Indersatonal Plies 38: 103-120, Mage 2001 (© 2001 Klawer La International Printed inthe Uied States 103 ‘The Centrality of Kashmir in India-Pakistan Security Dynamics AMALENDU MISRA University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom Abstract. A bellicose history, religious rivalry and a general sense of antipathy towards each other have put India and Pakistan at loggerheads for the past half-century. After their nuclear showdown in May 1998, very limited opportunities for peace existed between the two. Nonetheless, in an astonishing policy reversal, the nationalist (BJP) government in India agreed to setle the dispute over Kashmir with Pakistan in a peaceful man ner But, on the first anniversary of their nuclear tests, both India and Pak {stan found themselves involved in an undeclared war in Kashmir, This article seeks to explore the internal dynamics of the conflict in Indian-held Kashmir, analyze the security ramifications, and highlight the scope for confidence building measures (CBMs) as a deterrent against any full-scale rilitary confrontation between India and Pakistan, Finally it throws light fon the future of Kashmir following the Indo-Pakistani military encounter in Kargil in 1999, Introduction! In geo-stratogic terms, Kashmir is to India and Pakistan what the Kurile Islands are to Russia and Japan, the Spratlys Islands are to China and counties of Southeast Asia, and Cyprus to Turkey and Greece.? Although primarily cases of contested sov: ereignty, they nonetheless have extensive security ramifications with serious potential for conflict. The disproportionate military might of Russia, China and Turkey against their adversary(ies) in the respective cases reduces the severity of the conflict? By contrast, owing to their long-standing animosity and recent nuclear parity, one is forced to confront a scenario in which a conventional war between India and Pak- {stan could escalate into a nuclear conflict. Kashmir is occupied by both India and Pakistan, and they challenge the legality of each other's position. Both have twice gone to war over the status of Kashmir and are currently fighting a proxy war in the disputed region. Huntington's thesis on the “lash of civilizations” is present here as Muslim guerrillas fight a holy war or jihad against the nnon-Mustim Indian state and the replication of the later. India has responded to the situation by amassing the largest number of military personnel in the region in times of peace. Also, New Delhi’s counter-insurgency measures in Indian-held Kashmir have cre- ated a civil war-like situation with gross human rights violations. Meanwhile, reveling in their newly declared status as nuclear powers, both India and Pakistan push each other to alter or abandon their earlier position on Kashmir. “Their disagreements over Kashmir, in particular, have Kept tensions in the region at a constant boil."6 Strategic thinkers have long predicted that any conventional war104 Amalendu Misra between Pakistan and India over the disputed territory could escalate into a nuclear showdown.’ But, is the nuclear option as a means to force a Kashmir settlement being seriously considered by Islamabad and New Delhi? Kashmir in Perspective ‘Nestled in the high Himalayas, Kashmi’s original undivided form (a third of its territory, or 84,112 sq. kms, is in Pakistani control, out of this 5,180 sq. kms. is ceded to China, and 37,555 sq. kms. is under illegal Chinese occupation) touched Afghanistan in the north-west, Pakistan in the west, Chinese Central Asia in the north and Tibet in the east. In other words, Kashmir serves as the gateway to four great civilizations — Islamic, Chinese, Tibetan and Indian, Although predominantly Muslim, Kashmir Valley is not strictly Islamic in the sense that its rich culture isa product of contributions made by several different reli- gious, ethnic and cultural communities. Its southernmost flank, Jammu, is over~ whelmingly Hindu, its eastern region of Ladakh is Buddhist. The tenuous homo- ‘geneity of Islam in the Kashmir valley until recently was tempered by the presence of a significant number of Hindus. Interestingly, Kashmir, the largest princely state of the British Indiain empire, was ruled for the better half of the 19% century and until 1947 by a Hindu Maharaja. ‘That Kashmir featured prominently in British strategic thinking about a “grand design” is beyond dispute. It occupied a key position in British imperial aims in Chi- nese Central Asia.? But Kashmir’s strategic importance was often overestimated. The British strategic thinkers considered Kashmir important, but only in terms of serving as a listening post. Therefore, it served as a forefront for espionage rather than a buffer or a future battleground as the British ascribed to Tibet and Baluchistan respectively in future strategic terms. And, through Kashmir, the Raj maintained a consulate in Kashgar in Chinese Central Asia.1° The “Great Game” with which many have come to associate Kashmir had very little to do with Kashmir, It merely served. as the first frontier post. In post-colonial South Asia, Kashmir’s geo-strategic importance is valued to an extreme by India, Pakistan and China for their own separate reasons, For India and Pakistan, Kashmir is both an emotional and strategic issue. For China, however, itis purely strategic and limited to the larger interest of maintaining Chinese hegemony in the region. India treats Kashmir not as a frontier post, as did the British, but the first line of defense against any Chinese or Pakistani incursion from the north. Undoubtedly, the loss of Kashmir implies vulnerability of the federal capital New Delhi and the entire northern region to enemy offensive. However, for Pakistan, the loss of Kashmir could be calculated not only in the geo-strategic domain but also in terms of actual threats to the very survival of the Pakistani state. The issue of Kash- mir provides vital emotional glue to Pakistani identity, which is otherwise hostage to enormous ethnic, sectarian and economic differences. Should Islamabad surrender Kashmir, the Pakistani nation-building process would receive a mortal blow.‘The centrality of Kashmir in India-Pakistan security dynamics 105 From Limited Democracy to Electoral Fraud ‘While the nature of the current contest in Kashmir is framed by religions, the defi- nition of political identities along religious lines is of recent origin. Political parties embracing a particular religious ideal, although ubiquitous in Kashmir and the rest of India, were marginal until recent decades. As late as the 1980s, the two major political parties in the province — the National Conference (NC) and the Congress (1) — favored a policy of secularism. However, the difficult relationship between these two rivals, which ranged from extreme hostility to “tactical alliance,” dampened the true ideals of democracy in the province. Frustrated by their inability to act through politics, dissatisfied groups used religion as a means of political mobiliza- tion. While Hindu political groups like Shiv Sena concentrated on the Hindu-domi nated areas in Jammu, Islamic groups like Jamaat-e-Tlba and People’s League con- centrated on the Muslims of the province. Opportunism became the byword in Kashmiri politics of the 1980s.!! We are familiar with popular opposition to regimes where democracy has been trampled. In the case of Kashmir, democratic ideals were undermined not by any regime but by two