Supersemar

The Supersemar, the Indonesian

abbreviation for Surat Perintah Sebelas
Maret (Order of Eleventh March), was a
document signed by the Indonesian
President Sukarno on 11 March 1966,
giving the army commander Lt. Gen.
Suharto authority to take whatever
measures he "deemed necessary" to
restore order to the chaotic situation
during the Indonesian killings of 1965–66.
The abbreviation "Supersemar" is a play on
the name of Semar, the mystic and
powerful figure who commonly appears in
Javanese mythology including wayang
puppet shows. The invocation of Semar
was presumably intended to help draw on
Javanese mythology to lend support to
Suharto's legitimacy during the period of
the transition of authority from Sukarno to
Suharto.

In effect, the Supersemar came to be seen

as the key instrument of the transfer of
executive power from Sukarno to Suharto.

Background
One version of the document

On 30 September 1965, a group calling

itself the 30 September Movement killed
six senior army generals, seized temporary
control of parts of the center of Jakarta
and issued a number of decrees over
Republic of Indonesia Radio.[1] Suharto
and his allies defeated the movement and
in the rather drawn-out process which
extended out for six months or more,
Sukarno's formal position as president of
the nation was slowly but steadily ebbed
away. The armed forces accused its long-
standing rival, the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI), of being behind the "coup
attempt" and an anti-Communist purge
ensued. Over the next few months Suharto
and the armed forces seized the initiative.
During a cabinet meeting (which Suharto
did not attend), while student
demonstrations protected by the army
took place in Jakarta, troops without
insignia surrounded the presidential
palace where the meeting was being held.
It later transpired that these were from
Army special forces. Sukarno was advised
to leave the meeting and did so, flying to
the presidential palace in Bogor, 60 km
south of Jakarta, by helicopter. Later that
afternoon three army generals, Maj. Gen.
Basuki Rahmat, Minister for Veteran
Affairs, Brig. Gen. M Jusuf, Minister for
Basic Industry and Brig. Gen.
Amirmachmud, Commander of the 5th
Military Region/Jaya, visited Sukarno and
came away with the signed Supersemar
which they then presented to Suharto. The
next day Suharto used the powers thus
conferred on him to ban the PKI, and on 18
March, fifteen Sukarno loyalist ministers
were arrested. [2][3][4]
Suharto changed the composition of the
Provisional People's Consultative
Assembly (MPRS) and a year later, in
March 1967, the MPRS voted to strip
Sukarno of his powers and appointed
Suharto acting president. In 1968 the
MPRS removed the word 'acting' and over
two years after the events of September
1965 Suharto became the president of
Indonesia. The process of transferring the
presidency from Sukarno to Suharto had
taken over two years. Suharto remained in
power as president until he resigned in
during the political crisis in Indonesia in
May 1998.[1]
The document
The Supersemar itself is a simple
document of less than 200 words. It reads
as follows:[5]

THE PRESIDENT OF THE

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

ORDER

I. Considering
1.1 The current state of the
Revolution, together with the
national and international
political situation
1.2 The Order of the Day of the
Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces of the
Republic/President/Great Leader
of the Revolution dated 8 March
1966

II. Taking into account

2.1 The need for calm and
stability of the Government and
the progress of the Revolution
2.2 The need for a guarantee of
integrity of the Great Leader of
the Revolution, [the Armed
Forces] and the People to
preserve the leadership and
obligations of the
President/Supreme
Commander/Great Leader of the
Revolution and his teachings

III. Decides/Orders
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
SOEHARTO,
MINISTER/COMMANDER OF
THE ARMY
To: In the name of the
President/Supreme
Commander/Great Leader of the
Revolution
1. Take all measures deemed
necessary to guarantee security
and calm as well as the stability
of the progress of the Revolution,
as well as to guarantee the
personal safety and authority of
the leadership of the
President/Supreme
Commander/Great Leader of the
Revolution/holder of the Mandate
of the [Provisional People's
Consultative Assembly] for the
sake of the integrity of the Nation
and State of the Republic of
Indonesia, and to resolutely
implement all the teachings of the
Great Leader of the Revolution.
2. Coordinate the execution of
orders with the commanders of
the other forces to the best of his
ability.
3. Report all actions related to
duties and responsibilities as
stated above.

