court, to unmask his true color and attachment, that his testimony was given
proper and correct affiliation, in favor of accused."26

Time and time again, this Court has iterated the principle that where the culpability or the innocence of the accused hinges on
the credibility of the witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, the findings of trial courts are given the highest degree of
respect. After all, trial judges have an excellent chance to personally observe the declarants on the witness stand, an
opportunity that is not equally available to appellate courts.27

Moreover, it was the testimony of appellant that provided the link between him and Despe, as the following shows:

"Court: You said that Despe is your close friend?

"Basquez: Yes.

"Court: In fact he is the leader of the barangay police in Dumanlas?

"Basquez: Yes.

"Court: And you were one of his errand boy[s]?

 "Basquez: Yes."28

This admission in court belies appellant's claim that "Despe and accused do not know each other."29

Third Issue:

Error in the Description of the Accused

Appellant assails the victim 's description of her rapist as one who sported a big stomach and a balding head. He claims he is not
"dark-skinned, does not have a big belly and neither does he have a balding head."30

It should be clarified, at the outset, that it was Witness Jose Despe who, quoting the victim, said that the "one who raped her
was dark-skinned, [a] skin-head, with hallow scalp on top with big belly and with cutex on his fingernails."31

That the appearance of appellant differs from the description given by the victim does not necessarily affect her credibility as a
witness. It must be remembered that she positively identified him, not only during the investigation conducted by the police on
November 9, 1998, but also during the trial. We quote from her testimony:

"Q: You said, you were going home after attending to your class at Dumanlas Elementary School. While on your way
home, what happened, if any?

"A: I was waylaid by him.

"Q: Who is that him [you are] referring to?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: If that person you are referring to is in court, can you identify him?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: That person [whom] you pointed [to] as the one who waylaid you, what [was] he wearing at that time?

"A: He was wearing short pants.

"Q: [What] about his attire on the other portion of his body, can you recall?

"A: T-shirt.

"Q: Can you recall the color of the t-shirt?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: What was the color?

"A: White."32

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: You know who is that man, whom you said molested you?

"A: Yes, your Honor.

"Q: Why do you know him?

"A: Because I used to see him.

"Q: If that man is in court, can you point [to] him?

"A: That man. (witness pointed to accused, Vicente Basquez).

"Q: Do you know the house of that man?

 "A: I do not know.

"Q: But you said you know him? Where did you see him before he molested you?

"A: In the store."33

Moreover, the trial court noted the fact that appellant had a bulging stomach when he testified in court. 34 There was no
equivocation on this point. The other alleged discrepancies are minor. T o a young child, "brown complexion " may be the same
as dark skin, and having a "balding head" may refer to a long forehead. More important, minor discrepancies, if any, will not
detract from the fact that complainant categorically identified appellant as her assailant and vividly narrated the sexual assault
committed against her.

An error-free testimony cannot be expected from children of tender years, most especially when they are recounting details of
harrowing experiences, those that even adults would rather bury in oblivion. 35 To be sure, complainant's testimony may not be
described as flawless, but its substance, veracity and weight were hardly affected by the triviality of her alleged
inconsistencies. On the contrary, the supposed inconsistencies may have even reinforced her credibility, as they had probably
arisen from the naivete of a seven- year old child, confused and traumatized by the bestial act done upon, her person.

Appellant likewise submits that the victim failed to immediately identify him during the police investigation, and had merely
been pointed out to her.36

We are not convinced. As already discussed, appellant was positively identified by the victim. The reason for the latter's initial
failure to identify the former as her assailant was sufficiently explained by the trial court, as follows:

"Although the confrontation was marred [by the] alleged, testimony of Jose Despe, a Purok Leader at Buhangin,
Dumanlas, Davao City a Head of the Barangay Police by disputing the identification of accused by complainant, in the
presence of her grandmother, who when asked whether the accused was the one who abused her, she answered for
about 3 to 4 times, he was not the one; the situation and circumstances of said identification was done when
complainant was still confused, afraid and uncertain of the support of Jose Despe who apparently, as found by the
court, was wittingly partial [to the] accused, during the alleged confrontation .

"Moreover, during the confrontation in the Police Station of Buhangin, Davao City, the [complainant's] view of x x x
[the] accused was obstructed by a plywood made by Jose Despe, to cover and separate complainant [from the]
accused, intended to hide the complainant."37

Fourth Issue:

Absence of Penetration

Although there had been no complete penetration of the victim's vagina by appellant's penis, contact between them was not
ruled out by the doctor who testified in this case. In fact, he found the victim's vagina positive for spermatozoa. 38 In his
testimony, the doctor declared:

"Q: In your examination you refer[red] to a statement that the penetration may not be full but you are positive it
[may be] partial?

"A: Yes, it could be only between two lips of the genitalia of the victim and he ejaculated just outside.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: But certainly, there is a kissing of female organ and male organ?

"A: Yes."39

Existing rulings on rape do not require complete or full penetration of the victim's private organ. Neither is the rupture of the
hymen necessary. The mere introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the victim's genitalia engenders the crime of
rape.40 Hence, it is the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the
victim's genitalia that consummates rape.41 Penile invasion necessarily entails contact with the labia. Even the briefest of
contacts, without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be rape. 42

Finally, appellant tries to escape liability by advancing the defense of alibi. He testified that he was at a neighbor's house,
helping in the butchering and roasting of a pig.43 The trial court easily dismissed his contention in this wise:

"There is no evidence to show, accused was required to stay in the premises, all the time from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m., on
said date because the birthday celebrant herself, ha[d] no way of assuring accused stayed in the premises, all the time
more than merely seeing to it accused was around helping in the work, without certainty of the presence of accused,
during the entire period of the work.
 "Moreover, it is not denied from 11:00 up to 2:00 p.m., accused was not in the house of Pinsoy, helping in the
preparation of her birthday."44

In any event, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it is
not enough to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time. 45 Furthermore, alibi cannot prevail over
the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by complainant. Categorical and consistent, positive identification,
absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter , 'prevails over the appellant's defense of
denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of
any weight in law .46

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. We AFFIRM the assailed Decision finding VICENTE M. BASQUEZ guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity ex
delicto and another P50,000 as moral damages. Costs against appellant.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

People vs. Cabanada (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBELYN CABANADA

G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017

PERALTA, J.:

Facts: Appellant Cabanada was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft, the Information alleges that the accused, being then
employed as housemaid of complainant Catherine Victoria, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of the trust
reposed upon her with intent to gain, feloniously take, steal and carry away some valuable items and money in cash in the
aggregate amount of ₱154,000.00 belonging to the complainant, without her knowledge and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.

The defense narrated that at around 9:00 a.m. on April 12, 2009, Cabanada went to Catherine's house to work as a stay-out
housemaid, and left around 9:00 p.m. upon arrival of the Victoria family. On the same date, the plantsadora came around 9:00
a.m. and left at 3:00 p.m. On the next day, Cabanada returned to the house to resume her work. She was washing clothes when
Catherine called her and asked about the missing items. She denied any knowledge of the same.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime of qualified theft.

Ruling: Yes. The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as follows: 1. Taking of personal
property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done
without the owner's consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things; 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

The following circumstances are established during the trial: Cabanada worked as Victoria's housemaid for several years and has
unrestricted access to all parts of the house; on April 12, 2009, she was left alone at the house; the plantsadora, who only
reported for work every Sunday, had no access to the house and the car; Cabanada was alone from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.
after the plantsadora left at 3:00 p.m.; Cabanada admitted to the police in the presence of Catherine at the latter’s residence
that she stole the money and led them to her room where they recovered the ₱l6,0000.00 cash.

Ratio Decidendi: When accused admitted the crime while at the residence of her employer, she was not yet taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of her freedom.

Gist: Before Us for review is the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft.

PEOPLE vs CASTILLO y COMPLETO Case Digest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO
G.R. No. 172695 June 29, 2007

FACTS: Appellant was charged with parricide for allegedly shooting his wife with a dart from a rubber sling, hitting her at the
neck and causing her instantaneous death. In his defense, the accused said that he had no intention of killing his wife and that
he was practicing the use of the weapon when his wife was accidentally hit by the arrow. However, the trial court nonetheless
found him guilty on the ground that the evidence showed that the infliction of the fatal injury upon his wife was preceded by a
quarrel between her and the appellant, thus negating the latter’s defense. The same was affirmed on appeal. In the present
petition, the appellant contends that assuming that he was the one who killed his wife the same was accidental and not
intentional.

ISSUE: Is the exempting circumstance of accident applicable in the instant case?

HELD: No. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it.

"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The defense
miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:

1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.

By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act."
Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act
during the incident.

