Golden Beacon On Civil Law - 2018

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2018 GOLDEN BEACON

CIVIL LAW
By:
Dean MANUEL R. BUSTAMANTE
1. HUMAN RELATIONS
ARTICLE 19
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
DART PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO CALOGCOG

G.R. No. 149241, August 24, 2009, 596 SCRA 614
FACTS: Dart entered into Distributorship Agreement with Spouses Calogcog.

Following the expiration of the agreement, Dart was only convinced to
extend the period of distributorship upon the written promise of the
Calogcogs that they will observe and comply the terms and conditions
thereof. Dart subjected the spouses to an audit review by an auditing
firm. However, Spouses Calogcog disallowed the auditing firm from
inspecting their books and records. As a result, Dart only accepted
the spouses’ purchase order on a prepaid basis.
ISSUE: Whether Dart acted in bad faith or intended to injure the

Spouses Calogcog when it caused the auditing of the latter’s account
and when it implemented the prepaid basis in treating the latter’s
order.
HELD: NO. Bad faith cannot be attributed to the acts of Dart which
was supported by legitimate reasons, principally to protect its own
business. The exercise of its rights was not impelled by any evil
motive designed, whimsically and capriciously, to injure or prejudice the
Calogcogs.
HSBC vs. CATALAN

G.R. No. 159590, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 498
FACTS: A complaint was filed seeking to compel the bank to pay the
value of checks issued to her by Thompson as it refused to pay
the same despite repeated directives of the drawer to recognize the
check he issued. The bank filed motion to dismiss alleging that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action under Section 189 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check itself does not operate as
an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the
drawer with the bank and the latter is not liable to the holder
unless and until it accepts or certifies it.
ISSUE: Whether the bank is liable for damages on the basis of

its inaction on the drawer’s instructions.
HELD: YES. The bank can be held liable for damages. It was
not a suit on the value of the check itself, but how it acted
in relation to the claim for payment. The allegations in the
complaint that there was gross inaction of the bank on Thompson’s
instructions as well as its evident failure to inform her of the
reason are insouciance (lack of concern) on its part.
The complaint was anchored on Article 19 of the New Civil Code.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he
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acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts
with prudence and in good faith; but when he acts with negligence
or abuse.
Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of right principle, three

elements must concur, to wit:
(a) that there is a legal right or duty;

(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and
(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
SOLEDAD CARPIO vs. LEONORA VALMONTE

G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 38
FACTS: Leonora is a wedding coordinator. Michelle and Jon Sierra engaged

her services for their church wedding.
On that day, Leonora went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and
her family were billeted. When she arrived at the suite, several persons
were already there including Soledad, an aunt of the bride who was
preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Leonora went out of the suite carrying
the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal
sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception
was to be held.
She went back to suite after, and found several people staring at
her when she entered. It was at this juncture that Soledad allegedly
uttered the following words to Leonora: “ Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng
kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas
ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha!”
Soledad then ordered one of the ladies to search Leonora’s bag.
It turned out that after Leonora left the room to attend to her
duties, Soledad discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed
inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost.
A few days after the incident, Soledad received a letter from Leonora
demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated
to the newlywed’s relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation
as a result of Soledad’s imputation against her. Soledad did not respond
to the letter.
Thus, on 20 February 1997, Leonora filed a suit for damages against

Soledad.
ISSUE
Whether Leonora is entitled to damages.
RULING
YES. Leonora is entitled for damages.
In the case at bar, Soledad’s verbal reproach against Leonora was

certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew
that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag.
True, Soledad had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor,
but to malign Leonora without an iota of proof that she was the
one who actually stole the jewelry is an act, by any standard or principle
of law is impermissible.
Soledad had willfully caused injury to Leonora in a manner which is

contrary to morals and good customs. She did not act with justice and
good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose but to prejudice
Leonora.
Certainly, Soledad transgressed the provision of Article 19 in relation to

Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner

which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would
thereby offend morals or good customs. A person should be protected
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only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is

when he acts with prudence and good faith, but not when he
acts with negligence or abuse.
G.F. EQUITY, INC. vs. ARTURO VALENZONA

G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 466
FACTS: There was a contract whereby Valenzona was hired as a

coach of the Alaska Basketball Team in the PBA for a period of
two years. Paragraph 3 of the contract provides that “if at anytime
during the contract, the Coach, in the sole opinion of the
Corporation, fails to exhibit sufficient skills or competitive ability to
coach the time, the Corporation may terminate the contract.” During his
stint as head coach, the team placed third in both Open and
All Filipino PBA Conferences in 1988. He was later on served with
notice that the management was terminating his services. Six years
thereafter, he filed a complaint for damages asking for payment of
his compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination
of his employment.
ISSUE: Whether paragraph 3 of the contract is a legitimate exercise of

the right of petitioner to terminate respondent’s employment.
HELD: NO. The assailed condition clearly transgressed the principle of

mutuality of contracts, hence, it is null and void. It leaves the
determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill or
competitive ability to coach Alaska team solely to the opinion of
GF Equity.
When one party in an employment contract is given an unbridled

prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness,
fairness, reasonableness or even lack of basis of its opinion, it must
be struck down. To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would
open the gate of arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for void contractual
stipulations would be used as justification therefore. Consequently, since
the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground,
hence, contrary to law and GF Equity negligently failed to provide
legal basis for such pre-termination, the latter failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing
the right of Valenzona, thus, entitling the latter to damages under
Article 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code.
2. CIVIL PERSONALITY
CONTINENTAL STEEL MFG. CORP. vs. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR

FACTS: Hortillano’s wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery while she

was in the 38th week of pregnancy which resulted to the death of
Hortillano’s unborn child.
ISSUE: Whether Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the

death of his unborn child.
HELD: YES. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
It was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly
married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception, thus, Hortillano
was entitled to bereavement benefits.
3. FAMILY CODE
Article 26 paragraph 2 - DIVORCE OBTAINED ABROAD

REPUBLIC vs. OBRECIDO III
FACTS: Cipriano and Lady Miros got married in 1981 and

thereafter were blessed with two children. Miros went to the United
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States and eventually acquired American citizenship. Later, she obtained a

divorce decree of her marriage with Cipriano and got married to Stanley.
By reason thereof, Cipriano filed a petition for authority to marry
invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. The Solicitor
General opposed the petition on the ground that paragraph 2 of Article
26 is not applicable to Cipriano because it applies only to a valid
mixed marriage, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien.
ISSUE: Whether the Filipino spouse is legally capacitated to re-marry after

the other party is naturalized as a foreign citizen and later on
obtained a valid divorce decree.
HELD: YES, paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include

cases involving parties, who at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to re-marry as if the other party
was a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
- - - To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice

where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
- - - There are two (2) elements for the application of paragraph 2

of Article 26, namely,: (1) a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) a valid divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to re-marry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of marriage, but rather, their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to re-marry.
- - - Moreover, it is necessary that the naturalization of the other spouse

and the foreign divorce decree be proven. The party pleading it must
prove the divorce law as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Likewise, it must be shown that the divorce
decree allows the former spouse to re-marry as specifically required
in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
REPUBLIC vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
FACTS: Manalo, a Filipina, married Yoshino, a Japanese national, in San

Juan City, Metro Manila, Philippines.
While living in Japan, Manalo initiated a divorce proceeding and obtained

a favorable judgment against her alient spouse who is capacitated to
remarry.
Upon her return in the Philippines, Manalo filed a petition for

recognition of foreign divorce with the RTC and the same was favorably
granted. However, the OSG opposed the petition as it was the Filipina
spouse who obtained the divorce decree and not the alien spouse.
ISSUES
1. Whether a divorce decree initiated and obtained abroad by a
Filipino spouse can be recognized by Philippine court under paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Court.
2. Whether the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
3. Differentiate vinculo matrimonii from mensa et thoro.
RULINGS
1. YES, a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of a validly obtained abroad by the

alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Based on a clear and
plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained.
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Assuming for the sake of argument, that the word “obtained” should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act.
The purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where
it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or

not, a favorable decree dissolving the married bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result - the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or a wife.
A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same

place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving
end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both

instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of
the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.
2. YES, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
It is well settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take

judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged
and proved.
The burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence
of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations
of the complaint when those are denied by the answer and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer whey
they introduce new matters.
3. Vinculo Matrimonii or Absolute Divorce is a divorce which terminates

the marriage while Mensa et Thoro or Limited Divorce is a divorce which
suspends the marriage and leaves the bond in full force.
MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY et. al.

G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013, 790 SCRA 69
FACTS: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in the

Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
Fujiki’s parents, thus he could not bring his wife to Japan. Eventually, he
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekera, without the first

marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekera were married on May 15,
2008 in Quezon City. Maekera brought Marinay to Japan, however, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekera. She left Maekera and started
to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship.
In 2010, Marinay with the help of her first husband, Fujiki, was able
to obtain a judgment from Japan’s family court, which declared the
marriage between her and her second husband Maekera, who is a
Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy.
Upon coming to the Philippines, Fujiki filed with the RTC a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that Fujiki has no
personality to file the petition as he is neither a husband nor a wife
of the subsequent marriage.
ISSUE
Whether Fujiki, the first husband, has the personality to file a petition
to recognize the divorce decree obtained abroad.
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RULING
YES, Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason, he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and

material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it.
There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of

an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which comprises the
public record of his marriage.
DOREEN GRACE MEDINA vs. MICHIYUKI KOIKE

G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 733
FACTS: Doreen and Koike, a Japanese national, were married on June 14,
2005 in Quezon City.
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Koike jointly filed for divorce in Japan,
which was granted.
Subsequently, Doreen filed before the RTC a petition for judicial

recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven.
ISSUES
1) Whether a divorce decree jointly filed and obtained by the
Filipino and Japanese can be recognized by RTC under paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code.
2) Whether our courts can take judicial notice of a foreign judgment

of divorce.
3) Whether the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the divorce

decree is a question of fact.
RULINGS
1) YES, paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce

decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a divorce case.
2) NO, our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
3) YES, considering that the validity of the divorce decree between

Doreen and Koike, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan
on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the
evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal
is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule
45 petition for review.
The question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial

ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further
proceedings.
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It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure

proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted
to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after
all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
the courts.
GERBERT R. CORPUS vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 266
FACTS: Corpus was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian

citizenship through naturalization. He was married to Sto. Tomas, a Filipina,
in Pasig City. When he returned to the Philippines. he was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. He went
back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.
Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the

divorce decree in the civil registry office and was informed that the
foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent court.
Corpus filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration

of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent Sto. Tomas
failed to submit any response.
The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner Corpus
lacked locus standi.
ISSUE
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction from
the recognition of a foreign divorce.
RULING
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner Corpus of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce.
Petitioner Corpus being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed

by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce with
conformity to alien’s national law.
Article 40
LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004, 422 SCRA 376
FACTS: When Lucio and Lucia got married, they merely signed the
marriage contract without the presence of solemnizing officer. Since Lucia
has been working in Canada for many years, she was able to obtain a
divorce decree in 1991 from Canadian Court. The following year, Lucio
contracted a second marriage with Maria. On September 21, 1993, Lucio
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. In
October 1993, he was charged with bigamy and was later on convicted
by the lower court. The first marriage was nullified by the court after
the celebration of the second marriage.
ISSUE: Whether judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is

necessary before the spouse may validly contract a second marriage.
HELD: NO. In this case, it was found out that the first marriage is
void ab initio in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family
Code. This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with
and such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from
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the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void as initio

to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married.
The first element of bigamy requires that the accused must be

legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the accused was
never married. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married from the beginning. Accordingly,
accused was not married to his wife at the time he contracted
the second marriage with another woman.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no

semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration
of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which accused might be
held liable for bigamy unless he secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
What is contemplated by Article 40 of the Family Code as the

void marriage that must be declared void before a party may
contract a subsequent marriage is one that must exist although, it
is void.
Article 41
EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. 165842, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 461
FACTS: Eduardo was married to Rubylus on July 28, 1975. Later,

Rubylus was charged with estafa and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her
in jail after three months and never saw her again.
In 1996, he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no

longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20
years.
When Tina discovered that Eduardo was previously married to Rubylus,

she charged him of bigamy. During the trial, Eduardo alleged that he
was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married Tina, he
did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that
at the time he married Tina, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted.
ISSUE: Whether a judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary

before the other spouse may legally re-marry.
HELD: YES. There must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death of

the absent spouse. Otherwise, the spouse who contracted the second
marriage may be convicted of the crime of bigamy. Such judicial
declaration constitutes proof that he acted in good faith and would
negate criminal intention on his part when he married the complainant.
According to Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for
judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable
the present spouse to remarry. Parties should not be permitted to
judge for themselves such matter. The latter should be submitted to
the proper court for resolution.
The requirement for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of

the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present as
protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage
precisely because he or she could be charged and convicted of
bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is
found incredible. It is also for the benefit of the State. Marriage
is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good
morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation
should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance in the
manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON

G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 376
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FACTS: On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon, who was a member

of SSS and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. More than 15 years
later, Bailon filed before the CFI a petition to declare Alice presumptively
dead. The CFI granted the petition. Close to 13 years after his wife
Alice was declared presumptively dead, Bailon contracted marriage with
respondent Teresita Jarque.
Upon Bailon’s death, respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral

benefits and was granted P12,000 by the SSS. Cecilia Bailon-Yap,
who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona,
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and
funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in
his lifetime, the first with Alice Diaz, the second with her mother
Elisa Jayona and the third with respondent, all of whom are still
alive. In the meantime, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be
the brother and guardian of “Aliz P. Diaz,” filed before the SSS a
claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death.
ISSUE: Who between Alice Diaz and the herein respondent is entitled
to the death benefits?
HELD: Respondent is entitled to the death benefits. The two marriages

involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on
August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine
their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration.
Under Art. 83 of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted

during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio
unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or
contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears
noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is
deemed valid “until declared null and void by competent court.” If
follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party
assailing the second marriage. In the case at bar, as found by the
CFI, Alice has been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon
sought declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration
was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is

terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the
absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, specifically Art. 42, no judicial proceeding to

annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. If the absentee reappears, but
no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance even
if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not
terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of the presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues in spite of the spouse’s physical reappearance
and by fiction of law, he or she still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by
law. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify in
accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the
former’s death in 1998, respondent rightfully the defendant spouse -
beneficiary of Bailon.
Article 36 - PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC vs. LAILA TANYAG - SAN JOSE et. al.