self-serving, opportunistic political parties that had very little regard for the eléctorate. The final jolt came in the wake of the much publicized 1987 State Assembly elections in which the opposition was muffled by NC-Congress (I) dirty tactics of vote rigging, amending or ignoring electoral rules, and other irregu- Iarities, Such blatant disregard for democracy disenchanted not only the opposition but the masses as well. Disillusioned, several young opposition activists joined the armed struggle soon after the 1987 stage-managed election. !? Some Kashmiri politicians ascribe the roots of secessionism, armed uprising, insurgency and religious militancy in the province to the failure of democratic process, Balraj Puri, a former NC member, for example, argues that free and fair elec~ tions in the province not only curbed fundamentalism, secessionism and communal- ism but, to @ large extent, helped initiate @ natural progression towards the integra- tion of the province with India.!? This is satisfactory, as far as it goes. However, one ight follow by asking why — if democracy was so crucial to the province's political culture — did the Indian state undermine it? Moreover, one would expect, knowing, the sensitivity of the province's accession to India, that New Delhi should have been ‘more careful in dealing with its politics. What went wrong? With hindsight, it can be argued that the Congress (1) party had a nonchalant attitude towards Kashmir. The party is indeed notorious for its record of intervention in provincial politics to main- tain its hegemony. In the case of Kashmir, too, it maintained a similar disposition while ignoring the province's fragile political atmosphere and falsely believing in its own strength, ‘The Pakistani Position Kashmir has little in common with the modern Pakistani state. Though some Pak- istanis (Punjabis and Pushtuns) emphasize a greater degree of cohesion with Kash- mir, this claim is open to debate." In ethno-cultural terms, Kashmiris are distinct from the four main ethno-linguistic and cultural groups in Pakistan — Punjabis, Pushtuns, Sindhis and Balochs. Yet, there is an overwhelming impression both in106 Amalendu Misra Pakistan and abroad that Pakistanis strongly favour the accession of all of Kashmir into Pakistan.!5 This mind-set is reflected both in official position and popular aspi- ration. Although Pakistani allegiance to their state is not always total, they do appre- its external policies. Given the endemic ethnic collision between various groups in Pakistan, it seems strange that they wish to add another community (Kashmiris) that would only exac- erbate already existing ethnic tensions. The apparent unanimity between the Pak- istani state and the citizenry regarding Kashmir can be explained in terms of Islam. ‘Throughout, Islamabad’ claims on Kashmir and the promotion of self-determina- tion through propaganda and other means have drawn sustenance from a common faith. When a Pakistani state was imagined at Cambridge University during the 1930s, Kashmir was, say some historical assessments, represented by the letter “K” of Pakistan. !6 The Pakistani nation-building process, therefore, is unfinished without the inclusion of Kashmir. Kashmir is central to Pakistar’s Islamic national unity. Although Islam is the main factor that binds the Pakistani state and Kashmir, the matter has also been kept alive due to a “mutually contradictory historical narrative” between Pakistan and India. ‘The revisionist thesis that the Maharajah Hari Singh’s signature of accession was actually obtained after Indian forces moved into Kashmir!” has also helped Pakistan prepare a moral and legal case against Indian claims to the tertitory.!* According to this, had Britain and India not connived against Pakistan it could have rightfully inherited Kashmir according to the rules of partition. The narrative in Pakistan cen- ters around India's “evil designs” that intend to climinate the Pakistani state. In India, it takes the shape of perpetual Pakistani attempts to undermine Indian sovereignty. Scholars from both countries, and others with their own preferences for one of these perspectives, have produced rival versions of Kashmiri history. Instead of offering any plausible solution to the problem, their contributions have further complicated matters.!9 Also, Kashmir’s proximity to Pakistan’s domestic politics is crucial. Almost all Islamabad regimes, both democratic and authoritarian since Pakistan's creatioi 1947, have used the Kashmir issue to consolidate their position. As one critic puts it, from Liagat Ali Khan down to the recently deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff, all Pakistani leaders have been hawkish on Kashmir20 Therefore, any regime that ignores or attaches less importance to Kashmir risks becoming unpopular among. civilians or the military or both, leading to its eventual dismissal With regard to Kashmir, Pakistan follows a two-pronged approach, the breadth of which inchudes, at one end of the spectrum, the call for the international community to intervene and find a peaceful solution to the problem. On the other end of the same spectrum, Pakistan has maintained a clandestine involvement in promoting armed upris- ing in the territory against India2! Recent and overt Pakistani interference in Kashmiri affairs, however, goes back to the partition era during which the fate of Kashmir was decided. Islamabad claims that the manner in which Kashmir was accessioned to India does not reflect the genuine wish of the Kashmiris in the present context. Therefore, India should allow the Kashmiris the option of expressing their desire through a plebiscite on ‘whether to remain in the Indian federation, join Pakistan, or form an independent state by uniting with the other half ofthe teritory currently under Pakistani control.‘The centrality of Kashmir in India-Pakistan security dynamics 107 Further, Islamabad also insists on third-party negotiations on Kashmir ~ a demand vigorously opposed by New Delhi, India says that any other country’s involvement would undermine the spirit of the Simla Accord of 1972 that laid down the principle of a bilateral solution to any problem between the two. As mentioned carlier, Pakistan has also brought the matter to the attention of the international community? But, owing to its limited influence in international fora, Pakistan has failed to generate support in its favour23 ‘The Indian Position India’s case regarding Kashmir cannot be understood without first assessing the ‘commonality between New Delhi’s views and those of Islamabad. In other words, we need to identify the areas (both abstract and concrete) that are mutual to both India and Kashmir. The civil war-like situation in Kashmir is only a decade old. Consider- ing that the territory was joined to India immediately after independence, this upris- ing appears belated. Why did the Kashmiris not rise up against India in the first four decades preceding accession to India? Were they constrained? If not, what factors bound Indians and Kashmiris together in the past? Who were its key constituents? Can that old equation be re-established to end the civil war? The nature and character of current Kashmiri militancy is a recent phenome- non. For 40 years, from 1948 to 1987, the allegiance of the Muslim inhabitants of the province remained largely in New Delhi's favour. The Indo-Pakistani rivalry during this phase metamorphosed into two conventional