Abstract

One of the most novel aspects of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the provision for the

Autonomous Regions in the Cordillera and Muslim Mindanao, for areas “sharing common and

distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant

characteristics.” Support for establishing an Autonomous Region in the Cordillera, however, is

not unanimous. This paper focus on the forces or associations in society which exerts influence

on the formulation and determination of public policy mainly in the political parties, pressure

groups, public opinion and propaganda pertaining to regional autonomy. Also, this paper

determines if the reenactment of the 1987 Philippine Constitution specifically the political

decision and action nowadays or 30 years after was achieved. In particular, it discusses some of

the issues raised by the extremely varied nature of the cultures of the Cordillera peoples, and the

nature of local territorial boundaries and resource control, as well as the difficulties and potential

presented by indigenous institutions for the institution of autonomy in the Cordillera.

Highlights
The move for broader autonomy for Muslim Mindanao is continuing beyond what has already

been outlined in the 1987 Constitution. The basic constitutional principle on the subject says,

“There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras consisting

of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive

historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics

within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial

integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

Forming autonomous regions is in fact more than just a question of privilege for these two

regions. It is a question of right. One of the riches of the Filipino nation is the diversity of

cultures found in it. These diverse cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish. No
one culture should be allowed to crush any other. Thus, the basis for the establishment of

autonomous regions is homogeneity of the culture of the area and its distinctiveness from other

cultures, and not just geographic accident.

The phrase “Muslim Mindanao” should not be construed as meaning that all of Mindanao is

Muslim. It simply means those areas of Mindanao which are predominantly Muslim. The phrase

Muslim Mindanao is used in much the same way that the phrase Christian Philippines does not

suggest that all of the inhabitants of the Philippines are Christian.

The creation of the autonomous regions, however, does not mean the establishment of

sovereignties distinct from that of the republic. These autonomous regions can be established

only “within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial

integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

Autonomy in the Cordilleras has been at a standstill. Attempts at formulating a Basic Law for the

Cordilleras have not been to the satisfaction of the inhabitants and therefore have been rejected.
Muslim Mindanao has succeeded in implementing an Organic Act which for several years now

has formed the fundamental structure for the government of the region. The Organic Act,

however, is now slowly on the way to being replaced by the Organic Act for the Bangsamoro.

The process of replacement started with the approval of the Framework Agreement on the

Bangsamoro. But that was all it was—a framework. The negotiators have been feverishly

working to put flesh on the framework.

The approval by the negotiators of the wealth sharing agreement is a major step in the direction

of fortifying the desired autonomy.

“The parties acknowledge that wealth creation (or revenue creation and sourcing) is important

for the operation of the Bangsamoro, considering that the Bangsamoro territory is among the

most underdeveloped in the Philippines due to the decades-long conflict. Moreover, the existing

tax base therein is very limited. There is a need to bridge the financial gap between the
Bangsamoro’s prospective needs and the revenues being created therein. In this way, the

Bangsamoro can catch up with the more progressive areas of the country.”
An important point to remember is that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

is governed by two organic acts: the 1987 Constitution and the Organic Act for Muslim

Mindanao. When the framework agreement was announced we were assured that its completion

will not involve constitutional amendment. If it should and if the President wants it to go

through, he may have to modify his position on amending the current Constitution.

Constitutional amendment will require tremendous amount of work, not to mention

controversies.
At this stage of the negotiations dealing only with wealth creation and sharing, however, I do not

see any need for constitutional amendment. What has been touched so far does not involve the

control and development of natural resources but only taxes and revenues from natural resources

found in the territory. To a great extent this can be handled by ordinary legislation.
However, the determination of which areas containing natural resources can be covered as

special sources of revenue may have to await the determination of the extent of the Bangsamoro

territory. As I see it, the territory envisioned for the Bangsamoro is larger than what is covered

under the Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao. Under the 1987 Constitution the territories

included in the ARMM covered only provinces, cities, municipalities and geographic areas

which voted for inclusion in the ARMM. The framework agreement envisions a larger area.
So far, the general reaction to the draft revenue creation and sharing agreement has been positive.

Although it is still a draft, the negotiators deserve congratulations for the hard work.

Discussion
Conflict in Mindanao is one of the country's biggest issues that date back decades, tracing its

roots to disputes over land and religion. The Moros, faced with land grabbing of their ancestral

lands, have been fighting for what their say is rightfully theirs. Rebel groups such as the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) turned to

violence and demanded for a separate state.

Past administrations tried to attain peace in the south through negotiations, but none have

succeeded. Conflict between Moro groups seeking an independent state in Mindanao, and the

Government of the Philippines (GPH) has been ongoing for four decades. After numerous

attempts to resolve the conflicts, a final peace agreement between the Government of the

Philippines and the Philippines’ largest rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),

was signed in 2014 paving the way for the establishment of a new Bangsamoro Autonomous

Region to replace the current ARMM.