G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123
FACTS: Laila and Manolito were married on June 12, 1988 when Laila
was 19 years old and Manolito was 20 years old.
For nine (9) years, the couple stayed with Manolito’s parents. Manolito
was jobless, drug user and spent time with his friends drinking intoxicating
substances and gambling while Laila was selling fish at the wet market.
On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her

parents’ house.
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On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
ISSUES
1) Who has the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage.
2) What is psychological incapacity?
3) Whether a person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated

should be examined by a physician or psychologist.
RULINGS
1) Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage.
2) The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity

of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bonds
one is about to assume.
3) There is of course no requirement that the person sought to

be declared psychologically incapacitated should be examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at
such declaration. If it can be proven by independent means that one
is psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason why the same
should not be credited.
MA. TERESA TANI – DELA FUENTE vs. RODOLFO DELA FUENTE, JR.
G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017, 819 SCRA 638
FACTS: While they were still sweethearts, Ma. Teresa already noticed that
Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy.
On June 21, 1984, Ma. Teresa and Rodolfo got married in

Mandaluyong City.
Rodolfo’s attitude worsened as they went on their marital life. At first,

Rodolfo only inflicted non-physical forms of mistreatment on Ma. Teresa
by alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy,
and stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon
escalated into physical violence when on separate instances, he poked a
gun at his teenage cousin and at Ma. Teresa.
On June 3, 1999, Ma. Teresa filed a petition for declaration of

nullity of marriage against Rodolfo before the RTC of Quezon City.
On August 14, 2002, the trial court held that the marriage
between Ma. Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void
because Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was grave, serious and
incurable.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC on the

ground that the findings of psychologist Dr. Lopez on Rodolfo’s
psychological incapacity is a hearsay as it was based solely on
information given by Ma. Teresa to Dr. Lopez.
ISSUE
Whether the non-examination of the defendant party invalidate the

findings of the examining psychologist.
RULING
NO, the Court found sufficient compliance with Molina ruling to warrant
the nullity of Ma. Teresa’s marriage with Rodolfo. Ma. Teresa was able
to discharge the burden of proof that Rodolfo suffered from psychological
incapacity.
In the case of Reyes vs. Reyes, it states that the non-examination

of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or
invalidate the findings of the examining psychologist since “marriage, by its
very definition,” necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the
11
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally

witnessed mainly by the other.
Marcos vs. Carlos case emphasizes that Molina ruling does not require
a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to be
psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence
presented establishes the party’s psychological condition.
Dr. Lopez’s testimony, as corroborated by Ma. Teresa, sufficiently proved

that Rodolfo’s paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone
to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating
him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage.
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO vs. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO

FACTS: Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a

domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided for Jose’s
tuition fees for his college education.
Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on December 28,

1989 and were blessed with a son named Wesley on December 1, 1993.
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage before the RTC alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill his marital obligations.
In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that during their marriage,

Jose conspicuously tried to avoid his duties as husband and father; that
he was hot tempered and violent; that he would represent himself as
single and flirt openly; and would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy
between them as they slowly drifted apart.
She also presented the testimony of Dr. Tayag who prepared the
Pschological Report in which she primarily based on her interviews with
Rachel and Wesley and stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality
Disorder (APD).
The RTC granted the petition, relying on the findings and testimony of
Dr. Tayag and declared that Jose’s APD interfered with his capacity to
perform his marital and paternal duties.
On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC holding that the
totality of the evidence Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a
finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUE
Whether the totality of evidence in this case demonstrate the existence

of psychological incapacity.
RULING
NO, based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exist

insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose’s immaturity,
irresponsibility or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
In Santos vs. CA, the Court declared that psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by: (1) gravity, (2)
juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. Additionally, an expert opinion is not
absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with if the totality of evidence
shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability can be duly established.
In this case, Dr. Tayag’s assessment when taken together with the
various testimonies, failed to show that Jose’s immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
nullification of the parties’ marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be more than a “difficulty,” “refusal” or

“neglect” in the performance of the marital obligations. It is not enough
that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and
duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person which must be linked with the
12
manifestation of the psychological incapacity. These were not proven in this

case.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL SING BUENAVENTURA

G. R. No. 127449, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 261
FACTS: Petitioner Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of

nullity of marriage on the ground that he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The trial court decreed the marriage null and void ab initio. It
likewise ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages in
the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million
pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus
attorney’s fees of P100,000.00.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the award of moral and exemplary damages

are proper.
2. Whether petitioner’s acts and omissions justify the award of

attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
HELD: 1. NO. Article 21 of the New Civil Code is one of the instances
when moral damages may be recovered. It must be noted that Article 21
states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to
another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done
in complete freedom. However, the marriage was declared void ab initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The latter is confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of

psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because an innate inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on
the same facts was negated. The award of moral damages should
be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage,
but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and
yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have
been adduced in this case.
2. NO. The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower

court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act of filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as
unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are
grounded on petitioner’s psychological incapacity, which as explained above
is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the
obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral
and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Art. 45 - VITIATED CONSENT - Ground for Annulment of Marriage
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Orlando married Lilia. The former filed a petition for annulment of
their marriage stating that he was under threat and duress when he
contracted the said marriage since Lilia was already pregnant. In her
answer with compulsory counterclaim, she prayed for the dismissal of the
petition contending that the petitioner married her voluntarily and he
even wrote letters to her to check on the progress of her
pregnancy.
ISSUE: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground

of vitiated consent.
HELD: NO. To begin with, it was only on November 17, 1992 or

after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8)
months when Orlando took a serious step to have the same marriage
annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in
Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely
13
in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his

defense in the criminal case for bigamy. Viewed in this perspective,
the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable. But even in terms of merit,
the recourse must have fail. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s
apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelmingly at that
time, being a security guard, it is reasonable to assume that appellant
knew the rudiments of self-defense.
Orlando’s excuse that he could not have impregnated Lilia because

he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best
and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any
reference to his inability to copulate with Lilia. His counsel also
conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual
relationship with Lilia.
Article 120 - CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
JOSEFA FERRER vs. SPOUSES MANUEL FERRER

G.R. No. 166496, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 570
FACTS: The late Alfredo Ferrer acquired a piece of land. Through a

loan he introduced several improvements including a residential house and
a 2-door apartment building. However, it was only during his marriage
with petitioner Josefa that he was only able to pay the loan using
the couple’s conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, Josefa claimed,
they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred
that respondent Manuel Ferrer occupied one door of the apartment
building, as well as the warehouse; however, he stopped paying rentals,
alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue
of Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel
and Ismael and their spouses.
It is petitioner’s contention that when her husband was already

bedridden, respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a
document, purportedly to be his last will and testament. The document,
however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredo’s lot and the
improvement thereon. Learning of this development, Alfredo filed a
Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against respondents. The RTC
dismissed the same and ruled that the terms and conditions of the
Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, and
public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in good
faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do
otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Although the Supreme Court reaffirmed the CA’s decision, herein petitioner
filed another case claiming that, based on the RTC decision, when
Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the
cost of the improvements on Alfredo’s lot. She alleged that the cost of
the improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be
reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered
owners of Alfredo’s lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have the obligation to reimburse

petitioner.
HELD: YES. Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership
of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or
efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, the said
property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject
property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
PROPERTY RELATIONS - Consent of the Spouse in the

disposal of their conjugal property
DAVID AND LORENZA PELAYO vs. MELKI E. PEREZ

14
G. R. No. 141323, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 475
FACTS: David Pelayo, thru a Deed of Absolute Sale, conveyed to Melki

Perez, two parcels of agricultural lands. The sale was witnessed by David’s
wife, Lorenza, who signed only on the third page in the space
provided for witnesses of which Perez’ application for registration of
the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale was null and void for lack of
marital consent.
HELD: By affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space

provided for witnesses, Lorenza is deemed to have given her implied
consent to the contract of sale. A wife’s consent to the husband’s
disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or
set forth in any particular document, as long it is shown by acts of
the wife that such consent or approval was indeed given.
In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed

of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, evidence
shows that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property
and consented to the sale. Under Article 173, in relation to Article 166
of the New Civil Code, the lack of marital consent to the disposition
of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but
merely voidable.
HOMEOWNER AND SAVINGS LOAN BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 283
FACTS: Miguela and Marcelino were married on August 8, 1967. During

their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot from certain
Sandra.
The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes. The
Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late
Marcelino as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino executed a SPA in favor of one

Lilibeth, authorizing the latter to obtain loan from Homeowners Bank to
be secured by the Spouses Marcelino & Miguela’s house and lot,
Pursuant to the SPA, Lilibeth obtained a loan in the amount of

P300,000 from Homeowners Bank. As a security therefor, Lilibeth executed
on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject
property. The above-mentioned transaction took place without the knowledge
and consent of Miguela.
.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, Homeowners
Bank instituted extrajudicial foreclose proceeding on the mortgaged property.
After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed,
Homeowners Bank consolidated the ownership by executing Affidavit of
Consolidation and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino died on December 20, 1995. In one of

her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that Homeowner’s Bank
had already employed a certain Roldan to clean its premises and that
her car was razed because Roldan allowed a boy to play with fire in
the premises
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on

the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, Miguela instituted with
the RTC a complaint for Nullity of Real Estate, Certificate of Sale, Affidavit
of Consolidation of Ownership and Deed of Sale and Reconveyance.
In its answer, Homeowners Bank prayed for the dismissal of the

complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive
property in question of the late Marcelino.
ISSUE
Whether the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the
other spouse is valid in so far as the husband’s share is
concerned.
15
RULING
NO. The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both

the husband and wife. The absence of one renders the entire sale null
and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the husband who contracted the sale.
The rules of co-ownership do not apply to the property relations

of the husband and wife even in a suppletory manner. The regime
of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where
the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products,
fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by
either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR.

FACTS: Venancio is married to Lilia since 1973. During their union, they
acquired three (3) parcels of land in Malolos, Bulacan.
The said properties were mortgaged to Philippine National Bank (PNB)

on August 25, 1994 to secure a loan..
According to PNB, the Reyes Spouses contracted and duly consented

to the loan. When the Reyes Spouses failed to loan obligations, PNB
foreclosed the mortgaged real properties.
Venancio assailed the validity of the mortgage, claiming that his wife
undertook the loan and the mortgage without his consent and his
signature was falsified on the promissory notes and the mortgage. Since
the lots involved were conjugal properties, he argued that the mortgage
constituted over them was void.
During trial, Flores, a NBI handwriting expert, testified and proved

that Venancio’s signatures on the bank documents were falsified.
ISSUES
1) Whether the mortgage constituted over the properties is void.
2) Whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan
contracted unilaterally by Lilia C. Reyes.
3) Whether Venancio is guilty of laches and whether his claim is

barred by estoppel.
RULINGS
1) YES, real estate mortgage over a conjugal property is void if the
non-contracting spouse did not give consent.
Article 124 of the Family Code is the applicable provision regarding

the administration of their conjugal property. It provides that the written
consent of the spouse who did not encumber the property is necessary
before any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property can be
valid.
Flores, a handwriting expert of the NBI, compared the signature on

the loan documents with the standard signature of Venancio. He concluded
that they were not written by the same person. The PNB loan division
chief admitted that he merely relied on the documents presented to him,
and he never actually saw Venancio sign the documents.
Hence, having established that Venancio’s signature was forged, Venancio

proved that he did not consent to the real estate mortgage.
2) YES, while the mortgage is void, the principal obligation is not

affected.
In Article 122 of the Family Code, the payment of personal debts

contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership, except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
16
It is settled how Article 122 should be applied: there are two

scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in this case, the
wife, contracts a loan to be used for the family business and the other
is when she acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a mere surety or
guarantor, evidence that the family benefited from the loan need to be
presented before the conjugal partnership can be held liable. On the other
hand, if the loan was taken out to be used for the family business,
there is no need to prove actual benefit. The law presumes the family
benefited from the loan and the conjugal partnership is held liable.
Although PNB cannot foreclose the mortgage over the conjugal property in
question, it can still recover the loan amount from the conjugal
partnership.
Also, if the conjugal properties of the Reyes Spouses are not

enough to answer for the loan, PNB can then recover the remaining
unpaid balance from the separate properties of either Venancio or his wife,
Lilia. This is based on the last paragraph of Article 121 of the Family
Code which provides that if the conjugal partnership is insufficient to
cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance from their separate properties.
3) NO, laches does not apply where the delay is within the period
prescribed by law.
It is well settled that a delay within the prescriptive period is

sanctioned by law and is not considered as one that would bar relief.
Laches apply only in the absence of a statutory prescriptive period.
Records show that upon learning about the mortgage, Venancio

immediately informed the bank about his forged signature. He filed the
complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage
against PNB on September 22, 1998 which was still the prescribed period
to redeem a mortgaged property.
JOSEFINA FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS

FACTS: Josefina Castillo married Eduardo G. Francisco, who at that time

was already married to Carmelita Carpio. On August 31, 1984, the Imus
Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Josefina Castillo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land
with a house thereon. On the basis of the said deed of sale, the
Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 87976 and 87977 in the name of
“Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco.” On
February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made of record Entry No.
85-18003 at the dorsal portion of the said titles. This referred to an
Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his
marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, including
the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was
waiving whatever claims he had over the property.
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager
and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought bags of cement
from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay
the same. MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the court. After the
judgment in favor of MIWCC has become final, the court issued a
writ of execution against the aforementioned parcels of land. In the
light of this, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over
the two parcels of land in which she claimed that they were her
paraphernal properties and that her husband Eduardo had no propriety
right or interest over them as evidenced by his Affidavit of Waiver. She
alleged that she was the sole owner of the property levied on execution
by Sheriff Alejo. Hence, the levy on execution of the property was
null and void.
ISSUE: Whether the subject properties are conjugal properties of Josefina

Castillo and Eduardo Francisco.
HELD: NO. Article 148 of the Family Code provides: “In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned in common in

proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits
of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly
married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
17
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in

such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply even if both parties are
in bad faith.”
Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the
New Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article 148 the property
relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. The
petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested right over the property
in question. Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence
of marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the
same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Article 148 of the
Family Code also debilitates against the petitioner’s claim since, according
to the said article, a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation
where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage provided
that the parties prove their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon. We
agree with the findings of the appellate court that the petitioner failed
to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property
or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and, hence, is
not a co-owner of the property.
CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY
ELENITA M. DEWARA vs. SPOUSES RONNIE & GINA LAMELA

G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 483
FACTS: Eduardo and Elenita were married before the enactment of

the Family Code and thus the New Civil Code governed their
marital relations. They were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to
work in California, USA, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City. On
January 20, 1985, while Eduardo was driving the private jeep
registered in the name of Elenita, hit Ronnie. As a result, MTCC
found Eduardo guilty of reckless imprudence and sentenced him to
pay civil indemnities. The judgment became final and executory and
the sheriff levied the real property registered to Elenita married
to Eduardo. Elenita claimed that the said property was her
paraphernal property or exclusive property and could not be made to
answer for the personal liability of her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive

property of Elenita.
HELD: NO. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong

to the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in
the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy
this presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and wife
without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership.
The lot retains its conjugal nature.
Moreover, the presumption of conjugal partnership applies even

when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential
requirement for the presumption to arise. The presumption that the
property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear,
categorical, and convincing evidence -- there must be strict proof of
the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden
of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
NULL AND VOID OR INEXISTENT MARRIAGE

SALLY GO - BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR .
G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 702
FACTS: Benjamin married Azucena and they had three (3) children.
When Azucena left for USA, Benjamin had romantic relationship with
Sally where they lived as husband and wife. In order to appease
her father, Sally asked Benjamin to sign purported marriage contract
without marriage license knowing well that of Benjamin’s marital
status. Their cohabitation produced two (2) children and Benjamin
acquired several properties.
18
As the relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended, Sally left for

Canada bringing their two (2) children. She then filed a bigamy case
against Benjamin using the simulated marriage contract as evidence.
In retaliation, Benjamin filed an annulment of non-existent marriage
against Sally.
ISSUES: (1) What is the nature of the marriage of Benjamin

and Sally?
(2) What is the property relations governing the marriage

Benjamin and Sally?
HELD: (1) The marriage of the parties is not bigamous because

there was no marriage license, therefore, the crime of bigamy
was not committed and the marriage was null and void ab
initio and inexistent.
(2) Since Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of

marriage while the first marriage is still existing, their property relation
is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code where only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contribution. Since there is
no proof of Sally’s contributions to their cohabitation, there can be
no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
NO MARRIAGE - APPROPRIATE REMEDY
REPUBLIC vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