IV. Ends

Jakarta, 11 March 1966

PRESIDENT/SUPREME
COMMANDER/GREAT LEADER
OF THE REVOLUTION/HOLDER
OF THE MANDATE OF THE
[PROVISIONAL PEOPLE'S
 CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY]

[signed]

SUKARNO

Controversy
The circumstances
surrounding the signing of the
Supersemar

Indonesians usually end documents with

the place and date of signing of the
document. Given that the Supersemar was
supposedly signed in Bogor, it is odd that
the Supersemar is signed "Djakarta". In his
account of the events of March 1966,
Hanafi, a close friend of Sukarno and
ambassador to Cuba says that he went to
Bogor on 12 March and met with Sukarno.
He says that Sukarno told him Suharto had
sent three generals with a document they
had already prepared for him to sign. He
says that Sukarno felt he had to sign it
because he was in a tight spot, but that the
generals had promised to defend Sukarno
and that the order would not be misused.[6]
However, Martoidjojo, the commander of
the presidential bodyguard, who went with
Sukarno in the helicopter to Bogor, says
that the Supersemar was typed in Bogor
by Sukarno's adjutant and military
secretary, Brig. Gen. Mochammed Sabur.[7]
Djamaluddin corroborates this.[8]

The wording of the Supersemar itself

could be read as a threat, namely the
section reading "to guarantee the personal
safety and authority of the leadership" of
Sukarno. However, in 1998, accusations
appeared[9] of an even more direct threat,
namely that two members of the
presidential guard had seen Gen. M. Jusuf
and Gen M. Panggabean, second assistant
to the Army minister, pointing their pistols
at Sukarno. M. Jusuf and others have
denied this, and that Panggabean was
even present. They called into doubt the
credibility of key parts of the accusations,
and said it was impossible for the two
men to be so close to the president at the
time.

The disappearance of the

original

One of difficulties in historical research

regarding the Supersemar is that the
original document can no longer be found.
When then-Vice President Megawati
Sukarnoputri ordered the Indonesian
National Archives to find it, they reported
they only had two copies, one issued by
the Army's Information Centre and another
by the State Secretary, and that there were
significant differences between them.[10]

The existence of multiple

versions

Signatures of Sukarno on the four versions

One of the publications to appear since the
fall of Suharto alleges that there were
several versions of the Supersemar.[9] Even
before the fall of Suharto, an official
publication commemorating 30 years of
Indonesian independence reproduced one
version of Supersemar, while an officially
sanctioned high school history textbook
featured a different version.[5][11]

There are a number of differences

between the various versions of the
Supersemar:

In two versions, there is a missing plural

marker after the word "force" (Angkatan)
 in section III, paragraph 2
In the same two versions, there is an
extra definite article marker after the
word "responsibilities" (tanggung-
djawab") in section III paragraph 3
One version runs to two pages, whereas
the other versions are all on the one
page.
Sukarno's signature in one version lacks
the dot-and-horizontal-line after the
word "Soekarno".
There are also minor differences in the
proximity and shapes of the letters.[12]

The Order of 13 March

According to Hanafi, in his discussions
with Sukarno at the Bogor Palace on 12
March, Sukarno was angry that the
Supersemar had been used to ban the PKI,
as it was the prerogative of the president
to ban political parties. He said he had
asked Third Deputy Prime Minister
Johannes Leimena to take a written order
to Suharto, and that he would wait to see
what Suharto's reaction was – whether he
would obey it or not. He asked Hanafi to
help Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul
Saleh and First Deputy Prime Minister
Subandrio The two men showed Hanafi
the "Order of 13 March", which stated that
the Order of 11 March was technical and
administrative in nature, not political,
warned General Suharto that he was not to
take any actions outside the scope of the
order and asked Suharto to report to the
president at the palace. Saleh planned to
make copies of the order and distribute
them to loyal members of the palace
guard and to Sukarno's young followers.
Hanafi says 5,000 copies were made, and
that he took a few back to Jakarta with
him, but he does not know what happened
to the others.[6]

