GR No.

148991, Jan 21, 2004 ]

PEOPLE v. LEONARDO NUGUID Y MAYAO

465 Phil. 495

CARPIO, J.:
That on or about January 1, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
a private individual and without authority of law, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally
detain (sic) ROWENA RIANZARES Y MIRANDA by then and there taking and locking her inside his
room located at 1932 Firmeza Street, Sampaloc, this City, and preventing her from going out of
said room for a period of three (3) hours, more or less, thereby depriving her of her liberty and
during the said period of time, said accused by means of force, violence and intimidation, to
wit: by poking a knife, threatening to kill her should she resist and choking her, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge of her, against
her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling:
Yes. It is undisputed in this case that appellant was a "live-in" dog trainer and that he stayed in
the Rianzares' house in a room across Rowena's room. Therefore, the penalty imposable on
appellant is reclusion perpetua.
A word on the examination of Rowena. A rape victim is physically, socially, psychologically and
emotionally scarred, resulting in trauma which may last a lifetime.[55] It was thus highly
inconsiderate for the prosecutor and the defense counsel to trade quips at the precise time
Rowena was reliving her harrowing experience.[56] Courts are looked up to by people with high
respect and are regarded as places where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and
justice solemnly dispensed.[57] Levity has no place in the courtroom during the examination of
a victim of rape, and particularly not at her expense.
The trial court awarded moral and nominal damages but failed to award indemnity ex delicto.
An award of indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of guilt in rape cases.[58] We
thus award P50,000 to Rowena as civil indemnity. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,
the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000. The award of nominal damages is deleted
for lack of legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 16 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18,
in Criminal Case No. 00-179698, is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONARDO NUGUID y MAYAO is
adjudged guilty of RAPE, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
Rowena Rianzares P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
42 Phil. 69
[G.R. No. L-17332 August 18, 1921]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. OLIMPIO DE PERALTA,
defendant and appellant.
VILLAMOR, J.:
FACTS: On the half month of October 1919, Olimpio de Peralta succeeded Toledo, former
president of Philippine Marine Union. The latter looking for a desk glass went to a room of
house No. 507 of Jaboneros Street, which was rented to the said association and under the
privilege of Toledo as the president of said union. De Peralta entered the room in question in
the morning of the 16th of the same month, which gave rise to the information for trespass to
dwelling against Peralta, in which it is alleged that he entered the room of Toledo against the
will of the occupant. Then a trial proceeded which sentenced the accused to suffer two months
and one day of arresto mayor, and a fine of 400 pesetas, and costs, hence from this, an appeal
was taken.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of De Peralta constitutes the crime of trespass to dwelling?
HELD: “After a careful study of the testimony given in the case, we are of the opinion that the
accused, after calling at or near the door, pushed it and without the permission of the
occupants entered the room with the object of taking away the desk glass. There is no evidence
that Toledo had expressed his will in the sense of prohibiting the accused Peralta from entering
his room, and the mere fact that the latter entered it, without the permission of the occupant,
does not constitute the offense of trespass to dwelling provided for and penalized in article 491
of the Penal Code. In order that this crime may exist it is necessary that the entrance should be
against the express or presumed prohibition of the occupant, and the lack of permission should
not be confused with prohibition. In the decisions of the courts of Spain, as well as in those of
this jurisdiction, it has been held uniformly that this crime is committed when a person enters
another's dwelling against the will of the occupant, but not when the entrance is effected
without his knowledge or opposition.”
“…"It is not necessary, in the ordinary life of men, in order to call at the door of a house or
enter it, to obtain previous permission from the owner who lives in it. With the utmost good
faith may a person, to whom entrance has not been denied beforehand, suppose that the
owner of the room has no objection to receiving him in it." And in the present case it is to be
supposed that the members of the "Philippine Marine Union," among them the accused, had
something familiarity which warrants entrance into the room occupied by the president of the
association, particularly when we consider the hour at which the act in question happened
(between half past ten and eleven in the morning), the fact that the door of the room was not
barricaded or locked with a key, and the circumstance that the room in question was part of the
house rented to said association.
For the reason above stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused Olimpio
de Peralta is acquitted, with costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.”

September 27, 1915

G.R. No. 10331
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOAQUIN SILVANO, defendant-appellant.
Torres, J.:
Facts:
It was duly proven at the trial that Francisca Fabian and her husband lived in a house which
belonged to Simon de los Reyes; that they occupied room therein nest to the sala, which latter
room was rented and occupied by Joaquin Silvano, in company with two married couples; that
early in the morning of July 8, 1913, while the woman Fabian, an old lady named Marciana de
los Santos and a little girl named Eusebia Juan were asleep in the said room, Fabian's husband
having left for Cebu on the previous day, Joaquin Silvano, taking advantage of this
circumstance, entered the room by cutting a ribbon with which the door latch was fastened; tat
Francisca Fabian was awakened by the noise made by defendant's entry and turned up the light
of a lamp which stood on a table, whereupon she saw and recognized the defendant who was
already inside the room; that the defendant said to her: "If you're not willing, I'll kill you," to
which she replied by asking him why he had entered her room; that defendant was carrying a
pocket knife in his hand; that she became afraid and took refuge beside the old lady Marciana
de los Santos; and that at this moment defendant put out the light and precipitately left the
room. It was afterwards discovered that the ribbon with which the girl Eusebia Juan had
fastened the room door had been cut in two.
Issue: Whether or not the accused forcibly entered the dwelling of the plaintiff-appellee.
Ruling:
The facts aforestated, duly proven in the present cause, classify the crime as forcible entry of a
dwelling, inasmuch as it was committed by means of violence upon the door of the dwelling of
the offended party, and by intimidation, since defendant, who was carrying a pocket knife,
threatened the prosecuting witness with death. This crime is provided for and punished by
article 491, paragraph 2, o the Penal Code.
It is undeniable that Francisca Fabian, because of her husband's absence, had the old lady
Marciana de los Santos and the girl Eusebia Juan keep her company in her bed room on the
night of the occurrence, and that before going to bed she ordered the girl to fasten the
bedroom door with a ribbon, as Eusebia did do and so testified; and that early the following
morning the offended party was awakened by noise at the said door, whereupon she
immediately arose and turned up the light that stood on a table. Then she saw defendant inside
the room and at the same time he said to her: "If you're not willing, I'll kill you," to which she
replied by asking him why he had entered her room, and, on seeing that defendant was
carrying a pocket knife, she became afraid and took refuge beside the old lady Marciana.
Thereupon defendant put out the light, left he room, went to his bed in the adjoining room and
lay down. Narcisa de los Reyes, who was in the latter room, saw him at this moment and also
heard the offended party say: "Why did you enter this room and what did you want to do
here?" The ribbon, Exhibit A, which had been used to fasten Francisca Fabian's door, was
afterwards found to have been cut. Although defendant was a boarder in the said house
(according to the testimony of the proprietor thereof, Simon Reyes) and slept in the sala next to
the room of the offended party, he had no right to enter the living room rented and occupied
by Francisca Fabian and her husband.