People vs. Larrañaga

G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellants: Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, Davidson Rusia, James
Anthony Uy, James Andrew Uy
Per curiam decision

FACTS:

On the rainy night of July 16, 1997, Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, sisters, failed to come home on the expected time. Two days
after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar Cebu. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was
raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape, and attached to her
left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and
admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan
Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-
perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court: that he met Rowen and Josman at Ayala Mall at
10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, who told him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James
Anthony and James Andrew, who were in a red car. Josman stopped in front of the waiting shed where Marijoy and Jacqueline
were standing, and were then forced to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly, that after
stopping by a safehouse at Guadalupe, Cebu City, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met
Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled towards Tan-awan, leaving the red car at the
South Bus Terminal, that after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started to
rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jacqueline, that Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the
cliff and push her into the ravine, and that they made fun of Jacqueline, who was made to run while being followed by the
group while boarding the van; and was beaten until she passed out.
In his defense, Larrañaga, through his witnesses, claimed the following:

that on July 16, 1997, he was at Quezon City taking his mid-term examinations at the Center for Culinary Arts, that he also
attended his teacher’s lecture in Applied Mathematics, that in the evening of that day until 3:00 in the morning of July 17,
1997, he was with his friends at the R & R Bar and Restaurant, Quezon City, that representatives of four airline companies
plying the route of Manila-Cebu-Manila presented proofs showing that Larrañaga does not appear in their records from July 15 to
July 17, 1997, and that his neighbors at Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City, including the security guard saw him in his
condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997.

The brothers James Anthony and James Andrew claimed that they were at their home in Cebu City, celebrating their father’s
50th birthday, which ended at 11:30 in the evening.

Alberto and Ariel claimed that they had the van’s aircon repaired in the evening of July 16, 1997, accompanied by the former’s
wife and the owners of the van. The repair shop was only able to finish the work at 10:00 the following morning.

Josman claimed that he was at his house together with his friends about 8:00 in the evening of July 16, 1997, ate dinner and
drank, and thereafter went to BAI Disco, transferred to DTM Bar, and went home at 3:00 the following morning.

Rusia was discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court
found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer
the penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in
finding that there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were committed.
ISSUES:

1) Whether there was conspiracy.

2) Whether the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether the trial court erred in imposing the correct penalty.

HELD:

1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or may be inferred from
the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and community of interest. The appellants’ actions
showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding
that the appellants indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.

2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called
a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is
raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will
change from complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the victims were raped and subjected to
dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious
illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline.

3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable penalty to the offender is one
degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old when the crimes were committed. As penalty for
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be
imposed should be reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is
reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and
mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With regard to the rest of
the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above should be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing “two
(2) reclusiones perpetua”.

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. RICHARD G. CRUZ, RESPONDENT

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT [THE] RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BACK SALARIES AFTER THE CSC ORDERED HIS REINSTATEMENT TO HIS
FORMER POSITION, CONSONANT WITH THE CSC RULING THAT HE WAS GUILTY ONLY OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES
AND REGULATIONS.[9]
CSC's position

The CSC submits that the CA erred in applying the ruling in Bangalisan, requiring as a condition for entitlement to back salaries
that the government employee be found innocent of the charge and that the suspension be unjustified. CSC Resolution No.
080305 did not fully exculpate the respondent but found him liable for a lesser offense. Likewise, the respondent's preventive
suspension pending appeal was justified because he was not exonerated.

The CSC also submits that the factual considerations in Bangalisan are entirely different from the circumstances of the present
case. In Bangalisan, the employee, Rodolfo Mariano, a public school teacher, was charged with grave misconduct for allegedly
participating, together with his fellow teachers, in an illegal mass action. He was ordered exonerated from the misconduct
charge because of proof that he did not actually participate in the mass action, but was absent from work for another reason.
Although the employee was found liable for violation of office rules and regulations, he was considered totally exonerated
because his infraction stemmed from an act entirely different (his failure to file a leave of absence) from the act that was the
basis of the grave misconduct charge (the unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of the students).

The CSC argues that in the present case, the charge of dishonesty and the infraction committed by the respondent stemmed
from a single act - his failure to properly record his attendance. Thus, the respondent cannot be considered totally exonerated;
the charge of dishonesty was merely downgraded to a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.

Accordingly, the CSC posits that the case should have been decided according to our rulings in Jacinto v. CA[10] and De la Cruz v.
CA[11] where we held the award of back salaries to be inappropriate because the teachers involved were not fully exonerated
from the charges laid against them.
The respondent's position

The respondent maintains that he is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries because CSC Resolution No. 080305 exonerated
him from the charges laid against him; for the purpose of entitlement to back salaries, what should control is his exoneration
from the charges leveled against him by the CMWD. That the respondent was found liable for a violation different from that
originally charged is immaterial for purposes of the back salary issue.

The respondent also asserts that the Bangalisan ruling squarely applies since the CSC formally admitted in its Comment to
CMWD's petition for review before the CA that the penalty of reprimand is not a reduced penalty for the penalty of dismissal
imposable for grave misconduct and dishonesty.[12]

THE COURT'S RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal, [13] of a government employee who had
been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction. The Court's starting point for this outcome is the
"no work-no pay" principle - public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service. We have excepted from
this general principle and awarded back salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees
based on the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law";[14] to deny these employees their back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment after they have
been exonerated from the charge that led to their dismissal or suspension. [15]

The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - x x x.

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent
shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an
appeal. (italics ours)

This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries since it does not expressly provide for back
salaries during this period; our established rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the period of preventive
suspension[16] as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond question.

To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the
employee must be found innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified.[17] The reasoning behind these
conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful
appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is
unjustified and must be compensated.

The CSC's rigid and mechanical application of these two conditions may have resulted from a misreading of our rulings on the
matter; hence, a look at our jurisprudence appears in order.

Basis for award of back salaries

The Court had the occasion to rule on the issue of entitlement to back salaries as early as 1941,[18] when Section 260 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC)[19] was the governing law. The Court held that a government employee, who was
suspended from work pending final action on his administrative case, is not entitled to back salaries where he was ultimately
removed due to the valid appointment of his successor. No exoneration or reinstatement, of course, was directly involved in
this case; thus, the question of back salaries after exoneration and reinstatement did not directly arise. The Court, however,
made the general statement that:

As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service, and the
justification for the payment of salary during the period of suspension is that the suspension was unjustified or that the
official was innocent. Hence, the requirement that, to entitle to payment of salary during suspension, there must be either
reinstatement of the suspended person or exoneration if death should render reinstatement impossible.[20] (emphasis and
underscoring ours)

In Austria v. Auditor General,[21] a high school principal, who was penalized with demotion, claimed payment of back salaries
from the time of his suspension until his appointment to the lower position to which he was demoted. He argued that his later
appointment even if only to a lower position of classroom teacher amounted to a reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC.
The Court denied his claim, explaining that the reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC refers to the same position from
which the subordinate officer or employee was suspended and, therefore, does not include demotional appointments. The word
"reinstatement" was apparently equated to exoneration.

In the 1961 case of Gonzales v. Hon. Hernandez, etc. and Fojas[22] interpreting the same provision, the Court first laid down the
requisites for entitlement to back salaries. Said the Court:
A perusal of the decisions of this Court[23] x x x show[s] that back salaries are ordered paid to an officer or an employee only
if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal. In the case
at bar, [the employee] was not completely exonerated, because although the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service
[ordering separation from service] was modified and [the employee] was allowed to be reinstated, the decision [imposed upon
the employee the penalty of two months suspension without pay]. [emphasis and underscoring ours]

Obviously, no exoneration actually resulted and no back salary was due; the liability for the offense charged remained, but a
lesser penalty was imposed.

In Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson, et al.,[24] the City Mayor ordered the dismissal from the service of city employees after
finding them guilty as charged. On appeal, however, the decision was modified by considering "the suspension of over one year x
x x, already suffered x x x [to be] sufficient punishment"[25] and by ordering their immediate reinstatement to the service. The
employees thereupon claimed that under Section 695 of the RAC, the punishment of suspension without pay cannot exceed two
(2) months. Since the period they were not allowed to work until their reinstatement exceeded two months, they should be
entitled to back salaries corresponding to the period in excess of two months. In denying the employees' claim for back salaries,
the Court held:

The fallacy of [the employees'] argument springs from their assumption that the modified decision had converted the penalty to
that of suspension. The modified decision connotes that although dismissal or resignation would be the proper penalty, the
separation from work for the period until their reinstatement, would be deemed sufficient. Said decision did not, in the least,
insinuate that suspension should have been the penalty.

x x x [T]he modified decision did not exonerate the petitioners. x x x And even if we consider the punishment as suspension,
before a public official or employee is entitled to payment of salaries withheld, it should be shown that the suspension was
unjustified or that the employee was innocent of the charges proffered against him. [26]

On the whole, these rulings left the application of the conditions for the award of back salaries far from clear. Jurisprudence
did not strictly observe the requirements earlier enunciated in Gonzales as under subsequent rulings, the innocence of the
employee alone served as basis for the award of back salaries.