wars (1948 and 1965). ‘These confrontations were opportunities for the Kashmiris to rise up against India. Kashmiri opposition against the Indian state during these critical times could have been potentially damaging to India, initiating the process of Kashmir’s indepen- dence. Moreover, the logic used against the Pakistani state to create Bangladesh could have been used equally by Kashmiris against New Delhi in 1971.24 Interest- ingly, Kashmiris never exploited these situations in all those years. In the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, for instance, Kashmiris not only did not revolt against India, but also apprehended Pakistani infiltrators and soldiers and handed them over to Indian authorities 25 ‘One can identify several reasons for this behavior. Although overwhelmingly Islamic, Indian-held Kashmir is a melting pot of ideas and races. Kashmiri identity is a reflection of Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist cultures. Initially, therefore, Kashmiris, were faced with the choice of identifying themselves cther with the overtly authori- tarian, religiously narrow and the stifling centralized polity of Pakistan or a secular, socialist and democratic India. The special status of the province laid down in Article 370 of the Constitution of India, guaranteeing the preservation of the overwhelming Islamic identity and its protection from encroachment by non-Kashmiris, was a fur- ther incentive to its Muslim inhabitants to remain within the Indian union. Never- theless over the years this cordiality came under strain as New Delhi pressured the Kashmiri leadership to cede more policy areas to the centre than those (i.e, defense, foreign affairs, and communications) that were stipulated in the instrument of acces- sion.26 Further, a poor record of democracy in the province also created deep divi- sions between Kashmiris and the Indian state. A combination of factors — the resur-108 Amalendu Misra gence of global militant Islam, intervention of Pakistan, India’s meddling with the democracy movement and institutional failures — precipitated the crisis in the late 1980s. In addition, external factors, including the end of the Cold War and the “con- tagion effect” of secessionist movements elsewhere (e.g., Bosnia) provided moral impetus to the uprising. Irrespective of their ideologies and huge differences, almost all of India’s political parties consider Kashmir an inalienable part or limb of the nation’s sacred body (att aang). In spite of their great diversity, this attitude is shared by most Indians, As is the case with Pakistan, Kashmir also generates strong nationalistic sentiments among the ‘masses, the ruling establishment and the political parties. Although political regimes in India do not necessarily require Kashmir to consolidate their electoral position, any move on their part to abandon the province could prove fatal and amount to political suicide. New Delhi attaches far more geo-strategic importance to Kashmir than Pakistan. In terms of national security, New Delhi faces two external enemies in Kashmir — Pakistan and China. The Indian defense forces are trapped in direct combat on and around the infamous Siachen glacier against Pakistani-supported forces or the regu- lar Pakistani arniy. India’s military is also on perpetual guard against China in the outer Aksai Chin region. Already, Pakistan and China occupy large chunks of Kash- mii territory. In India’s threat perception, abandonment of Kashmir would mean reducing the external line of defense close to the national capital New Delhi and exposing it to direct enemy strikes within minutes, ‘The crisis in Kashmir no doubt has tainted India's international image. For New Delhi, it is an agonizing and, at the same time, intractable question. The problem is insoluble because any alternative to the status quo undermines India's sovercignty and national security. Within India, nationalists, bureaucrats, neutral academics, pol- icy-makers, and a section of brasstacks have suggested a number of measures from ethnic flooding to military rule, plebiscite to shared sovereignty, conceding the valley to Pakistan or allowing Kashmir’s complete independence27 All these suggestions, however, are fraught with limitations. And, alternatives to these broad and difficult options are equally non-viable from both Indian and Pakistani perspectives. Realisti- cally, then, India is unlikely to give up Kashmir, Also, if India continues with the sta- tus quo itis improbable that there would be a very large constituency for peace on Indian terms. Hence the grim remark of an analyst that the “prospects (in Kashmir) are for a long, bitter war that may last generations”28 may be true. Kashmir in Post-nuclear India-Pakistan Peace Initiatives One can identify four primary areas of conflict between Indian and Pakistan that pose major impediments to confidence building measures (CBMs). These are Kash- ‘mir, nuclear arms, religious extremism, and the role of the ruling establishment.2?, Until recently, bar Kashmir, ll other areas of contention appeared tractable. Howev- er, in a major policy change, New Delhi expressed its willingness to settle the Kash- mir dispute with Pakistan. On his historic bus journey to Lahore on February 20, 1999, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee made it amply clear that his government wanted a settlement to the Kashmir problem. Throughout the past 50‘The centrality of Kashmiri India-Pakistan security dynamics 109 years, Kashmir was non-negotiable forall the politcal regimes in New Delhi. That an Indian government would talk one-to-one with Pakistan on Kashmir was a surprise. It was doubly surprising as the talks were initiated by a staunchly nationalist Indian government. The Lahore Declaration (the outcome of Mr Vajpayee’s visit to Pak- istan) spelled out Kashmir as the main obstacle to peace between the two countries. Many analysts were left perplexed by New Delhi’s paradoxical dynamism that included, in the late 1990s, nuclear tests, intensified rhetoric against Beijing, test fi ing the Agni II Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and finally the “bu diplomacy?’ which unveiled a new era in India-Pakistan relations, Nevertheless, logic existed within New Delhi's paradoxical dynamism. Several different factors can be identified as catalysts working towards this new policy orientation, t, of course, was Pakistan’s nuclear capability. As long as Pakistan was non- nuclear, India could ignore its demand for a settlement. The parity in nuclear capa- bility forced New Delhi to reassess its position. Interestingly, their mutual nuclear ‘weapon capabilities also allowed India’s “hot pursuit” of the militants inside Pakistan; Pakistan would be deterred from responding for fear of nuclear retaliation. Indian strategic thinkers were seriously imagining a scenario in which Kashmiri separatists, armed with a couple of nuclear weapons provided by disgruntled Pakistani army officers, take New Delhi hostage with the explicit demand of the later’s uncondition- al pull out from Kashmir. Therefore, the objective of the New Delhi-initiated Lahore Declaration was to design CBMSs that prevent no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear arsenals and control of such ‘weapons. If we probe the declaration a litle deeper we notice that New Delhi wanted a ‘mutual nuclear non-aggression pact prior to any settlement on Kashmir. Simultane- ously, it