The conflict between the GPH and the MILF is not the only conflict affecting the ARMM.

Rather, the conflict situation in Mindanao is multi-faceted, involving numerous armed groups, as

well as clans, criminal gangs and political elites. While the GPH is actively trying to resolve

these conflicts, the degree of violence and unrest in the ARMM serves as a major obstacle to

achieving sustainable peace in the region.

The presence of a plethora of armed groups in the ARMM increases the risk of accidental clashes

between groups which are aligned, or between armed groups and government forces. However,

the Moro insurgencies in the region are not considered to be the main source of conflict, while

resolving the conflict between the GPH and the MILF will be a step towards peace in the

ARMM, it will not end conflict in the region.

Lawlessness in Mindanao also is responsible for thriving shadow economies. Principal among

these are the trade in illegal drugs and weapons. While the shadow economies in the ARMM are

linked to violence and conflict, some of them, such as cross-border trade in the Sulu Sea also
have the potential to contribute to peace. This is because they play an important role in the

provision of livelihoods for fragile island communities.

Intercommunal tensions are also prevalent in Mindanao. Moros do not constitute a single ethnic

group. Numerous Muslim ethnic groups have distinct linguistic and cultural traditions while at

the same time identifying as Moro because of their religion. Moreover there are sizeable

populations of descendants of Christian settlers from other parts of the Philippines living in the

ARMM, as well as non-Muslim indigenous tribes. The absence of state services in the ARMM

also contributes to fragility and instability in the region. Regional government spending on

services is low, and the provision of healthcare and education in the region is inadequate. The

Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) is the latest of the government's efforts to quell the conflict in

Mindanao. It abolishes the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and establishes

the new Bangsamoro political identity in its place. The law is based on the Comprehensive

Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed by the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF). The ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) last January

25, 2019 is the latest procurement of the administration to attain peace in Mindanao and end

their long-time struggle for independence.

The term Bangsamoro was derived from the Malay word “nation” or “bansa” which means

“nation of the Moro”. These natives and original inhabitants of Mindanao belong to multiple

ethnolinguistic groups made up of Muslims who mostly live in Mindanao, Sulu, and Basilan.

They are those who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and

political beliefs and has the right to identify themselves by ascription or self-ascription.
Bangsamoro people will also have the right of self-determination, which is basically their

collective right to achieve their own political, cultural and economic privilege.
The BOL, now called the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (OLBARMM), is made to establish a new autonomous political entity in the

Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BAR). It aims to bring peace by addressing the grievances,

sentiments, and demands of Muslims in the region.

The BAR is a parliamentary-democratic government consists of an executive and a legislative

branch. It will be headed by the regional leader called the Chief Minister, who will be chosen

among members of the Bangsamoro government while its members will be elected by the

people.
The OLBARMM will provide annual block grants and special development funds to be allotted

for the rehabilitation of damaged communities in the Bangsamoro region. The amount of the

block grant is P60 to 70 billion – equivalent to five percent of the net national internal revenue

collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and of the Bureau of Custom.

Under former President Benigno Aquino III, several versions of the proposed BBL were

submitted to Congress, the House Committee and the Senate, but its efforts to pass the BBL

eventually failed.
On the other hand, the latest version of the BBL passed during the Duterte administration – the

OLBARMM – were acceptable to both the government and the rebel groups.
The recently abolished Autonomous Region on Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was replaced by the

Bangsamoro Autonomous Region on Muslim Mindanao because some officials consider it as

“failure due to corruption and mismanagement”.

Both ARMM and BARMM include the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu,

and Tawi-Tawi. In the recent plebiscites, which decides the scope of the autonomous region, a

majority of ARMM voters approved the BOL while Lanao del Norte voted against the inclusion

of its six municipalities that wanted to join the BARMM.

In the ARMM, the Bangsamoro government was under the general supervision of the President

of the Philippines. However, the Bangsamoro government will have an asymmetrical relationship
with the national government, as BARMM will have more autonomy than other regions in the

country.
The autonomous region will have an “Intergovernmental Relations Body” composed of

representatives from both the Bangsamoro government and central government that will settle

the problems on intergovernmental relations. The representatives that would be authorized to the

region are nine reserved powers for the central government, 57 exclusive powers for the

Bangsamoro, and 14 concurrent powers for both.

Some matters including budgeting, administration of justice, agriculture, disaster risk reduction

and management, ancestral domains, human rights, local government units, public works, social

services, tourism, and trade and industry are the exclusive powers the Bangsamoro government

will have. While the nine reserved powers of the central government will retain powers over

constitutional and national matters such as foreign affairs and defense.