In the official biography of Suharto, it is

also said that Sukarno questioned
Suharto's use of the Supersemar and sent
Leimena to ask Suharto to take
responsibility for his actions.[13] Saelan,
deputy commander of the presidential
guard says Suharto ignored the order,[14]
and Hanafi says that Suharto sent a
message back via Leimena, who returned
to Bogor later that evening, saying he
would take responsibility for his actions,
and that he was unable to come to Bogor
as he was due to attend a meeting of all
the military commanders at 11 am the
following day, to which he invited Sukarno.
Incidentally, Hanafi is ambiguous as to the
dates in his account, as he says he was in
Bogor on 12 March, but the "correction" to
the Supersemar was known as the Order
of 13 March.[6]

Notes
1. Ricklefs (1982) p269
2. Ricklefs (1982) pp274-275
3. Schwarz (1999) p25
4. Crouch (2007) pp187-192
5. Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia
(1985)
6. Hanafi (1999)
7. Martoidjojo (1999)
8. Djamaluddin (1998)
9. Center of Information Analysis (1999)
10. Fic, Victor M. (2005). Anatomy of the
Jakarta Coup, October 1, 1965: The
Collusion with China which Destroyed the
Army Command, President Sukarno and the
Communist Party of Indonesia . Yayasan
Obor Indonesia. p. 34.
ISBN 9789794615546. Retrieved 9 March
2018.
11. Chaniago et al. (1997)
12. Pambudi (2006)
13. Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin (1991)
14. Saelan (2001)

References
Bachtiar, Harsja W. (1988), Siapa Dia?:
Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasional
Indonesia Angkatan Darat (Who is He?:
Senior Officers of the Indonesian Army),
Penerbit Djambatan, Jakarta, ISBN 979-
428-100-X
Center of Information Analysis (CIA
[sic]) (1999), Kontoversi Supersemar
(The Supersemar Controversy),
Yogyakarta, ISBN 979-9222-10-9
Chaniago, Asmid Kamal & Yusmar Basri,
IPS Sejarah untuk kelas 1–3 SLTP:
dikembangkan dan disesuaikan dengan
kurikulum SLTP/GBPP 1994 (History for
Junior High School Third Grade, in
accordance with the 1994 Junior High
School Curriculum), Yudhistira,
ISBN 979-453-588-5
Crouch, Harold (2007), The Army and
Politics in Indonesia, Equinox Publishing,
Singapore, ISBN 979-3780-50-9
Djamaluddin, Dasman, (1998), General
TNI Anumaerta Basoeki Rachmat dan
Supersemar (The late General Basoeki
Rahmat and the Supersemar, Grasindo,
Jakarta, ISBN 979-669-189-2
Dwipayana, G and Sjamsuddin, Nazaruin
(eds) (1991), Jejak Langkah Pak Harto: 1
Oktober 1965 – 27 Maret 1968 (Actions
of Pak Harto: 1 October 1965 – 27 March
1968), PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada,
Jakarta, ISBN 979-8085-02-7
Hanafi A.M. (1999), Menggugat Kudeta:
Jend. Soeharto dari Gestapu ke
Supersemar (Accusation of a Coup
d'Etat: Gen. Soeharto from the [30
September Movement] to the
Supersemar), Yayasan API, Jakarta
Martowidjojo, H.Mangil (1999),
Kasaksian Tentang Bung Karno 1945–
1967 (Testimony Regarding Bung karno
1945–1967), Grasindo, Jakarta,
ISBN 979-669-519-7
Pambudi, A. (2006), Supersemar Palsu:
Kesaksian Tiga Jenderal (The Fake
Supersemar: Testimony of the Three
Generals, Media Pressindo, Jakarta
ISBN 979-22-2137-9
Ricklefs (1982), A History of Modern
Indonesia, Macmillan Southeast Asian
reprint, ISBN 0-333-24380-3
Saelan, H.Maulwi (2001), Dari Revolusi
'45 Sampai Kudeta '66 (From the
Revolution of '45 to the Coup d'Etat of
'65), Yayasan Hak Bangsa, Jakarta,
ISBN 979-96535-0-9
Shwarz, Adam (1999), A Nation in
Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability,
Allen & Unwin, ISBN 1-86508-179-5
 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia
(1985) 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka (30
Years of Indonesian Independence)
1965–1973, 6th reprint

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