The innocence of the employee as sole basis

for an award of back salaries

In Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc.,[27] we ruled that the payment of back salary to a government employee, who was
illegally removed from office because of his eventual exoneration on appeal, is merely incidental to the ordered reinstatement.

Tan was subsequently reiterated in Tañala v. Legaspi, et al.,[28] a case involving an employee who was administratively
dismissed from the service following his conviction in the criminal case arising from the same facts as in the administrative case.
On appeal, however, he was acquitted of the criminal charge and was ultimately ordered reinstated by the Office of the
President. Failing to secure his actual reinstatement, he filed a mandamus petition to compel his superiors to reinstate him and
to pay his back salaries from the date of his suspension to the date of his actual reinstatement. We found merit in his plea and
held:

[The employee] had been acquitted of the criminal charges x x x, and the President had reversed the decision x x x in the
administrative case which ordered his separation from the service, and the President had ordered his reinstatement to his
position, it results that the suspension and the separation from the service of the [employee] were thereby considered illegal. x
x x.

x x x [In this case,] by virtue of [the President's order of reinstatement], [the employee's] suspension and separation from the
service x x x was thereby declared illegal, so that for all intents and purposes he must be considered as not having been
separated from his office. The lower court has correctly held that the [employee] is entitled to back salaries. [29]

The Tañala ruling was reiterated in Cristobal v. Melchor,[30] Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,[31] De Guzman v.
CSC[32] and Del Castillo v. CSC[33] - cases involving government employees who were dismissed after being found administratively
liable, but who were subsequently exonerated on appeal.

In Garcia v. Chairman Commission on Audit,[34] the Court held that - where the employee, who was dismissed after being found
administratively liable for dishonesty, was acquitted on a finding of innocence in the criminal case (for qualified theft) based on
the same acts for which he was dismissed - the executive pardon granted him in the administrative case (in light of his prior
acquittal) entitled him to back salaries from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his actual reinstatement.

The above situation should be distinguished from the case of an employee who was dismissed from the service after conviction
of a crime and who was ordered reinstated after being granted pardon. We held that he was not entitled to back salaries since
he was not illegally dismissed nor acquitted of the charge against him.[35]

Incidentally, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[36] if the public official or employee is acquitted of the criminal
charge/s specified in the law, he is entitled to reinstatement and the back salaries withheld during his suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,[37] the Court clarified that the silence of Section 42 (Lifting of Preventive Suspension
Pending Administrative Investigation) of the Civil Service Decree[38] on the payment of back salaries, unlike its predecessor,[39] is
no reason to deny back salaries to a dismissed civil servant who was ultimately exonerated.

Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point x x x [as] it does not cover dismissed civil servants who are ultimately
exonerated and ordered reinstated to their former or equivalent positions. The rule in the latter instance, just as we have said
starting with the case of Cristobal vs. Melchor is that when "a government official or employee in the classified civil service had
been illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left
his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held." [40]

These cited cases illustrate that a black and white observance of the requisites in Gonzales is not required at all times. The
common thread in these cases is either the employee's complete exoneration of the administrative charge against him (i.e., the
employee is not found guilty of any other offense), or the employee's acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence. If
the case presented falls on either of these instances, the conditions laid down in Gonzales become the two sides of the same
coin; the requirement that the suspension must be unjustified is automatically subsumed in the other requirement of
exoneration.

Illegal suspension as sole basis for an award

of back salaries

By requiring the concurrence of the two conditions, Gonzales apparently made a distinction between exoneration and
unjustified suspension/dismissal. This distinction runs counter to the notion that if an employee is exonerated, the exoneration
automatically makes an employee's suspension unjustified. However, in Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al.,[41] the Court had the
occasion to illustrate the independent character of these two conditions so that the mere illegality of an employee's suspension
could serve as basis for an award of back salaries.

Abellera, a cashier in the Baguio City Treasurer's Office, was ordered dismissed from the service after being found guilty of
dishonesty and gross negligence. Even before the period to appeal expired, the City of Baguio dismissed him from the service.
On appeal, however, the penalty imposed on him was reduced "to two months suspension, without pay" although the appealed
decision was affirmed "in all other respects."

When the issue of Abellera's entitlement to back salaries reached the Court, we considered the illegality of Abellera's suspension
- i.e., from the time he was dismissed up to the time of his actual reinstatement - to be a sufficient ground to award him back
salaries.

The rule on payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently
ordered reinstated, is already settled in this jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an
employee is not allowed to work may be decreed not only if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension
(Sec. 35, RA 2260), but also when the suspension is unjustified.

In the present case, upon receipt of the [Civil Service Commissioner's] decision x x x finding [Abellera] guilty, but even before
the period to appeal had expired, [the Baguio City officials] dismissed [Abellera] from the service and another one was
appointed to replace him. [Abellera's] separation x x x before the decision of the Civil Service Commissioner had become
final was evidently premature. [The Baguio City officials] should have realized that [Abellera] still had the right to appeal the
Commissioner's decision to the Civil Service Board of Appeals within a specified period, and the possibility of that decision being
reversed or modified.[42] As it did happen on such appeal x x x the penalty imposed by the Commissioner was reduced x x x to
only 2 months suspension. And yet, by [the Baguio City officials'] action, [Abellera] was deprived of work for more than 2
years. Clearly, Abellera's second suspension from office [i.e., from the time he was dismissed up to his actual
reinstatement] was unjustified, and the payment of the salaries corresponding to said period is, consequently,
proper.[43] (emphases and underscoring ours)

The import of the Abellera ruling was explained by the Court in the subsequent case of Yarcia v. City of Baguio[44] that involved
substantially similar facts. The Court clarified that the award of back salaries in Abellera was based on the premature execution
of the decision (ordering the employee's dismissal from the service), resulting in the employee's unjustified "second suspension."
Under the then Civil Service Rules, the Commissioner of Civil Service had the discretion to order the immediate execution of his
decision in administrative cases "in the interest of public service." Unlike in Abellera, this discretion was exercised in Yarcia;
consequently, the employee's separation from the service pending his appeal "remained valid and effective until it was set aside
and modified with the imposition of the lesser penalty."[45]

The unjustified "second suspension" mentioned in Abellera actually refers to the period when the employee was dismissed from
the service up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Under our present legal landscape, this period refers to "suspension
pending appeal."[46]

In Miranda v. Commission on Audit,[47] the Court again had the occasion to consider the illegality of the suspension of the
employee as a separate ground to award back salaries. Following the filing of several administrative charges against him, Engr.
Lamberto Miranda was "preventively" suspended from June 2, 1978 to May 7, 1986. He was reinstated on May 22, 1986. On
October 7, 1986, the administrative case against him was finally dismissed "for lack of evidence." When his claim for back
salaries (from the time he was "preventively" suspended up to his actual reinstatement) was denied by the Commission on Audit,
he brought a certiorari petition with this Court.

In granting the petition, the Court ruled that since the law[48] limits the duration of preventive suspension to a fixed period,
Engr. Miranda's suspension for almost eight (8) years is "unreasonable and unjustified." Additionally, the Court observed that the
dropping of the administrative case against Engr. Miranda for lack of evidence "is even an eloquent manifestation that the
suspension is unjustified."[49] The Court held:

This being so, Engineer Miranda is entitled to backwages during the period of his suspension as it is already settled in this
jurisdiction that a government official or employee is entitled to backwages not only if he is exonerated in the administrative
case but also when the suspension is unjustified.[50] (emphases and underscoring ours)

Jurisprudential definition of exoneration

The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated
of the charge against him. This is the Court's teaching in City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA.[51] In this case, the employee was
initially found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and was given the penalty of dismissal by the City Mayor of Zamboanga.
On appeal, however, the CA limited the employee's guilt to improper conduct and correspondingly reduced the penalty to "six-
months suspension without pay with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely."[52] The CA also awarded him "full backwages."[53]

We held that the CA erred in awarding back salaries by reiterating the principle that back salaries may be ordered paid to an
officer or employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to
be illegal.[54]

The Court had the occasion to explain what constitutes "exoneration" in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,[55] the respondent's cited
case. In this case, the Secretary of Education found the public school teachers guilty as charged and imposed on them the
penalty of dismissal. On appeal, the CSC affirmed the Secretary's ruling but reduced the penalty imposed to suspension without
pay. However, the CSC found one of the teachers (Mariano) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations,
and only penalized her with reprimand. None of the petitioning public school teachers were awarded back salaries.

On appeal to this Court, we awarded back salaries to Mariano. We explained that since the factual premise of the administrative
charges against him - i.e., his alleged participation in the illegal mass actions, and his suspension - was amply rebutted, then
Mariano was in effect exonerated of the charges against him and was, thus, entitled to back salaries for the period of his
suspension pending appeal.

With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his back wages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the [CSC] will
show that he was exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The Secretary of the DECS charged him
with and he was later found guilty of grave misconduct x x x [and] conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service x x x
for his participation in the mass actions x x x. It was his alleged participation in the mass actions that was the basis of his
preventive suspension and, later, his dismissal from the service.

