1.

OLIMPIO PANGONOROM and METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On or about the 10th day of July, 1989, in Quezon City, Olimpio Pangonorom, the driver and person in
charge of a motor vehicle (MMTC-passenger bus) strike and collide with an [I]suzu [G]emini car,
belonging to Mary Berba and driven by Carlos Berba y Remulla, thereby causing damages in the total
amount of ₱42,600.00,; as a consequence thereof said Carlos Berba sustained physical injuries for a
period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same
period of time and also his passengers namely: Mary Berba y Matti and Amelia Berba y Mendoza
sustained physical injuries for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated them from performing
their customary labor for the same period of time, thereafter, abandoned said offended parties without
aiding them, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties in such amount as may be
awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

The prosecution presented five witnesses: (1) Carlos R. Berba; (2) Mary M. Berba; (3) Amelia Berba; (4)
Edward Campos; and (5) Enrico B. Estupigan. On the other hand, the defense presented three
witnesses: (1) Olimpio himself; (2) Milagros Garbo; and (3) Nenita Amado.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC Branch 79) finds accused Olimpio Pangonorom (“Olimpio”)
guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple slight physical injuries and sentences him
to suffer an imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended parties of the
damages incurred by their motor vehicle and to reimburse their medical expenses. Herein petitioners
appealed the trial court’s decision which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in toto. Likewise, the
appellate court held that his employer, Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) was already estopped in
assailing the trial court’s decision considering that the it never appealed said decision within the
reglementary period.

Hence, the present petition. It is also worthy to note that as defense, the training officer of MMTC testified
on the procedure of the company in hiring an applicant driver and the requirements to be submitted by the
applicant, and, the supervisor of the same company explained the internal control relative to the
supervision of their drivers.

ISSUE:

1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in sustaining the trial court’s findings of facts
instead of considering certain facts and circumstance raised by petitioners that properly cast an element
of reasonable doubt.

2. The CA erred for having ruled that the MMTC is already estopped from assailing the trial court’s
decision considering that the MMTC never appealed the same within the reglementary period

3. MMTC is subsidiarily liable considering its due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees..

HELD:

1. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can
correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision
based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. Petitioners assert that Carlos was
negligent because he transferred to the lane where Olimpio was then driving along without first blinking
his signal light and with his car only 20 meters away from the bus. This being so, petitioners assert that
they should not be held responsible for Carlos’ negligence. Petitioners’ assertions have no merit.
Olimpio is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the MMTC since 1984.17 As a public utility
driver, Olimpio should have as his primary concern the safety not only of himself or of his passengers,
but, also the safety of his fellow motorists. Considering that it had just rained, it was still drizzling and the
road was slippery when the subject incident took place,18 Olimpio should have been more cautious and
prudent in driving his passenger bus.

2. YES. Per careful perusal of the records of the case, the Supreme Court (SC) found that when
petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal, the MMTC already appealed the civil aspect of this case. It
likewise interposes an appeal with respect to the civil aspect of this case because of its subsidiary liability
as employer of the accused under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

3. NO. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense in the present case.

The law involved in the present case is Article 103 of the RPC, in relation to Articles 100 and 102 of the
same Code, which reads thus:

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

Pursuant to the above Article, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee’s civil liability in a
criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he is indeed the employer of the
convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the employee committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution against the employee has not been
satisfied due to insolvency.

The provisions of the RPC on subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are deemed written into the
judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial
court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.

The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal
action. In the present case, there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioners,
the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry, and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a
wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. However,
there is no proof here of Olimpio’s insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not
attained finality. This being so, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only
after proof of the accused-employee’s insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced.

In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employer’s subsidiary civil liability unless it
appears that the accused-employee’s primary liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied because of
insolvency. This fact cannot be known until sometime after the verdict of conviction shall have become
final. And even if it appears prima facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied,
execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of course. The procedure for the enforcement
of a judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes
final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is returned unsatisfied
because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the
MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily
liable with its accused-employee considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpio’s insolvency.
 2. ANTONIO V. NUEVA ESPANA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On May 15, 1998, petitioner Antonio E. Nueva España was driving a passenger bus owned by Vallacar
Transit, Inc. He was then traversing the national highway of Negros Oriental, while negotiating a curve the
driven bus collided with a northbound Honda motorcycle. As a result, Reynard So, the driver of the
motorcycle, and Nilo Castro, the person riding in tandem with him, were killed. During the trial of the case,
the prosecution presented Julito Dayuday and Florencio Banico as eyewitnesses to the collision. The
father of So and the mother of Castro were also called to the witness stand to substantiate their
respective claims for damages.