Conclusion:
Outline:

1. What is the significance of autonomy from the point of view of cultural minorities?
2. What have been done/historical attempts to promote autonomy?
3. What are the issues that led to failure of regional autonomy in the past?
4. What political forces exist today that could help address the autonomy issues in the

Philippines?

The continuing struggle of cultural minorities’ for self-determination and self-governance is not

about political tactics driven by self-serving motives seeking to gain social standing and political

power. Although often misunderstood, confused with localized rebellion or altogether dismissed

as uninformed or misguided uprising against government establishment, this unending bid for

freedom from the political and economic claws of the centralized political administration
represents a noble intention and a firm resolve of legitimate minorities to promote and preserve

their ethnicity, social identity, ancestral domains, political and economic rights. Given the long

history of exploitation, discrimination and marginalization committed against various tribal

communities by prevailing political regimes and the ruling class, this relentless struggle has,

through various historical events, evolved into a legitimate and passionate search for political

and economic freedom.

This is the main bone of contention that the 1986 Constitutional Commission (or ConCom) has

sought to address, having recognized the validity and legitimacy of the cultural minorities’

struggles for fair treatment and just recognition as co-actors and stakeholders in the national life

within the framework of the central government. The Muslims in Mindanao and the Cordillera

people, being the most organized cultural minorities, were regarded as the direct beneficiaries of

this constitutional measure. Eventually, the 1987 Constitution that has evolved demonstrated a

clear and decisive adoption of autonomy as the institutionalized response and a most appropriate

measure to address the cultural minorities’ persistent clamour for freedom from discrimination,

and as the constitutionally mandated mechanism for ensuring an “efficient working relationship”

between the indigenous tribal communities and the central administration.

Autonomy is not a new reality in the national life of Filipinos. As a way of breaking free from

the grips of American colonial presence, the Muslims have persistently petitioned the American

government for independence from colonial rule. This would come to an important milestone in

1926 when a group of Muslim leaders succeeded in serving a formal petition to the US Congress

known as the Declaration of Rights and Purposes asserting legitimacy of their claim of

independence from American colonial powers and positioning themselves as the independent

constitutional sultanate to be known as the Moro Nation. From then on, independence

movements in the Muslim south have emerged in succession, including the Muslim
Independence Movement in the 1960s and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the

1970s through the 1990s driven mainly by a collective intent on establishing the Bangsamoro

Republic. In the north, the Kalingas and the bontocs have been pressing for similar independence

reforms since the 1970s basically in reaction to massive displacement from their ancestral

domains.
The bloody struggles of these marginalized tribes constitute some of the darkest years in their

relentless search for peace based on pluralistic tolerance and fair co-existence. But the historical

issues relating to autonomy remained unresolved as attempts to integrate the indigenous tribes

into the social and political mainstream failed miserably. On hindsight, the overall reason for

such failure has been the monopolistic approach of the government in which the same cultural

traits, systems of thought and lifestyle were applied to all Fiipinos regardless of cultural roots

and backgrounds. This is seen, for instance, in the construction of the Chico Dam in the north in

which the Bontoc and Kalinga minorities have been effectively evicted from their “homeland”.

In the south where the government allowed entry of multinational plantations hydroelectric

dams, mining and logging operations, the local ethnic tribes have been rendered practically

landless and homeless after they have been displaced from their ancestral lands. In all of these

cases, the indigenous groups were either not effectively consultedor not informed at all. If any

health and education services were made available, they proved to be inappropriate to the local

traditions, culture and lifestyle of the communities. These only made the issue of autonomy

much more complicated as the cultural minorities experienced discrimination and

marginalization, if not total dislocation. This only made the work of regional autonomy painfully

difficult, if not impossible.

The constitutional measure affirming regional autonomy as the government’s preferred mode of

engagement with the cultural minorities promises a bright future, butthe central administration
should be able to manage some of the toughest hindrances if a real and lasting journey on the

road to peace and prosperity is to be realized.

For one, the unqualified fear that autonomy could lead to separatism needs to be addressed.

There are apprehensions that the Muslims, given their “intense feeling of nationality in

Moroism”, might eventually push for separatism and secession could be the unavoidable

consequence. Secondly, the realities in Cordillera, while favoring autonomy, could encourage

isolationist tribal tendencies through increasingly regionalistic sentiments that could render the

Filipino identity less and less defined.

There are no quick and easy answers to the questions surrounding autonomy, but for sure, to

continue the monopolistic and highly centralized policies and programs of the government could

only lead to further distancing of the cultural minorities from the prevailing fabric of national

integrity and sovereignty. Further, the use of force and armed interventions to contain local

separatist movements will only alienate the already distant tribal groups, and will only produce

more indifference, if not total separation.

Recommendation

References:
https://cnnphilippines.com/news/bangsamoro-basic-law-bbl-timeline.html
https://pia.gov.ph/news/articles/1018364