FACTS: Merlinda requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage

(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend
of five years.
Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to
a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national, on June 24, 2002 at the
office of the MTCC Palace of Justice.
She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did
not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing
officer; and that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers. She, thus, filed before the RTC a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion.
The RTC granted the petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar to
cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract
of Melinda and Ye Son Sune.
The OSG, however, filed an appeal assailing the Decision on the

ground that (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the
entries in the wife portion of the alleged contract is, in effect, declaring
the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, in
effect, nullifies the contract.
(2) Whether Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate

remedy for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
RULINGS
(1) NO. Melinda indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there
was no marriage to speak about, but the correction of the record of
such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence presented.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of

marriage by canceling the entries in the wife portion thereof, the trial
19
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
(2) YES. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
The proceeding may either be summary or adversary. If the correction

is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it
is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial

court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed whereas opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence
has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate
of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of Melinda. The latter,
however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one
who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she
claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she
was not the one who entered into such marriage.
JO-ANN DIAZ - SALGADO vs. LUIS G. ANSON

G.R. No. 204494. July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 541
FACTS: Luis alleged that he is the surviving spouse of the late

Severina, with whom he was married in a civil ceremony in 1966. During
the marital union, they acquired several real properties, which Luis
claimed pertained to the conjugal partnership.
Without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three (3) separate
Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann,
Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship. Jo-Ann secured new
certificates of title over the said property while the properties subject of
the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina.
Claiming that he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal

properties, and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina, Luis
filed a complaint to annul the deeds of sale.
On the other hand, Jo-Ann contends that she was unaware of any
marriage contracted by her mother with Luis, only knowing theirs to be a
common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated
through a Partition Agreement by virtue of which Luis had already received
the properties apportioned to him.
Jo-Ann disputed the validity of Luis and Severina’s marriage on the

ground of lack of marriage license. The marriage contract presented to
court contained an equivocal declaration that no marriage license was
exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage.
The RTC nonetheless ruled that the marriage is valid. It noted that
the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of
regularity in its execution and is conclusive to the fact of marriage.
The CA sustained the RTC ruling because Jo-Ann did not present
any evidence to controvert the evidence presented by law.
ISSUES
1) Whether the presumption of regularity attached to public document
stand in the presence of prima facie evidence of the non-existence of the
marriage license.
2) Whether the partition agreement is valid.
RULINGS
1) NO, the presumption of regularity does not hold water vis-à-vis a
prima facie (marriage license), which on its face has established that no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage

license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must
be apparent on the marriage contract, or the very least, supported by a
20
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties.
Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on

the marriage itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of
an exceptional character and no proof to the contrary was presented, there
is no plausible conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and
Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void
ab ignitio.
2) YES, the provision on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall

apply in the partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina.
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to

marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that
their marriage is void from the very beginning for lack of a valid
marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 147
of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their
properly relations.
Article 147 of the Family Code “applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of
a marriage license. Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s effort
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that “partition, in

general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be
divided, or its value.
As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil

Code is precise that “partition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by Judicial proceedings x x x,” The law does not impose a
judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the
same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the
execution of the Partition Agreement.
PROPERTY OWNED IN COMMON TO BE DIVIDED

UNDER THE RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO

FACTS: In the course of their marriage, Leonardo and Marrieta were

able to acquire a parcel of land.
Eventually, their marriage was declared void on the ground of

psychological incapacity.
Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership

over the property over the property, Leonardo asked Marietta for
partition, but the latter refused.
ISSUE: Whether the action for partition is proper.
HELD: YES. Leonardo and Marrieta’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed

their property relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure
in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, however, Article
147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’
property relations.
This particular kind of co-ownership under Article 147 applied when

a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
21
Here, the former spouses both agreed that they acquired the
subject property during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it
shall be presumed to have obtained by their joint effort, work or
industry and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by

Leonardo and Marietta, which should be divided in accordance with the
rules on co-ownership.
PATERNITY AND FILIATIONS
GERARDO CONCEPCION vs. CA & MA. TERESA ALMONTE

G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 438
FACTS: Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989.
Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. Gerardo
and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On
December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to
Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid
and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to
the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded
to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
ISSUE: Can a child born during a marriage subsequently annulled be declared

as an illegitimate child on the basis of his mother’s statements?
HELD: NO. The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.

Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or
born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty
in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy,
Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the

mother may have declared against his legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
The import of Ma. Teresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her
legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This
declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is
the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family
Code. Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1) (b) of the Family Code. He cannot.
He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only
Ma. Theresa’s husband, Mario, or in a proper case, his heirs, who can
contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn
the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in

marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this
presumption on the basis of Article 168 (1) (b) of the Family Code, it
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access
that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,
unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The
presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the
evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child.
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES

MAGLAYA
FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City
of Manila leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building.
Respondent Corazon claims that as the legitimate child of the

deceased Francisco and Genoveva Mercado has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualification required of an administrator.
Petitioner Belen claims, as Francisco’s second wife and surviving

spouse, that she should be made administratrix of Francisco’s estate. She
22
claims that respondent Corazon could not be the daughter of Francisco,

although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding
birth certificate was not signed by him. Further, she said that Corazon, despite
her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva
Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed
parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union.
Corazon offered as evidence a certification from Civil Registrar of

Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took
place, were destroyed. She testified having been in open and continuous
possession of a legitimate child.
ISSUE: Is a child presumed legitimate in the absence of any concrete

proof of a lawful marriage between her parents?
HELD: NO. A legitimate child is a product of, and therefore, implies

a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union
and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more empathic on the
matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate,
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 166
FACTS: Virgilio and Dita are spouses who once had a blissful married
life and were blessed with a son.
However, their one sugar coated romance turned bitter when Virgilio
discovered that Dita was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour.
Thus, prompted him to file an adultery case against Dita and her
paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged.
Thereafter, Dita filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and

Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains against Virgilio.
During the pre-trial, both parties entered into a Compromise Agreement for
the liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequently, Virgilio filed a motion for the repudiation of the

Agreement on the ground that the conviction of Dita of the crime of
adultery disqualifies her from sharing in the conjugal property.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the partial voluntary separation of property by the
spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
is valid.
(2) Whether the conviction of Dita of the crime of adultery a

disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property..
RULINGS
(1) YES. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of
property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject
to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed by law.
This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of
nullity of marriage was still pending.
(2) Finally, the conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory
penalty of civil interdiction. Article 43 of the RPC enumerates the
accessory penalties of prision correccional and civil interdiction is not one of
them and does not deprive the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
GLORIA ZOLETA – SAN AGUSTIN vs. ERNESTO SALES

G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016, 801 SCRA 683
FACTS: On March 14, 1994, brothers Teodoro and Ernesto Sales filed an
action for the judicial approval of their recognition as the illegitimate
children of the late Louis Fernandez and his common-law wife Epitacia
Sales who was a housekeeper in the Fernandez household. Louis and his
legal wife Marie Louise did not have any child.
23
According to the Sales brothers, Louis formally recognized them as his

children by Epitacia in two public documents bearing his thumb marks, viz:
(1) a notarized document dated November 11, 1980 jointly executed by Louis
and Epitacia formally recognizing the Sales brothers as their children and (2)
a document solely executed by Louis on December 2, 1980, dominated as
Acknowledgment of Children.
Petitioner Gloria raised her opposition and alleged that the Spouses
Fernandez informally adopted her as their child when she was only 2 years
old as she was treated as their own child by showing photographs. She
insisted that the father of the Sales brothers is Corpus, the former
houseboy of the Fernandez household.
Gloria asserted that the documents presented by the Sales brothers

were spurious as Louis could still write, rendering incredible the mere
affixing of his thumbprints to the contested documents.
Palad, a fingerprint examiner of the NBI, compared the thumbprint of

Louis on the documents of recognition with the other documents containing
his thumb marks. Thereafter, he concluded that all the thumbprints in the
disputed documents belong to Louis.
ISSUE
Whether the documents submitted by the Sales brothers sufficiently
established their recognition as illegitimate children of Louis Fernandez.
RULING
YES, the documents submitted by the Sales brothers sufficiently
established their recognition as illegitimate children of Louis Fernandez.
The legitimate filiation of a child may be established, among others,

by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. The same
requirement applies in establishing the filiation of illegitimate children.
In the case at hand, although Louis’ thumb mark appears in the

notarized document, a thumb mark has been repeatedly considered by the
Court as a valid mode of signature.
The Court, in the case of Yason vs. Arciaga, held that a signature
may be made by a person’s cross or mark.
Moreover, a notarized document is a public document and as such,

it enjoys the presumption of regularity, which can be only be overthrown
by clear and convincing evidence. It serves as a prima facie evidence
of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of
its existence and due execution.
The bare allegations of Gloria cannot qualify as clear and convincing

evidence to overturn such presumption.
ROMEO F. ARA et. al. vs. DRA FELY S. PIZARRO et. al.
FACTS: Romeo, William, Dr. Pizarro and Henry all claimed to be children
of the late Josefa who died on November 18, 2002.
The late Josefa left properties in Dr. Pizarro’s possession and so

Romeo, William and Henry filed for judicial partition of the properties before
the RTC.
Dr. Pizarro averred that she was the only legitimate and only child
of Josefa. She denied that any of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings.
Petitioners Ramon and William argued that during Josefa’s lifetime, she
acknowledged all of them as her children directly, continuously, spontaneously
and without concealment and that in the absence of any record of birth
in the civil register, filiation may be established on admission of filiation
in a public or handwritten document.
ISSUE
24
Whether filiation be proved through open and continuous possession of

the status of illegitimate children after the death of the putative parent.
RULING
NO, it is clear that any action seeking to prove filiation sought

under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
To establish filiation as illegitimate children after the death of a

putative parent, the only evidence allowed is a record of birth appearing
in the civil register, or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate
filiation made in a public document or a privately signed handwritten
instrument by Josefa.
After Josefa’s death in 2002, petitioners could no longer be allowed

to introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa.
Petitioners also did not present the kind of evidence contemplated under
Article 172 of the Family Code. They did not present evidence of an
admission of filiation as a public document or a privately handwritten
instrument signed by the putative parent.
PARENTAL CONSENT
JOCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO GUALBERTO

G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 450
FACTS: During the pendency of an action for declaration of nullity

of marriage of the spouses, the husband, Crisanto Gualberto, moved
that the custody of their child below age of seven be
transferred to him. He alleged that his wife was a lesbian. The
trial court awarded custody to the mother, but was reversed
by the appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether lesbianism per se is a sufficient ground to

remove custody of the child below seven years old from the
mother.
HELD: NO. It is not enough that the woman is a lesbian. He

must also demonstrate the she carried on her purported relationship
with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son
or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral
development.
Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental

neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute
or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to
have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the
husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have an adverse
effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercising proper parental care.
Article 213 of the Family Code takes its bearing from Article
363 of the Civil Code which prohibits in no uncertain terms the
separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless a
separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a
court.
CONSENT TO ADOPTION
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 415
FACTS: Diwata, a US citizen, filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors,

natural children of Manuel, the former’s brother and Amelia.
In her petition, she alleged that when her brother died, the children
were left to the care of their paternal grandmother as their biological mother
Amelia went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her
second marriage and no longer communicate with them from the time she
left up to the institution of the adoption proceedings.
25
After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being
supported by Diwata and her children abroad who gave their written consent
for their adoption.
ISSUE
Whether minors be adopted without the written consent of their
biological mother.
RULING
NO. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption. Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.
FAMILY HOME
Article 153
JOSE HONRADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The Family Home of the petitioner therein was levied upon to
answer for his judgment debt, and the sale of the said property was
set. Petitioner was served with a copy of the notice of sale which
he opposed. Petitioner, however, allowed the sale at the public
auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale
over the property in favor of the private respondent therein. The
petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff
or the Court until one year from the date of the auction sale
when he filed his motion to declare the property exempt from
execution. But even in the said motion, petitioner failed did not present
evidence that the property was a family home.
ISSUE: Whether or not a family home may not be exempt for

execution.
HELD: YES. While it is true that the family home is constituted

on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article
153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set
up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at
public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later
claiming the exemption.
PERLA G. PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III

FACTS: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino died intestate. He was survived by his

wife, Perla and their two (2) sons: Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III.
Among the properties left by the late Marcelino was a residential house
covering an area of 755 square meters.
On August 10, 1987, Perla, Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III

extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino. Accordingly, a new title was
issued in the names of Perla, Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III.
After ten (10) years on August 10, 1997, Perla and Marcelino Marc
formally advised Marcelino V to partition the subject property and
terminate the co-ownership. Marcelino III refused the partition of the
subject property on the ground that it that the subject property is being
used as the Family Home by his son Marcelino III that should continue
despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a
minor beneficiary residing in the premises. The minor beneficiary is the
son of Marcelino III, who is the grandson of Spouses Marcelino and
Perla.
ISSUE
Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one of
the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a
minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
26
HELD
NO. The family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10
years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head
who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented
to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home.
After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the
family home shall be preserved only until the minor beneficiary
reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to
safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until
reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself.
However, three (3) requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is
entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3)
they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS

FACTS: Albino was held liable by the trial court to pay to Otelio the
sum of P400,000 representing the shoe materials he bought on credit.
Otelio moved for the issuance of writ of execution and to satisfy the
judgment award, Albino’s house and lot was attached, auctioned and
awarded to Otelio as the highest bidder. Albino protested and claimed that
he had no other property to answer for the judgment credit and the
house and lot in which he was residing was his family home thus
exempt from execution.
ISSUE: Whether the judgment or judicial order is legal for the

attachment and sale on public auction of the family home to satisfy the
judgment award.
HELD: NO. The judgment or judicial order to attach and sell on public
auction of the family home to satisfy the judgment award is null and
void and it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated
as an outlaw and slain at sight or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.
The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and

free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on
which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to
enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it
and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases under Article 155 of the Family Code.
SIMEON CABANG vs. MR. & MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY

G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172
FACTS: Simeon had established his family home over the property of
registered owner Felix Odong and he had been in continuous, open,
peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of land since
1956 up to present. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay bought the subject
property from the heirs of Felix Odong and upon discovery that
Simeon was actually occupying the lot, they filed a complaint for
recovery of property.
ISSUE: Whether the property subject of the controversy is a duly

constituted family home.
HELD: NO. Under Article 153 of the Family Code, a family home is
deemed constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. It is likewise a given fact that the
family home must be constructed on property owned by the persons
constituting it. Since the property on which the alleged family home
stands is owned by the Odongs, their continued stay on the subject
land is by mere tolerance of the late Felix Odong.
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 1
FACTS; Belen and Federico were married. But the same was later
annulled because it was solemnized without the required consent per
Article 85 of the New Civil Code. Seven (7) months after said
27
annulment, petitioner gave birth to twin daughters which she later

raised in the U.S. with the help of her second husband. A petition
for declaration of legitimacy and support, with application for support
pendente lite was filed by petitioner against Federico since they were
no longer capable of paying the college education of the twins.
Because the parents are no longer capable of providing support,

petitioner alleges that the twins’ grandfather should be ordered to
provide the support. On the other hand, respondent Francisco avers that
the order of liability for support under Art. 199 is not concurrent
such that the obligation must be borne by those related to the
recipient and in this case petitioner and her second husband. He also
alleges that even if he is responsible for said support, he could
not be made to answer beyond what petitioner and the father could
afford.
ISSUE: Whether the obligation to give support devolves on the

grandfather in default of the financial capacity of twin daughters’ parents.
HELD; YES. Respondent Francisco is liable for half of the amount

of school expenses incurred by twin daughters as support pendente lite.
The petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation
of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins’
entitlement to support pendente lite thus the next question is who
should be made liable for said award.
Anent respondents Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the
option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation
to support the twins. Art. 204 provides that “the person obliged to give
support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying
the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family
dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
obstacle thereto.” Under the said provision, Francisco could not avail for
himself of the second option.
Articles 175 & 176 - PROOF OF FILIATION
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ vs. RONALD PAUL GARCIA

G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648
FACTS: Jenie and Dominique were living together as husband and

wife without the benefit of marriage and resided with Dominique’s
parents. Thereafter, Dominique died. After almost two month, Jenie gave
birth to Christian. Jenie applied for the registration of the child’s birth
using the surname of Dominique in support of which she submitted
affidavit to use the surname of the father and affidavit of acknowledgement
executed by Dominique’s father. Attached to the affidavit is a
document entitled “Autobiography” which was handwritten by Dominique. The
Civil Registrar denied Jenie’s application because the child was born out
of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth
and has no more capacity to acknowledge the paternity of the
child.
ISSUE: Whether the unsigned handwritten statement by the deceased

father can be considered as recognition of paternity.
HELD: YES. A father who acknowledges paternity of a child through

a written instrument must affix his signature. It is clearly implied in
Article 176 of the Family Code. However, special circumstances exist to
hold that the unsigned Autobiography of Dominique substantially satisfies the
requirement of law. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the
child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
unquestionably handwritten by Dominique. Third, Jenie’s testimony is
corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father. These
circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his
statements in his Autobiography.
3. PROPERTY
FEL ENERGY, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS
ISSUE: Whether power barges are considered personal properties.