was engaged in the pursuit of a military edge over Pakistan as was confirmed by the recent testing of intermediate range Agni II missile capable of carrying nuclear ‘warheads and targeting any part of Pakistan and a large area of China. Added to that is ‘New Delhi’s superior conventional warfare capability vis-a-vis Islamabad" Iti an old Brahminic ploy to neutralize the enemy through gestures of friendliness while building ‘up one’s own strength. New Delhi appeared to be pursuing just that tactic, The second factor that motivated India to talk of a Kashmir settlement was the increasing realization that an independent Kashmir was improbable. There was never 1 genuine willingness among the Pakistani establishment to grant independence to Kashmir. Thanks to China, which feels nervous about its own restive Uighur Muslim populace in the outlying province of Sinkiang, Pakistan is ever more cautious in talk- ing about an independent Kashmir. China, a committed ally of Pakistan, has been less partisan throughout the current crisis ‘As mentioned earlier, Kashmir is not only occupied substantially by India, more than half of its territory is usurped by Pakistan and China. If there isa genuine agree- ment on Kashmir, New Delhi would insist on a transparent settlement that would involve not only Indian-occupied Kashmir but the other two usurpers — Pakistan and China. New geopolitical developments in the region, discussed below, and a sober reckoning about the remote probability that Pakistan, China and India would all cede territories for a unanimous solution to the problem have helped New Delhi initiate this discussion.110 Amatendu Misra A warming of relations with China®® — which has developed cold feet over Kash- ‘mir — and the talk of a new strategic arc joining Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi,?> also contributed to India's new stance on Kashmir. Beijng’s fully appreciates divi- dends of a long-term peaceful relationship with New Delhi. A sort of mutual consen- sus between China and India to respect the status quo on their border demarcation further qualifies the distancing away of the Chinese from the Kashmir issue. China's uneasy hold over Tibet and India’s involvement in the “Tibet Question” is another factor that motivates Beijing to turn a blind eye to the Indian position in Kashmir. However, Beijing is unlikely to leave Islamabad completely to its fate. With the excep- tion of Pakistan, China “has experienced difficulty in establishing consistently good ‘workable relations with others? Therefore, until Beijing is fully convinced that it can strike a permanent and long-term relationship with New Delhi, it would not abandon Islamabad. New Delhi's long-term objective was to create a sense of friendliness among Pak- istanis towards India. There was a rapid development in that direction including ges- tures such as the renewal of a New Delhi-Lahore bus connection, easing of visa restrictions, cricket diplomacy, increased trade relationships and so on. However, the recent India-Pakistan military engagement in Kargil has put a big question mark on any peace initiatives and confidence building measures. The worst casualty of the recent military engagement in Kashmir is the loss of faith among Indians and Pak- istanis towards each other. There is a strong reckoning among Indians (moderates included) that Pakistan cannot be trusted.5 Kashmir has also inspired generation of Indians and Pakistanis to embrace extreme forms of jingoism. Sports links between the two countries already were temporarily suspended. And, the Indian establishment appears resolute in its stand that there can be no agreement about Kashmir on Pakistani terms. Kargil and the Long-term Geo-political Situation After their nuclear tests in May 1998, New Delhi and Islamabad claimed “war between them is now unthinkable.” Within a year, however, they were locked in a bit- ter battle over Kashmir. The latest crisis in Kashmir was Pakistan’s doing.* It buried the Lahore Declaration signed between the prime ministers of both India and Pak- istan only a short time earlier. In May 1999, a nervous New Delhi discovered that some strategic heights in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir had been occupied by Pakistani-backed militants and army regulars. When it tried to flush them out, Indian troops came under heavy attack. It responded in a characteristically military fashion. But the battle dragged on for more than two months, with no sign that the infiltrators were retreating and disproportionate casualties on the Indian side. ‘The military confrontation between India and Pakistan in Kargil was a “localised wwar."37 However, it had wider ramifications. It deeply affected the politics and popu- lar mood on two sides. Both India and Pakistan daringly responded to the crisis. The sectarian divide in Pakistan and differences over religion and caste in India, which. have long plagued domestic social conditions in these two countries, were momen- tarily forgotten. The war filed a generation of Indians with deep nationalistic fervor who earlier had begun to question the efficacy of holding on to Kashmir. The massThe centrality of Kashmir in India-Pakistan security dynamics U1 response to the crisis in Pakistan was even more profound. The event was also a watershed for Kashmiris, albeit for an entirely different reason. For the frst time, the Kargil crisis brought Kashmiris closer to the truth that India will never give up on its Kashmir position. The reactions of the international community to the Kargil crisis in particular, and to Kashmir in general, were even more crucial ‘Humanitarian intervention by the international community in domestic conflicts, within several troubled regions had heightened Kashmiri hopes for a similar response. In the past 52 years, Pakistan has introduced the Kashmir issue to the inter- national community with dogged persistency and pursued, pleaded and even demanded international intervention. From the beginning, Kargil was a part of Pak- istani military adventurism; nonetheless, Islamabad hoped that such a crisis would lead to greater international involvement in Kashmir. At a time when the UN and the West were engaged in one way or another in Kosovo, East Timor, Chechnya and Kur- distan, such calculations were not completely out of place. The anti-India umbrella opposition, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APH ‘was determined to create panic in the valley during the Kargil war. This rainbow coalition that had achieved very little prior contact with the masses (owing to con- stant harassment by the Indian forces) came out into the open during the war. Its call for hartals or closures of businesses and all other public activities by Kashmiris was widely heeded. For a while it appeared to be posing as an alternative to the pro-India National Conference government of Farooq Abdullah in Kashmir. Meanwhile mili- tant infiltrators from Pakistan used arson, random shooting and car bomb attacks to demoralize Indian security forces and incite a popular Kashmiri uprising, Indeed, the intensification of terrorism at this juncture was used as a means to open up new fronts. The simultaneous shelling by Pakistan along the Line of Control (LoC) in Uri and Kupwara sectors in the valley and the Rajouri and Poonch areas in Jammu creat- ed a state of deep confusion. ‘A prolonged engagement in Kargil would have been disastrous for India. New Delhi not only found it difficult to react to the situation, but was extremely weary of the restive Kashmiris in the valley. Since it had responded harshly in Kashmir during. peacetime, one could only imagine how it would have behaved had the Kashmiris come out into the streets at this critical jancture. Although international law of war recognises the rights of a sovereign nation to defend its territory, it is equally harsh if civilians are its major targets. An early end to the confrontation in Kargil threw cold ‘water on the plans of those who were hoping for an international intervention, It was a bloody campaign and the West stood by India's offensive against the infil- trators.