G.R. No. L-3612 December 29, 1950

AVELINO NATIVIDAD, PEDRO GABRIEL, and MIGUEL EVANGELISTA Petitioners, vs. RICARDO C.
ROBLES, Justice of the Peace Court of Malabon, Rizal, Respondent.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for petitioners.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ireneo V. Bernardo for respondent.
MORAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition against the Justice of the Peace court of Malabon. Petitioners,
on August 18, 1949, were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malabon, Rizal, with
qualified trespass to dwelling. After conducting a preliminary investigation, said court elevated
the case to the Court of First Instance for trial on the merits. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, instead of filing an information, asked the court of First Instance of Rizal to return the
case to the Justice of the Peace court for trial on the merits. The case was set for trial by the
latter court, hence the instance petition to prevent such trial upon the ground that it is not the
justice of the peace court but the Court of First Instance which has original jurisdiction to try
the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the offenses charged against petitioners "trespass on private property"
includes qualified trespass to dwelling.
Ruling:
There can be no doubt "private property" includes all property, personal or real, and therefore,
it includes dwelling. The jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila over this offense was first
vested by Act No. 267 of the Philippine Commission who undoubtedly employed the words
"trespass on private property" in the sense in which they were understood in the United States
of America. And under the American Criminal Law, trespass on private property includes
trespass to dwelling. the offense of trespass to dwelling with violence as charged against the
petitioners, fall within the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court of Malabon,
concurrent with that of the Court of which first exercised jurisdiction was the Justice of the
Peace court of Malabon, which already acted on the case though erroneously in the form of
preliminary investigation. The Court of First Instance to which the case was elevated did
nothing but return the same to the court of origin. From all the foregoing, petition is denied,
with costs against petitioners.

US v De la Cruz
Passion or Obfuscation
Date: 29 March 1912 Ponente: Carson, J.
Facts:
Defendant, in the heat of passion, killed his querida (concubine or lover) upon catching her red-
handed in the arms of another. Trial court convicted defendant of homicide and sentenced him
to 14 years 8 months 1 day of reclusion temporal. Supreme Court found extenuating/mitigating
circumstances in the commission of the act of homicide therefore reducing defendant’s
sentence to 12 years 1 day of reclusion temporal.
ISSUES:
WoN there is an extenuating/mitigating circumstance present.
Ruling:
YES. There is an extenuating circumstance present in the case. The Court is of the opinion that
the defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and
obfuscation when he caught his querida in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.
The Court mentioned the view taken by the Supreme Court of Spain regarding a case with
similar state of facts: A man who kills a woman (his lover) for having caught her in her
underclothes with another man and afterwards shoots himself inflicting a serious wound should
be responsible for the act but with extenuating circumstance considered because he acted as
such due to strong emotion which impelled him to perform the criminal act. The situation
presents a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce the violent passion
and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation. The Court also
differentiated this case from US v Hicks:
In the Hicks case, the cause of the alleged passion and obfuscation of the defendant was his
vexation, disappointment, and deliberate anger due to the woman’s refusal to live with him.
The act of killing was done with premeditation and preparation. Prior to the accomplishment of
his criminal design, he acted properly in front of his victim in order to mask his true intentions.
In this case, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally produced passion
and obfuscation was because of the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him and his
Related Provisions: Subsection 7, Art. 9 (penal code imposed back then):
The following are extenuating or mitigating circumstances: Xxx That of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation
Santiago Paera vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 181626 May 30, 2011
Facts: Santiago Paera was a punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Occidnetal, he
allocated his constituents use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting the
distribution to the residents he governs. The tanks sits on a land located to the neighboring
barangay, owned by Vicente Darong the complainant, father of the complainant Indalencio
Darong. Despite the petitioners scheme, Indalencio continued drawing water from the tank. On
April 7, 1999 the petitioner reminded Indalencio of the water scheme distribution and cut
Indalencios access. The following day some of the residents of barangay Mampas complained
to Santiago about an interruption of the water supply. Petitioner discovered a tap from the
main line which he promptly disconnected. To stop the flow of eater from the ensuing leak, the
petitioner borrowed a bolo to create a wooden plug. It was this point where Indalencio arrived
at the area. According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up the bolo
and charged at Indalencio shouting I will kill you! Indalencio ran for safety, passing along the
way was his wife Diosetea Daring who had followed him in the water tank. Upon seeing her
husband run he asked Santiago what was happening. The petitioner answered I dont spare
anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you! Diosetea ran and found refuge to a relative
house. Unable to pursue the complainants wife, petitioner tried to follow Indalecio and passed
by Vicente the father of the complainant and said that Even you are old I will crack open your
skull! According to Santiago it was Indalencio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily inquiring
why the petitioner severed his water connection. This left the petitioner with no choice take a
defensive stance and took the borrowed bolo prompting Indalencio to scamper.
Issue:
whether or not the petitioner Santiago Paera is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.
Supreme Court Ruling: The lower court found the petitioner guilty of the three counts of grave
threats due to the petitioner was defenses lone witness and found the prosecutions evidence
sufficient to prove the elements of grave threats under Article 282. The Supreme Court denies
the petition and affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.
Santiago is liable for three counts of Grave Threats.
Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten another
with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a
crime. This felony is consummated as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person
threatened.
Applying these parameters, it is clear that Santiago’s threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea and
crack open Vicentes skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least) homicide
and serious physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These threats were consummated as
soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard Santiago utter his threatening remarks. Having
spoken the threats at different points in time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid
succession, Santiago incurred three separate criminal liabilities.
[G.R. NO. 171511 : March 4, 2009]
RONNIE CALUAG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
That on or about the 19th day of March, 2000, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence
upon the person of NESTOR PURCEL DENIDO, by then and there mauling him, thereby inflicting
upon him physical injuries which required medical attendance for less than nine (9) days and
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6 "Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?"
thereby causing said complainant to be threatened. Upon arraignment, Caluag and Sentillas
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of grave threats.
Ruling:
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be
accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime
but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not
amount to a crime and there is no condition.
The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to the
barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier at around 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon. On her way there, petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her
forehead, while at the same time saying "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"20 Considering what
transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia's husband, petitioner's act of pointing a gun at
Julia's forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of the surrounding
circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury
evinced by petitioner's accompanying act.
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282, par. 2
(grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to
kill was not subject to a condition.
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, "shall
threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel", since it presupposes that
the threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong
will constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave threats on
one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The Decision dated December 9,
2005 and the Resolution dated February 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
28707 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