28
HELD: NO. Power barges are real property and are thus subject to
real property tax. Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that
“docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their
nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or
coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are
categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature
of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an
industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said
industry or work.
LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL vs. HON. ZEUS ABROGAR

G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009, 576 SCRA 108
FACTS: Luis was charged of the crime of theft by stealing and

using the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by
conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) which is a method of
routing and completing international long distance calls using lines,
cables, antennae, and/or airwave frequency which connect directly to the
local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is
destined. Luis claimed that international long distance calls and the
business of the providing telecommunications or telephone services are
not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether the business of providing telecommunications and the

telephone services are personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.
HELD: YES. The only requirement for a personal property to be the

object of theft under the penal code is that it can be capable of
appropriation. It need not be capable of “asportation” which is defined
as “carrying away.” Jurisprudence is settled that to “take” under the
theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or
carrying away.
Appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control

by science such as electrical energy can be achieved by tampering
with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of
nature. Luis was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale
(ISR) or the unauthorized routing and completing of international long
distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and
connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the country where destined.
4. CO-OWNERSHIP
Article 487
RESUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
454 SCRA 42, G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005
** * It was held that anyone of the co-owners may sue for

ejectment.
-- this is an unqualified and categorical authority of anyone of the

co-owners to evict possessors or lessees.
When the action is brought by one of them for the benefit

of all, a favorable decision will benefit the co-owners , but an adverse
decision cannot prejudice their rights.
ARNELITO ADLAWAN vs. EMETERIO ADLAWAN

479 SCRA 275, G. R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006
FACTS: Arnelito Adlawan was acknowledged illegitimate son of Dominador

Adlawan who died without an issue and survived by his wife
Graciana. Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, petitioner
executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house
built thereon. Arnelito filed an unlawful detainer suit to eject respondents
from the property in his own name and as the sole owner of
the property.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for
ejectment.
29
HELD: NO. The late Dominador Adlawan was survived not only by
petitioner but also by the legal wife of the decedent, Graciana, who
died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987.
- - - By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of

Lot 7226 under Article 998 of the New Civil Code.
- - - the death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the
absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her
relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had
no blood relations.
- - - Article 487 provides that “any one of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment.”
- - - this article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of

possession: forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery
of possession (accion publiciana) and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion).
A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of

joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit if
presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners.
- - - Where the suit for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims
to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated
property, the action should be dismissed. (Baloloy vs. Hular, 438 SCRA 80, G. R. No.
157767, September 9, 2004).
- - - It is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer
in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the
heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication
over the disputed property.
- - - It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant

action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that
necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his
late father Dominador.
PUBLIC DOMINION
DOMALSIN vs. SPOUSES VALENCIANO

Q: What is the property of public dominion?
A: Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil

Code as follows:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the state, banks, shores,
roadsteads and other of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
Q: Who owns property of public dominion?
A: Properties of public dominion are owned by the general public.

Public use is “use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but
open to the indefinite public.” As the land in controversy is a portion
of Kennon Road which is for the use of the people, there can be
no dispute that same is part of public domain. This being the case, the
parties cannot appropriate the land for themselves. Thus, they cannot
claim any right of possession over it.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
HEIRS OF ZOSIMO MARAVILLA vs. PRIVALDO TUPAS
30
FACTS: Privaldo, along with the other heirs of the late Asisclo, has
maintained their occupation and possession of the subject property located in
Boracay island.
The heirs of the late Zosimo claimed ownership over 10,000 square
meters of said property by a virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February
8, 1975 betweem Zosimo and Asiclo.
The heirs of Zosimo filed a case for quieting of title with recovery
of possession and the RTC ruled in their favor.
While the motion for execution was pending, the Supreme Court
declared Boracay island as government property.
The CA ordered the decision of the RTC granting the motion for
execution as null and void and ruled that the Boracay Decision was a
supervening event and the RTC erred in not declaring null and void
the sale of unregistered land considering that Boracay island has been
classified as an inalienable land.
The heirs of Zosimo argued that the Boracay Decision is not a

supervening event and the settled dispute between the parties as to who
has the better right to the property is distinct and separate from the
issue of titling sought in the Boracay decision.
ISSUE
Whether private individual may acquire vested right of ownership over
the Boracay island, considering that they have been in open and continuous
possession for several years.
RULING
NO. In the present case, the basis of Zosimo’s claim over the
subject property is the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land.
This Deed of Sale has been acknowledged and adjudged by the

RTC to be binding between the parties and in fact, has attained finality.
The SC in the Boracay Decision ruled that the entire island of

Boracay as state owned except for lands already covered by existing
titles.
Therefore, the Boracay island, being owned by the State, can only be
declared or made subject of private ownership by the government.
Only the government can determine the manner in which the Boracay
island should be disposed of or conveyed to private individuals, pursuant
to the Regalian Doctrine which dictates that all lands not clearly within
private ownership shall be presumed to be part of the public domain
belonging to the State.
Thus, all lands that have not acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, remain part of the inalienable public domain.
In this case, at the time of the sale of the subject property, the
late Asisclo had no right to sell a property that has not been declared
alienable by the State. One cannot dispose of a thing he does not
own.
Therefore, the “Sale of Unregistered Land” is void ab initio for

having an object outside the commerce of men.
5. SUCCESSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF DELGADO &
RUSTIA vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
FACTS: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate and without
descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Petitioners and
respondents are their respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate
estate.
31
The petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia were never married. According to petitioners, sometime in
1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa. They eventually lived together
as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners pointed out that no record of the contested marriage existed in
the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as
one of the sponsors referred to her as “Señorita” or unmarried.
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Ocampo

with five other children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another
son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the
claimants in Josefa’s estate. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Ocampo
which was admitted one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status
of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got
married is crucial to the claimants because if Ramon Osorio and Felisa
Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was
a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded
from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by
the principle of absolute separation between legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and
his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s estate, as
they would all be within the illegitimate line.
ISSUE
1) Are grandnephews and grandnieces entitled to inherit by the
right of representation in the collateral line?
2) Whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa

and between Felisa and Ramon.
RULINGS
1) NO. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces), Consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the
only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake
of her intestate estate are her brothers and nieces, or their children
who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.
2) YES. In this case, several circumstances give rise to the

presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed
status as husband and wife was such that even the original
petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao
in 1975 referred them as spouses.
FELIX AZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 119
FACTS: Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of

Eugenia E. Igsolo.
However, this was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-
in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the deceased.
According to her, the will was forged and imbued with several
defects.
Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is that the will was
not properly acknowledged. The notary public Petronilo Y. Bautista, only
wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotaryo ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo, 1981 dito sa
Lungsod ng Maynila.
ISSUE
Whether the will is fatally defective.
RULING
YES. The notarial will is fatally defective.
32
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of

pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose
attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. The attestation clause is “a memorandum of the
facts attending the execution of the will” required by law to be
made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear the
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an
act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the
bottom thereof negatives their participation.
And perhaps most importantly, a will, which does not contain an

acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. A jurat is that
part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her; the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Any one of
these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all
three defects is just aching by judicial rejection. There is a distinct
and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive
catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of notarial will.
CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS

FACTS: Rufo, the father of Celestino and Saturnino, mortgaged a

parcel of land he owns as a security for a loan with the Rural
Bank. For his failure to pay his loan, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole
bidder. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by
law and a new title was issued in the name of the bank.
Later, Celestino and Saturnino executed an Extrajudicial Settlement

where they intended to redeem the property mortgaged by their father
with the Bank.
Saturnino bought the subject property from the bank and

thereafter, he filed a complaint for recovery of possession against
Celestino.
ISSUE: Whether there ever a co-ownership between Celestino and

Saturnino over the subject property at any given point of time.
HELD: NONE. At the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement,

the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased
father. The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person
consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing
at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession. Since Rufo lost ownership
of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at
the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
formed part of his estate.
RAFAEL C. UY vs. ESTATE OF VIPA FERNANDEZ LAHAYLAHAY

G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017, 822 SCRA 382
FACTS: Vipa is the registered owner of land situated in Jaro, Iloilo City.
Vipa and her husband, Levi, have two children, Grace Joy and Jill
Frances.
A contract of lease was executed in 1990 between Vipa and Rafael

over the subject property and the improvement thereon.
On March 5, 1994, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever.

Grace Joy became the de facto administrator of the Estate of Vipa.
In June 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rentals. Consequently,

on June 12, 2003, the Estate of Vipa, through Grace Joy, filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer with MTCC against Rafael. At the time of
filing of the complaint, Rafael’s unpaid rents amounted to P271,150.00.
In his answer, Rafael denied that he refused to pay the rent for
the lease of the subject property. He claimed that Patria, Vipa’s sister,
demanded for the payment of the rents, claiming that she is the rightful
heir of Vipa.
33
Since Rafael had no idea who is entitled to receive the rent for the
subject property, he deposited the amount of P10,000 with the Office of
the Clerk of Court on November 20, 1998 and that Grace Joy was
informed of such consignation.
The MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of the Estate of Vipa.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTCC’s decision and dismissed the
complaint for unlawful detainer.
The RTC held that the MTCC erred in including the entire subject
property as part of the Estate of Vipa. The RTC explained that the
subject property was acquired by Vipa during the subsistence of her
marriage with Levi, and as such, is part of their conjugal properties.
Accordingly, the RTC ruled that Rafael, as co-owner of the subject

property, having bought Levi’s one - half share thereof, had the right to
possess the same.
However, the CA reversed RTC’s decision on the ground that the

issue of ownership of the subject property was raised for the first
time on his appeal with the RTC.
ISSUES
1) Whether Rafael is barred from raising the claim that he owns
Levi’s one-half undivided share in the subject property for the first time
on appeal to RTC.
2) Whether Rafael becomes a co-owner and has the right to possess

the subject property as an incident of ownership.
3) Whether Rafael could still be directed to vacate property and be

not obliged to pay the unpaid rents.
RULINGS
1) NO. It is true that fair play, justice and due process dictate that
parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues that they
could have raised but never did during trial.
However, before a party may be barred from raising an issue for

the first time on appeal, it is imperative that the issue could have
been raised during trial.
What escaped the CA’s attention is that the sale of the one-half
undivided share in the subject property to Rafael was consummated only
on December 29, 2005, more than two years after Rafael filed with the
MTCC his answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer on July 18, 2003.
Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his acquisition of Levi’s share
in the subject property as an affirmative defense in the answer he filed
with the MTCC.
Thus, the CA should have exerted efforts to resolve the said issue
instead of dismissing the same on the flimsy ground that it was not
raised during the proceeding before the MTCC.
2) YES. The sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the

subject property to Rafael effectively transferred his right as a co-owner
thereof thus making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property.
Upon Vipa’s death, one-half of the subject property was automatically

reserved in favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the
conjugal partnership. The other half, which is Vipa’s share, was transmitted
to Vipa’s heirs - Grace J oy and Jill Frances.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, a co-owner could sell his
undivided share, hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of
his undivided interest.
Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half share in the subject property
was not necessarily void, for the right as a co-owner thereof was
34
effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject

property.
3) NO. Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the property

since he became a co-owner of the subject property on December 29,
2005 - the time when Levi sold his one-half undivided share over the
subject property to Rafael.
Otherwise stated, prior to his acquisition of Levi’s one-half undivided

share, Rafael was a mere lessee of the subject property and is thus
obliged to pay the rents for his possession thereof.
RESERVA TRONCAL
MARIA MENDOZA vs. JULIA P. DELOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 74
FACTS: Placido and Dominga had four (4) children: Antonio, Exequiel
married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Three (3) parcels of land
located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan were registered in the name of Exequiel
married to Leonor in which Exequiel was in possession of the
properties. After Exequiel’s death, the properties passed to his spouse
Leonor and only daughter Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share
went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue
and these properties were adjudicated to Julia, Leonor’s sister, as
the sole surviving heirs of Leonor and Gregoria.
On the other hand, the heirs of Antonio: Apolonio and Valentin

claimed that these properties should be reserved by Julia in their
behalf and must now revert back to them applying Article 891 of
the New Civil Code on reserva troncal.
ISSUES: (1) Who are the person involved in reserve troncal?
(2) Whether Julia, sister of Leonor and aunt of Gregoria,

qualifies as reservoir or reservista.
(3) Whether the heirs of Antonio, namely: Apolonio and Valentin

as reservees or reservatarios.
HELD: (1) As contemplated in Article 891 of the New Civil Code, the
following persons are involved in reserva troncal:
a) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the

property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title;
b) the descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the

property;
c) the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained

the property from the prepositus by operation of law;
and
d) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree

from the prepositus and who belongs to the line from
which the property came and for whom the property
should be reserved by the reservor.
The ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from

Exequiel as he was the ascendant from where the first transmission
occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute
as the descendant who received the properties by gratuitous title.
(2) YES. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is

made to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative from
whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s collateral
relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her
mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is
Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia,
her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative
within the third degree and not her ascendant.
(3) NO. They cannot be considered reservee/reservatarios as they are

not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the
35
properties came. They are first cousins of the propositus who are
fourth degree relatives and are not reservees/reservatarios.
COLLATION - Article 1061
CORAZON M. GREGORIO vs. ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG

FACTS: During the lifetime of Casimiro, he transferred one lot by way

of Deed of Donation to his son, Vicente. Upon the death of Casimiro,
an inventory report of the properties of the decedent was made before
the probate court excluding the donated lot to Vicente.
ISSUE: Whether the donated lot be excluded from the inventory of

the properties of the decedent.
HELD: NO. Article 1061 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that
“every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that
it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir and in the account of partition.
By express provision of law then, the lot which was donated

by the decedent to his son, Vicente, should be included in the
inventory of the properties of the decedent.
AMELIA P. ARELLANO vs. FRANCISCO PASCUAL