>8 Even more startling was Western diplomatic and moral support for New Delhi's campaign in Kashmir. The Economist, for example, maintained, "India should continue its slow and bloody method of ejecting the intruders from its territory” °By far it was the longest Indian military confrontation in Kashmir. While India’s offen- sive continued, Pakistan sought to garner international support, However, there was little support for the Pakistani position. Although the European community, the United States, Britain and others expressed their anxiety over the crisis, they nonetheless maintained that Pakistan unconditionally withdraw its personnel from the Indian-held part. The intervention by US President Bill Clinton, who asked Pak-112 Amalendu Misra istan to pull back, finally brought the military confrontation to an end and helped avert a full-scale war between the two nuclear powers. ‘This Indian military victory over the Pakistani infitrators may be short-lived. The Line of Control (LoC) is porous and New Delhi cannot maintain a 24 hour vigil in this inhospitable terrain, Second, there could be a renewed attempt by Muslim militants to take up positions. Third, having lost the war both at the diplomatic and military level, Islamabad would not hesitate to meddle in the situation in whatever possible means available to it. However, on balance, one could also argue that Pakistan has been forced to support militancy in Kashmir having failed to bring India into any meaningful nego- tiation including that of the UN sponsored plebiscite? Further, since New Delhi consis- tently has ignored Islamabad’s proposal for conventional and nuclear arms control (such as nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia) the latter pursues a policy of “bleed- ing India in hundred different places” to weaken its strength. In the past, Pakistan has regularly assisted, organised and dispatched groups of highly motivated Muslim guerrillas from its side of Kashmir to cross the LoC and attack Indian positions and kill civilians in the Indian-held Kashmir. ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan left thousands of potential recruits for a future jthad. Now Kashmir has become a haven for these radical militants. Actively supported by fan, these Islamic mercenaries now arrive from as far away as Canada, the UK and Chechnya.#! ‘The Pakistani-sponsored Muslim mercenaries are fast becoming a source of regional instability and global terrorism. Although the United States actively promot- ed the role of these fighters during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it now sees them as a menace. This is amply qualified in Washington's non-recognition of the ‘Taliban government in Afghanistan and the campaign against Osama Bin Laden? There is @ consensus now in the West that the Pakistani-backed guest militant Kashmir threaten regional security in this most militarized area. Spearheaded by Benazir Bhutto, even within Pakistan a storm was brewing against Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff and the efficacy of his support to the militants. Thanks to their ruth- lessness and, often, unorthodox un-Islamic activites like extortion, gang rape and. killing of innocent civilians,44 the Kashmiris now question their credentials as mujahids or God’s soldiers. However, so long as Pakistan serves as a patron to the militants there is little chance of finding any peaceful solution to the problem, Involvement of Muslim militants has transformed the conflict over Kashmir from a strictly territorial issue to that ofa religious war. For narrow political gains Pakistan has Islamised the Kashmir issue both domestically and at the international level (within the Organization of the Islamic Countries, OIC). But the outcome has been. extremely damaging, It has not only prevented finding a democratic solution to the problem#5 but has encouraged Hindu fundamentalism in India, While the Kargil adventure was turned into a “people's religious crusade” by the Islamic hard-liners in Pakistan, 46 the Hindu chauvinists in India interpreted it as another attempt by Mus lim marauders from Central Asia to invade India.‘? In the past, Kashmir has been exploited by right-wing parties to garner Hindu votes in India. They might use the ‘occasion in subsequent parliamentary elections. And, it can significantly affect India’s secular fabric and the majority-minority relations.‘The centrality of Kashmir in India-Pakistan security dynamics 113 ‘The Scope for Confidence Building Measures Although Pakistan has used the Islamic card to create tension in Kashmir, it now recognises the unintended consequences of such moves on itself. The rise of religious obscurantism, sectarian schisms, and extreme fanaticism haunting the Pakistani state and society today are the results of it playing host to Islamic fundamentalism, Islam~ abad pursued a policy of promoting fundamentalist Islam with Washington's active collusion. Thanks to the prospect of building oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia across Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States was easily persuaded by the Pak- istani logic of nurturing the Taliban.** Mercifully that prospect now seems stalled. A new reckoning in Washington opposes Talibanisation of the region. If this policy reversal is extended to the Indian sub-continent, it can create an atmosphere for dia- logue on Kashmir, By constantly associating the Kashmir conflict with Islamic terrorism, New Delhi hhas managed to corner considerable international sympathy. This factor has not only enabled India to resist any third party intervention but also has helped it dismiss the democratic opposition movement in the valley as civilian fronts of various terrorist organizations. A level playing field for any negotiation, therefore, is dependent on the weeding out of Islamic terrorism in Kashmir. In the past, General Musharraf has been partial to Kashmiri militants, arguing, “Islam does not recognize political boundaries. Jihad is a concept of God.” For a start, serious American efforts to con- strain militant Islam in Central Asia could include a request to Pakistan to stop play- ing host to the mujahids in Kashmir. A guid pro quo could follow, forcing India to limit its support to various sectarian Islamic organizations responsible for the mur- der and mayhem in Sind and Punjab in recent years. Although hawkish, General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan's mili- tary-led government, also recognises the importance of peace initiatives between Islamabad and New Delhi. Unlike many of his civilian and military predecessors, ‘Musharraf regards Kashmir to be the core issue confronting the two countries.5° Kashmir, in his view, is the precursor to any formal arms control