US vs.

Pablo
G.R. No. L-11676, October 17, 1916
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

Torres, J.:

Facts:
● At about noon of October 21, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policemen of the Municipality of
Balanga, went by order of his chief, Jose D. Reyes, to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a
jueteng game. With him was Tomas De Leon.
● However upon arrival at a vacant lot, the players, perhaps advised by his approach,
already left and ran away but there he found Francisco Dato, a low table, a tambiolo and
37 bolas.
● Andres Pablo had also seen Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo left the said lot but he
refrained from arresting them as at first he had seen no material proof that the game was
being played.
● Andres Pablo reported what had happened to his chief thrum a memorandum and on
October 22, 1915, Jose Reyes field a complaint in the Court of Justice of the Peace
charging Dato, Malicsi and Rodrigo with having gambled at jueteng in violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 5.
● At the hearing, Francisco Dato pleaded guilty and the other two accused Maximo Malicsi
and Antonio Rodrigo, not guilty. During the trial, which happened on or about November
6, 1915 for Criminal Cause No. 787, Andres Pablo testified under oath that on October
21, 1915, he and Tomas De Leon went to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng game,
found Francisco Dato, a low table, a tambiolo, and 37 bolas but never saw the accused
Malicsi and Rodrigo on the said lot nor did they see them run. The court rendered a
decision sentencing only Francisco Dato as guilty and acquitting both Maximo Malicsi
and Antonio Rodrigo.
● Even before the case came to trial, Andres Pablo had an interview and conference with
the accused Malicsi and Rodrigo in the house of Valentin Sioson. There he was
instructed not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo and received the sum of P15 from
Gregorio Ganzon.
● On December 1, 1915, after making preliminary investigation, the provincial fiscal filed
an information in the Court of First Instance of Bataan charging Andres Pablo with the
crime of perjury under the provisions of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 for falsely stating that
neither did he overtake Malicsi and Rodrigo nor did he see them run away despite
knowing that the statement was and material to the decision of the Criminal Cause No.
787, US vs. Rodrigo and Malicsi.
● The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court charged Pablo guilty of the
crime of perjury and was convicted under Act No. 1697 which repealed the provisions
contained in Articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code relative to false testimony.
● However, Act No. 1697 and the repealing clause of Act No. 2657 do not provide for any
penalty.

Issue:
Whether or not, the defendant should go unpunished given that Act No. 1697 does not provide
for any penalty against the crime of perjury.

Held:
No. Act No. 1697 did not expressly repeal Articles 318 to 324 of Penal Code.
Law 11, Title 2, Book 3 of the Novisima Recopilacion states that:
“All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must be literally
obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail.”
Therefore Articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code are in forced and are applicable to crimes of
false testimony of Andres Pablo.

Decision:
The judgement appealed from was hereby reversed and sentenced Andres Pablo to the penalty
of 2 years 4 months and one day of prison correcional, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in
case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty. He shall also pay the costs of both instances.

US vs. Sweet
G.R. No. 448, September 20, 1901
Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

Ladd, J.:

Facts:
● Philip K. Sweet was an employee of the U.S. Military who assaulted a prisoner of war
resulting to a case filed with the Courts of First Instance. But according to Sweet, he was
only “acting in line of duty” at the time the alleged offense was committed and that the
court has no jurisdiction over the case.

Issues:
1. Whether or not, the Courts of First Instance has jurisdiction over the case,
2. Whether or not, an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner
of war is not an offense under the Penal Code.
3. Whether or not, if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military character
sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its commission exempts
him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.

Held:
1. Yes. Act No. 136 of US Philippine Commission. Section 56(6), Courts of First Instance
are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six
months imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed. The CFI
has jurisdiction over the case because his claim that he was only acting in line of duty
was not supported by any findings or by any evidence.
2. Yes. While it is true that an assault committed in time of war by a military person upon a
prisoner of war is punishable as an offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice
(Art. 232) and it is also true that under the provisions of the same Code (Arts. 4, 5) the
military tribunals have, with certain exceptions, exclusive cognizance of all offenses
whether of a purely military nature or otherwise, committed by a military person, it does
not render them any less an offense under the Articles of the Penal Code.
3. No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is
unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought before them
for trial.
Antonio F. Trillanes, IV vs. Hon. Oscar Pimentel, Sr.
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Carpio Morales, J.:

Facts:
● At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, Antonio Trillanes, together with 300 more heavily
armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded
the resignation of the President and key national officials.
● Later that day, Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the AFP to suppress the
rebellion. In the evening of the same date, the militant soldiers surrendered after a series
of negotiations and teeming tensions.
● Antonio F. Trillanes, along with his comrades in the Oakwood Incident, was charged with
coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, People vs.
Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al.
● Almost 4 years later, Trillanes, who remained in detention, ran and won a seat in the
Senate for a six-year term commencing at noon of June 30, 2007.
● On June 22, 2007, Trillanes filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 148,
an Omnibus Motion for leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
Related Requests but the trial court denied all requests in the Omnibus Motion by Order
of July 25, 2007. Trillanes moved for reconsideration but the trial court just the same
denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.
● He then filed a petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not, the petitioner’s election as Senator exempts him from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general.

Held:
No. As a matter of Law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed place
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the
pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorised by the court to be released on bail or
on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.
Petitioner position fails. On the generality and permanence of his request alone, petitioner’s
case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jalosjos succinctly expounds:
“Allowing accursed-appellant to attend Congressional sessions and committee meetings for five
(5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appartenant
to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of
a special class, it would also be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon vs. Alberto Romulo, et al.

G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009
Azcuna, J.:

Facts:
● On or about November 1, 2005, in Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City, Lance
Corporal Daniel Smith, SSgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, and Keith
Silkwood, all members of the US Armed Forces, were accused with the crime of rape
committed against Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried Filipino woman. The
crime happened inside a Starex Van with Plate No. WFK-162, owned by Starways
Travel and Tours, with office address of 8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City and
driven by co-accused Timoteo L. Soriano Jr.
● On December 4, 2006, the Regional Trial Court of Makati found Lance Corporal Daniel
Smith guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape while the others were
acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. He was detained at the Makati Jail as ordered
by the Makati Court.
● On December 29, 2006, Smith was taken out of the Makati Jail and was brought to a
facility for detention under the control of the US government provided for under new
agreement between Alberto G. Romulo and Kirstie A. Kenny on December 19 and 22,
2006 in accordance with the Visiting Force Agreement which states that Smith shall be
returned to US Military custody at the US embassy in Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not, the Visiting Force Agreement is void and unconstitutional.

Held:
No. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States does
not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognised by the said
state.
Article XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution states that:
After the expiration in 1991of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
This provision is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces
through the VFA is a presence allowed under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-
US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine
Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the constitutional provision resulting from
such presence.

The Court however ruled that the “Romulo-Kenny Agreements” of December 19 and 22, 2006
are not in accord with the VFA because the detention of the accused in the US Embassy is not
“by Philippine Authorities”.
Article V, Section 10 states that “The confinement or detention by Philippine Authorities of the
United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines
and United States Authorities”.