11 Phil. 543
[G.R. No. 4812 October 30, 1908]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ROMUALDO MENA, defendant and appellant.
CARSON, J.:
FACTS: On or about 21st day of December 1907, the 3 carabaos of the defendant trespassed
and damaged the rice paddies of Ceferino Flora, who then took possession of the animals and
refused to return them to the defendant unless he is compensated with. The defendant knows
that he need to compensate Flora for the damage but he said that he was unable to do so in
kind, because at the time he does not own rice and it seemed that the damage was
questionable. Flora, with his son, took the carabaos to deposit it to the justice of peace until the
issue is settle, however, on the way they encountered the defendant with some friends; Flora
refused to surrender the animals then the defendant drew his bolo and rushed at Flora’s son
cutting the mecate used to lead the carabao, and with threats of bodily injury, compelled him
to release the other carabao. The defendant further made threats of bodily injury and also
compelled Flora himself to release the carabao he was riding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the actions of the defendant fall under the crime of unlawful coercion.
HELD: “Without entering upon a discussion of the respective rights of the parties, we are of
opinion that, granting it were true that the complaining witness had no lawful right to take
possession of the carabaos or to take the carabaos to the justice of peace, and granting further
that the accused had a right to have the carabaos turned over to him, when he demanded them
of the complaining witness, nevertheless, the crime of coaccion (unlawful coercion), as defined
and penalized in article 497 of the Penal Code, was committed by him, when with violence he
compelled the complaining witness to turn over the carabaos against his will, it being clearly
understood by the defendant and his friends that the complaining witness was not seeking to
appropriate the animals or to carry them off as his property, and that he merely asserted s right
to the possession of the carabaos for the purpose of taking them to the justice of the peace in
order that the question of the damages might be adjusted.
The acts committed by the defendant clearly fall within the foregoing definition of the crime of
coaccion. With violence he compelled the complaining witness to do that which he did not
desire to do – that is to say, to turn over the possession of the carabaos – and it matters not
whether it was “just or unjust” that they should thus have been turned over to the defendant;
whether it was or was not the duty of the complaining witness to turn them over on demand,
the defendant was guilty of the crime of coaccion unless he was lawfully authorized to enforce
his demand when the complaining witness refused compliance therewith.”

GR Nos. L-8820 and L-8821, May 26, 1956 ]

MARCIAL PUNZALAN v. PEOPLE
99 Phil. 259
JUGO, J.:
FACTS:
"That on or about the 14th day of November, 1951, in the Municipality of Tiaong, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the said accused, being the
Municipal Mayor of said municipality, taking advantage of his official position as such, without
any justifiable motive, and with evident purpose of extorting confession from one Moises
Escueta did then itnd there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously illtreat the latter, by then and
there assaulting, beating and striking the abdomen, face, breast and arms with an Automatic
Pistol, caliber .45 and his fist, while said Moises Escueta was kept in the Camp of the Phil.
Ground Force (PGF) located in the said municipality, thereby causing injuries in the different
parts of his body which required medical attendance for a period of seven (7) days, and
incapacitated the said offended party from performing his customary labor for the same period
of time".
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a grave coercion.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals found him guilty of grave coercion, and, compensating the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of authority with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, andsentenced him to suffer 2 months and 21 days of arresto mayor to pay a fine of
PI50 with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.The appellant claims that the coercion was not consummated but frustrated only for the
reason that the offended party did not confess the crime attributed to him. This conclusion is
contrary to the doctrine laid down by this Court in U. S. vs. Cusi, 10 Phil, 413, which says:
"Coercion. The fact that an individual was maltreated for the purpose of compelling to confess
a crime which was attributed to him, constitute the crime of consummated coercion, even if
the agents of the authorities who carried out the maltreatment did not accomplish their
purpose to draw from him a confession, which it was their intention to obtain by the
employment of such means".
This doctrine was reiterated in the case of U. S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil., 352, where it did not
appear that the offended party acceded to the purpose of the coercion. It is unnecessary to say
that inasmuch as the allegations in the information conferred jurisdiction on the court of first
instance, the fact that the accused was convicted of a lesser crime included within those
allegations did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner. It Is so ordered.

[ GR No. 9369, Dec 24, 1914 ]

US v. ALEJANDRO ALBAO +
29 Phil. 86
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS:
This defendant was charged with the crime of robbery. On the 8th day of July, 1913, the
prosecuting attorney of the Province of Cebu presented a complaint in the court of the justice
of the peace of the municipality of Cebu. On the same day a warrant for the arrest of the
defendant was issued. On the same day the defendant was detained and was admitted to bail
upon a bond in the sum of P5,000.
On the 21st day of August, 1913, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Cebu presented a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of said province, charging the defendant with the crime
of robbery. The complaint alleged;
"That in or about the last part of the month of June, 1913, within the municipality of Cebu of
this province and judicial district the said accused Alejandro Albao did, willfully, maliciously, and
criminally, and with intent of gain, through violence and intimidation upon the person of
Vicente Lizarraga of the municipality of Cebu, seize a quantity of opium worth P14,000
belonging to the said Vicente Lizarraga; in violation of law."
Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arrested, and pleaded not guilty, was tried, found
guilty of the crime of robbery, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of ten years of
presidio mayor, and to pay the costs, in accordance with the provisions of article 502, in
relation with paragraph 5 of article 503 of the Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime being charged.
Ruling:
Yes. After a careful examination of the record, we are fully persuaded that the defendant is
guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, beyond a reasonable doubt. The lower court
imposed the penalty provided by law in its maximum degree, holding that there existed the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. In our opinion, there is nothing in the record which
indicates that the defendant took advantage of the nighttime for the purpose of committing
the crime in question. There being neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances, the
defendant should be punished in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 503,
in relation with article 502 of the Penal Code, or in the medium grade of presidio correccional
to presidio mayor in its medium grade. In our opinion, the defendant should be sentenced to be
imprisoned for a period of six years and one day of presidio mayor, and to pay the costs.
Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby modified, and it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the defendant be sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of six years and one
day of presidio mayor, and to pay the costs.
US v LAHOYLAHOY and MADANLOG
38 Phil. 330STREET
July 15, 1918
FACTS
- The information in a prosecution for robbery withquadruple homicide charged that the
accusedcriminally and by force appropriated certain articlesof value, the property of one
Roman Estriba, and onoccasion thereof killed the said Roman Estriba andthree others.
However, the proof showed that themoney which was the subject of the robbery wastaken
from one Juana Seran who was robbed andkilled separately from the other three victims.
ISSUE:
WON the conviction for robbery with quadruplehomicide can be sustained
HELD
NO- Subsection 5 of section 6 of General Orders No. 58declares that a complaint or information
shall show, among others things, the names of the persons against whom, or against whose
property, the offense was committed, if known. The complaint in this case therefore properly
contained an avermentas to the ownership of the property; and upon principle, in charging the
crime of robbery committed upon the person, the allegation of the owner's name is essential.
But of course if his name cannot be ascertained, it may be alleged that it is unknown. - From
the fact that the name of the injured person may, in case of necessity, be alleged as unknown it
should NOT be inferred that the naming of such person, when known, is of no importance.
Where the name of the injured party is necessary as matter of essential description of the
crime charged, the complaint must invest such person with individuality by either naming him
or alleging that his name is unknown.
It is elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter essential
to the proper description of the offense.
Toconstitute robbery, the property obtained must bethat of another, and indictments for such
offensesmust name the owner; and a variance in this respectbetween the indictment and the
proof will be fatal. Itis also necessary in order to identify the offense.- A complaint charging the
commission of thecomplex offense of robbery with homicide mustnecessarily charge each of
the component offenseswith the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints.It is well recognized in this jurisdiction that where acomplex
crime is charged and the evidence fails tosupport the charge as to one of the
componentoffenses the defendant can be convicted of theother. The mere circumstance that
the two crimesare so related as to constitute one transaction in noway affects the principles of
pleading involved in thecase. To permit a defendant to be convicted upon acharge of robbing
one person when the proof showsthat he robbed an entirely different person, when thefirst
was not present, is violative of the rudimentaryprinciples of pleading.