However, the [CSC], in the questioned resolution, made [the] finding that Mariano was not involved in the "mass actions" but
was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother. Although the CSC imposed upon
him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to
inform the school or his intended absence and neither did he file an application for leave covering such absences.

x x x x

However, with regard to the other petitioners, the payment of their back wages must be denied. Although the penalty imposed
on them was only suspension, they were not completely exonerated of the charges against them. The CSC made specific findings
that, unlike petitioner Mariano, they indeed participated in the mass actions. It will be noted that it was their participation in
the mass actions that was the very basis of the charges against them and their subsequent suspension. [56]

Bangalisan clearly laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete
exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the
administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee
cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. The
employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to back salaries when the offense actually committed does not
carry the penalty of more than one month suspension or dismissal. [57]

Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of suspension of a member of the civil service who is
subsequently ordered reinstated, may be decreed only if the employee is found innocent of the charges which caused the
suspension and when the suspension is unjustified. This pronouncement was re-echoed in Jacinto v. CA,[58] De la Cruz v.
CA,[59] and Hon. Gloria v. CA.[60] Taking off from Bangalisan, the Court in De la Cruz categorically stated:

The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders x x x
were commuted by the CSC to six (6) months suspension is already settled.

In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, we resolved the issue in the negative on the ground that the teachers were neither
exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of back wages in administrative
disciplinary cases.[61]

In Hon. Gloria, involving the same factual situation as Bangalisan, the CA awarded the public school teachers back salaries - for
the period beyond the allowable period of preventive suspension - since they were ultimately exonerated. In affirming the CA,
the Court distinguished preventive suspension from suspension pending appeal for the purpose of determining the extent of an
employee's entitlement to back salaries. The Court ruled that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, there are two kinds of
preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i)
preventive suspension pending investigation[62] and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal;[63] compensation is due only for
the period of preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.[64] Citing Floyd R.
Mechem's A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers,[65] Hon. Gloria ruled:

Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, his suspension must be
unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that "payment of salaries corresponding to the
period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his
suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified."[66] (emphases and underscoring ours)

A careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict observance of the second condition for an award of back salaries
becomes important only if the employee is not totally innocent of any administrative infraction. As previously discussed, where
the employee is completely exonerated of the administrative charge or acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same
facts based on a finding of innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the first. Otherwise, a determination of
the act/s and offense/s actually committed and of the corresponding penalty imposed has to be made.

Unjustified suspension

On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met upon a showing that the separation from office is not
warranted under the circumstances because the government employee gave no cause for suspension or dismissal. This squarely
applies in cases where the government employee did not commit the offense charged, punishable by suspension or dismissal
(total exoneration); or the government employee is found guilty of another offense for an act different from that for which he
was charged.

Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz illustrate

the application of the two conditions

Both the CA and the respondent applied Bangalisan to justify the award of back salaries. The CSC argues against this position
with the claim that the rulings in Jacinto and De la Cruz, not Bangalisan, should apply. After due consideration, we see no
reason why the cited rulings and their application should be pitted against one another; they essentially espouse the same
conclusions after applying the two conditions for the payment of back salaries.

Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz all stemmed from the illegal mass actions of public school teachers in Metro Manila in 1990.
The teachers were charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross violation of civil service law, rules and
regulations, among others. The then Secretary of Education found them guilty and dismissed them from the service. The CSC,
on appeal, ordered the teachers reinstated, but withheld the grant of their back salaries. The CSC found the teachers liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on them the penalty of suspension. The CSC reasoned that
since the teachers were not totally exculpated from the charge (but were found guilty of a lesser offense), they could not be
awarded back salaries.

When these cases reached the Court, the issue of the teachers' entitlement to back salaries was raised. The teachers claimed
that they were entitled to back salaries from the time of their dismissal or suspension until their reinstatement, arguing that
they were totally exonerated from the charges since they were found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.

Under this factual backdrop, we applied the two conditions and distinguished between the teachers who were absent from their
respective classes because they participated in the illegal mass action, on one hand, and the teachers who were absent for
some other reason, on the other hand.

With respect to the teachers who participated in the illegal mass actions, we ruled that they were not entitled to back salaries
since they were not exonerated. We explained that liability for a lesser offense, carrying a penalty less than dismissal, is not
equivalent to exoneration. On the second condition, we ruled that their suspension is not unjustified since they have given a
ground for their suspension - i.e., the unjustified abandonment of their classes to the prejudice of their students, the very
factual premise of the administrative charges against them - for which they were suspended.

With respect to the teachers who were away from their classes but did not participate in the illegal strike, the Court awarded
them back salaries, considering that: first, they did not commit the act for which they were dismissed and suspended;
and second, they were found guilty of another offense, i.e., violation of reasonable office rules and regulations which is not
penalized with suspension or dismissal. The Court ruled that these teachers were totally exonerated of the charge, and found
their dismissal and suspension likewise unjustified since the offense they were found to have committed only merited the
imposition of the penalty of reprimand.
These cases show the Court's consistent stand in determining the propriety of the award of back salaries. The government
employees must not only be found innocent of the charges; their suspension must likewise be shown to be unjustified.

The Present Case

We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during the period he was suspended from work,
following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his former position. The records show that the charges of grave misconduct and
dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found, there was no corrupt motive showing malice on the part of the
respondent in making the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of dishonesty was well refuted by the
respondent's evidence showing that he rendered overtime work on the days in question.

We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA affirmed these factual findings. However, on the legal
issue of the respondent's entitlement to back salaries, we are fully in accord with the CA's conclusion that the two conditions to
justify the award of back salaries exist in the present case.

The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and
regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime pay
despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with.

The second condition was met as the respondent's committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor suspension
(for more than one month), but only reprimand.

In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed by the CMWD until his reinstatement to his
former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension
pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries per our ruling in Hon. Gloria.[67]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005

Fact: The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated petitioner as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of
P2.2 million of PNB funds. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ordered petitioner to file their respective
counter-affidavits. Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper information against
petitioner and was thereafter referred for review to the Office of the Special Prosecutor who affirmed the resolution of Graft
Investigation Officer, Deputy Special Prosecutor recommended the approval of the memorandum of Special Prosecution
Officer.Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred in the approval. Ombudsman concurred thereto.
Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed
before the Sandiganbayanpetitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File Motion
for Reinvestigation.The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner filed his motion for reinvestigation in
the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the
reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was assigned to Special Prosecution Officer. Convinced that no probable cause existed to
indict petitioner Special Prosecutor Micael recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation was approved by
Deputy Special Prosecutor Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Tamayo. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier
participated in the initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of
the case with the marginal note “assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.” Special Prosecutor
Micael filed a Manifestation, to which was attached a copy of his memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan of the disapproval
by Ombudsman Desierto of his recommendation to dismiss the case. On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of Micael. Apparently, petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on 27 June 2000, Special Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer
filed a Motion to Set the Case for Arraignment alleging therein that the prosecution did not give due course to the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it was the second motion which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added
that the results of the reinvestigation were already submitted to the respondent court before receiving the motion for
reconsideration.Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s failure to resolve his
motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution13 dated 24 March 2003, the respondent court directed the Office of the
Ombudsman to resolve the said motion.In a memorandum14 dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer
recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos
changed his previous position and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration be
approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who
succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when he retired, approved Joselito Ferrer’s memorandum recommending the denial of the
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case. The First Division of this Court issued the
temporary restraining order prayed for.The instant petition was transferred to the Second Division of this Court.

Issue: where Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion?

 Held: Yes, attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant
case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special
Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. Having participated
in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of appropriate information, it
behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He
should have delegated the review to his Deputies

Nov 10, 2012

Samartino v. Raon, CA Digest

Facts:

1. Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late
Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half
share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena
Bernardo.

2. 2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for
ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena, she leased her share to petitioner for a period of five years counted
from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property
despite demands therefor.

3. Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service, he was not at home as he was then
confined at the NBI rehab center since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug
dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that
petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it
will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the
Rehabilitation Committee.]

4. The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner in default and ordered them to present
evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a
motion to set aside judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision. This decision became final, the property was sold
in an auction to the respondents, Petitioner filed petition for relief from judgement alleging that the parcel of land from which
he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 13, 1988. Petition was dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA which was also dismissed,
including his MR, hence this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner

NO. The summon was ineffective. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons
personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling
house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

1. Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly
served in person will substituted service be availed of.

2. The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service;
why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons
must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.

3. It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons may be proved by
evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the
 acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to
do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds

4. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioner’s brother, on whom
substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner’s residence.