G.R. No. 189776, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 826
FACTS: Angel died intestate and single leaving as heirs his three (3)
siblings: Amelia, Francisco and Miguel.
During the settlement of estate of the decedent, Francisco &

Miguel claimed that the parcel of land donated by Angel during
his lifetime to Amelia is subject to collation and considered the
same as advance legitime.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the collateral relatives of the

decedent are entitled to legitime.
(2) Whether the property donated by Angel to Amelia

should be formed part of his estate at the time of his
death.
(3) Whether the property donated is subject to collation.
(4) Whether the estate of Angel be partitioned equally

among the three (3) siblings as his legal or intestate
heirs.
HELD: (1) NO. The decedent was survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and therefore, are not entitled to any legitime which
the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.
(2) NO. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is
entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties
to anyone, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to his sister Amelia is valid as is deemed as
donation to a “stranger.”
(3) NO. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs and one
of its purposes is to determine the legitime and the free portion.
There being no compulsory heir, the donated property is not subject
to collation.
(4) YES. The decedent’s remaining estate should be partitioned equally

among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives pursuant to Articles 1003 and
1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that “the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased . . . and
should the only survivors be brother and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares.
36
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL

FACTS: Teofilo died intestate and was survived by his compulsory heirs,
wife Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. He was predeceased by his
parents and he had no other siblings except Juan. Upon Teofilo’s death,
all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of his inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs.
Later, Juan filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Felicidad in view of the absence of the required marriage license;
declaration of nullity of the status of a child as the latter was
neither natural or adopted son of his late brother; and recovery and
reconveyance of the property. The trial court rendered judgment in favor
of Juan based on summary judgment, however, the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment.
ISSUES
1) Whether or not the summary judgment is applicable in an action
for annulment of marriage.
2) Whether or not the brother has the legal personality to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage.
HELD: 1) NO. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and

summary judgment have no place in cases of declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage and annulment of marriage.
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the
State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. Both the
Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should
order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It
is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that
there is no suppression of evidence and to make sure the evidence
to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
2) Generally, NO, because the rule makes it the sole right of the
husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, however, the compulsory heir in order to protect his successional
right has the right to question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses in the settlement of estate proceedings filed in regular court.
The legal personality of Juan to bring the nullity of marriage case

is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not legitimate,
adopted or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate or legally

adopted son of Teofilo, then Juan has no legal personality to
ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected. The presence of descendant,
illegitimate or even an adopted child excludes the collateral relatives
from inheriting from the decedent.
LOLITA BAS CAPABLANCA vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS

G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017, 828 SCRA 482
FACTS: Andres and Pedro Bas acquired Lot 2535 with an area of 6,120
square meters on May 12, 1937.
On November 28, 1939, Pedro Bas sold to Faustina his portion of Lot
2535 as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale.
After the death of Faustina and her husband, their heirs executed a
notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Sale where Lot
2535 was conveyed to one of their heirs, Alejandra.
Alejandra sold the land to Edith Deen, who in turn sold it to Atty.
Eddie Deen.
Upon the death of Atty. Deen, an Extra-judicial Settlement with Absolute

Deed of Sale was executed and they sold the land to Norberto Bas, who
took possession of and built a house on it.
37
On December 15, 1995, Norberto Bas died without a will and

succeeded by his niece and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca (Lolita).
In October 1996, Josefina Bas Espinosa (Josefina), representative of Heirs

of Pedro Bas, filed a complaint for Clarification of Ownership of Lot 2535
against Lolita before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, but it was not resolved.
Lolita sought to register her portion in Lot 2535 but was denied by
the Register of Deeds citing the need for a court order. She learned
that the TCT in favor of Andres and Pedro Bas on Lot 2535 has been
cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the Heirs of
Pedro Bas.
On December 16, 1997, Lolita filed a complaint before the RTC for
the cancellation of titles thereon.
In their answer, the Heirs of Pedro Bas claimed that “the sale
between Pedro Bas and Faustina in 1939 was fake, spurious and invalid
because Pedro who was an illiterate never learned how to write his name
so that the signature thereon could not have been made by Pedro.
Lolita’s claim is anchored on a sale of the property to his

predecessor-in-interest and not any filiation with the original owner Pedro
Bas.
ISSUES
1) Whether the dispute in this case is the heirship of Lolita to
Norberto or the validity of sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to
Faustina that culminates to Norberto.
2) Whether Lolita should be declared first as the sole heir for a

separate proceeding in a proper special proceeding to resolve her action for
cancellation of titles of the property.
RULINGS
1) The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of Lolita to
Norberto but the validity of the sale of the property in 1939 from
Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer transactions that
culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto.
For with Pedro’s sale of the property in 1939, it follows that there
would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been
transmitted to his heirs.
Lolita’s claim is anchored on a sale of the property to her

predecessor-in-interest and not on any filiation with the original owner. What
Lolita is pursuing is Norberto’s right of ownership over the property which
was passed to Lolita upon the latter’s death.
2) NO, the Court finds no need for a separate proceeding for a

declaration of heirship in order to resolve Lolita’s action for cancellation of
titles of the property.
In Bordalla vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has stated that no judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary in order that as heir may assert his
or her rights to the property of the deceased.
In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special proceeding

and to require it would be superfluous considering that Lolita had already
presented evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto
which the heirs of Pedro never disputed. Moreover, to dismiss the case
and require Lolita to institute a special proceeding to determine her
status as heir of the late Norberto would hamper, instead of serve,
justice.
6. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Article 15 - Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of person are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad.
0
Article 16 - Real properties as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
38
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to

the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.
Article 17 - The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.
Article 1039 - Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation

of the decedent.
Domiciliary Theory posits that the personal status and rights of a

person are governed by the law of his domicile or the place of
his habitual residence.
Nationality Theory postulates that it is the law of the person’s

nationality that governs such status and rights.
OBLIGATION OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL TO SUPPORT MINOR CHILD
NORMA DEL SOCORRO vs. ERST JOHAN BRINKMAN JAN WILSEM

FACTS: Norma and Brinkman contracted marriage in Holland on September

25, 1990 and thereafter were blessed with a son, Roderigo.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree

issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
Brinkman made a promise to provide monthly support to their son

in the amount of 250 Guildene which is equivalent to Php17,500.00.
However, since the arrival of Norma and her son in the Philippines,
Brinkman never gave his promised support.
Not long thereafter, Brinkman came to the Philippines and remarried.

Norma sent a letter demanding for support, however, Brinkman refused to
receive the letter.
Norma filed a complaint against Brinkman for violation of RA 9262

for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child.
According to Brinkman, under to the laws of Netherlands, he is

not obliged to support his son, however, he never proved it in court.
ISSUE: Whether a foreign national is obliged to support his minor child

under Philippine law.
HELD: YES. Under private international law, the party who wants to have
a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.
In the present case, Brinkman hastily concludes that being a

national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support.
While Brinkman pleaded the laws of Netherlands that parents are not obliged
to support their child after the issuance of a divorce decree, he failed to prove
the same.
In view of Brinkman’s failure to prove the national law of the

Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern.
Under the doctrine of processual presumption, if the foreign law

involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation

to support has not properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it
is presumed to be the same with Philippine Law, which enforces the
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obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-

compliance therewith.
DIVORCE OBTAINED ABROAD OF FOREIGN NATIONAL
MA. REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Rebecca was born in Guam, U.S.A. to parents both of

American citizenship, married Vicente in the Philippines. They begot a
daughter in 1982. In 1996, Rebecca initiated a divorce proceeding before
the Dominican Republic court which it granted ordering the dissolution of
the couple’s marriage and “leaving them to remarry after completing the
legal requirements,”
ISSUE: Whether the divorce granted by the foreign court binds Rebecca
and Vicente.
HELD: YES. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca at the time
she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente was an American
citizen. The divorce granted by the foreign court during which Rebecca is
an American citizen is valid and binds her and her Filipino husband.
In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come

within the pale of the country’s policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.
EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis contracted 3 marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six
children. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, Felicisimo
married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen with whom he had
a son, Tobias. However, Merry Lee filed a Complaint for Divorce
before the court in the State of Hawaii, U.S.A., which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody.
Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad then surnamed Sagalongos in

the U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her
for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed
a petition for letters of administration. Petitioner Rodolfo, one of the

children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground, inter alia, asserting that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code (FC) cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256
of the FC.
ISSUE: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad

may validly remarry in the Philippines considering that Felicidad’s marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized before the FC took effect.
HELD: YES. Firstly, in the case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139
(1985), the SC held that after a valid divorce had been obtained by the
foreign husband, the Filipino wife should no longer be considered married
to alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations.
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera where the
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the
said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in
filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that
“the severance of the marital bond had the effect of disassociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.”
FELICITAS AMOR – CATALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

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FACTS: Felicitas married Orlando. Thereafter, they migrated to the United

States of America and became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years
of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced.
Two months after the divorce, Orlando married respondent Merope.

Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with damages against Orlando and
Merope.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition

for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the
ground of bigamy.
HELD: YES. Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The
two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matirmonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et toro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and the leaves the bond in full
force. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must
be proved considering that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. If this is done, the SC remanded the case to the trial court
for its proper disposition for the determination of whether a divorce
decree was indeed obtained in accordance with American law and will
thus, NOT restrict marriage.
7. OBLIGATIONS
Civil Obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do and not to do. It

gives the creditor the legal right to compel by an action in court
the performance of such obligation.
A natural obligation is based on equity and natural law. There is no

legal right to compel performance thereof but if the debtor voluntarily
pays it, he cannot recover what was paid.
Article 1182 - When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the
will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it
depends upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the
obligation shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of this
Code.
Article 1197 - If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature
and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended,
the courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it
depends upon the will of the debtor.
In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may be under
the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once
fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.
CONCHITA SONLEY vs. ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK

G.R. No. 205623, August 10, 2016, 800 SCRA 108
FACTS: Conchita agreed to purchase a parcel of land from Anchor

Savings Bank. She, however, defaulted in paying her monthly obligations
which prompted Anchor to rescind the Contract to Sell.
In filing the complaint, Conchita averred that the rescission of the

contract to sell was null and void because she had already substantially
paid her obligations to the bank. Anchor contended that the post-dated
checks issued by Conchita in its favor covering her monthly obligation
were all dishonored.
During the pre-trial, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement.

On the basis thereof, the trial court rendered a Judgment whereby
Conchita agreed to repurchase the subject property from Anchor.
However, Conchita failed to comply with her obligations. Thus, Anchor

prayed that a writ of execution be issued in its favor ordering, among
others, that the Contract to Sell entered into between the parties
rescinded. This was granted by the trial court.
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Conchita now argues that Anchor is not entitled to execution as the

Compromise Agreement does not specifically provide that in case of default,
a writ of execution may issue; that the remedies available to Anchor are
to charge penalties and/or rescind the agreement as provided for under
the Contract to Sell; and that before a writ of execution may issue,
Anchor must first institute an action for rescission and secure a judicial
declaration that the Contract to Sell is rescinded, which were not done in
this case.
ISSUE
Whether an action for rescission required for a party aggrieved by

the breach of compromise agreement to be able to enforce the
compromise or insists on his original demand.
RULING
NO, an action for rescission is not required.
Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code, “if one of the parties fails or
refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce
the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand.
The language of this Article 2041 denotes that no action for

rescission is required, and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a
compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or
involved in his original demand as if there had never been any
compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He
need not seek, a judicial declaration of rescission, for he may ‘regard’ the
compromise agreement already ‘rescinded.’
Conchita may be right in arguing that Anchor has the option to

proceed with the sale and charge corresponding penalties instead, pursuant
to the stipulations in the Contract to Sell.
However, Anchor chose to rescind the same, an option to which it

is equally entitled to by contract and under the law, and thus evict
Conchita from the premises.
8. DOUBLE SALES
Article 1544 - If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the

person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the

person who in good faith who in good faith was first in the
possession; in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith.
RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA vs. MANILA MISSION

G.R. No. 130223, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 415
FACTS: Spouses Soliven sold the subject property to Manila Mission.

However, it was only on 28 April 1994 when title was transferred in
the name of Manila Mission. In the meantime, on 15 April 1993,
Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara filed an action for sum of money
before the RTC against Spouses Soliven. The RTC issued a writ of
attachment on 21 May 1993 attaching the subject property which was
still then in the name of Spouses Soliven.
ISSUE: Which is superior, a previous but unregistered sale or a

subsequent but duly annotated attachment?
HELD: The settled rule is that levy on attachment, but duly

registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result
is a necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved
was duly covered by the Torrrens system which works under the
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fundamental principle that registration is the operative which gives

validity to the transferor creates a lien upon the land.
SPOUSES SABITSANA vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI

G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013, 703 SCRA 145
FACTS: On September 2, 1981, Alberto executed an unnotarized deed of

sale in favor of Juanito over a parcel of unregistered land.
On October 17, 1991, Alberto sold the lot to Juanito’s family

lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana, through a notarized deed of sale of absolute
sale. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds and
correspondingly paid real property taxes and introduced concrete improvements.
In 1998, Juanito applied for registration of the lot under the Public
Land Act with the DENR, however, Atty. Sabitsana opposed the application
claiming that he was the true owner of the lot.
On April 11, 2000, Juanito filed an action for quieting of title

against Atty. Sabitsana claiming that the latter bought the lot in bad
faith and was exercising acts of possession and ownership over the
same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title.
ISSUES: 1) Whether Article 1544 on double sales applies in this case.
2) Whether Juanito has a better right with unnotarized deed of

sale over the subsequent notarized deed of sale of Atty.
Sabitsana.
3) Whether the sale is valid in the absence of marital consent.
4) Whether Juanito is entitled for the award of attorney’s fees

and litigation expenses.
HELD: 1) NO. The provision of Article 1544 of the Civil Code does
not apply to sales involving unregistered land.
The issue of the buyer’s good or bad faith is relevant only where
the subject of the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying
the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean.
The purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner
is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.
2) YES. The sale to Juanito was executed on Septemer 2, 1981 via

an unnotarized deed of sale, while the sale to Atty. Sabitsana was
made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991 or ten (10)
years thereafter.
Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the
lot, while the subsequent sale to Atty. Sabitsana is null and void
because when it was made, the seller Alberto was no longer the
owner of the lot.
The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not
alter anything, since the sale between him and Alberto remains valid
nevertheless. Notarization or the requirement of a public document under
the Civil Code is only for convenience and not for validity or
enforceability.
3) YES. Even admittedly the lot was a conjugal property, the

absence of the wife’s signature and consent to the deed did not
render the sale to Juanito absolutely null and void, but merely
voidable.
Since Alberto and his wife were married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, Article 173 of the Civil Code should apply. Under
the said provision, the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s
consent is not void but merely voidable. In the absence of a decree
annulling the deed of sale in favor of Juanito, the same remains
valid.
4) YES. Atty. Sabitsana’s actual and prior knowledge of the first sale
to Juanito makes him purchaser in bad faith.
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Moreover, as Juanito’s family lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was under

obligation to safeguard his client’s property and not jeopardize it. Such
is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his general agency.
9. MACEDA LAW (RA 6552)

(Buyer’s Protection on Sales of immovable property on installments)
Most important features:
(1) After having paid installments for at least two years, the buyer
is entitled to a mandatory grace period of one month for
every year of installment payments made, to pay the unpaid
installments without interest.
If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the

buyer the cash surrender value equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of
the total payments made, and after five years of installments, an
additional five percent (5%) every year but not to exceed
ninety percent (90%) total payments made.
(2) In case the installments paid were less than 2 years, the
seller shall give the buyer period of not less than 60 days. If
the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of
the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after 30
days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation
or demand for rescission by notarial act.
MOLDEX REALTY, INC. vs. FLORA SEBERON