People V Jabiniao and John Doe

G.R. No. 179499
April 30, 2008
Facts:
Maria Divina Pasilang and her husband Ruben where sleeping in their house when Toribio
Jabiniao, Jr., and a lokout, entered the same without permission, and by means of force,
intimidation, and violence with the use of their handguns pointed the same to the couple, and
then robbed and carried away the money. When Ruben crawled towards the door to close it,
gunshots were heard from the outside, which pierced through the door, hitting Ruben’s chest,
and causing his death.
Jabiniao and the lookout was charged for a special crime for robbery with homicide, but upon
petition with SC, Jabiniao argued that the complaint against him was erroneous since the
robbery had been accomplished when the killing occurred.
Issue:
WON the time of killing is material in a crime of robbery with homicide.
Held:
No. So long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during, or after
the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, the felony committed is the
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
PEOPLE vs. VELOSO (DIGEST)
No. 23051 (1925)
Malcolm, J.
PEOPLE v VELOSO 112 SCRA 173 PER CURIAM; February 25, 1982
FACTS:
In May 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma Veloso was at that time a member of
the House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the
club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing
more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the
gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact.
As a result, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for,
and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided, the
police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the same
date. Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police.
One of them was the defendant Veloso.
Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso
read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the
police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as
John Doe.
As Veloso’s pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso
to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation
between the policemen and the accused, the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and
Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search. At last the patience of the officers was
exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. All of
the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again
refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department It was necessary
for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that
three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.
In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrested in the raid were accused of
gambling. All of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof,
with the sole exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house.
ISSUE:
WON a search warrant which did not specify the specific person (i.e., John Doe warrant) maybe
constitutional and valid. (YES)
RULING:
A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of ‘John
Doe’ or ‘Richard Roe’, whose other or true name is unknown is void, without other and further
descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in
acting under it.
Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained
of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate
clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state
his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any
other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the
building to be searched as “the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands.” This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.

G.R. No. L-32997 July 30, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANICETO PEDROSO and AGUSTIN
SALCEDO, accused-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
on or about February 10, 1963, in the Barrio of Muslim, Municipality of Tulunan, Province of
Cotabato, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in
company with Silverio Acanto alias Ator alias Mayor Alias Bila-an, and Jose Miller alias Bert Alias
Silver, and who are still at large, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with unlicensed firearms and bladed weapon, with the intent of gain, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of violence, force and intimidation
on persons, take and carry away from the dwelling of one Agustin Mallorca, their personal
belongings. that on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to steal
and carry away the above described articles, the said accused, together with their companions
above-mentioned, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and with intent to kill, attack and assault Agustin Mallorca, Proceso Mallorca,
Iluminada Cabardo, Leticia Mallorca y Agudo, Edmundo Agudo and Natividad Mallorca, and as a
consequence thereof, the first two persons suffered mortal wounds which caused their
instantaneous death, and the rest four persons sustained serious wounds which ordinarily
would cause their death, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced
the crime of robbery with multiple homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of defendants, that is, by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to them which prevented their death.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a crime of robbery.
In sum and substance, the extra-judicial confessions of the appellants having been made
voluntarily, corroborated with incontrovertible proof of corpus delicti are sufficient to sustain a
conviction. 51 The records satisfactorily proved the fact of loss sustained and the fact of death.
No less than two witnesses (Edmundo Agudo and Antonina Mallorca) who were in concord,
testified to the fact of loss. They stated in open court that the appellants were able to rob one
shotgun, an ammunition, goods that were sold in the store of the victims and certain amount of
money, the sum of which they do not know. 52 The fact of death of Proceso Mallorca and
Agustin Mallorca was established by the post-mortem findings 53 and court testimony of Dr.
Jesus Cuerpo, the Municipal Health Officer of Mlang, Cotabato. 54
The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined and
penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. As previously discussed, We have
considered the aggravating circumstances of band and double homicide against the accused.
Since no mitigating circumstances exist and the crime is punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death, the correct and proper penalty is the supreme penalty of death.

