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    Honneth Integrity and Disrespect

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    Mario Carvalho

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    Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition Axel Honneth Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 2. (May, 1992), pp. 187-201. Stable URL: http://links,jstor-org/siei?sici=0090-5917% 28199205%2920%3A2%3C 187%3AIADPOA%3E2.0,CO%3B2-V Political Theory is currently published by Sage Publications, In. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www.jstororg/about/terms.huml. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hup:/www jstor-org/journals/sage.heml, Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ Thu Aug 31 13:39:58 2006 INTEGRITY AND DISRESPECT Principles of a Conception of Moral Based on the Theory of Recognition AXEL HONNETH Unversity of Frankfurt Toots 800% sonra sav an tana igi, is Bch ought 0 cncorr sgl mrt ona he hat te ly Seg a pros nnpe uon of an As wel noe tec Fonte ced i say ich ma tana Soames irae wos ht nit edonone enon chance o so wpb! i kes ope poco human gy Eni sber on hcl yale Ustad wy raul at hearers o whch ewes mance Soa wer 2 sci pm ine bok Soctal wopias primarily aim to bring about happiness, ora leas to eliminate dies sand the conditions which preserve or generate i Theones of saul law aim ppamariy 16 bong about dignity, human nghs,jndcal guarantees fr the secur oF liber of ma, treating these as eategones of humsn pnde. Socal ulopas ae, accoré- ingly, onested predomunaily toward the elimiation of human misery, natural law ‘predominantly toward the elimination of human degradation" ‘The fact that Bloch approaches the problem negatively here reveals two considerations of principle which function as determining premises in his reasoning first, thatthe essence of everything which, in moral theory, is known as “human dignity” can only be ascertained indirectly by determining the forms of personal degradation and injury; and second, that it was only such negative experiences of disrespect and insult that turned the normative AUTHOR'S NOTE: This essay 1s 4 modified version of the maugural lecture eld atthe Department of Philosophy, Universi of Franfurt on June 28,1900 POLITICAL THEORY, Vo 20 No.2, May 1992147201 (©1992 Sage Publtions, le. 187 188 POLITICAL THEORY / May 1992 goal of securing human dignity into a driving force in history. The first premise would appear to rest on a proposition put in the terms of moral philosophy, the second premise on a thesis ascribable to what might be called ‘moral sociology. Since Bloch employs the two only as a theoretical foil for ‘a Marist appropriation of the natural law tradition, he allows both to stand as unresolved philosophical hypotheses. Although he situates them at the Center of his arguments on moral theory, in order to uphold the hermeneutic framework of his study, he refrains from tuning these premises themselves into an object of independent reflection. This approach, however, caused him to overlook what actualy is the philosophical thrust of his book. If in a con- cept of the dignity, the complete integrity of man is only to be approximated by determining what forms personal insult and disrespect take, then, con- versely, it would hold that the constitution of human integrity is dependent ‘on the experience of intersubjective recognition. Without realizing it, Bloch avails himself of a normative theory of mutual recognition; according to this theory, the integrity of human subjects, vulnerable as they are to injury through insult and disrespect, depends on their receiving approval and respect from others. In the remarks that follow, I attempt to go one step further in clarifying this project of an interrelation between disrespect and human integrity ‘outlined in negative terms by Bloch, but not followed through by him. ‘Starting from the first premise of Bloch's study, I seek to draw a systematic distinction between different forms of personal disrespect. This differen tion of three basic forms of disrespect will, in a subsequent step, yield indirect insights into the totality of experiences of recognition on which a person ‘depends for the safeguarding of his integrity. Only after undertaking this ‘excursus into the theory of recognition can I conclude by treating Block's second premise, which, cast in the terms of moral sociology, deems the experience of personal disrespect to represent a moral driving force in the process of societal development. 1 “The language of everyday life is still invested with a knowledge — which wwe take for granted—that we owe our integrity, in a subliminal way, to the receipt of approval or recognition from other persons. Up to the present day, when individuals who sce themselves as victims of moral maltreatment describe themselves, they assign a dominant role to categories tha, as with “insult” or “degradation,” are related to forms of disrespect, tothe denial of Honneth / INTEGRITY AND DISRESPECT 189 recognition. Negative concepts of this kind are used to characterize a form of behavior that does not represent an injustice solely because it constrains the subjects in their freedom for action or does them harm, Rather, such ‘behavior is injurious because it impairs these persons in their positive understanding of self —an understanding acquired by intersubjective means. ‘There can be no meaningful use whatsoever of the concepts of “disrespect” ‘of “insult” were it not for the implicit reference to a subject’s claim to be granted recognition by others. Hence the language of everyday life, which Bloch himself invokes as a matter of course, contains the reference to a concept based on the theory of intersubjectivity; this concept holds the invulnerability and integrity of human beings to depend on approval being forthcoming from others. Not only Hegel’s theory of recognition but espe- cially G. H. Mead’s social psychology transformed this intuitive knowledge into a basis for the framework of asystematic theory. According to this theory, human individuation is a process in which the individual can unfold a practical identity to the extent that he is capable of reassuring himself of recognition by a growing circle of partners to communication.” Subjects ‘capable of language and action ate constituted as individuals solely by leaming, from the perspective of others who offer approval, to relate to and abilities. iduality grows, they cometo depend \creasing extent on the conditions of recognition they are afforded by the life-world of their social environment. That particular human vulner- ability signified by the concept of “disrespect” arises from this interlocking of individuation and recognition on which both Hegel and Mead based their iquiries. Since, in his normative image of self — something Mead would call his “Me”—every individual is dependent on the possibility of constant reassurance by the Other; the experience of disrespect poses the risk of an injury that can cause the identity of the entire person to collapse. It is obvious that we use the terms “disrespect” or “insult” in everyday language to designate a variety of degrees of psychological injury to a subject. The use of a single expression would threaten to efface the categor- ical deprivation of basic human rights and the subtle humiliation that accompan- ies public statements as to the failings of a given person. However, the fact, that we are also intuitively inclined to break down the positive counter- concept of “respect” into a number of intuitive gradations already implies that internal differences exist between individual forms of disrespect. Kant's introduction ofthe concept of respect into the field of moral theory isattested toin discussion ofthe notion still under way today. There, a variety of means 190 POLITICAL THEORY / May 1992 —be they phenomenological or drawn from an analytical philosophy of language—has been employed in an attempt to distinguish between the differing degrees of respect accorded another person in terms of which of his, personality traits achieve recognition and in what way.” As I seck to set up a systematic classification of three forms of “disrespect,” I will implicitly refer back to this debate. The differences between these forms are measured by the degree to which they can upset a person’s practical relationship to self by

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