G.R. No. 176289, April 8, 2013, 695 SCRA 331
FACTS: Moldex entered with a Contract to Sell of a certain property at

Metrogate Cavite with Flora despite of its lack of license to sell.
Flora had made installment payments from March 11, 1992 to July
19, 1996 in the aggregate amount of P375,295.49. She had defaulted in
her succeeding payments.
Moldex sent notices to Flora to update her account but to no

avail. Finally, Moldex sent Flora a Notarized Notice of Cancellation of
Contract to Sell.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the contract to sell despite the lack of license

to sell is valid.
2) What is the right available to Flora under the Maceda Law?
HELD: 1) YES. PD 957 provides that the lack of license to sell on

the part of a subdivision developer does not result for the nullification
or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer.
Thus, the contract to sell entered into between Flora and Moldex
remains valid despite the lack of license to sell on the part of the
latter at the time the contract was entered into.
2) Since Moldex had already sent Flora a Notarized Notice of

Cancellation of Contract to Sell, the only option available is Section 3
(b) under Maceda Law or RA 6552, whereby Moldex shall refund to
Flora the cash surrender value of her payments on the property
equivalent to the 50% of the total payments made or P187,647.75.
GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC. vs. EVELYN M. ANGELES

FACTS: Angeles purchased a house and lot under a Contract to Sell from
Gatchalian payable for a period of ten years.
After 48 monthly installment payments, Angeles failed to satisfy her

monthly installments with Gatchalian.
Several demands were made by Gatchalian but the same were

continually disregarded by Angeles. Finally, Gatchalian served Angeles with a
Notice of Notarial Rescission thru registered mail.
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Consequently, Angeles was furnished by Gatchalian a demand letter

demanding her to pay the outstanding reasonable rentals for her use and
occupation of the house and lot to date and to vacate the same. She
was informed in said letter that the 50% refundable amount that she is
entitled to has already been deducted with the reasonable value for the
use of the properties.
ISSUES: 1) Whether there is a valid cancellation of the Contract to Sell.
2) Whether Angeles is entitled to the benefit of Maceda Law or

RA 6552.
3) Whether Angeles can be ejected for non-payment of monthly

installments.
HELD: 1) NO. A valid and effective cancellation under RA 6552 must

comply with the mandatory twin requirements of a notarized notice of
cancellation and a refund of the cash surrender value.
Although there was a notarial rescission sent thru registered mail but
it was not accompanied by the refund of the cash surrender value
equivalent to 50% of the total payments made.
For failure to refund the cash surrender value to the defaulting

buyer Angeles, Gatchalian cannot deduct the same for the amount of
the rentals due to Gatchalian as there was nothing in the contract to
apply compensation under Art. 1279 of the New Civil Code.
2) Angeles is entitled to receive the cash surrender value equivalent

to 50% of the total payments made as provided for by Section 3 (b)
of RA 6552.
3) In the absence of a valid cancellation of the Contract to Sell

between Gatchalian and Angeles, the contract remains valid and existing.
Thus the complaint for unlawful detainer would be a violation of the
mandate of RA 6552.
OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. SPOUSES JOVELLANOS

FACTS: Spouses Jovellanos entered into a Contract to Sell with Palmera

Homes for the purchase of a residential house and lot payable for a
period of 10 years.
Later, Palmera Homes assigned all its rights, title and interest in the
Contract to Sell in favor of Optimum.
A year later, Optimum issued a Notice of Delinquency and

Cancellation of Contract to Sell to Spouses Jovellanos for their failure to
pay their monthly installments despite several written and verbal demands.
A month later, a final Demand Letter by Optimum required Spouses

Jovellanos to vacate and deliver possession of the subject property within
seven (7) days, which however remained unheeded.
Optimum instituted the action for unlawful detainer within one year
from the final demand to vacate.
ISSUE: Whether the validity of the cancellation of the Contract to Sell

under RA 6552 lies within the competence or jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
HELD: YES. Under RA 6552, the mechanics of cancellation of

Contract to Sell is based on the amount of installments already paid by
the buyer under the said contract.
Since Jovellanos had paid less than two years in installments,

Section 4 of RA 6552 provides for three (3) requisites before the seller
may actually cancel the subject contract: first, the buyer shall give the
buyer a 60-day grace period to be reckoned from the date the
installment became due; second, the seller must give the buyer a notice
of cancellation/demand for rescission by notarial act if the buyer fails to
pay the installments due at the expiration of the said grace period; and
third, the seller may actually cancel the contract only after 30 days from
the buyer’s receipt of the said notice of cancellation/demand for rescission
by notarial act.
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There was a valid and effective cancellation of the Contract to Sell

in accordance with Section 4 of RA 6552 and since Spouses Jovellanos
had already lost their right to retain possession of the subject property
as a consequence of such cancellation, their refusal to vacate and turn
over possession to Optimum makes out a valid case for unlawful detainer.
SPOUSES FAUSTINO & JOSEFINA GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 172036, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 280
FACTS: On May 28, 1993, Spouses Garcia and Dela Cruz entered into
a Contract to Sell wherein the latter agreed to sell to the former
for P3M the five (5) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT).
The Contract to Sell entered into contains a proviso that failure

of Spouses Garcia to pay the purchase price in full shall cause the
rescission of the contract and forfeiture of one – half (1/2%) percent of
the total amount paid to Dela Cruz.
At the time of the execution of the said contract, three (3) of

the subject lots were registered in the name of Abelida from whom
Dela Cruz allegedly acquired said properties by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
As agreed upon, Spouses Garcia shall make a down payment upon

signing of the contract. The balance shall be paid in three (3)
installments.
On its due date December 31, 1993, Spouses Garcia failed to pay
the last installment in the amount of P1.672M.
Sometime in July 1995, Spouses Garcia offered to pay the unpaid

balance, which had already been delayed by one and half year, which
Dela Cruz refused to accept.
On September 23, 1995, Dela Cruz sold the same parcels of land
to Atty. Bartolome for P7.793M.
In order to compel Dela Cruz to accept Spouses Garcia’s payment

in full satisfaction of the purchase price and thereafter, execute the
necessary document of transfer in their favor, Spouses Garcia filed a
complaint for specific performance before the RTC.
ISSUES: 1) Whether Spouses Garcia may compel Dela Cruz to

accept the payment in full and execute a Deed of Absolute
Sale.
2) Whether Dela Cruz has the power to rescind the contract

upon the failure of the Spouses Garcia to pay the balance
of the purchase price.
3) Whether judicial intervention is necessary despite the automatic

rescission provided for in the contract to sell.
4) Whether the provisions of RA 6552 otherwise known as the

Maceda Law are applicable in the present case.
5) Whether Atty. Bartolome is a buyer in bad faith for having

knowledge of the previous contract to sell.
HELD: 1) NO. Contracts are law between the parties, and they are
bound by its stipulations.
It is clear from the provisions of the contract that the parties

intended their agreement to be a Contract to Sell: Dela Cruz retains
ownership of the subject lands and does not have the obligation to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale until Spouses Garcia’s payment of the
full purchase price.
Payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of

which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of
the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.
Strictly speaking, there can be no rescission or resolution of an

obligation that is still non-existent due to the non-happening of the
suspensive condition.
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Dela Cruz is not obliged to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in

Spouses Garcia’s favor because of their failure to make full payment on
the stipulated date.
2) YES. Pursuant to Art. 1191, the law makes it available to the

injured party alternative remedies such as the power to rescind or enforce
fulfillment of the contract, with damages in either case if the obligor
does not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
There is nothing in this law which prohibits the parties from

entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the
contract would cause its cancellation even without court intervention.
The vendor’s right in contract to sell with reserved title to

extrajudicially cancel the sale upon failure of the vendee to pay the
stipulated installments and retain the sums and installments already received
has long been recognized by the well-established doctrine.
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for

automatic recession upon non-payment cannot be doubted.
It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right

to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach without need of
going to court.
Thus, rescission under Article 1191 was inevitable due to Spouses

Garcia’s failure to pay the stipulated price within original period fixed
in the agreement.
3) YES. Judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of

obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed
rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even
without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not
the rescission was proper.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be

merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the
revocatory act.
4) NO. The Maceda Law applies to contracts of sale of real

estate on installment payments including residential condominium apartments
but excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales to tenants.
The subject lands, comprising five (5) parcels do not comprise

residential real estate within the contemplation of the Maceda Law.
Even it we apply the Maceda Law to the present case, Spouses

Garcia’s offer of payment to Dela Cruz was made a year and a half
after the stipulated date.
This is beyond the sixty-day grace period under Section 4 of the

Maceda Law.
5) NO. It is undeniable that Spouses Garcia failed to pay the

balance of the purchase price on the stipulated date of the Contract to
sell.
Thus, Dela Cruz is within her rights to sell the subject lands to Atty.
Bartolome.
Neither Dela Cruz nor Bartolome can be said to be in bad faith.
10. PRESCRIPTION AND RECONVEYANCE
SPOUSES SOFRONIO SANTOS vs. HEIRS OF DOMINGA LUSTRE

G.R. No. 151016, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 120
FACTS: Dominga Lustre mortgaged her residential lot to Spouses Santos.

She then sold the property to Natividad Santos. The cancellation of the
mortgage and the sale of the property were both inscribed in the title.
Thereafter, the Spouses Santos transferred the property, by way of sale, to
their son, Froilan. The heirs of Dominga Lustre filed a complaint for
Declaration of inexistence of contract, annulment of title and reconveyance,
averring that the sale to Natividad was simulated as Dominga’s signature
was forged and that the spouses Santos also simulated the Deed of
Sale transferring the property to their son, Froilan. The Santoses allege
that the heirs of Dominga Lustre’s right of action had prescribed.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the heirs of Dominga Lustre is

barred by prescription.
HELD: NO. The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate
of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is an
action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.
A person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation

of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on
implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years.
The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need

to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession
of the property, prescription does not commence to run against
him.
When an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would

be in a nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible.
ANICETO UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: In 1979, Carmencita acquired ownership of a parcel of land

from her brother.
The land was later subdivided into Lots No. 54-B-8 and No. 54-B-9
covered by TCT # T-58334 and T-58335.
Subsequently, Carmencita sold Lot No. 54-B-8 to a certain Bobby

Adil on installment, on the condition that the absolute deed of sale
will be executed only upon full payment.
Adil failed to pay the amortization, and he was forced to sell his
unfinished building on the property to spouses Omandac.
Meanwhile, Carmencita borrowed money from a certain Grace Ng and

as a security, she delivered TCTs No. T-58334 and T-58335.
Grace Ng, on the other hand, borrowed money from Aniceto and also
delivered to the latter the two TCTs to guarantee payment of the loan.
Sometime thereafter, Carmencita learned that Aniceto filed a case for

recovery of possession against spouses Omandac before the RTC which
ruled in favor of Aniceto.
The decision became final and executory in 2001 and the spouses
Omandac were ejected from the property and Aniceto gained possession of
the property.
In July 1999, Carmencita filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed with

Damages against Aniceto.
The subject of the complaint was the deed of sale allegedly

executed between Carmencita and Aniceto involving Lots # 54-B-8 and 54-
B-9. Carmencita prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and
void because the alleged sale between her and Aniceto was a forgery
considering that she never sold the lots and her signature in the
purported deed of sale is spurious.
On July 29, 1999, an Amended Complaint was filed and the same
was not signed by Carmencita but by her counsel.
Aniceto, on the other hand, claimed that the action is a collateral

attack on the title which is prohibited by law under the principle of
indefeasibility of the title after the lapse of one year from registration.
He further claimed that the action for annulment of deed of sale

is already barred by the statute limitation, guilty of estoppel and laches
and the certification against forum shopping is defective.
ISSUES
48
1) Distinguish whether an action is a direct attack or

a collateral attack
2) Whether an action for annulment of the deed of sale is

either a direct attack or a collateral attack on the title.
3) What is the nature of the action for reconveyance?
4) Whether an action for reconveyance may be based on a void

contract.
5) What is laches? How can it be proved.
6) Whether there is a substantial compliance with the requirements

against forum shopping.
HELD: 1) An action is a direct attack when the object of an action

is to annul or set aside the judgment in the registration proceedings.
On the other hand, a collateral attack is when, in an action to

obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or registration
proceeding is nevertheless made as incident.
2) NO. Carmencita is seeking a relief for an annulment of the

deed of sale, which is not an attack on the judgment or registration
proceeding pursuant to which the titles were decreed.
It does not seek to set aside the judgment of registration of

titles nor does it seek to nullify the title by challenging the judgment
or proceeding that decreed its issuance.
The action is in reality one for reconveyance, which is

imprescriptible when based on a void contract.
3) An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy

granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is

respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of
the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with
a better right.
However, such recourse cannot be availed of once has passed to

an innocent purchaser for value.
For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not

have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Here, Carmencita does not only seek to annul the purported deed of
sale but also to cancel the titles in the name of Aniceto.
If the reliefs are granted and the TCTs are cancelled, the titles
to the lots will revert to Carmencita as she was the previously
registered owner.
Thus, a ruling in favor of Carmencita would be equal to what an

action for reconveyance seeks to accomplish.
Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, a contract is voidable when

the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
When the consent is totally absent and not merely vitiated, the
contract is void.
4) YES. An action for reconveyance may also be based on a void

contract.
When the action for reconveyance is based on a void contract, as

when there was no consent on the part of the alleged vendor. The
action is imprescriptible.
49
The property may be reconveyed to the true owner, notwithstanding

the TCTs already issued in another’s name. The issuance of a
certificate of title in the latter’s favor could not vest upon him or
could it validate the purchase thereof which is null and void.
Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title
than what he actually has. Being null and void, the sale produces no
legal effects whatsoever.
Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is therefore

determined by the nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded
on a claim of an implied or constructive trust or one based on the
existence of a void or inexistent contract.
There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance based on a

void contract is imprescriptible.
5) Laches is a doctrine in equity, and applied only in the

absence of, and never against statutory law.
The positive mandate of Article 1410 of the Civil Code conferring

imprescriptibility to actions or defense for the declaration of the inexistence
of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments
based only on equity.
The elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is
evidentiary in nature, a fact cannot be established by mere allegations in
the pleadings.
Therefore, at this stage, the dismissal as to the ground of laches

would be premature. The issues must be resolved in the trial on the
merits.
6) YES. The original complaint contained a proper verification and

certification against forum shopping duly signed by Carmencita.
What was signed by Carmencita’s counsel was the Amended Complaint

dated July 29, 1999, who was not authorized to sign on her behalf.
However, its verification and certification specified the statement that this
amended complaint should be taken and read together with the original
complaint which the CA took this as “cautionary move” on the part of
Carmencita which is tantamount to substantial compliance.
A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal

responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other
tribunal that there are no pending cases involving basically the same
parties, issues and causes of action.
It is recognized rule that the certification must be executed by

the party-pleader, not by her counsel, however, the Court chose to
overlook the procedural lapses in the interest of substantial justice and
the existence of prima facie merit of the petition.
LUCIA CARLOS ALIÑO vs. HEIRS OF ANGELICA LORENZO

G.R. No. 159550, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 139
An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the reckoning point

is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property.
If the person claiming to be the owner is in actual possession
thereof, the right to seek to quiet title to the property, does
not prescribe.
One in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to
be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed
or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right.
RECONVEYANCE NOT INDIRECT ATTACK