PEOPLE vs. JUMAWAN31 SCRA 825G.R. No. L-28060, February 27, 1970
Teehankee, J.
FACTS: This case refers to the trial Court’s judgment on June 5, 1967, it was shown that
theaccused collected amounts from customers of the business firms, namely; MontelDiscount
Center, the Iloilo Enterprises and the Piamonte, Bros. for being an agent oncommission basis.
The said collections were returned to the firms, but on oneinstance, he refused to turn over the
collections for July and August 1965 to the Mon-tel Discount Center. He also rejected the
demand letter of the company for thepayment of Fifty Five (Php55.00) pesos. The accused
contended that he did not return the money because Mr. ManuelPiamonte, his real original
principal, has not paid and refuses to pay him hiscommission, on account of business losses. He
further alleged that he should havebeen paid by the complainant the amount of P1.50 per day
as his earnedcommissions. Supposedly, the amount he withheld which constitutes his
accruedcommissions is equivalent to or more than what he should receive from Mr.
Piamonteas payment considering that he was able to turn over the full amount of Php65.00
tohim. Thus, the City Court of San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) in its judgment find
theaccused-appellant guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RevisedPenal
Code, for having retained in his possession even after demand, his lastcollections in the amount
of P55.00, due to non-payment of his accrued commissionsin the larger amount of P65.00
earned on previous collections actually turned over, aswell as non-payment of his expense
allowance of P1.50 per day, the trial court basedits verdict solely on its rejection of appellant’s
defense that he had such right of retention under Articles 1912 to 1914 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:Whether or not the accused should be held liable for estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:Appellant contended that there was an error when the trial Court made no ruling onhis
lack of criminal intent and the absence of damage or prejudice to his principal.Likewise, it was
not even established that there was a damage or prejudice as anessential element of estafa.
Appellant’s principal could not claim any such damage orprejudice, for appellant had retained
and set off merely in part what was justly andlong due to him, with a balance still owing to
him.All these factors, the absence of criminal intent on appellant’s part and lack of damage or
prejudice caused to the principal, besides the appellant’s proven goodfaith, entitle appellant to
a verdict of acquittal
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20,
1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early
as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this
case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
People v. Sensano and Ramos
G.R. No. 37720
March 7, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married in 1919. Shortly after the birth of their
child, Mariano went to the Province of Cagayan and remained there for three years. During his
three-year stay, he did not write to his wife nor did he give support to her and the child. Ursula
was poor and illiterate and had no relatives upon whom she could call. Then Marcelo Ramos
took her and the child to live with him.
When Mariano returned in 1924, he filed a case against Ursula and Marcelo for adultery. They
were sentenced to four months and 1 day. After completing the service of the sentence, Ursula
asked for forgiveness from Mariano, to which the latter replied that she can do whatever she
wants and that he wants nothing to do with her. Mariano then left for Hawaii where he stayed
for seven years.
He knew that his wife had lived again with Marcelo. Upon his return to the Philippines, he again
filed a case for adultery. The court of first instance sentenced Ursula and Marcelo to 3 years, 6
months, and 21 days in prison. They contended that the court of first instance erred in not
considering that Mariano had already consented to the adultery.
The Solicitor General contended that Mariano’s absence from the Philippines made it
impossible for him to take any action.
Issue:
Had Mariano consented to his wife’s adulterous acts?
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that he told his wife that he had nothing to do with her and that she can do
whatever she wants is considered as consent for the adultery. He did not interfere with his
wife’s relations for seven years despite knowing that the latter was staying again with her lover.
The Solicitor General’s contention has no merit. He could still have taken actions despite his
absence from the country had he wanted to.
EOPLE
v
GUINUCUD and ROSARIO TAGAYUN

G.R. No. L-38672 October 27, 1933 FACTS:

On April 1930, the husband, Ramon Palattao, abandoned and deserted his wife, Rosario
Tagayun, and their child. Rosario lived with her mother. Thereafter, at the request of the
mother of Rosario, the barrio lieutenant, took Rosario and her child to Ramon's house but she
was refused admission by the said Ramon. Thereafter, on July 3, 1930, Ramon, induced his wife,
to sign the document which appears in the record as Exhibit 1 as follows: 1. They will live
separately. 2. The mutually agree to give privilege to love or marry other people. 3. They are
bound to support their child jointly. Ramon then admitted on cross-examination that, for more
than a year before he filed the complaint in this case, he knew that his wife Rosario and her
coaccused Alfonso were living together in the same house. During all that time he took no
action whatever to vindicate the honor or his name, because he felt bound by the alleged
agreement to give his consent to Rosario's conduct or because he expected her to reciprocate.
He was "assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as the 'offended spouse," and his
conduct as shown by the evidence in this case warrants the inference that he consented to, and
acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is, therefore, not
authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
ISSUE:
WON the said contract implies that the husband has consented to his wife’s affair.
WON the contract will bar criminal proceedings.
HELD:
1. YES. The contract has implied that Ramon has consented with the affair. Exhibit 1, is void in
law, it is nevertheless competent evidence to explain the husband's inaction after he knew of
his wife's living with the coaccused and to show that he acquiesced in her conduct. The
expression "if he shall have consented" in article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which bars the
"offended" husband from instituting a prosecution, has no reference to any consent or
agreement prior to the commission of the offense but relates to an express or implied
acquiescence subsequent to the offense. This consent or acquiescence need not be express but
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FREDIE LIZADA (G.R. No. 143468-71. January 24, 2003)
SEPTEMBER 10, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY
Subject: Criminal Law 1- Attempted Felonies

Ponente: Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr.

Doctrine: The spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from criminal liability for
the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his
desistance.
FACTS: In August 1998, the petitioner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by
means of force, violence and intimidation Analia Orillosa, his stepdaughter, by embracing,
kissing, and touching her private parts. He then proceeded with carnal knowedge to remove her
skirt and panty and placed himself on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina.
This allegation was repeated four times in a different occasions.
However, medical examination revealed that Analia’s hymen was intact, and the other parts of
her vagina was not injured due to an insertion of average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full
erection.
The testimony of Rossel, Analia’s sister, also proved that no insertion of penis happened
because the petitioner stopped after he saw her.
Hence, petitioner was charged for four counts of qualified rape under four separate
information. RTC accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him and
sentenced to Death Penalty in each and every case as provided for in the seventh paragraph,
no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, petitioner averred in his brief that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that the testimony of Rossel was not taken into consideration in the
decision.
ISSUE: WON Lizada is guilty of acts of lasciviousness only.
RULING: NO. Accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The essential elements
of an attempted felony are as follows:

The offender commencesthe commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