agreements. There- fore, while he does not exclude the existing frameworks for any bilateral discussion, his focus on Kashmir suggests a top-down rather than a Bottom-up approach to over- all conflict resolution! True, the conventional approach to bilateral and multilateral CBMs emphasizes less contentious issues first with the most difficult problems addressed later. This approach invariably adds a natural balance and longevity to negotiations and to ultimate outcomes. ‘A top-down approach to conflict resolution requires a solid popular base, political courage, reciprocity, a certain degree of obligation and visionary leadership. General Musharraf’s proposal to resolve the Kashmir dispute firs, in order to usher in per- ‘manent peace in the region, is not without its attendant bottlenecks. First, this is a unilateral suggestion and may not be acceptable to India. Second, it favors the Pak- istani position and would therefore fail to bring India to any negotiating table, Third, even if the leadership in New Delhi decides to follow up the Pakistani suggestion, it will find it hard to carry it through owing to the nature and character of the coalition government. Moreover, New Delhi’s liberal use of Kargil conflict for domestic divi- dends in recent months has clouded prospects of any negotiation in this direction 52114 Amalendu Misra India’s commitment to CBMs has always been partial? In the 1980s it was one of the staunchest opponents of CBMs. Although India embraced this concept in the 1990s, its commitment to the ideals of CBMs (like Pakistan's) remains half-hearted.5# Indeed, the continuation of the scepticism over CBMs and mistrust towards Pakistan is reflected in India’s new defense budget.55 ‘While the establishment of long-term peaceful relations is dependent on the ini- tiative and commitment of the concerned states, third party involvement can greatly enhance its scope. Breaking this deadlock requires outside intervention. While India is against third-party intervention and negotiation on Kashmir, itis not opposed to constructive suggestions. One of the main hindrances to India-Pakistan cooperation in the past was the low level of US interest in the region. Since Washington consid- cred South Asia a “strategic sideshow both India and Pakistan were left to them- selves and a rising level of tension between the two was only natural. Greater US involvement in the civilian and economic sector in both countries could have been a deterrent for the India-Pakistan conflict. But that could change. Sensitive to New Delhi’ stand on Kashmir, Washington has now refused to medi- ate on the matter.57 While this new position rules out any direct intervention by the US, President Clinton made it amply clear that, should India and Pakistan need American assistance in any negotiation, Washington would provide all possible help. This non-intervention can be interpreted as a form of de facto intervention. By insist: ing on a bilateral solution to the problem, Washington has applied moral force on both Islamabad and New Delhi to open dialogue. Here the agenda appears to be con- structive engagement. Since neither Pakistan nor India wish to miss the opportunity to have a friend and ally in the United States, both would seriously work toward find- ing a solution to the dispute.* Soon after the visit of President Clinton to the sub- continent, General Musharraf expressed his desire to begin talks with India on Kash- mir, Although New Delhi is lukewarm to such a dialogue, the potential for ‘movement exists. Indeed, the most effective way to solve the problems between India and Pakistan is to open channels of communication both with summitry and at the grassroots level which encourages people-to-people contact? It is a supreme irony that, although India is home to the third largest Muslim population in the world, Muslims of Kash- mir valley wish to separate from the country. This suggests the failure of the Indian. state to promote greater cohesion among its different communities. Given their numerical strength, Indian Muslims could play an important role in establishing bridges of friendship with Pakistan. A spillover effect on Kashmir can be a likely out- come of this engagement. If Pakistan uses the logic of religion to forment tension in Kashmir, India could use the same logic to neutralize it. If New Delhi facilitates greater interaction between Indian Muslims and their Pakistani counterparts the process could undoubtedly lead to significant reduction of tension. ‘The rise of Hindu militancy in India, however, makes it difficult for the Indian state to appreciate the contribution that Indian Muslims could make in this direction. Indeed, the xenophobia and terror tactics of the Hindu nationalist parties such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Shiv Sena has created an atmosphere within India where any rapprochement with Pakistan on Kashmir is treated as subver-‘The centrality of Kashoir in India-Pakistan security dymamies 115 sive and anti-national. Therefore, no confidence building measures can strike root in India-Pakistan relations unless and until the influence of the above parties is checked, Conclusion Kashmir’s divided sovereignty and its acute geo-political significance constitute ideal conditions to serve as a buffer state between India, China and Pakistan. Move- ‘ment in that direction is possible only when India, Pakistan and China all voluntarily cede the territory under their occupation, However, neither China nor Pakistan are prepared for such an arrangement for their own separate reasons. China’s position on the recent India-Pakistan military confrontation in Kashmir remained studiously neutral. This can be interpreted as its unwillingness to see any change in the status ‘quo, New Delhi, one can argue, would willingly give up the territory under its control provided the other two powers involved follow suit. Pakistan’s unilateral and unprovoked violation of India's sovereign territory and the ensuing military conflict has made any negotiation on Kashmir an impossible task in the foreseeable future. Its meddling in the issue has not only affected Indo- Pakistani relations but forced other international actors to rally behind India, sup- porting a bilateral resolution of the matter. ‘Until now, Islamabad has insisted on the merger of Indian-occupied Kashmir with Pakistan, But if India insists on a settlement culminating in Kashmir’s complete inde- pendence, that would surely be to Pakistan's utter disadvantage. Similarly, India can- not ignore any Pakistani demand for discussion on Kashmir, The logical outcome of this stalemate is the maintenance of the status quo. At the moment, there is a consen- sus in India that the “line of control in Kashmir” should become a permanent, inter- nationally recognized border between India and Pakistan. Yet, the feasibility of this “Cyprus scenario” does not look very promising due to Kashmir’s precarious balance between two nuclear powers. Given Pakistan's newly acquired nuclear status itis like- ly that both the civilian and military establishment there would use this capability to support militancy in Kashmir with renewed vigor. In the final analysis, however, Pakistan will find it hard to pursue the current poli- cy of offensive engagement. Pakistan’s economy is in ruins, particularly because of Kashmir-related defense expenditures (one cannot ignore the possibilty of the coun- try becoming bankrupt because of this