Herein accused was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Bais City (Negros Oriental) for the crime of
Reckless Imprudence resulting to Double Homicide, aggravated by his failure to help the victim/s, as
provided for in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and appreciating in his favor the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposing the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of Arresto
Mayor as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Correcional as maximum.

Upon the elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court affirmed the decision as
to the damages awarded including moral and exemplary damages, and the indemnity awarded for the
victims for the loss of their earning capacity, but modified the period of the indeterminate penalty to six (6)
years of Prision Correcional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Likewise, said
court provided for the subsidiary liability of the accused-appellant’s employer pursuant to Article 103 of
the RPC.

Hence, this appeal, wherein Petitioner insists that he should not be made liable for the mishap as it was
actually the Honda motorcycle (the victims’) that rammed into the bus he was driving. He seeks the
reversal of his present conviction.

ISSUE:

1. The ruling of the Court of Appeals is untenable and contrary to law because the evidence of the
prosecution is incompatible with the physical evidence on record;

2. The award of damages in the (total) amount of more than ₱18 Million is untenable and contrary to
jurisprudence and law;

3. The accused-appellant’s employer, Vallacar Transit, Inc. is subsidiarily liable.

4. The CA correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment.

HELD:

1. The Court does not ordinarily pass upon the findings of fact of the trial court, especially if they have
been affirmed on appeal by the appellate court.10 The trial court was able to observe the witnesses and
their demeanor on the stand and was in a position to scrutinize and discern whether they were telling the
truth. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed. In the
case at bar, we see no reason to deviate from the rule. The Court is in full agreement with the trial court
and with the Court of Appeals regarding petitioners liability for the crime charged against him.

2. It is necessary to modify the award of damages given by the lower courts. When death occurs due to a
crime, the following damages may be recovered: (1) a civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim;
(2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victims
which would cost ₱50,000 each for the heirs of both So and Castro is in order. The earnings of So and
Castro were both above the minimum wage that required documentary evidence of their earning
capacities finds application. The heirs failed to present proof, it was therefore erroneous for both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals to award compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity on the basis
alone of the oral testimonies of So’s father and Castro’s mother. Temperate damages in the amount of
₱25,000 each may be awarded to the heirs of So and Castro, respectively.

The award for moral damages by the court a quo, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, should be
adjusted for being excessive that would not inflict injustice on the accused. The award of ₱200,000 as
moral damages each for the heirs of So and Castro, respectively, should accordingly be reduced to
₱50,000.23. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages, which under the prevailing
jurisprudence should be in the amount of P25,000, may also be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Here, petitioner failed to render aid or
assistance to his victims after the collision.

The heirs of the deceased Reynard So are entitled to the total amount of ₱ 253,000 and the heirs of Nilo
Castro are also entitled to the total amount of ₱ 205,000.

3. YES. The Supreme Court (SC) adopted the ruling of the CA as to appellant’s employer. Under Article
103 of the RPC, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee’s civil liability in the criminal
action if it can be shown that: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) the accused is insolvent. However, subject to
prevailing jurisprudence, the subsidiary liability may be enforced only upon a motion for subsidiary
writ of execution against Vallacar Transit, Inc. and upon proof that petitioner is insolvent.

4. NO. The SC was constrained to amend the penalty herein imposed by the CA. The imposable penalty,
under Article 365 (2) of the RPC for homicide resulting from reckless imprudence in the use of the motor
vehicle is Prision Correcional in its medium and maximum period, which ranges from 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years.

Under Article 64 of the same law, the penalty shall be divided into three equal portions, each of which
shall form one period. The offense having been attended by one aggravating circumstance premised on
the failure of petitioner to aid his victims, the penalty shall be increased but it cannot exceed the penalty
provided by law in its maximum period. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
petitioner is thus entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which
is Arresto Mayor in any of its periods, to Prision Correcional maximum. Accordingly, petitioner should
suffer the penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to 6 years
of Prision Correcional, as maximum.