He does not performall the acts of execution which should producethe felony;
The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneousdesistance;
The non-performance of all acts of executionwas due to causeor accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his spontaneous
desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted felony.The law does not punish him for his attempt
to commit a felony.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the commission
of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her.
However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape
by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of
the victims brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Mary Joys private organ. Accordingly, as the
crime committed by the appellant is attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should
be an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as maximum.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
JOHN MONTINOLA @ TONY MONTINOL
January 31, 2008 G.R. No. 178061
Facts: In six information’s, The prosecution charged Montinola with raping his minor daughter,
AAA, on 29 October 1999, 19 December 1999, February 2000, March 2000, 4 November 2000,
and January 2001. AAA was born on 12 October 1987. AAA attempted to report the 29 October
1999 incident to her mother. However, whenever she tried to tell her mother, Montinola
interrupted her and told her mother that, "Kasi ginulpi ko 'yan, kaya 'yan ganyan. x x x ginulpi
ko
'yan dahil may ginawa 'yang kasalanan. In the first week of March 2001, AAA ran away and
went to her friends for help. She told them that she was being beaten at home, but did not say
anything about the sexual abuses. When asked why she did not tell her friends about the
incidents, AAA stated that, "Ano naman po ang magagawa nila at saka iniisip ko po baka
ipagsabi nila sa ibang kapitbahay namin. One of her friends' older sister, Cheche, accompanied
AAA to the Makati office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
There, AAA talked to a social worker about Montinola's physical and sexual abuses. The DSWD
kept AAA in its custody for one week then returned her to her parents after they explained to
the
DSWD that AAA was just being disciplined at home. Thereafter, AAA ran away again and went
to her friend's cousin's house in Pasay. She went to Batangas with her friend's cousin's aunt and
did not return home for two weeks. She learned that her parents were looking for her when she
saw a notice in the newspaper saying that she was missing. Cheche referred AAA to one Atty.
Crystal Tenorio for legal assistance. On 26 March 2001, AAA went to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) where she executed affidavits. Dr. Maria Salome Fernandez of the NBI
examined AAA and found a healed hymenal laceration
Issue: WON accused-appellant is guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness?
Rulling: In the trial court’s decision accused JOHN MONTINOLA is guilty of rape punished
under Article 266(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353 in relation to RA 7610;
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape and not as consummated
rape;
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness resulting to Child Abuse of a Minor,
who is over 12 years of age, as defined and punished under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA 7610. The trial court held that (1) AAA's testimony was categorical,
straightforward, and consistent; (2) her failure to immediately report the incidents to her
relatives
or to the proper authorities did not affect her credibility; and (3) rape can be committed even in
places where there are other people. Court of Appeals held that (1) AAA's testimony was
candid,
straightforward, spontaneous, honest, sincere, and categorical; (2) the minor inconsistency in
AAA's testimony did not affect her credibility; (3) AAA's failure to immediately report the
incidents to her relatives or to the proper authorities did not affect her credibility; and (4) rape
can be committed even in places where there are other people.
People v Crisostomo G.R. No. L-19034 February 17, 1923
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI Cavite
Reyes J.
FACTS:After 8 or 9 am of Dec 26, 1920, while Macaria Gabriel and her aunt
CandidaAcuña were walking in the direction of their houses from that of GregoriaAcuña,
to whom Macaria had paid the sum of P30, Pedro Crisostomo met themon the
way.Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde dragged Macaria
Gabrielalong and took her against her will to a rice field. Macaria Gabriel cried for
helpand proffered insults to the appellants.The other defendants, Segundo Espiritu,
Primitivo Alcoba, and BartolomeCaguiat, caught hold of Candida Acuña, thus
preventing her from helping herniece.Gregoria Acuña, attracted by the cries of Candida,
repaired to the place and,with a club attacked those who were holding Candida, and they
lastly releasedher.As soon as Candida Acuña was released by her aggressors, she went to
the houseof Macaria Gabriel and reported the matter to the latter's brother,
Constantino,who ran after the abductors of his sister overtaking them when they had
justreleased her, which they did upon seeing Constantino.The appellants were
prosecuted and tried in the CFI Cavite.Defense:There was an agreement between
Macaria and Pedro to elope.The court found Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and
Casimiro Garde guilty asprincipals, and Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and
Bartolome Caguiat asaccomplices, of the consummated crime of abduction through
violence.Hence this appeal.
Issue: WON the appellants are guilty of abduction through violence
Held: No. Guilty only of illegal detention(1) The manner of eloping planned, according
to the defense, by MacariaGabriel, is improbable:
•
the offended party was 30 years' age, she must be presumed morereflexive and cautions
in carrying out a preconceived plan than a youngwoman,
•
she would not have done so in the daytime
•
she would not have gone in company with Candida Acuña
•
In view of her age, she would have naturally enjoyed a certain degree ofliberty such as to
go, as she did, to the barrio of Salinas, Bacoor, from herresidence in Palicot, Imus; with
which liberty she could have plannedand carried into effect with full success her escape
from the parentalhouse.(2) Pedro Crisostomo spontaneously, admitted to Lieutenant
Sotto of theConstabulary having, with his companions, deemed it advisable to
abductMacaria, in view of the fact that she firmly answered in the negative to
hisproposal and, on another occasion, he requested Epifanio Gabriel, anotherbrother of
the offended party, to intervene in his favor and that he consideredthe fault committed
by him as an offense not only against Macaria but alsoagainst her family.Conclusion:
defendants took away Macaria Gabriel against her will.(3) However, the element of
unchaste designs was not proven.(3.1) Pedro Crisostomo testified that his intention in
eloping with Macaria was toget married with her in Bacoor. This intention to marry does
not constituteunchaste designs as it appears that either of them had no impediment
tocontracting a marriage.Viada, in defining abduction under the old Spanish laws, says
in general asfollows:By abduction is meant the taking away of a woman from her house
or the place

VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs. MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant

G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000
FACTS:
The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he got married to
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for
bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the
Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage
between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Despite this,
the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the
time he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
trial court. The petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage necessary for remarriage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision. Under Article 40 of
the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But
here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before
the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused
was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person
who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally
dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense
in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.
Facts:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-
lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the
latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was
indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear
proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared null
and void ab initio and without legal force and effect
Ruling:
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that
the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of
the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of
the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is
AFFIRMED.

ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004
FACTS:
Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Binas in 1955 and they separated in 1966. He contracted a
second marriage to Narcisa Arcena in 1966 then Narcisa went to Japan. While Narcisa was in
Japan, he married Zenaida for the second time in 1989.
Narcisa came home in 1992 and discovered Salvador’s affair with Fe Corazon Palto and his
second marriage to Zenaida. The event was followed by Salvador’s filing of an annulment case
and the other hand, Narcisa filed for bigamy against Salvador.
In his defense, Salvador contended that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida and that
the bigamy case should be suspended since the annulment case is prejudicial.
ISSUES:
Is the resolution of the annulment case a requisite for the bigamy case to prosper?
HELD:
Annulment has no bearing upon determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in bigamy. The
only requirement for bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting when the second
marriage was contracted.
Even void and voidable marriages shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise by the Court.
Salvador’s marriages to Zenaida and Narcisa are both subsisting, which makes him guilty of
bigamy.
A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is
committed against the state. Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced by even a
civic-spirited citizen who may come to know of it.
Novicio V. Aggabao
G.R. No. 141332
December 11, 2003
463 PHIL 510
Facts:
Petitioner Ligaya Novicio, treasurer and stockholder of Philinterlife Insurance Co., sent a letter
to Philinterlife’s depository banks, informing them that several stockholders of Philinterlife,
including respondent Alma Aggabao had been restrained by CA from exercising their rights as
shareholders of Philinterlife.
Respondent claimed that the letter injured her reputation and credibility as the corporate
secretary and chief accountant of Philinterlife, so she filed a case of libel against petitioner.
Issue:
WON Novicio’s letter is libelous.
Held:
No.
Only one requisite (that the victim must be identifiable) was satisfied. The other three (That the
writing must be 1. defamatory; 2. Malicious; 3. Given publicity) were not satisfied. Therefore,
no libelous charge may be imputed against petitioner.