CECILIO P. DE LOS SANTOS and BUKLOD MANGGAGAWA NG CAMARA (BUMACA), petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), HON. COMMISSIONERS VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY, RAUL T.
AQUINO, and ROGELIO I. RAYALA, CAMARA STEEL INDUSTRIES INC., JOSELITO JACINTO, ALBERTO F. DEL PILAR, DENNIS
ALBANO, MERCEDITA G. PASTRANA, TOP-FLITE and RAUL RUIZ, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which remanded this case to the Labor Arbiter who ruled that petitioner Cecilio P. de los Santos was illegally dismissed
by private respondent Camara Steel, Inc., and as a consequence, ordered his immediate reinstatement. Specifically, the
dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision promulgated 23 May 1999 states —

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Camara Steel Industries, Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant
Cecilio de los Santos to his former position within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution without loss of seniority
rights and other benefits with full back wages from date of dismissal up to actual date of reinstatement which is hereby
computed as of even date as follows:

From 8/23/93-12/15/93 = 3.73 mos.

P118 x 26 days x 3.73 mos. = P11,443.64
12/16/93 - 3/29/94 = 3.43 mos.
135 x 26 days x 3.43 mos. = 12,039.30
Total Backwages as of 3/29/94 P23,482.94

Respondent Camara Steel Industries, Inc. is also ordered to pay complainant 10% for and as attorney's fees.

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

On 3 May 1991 petitioner De los Santos started working at Camara Steel Industries Inc. (CAMARA STEEL), a company engaged in
the manufacture of steel products such as LPG cylinders and drums. He was first assigned at the LPG assembly line, then later,
as operator of a blasting machine. While performing his task as such operator, he met an accident that forced him to go on
leave for one and a half (1-1/2) months. Upon his return, he was designated as a janitor assigned to clean the premises of the
company, and occasionally, to transfer scrap and garbage from one site to another. 1

On 11 May 1993 petitioner was doing his usual chores as a janitor of CAMARA STEEL when he momentarily left his pushcart to
answer the call of Narciso Honrado, scrap in-charge, who summoned him to the company clinic. There Honrado handed him a
box which he placed on top of a drum in his pushcart for transfer to the other lot of the company near gate 2. On his way out of
gate 2, however, the security guard on duty found in the box handed to him by Honrado two (2) pieces of electric cable
measuring 2.26 inches each and another piece of 1.76 meters with a total estimated value of P50.00 to P100.00. Apprehensive
that he might be charged with theft, petitioner De los Santos explained that the electric cord was declared a scrap by Honrado
whose instructions he was only following to transfer the same to the adjacent lot of the company as scrap.

Narciso Honrado admitted responsibility for the haul and his error in declaring the electric cables as scrap. The general
manager, apparently appeased by Honrado's apology, issued a memorandum acknowledging receipt of his letter of apology and
exculpated him of any wrongdoing.

Taking an unexpected volte face, however, the company through its counsel filed on 9 July 1993 a criminal complaint for
frustrated qualified theft against Honrado and herein petitioner De los Santos. The complaint however was subsequently
dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig for lack of evidence. 2

On 23 August 1993, upon request of Top-Flite, alleged manpower agency of De los Santos, CAMARA STEEL terminated his
services.

Aggrieved by his illegal termination, De los Santos sought recourse with the Labor Arbiter who on 29 March 1994 rendered a
decision ordering respondent CAMARA STEEL to reinstate Delos Santos to his former position within ten (10) days without loss of
seniority rights and other benefits with full back wages from date of dismissal up to actual reinstatement as herein before
stated.
CAMARA STEEL went to the NLRC for recourse. Top-Flite filed a Motion for Intervention praying that it be permitted to
intervene in the appeal as co-respondent and, accordingly, be allowed to submit its own memorandum and other pleadings. 3

On 23 May 1995 the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and ordered the return of the entire records of the case to the arbitration
branch of origin for further proceedings. In its Decision, NLRC specified the reasons for the remand to the Labor Arbiter —4

First, as respondents have broadly implied, having alleged that he was an employee of Camara Steel, it was
complainant's burden to prove this allegation as a fact, not merely through his uncorroborated statements but through
independent evidence. As noted by respondents, he has not submitted one piece of evidence to support his premise on
this matter except for his sworn statement.

Secondly, the Arbiter maintained that the contract of services submitted by respondents was insufficient to prove that
complainant was an employee of Top-Flite, but he has obviously omitted consideration of Annexes F, G, H and I which
are time sheets of the complainant with Top-Flite and the corresponding time cards which he punches in for Camara
Steel.

The NLRC further noted that under the circumstances it became appropriate to conduct a formal hearing on the particular issue
of whether an employer-employee relationship existed between the parties, which issue was determinative of the nature of
petitioner's dismissal by CAMARA STEEL. That being so, according to the NLRC, it was necessary for the Labor Arbiter to issue the
appropriate directive to summon Top-Flite as a necessary party to the case, for the manpower agency to submit its own
evidence on the actual status of petitioner.

As pointed out by petitioner, the errors in the disputed decision by the NLRC are: (a) NLRC violated due process of law when it
did not consider the evidence on record; (b) CAMARA STEEL, and not Top-Flite, is the real employer of petitioner; (c) Contrary
to the finding of NLRC, Top-Flite was made a party respondent in the illegal dismissal case docketed as NLRC-NCR No. 00-08-
05302-93 and the NLRC was therefore in error in remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.

Petitioner De los Santos contends that NLRC was in grave error when it ruled that, with the exception of a bare assertion on his
sworn statement, he "has not submitted one piece of evidence to support his premise"5 that he was in fact an employee of
CAMARA STEEL.

To underscore NLRC's oversight, petitioner brings to our attention and specifies the pieces of evidence which he presented
before the Labor Arbiter on 19 November 1993 — also appended as Annexes to petitioner's "Traverse to Camara's Position Paper
and Reply:" (a) Annex "E" to "E-1" — Approval signature of Camara's Department head, Reynaldo Narisma, without which
petitioner cannot render overtime; (b) Annex "F" — Petitioner's daily time record for 8/3/92 to 8/9/92; (c) Annex "F-1" —
Signature of private respondent Mercedita Pastrana, approving in her capacity as Assistant Manager of Camara Steel; (d) Annex
"F-2" — Signature of private respondent Dennis Albano, Personnel Manager of Camara Steel Industries Inc. also co-signing for
approval; (e) Annex "F-3" — Signature of Narisma, as Department Head of Camara Steel Industries Inc. where petitioner is
working; (f) Annex "G" — Daily Time Record of petitioner for 7/6/92 to 7/12/92; (g) Annex "G-1" — Signature of Camara Steel
Assistant Manager; (h) Annex "G-2" — Signature of Camara's Personnel Manager, Dennis Albano, approving; (i) Annex "G-3" —
Signature of Camara's Department Head where petitioner is working, Mr. Narisma, approving; (j) Annex "H" to "H-1" —
Petitioner's Daily Time Card (representative samples) with name and logo of Camara Steel Industries Inc.; and, (k) Annex "J" —
Affidavit of Complainant.

All these pieces of evidence which, according to petitioner De los Santos, were not properly considered by NLRC, plainly and
clearly show that the power of control and supervision over him was exercised solely and exclusively by the managers and
supervisors of CAMARA STEEL. Even the power to dismiss was also lodged with CAMARA STEEL when it admitted in page 3 of its
Reply that upon request by Top-Flite, the steel company terminated his employment after being allegedly caught committing
theft.

Petitioner De los Santos also advances the view that Top-Flite, far from being his employer, was in fact a "labor-only" contractor
as borne out by a contract whereby Top-Flite undertook to supply CAMARA STEEL workers with "warm bodies" for its factory
needs and edifices. He insists that such contract was not a job contract but the supply of labor only. All things considered, he is
of the firm belief that for all legal intents and purposes, he was an employee — a regular one at that — of CAMARA STEEL.

In its comment, private respondent CAMARA STEEL avers that far from being its employee, De los Santos was merely a project
employee of Top-Flite who was assigned as janitor in private respondent company. This much was acknowledged by Top-Flite in
its Motion for Intervention filed before the NLRC.6 Such allegation, according to private respondent CAMARA STEEL, supports all
along its theory that De los Santos' assignment to the latter as janitor was based on an independent contract executed between
Top-Flite and CAMARA STEEL.7

Respondent CAMARA STEEL further argues that crystal clear in the Motion for Intervention of Top-Flite is its allegation that it
was in fact petitioner's real employer as his salaries and benefits during the contractual period were paid by Top-Flite; not only
that, De los Santos was dismissed by CAMARA STEEL upon the recommendation of Top-Flite. These ineluctably show that Top-
Flite was not only a job contractor but was in truth and in fact the employer of petitioner.

In his petition, De los Santos vigorously insists that he was the employee of respondent CAMARA STEEL which in turn was not only
denying the allegation but was finger-pointing Top-Flite as petitioner's real employer. De los Santos again objects to this
assertion and claims that Top-Flite, far from being an employer, was merely a "labor-only" contractor.
In the maze and flurry of claims and counterclaims, several contentious issues continue to stick out like a sore thumb. Was De
los Santos illegally dismissed? If so, by whom? Was his employer respondent CAMARA STEEL, in whose premises he was allegedly
caught stealing, or was it Top-Flite, the manpower services which allegedly hired him?