involvement). Additionally, thanks to Islami- sation of politics, a military dictatorship, and its long history of supporting terrorists, Pakistan faces growing international isolation. If Pakistan accepts the status quo on Kashmir it can avoid certain impending threats to its long term interests. Although this is a bitter prescription, it has to come to terms with the hard geo-political reali- ties and the dangers of a full-blown war. Since India, Pakistan and China are all in possession of a part of Kashmir this arrangement would suit all three. While such an ‘outcome would considerably reduce regional tension, it will nonetheless prove fatal to aspirations for Kashmiri independence,116 Amalendu Misra NOTES 1, The author fs gratefl tothe editor and three anonymous referees of Iernatonal Polite for thee ‘aluable comments and detailed criticisms onan earlier draft ofthis es 2. Although Karls, Spadys and Cyprus have received les attention and coverage inthe world media compared to Kashmis they nonetheless have iemense conflict potential and ar likely o dominate the regional and evn global polities in the immediate fate 3, Fora deuiled discussion on the Spratiscontovesy, see Mark. Valencla, China andthe South China ‘Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper 298 (London: ISS/Oxtord University Pres, 1995). heteniy Vietnam is "eying to oft the Chinese dominance in South China Sea (ex Spry) by developing an infor- ‘mal strategic alliance with Inia. Neyan Chand, “After the Bom” Far Eastern Faanomtic Review (April 15, 2000, p20, 4 While intellectually orginal, Huntingtons thesis nonetheless contested by many scholars and emai controversial. In response to Huntington's arguments in “The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Afar Vol. 72, No.3 (1993), pp. 2248, Fouad Ajai Kishore Mahibhubuni, Robert L. Barley, Lia Bingun and Jeane J. Kikpatick provided counter arguments in Foreign Afr, Vo. 72, No 4 (1993), pp. 2-26, In defence of his ginal postion, Huntington gun proposed“ Not Civilization - Whar? Frlgn Afi, Vol. 72, No.5 (193), pp. 186194. Huntington has reworked the arguments in The Clas of Citations ‘and the Remaking of the Worl Oner (New Yor: Simon & Suse, 1936) 5, Fora thought dicussion, see Mark Jurgensmeyer, The New Cold Wis? Religious Nationals Cone fronts the Secular Stat (Beckley: University of California Pzess, 1993). 66 “South Asa: An Explosive Mature? States Survey, 1998-99 (London: Oxford/nernationa Insti tute for Strategie Studies, 1998),p.222 7. This, however, not a unanimous view. Scholars ate divided in their resonse to nucleation of South Asia. While one schoo! holds that thanks to India-Pakistan nuclear parity there is now a ‘clne deterence another sehool cis the conteary. Howes its too ex to predic whether the proliferation optimists ~ suchas Devin Hagerty and Peter Lavoy — or the proliferation pessimists — such 5 Scott Sagan, PrafulBidwai and Achin Vanaik —atecortet in ther assessment. Forte beter half f this century, Britain ascribed tothe Mackinderan School of geopolitical theory which attached a great deal of importance to Central Asia a the “pivot of history” 9. Fora detailed and stimulating discussion on trish strategic planning se, G. Alder British India’s [Northern Frontier, 1865-1945: A Study imperial Policy (London: Bodley Hexd, 1963). 10, Peter John Brobst, “Sir Olaf Catoe andthe Question of British Grand Desig’ in "Kashmir 1947: Burdens of the Past, Options for the Future — Four Perspectives” Commonwealth and Comparative Pots, Vol. 36, No.1 (198). 96. 11, The 1987 State Assembly lection, however was stage-managed by the formation ofa cartel between ‘he Congres (1) and the National Confrence, pital outs suchas the Hind right-wing BJP and the Muslim United Font contested inthe election and had some succes 12, The most prominent among these are the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (KLF) lade Yasin ‘Mali, Hiebul Mujahedin eader Mohammed Yusu Shah and 000. 13, Sten Widnal, “The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Janna and Kashmie Asin Survey, Vol 37, No. 110997), pp. 1006-1007. 14, These claims are based on the Kashmir biredr that ocurred de 1o migration of several groups of ashmie weavers tothe undivided Panjab in the ate 19 and earl 20° cen, 15, -Mehtab Alf Shab, “The Kashmir Problem: A View from Four Proviness of Pakistan.” Contemporary South Asia, VoL 4, No.1 (1995), p. 108, 16, Kuldip Naya, “Kashmie: Rereaing its Past in dee to Ofer a Practicable Solution The Round ‘Table Nol, 323 (1992), . 306. 17. ‘The main architect of this theory i Alastair Lamb who has consistently questioned the Tndin side of. the argument. For tis particular thesis ee Alastair Lamb, Kash: A Dipped Legacy (Hertford shire: Roxfrd Books, 1991). This revisions interpretation, however, hasbeen heavily criticized by Inia. Foran interesting discussion, see Prem Shankar ha, Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History (ew Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).1s, 2 BR 24, 25. 26, a. 28, 20. 3h x 3 u ‘The centrality of Kashmir in India-Pakistan security dynamics 117 ‘That the “acesion of Kashmie to tndia was the end result ofthe deliberate planning, begun wel before independence, and that it was orchestrated to considerable extent by Lord Mountbatten? beeping Indias long term strategic interest in view (hus questionable) is marsaled by Pakistan in ‘recent years. Robert G Wirsng, Indi, Pakistan and the Kase Dispute: On Regional Confit adits Resolution (London: Macmilan, 1998), pp. 25-26 ‘Lamb, opt, and The Birth ofa Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 (Hertfordshire: Roxforé Books, 1994) and ‘Prem Sankar J, Kashi 1947: Riva Versions of History (Delhi: Oxford University res, 1996). recent years, these two author ave provide credence both Pakistani and Indian claims over the territory From two rival vantage point. ‘Yunas Samad, “Kashmir and the Imagining of Pakistan.” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 4, No, 1 (2995),p.74 Fora good discussion on claims of Pakistan-sponsored clandestine armed involvement in Keshmit, see Edward Desmond, "The Insurgency in Kashi” Contemporary South Asi, Vo. 4, No. (1981), pp.516. ‘UN Documents Oficial Records, 5/2245 (1951) p. 16 ‘Although Fakstan is « Maslin country, thenks to India’s cordial reationship with many Islamic polities there exist no consensus among the Organization of Ilamic Countries (OIC) on Kasha. ‘One can also argue that, unlike the Bangladeshis who recived military support from India in their 1971 war of veration, Kashmiris resived no such support Indeed the Kashmiris have been able to wage thei bate against India in recent yeas because of the military support fiom exeral actors A hypothetical question such asf they were provided military support how woul the Kashmiis have responded inthe 19605 and 1970s suggests hypothetical ans Raju G.C. Thomas, "The Struggle for Kashmit: Alternative Interpretations and Solutions” Conn porary South Asi, Vol. 2, No.2 (1993) p. 207. ‘Balraj Par, “Kashmiri: the Vitality of Rashmi Identity” Contemporary South Asi, Vol 4, No.1 (1995), p57. Foran original discussion onthe diferent solutions, sce Raj G.C. Thomas, “Relection on the Kash- ‘ir Problem in Raju GC. Thomas, ed, Pespecines on Kashmir The Roots of Conic in South Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992). Options such as independence, plebiscite, shared sovereignty, Kash mir asa protectorate, changing the ethnic profile ofthe valy through tanssgration, renegotiation ofthe boundary and finally India conceding the Valley to Pakistan ll have been assessed from an enlightened and neural perspective inthis stimulating volume. However, owing to their mutually cxclsive postions none a these options ace acceped ether by India o Pakistan Desmond of ct P16 For a wide ranging dscusion, see Michael Krepon and Art Sevak, eds, Criss Prevention, Con lence Building ad Reconciaion in South Asia (New Delhi: Mahohat, 1996). J. Mohan Malik, “india Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, Coss and Implications” Contemporary Souths Aca Vl. 20, No.2 (1998) e207 On the Bus to Peace” The Ezononst (Febroary27,1999),p.67 India went on record that it conducted the May 1998 nuclear tests to counter Chinese hegemony in South Asa. The statement of George Fernandes that Ching is India's number ane ener, howeves, was a "red herring” The tests were actualy conducted keeping Pakistan a view. There was no diplo- matic fll out between Beijing and New Delhi following the Indian tests. Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh visited Bejing atthe height of the latest Rashmi cris. The conclusive est was an agreement to set up ablatral “security dialogue" between Indi and China. This could signiicantty alfect the Kashmir issue —and might be to Indias advantage Forrellections on this arch, sce Diver, Eas Asan Rosi orcgn Policy: A New Rosso-Chinese Asis” The acc Review, ol. 11, No.4 (1998), pp. 485-503; Stephen Blank, "Which Way for Sino- Russian Relations?" Orbis (Summer 1998) pp. 45-360; Tan Chung, “A Russo-Sino-Indian Seategic Triangle — Signals Missed in tdi." Economie and Political Woot: Vol. 34, Nos. 1&2 (Ja. 9, 1988), p12 Michae! Yahuda, “China's Foreign Relations The Long March, Future Uncertain,” The China Quar- tery. No, 159 (1999), p. 65118 Amalendu Misra 35. This outpouring of rage was a result ofthe seriousness that Indians attached to Vajpayee’ trp t0 Pakistan Infact, there was very litle by way of concrete agenda inthe bus diplomacy It was merely trip undertaken to create an atmosphere of friendliness. India fl betrayed because, while the Pak Istani goverament was welcoming his Indian counterpan, it was simultaneously busy making prepa- rations for anew offensive in Karl. The progressive India Today pointed thatthe "mere mention of KargilKashmir conjures vivid images, of betrayal, anxiety, anger, sadness, determination, bravery, triumph and euphoria” Swapan Dasgupta, “Uniting India” India Today ly 2, 1999) pI. 36. "Kashmie Again? editorial, The Eonomis (Jue 12, 1989), p. 18. 37. Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashar: Democracy, Sei Determination and a Just Peace (New Delhi: Sage, 1997), p18. 38, "Kashmir: Militant Tendencies" The Economis (June 8, 1989),p. 78, 39. “Ever More Dangerous in Kashmis” The Bcanomis (June 19,1999), p75 40. The plan for a Cease-fie and Thuce Agreement between India and Pakistan was formalized in the LUN resolution of August 13, 198. This resolution alo called for a plebiscite subject to the return of, ‘normalcy in Kashmir and withdrawal of Pakistani regulars, UN Security Council Offical Records Documents S/1100 (August 15,1948). 4. Chris Smith, “Guess Ignite Regional Storm? The World Today, Vol $5,No.7 (1999), p.20. 42. "South Asia: An Explosive Mixture” Staregic Survey, 198-99 (London: Oxford / TISS, 1999), pp 223.204, 8. Smith op cit, p19 44. The atest vietins of Islamic militancy in Kashmie wer the minority Sikhs. Some 35 innocent Sikhs living in Chithisingh Por inthe Anantnag District in South Kashmir were massacred by the mem> bets of Lashkar-e-Toiba and the event coincided with President Clinton's vst India. 48. SVR. Nas, "Islamic Opposition inthe Political Proces: Lessons from Pakistan’ in John 1, Esposito, cc Poliscal Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Boulder: Lynne Rinne, 1997), pp. 135-156 46, Jason Barke, “Inthe Land ofthe Enemy” India Today (Jly 12,1999), pp 12-18 47. JN-Deshpande, "After the Conflict — Focus oa Kashmir” Economic and Political Weekly, Vo. 4, No. 29 (ly 17,1989), p. 1985. 48, Foran extremely stimulating discussion, see Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil ad the New Great Game in Central Asia London: LB. Tauris, 1998). 49. Harinder Baweja, "Mounting Evidence” India Today (March 13,2000), p.23. 50, In the General’ opinion no headway bas been made in the two countries relations because Kashmir bas always been given a ack seat. “Indeed there is only one dispute between the two, the Kashmir dispute... others are jst aberrations, minor differences of opinion which canbe resolved” Interview with General Musharraf, The Hindu ol. 26,No. 4 (January 22,2000) p. 51. Skeptics argue that Masharrafs tough stance on Kashmir is aimed at not finding a solution to the problem. "Peace with Inia, he realizes, can only stengthen India’s hold on Kashmic” Moreover, as Hamid Gul, former chief of Pakistani counter intligence service ISI points out being a military ‘man Mosharaf is fully awae ofthe fact thatthe "The Pakistan Army can never turn its face away from Kashmit. Iti the reason for is existence” Harinder Baweja “Pakistn-General in Trouble” India Today (Api 10,2000), 9.27. 52, Karl spawned five popular mainstream and several regional language movies in India. The other- rie fractred Indian society found woven together during the Kari confit. 53. MarieFrance Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence Duiding Measures, Adelphi Paper 307, (London ISS/Oxford, 1996), p.35. 54. Aabha Dist, "India-Pakistan: Are Commonly Accepted Confidence Building Structures Relevant Security Dialogue, Vol. 26, No.2 (1995), p19. 55, Neve Delhi introduced a staggering 28 percent Increase in the defence budget forthe year 2000, Thi ‘wae undertaken in order to consolidate its postion in Kashi Stephen Cohen, “The United States, India and Pakistan: Retrospective and Prospective” In Selig S. Harrison, Paul H. Kreisherg and Dennis Kux, eds, India and Pakistan: The First Fy Years (Cam- bridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1999), p. 195.The centrality of Kashmir i India-Pakistan security dynamics 119 57. Reflecting on the US policy on Kashmir, President Bill Clinton said during his bref stopover in Pak- stan that "We cannot and will not mediate on Kashmie” Bawa, "Pakitan-Gencral in Tube? op city p28, 58. This new American engagement refers to a situation where the United States can have beter rla- tions with several states engaged in rivalry. However, the US engagement with each would led toa situation where the contending partes can have better relations with each other atthe same time. ‘Nayan Chanda, "Coming in from the Cold” Far Eastern Economic Review (March 30,2000), pp. 22- 23. 58, Mutahir Abmed, “Confidence-building Measures between Pakistan and India: An Argument for Change" Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 7, No.2 (1998), pp. 137-145 60. Indians would lik the United States to support their stand, Although Washington has not endorsed the oficial Indian view that the Line of Contol in Kashmir be made the permanent horder between India and Pakistan, President Clinton, during his visit to India, epeatedly called for the Line of Con- trol to be respected, Address for correspondence: Amalendu Misra, Ph.D., School of Aftican and Asian Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BNI 9RH, United Kingdom Email: amalendumisra@hotmail.com