GODOFREDO ORFANEL v. PEOPLE, GR No. L-26877, 1969-12-26

Facts:
From a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
convicting him of the crime of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with
subsi-diary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall not exceed six (6) months,... and to
pay the costs, defendant Godofredo Orfanel has appealed, by petition for review on certiorari,
which has been given due course.
defendant Godofredo Orfanel wrote to the Director of Printing and sent by ordinary mail... the
letter Exhibit A,... After investigating the charges contained in Exhibit A, the latter's office
submitted its report, Exhibit F, to the Commissioner of Civil Service, recommending complete
exoneration of complainant Jeans Ballesteros, and the charges against him were, accordingly,...
dismissed.
Soon thereafter, complainant commenced the present criminal action for libel, against
defendant Godofredo Orfanel. After due trial, under a plea of not guilty, the Court of First
Instance of Manila... rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction, imposing the
penalty already adverted to. On appeal, taken by the defendant, said judgment was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Defendant maintains that the Court of Appeals has erred: (1) in not holding that Exhibit A is a
"privileged communication which would exempt the author thereof from criminal
responsibility"; (2) in basing his conviction on a "presumption of malice"; (3) in... failing to hold
"that Exhibit A merely contained an opinion or belief" for which defendant "incurred no
criminal liability"; (4) in holding that the failure of the defense to present Artemio Holgado as a
witness "should be taken against" him
(defendant); and (5) "in holding that there had been publication of the letter Exhibit A."
With respect to the first assignment of error, it should be noted that a privileged
communication may be either absolutely pri-vileged or conditionally privileged.
Exhibit A is not an absolutely privileged communication. It belongs to the class of
communications regarded as qualifiedly pri-vileged, pursuant to Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code
Exhibit A falls under the first subdivision of the above-quoted provision. Being conditional or
qualified, the privileged nature of said communication does not warrant defendant's acquittal,
if he acted in bad faith or with malice
The imputations contained in his letter Exhibit A appear to be absolutely groundless.
Issues:
Whether or not said imputations are true.
Ruling:
Under the last assignment of error, defendant assails the decision appealed from, upon the
ground that he should not be held accountable for the fact that Exhibit A was read by the
Adminis-trative Officer of the Bureau of Printing, who, apparently, opens letters addressed to...
the Director of Printing, and, also, by his secretary, Mario Banzuela to whom the Director had
referred it, as well as by those who participated in the aforementioned investi-gation, inasmuch
as said communication was addressed to no other than the Director of
Printing. It should be noted, however, that defendant had, likewise, sent a copy of Exhibit A to
the Secretary of General Services. Moreover, considering that the former had explicitly asked
an investigation of the charges preferred in said... communication, it is obvious that the reading
of Exhibit A by other persons than its aforementioned addressee was precisely what the
defendant had envisaged and sought. Even, however, if no other person than the Director of
Printing, to whom Exhibit A was... ad-dressed, had read it, still such fact is sufficient publication
there-of, for purposes of libel, for he is a third person as regards its writer and the person
defamed therein.[11] Indeed, "(a) libel is 'published' not only when... it is widely circulated, but
also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice of another person" than its
author and the offended party.[12]... the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against defendant Godofredo Orfanel.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Borjal v. CA Case Digest ( GR No. 126466)
JUNE 1, 2019 ~ PINGTHINGLAW
Borjal v. CA
GR No. 126466
January 14, 1999
Facts:
Arturo Borjal was the president of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., and Maximo Soliven was the publisher
and chairman of its editorial board. Borjal was among the regular writers of The Philippien Star
who runs the column Jaywalker. The case stems from the articles written in Jaywalker, which
called a certain organizer of a conference a self-proclaimed hero.
Around that time, the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) was organized.
Its objective was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation
policy for presentation to Congress. The conference was estimated to cost around
Php1,815,000, which would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors. Private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected as Executive Director of the FNCLT. As such, he
wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business committee to support the conference.
The Jaywalkercontained articles allegedly referring to these solicitation letters and other
defamatory statements. However, none of these articles named the organizer nor the
conference referred to. Wenceslao, thinking he was the one talked about in the article, filed a
case of libel against Borjal, Soliven, and others. The trial court as well as the appellate court
found the accused guilty of libel.
Issue:
Were the courts a quo correct in convicting the accused of libel?
Ruling:
No. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is
not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized
himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. In the case at bar, these requisites
were not complied with.
Even Wenceslao admitted that he had doubts whether he was really the organizer referred to
in the articles. In fact, he admitted that there were several organizers and that he spoke to
Borjal to inquire if he was the one talked about in the articles. Identification is grossly
inadequate when even the victim is unsure that he was the object of the attack.
The other errors revolve around the issue of whether the articles constitute privileged
communications. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Article 354 of the RPC
provides the cases of privileged communication, to wit:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and,
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.
The Supreme Court agrees that the articles are not within the exceptions of Article 354, but this
does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. The enumeration under Article 354 is
not exclusive. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The
conference is one imbued with public interest, and Wenceslao is a public figure. The rule is that
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, but it must be a false allegation
of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. Honest criticisms on the conduct of public
officials and public figures are insulated from libel judgments.

VASQUEZ VS CA GR No. 118971 September 15, 1999

Facts: Sometime in April 1986, petitioner and some 37 families from Tondo Foreshore Area
went to see then NHA general Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their
barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo. After the meeting, petitioner and his companions were
interviewed by reporters of the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. The article was published
containing such statements from the petitioner imputing that Olmedo, through connivance
with NHA officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the area and that he was involved in
illegal activities such as attempted murder, gambling and stealing. Olmeda filed a complaint for
libel.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of libel
Held: Elements of libel under Art. 353 of RPC: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.
An allegation is defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the
memory of one who is dead
There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person – it is not required that
the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. In determining the meaning
of any publication alleged to be libelous the words shall be taken in their ordinary sense.
To satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third person or stranger
was able to identify the defamed person as an object of the defamatory statement.
Under Art. 361 of RPC, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with
respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is
shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove the
imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Even if the defamatory
statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official
concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is with knowledge is
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. In this case, petitioner was able
to prove his allegation of land grabbing based on a letter of NHA Inspector General, and the
memoranda of the NHA general manager. With regard to those charge of involvement in illegal
activities there are in fact charges filed, the truth of which were not in issue.