Inextricably intertwined in the resolution of these issues is the determination of whether there existed an employer-employee
relationship between CAMARA STEEL and respondent De Los Santos, and whether Top-Flite was an "independent contractor" or a
"labor-only" contractor. A finding that Top-Flite was a "labor-only" contractor reduces it to a mere agent of CAMARA STEEL which
by statute would be responsible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such employees had been directly
employed by the employer.

Etched in an unending stream of cases are the four (4) standards in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages;
(c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative employee's
conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the so-called "control test."

As shown by the evidence on record, De los Santos was hired by CAMARA STEEL after undergoing an interview with one Carlos
Suizo, its timekeeper who worked under the direct supervision of one Renato Pacion, a supervisor of CAMARA STEEL. These
allegations are contained in the affidavit8 executed by De los Santos and were never disputed by CAMARA STEEL. Also remaining
uncontroverted are the pieces of documentary evidence adduced by De los Santos consisting of daily time records marked
Annexes "F" and "G" which, although bearing the heading and logo of Top-Flite, were signed by officers of respondent CAMARA
STEEL, and Annexes "H" and "I" with the heading and logo of CAMARA STEEL.

Incidentally, we do not agree with NLRC's submission that the daily time records serve no other purpose than to establish merely
the presence of De los Santos within the premises of CAMARA STEEL. Contrarily, these records, which were signed by the
company's officers, prove that the company exercised the power of control and supervision over its employees, particularly De
los Santos. There is dearth of proof to show that Top-Flite was the real employer of De los Santos other than a naked and
unsubstantiated denial by CAMARA STEEL that it has no power of control over De los Santos. Records would attest that even the
power to dismiss was vested with CAMARA STEEL which admitted in its Reply that "Top-Flite requested CAMARA STEEL to
terminate his employment after he was caught by the security guard committing theft."

A cursory reading of the above declaration will confirm the fact that the dismissal of De los Santos could only be effected by
CAMARA STEEL and not by Top-Flite as the latter could only "request" for De los Santos' dismissal. If Top-Flite was truly the
employer of De los Santos, it would not be asking permission from or "requesting" respondent CAMARA STEEL to dismiss De los
Santos considering that it could very well dismiss him without CAMARA STEEL's assent.

All the foregoing considerations affirm by more than substantial evidence the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between De los Santos and CAMARA STEEL.

As to whether petitioner De los Santos was illegally terminated from his employment, we are in full agreement with the Labor
Arbiter's finding that he was illegally dismissed. As correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, it was Narciso Honrado, scrap in-
charge, who handed the box containing the electrical cables to De los Santos. No shred of evidence can show that De los Santos
was aware of its contents, or if ever, that he conspired with Honrado in bilking the company of its property. What is certain
however is that while Honrado admitted, in a letter of apology, his culpability for the unfortunate incident and was
unconditionally forgiven by the company, De los Santos was not only unceremoniously dismissed from service but was charged
before the court for qualified theft (later dismissed by the public prosecutor for lack of evidence). For sure, De los Santos
cannot be held more guilty than Honrado who, being the scrap in-charge, had the power to classify the cables concerned as
scrap.

Neither can we gratify CAMARA STEEL's contention that petitioner was validly dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. As
provided for in the Labor Code:

Art. 282. Termination by employment — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: x
x x (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative x x x x

Of course, it must be stressed that loss of confidence as a just cause for the termination of employment is based on the premise
that the employee holds a position of trust and confidence, as when he is entrusted with responsibility involving delicate
matters, and the task of a janitor does not fall squarely under this category.

Petitioner De los Santos argues that Top-Flite was merely a "labor-only" contractor. To fortify his stance, De los Santos brings to
our attention the contract of service9 dated 8 February 1991 between CAMARA STEEL and Top-Flite which provides:

1) The contractor (Top-Flite) shall provide workers (non-skilled) six (6) days a week for the Client's (Camara) factory
and edifices.

However, both respondent CAMARA STEEL and Top-Flite10 are adamant in their belief that the latter was not a "labor-only"
contractor as they rely on another provision of the contract which states —
 2) The Contractor warrants the honesty, reliability, industry and cooperative disposition of the person it employs to
perform the job subject to this contract, and shall employ such persons only as are in possession of health certificates
and police clearances x x x

The preceding provisions do not give a clear and categorical answer as regards the real character of Top-Flite's business. For
whatever its worth, the invocation of the contract of service is a tacit admission by both parties that the employment of De los
Santos was by virtue of such contract. Be that as it may, Top-Flite, much less CAMARA STEEL, cannot dictate, by the mere
expedient of a unilateral declaration in a contract, the character of its business, i.e., whether as "labor-only" contractor, or job
contractor, it being crucial that its character be measured in terms of and determined by the criteria set by statute. The case
of Tiu v. NLRC11 succinctly enunciates this statutory criteria —

Job contracting is permissible only if the following conditions are met: 1) the contractor carries on an independent
business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own
manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the
performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and 2) the contractor has substantial capital or investment in
the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of
the business.

"Labor-only contracting" as defined in Sec. 4, par. (f), Rule VIII-A, Book III, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code states that a "labor-only" contractor, prohibited under this Rule, is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor
merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal and the following elements are
present: (a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work
or service under its own account or responsibility; and, (b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or
subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.

Applying the foregoing provisions, the Court finds Top-Flite to be a "labor-only" contractor, a mere supplier of labor to CAMARA
STEEL, the real employer. Other than its open declaration that it is an independent contractor, no substantial evidence was
adduced by Top-Flite to back up its claim. Its revelation that it provided a sweeper to petitioner would not suffice to convince
this Court that it possesses adequate capitalization to undertake an independent business. 12 Neither will the submission prosper
that De los Santos did not perform a task directly related to the principal business of respondent CAMARA STELL. As early as
in Guarin v. NLRC13 we ruled that "the jobs assigned to the petitioners as mechanics, janitors, gardeners, firemen and
grasscutters were directly related to the business of Novelty as a garment manufacturer," reasoning that "for the work of
gardeners in maintaining clean and well-kept grounds around the factory, mechanics to keep the machines functioning properly,
and firemen to look out for fires, are directly related to the daily operations of a garment factory."

In its comment respondent CAMARA STEEL emphatically argues that Top-Flite, although impleaded as respondent in NLRC-NCR
Cases Nos. 00-0704761-93 and 00-0805061-93, subject of the present appeal, was never summoned for which reason it was
deprived of procedural due process; basically the same line of argument adopted by the NLRC in its decision to remand the case
to the arbitration branch of origin. CAMARA STEEL obviously wants to impress upon us that Top-flite, being a necessary party,
should have been summoned and the failure to do so would justify the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter.

We are not persuaded. The records show that Top-Flite was not only impleaded in the aforementioned case but was in fact
afforded an opportunity to be heard when it submitted a position paper. This much was admitted by Top-Flite in par. 5 of its
Motion for Intervention where it stated that "movant submitted its position paper in the cases mentioned in the preceding
paragraph but the Presiding Arbiter ignored the clear and legal basis of the position of the movant." 14 In other words, the failure
of Top-Flite to receive summons was not a fatal procedural flaw because it was never deprived of the opportunity to ventilate
its side and challenge petitioner in its position paper, not to mention the comment which it submitted through counsel before
this Court.15 It moved to intervene not because it had no notice of the proceedings but because its position paper allegedly was
not considered by the Labor Arbiter. While jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired by service of summons,
it can also be acquired by voluntary appearance before the court which includes submission of pleadings in compliance with the
order of the court or tribunal. A fortiori, administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity
of certain procedural requirements subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
justiciable cases presented before them. In labor cases, a punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in
the interest of the workingman. A remand of the case, as the NLRC envisions, would compel petitioner, a lowly worker, to tread
once again the calvary of a protracted litigation and flagellate him into submission with the lash of technicality.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision of the NLRC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter promulgated 23 May 1999 is REINSTATED and ADOPTED as the Decision in this case.

SO ORDERED.

RUTH D. BAUTISTA,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, REGION IV, and SUSAN
ALOA, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents a new dimension in the ever controversial Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 or The Bouncing Checks
Law. The question posed is whether the drawer of a check which is dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds can be prosecuted
under BP 22 even if the check is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from its due date. The burgeoning jurisprudence
on the matter appears silent on this point.

Sometime in April 1998 petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private respondent Susan Aloa Metrobank Check No. 005014037
dated 8 May 1998 for P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank Cavite City Branch. According to private respondent, petitioner assured
her that the check would be sufficiently funded on the maturity date.

On 20 October 1998 private respondent presented the check for payment. The drawee bank dishonored the check because it was
drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).

On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Cavite City. 1 In addition to the
details of the issuance and the dishonor of the check, she also alleged that she made repeated demands on petitioner to make
arrangements for the payment of the check within five (5) working days after receipt of notice of dishonor from the bank, but
that petitioner failed to do so.

Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her defense that presentment of the check within ninety (90)
days from due date thereof was an essential element of the offense of violation of BP 22. Since the check was presented for
payment 166 days after its due date, it was no longer punishable under BP 22 and therefore the complaint should be dismissed
for lack of merit. She also claimed that she already assigned private respondent her condominium unit at Antel Seaview
Condominium, Roxas Boulevard, as full payment for the bounced checks thus extinguishing her criminal liability.

On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner
for violation of BP 22, which was approved by the City Prosecutor.

On 13 May 1999 petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region IV a petition for review of the
22 April 1999 resolution. The ORSP denied the petition in a one (1)-page resolution dated 25 June 1999. On 5 July 1999
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied on 31 August 1999. According to the ORSP, only
resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal complaint were cognizable for review by that office, citing Department Order
No. 223.

On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the resolution of the ORSP, Region IV,
dated 22 April 1999 as well as the order dated 31 August 1999 denying reconsideration. The appellate court issued the assailed
Resolution dated 26 October 1999 denying due course outright and dismissing the petition. 2 According to respondent appellate
court -

A petition for review is appropriate under Rule 42 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, filed in the Court of Appeals. Rule 43 x x x provides for appeal, via a
petition for review x x x from judgment or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner's "Petition for Review" of the ORSP resolution does not fall under any of the agencies mentioned in Rule 43
x x x x It is worth to note that petitioner in her three (3) assigned errors charged the ORSP of "serious error of law and grave
abuse of discretion." The grounds relied upon by petitioner are proper in a petition for certiorari x x x x Even if We treat the
"Petition for Review" as a petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to allege the essential requirements of a special civil action.
Besides, the remedy of petitioner is in the Regional Trial Court, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts x x x x (italics
supplied)

First , some ground rules. This case went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 applies to "appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions." 3cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco
v. PCGG, 4 Koh v. Court of Appeals, 5 Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte 6 and Crespo v. Mogul. 7 In these cases this
Court held that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in
the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.

A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial
body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making." 8cräläwvirtualibräry

In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees, 9 we held that a voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely
or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency, hence his decisions and awards are appealable to the Court of
Appeals. This is so because the awards of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of the period to
appeal; 10 and since their awards determine the rights of parties, their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court.
Therefore, the proper remedy from an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, following
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for appellate review of all adjudications of
quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He
does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint
or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. 11 While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal. 12cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal
complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with
finality only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable
fine, 13 the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense in the trial of the
case.

Besides, it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal to determine the specificity and
adequacy of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or
if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or, he may otherwise proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his
view, in due and proper form. 14cräläwvirtualibräry

In the present recourse, notwithstanding the procedural lapses, we give due course to the petition, in view of the novel legal
question involved, to prevent further delay of the prosecution of the criminal case below, and more importantly, to dispel any
notion that procedural technicalities are being used to defeat the substantive rights of petitioner.

Petitioner is accused of violation of BP 22 the substantive portion of which reads -

Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos,
or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank x x x x (italics supplied).

An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that The Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two (2) distinct acts: First, making or drawing and issuing
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank; and, second, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank shall fail to keep sufficient
funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the
date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. 15cräläwvirtualibräry

In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the check at the time of its issuance,
while in the second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or
maintain credit within ninety (90) days from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the offense is consummated by
the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit.

The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time of issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient funds in nor
credit with the drawee bank at the time, while that involved in the second offense is good when issued as drawer had sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank when issued. 16 Under the first offense, the ninety (90)-day presentment period is not
expressly provided, while such period is an express element of the second offense. 17cräläwvirtualibräry

From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that petitioner is being prosecuted for violation of the first paragraph of the
offense.

Petitioner asserts that she could not be prosecuted for violation of BP 22 on the simple ground that the subject check was
presented 166 days after the date stated thereon. She cites Sec. 2 of BP 22 which reads -

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment which is refused by
the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee (italics supplied).

Petitioner interprets this provision to mean that the ninety (90)-day presentment period is an element of the offenses punished
in BP 22. She asseverates that "for a maker or issuer of a check to be covered by B.P. 22, the check issued by him/her is one
that is dishonored when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from date of the check. If the dishonor occurred after
presentment for payment beyond the ninety (90)-day period, no criminal liability attaches; only a civil case for collection of sum
of money may be filed, if warranted." To bolster this argument, she relies on the view espoused by Judge David G. Nitafan in his
treatise - 18cräläwvirtualibräry

Although evidentiary in nature, section 2 of the law must be taken as furnishing an additional element of the offense defined
in the first paragraph of section 1 because it provides for the evidentiary fact of "knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit"
which is an element of the offense defined in said paragraph; otherwise said provision of section 2 would be rendered without
meaning and nugatory. The rule of statutory construction is that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner
as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each other. The same section cannot
be deemed to supply an additional element for the offense under the second paragraph of section 1 because the 90-day
presentment period is already a built-in element in the definition of said offense (italics supplied).

We are not convinced. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information, and
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be
determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes. 19cräläwvirtualibräry

The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value;
(b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 20cräläwvirtualibräry

The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check presented within
the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential
element of the offense. Since knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima
facie presumption of the existence of this element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of which
was subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. 21 The term prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counterbalance the
presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. 22cräläwvirtualibräry

The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the
contrary. 23 Neither does the term prima facie evidence preclude the presentation of other evidence that may sufficiently prove
the existence or knowledge of insufficiency of funds or lack of credit.

Surely, the law is not so circumscribed as to limit proof of knowledge exclusively to the dishonor of the subject check when
presented within the prescribed ninety (90) day period. The deliberations on the passage of BP 22 (then known as Cabinet Bill
No. 9) between the author, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, and Bataan Assemblyman Pablo Roman prove insightful
-

MR. ROMAN: x x x x Under Section 1, who is the person who may be liable under this Section? Would it be the maker or the
drawer? How about the endorser, Mr. Speaker?

MR. MENDOZA: Liable.

MR. ROMAN: The endorser, therefore, under Section 1 is charged with the duty of knowing at the time he endorses and delivers
a check . . . .

MR. MENDOZA: If the endorser is charged for violation of the Act then the fact of knowledge must be proven by positive
evidence because the presumption of knowledge arises only against the maker or the drawer. It does not arise as against
endorser under the following section (italics supplied).

MR. ROMAN: But under Section 1, it says here: "Any person who shall make or draw or utter or deliver any check." The
preposition is disjunctive, so that any person who delivers any check knowing at the time of such making or such delivery that
the maker or drawer has no sufficient funds would be liable under Section 1.

MR. MENDOZA: That is correct Mr. Speaker. But, as I said, while there is liability even as against endorser, for example, the
presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds arises only against the maker or drawer under Section 2.

MR. ROMAN: Yes, Mr. Speaker. It is true; however, under Section 1, endorsers of checks or bills of exchange would find it
necessary since they may be charged with the knowledge at the time they negotiate bills of exchange they have no sufficient
funds in the bank or depository.

MR. MENDOZA: In order that an endorser may be held liable, there must be evidence showing that at the time he endorsed the
check he was aware that the drawer would not have sufficient funds to cover the check upon presentation. That evidence must
be presented by the prosecution. However, if the one changed is the drawer, then that evidence need not be presented by the
prosecution because that fact would be established by presumption under Section 2 (italics supplied).24cräläwvirtualibräry
An endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under BP 22, even though the presumption of knowledge does not apply
to him, if there is evidence that at the time of endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency of funds. It is evident from the
foregoing deliberations that the presumption in Sec. 2 was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not to foreclose
admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such knowledge. Thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the
check for payment within ninety (90) days from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other evidence. Whether such evidence is
sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the information is addressed to the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is a
matter not controllable by certiorari. Certainly, petitioner is not left in a lurch as the prosecution must prove knowledge
without the benefit of the presumption, and she may present whatever defenses are available to her in the course of the trial.

The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference
between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either
form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while
evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. 25 Applying this analogy to the case at
bar, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor
of the check presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge.

It is worth reiterating that courts will not normally interfere with the prosecutor's discretion to file a criminal case when there
is probable cause to do so. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 26 The prosecutor has ruled that there is probable cause in this case, and we see no
reason to disturb the finding.

WHEREFORE , the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 1999 which dismissed the petition for review
questioning the resolution of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999, and its order dated 31
August 1999 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

YNOT v. IAC

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute
ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose) and carabeef. The
carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
(NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of
Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These
were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they
can no longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of
the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court,
such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed
without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—
that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject
of the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of
a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident
depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear.
The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is
missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can
be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming
there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation,
denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are
certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance,
summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons
of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure
is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of
legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited
discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere
to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and
abuse, and even corruption.