ON VALIDITY OF TITLE
MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA vs. GREGORIA TAGUFA
FACTS: Spouses Epifanio Tagufa owned an untitled property containing

an area of 539 square meters. They mortgaged the property to DBP.
50
For failure to redeem the property, DBP foreclosed the same and
sold it to Atty. Romulo Marquez.
On April 4, 2002, Mariflor, the daughter of Epifanio and an
American citizen, purchased the subject property from Atty. Marquez by
executing a SPA in favor of her brother, Runsted, with an agreement
that the latter will reconvey the said property to his sister when
demanded.
Mariflor discovered that the same unregistered property was titled in

the name of Gregoria, wife of Runsted, under OCT No. P-84609 by
virtue of a free patent application before the DENR.
Because of fraud, Mariflor instituted an action for reconveyance and

recovery of property of the subject property.
Gregoria claimed that the action for reconveyance would amount to

a collateral attack on the title, which was proscribed under the
principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
ISSUE: Whether the action for reconveyance constitutes an indirect or

collateral attack on the validity of the title.
HELD: NO. In a complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration is

respected as incontrovertible and is not being questioned.
An action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in

personam, available to a person whose property has been wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system in another’s name.
What is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully

or erroneously registered in another’s name to its rightful owner or to
the one with a better right.
If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose

name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the
real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the

property.
The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name
does not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject land.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does

not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.
A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title

over the particular property described thereon. It cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a
shield for the commission of fraud, neither it permits one to enrich
himself at the expense of others.
Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose

the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with person not
named in the certificate or that it may be held in trust for
another person by the registered owner.
11. ADVERSE CLAIM

SPOUSES JESUS CHING vs. SPOUSES ADOLFO ENRILE
FACTS: Spouses Jesus Ching purchased from Raymunda a property in

Las Piñas City. The sale was perfected upon delivery of a duly notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale with the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT and
they immediately took physical possession of the subject property.
The couple failed to register the sale and instead they

executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the same was annotated
at the back of the title.
Three years after the sale, Spouses Ching received a Notice of

Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution on account of court decision
in favor of Spouses Adolfo against the vendor Raymunda. Spouses Jesus
Ching filed a petition to remove cloud or quiet title to real property,
however, it was countered by Spouses Adolfo that the Annotated Adverse
51
Claim had already prescribed after a lapse of thirty (30) days from
the date of registration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the levy on attachment later annotated

shall prevail over the Adverse Claim earlier annotated at the back
of the title by the mere lapse of 30 days and even without
any petition in court for its cancellation.
HELD: NO. A notice of Adverse Claim remains valid even after

the lapse of the 30-day period as provided by Section 70 of
PD 1529. As long as there is yet no petition for cancellation
for its cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains subsisting.
After the lapse of 30 days, the annotation of the adverse claim
may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition by the party
in interest.
The law does not require a person dealing with the owner of
registered land to go beyond the certificate of title as he may rely on
the notices of the encumbrances on the property annotated on the
certificate of title or absence of any annotation. Here, the adverse
claim is annotated at the back of title coupled with the fact
that the Spouses Ching are in possession of the disputed
property. Spouses Adolfo should have put in guard and required
them to ascertain the property offered to them has already been sold to
another to prevent injury to prior innocent buyers.
NAVOTAS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. GERMAN D. CRUZ

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect

the interest of a person over a part of real property, and serves as
a notice and warning to third parties dealing with the said
property that someone is claiming an interest over it or has a
better right than the registered owner.
ROGELIA P. DIAZ - DUARTE vs. SPOUSES BEN & ESTHER ONG

In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first

be conducted. The hearing will afford the parties an opportunity to
prove the propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim. Petitioner
was unlawfully denied this opportunity when the Register of Deeds
automatically cancelled the adverse claim. Needless to state, the
cancellation of adverse claim in ineffective.
ALFREDO SAJONAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 79
The general rule it that a person dealing with registered

land is not required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. However, such person is charged with
notice on the face of the register or certificate of title.
A person who deals with registered land is bound by the liens and
encumbrances including adverse claim annotated therein.
12. RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL

PURIFICACION ESTANISLAO vs. SPOUSES NORMA & DAMIANO GUDITO
G.R. No. 173166, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 330
FACTS: Estanislao family have been renting and occupying the lot
owned by Gaspar since 1934. The former built the house on the
subject lot in accordance with the lease agreement with Gaspar.
When Gaspar died, the subject property was inherited by his son,
Victorino married to Esther.
In the 1980s, Victorino wanted the Estanislao family to vacate the

said property, but the tenants refused because of laws allegedly prohibited
their ejectment therefrom. Resultantly, Estanislao, with due notice to Victorino,
deposited the amount of monthly rentals at Allied Bank under the savings
account in the name of Victorino.
52
In the interim, a Deed of Donation was executed by the Victorino

couple in favor of their daughter Norma married to Damiano Gudito.
Hence, in October 1994, Spouses Gudito notified Estanislao family to
remove their house and vacate the premises within 3 months.
When Estanislao family failed to comply with the demand to vacate,

the Spouses Gudito filed a complaint for unlawful detainer/ejectment against
them.
ISSUES
1) Whether the right of possession is established by virtue of
the Deed of Donation.
2) Whether the right of first refusal applies to Estanislao.
HELD: 1) YES. The Deed of Donation had been prepared and

acknowledged before a notary public is vested with public interest, the
sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear
and convincing evidence.
Thus, the donation made by the Victorino couple is a valid exercise

of their right as owner of the subject property and the Spouses Gudito
are legally entitled to the said property as donees.
2) NO. The right of first refusal applies only to a case where

the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.
Since the subject property was donated by the Victorino couple to

their daughter Norma and her husband, Damiano Gudito, their right to
possess the subject property for their own use as family residence
cannot be denied.
13. QUIETING OF TITLE
SEVERINO BARICUATRO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On October 16, 1968, Severino bought two (2) lots on an

installment basis from Galeos. The two lots are part of Spring Village
Subdivision.
After the sale, Severino introduced certain improvements on said lots

and started to reside therein in 1970. Since then he has been in
actual and physical possession of the said two (2) lots.
However, on December 7, 1968, two months after the sale, Galeos

sold the entire subdivision including the two (2) lots to Amores.
Subsequently, Galeos informed Severino about the sale to Amores and
advised him to pay the balance of the purchase price of the two (2)
lots directly to Amores.
On December 27, 1974, Amores sold the two (2) lots to Nemenio.
Prior to the sale, Amores informed Severino about the impending sale of
the two (2) lots, but the latter failed to respond.
Before Nemenio caused the transfer of the titles to the two (2)
lots and issuance of tax declaration in his name, he visited the
residence of Severino.
Thereafter, Nemenio demanded from Severino to vacate the said lots

but the latter refused to do so.
A complaint for quieting of title was filed by Nemenio against

Severino.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the action for quieting of title is the best
remedy.
(2) Whether Amores is a purchaser in good faith.
(3) Whether Nemenio is also a purchaser in good faith

upon his reliance in the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title.
53
HELD: (1) YES. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to
title to real property.
Its purpose is to secure an adjudication that a claim of title to

or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is
invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be
forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.
In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked

to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants not only to place things in their proper place but to
make the one who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not
to disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he
who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements
he may desire, to use and even to abuse the property as he
deems best.
(2) NO. Amores did not act in good faith when he bought two
disputed lots, however, when he registered his title, the preponderance of
evidence supports the finding that he already had knowledge of the
previous sale of the disputed lots to Severino. Such knowledge tainted
his registration with bad faith.
The prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer

does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the
property.
Under Article 1544, the ownership of an immovable property shall

belong to the purchaser who in good faith registers it first in the
registry of property.
For a second buyer to successfully invoke the protection by Article

1544 of the Civil Code, he must possess good faith until the
registration of the deed of conveyance covering the same.
(3) NO. Nemenio cannot claim to be purchaser in good faith because

he visited the residence of Severino before he registered the disputed
lots on his name. The registration of Nemenio was done in bad
faith. The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not extend
to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a
flaw.
A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the

prosecution of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for
fraud.
ELIAS GALLAR vs. HERMENEGILDA HUSAIN

G.R. No. L-20954, May 24, 1967, 20 SCRA 186
FACTS: On January 9, 1919, Teodoro sold his land to Serapio for P30
with the right to repurchase within six years in a private document.
On January 28, 1919, shortly after the execution of the deed of

sale, Serapio transferred his right to Graciana, sister of Teodoro.
Graciana subsequently transferred her rights to the land to Elias on

April 2, 1919 in exchange for one cow in a private document.
On the same occasion, April 2, 1919, possession of the land

together with the TCT was delivered to Elias.
On October 10, 1960, after 41 years, Elias filed a suit against

the heirs of Teodoro to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor
so that he could get a transfer certificate of title.
On the other hand, the heirs of Teodoro invoked prescription to

bar Elias’ action.
ISSUES
(1) Is Elias’ suit one for specific performance or one for
the quieting of title?
54
(2) Has the action prescribed?
(3) If the heirs of Teodoro had been the possessor of the

property (instead of Elias) would the answer be the same?
HELD: (1) Elias’ suit should be considered an action to quiet

title as it seeks to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast on
his ownership despite the fact that the transactions had all been
merely in private document.
(2) As Elias is in possession of the land, the action is

imprescriptible.
(3) If the heirs of Teodoro were in possession of the

property, Elias’ action would have been prescribed for then the
action would not be one to quiet title, but one to recover real
property which must be brought within the statutory period of
limitation governing such action.
VICENTE SAPTO vs. APOLONIO FABIANA

G.R. No. L-11285, May 16, 1958, 103 Phil 683
FACTS: On June 8, 1931, Samuel and Constancio Sapto executed

a deed of sale of a portion of land covered by TCT # T-5701
in favor of Apolonio for P245.00.
The sale was never registered. Possession of the land was

conveyed to Apolonio and the latter has been in the possession
thereof since 1931.
Thereafter, Constantino died without any issue. Samuel upon his

death was survived by his widow and children, Laureana and
Vicente.
On October 19, 1954, the widow of Samuel, together with

their two children, filed an action for the recovery of the parcel
of land sold by their predecessors to Apolonio in 1931.
ISSUES
(1) Whether an action for quieting of title would compel
the sellers’ successors-in-interest to execute the proper deed
of conveyance in 1954 in favor of the buyer.
(2) Has the action prescribed?
(3) Whether the deed of sale over the land in

question, although was never registered, is still valid and
binding?
HELD: (1) YES. The action for quieting of title is to remove the
cloud cast upon the buyer’s ownership by the refusal of the sellers’
successors-in-interest to recognize the sale by their predecessors.
Thus, Apolonio, being a buyer of the land in 1931 who possessed

it from that date may still compel the sellers’ successors-in-interest to
execute the proper deed of conveyance in 1954 so that the deed
may be registered.
(2) NO. Since Apolonio has been in possession of the property, the
action DOES NOT PRESCRIBE or IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.
(3) YES. Since the property has remained and still in the
possession of the vendee of the property, it is clear that conveyance
between buyer and his vendors is valid and binding upon the vendors,
and is equally binding and effective against the heirs of the vendors.
To hold otherwise would make of the Torrens system a shield for
the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs.
HERMINIO M. DE GUZMAN vs. TABANGAO REALTY INC.

FACTS: Sometime in 1980, Serafin and Josefino de Guzman purchased

on credit oil and lubricating products from FSPC, but they eventually
failed to pay for their credit purchases from FSPC.
55
FSPC filed a complaint for sum of money against Serafin and

Josefino before the RTC of Manila.
After trial, decision was rendered finding Serafin and Josefino liable
to pay their outstanding obligation to FSPC and the judgment became
final and executory.
On June 30, 1983, FSPC levied upon a parcel of land covered

by TCT # 3531 in the name of Spouses Serafin & Amelia de
Guzman.
At the public auction, the sheriff awarded the certificate of sale

to Tabangao Realty as the highest bidder and the same was annotated
on TCT # 3531 on April 13, 1988.
The Spouses De Guzman did not redeem the subject property

within one year from registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale on
TCT # 3531.
On October 19, 2001, upon the deaths of Spouses De Guzman,

their heirs filed a complaint for quieting of title on the ground that
the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale has lost its effectivity as it had been
terminated and extinguished by prescription, laches and estoppel, since more
than 13 years having elapsed from its registration on April 13, 1988
without the buyer taking any step to consolidate its ownership and/or
take possession of the property.
ISSUE; Whether the action for quieting of title would prosper in the
instant case.
HELD: NO. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable

requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrances, or proceeding claimed to be

casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Complainants’ allegation that they were children and only heirs of the
deceased Spouses De Guzman and that the subject property was still
registered in Spouses De Guzman’s names under TCT # 3531. However,
these allegations are insufficient to establish complainants’ title to the
property.
Respondent Tabangao was already substituted to and acquired all the

rights, title, interest, and claims of the Spouses De Guzman to the
subject property on April 13, 1989, when the one – year redemption period
expired. Upon the deaths of Amelia de Guzman on January 1, 1997 and
her husband Serafin de Guzman on April 23, 2001, they had no more
rights, title, interest and claim to the subject property on by succession
to complainants as their heirs.
The execution of the final deed of sale and/or conveyance to

Tabangao is a mere formality and confirmation of the title already vested
in respondent under Rule 39, Section 33 of the Rules of Court. There
is nothing in the rules requiring the institution of a separate action for
execution of such a deed. Therefore, no prescription period for any
action has begun to run.
CLT REALTY DEV’T CORP. vs. PHIL-VILLE DEV’T CORP.