People vs. Villanueva (G.R. No. 172116, October 30, 2006)

Facts:
PO1 Rana of Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Group (DDEG) was informed that Villanueva herein
appellant was selling shabu. PO1 immediately composed a team to entrap appellant wherein
PO1 Rana acted as the poseur buyer. After the entrapment the confiscated substance was
submitted to the Northern Police District for examination which gave a positive result.
Appellant denied the accusation and testified that was at home when suddenly the Policemen
knocked and looked for a certain person named Roger. When he identified himself as Roger, he
was immediately handcuffed and brought to the headquarters without explanation and it was
only later on that he discovered that he was being charged for selling shabu.
After hearing, the trial court finds Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for drug pushing
punishable under RA 9165. Court Appeals affirmed decision. Hence this petition.
Appellant insist that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty alone
could not sustain conviction, and that self serving and uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Rana
could not prevail over his constitutionally granted presumption of innocence.
Issue:
Whether or not error attended the trial courts findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of RA 9165.
Ruling:
In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the duty to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only
the commission but likewise to establish, with the same, the quantum of proof, the identity of
the person or persons responsible therefore.
This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout
the trial. However when prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by
presenting the evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegation in the
information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of evidence
shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and
nullify if not to overthrow, that prima facie case.
In this case, the Prosecution submitted three strong positive and substantial evidence:
1. The Prosecution established with moral certainty the presence of all elements necessary
for the prosecution for the illegal sale of drugs;
2. PO1 Rana identifies Villanueva as the person who sold to him a plastic sachet containing
the crystalline substance;
3. Regulated Drug of Shabu contained in the plastic sachet which Villanueva handed over
PO1 Rana, was duly proven before the Trial Court.
Against such three evidence, Appellant could only say that no entrapment was conducted and
insisted that he was just framed up.
Wherefore, Decision of RTC and CA was affirmed.

People vs Padua G.R. No. 174097 July 21, 2010 De Castro J.

Facts: Two separate informations dated August 19, 2002 were filed before the RTC against
appellant for llegal sale and possession of shabu. According to the prosecution a buy-bust
operation was held on Aug 18, 2002 at the house of Padua in Taguig City wherein a police
officer who posed as buyer was handed by Padua an aluminium sachet containing shabu and
the police gave him a marked 200pesos in return. Upon the signal of the police officer-buyer
the buy-bust team frisked and arrested Padua. They found four sachets of shabu and the
marked money on Paduas pockets. Later, the buy-bust team turned over the seized drugs to
the investigator, who thereafter brought the evidence to the SPD Crime Laboratory Office, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City. Conflict: The defense, on the other hand, had an entirely different
version of what transpired that morning. Padua alleges that there was no buy-bust operation
and that police officers when into his house and handcuffed him and asked him to give them
120,000 pesos otherwise a case will be filed. Padua was found guilty in the RTC and he
appealed in the Court of Appeals.
Issue: 1. The guilt of the Padua was not proven beyond reasonable doubt for failure of the
prosecution to establish the chain of custody of the specimen
Held: 1. There is no broken chain in the custody of the seized items, found to be shabu, from
the time PO2 Aguilar got the shabu, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer,
and up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for
laboratory examination. Non-compliance with the stipulated procedure(RA 9165), under
justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers. The testimony of PO2 Aguilar outlines the chain of
custody of the confiscated items, i.e., sachets of shabu. The fact that the persons who had
possession or custody of the subject drugs, such as Forensic Chemist Rivera-Dagasdas and the
alleged investigator, were not presented as witnesses to corroborate Aguilars testimony is of no
moment. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the investigator and the
forensic chemist, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. Further, not all people who
came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is nothing in
Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing the same that imposes such requirement.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA a.k.a.
FERNAMDO RANCHE ABANA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016 DEL CASTILLO,
J.:
FACTS
: A civilian informant, one "Droga", went to Police Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City and
reported to the duty officer SPO1 Espenido that the appellant was actively engaged in the
illegal drug trade. Espenido immediately assembled a buy-bust team, with him as the team
leader, the civilian asset and with PO2 Enriquez, SPO1 Cañete, and SPO1 Nuñez. The police
team designated the unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer and provided him with a
P100.00 marked money bill. They saw the "civilian informant" handling over the marked
P100.00 bill to the appellant, who in exchange gave to the former a plastic pack containing
shabu. Once arrested, SPO1 Espenido recovered the P100.00 marked money from the appellant
while the plastic pack was given by the "civilian informant" to SPO1 Espenido. RTC: Guilty CA:
Upheld RTC ruling The appellant contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation
report to the PDEA after the buy-bust operation violates RA 9165; and that the non-
presentation of the unnamed "civilian informant" who allegedly brokered the transaction with
him casts serious doubts on the factuality of the buy-bust operation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether coordination with the PDEA is an indispensable requirement before police
authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation
RULING
: The accused is hereby acquitted. 1. No. Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation; that in fact, even the
absence of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation.
Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in prosecuting drug-
related cases.
Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their
invaluable service to the police.

People v. Ulat
G.R. No. 180504. 5 October 2011
Facts:
Edwin Ulat (Ulat) was charged in an information with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165. Ulat pleaded not guilty when he was arraigned.
According to the prosecution, a confidential informant relayed information regard the illegal
drug trade activity of an alias Pudong. The police conducted a buy-bust operation if indeed
there was illegal drug trade. The operation proved successful and in the police’s custody was
alias Pudong. Then, Pudong was brought to the Makati DEU for proper investigation. The
investigator also prepared for a request for laboratory examination of the specimen purported
to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, which was obtained from Pudong. A sworn statement
was also made in connection with the buy-bust operation.
On the other hand, the defence narrated that Ulat was at home watching television when he
saw five to seven men in front of their door whom he thought were looking for someone. He
approached them and asked who they were looking for. A gun was poked at him and he was
told to go with them to the barangay hall. He was asked if he knew a certain Sandy, which he
denied. He was brought to the barangay hall and then to the Criminal Investigation Division.
After due proceedings, the trial court convicted Ulat of the crime charged against him. On
review, the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court. Hence, Ulat appealed before
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the conviction was proper despite the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution
allegedly presented conflicting testimonies on material points regarding the chain of custody of
the illegal drug taken from Ulat.
Ruling:
No. The conviction was not proper.
The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is
proved. This basic constitutional principle is fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offence charged by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
The law prescribes specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, independently of
the general procedures geared to ensure that the rights of people under criminal investigation
and of the accused facing a criminal charge are safeguarded.
In this case, however, the prosecution failed to demonstrate with moral certainty that the
identity and integrity of the prohibited drug, which constitutes the corpus delicti, had been duly
preserved.
The records reveal that the prosecution did not establish the exact location where the
confiscated illegal drug was marked and the identity of the person who marked it because of
contradicting testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses. The conspicuous variance in the
testimonies for the prosecution casts serious doubt on the arresting team’s due care in the
custody of the confiscated illegal drug.
Taking into consideration all the conflicting accounts of the prosecution’s witnesses, the
Supreme Court held that any reasonable mind would entertain grave reservations as to the
identity and integrity of the confiscated sachet of shabu submitted for laboratory examination.
In Zaragga v. People, the Supreme Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to
when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized
drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. Thus, the accused were
acquitted due to the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
In this case, the acquittal of Ulat is proper for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.