YNOT v. IAC

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute
ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose) and carabeef. The
carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
(NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of
Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These
were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they
can no longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of
the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court,
such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed
without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—
that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject
of the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of
a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident
depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear.
The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is
missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can
be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming
there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation,
denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are
certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance,
summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons
of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure
is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of
legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited
discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere
to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and
abuse, and even corruption.

TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential

Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary

of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it

became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the

Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's

resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for

investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of

charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982,

all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on

June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan

on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private

corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official

functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General

Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing

services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his

failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the

information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy

disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as

it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures

prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the

complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security

Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a

case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period

fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute

impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of

the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

CARLOS R. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING
CORPORATION,* Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 29, 2002 decision1 and November 18,
2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51736. The challenged decision affirmed resolution nos.
9817382 and 9904793 of the Civil Service Commission dismissing the appeal of petitioner Carlos R. Gonzales from the decision of
the board of directors of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) finding him guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and ordering his dismissal from the service.

Petitioner was the casino operations manager of PAGCOR's Casino Filipino-Heritage in Pasay City. He was administratively
charged for dishonesty, misconduct and violation of company rules and regulations on the basis of the following:

Summary description of charge(s):

1. Unauthorized playing in [Casino Filipino]-Heritage [on] October 8 [and] 9, 1997, i.e., playing in [his] own branch and playing
beyond 6:00 a.m. of the day after an occasion.

2. Unauthorized playing at the big tables [on October 9, 1997].

3. Exceeding the table limit of P5,000 per deal set by management for playing officers.

4. Borrowing about P2.9 [m]illion from financiers.

5. Conspiring with [his] capital partners, composed of a guest [branch manager] and a small-time financier/player, in conceiving
and executing a nefarious scheme to draw P7 [m]illion from the casino treasury against personal checks issued by the small-time
financier/player who had only P20,000 in her bank account.

[He] personally facilitated with the casino treasury the personal checks of [his] capital partner without the authority of the
Senior Branch Manager for Operations and while [he was] not on duty.4

The charges arose from the irregularities that transpired during the opening of the expanded VIP gaming area at the Casino
Filipino-Heritage on October 8, 1997. Petitioner, in connivance with Richard Syhongpan, branch manager of Casino Filipino-
Davao City, concocted a scheme to draw P7 million from the casino treasury against the personal checks of Corazon Castillo, a
small-time financier and player who only had P20,000 in her account.

To circumvent casino regulations prohibiting PAGCOR officers from playing at the big tables, placing bets exceeding P5,000 per
deal and playing beyond 6:00 of the following morning, Syhongpan and petitioner employed Castillo as their "gunner" to proxy
for them in betting at the VIP area of the Casino Filipino-Heritage with bets ranging from P100,000 to P300,000 per deal. On
Syhongpan's instruction, petitioner approached various financiers to borrow money whenever they needed additional capital. In
the process, they incurred a total indebtedness of P2.7 million. When they could no longer borrow from the financiers, they
utilized one Quintin Llorente whom they falsely presented as an applicant for the accommodation of checks. In truth, the
applicant/owner of the checks was Castillo. Taking advantage of his position and influence, petitioner, who at that time was
supposed to be off-duty, accompanied Llorente to the treasury window and made his co-employees there believe that the check
accommodations were all cleared by the senior branch manager or the branch manager for operations when in fact they were
not. This enabled Syhongpan, petitioner and Castillo to borrow a total of P7 million from the treasury of Casino-Filipino-
Heritage. When they were through playing, they had P600,000 in total winnings from which petitioner received P250,000 as his
share.

PAGCOR had the matter probed by a panel of investigators which conducted hearings thereon. On December 2, 1997, PAGCOR
dismissed petitioner from the service for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and for loss of confidence. It denied his motion for reconsideration.

In resolution no. 981738 dated July 2, 1998, petitioner's appeal to the Civil Service Commission was dismissed for lack of merit.
He sought the reconsideration thereof but it was likewise denied in resolution no. 990479 dated February 17, 1999.

Undeterred, petitioner elevated his case to the CA. He contended that the Commission failed to appreciate that the facts of the
case did not support the charges against him. He also claimed that the Commission violated his right to due process.

The appellate court, however, dismissed petitioner's appeal. It ruled that the Commission did not err in upholding petitioner's
dismissal from the service and that its factual findings, duly supported by evidence, were conclusive on the court. It also held
that petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to present his case and, hence, his assertion that he was deprived of due
process was untenable. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner challenges the CA decision on the ground that he was denied due process. He also claims that the CA ruled
erroneously that the factual findings of PAGCOR, as affirmed by the Commission, were conclusive on it. Finally, he faults the CA
for its failure to appreciate circumstances that would mitigate his liability.

This Court is not persuaded.

Where the opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.5 Here, petitioner was heard through the written statement he submitted in response to the
memorandum of charges against him. He was given the opportunity to testify during the marathon hearings conducted by a
panel of investigators. He was also able to participate in all stages of the administrative proceeding as shown by the appeal he
filed with the Commission.

The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity
to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 6 Any seeming defect in
its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. 7 Thus, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked
by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. 8
In this case, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of PAGCOR as well as the Commission's resolution
dismissing his appeal and affirming the decision of PAGCOR in toto. In this light, his protestations that he was deprived of due
process does not hold water.

Petitioner's insistence that the appellate court erred when it ruled on the conclusiveness upon it of the factual findings of
PAGCOR as affirmed by the Commission is likewise incorrect. The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if
based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. 9 It is not for the appellate court to substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses.10 Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on
proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. 11 None of these defects has been shown in this case.

Unable to convince the appellate court to disregard the findings of fact of PAGCOR as affirmed by the Commission, petitioner
now wants us to open the entire records of the case and evaluate every detail of the respective versions of PAGCOR and the
Commission vis - à-vis his own. It is well-settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding
and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case.12 It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court, tribunal or
office.13 This flows from the basic principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latter's findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this
Court.14

The appellate court held that the factual findings of PAGCOR and the Commission were supported by substantial evidence. This
Court finds no reason to rule otherwise.

Through their "gunner" Castillo, Syhongpan and petitioner violated the table and time limits of PAGCOR officers. Petitioner
accompanied Llorente to the treasury window as an alleged applicant for accommodation of checks despite knowing that the
true applicant was Castillo who only had P20,000 in her bank account. He facilitated the accommodation of the checks by
making it appear that the checks had the clearance of the proper officers. But even assuming that he had the authority to make
such facilitation, he could not have validly done it since he was not on official duty at that time.

His acts thus constituted fraud or deceit. He deliberately flouted the rule of law, standards of behavior and established
procedures. He used his influence and position for his own benefit and to the prejudice of PAGCOR. Hence, petitioner was
correctly held liable for dishonesty and gross misconduct.

His acts warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal.

Petitioner takes the appellate court to task for not considering, in the determination of the penalty imposed on him (1) his
twenty years of service and (2) the fact that it was his first offense. There is no merit in this argument.

Petitioner failed to raise this issue before PAGCOR and the Commission. He pleaded the matter only in his consolidated reply to
PAGCOR's and the Commission's respective oppositions to his motion for reconsideration in the CA. Thus, the appellate court
correctly disregarded his belated invocation of circumstances that could have mitigated his liability. Matters, theories or
arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.15

Length of service does not necessarily entitle the erring employee to a reduction of the penalty imposed on him. It is not a
magical invocation that will automatically mitigate the liability of the party claiming it. 16 It is an alternative
circumstance17 which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate the penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case.

In this case, petitioner used his length of service, position and influence in carrying out the scheme which prejudiced the
interests of PAGCOR. Thus, it exacerbated, rather than tempered, the seriousness of his misdeed. Instead of exhibiting loyalty
to PAGCOR which recognized and rewarded his past services by promoting him to his present position, petitioner betrayed the
trust reposed on him and took advantage of his position to benefit himself. In the vernacular, this is known as bantay-salakay.

The gravity of the offense committed thus militates against his plea to treat length of service and "first offense" as mitigating
circumstances.18

Dishonesty and grave misconduct have always been and should remain anathema in the civil service. 19 A civil servant who
commits them exhibits moral obliquity and is neither fit nor worthy to remain in public office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DEnIed. The assailed May 29, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51736
upholding the Civil Service Commission's resolution nos. 981738 of July 2, 1998 and 990479 of February 17, 1999 is
hereby AFFIrMed.

Costs against petitioner.

Lim vs Court of Appeals GR 111397 12 August 2002

Facts: Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction, against Mayor Alfredo Lim. Policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s
license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club
and restaurant operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the work permit
applications of Bistro’s staff. Court granted preliminary injunction. However Lim issued closure of Bistro operations and filed
motion to dissolve the injunction order.
Issue: Whether or not Lim violated due process on the ground of failing to give Bistro the opportunity to be heard?
Decision: Petition denied. Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila without
due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code.
There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial
establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the
Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of
its licenses and permits. The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with
law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law.