G.R. No. 160726, March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 289
FACTS: A complaint for quieting of title was filed by Phil-Ville against

CLT claiming that it has been in “actual, open, notorious, public,
physical and continuous possession” of the 16 parcels of land before
1980 up to the present. It fenced said parcels of land in 1980 and
1991.
On the other hand, CLT claimed to be the owner of a parcel

of land known as Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate as evidenced by TCT
No. 177013.
However, CLT’s TCT No. 177013, although apparently valid as effective,

is in truth and in fact, invalid and ineffective and unless declared by
the Court, will inevitably prejudice Phil-Ville’s title over its 16 parcels of
land, as said title of CLT is a potential cause of litigation between
Phil-Ville and CLT as both parties are claiming title to the subject
56
properties when CLT’s TCT # T-177013 actually overlaps the 16 parcels

of land of Phil-Ville’s 16 TCTs.
The RTC declared Phil-Ville as “the true, absolute and legitimate

owner of the sixteen (16) parcels of land and CLT’s TCT # T-177013
was declared null and void. It was found out that CLT purchased or
acquired its TCT # T-177013 on December 10, 1988 from its predecessor
Estrellita Hipolito who acquired the land covered by her TCT # R-17994
by virtue of an approved Compromise Agreement between her and Atty.
Jose B. Dimson wherein the latter transferred to Hipolito on September 2,
1976 Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT # R-15166, which
property in turn appears to have been acquired by Dimson by virtue of
an court order dated June 13, 1966 awarding to him as his attorney’s
fees whatever remained undisposed of in Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29
of the Maysilo Estate of Maria De La Concepcion Vidal. Finally, the LRTC
Verification Committee found that “nothing more was left for the heirs
of Maria dela Concepcion Vidal to convey to Jose R. Dimson as his
attorney’s fees and consequently, nothing at all was left for Jose R.
Dimson to convey to Hipolito. In short, Hipolito’s TCT No. R-17974 is
null and void as no land had been registered and TCT No. T-177013
which was derived from TCT # T-17974 is similarly null and void.
ISSUE: Whether TCT # T-177013 imposes a cloud on Phil-Ville’s titles to

their 16 parcels of land.
HELD: YES. Quieting of title is common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property or any
interest but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two

requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Both requisites in order for an action for quieting of title have

been met: (1) Phil-Ville had established its equitable title or interest in
the 16 parcels of land subject of the action; and (2) TCT No. T-177013,
found to overlap titles to said properties of Phil-Ville, was previously
declared invalid.
VILMA I. QUINTOS vs. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS

G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014, 726 SCRA 482
FACTS: Spouses Ibarra were owners of a parcel of land consisting of

281 square meters covered by TCT # 318717.
In 1990, Spouses Ibarra had already passed away, leaving to their

ten (10) children ownership over the subject property.
Having failed to secure a decision for partition, the siblings

instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication on September 21,
2004 to transfer the property in favor of the ten (10) siblings.
Subsequently, respondents (7 siblings) sold their 7/10 undivided share

over the property in favor of the Spouses Candelario.
On June 1, 2009, the petitioners (remaining 3 siblings) filed a

complaint for quieting of title against the respondents and Spouses
Candelario and alleged that they have been in adverse, open, continuous,
and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4) decades
and there are entitled to equitable title.
However in 2005, the respondents entered into a Contract of Lease

with Avico Lending Investor over the subject matter without the objection
of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were able to prove equitable title or

ownership over the property.
57
HELD: NO. Quieting of title in a common law remedy for the removal
of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites

must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action,
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
doubt on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.
IMELDA SYJUCO vs. FELISA D. BONIFACIO

FACTS: The Syjucos are the registered owners of a parcel of land

situated in Caloocan City covered by TCT # T-108530 issued on March
26, 1984.
They have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of

the subject land, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
since 1926 and they have been paying the real property taxes over the
subject land since 1949.
Sometime in 1994, Syjucos learned that the purported owner of the

subject land was Felisa Bonifacio who was able to register the subject
land in her name under TCT No. 265778 on March 29, 1993.
Bonifacio’s title was issued pursuant to an order dated October 8,

1992 by RTC, Branch 125 of Caloocan City in the Petition for Authority
to Segregate.
For unexplained reasons, the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan issued

TCT No. 265778 to Bonifqacio on March 29, 1993 even before RTC -
Branch 125 declared its Order dated October 8, 1992 granting Bonifacio’s
petition for segregation final and executory on April 6, 1993.
On July 28, 1994, to protect their rights and interest over the
subject property, the Syjucos lodged a special civil action for quieting
of title especially praying for declaration of nullity and cancellation of
Bonifacio’s TCT No. 265778.
Subsequently, the Syjucos discovered that Bonifacio sold the subject

land to VSD Realty. Bonifacio’s TCT # 265778 was cancelled and replaced
by TCT # 285313 in the name of VSD Realty.
As a result, the Syjucos amended their petition impleading VSD Realty

on April 25, 1995.
ISSUES
(1) Whether an action for quieting of title is a direct attack on the
certificates of title of Bonifacio and VSD Realty.
(2) Whether an action for quieting of title has prescribed.
RULINGS
(1) YES. The instituted action in this case is clearly a direct
attack on a certificate of title to real property.
In their complaint for quieting of title, the Syjucos specifically pray

for the declaration of nullity and/or cancellation of Bonifacio’s TCT #
265778 and VSD TCT # 285313 over the subject land.
The relief sought is certainly feasible since the objective of an

action for quieting of title as provided under Article 476 of the Civil
Code, is precisely to quiet title, remove, invalidate, annul and/or nullify a
cloud on title to real property or any interest therein by reason of
any instrument, record, claims, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable and may be prejudicial to the title.
(2) NO. It is an established doctrine in land ownership dispute that

the filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed
property is in the possession of the plaintiff. One who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may
58
wait his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking

steps to vindicate his right, the reason for this rule being that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of
a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effects on his own title, which right
can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
14. A VERBAL CONTRACT OF SALE IS VALID

SPOUSES MAGDALINO & CLEOPE BADILLA vs. FE BRAGAT
G.R. No. 187013, April 22, 2015, 757 SCRA 131
FACTS: On November 18, 1968, Spouses Pastrano sold their property

consisting of 1,015 square meters to Ledesma thru Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land.
In 1970, Ledesma sold to Spouses Badilla “on installment basis” a

200 square meter portion of his property. The sale was not reduced in
writing, however, but the Badillas took possession of the portion sold.
On April 18, 1978, Spouses Bragat bought 991 square meters of the
property from Ledesma, thru a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Residential
Lot.
On May 5, 1989, Spouses Pastrano executed another Deed of Absolute

Sale of Registered Land in favor of Fe Bragat covering the entire area
of 1,105 square meters of the subject property.
Alleging that Bragat is the absolute owner of the subject property,

she is now demanding the Spouses Badilla to vacate the area which
they are occupying.
ISSUE: Whether the ownership of the portion occupied by the Badillas

of the subject property passed to Spouses Badilla upon their verbal
purchase of said portion from Ledesma.
HELD: YES, the ownership of the portion occupied by the Badillas of

the subject property passed to them upon their verbal purchase of said
portion from Ledesma.
The Civil Code states that ownership of the thing sold is transferred
to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the same.
And the thing is understood as delivered when it is placed in the

control and possession of the vendee. Delivery (traditio) operated to divest
the vendor of title to the property which may not be regained or
recovered until and unless the contract is revoked or rescinded in
accordance with law.
The same is true even if the sale is a verbal one, because it is

held that when verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially
consummated, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of
Frauds, which applies only to an executory agreement.
And, where it was proven that one party had delivered the thing
sold to another, then the contract was partially executed and the Statute
of Frauds does not apply. Hence, the ownership of the portion of the
subject property in question has been validly and legally passed to
Spouses Badilla upon their purchase of such portion.
It is undisputed that the spouses Pastrano had previously sold on

November 18, 1968 their property to Ledesma. Therefore as early as such
date, it is established that the Pastranos no longer had ownership over
the property.
Then, as Ledesma subsequently sold in 1970 a portion of the

property to the Badillas who immediately took delivery and possession,
ownership of this portion had also been transferred to the said spouses.
Although the sale appears to be merely verbal, and payment therefore

was to be made on installment, it is a partially consummated sale, with
the Bandillas paying the initial price and Ledesma surrendering possession.
That the parties intended for ownership to be transferred may be

inferred from their lack of any agreement stipulating that ownership of the
59
property is reserved by the seller and shall not pass to the buyer until
the latter has fully paid the purchase price. The fact is, Ledesma, even
delivered to the Badillas the owner’s duplicate copy of the title.
15. CONTRACT OF ANTICHRESIS
CHARITO & VILMA MAGTALAS vs. HEIRS OF BENJAMIN MALANCE

G.R. No. 219071, August 24, 2016, 801 SCRA 485
FACTS: Malance obtained a loan of P600,000 from Magtalas Sisters

evidenced by a Kasulatan which provides that the latter shall have the
right to the fruits of the subject land owned by Malance for six (6)
years or until the loan is fully paid.
After the death of Malance, his heirs filed a Complaint for Recovery
of Possession and Declaration of Nullity of the Kasulatan against Magtalas
sisters.
During trial, the heirs questioned the validity of the Kasulatan claiming
that the same was executed at the time when Malance was mentally
incapacitated and that his signature thereon was simulated.
In their answer, Magtalas sisters averred, among others, that the

Kasulatan was executed before a notary public at the time when Malance
was of sound mind, though sickly, and the heirs must pay Malance’s
indebtedness prior to recovery of possession.
ISSUE
Whether the heirs of Malance are entitled to the possession of the
property.
RULING
NO, the heirs of Malance are not entitled to the possession of the
property.
The evidence as to the genuineness of Malance’s signature and the

consequent due execution and authenticity of the Kasunduan preponderance in
favor of Magtalas sisters, who were likewise able to prove Melance’s receipt
of the amount of P600,000.
A contract of antichresis exists if the following elements are present:

(1) the creditor will have possession of the debtor’s real property given
as a security; (2) such creditor will apply the fruits of the said property
to the interest owed by the debtor, if any, then to the principal amount;
(3) the creditor retains the enjoyment of such property until the debtor
has totally paid what he owes and (4) should the obligation be duly
paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished proceeding from the
accessory character of the agreement.
In the case at hand, the language of the Kasulatan leaves no

doubt that the loan was secured by an antichresis over the property of
Malance, specifically authorizing the Magtalas sisters to receive the fruits of
the subject landholding with the obligation to apply them as payment to
his principal loan for a period of six (6) years.
As antichretic creditors, the Magtalas sisters are entitled to retain

enjoyment of the subject land until the debt has been totally paid.
16. RECONSTITUTION - TITLE NOT ACTUALLY LOST

SPS. ERNESTO & GONIGONDA IBIAS vs. BENITA P. MACABEO
G.R. No. 205004, August 17, 2016, 800 SCRA 694
FACTS: On August 13, 1999, Ernesto executed an Affidavit of Loss

alleging that the owner’s duplicate of TCT # 24605 was missing among his
files. The petition for reconstitution was granted and a new TCT # 24514
was issued to Spouses Ernesto & Gonigonda Ibias.
Benita filed a complaint for annulment of title. She averred that she
is the heir of Albina and Marcelo, the registered owners of the parcel
of land covered by TCT # 24604; and Ernesto knew that the title to the
land was not lost but was in her possession, as proved by his letter
60
dated 23 July 1999 where he asked her (Benita) for the whereabouts of
TCT # 24605 which was in her possession.
In their defense, Spouses Ibias countered that Ernesto and his late
brother, Rodolfo, are the only heirs of Marcelo and Albina Ibias. After the
death of their parents, Ernesto inquired from Benita the whereabouts of the
title but the latter failed to turn over the title. Believing in good faith
that the title was lost, he applied for a reconstitution of the title.
ISSUE
Whether a prior knowledge of the certificate of title’s whereabouts a
ground for cancellation of the reconstituted title.
RULING
YES, knowledge of the certificate of title’s whereabouts is a ground
for cancellation of the reconstituted title.
In the case of Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc., it was held that
“the reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title in its original form and conditions. It does not determine
or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed
title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself
does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
Reconstitution of title, under Sec. 109 of PD 1529, applies only if the

owner’s duplicate certificate of title is indeed lost or destroyed. If a
certificate of title has not been lost and is in fact in possession of
another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that
rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the allegedly lost owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
# 24605 was in the possession of Benita. The alleged lost of TCT #
24605 was offered in evidence during the trial, which was uncontested by
the parties. There is no reason to justify the issuance of a constituted
title in the name of Spouses Ernesto & Gorgonia Ibias.
Hence, there is no error in the cancellation of the same

reconstituted title. It follows that the reconstituted title under the name of
Spouses Ibias should be canceed.
17. PROHIBITION TO FOREIGNER TO ACQUIRE LAND
TAINA MANIGQUE – STONE vs. CATTLEYA LAND, INC.

FACTS: On November 6, 1992, Cattleya entered into a Contract of

Conditional Sale with the Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of land,
including the subject property.
However, while following up the registration of the August 30, 1993

Deed of Absolute Sale at the Office of the Register of Deeds, Cattleya
learned that the owner’s copy of the title to the land in question was
with Taina.
The subject land had apparently been sold to Taina’s common-law

husband, Michael Stone, by Spouses Tecson in 1985, but the title was
placed in Taina’s name as Stone was a foreigner.
Cattleya instituted a civil action for quieting of title and/or recovery

of ownership and cancellation of title.
Taina posits that while Michael’s legal capacity to own or acquire real
property in the Philippines was not entirely unassailable, there was
nevertheless no actual violation of the constitutional prohibition, because in
this case no real transfer of ownership had been effected in favor of
Michael from Col. Tecson. Taina claimed that she was not exactly dummy
Michael’s dummy at all but his active partner.
Cattleya counters that the sale between Col. Tecson and Michael was
absolutely null and void, as this was a flagrant violation of the
61
constitutional provision barring or prohibiting aliens or foreigners from acquiring

or purchasing land in the Philippines.
ISSUE
Whether the sale of land by Spouses Tecson to Michael Stone, a
foreigner although ostensibly made in Taina’s name, was valid, despite the
constitutional prohibition against the sale of lands in the Philippines to
foreigners.
RULING
NO, the sale is null and void by reason of the constitutional
prohibition against the sale of lands in the Philippines to foreigners or
aliens.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that “Save in

cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate, it

has been held that “aliens, whether individual or corporations, are
disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain. Hence, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.
In the case at bench, Taina admitted that it was Michael who paid
with his own funds the subject lot, hence, Michael Stone was its real
purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears stressing that if the deed
of sale proclaimed that she was the purchaser or buyer of the subject
property and this subject property was placed under her name, it was
simply because she and Michael wanted to skirt or circumvent the
constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from
acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines.

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2018 GOLDEN BEACON

DART PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO CALOGCOG

FACTS: Dart entered into Distributorship Agreement with Spouses Calogcog.

ISSUE: Whether Dart acted in bad faith or intended to injure the

HSBC vs. CATALAN

ISSUE: Whether the bank is liable for damages on the basis of

The complaint was anchored on Article 19 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of right principle, three

(a) that there is a legal right or duty;

SOLEDAD CARPIO vs. LEONORA VALMONTE

FACTS: Leonora is a wedding coordinator. Michelle and Jon Sierra engaged

Soledad then ordered one of the ladies to search Leonora’s bag.

Thus, on 20 February 1997, Leonora filed a suit for damages against

In the case at bar, Soledad’s verbal reproach against Leonora was

Soledad had willfully caused injury to Leonora in a manner which is

Certainly, Soledad transgressed the provision of Article 19 in relation to

One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner

only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is

G.F. EQUITY, INC. vs. ARTURO VALENZONA

FACTS: There was a contract whereby Valenzona was hired as a

ISSUE: Whether paragraph 3 of the contract is a legitimate exercise of

HELD: NO. The assailed condition clearly transgressed the principle of

When one party in an employment contract is given an unbridled

CONTINENTAL STEEL MFG. CORP. vs. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR

FACTS: Hortillano’s wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery while she

ISSUE: Whether Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the

Article 26 paragraph 2 - DIVORCE OBTAINED ABROAD

FACTS: Cipriano and Lady Miros got married in 1981 and

States and eventually acquired American citizenship. Later, she obtained a

ISSUE: Whether the Filipino spouse is legally capacitated to re-marry after

HELD: YES, paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include

- - - To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice

- - - There are two (2) elements for the application of paragraph 2

- - - Moreover, it is necessary that the naturalization of the other spouse

REPUBLIC vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

FACTS: Manalo, a Filipina, married Yoshino, a Japanese national, in San

While living in Japan, Manalo initiated a divorce proceeding and obtained

Upon her return in the Philippines, Manalo filed a petition for

2. Whether the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

3. Differentiate vinculo matrimonii from mensa et thoro.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of a validly obtained abroad by the

The purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd

Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or

A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same

Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both

2. YES, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

It is well settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take

3. Vinculo Matrimonii or Absolute Divorce is a divorce which terminates

MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY et. al.

FACTS: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in the

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekera, without the first

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and

There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of

DOREEN GRACE MEDINA vs. MICHIYUKI KOIKE

Subsequently, Doreen filed before the RTC a petition for judicial

2) Whether our courts can take judicial notice of a foreign judgment

3) Whether the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the divorce

It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce

3) YES, considering that the validity of the divorce decree between

The question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial

It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure

GERBERT R. CORPUS vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS