1.Luspo v.
People ●Braga, Chief Logistics Officer and Flores, Supply Accountable
G.R No. 188487, February 14 2011
Topic: Powers and duties of public officers
Petitioner: Van D. Luspo (Chief of Fiscal Services, Budget division)
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Doctrine:
There are two ways for a public official to violate this provision in the
performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to
any party, including the government; or (b) by giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference.
Elements:
1.The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial, or official functions;
2.He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3.His action caused undue injury to any party, including the government,
or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference
in the discharge of his functions.
Facts:
●The PNP General HQ conducted an investigation of several
officers of the PNP and a private individual
●It was found that there were to Advices of Sub-Allotment(ASA)
worth P5m each totalling P10m for the purchase of Combat, clothing and
individual equipment (CCIE) without approval.
●ASAs were issued without an approved personnel program
from the Directorate for Personnel
●100 checks were written worth P100k each, payable to DI-BEN
Trading, MT Enterprises J-Mos Enterprises and Triple 888 all owned by
one Margarita Tugaoen
●Tugaoen later admitted non-delivery of the equipment
purchase for the amount of P10M since the payment was allegedly for a
previous amount owed by PNP.
Officer stated that the CCIE they received in 1992 was from PNP Logistics
Command not from Tugaoen and was only worth P5.9m
●A recommendation for a complaint for Malversation was filed
against the officers and the Ombudsman-AFP included Luspo since he
was co-signatory to the 100 checks.
●The Ombudsman ruled that there was a conspiracy to execute
this “ghost purchase” of the CCIE and recommended filing criminal
information for Malversation for 100 counts of malversation under 217 of
the RPC.
●Office of the Special Prosecutor agreed with the OMB-AFP with
modification that they be charged under Sec. 3 of RA 3019 of the Anti
Graft and corrupt practices act.
●Director Sistoza was cleared of the charges.
●7 witnesses were presented and sought to establish that Luspo
and the others acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality when
they failed to have the ASA approved. As well as violation of General HQ-
AFP Circular 8 when they failed to make any budget proposals for the
purchase of the equipment.
●OSP found that the documents for the purchase did not even
reach the office of Madridejo the Chief Accountant.
●The accused filed a demurrer to evidence, since they were not
assisted by counsel when the 100 checks and the documents were
elicited from them. - Denied
●Sandiganbayan Ruling: The anti-graft court found sufficient
evidence inculpating Luspo, Duran, Montano, and Tugaoen for conspiring
and confederating with one another to deprive the government/PNP of
P10 million
●Luspo had signed the ASA without the authority from the
Directorate for Comptrollership nor from the Chief of PNP. His issuance
and signing thereof were allegedly made without a prior program request
from the Office of the Directorate for Personnel as mandated by the
logistic requirements of the PNP. Thus he was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue/s:
1.WON enough evidence was presented to prove that
Luspo violated Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
Ruling: Luspo is acquitted

No, since Director General Nazareno delegated the task of

affixing his signature in ASAs to Domondon who later sub-delegated
it to Luspo. Being a ministerial duty, it could be delegated, and sub-
delegated.

Luspo had acted within the authority given to him as it

stemmed from Nazareno himself.

There is likewise no proof that Luspo acted with palpable

bias or favor towards Tugaoen. The prosecution failed to show that it
was Luspo's duty to search for, negotiate and contract with suppliers.
The only deduction from the prosecution's evidence is that, being
then the Chief of the Fiscal Services and Budget Division of the Office
of the Directorate for Comptrollership, it was Luspo's duty to distribute
the funds allocated to the PNP by the DBM by the issuance of an
ASA in favor of the force's regional commands.

The prosecution cannot link Luspo as a conspirator to

defraud the PNP/government on the strength merely of his signature,
nor can a valid assumption be made that he connived with Duran and
Montano, who subsequently disbursed the ASAs.

2. Jacinto vs. CA
G.R. No. 124540. November 14, 1997
Petitioner: MERLINDA JACINTO, ADELINA AGUSTIN, SUSAN AGUSTIN,
EVELYN ATIENZA, NIDA BALANE, ANICIA CARLOS, CELEDONIA
CARLOS, LIWANAG CASTILLO, JOSEFINA DE GUZMAN, MINERVA
GARCIA, MARIA GATDULA, ALICIA GUNDA, AURORA LOPEZ,
CARMENCITA MANANSALA, ERLINDA MARTINEZ, LOLITA NAVARRETE,
GUADALUPE PANERGO, MARIA PULGA, PAZ SERRA and VIRGINIA
ZAMORA
Respondents: HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION; and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS
Topic:
Doctrine: Civil service employees have the right to organize and to peaceful
assembly. However, their right to strike may be limited or prohibited by law.
Facts:
1.Petitioners are all public school teachers from Metro Manila.
2.From Sept. 17-21 1990, they had unauthorized absences for a “mass action”
for the government to give in to their demands
a.DECS (Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) now
known as the Department of Education (DepEd)) secretary, Isidro Cario,
issued a return to work order, that under the Civil Service Law, strikes and
unauthorized mass leaves that disrupt public services are prohibited.
i.And that they must return within 24 hours otherwise dismissal
proceedings shall be instituted.
ii.Petitioners ignored said order, so they were administratively charged with
gross misconduct, gross neglect of duty, unjustified abandonment of post etc.
b.They were found guilty, and dismissed. (Jacinto and Agustin were only
given 6 months suspension)
c.Petitioners argue that they did not strike, rather, it was a mere exercise
of their right to peaceably assemble
d.The decisions were appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
which dismissed the appeals for lack of merit and then to the Civil Service
Commission which set aside the Orders of the MSPB in the contested
resolutions.
e.CA also found the petitioners guilty.
Issues:
a.WON petitioners are guilty of gross misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
unjustified abandonment of post etc. YES
b.WON petitioner have a right to peaceful assembly. YES but their right
to strike may be limited or prohibited by law.
c.WON petitioners are entitled to backwages. NO.
Held:
a.The Constitution grants the right to peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances, they may also form associations
for purposes not contrary to law, and to engage in peaceful concerted
activities. (Bill of Rights)
b.it is recognized, however, that in connection with the grievances, there
may be some sort of disorder. But, utmost discretion must be
exercised in determining between disorderly and seditious conduct.
c.Supremacy of freedoms of speech and assembly over comfort and
convenience; but said freedoms are not absolute
i.Oppression of said freedoms must be based on reasonable ground
to fear that serious evil will result- clear and present danger test
ii.Civil servants’ rights to organize are recognized, the limitations, however, are
based on considerations of national security and preservation of democratic
institutions.
iii.As to the right to strike, the Constitution provides that it must be “in
accordance with law”
iv.Thus, this may be limited by the State
v.E.O. 180- provides guidelines for the right of government workers
to organize, and enjoins them from staging strikes, mass leaves,
demonstrations, walkouts and other mass action that will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service
vi.Strike- any temporary stoppage of work by concerted action or employees
as a result of an industrial and labor dispute.
d.The action of the teachers resulted to the non-holding of classes in
several public schools
e.Their action was for redress of the public authorities to implement the
release of P680M worth of fringe benefits, clothing allowance,
increase of minimum wage, removal of the US bases, repudiation of
foreign debt
f.THUS, they are guilty of the charge.
g.Note: Jacinto tried to escape liability by claiming she went to class on Sept.
19, but failed to sign the logbook. But the CSC and CA found this to be
doubtful.
h.She also had different statements because she previously claimed that
the absence was because of her depression.
i.Not entitled to back wages because they are not illegally dismissed.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that Petitioner Merlinda Jacinto is granted
backwages, without deduction or qualification, from the time she was
suspended until her actual reinstatement, the total of which, consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence,65 should not exceed five years.

3. GSIS v. GARCIA
G.R No. 170132
Topic: Right of Public Officers
Petitioners: GSIS and Winston Garcia (GSIS President & General Manager)
Respondents: Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG)
Ponente: Garcia
Doctrine: Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations,
without including the right to strike.
FACTS:
●October 4-7, 2004: A four day concerted demonstration, rallies and en
masse walkout waged was held in front of the GSIS main office in Roxas
Boulevard Pasay City. The mass participants were GSIS personnel,
among them members of the KMG, a public sector union of GSIS rank
and file employees. Contingents from other government agencies joined
causes with the GSIS group. The mass action's target appeared to have
been against Garcia and his management style. The Mayor of Pasay City
allegedly issued a rally permit but the absence of the participating GSIS
employees was not covered by a prior approved leave.
●Oct. 10, 2004: the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a
memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause
why they should not be charged administratively for their participation. In
reaction, Atty. Molina (KMG counsel) sought reconsideration of the
directive on the ground that the employees resumed work on Oct. 8, 2004
in obedience to the return-to-work order. This was denied by the filing on
Oct. 25, 2004, of administrative charges against 110 KMG members for
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
●KMG’s President Albert Velasco commenced the suit with the filing of
the Petition for Prohibition at bench on the ground that its members should
not be made to explain why they supported their union’s cause. KMG
faulted Garcia with blatant disregard of Civil Service Resolution No.
021316 (Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action) Section 10 of which
exhorts government agencies to "harness all means within their capacity
to accord due regard and attention to employees' grievances and facilitate
their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance
machinery or any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and
existing civil service rules."
● Two supplements to this petition were filed by KMG.
●1st: it apprised the CA of the supposed fact that its speaker,
Atty. Molina had been placed under preventive suspension for
90 days and that the formal charges will deprive its members the
privileges and benefits due them and will also disqualify them
from promotion, step increment adjustment and receipt of
monetary benefits including their 13th month pay and Christmas
bonuses.
●2nd: Garcia served a spate of additional formal charges against
230 of KMG’s members for their participation.
●Garcia averred that the case was filed by an unauthorized representative
because Velasco had already been dropped from the GSIS rolls and had
ceased to be a member and President of KMG. Garcia also invoked forum
shopping because the subject petition merely duplicated those already in
the petitions for certiorari and prohibition earlier filed by Velasco.
●Pending the resolution of the CA, GSIS management proceeded with the
investigation of the administrative cases. 207 out of 278 cases had been
resolved resulting in the exoneration of 20 respondent employees, the
reprimand of 182 and suspension for one month of five.
●Ruling of the CA: (in favor of Garcia)
o Garcia's "filing of administrative charges against 361 of
[KMG's] members is tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ
of prohibition."
o It also held that the organized demonstrating employees
did nothing more than air their grievances in the
exercise of their "broader rights of free expression" and
are, therefore, not amenable to administrative
sanctions.
o It equated the right to form associations with the right to
engage in strike and similar activities available to
workers in the private sector. It concluded that GSIS
employees are not barred from forming, joining or
 assisting employees’ organization, Garcia could not
validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging
or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding
the service disruptive effect.
●Hence the petition. The arguments of the parties are:
Petitioners:
o The filing of the formal charges are a natural
consequence of the service-disrupting rallies and
demonstrations staged during office hours by the
absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate
issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action.
Respondents:
o A strike presupposes a mass action undertaken to press
for some economic demands or secure additional
material employment benefits.
ISSUES:
1. WON GSIS and Garcia should be enjoined from implementing
the formal administrative charges made against members of a
KMG for staging a demonstration without prior approved leave?
NO
2. WON the mass action partook of a prohibited concerted mass
action? YES (sub-issue)
RULING:
The SC granted the petition. They disagreed with the CA’s ruling.
●Civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the
Government including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters like the GSIS, or those created by special law.
Employees of covered GOCCs are part of the civil service system and are
subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general
terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters involving self-
organization, strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions. Among
these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987,
providing guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316 which provides
rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector. The
appellate court's position is contrary to what Section 4 in relation to
Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 021316 provides.
●The Court cited cases were in it ruled the policies established on public
sector unionism and rules issued on mass action:
o Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment: a case decided under the 1973
Constitution, an en banc Court declared that it would be
unfair to allow employees of government corporations
to resort to concerted activity with the ever present
threat of a strike to wring benefits from Government.
Then came the 1987 Constitution expressly
guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
personnel to self-organization to complement the
provision according workers the right to engage in
"peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law."
o Bangalisan v. CA: employees in public service may not
engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of work; that the right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of
unions or associations, without including the right to
strike.
o Jacinto v. CA: this case explained that there are
standards for allowable limitations such as the
legitimacy of the purpose of the association and the
overriding considerations of national security.
o Gesite v. CA: the Court defined the limits of the right of
government employees to organize which is limited to
the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike. It added that public
employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences
to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
●The SC in this case held that the KMG’s members participated on a
prohibited concerted activity.
●For four straight days, they staged a walk out and waged a
mass protest demonstration at the GSIS main building.
●The record of attendance for the period shows that on the first
day, 851 employees or 48% of the total number of employees in
 the main office took to the street during office hours from 6AM- ●The principle of accountability demands that every erring government
2PM, leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an employee be made answerable for any malfeasance or misfeasance
office where a host of transactions take place every business committed. And lest it be overlooked, the mere filing of formal
day. administrative case, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged, does
●On the second day, 707 employees left their stations while 538 not overcome the presumptive innocence of the persons complained of
employees participated in the mass demonstrations on the third nor does it shift the burden of evidence to prove the guilt of an
day. administrative offense from the complainant.
● The SC held that to say that there was no work disruption or that the ●Also, the filing of charges against a large number of persons and/or the
delivery of services remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS likelihood that they will be suspended or dismissed from service for the
main office during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale offense do not indicate a strong case of grave abuse of authority to justify
absences would be to understate things. And to place the erring the CA’s issue of prohibition.
employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be to ●While the CA faulted Garcia for not first tapping existing grievance
trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of machinery and other modes of settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG
professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Collective Negotiations Agreement, the fault actually lies on KMG for non-
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. exhaustion of less confrontational remedies when it spearheaded a
●The Court disagrees with the claim of respondents. The stubborn fact concerted mass action without resorting to available settlement
remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling mechanism.
activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach provoking
work stoppage and service delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be
forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.
●The Court also ruled that the protest rally and gathering in question did
not involve some specific material demand. But then the absence of such
economic-related demand, even if true, did not, under the premises, make
such mass action less of a prohibited concerted activity. For any collective
activity undertaken by government employees with the intent of effecting
work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or
force concessions, economic or otherwise, is a prohibited mass action
and doubtless actionable administratively. Bangalisan even went further
to say the following: "[i]n the absence of statute, public employees do not
have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose."
●Therefore, Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS rests the
authority and responsibility under Sec. 45 of RA 8291, the GSIS Act of
1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for
cause. At bottom then, Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of
administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October
4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and
enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when
he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally
correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction.

4. Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
A.C. No. 7399
August 25, 2009
Topic: Rights of public officers
Complainant: Antero J. Pobre
Respondent: Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
Doctrine: No member [of the Congress] shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Facts:
●Based on Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the
Senate floor, Antero Pobre filed a complaint of disbarment or other
disciplinary actions against the aforesaid Senator. (Context: After sending
out public invitations for nomination, JBC announced that only incumbent
SC justices were qualified for the vacant Chief Justice post. Sen. Santiago
was an applicant.]
●To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part
of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the
other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
●Senator Santiago did not deny the statements but claimed that those
statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her
duty as a member of Congress or its committee.
●The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: “xxxx No member shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.”
Issue/s: Whether or not Senator Santiago’s speech do not constitute as
privileged speech and could thus lead to disbarment.
Held/Ratio: No. Complaint dismissed.
The privilege speech of Sen. Santiago is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceedings under the ROC.
●Without parliamentary immunity, parliament or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial.
● Moreover, Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the
manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity.
However, as a member of the Bar, Sen. Santiago has undoubtedly crossed
the limits of decency and good professional conduct.
●No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts
should be allowed to erode the people's faith in the judiciary. In this case,
the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
●Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any
other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and
to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are
keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.
●Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege.
●SC ruled that it is imperative on their part to re-instill in Senator/Atty.
Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and
remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted
to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for
their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.
●The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on
Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act
of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The
 factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court
from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
5. Cotiangco v. Province of Biliran
G.R. No. 157139
October 19, 2011
Topic: Rights of public officers
Petitioner: CARLOS COTIANGCO, LUCIO SALAS, EDITHA SALONOY, MA.
FILIPINA CALDERON, ROSALINDA ABILAR, MEDARDA LARIBA, TITO
GUTIERREZ, BENJAMIN LUCIANO, MYRNA FILAMOR AND MONIANA
NAJARRO
Respondent: THE PROVINCE OF BILIRAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine: The "next in rank rule" specifically applies only to promotions
and not to positions created in the course of a valid reorganization. Apart
from the fact that the "next in rank" rule only gives preference to the
person occupying the position next in rank to a vacancy, it does not by
any means give him exclusive right to be appointed to the said vacancy.
Indeed, the appointing authority is vested with sufficient discretion to
appoint a candidate, as long as the latter possesses the minimum
qualifications under the law.
Facts:
●Petitioners held permanent appointments as public health workers in the
Province of Biliran.
●The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) passed an SP Resolution approving
the revised structure and staffing pattern of the provincial government.
●Pursuant to said Resolution, EO 98-07 was issued, declaring all positions in
the provincial gov’t as abolished except those of the Provincial Treasurer
and all elective positions.
●EO 98-08 revoked EO 98-07. It declared all positions in the new staffing
pattern vacant, and directing all permanent employees to submit their
applications.
●Petitioners filed a suit for Prohibition questioning the validity of EO 98-08.
●Meanwhile, pursuant to the EO, a Personnel Placement Committee was
created to screen and evaluate all applicants for vacant positions.
●Petitioners failed/refused to apply for any position, claiming that to do so
would be inconsistent with their pending suit for prohibition.
●At any rate, petitioners argue that under a CSC Resolution, there
should be a screening of the qualifications of all existing
employees, and not merely of those who filed their respective
applications under the new staffing pattern.
●As a result of the reorganization, the positions occupied by petitioners were
excluded or abolished. Petitioners received their notices of
termination/non-reappointment.
●The Governor and the CSC denied their appeals.
●CA affirmed the CSC resolution with modification.
Issue/s:
a.Whether or not the reorganization was done in bad faith.
b.Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when they were
not screened and evaluated for possible appointment to new positions.
Held/Ratio: Petition is denied. Respondent won.
1. No. Petitioners failed to show that the reorganization was done in bad faith.
They have not adduced sufficient evidence to establish the existence of bad
faith.
●Section 8 of the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers (R.A. 7305)
provides that " (i)n case of regular employment of public health workers,
their services shall not be terminated except for cause provided by law
and after due process."
●Nevertheless, a government officer/employee’s removal from
office as a result of a bona fide reorganization is a valid cause
for the employee’s removal
●Good faith is presumed. The party who alleges bad faith has the burden
of proving the allegation.
●Section 2 of R.A. 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil
Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization) cites instances that may be considered as evidence of
bad faith in the removal from office of a government officer or employee
pursuant to a reorganization Petitioners failed to adduce evidence to show
bad faith. (See notes)
 ●Petitioners failed to adduce evidence to show bad faith on the part of the removal exists when, pursuant to a bona 􏰒fide reorganization, a position has
province in effecting the reorganization. Reasons - been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or
●Number of positions were reduced (from 120 to 98) consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other
●4 new positions were created lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some
●No reclassification of offices in the dept which substantially of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in
perform the same function as the original offices the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
●Petitioners have not adduced evidence that they were replaced reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
by those less qualified in terms of states, performance, and merit i.Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the
● Furthermore, petitioners erroneously insist on the “next in rank rule.” The new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
"next in rank rule" specifically applies only to promotions and not to ii.Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the
positions created in the course of a valid reorganization. Apart from the same functions is created;
fact that the "next in rank" rule only gives preference to the person iii.Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of
occupying the position next in rank to a vacancy, it does not by any means status of appointment, performance and merit;
give him exclusive right to be appointed to the said vacancy. Indeed, the iv.Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
appointing authority is vested with sufficient discretion to appoint a concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same
candidate, as long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications function as the original offices;
under the law. v.Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section
3 hereof.
2. Petitioners were not considered for the new positions because they had not
filed their applications notwithstanding the invitation for them to do so
●RA 6656 provides that all officers and employees of the agency being
reorganized shall be invited to apply for any of the positions in the new
staffing pattern, and that the said application shall be considered by the
Placement Committee in the placement and selection of personnel
●Clearly, the law mandates that only those who have filed the requisite
application for the subject position may be considered by the committee
for possible appointment
●It is the submission of the application form that signals an employee’s
interest in a position
●Without filing the application form, there would be no bases for
evaluating the qualifications of the candidates for employment.
●The committee cannot spend its limited time and resources in
considering the qualifications of all previous employees of the agency
being reorganized, even if they have not signified their intention to
continue working in the said agency

Notes:
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed
except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for

6. Baculi v. Office of the President
G.R. No. 188681 & G.R. No. G.R. No. 201130
March 8, 2017
Topic: Law on Public Officers; Liabilities of PublicOfficers
Petitioners: Francisco T. Baculi || Secretary of Agrarian Reform & Regional
Director of Agrarian Reform Region 2
Respondents: Office of the President || Francisco T. Baculi
Ponente: Bersamin J.
DOCTRINE: The law abhors the indefinite preventive suspension of public
officials and employees, whether they are presidential appointees or not. For
presidential appointees, the suspension should last only within a reasonable
time. For non-presidential appointees, the maximum period of preventive
suspension is 90 days. Once the allowable period of preventive suspension
had been served, the public officials and employees must be automatically
reinstated
FACTS:
●July 16,1988: the petitioner was appointed as Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) II of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) –
Cagayan by Pres. Cory Aquino
●1991: Acting in his capacity as PARO II, he entered into several
contracts with various suppliers for the lease of typewriters, computers,
computer printers, and other accessories.
● It was revealed by separate reports from the DAR Committee on Audit
(DAR-COA) & the DAR Regional Investigating Committee of Cagayan
(DAR-RIC) that the such transactions were full of irregularities (i.e.)
● Baculi executed and approved contracts of lease w/o the
corresponding Certificate of Availability of Funds as provided in
Sec. 86 of P.D. 1445(Auditing code of the PH) and that;
●There was no public bidding held thus violating COA Circular
no. 85-55-A
●Sept 4, 1992: DAR Sec. Ernesto Garialo, finding prima facie case,
formally charged Baculi w/ gross dishonesty, abuse of authority, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
was he was placed under preventive suspension for 90 days
●Oct 25, 1992: Baculi prayed for the dismissal of the case alleging that he
acted purely for the benefit of the DAR provincial office. He likewise
alleges that the formal charged against him was null and void bec. it was
based on the report of the DAR-RIC w/c allegedly had no authority to
investigate administrative complaint against presidential appointees
●May 17, 1994: After investigation by the department’s legal office, the
Assistant Secretary of said legal office Hector D. Soliman, issued an order
dismissing Baculi from the service.
●Baculi appealed to the CSC but such appeal was dismissed for lack of
merit.
●Baculi filed a Pet. For Review with the SC w/c decided to set aside the
dismissal order against Baculi and ruled that Sec. Garilao has no
disciplinary jurisdiction over Pres. Appointees. The DAR Sec was
however given the prerogative to forward his finding to the OP for a more
a appropriate action
●Jan 9, 2001: with the SC decision, Baculi through a letter, requested
Sec. Horacio Morales to issue an order of reinstatement. He however,
was never formally reinstated
●On the other hand, inline with the SC’s decision, the succeeding DAR
Sec. Hernani A. Braganza forwarded his findings and recommendation of
dismissal to the OP. The OP through a memorandum, order Baculi’s
dismissal.
●[For G.R. 201130] Pet. Requested for a petition for Mandamus with the
CA to compel the DAR sec to pay his basic salaries, other emoluments
and benefits w legal interest covering the period of Aug 2, 1994 (1st
dismissal by the DAR Sec) to June 25, 2003 (just before the 2nd dismissal
by the OP) to w/c the CA granted the backwages.
ISSUE/S:
a.WON the 1st order of dismissal was valid =NO
b.WON the 2nd order of dismissal was valid= YES
c.WON the CA erred in granting the Mandamus petition= NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court: (1) DENIES the petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. No. 188681, and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated in CA-
G.R. SP No. 82629; and (2) DENIES the petition for review on certiorari in
G.R. No. 201130, and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No.
115934. No pronouncement on cost of suit. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
[1st Issue]
●Whether or not Baculi belonged to the category of o6cers and employees
under the DAR Secretary's disciplinary jurisdiction was a question to be
determined in conjunction with Section 38 (a) of Presidential Decree No.
807 (Civil Service Decree), as follows:
● Sec 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non
Presidential Appointees. (a) Administrative proceedings may be
commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the
head of department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs or agencies, regional directors, or upon
sworn, written complaint of any other persons
●The above has drawn a definite distinction between subordinate officers
or employees who were presidential appointees, on the one hand, and
subordinate officers or employees who were non-presidential appointees,
on the other. Thus, Baculi, as a presidential appointee, came under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the President in line with the principle that the
"power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.". As such, the DAR
Secretary held no disciplinary jurisdiction over him. Verily, P.D No. 807
has expressly specified the procedure for disciplinary actions involving
presidential appointees
[2nd Issue]
●Baculi challenges his 2nd dismissal on 2 grounds
● (1) That DAR-RIC lacked authority to investigate admin
complaints against presidential appointees thus rendering its
report null and void
●(2) That the order must’ve issued by the president who
should’ve personally exercised the power to remove and not by
the Acting Deputy Exec. Sec. for legal affairs
●In the absence of a law or administrative issuance barring the DAR-RIC
from conducting its own investigation of Baculi even when there was no
complaint being first filed against him, the eventual report rendered after
investigation was valid.
●Though the powers and functions of the Chief Executive have been
expressly reposed by the Constitution in one person, the President of the
Philippines, it would be unnatural to expect the President to personally
exercise and discharge all such powers and functions. Somehow, the
exercise and discharge of most of these powers and functions have been
delegated to others, particularly to the members of the Cabinet,
conformably to the doctrine of qualified political agency
●Thus, the dismissal of Baculi through the order of June 25, 2003, being
by authority of the President, was entitled to full faith and credit as an act
of the President herself
[3rd Issue]
●By law, Baculi should’ve been automatically reinstated at the end of the
90 day period of his preventive suspension because his case was not
finally decided w/in the said period.
●There are 2 kind of preventive suspension one is a PS pending
investigation while the other is a PS pending appeal where the penalty
imposed by the discipling authority is either suspension or dismissal but
after review the respondent is exonerated
●The nature of the 1st is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable
the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by
preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses
against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not
rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the
respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation,
respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should
be reinstated
●There shall be no indefinite suspensions pending investigation, w/n the
official is a presidential or non-presidential appointee. The law abhors
indefinite preventive suspension because the indefiniteness violates the
constitutional guarantees under the due process and equal protection
clauses, as well as the right of public officers and employees to security
of tenure.
● [ Garcia v. Exec. Sec.] To adopt the theory of respondents that
an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative
charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to
countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can,
in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due
hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and
the Civil Service law. This, it is believed, is not conducive to the
maintenance of a robust, effective and efficient civil service, the
integrity of which has, in this jurisdiction, received constitutional
guarantee, as it places in the hands of the Chief Executive a
 weapon that could be wielded to undermine the security of
tenure of public officers.
7. Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
G.R. No. 141309
June 19, 2007
Topic: Law on Public Officers; Liabilities of Public Officers
Petitioners: Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (former Commissioner on Internal
Revenue
Respondents: Fortune Tobacco Corporation
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
DOCTRINE: A public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where
said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where
the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
FACTS:
Background of the Case filed before the RTC:
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged
in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, RA 7654 was enacted. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette
brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands
subjected to an ad valorem tax of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, petitioner
issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to a 55% ad valorem
tax. RMC 37-93 in essentially subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion"
cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on
locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at
55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum
tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
On July 2, 1993, BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent a copy
of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco
received a copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was subsequently
denied. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency
amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and
demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.
On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the CTA, which
on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of
RMC 37-93.9 The CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and
unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax
assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has
fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
RTC:
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter
should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right
against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to
equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no
cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification
against forum shopping was signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the
rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding
that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the
merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further
held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by
respondent’s submission of the corporate secretary’s certificate authorizing its
counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping.
CA
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of
the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice
or bad faith. The appellate court ruled that Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers
while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant
case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint
for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the
certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the
corporate secretary’s certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the
same.
SC (Arguments of Petitioner)
Petitioner then filed with the SC contending that the suit is grounded on her
acts done in the performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is
Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. Under
this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code,
specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of
constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while
Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior
public officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does
not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for
failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification against
forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules and to
dismiss the complaint.
SC (Arguments of Respondent)
Respondent argues that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers’
"acts" from which civil liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which
deals specifically with the public officers’ violation of constitutional rights, is a
special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a
cause of action or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent
alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said
public officer should have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it concluded
that even granting that the complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should be denied
inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable.
ISSUE/S: (Focus on 1 & 2)
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office? YES
(2) May petitioner be held liable for damages? YES
(3) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of
the Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant
complaint states a cause of action? Article 32 of the CC
(4) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on
certification against forum shopping? NO
RULING: The petition was denied.
HELD:
First & Second Issue
The Court held that the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts
within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is
not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment
for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability
may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of
a superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability
may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by
willfulness or negligence. Thus –
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer shall not
be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties,
unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence.
xxxx
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No subordinate officer
or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith
in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful
or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals,
public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders or
instructions of his superior.
In addition, citing itself in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, that a public
officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another,
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his
acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.
Third Issue
Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on
the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the
performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers,
the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will
make them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in
particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is
general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without
specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the
official concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms
a particular specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages
against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties.
Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation
of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public
officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While
the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law,
Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a
public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful
acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38
of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from
errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific
provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek
damages for violation of constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action
based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same
will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore
correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Fourth Issue
The subsequent submission of the secretary’s certificate authorizing the
counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured the
defect of respondent’s complaint. Furthermore the Court held that the merits
of the instant case justify the liberal application of the rules.

8. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.
EDGARDO A. MABELIN
A.M. No. P-98-1275
March 26, 2003
Topic: Law on Public Officers; Liabilities of Public Officers- Arias Doctrine
Petitioners: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
Respondents: EDGARDO A. MABELIN
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
DOCTRINE: (There’s no Arias Doctrine mentioned in the case).
"Incompetence in the Performance of Duty" has been defined16 as the manifest
lack of adequate ability and fitness for the satisfactory performance of official
duties by reason of the officer’s vice or vicious habits. This has reference to
any physical, moral or intellectual quality the lack of which substantially
incapacitates one to perform the duties of an officer.
FACTS:
Edgardo A. Mabelin, Legal Researcher II of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 14, Ligao, Albay, was charged with Dishonesty and Incompetence in
the performance of duty by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
There was an information for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions
was filed against Zaldy Gazer y Lizano before RTC of Albay. The model of the
firearm “COVINA, Cal. 22, Serial no. F00797”
The firearm was submitted in evidence to the custody of respondent Mabelin
(Acting Clerk of Court of Branch 14 since 1989). In this case the accused was
acquitted due to the failure of prosecution to prove that the firearm was used
in the crime and found it to be inadmissible. As consequence the firearm was
ordered to be forfeited in the favor of government.
(FIVE YEARS after the decision) Judge Sanez (Executive Judge of RTC at
Ligao) sent a letter to the Branch Clerk of Branch 114 requesting a report
regarding the whereabouts of COVINA firearm. Because it was found out the
gun was neither in the custody of the court nor with the Firearms and
Explosives Unit (FEU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The letter was received by Atty. Jesus Orlando M. Quiñones, who was
appointed Branch 14 Clerk of Court in 1995. Since respondent was the Acting
Clerk of Court of Branch 14 at the time the criminal case was tried and decided,
Atty. Quiñones forwarded the letter to him.
Respondent’s Reply: presiding judge Romulo SG Villanueva who was the
acting presiding judge of Branch 14 verbally requested to respondent that the
custody of the firearm be transferred to the judge. Respondent agreed.
Judge Sanez brought the matter to Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by
letter and suggested an investigation. Consultant Justice Narciso T. Atienza
was directed to conduct the investigation.
●Whereabouts of the firearm
●Report of Mabelin (respondent) that the custody of the firearm was
transferred to Acting Presiding Judge Romulo Villanueva
It was found out from Judge Villanueva: (1) he bought the firearm from
Mabelin with the knowledge that Mabelin was the owner and a loose firearm;
(2) then Judge gave it to a friend who volunteered to register it; (3) it was used
to off set a debt from his friend (who volunteered registered it) but until that
time it wasn’t registered to the Judge Villanueva’s name; (4) he can’t locate his
friend when he was informed that the location of the COVINA firearm was
being investigated.
Justice Atienza’s recommendation in his Report after the investigation:
Mabelin charged administratively for Dishonesty and that Atty. Quiñones be
directed to file a criminal complaint for Malversation of Government Property
with the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon.
●February 6, 1992- promulgation of the Criminal Case of illegal
possession of firearm.
●March 13, 1992- Judge Villanueva was the acting presiding judge of RTC
branch 14. (Implies that the judge was not aware that the gun was a
subject of a previous criminal case)
●During the hearing Mabelin just bowed his head and stared at the floor
and did not deny nor rebut the statements of Judge Villanueva.
SC Resolution: case against Mabelin was treated as an Administrative
Complaint for "Dishonesty and Incompetence in the Performance of Duty" and
was docketed as ADM-98-1275, the subject of the present case.
OCA referred the criminal aspect of the case to the Ombudsman for the filing
of appropriate court proceeding against respondent. However, by the Order of
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. This was closed and terminated beause Atty.
Quiñones, who was directed to file a formal complaint under oath against
respondent, had ceased to be connected with the Ligao RTC (in 1999), hence,
"the absence of a vital witness to warrant further proceedings."
Respondent Argues: (1) While it is his duty to deliver the firearm, there was
no order issued by the trial court; (2) he transferred the custody of the firearm
to Judge Villanueva because he was ordered; (3) the claims of judge
Villanueva is false; (4) he was embarrassed to ask Judge Villanueva to
acknowledge in writing the turn over of the firearm to him.
SC promulgated a resolution to refer this case to CA. Raffled to
Associate Justice Eduardo P Cruz. → Respondent found guilty.
SC finds that Mabelin is not guilty of DISHONESTY but he is guilty of
INCOMPETENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY. Incompetence
amounts or is equivalent to "inefficiency" which is descriptive of respondent’s
actuations. For the Manual for Branch Clerks of Court explicitly mandates that
all exhibits used and turned over to the Court and before the case/s involving
such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under the custody and
safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.
●Mabelin was aware that he was required to turn over the firearm but
failed to keep it in his custody and transfer it to the proper authorities;
●The dispositive portion of the criminal case, quoted earlier, clearly stated
that the firearm and the rounds of ammunition were "ordered forfeited in
favor of the government, the same to be disposed of in accordance with
existing laws."

ISSUE: WON Mabelin is guilty of dishonesty? NO. But he’s guilty of ●He should have timely made a written memorandum that he was ordered
Incompetence in the Performance of Duty. by the judge to turn over the firearm to Judge Villanueva;

RATIO: ●Annotation of the transfer of possession was without date and signature
hence there’s no proof that it existed before the inquiry for the firearm
Judge Villanueva claimed when he was being offered with the firearm he started.
brought it home and kept it without scrutinizing to remember the model, brand,
caliber/serial number. His friend Robert Chu test fired the firearm. The Judge RULING: WHEREFORE, Edgardo A. Mabelin is found guilty of
then paid Mabelin P4500 in 3 installments without any written memorandum INCOMPETENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY and is accordingly
covering the transaction. The actions of Judge Villanueva were questionable hereby SUSPENDED from the service for Six (6) Months without pay.
who had been a public prosecutor for 10 years before: (1) he was unfamiliar
with the firearm he bought; (2) he didn’t call respondent that he was carrying
an unlicensed firearm in public in his pocket; (3) he bought the firearm to just
off set it for his debt.

The respondent’s testimony was corroborated by Froilan R. Riñon (Branch 12

utility worker) he was the utility worker of Judge Villanueva.

●He was asked by the judge to get Mabelin with the firearm-exhibit in
People v. Gacer, the criminal case. When respondent was in the Judge’s
chambers Froilan was asked to get coffee which he did and hear the
Judge say "Maurag na klaseng badil ini Ed digdi na ngona ini sakuya, ako
na ang bahala kaini magturnover" (This is a nice kind of gun Ed, for the
meantime just leave it here with me, I’ll take care of this and make the
transfer/turnover of this gun to the proper authorities).
 and verify the deposit in the LBP in his name as treasurer-in-trust for
MTMSI.
9. BERNARDO v CA ●Jan. 20, 1986: The Articles of Incorporation (AOI) of MTMSI was
G.R No. 124261 registered with the SEC. Bernardo signed as one of its incorporators. It
May 27, 2004
also appears in the AOI that Bernardo was a member of the Board of
Directors. Bernardo executed an affidavit that he was elected treasurer of
Topic: Liabilities of Public Officers
MTMSI.
Petitioners: Armando Bernardo
●It turned out that while Bernardo was an elected treasurer of MTMSI, he
Respondents: CA, Civil Service Commission (CSC) and Land Bank of the
never opened an account with the LBP, Baliuag Branch, for the account
Philippines (LBP)
of the said corporation. In the meantime, Bernardo was promoted to the
Ponente: Callejo Sr.
position of Assistant Branch Manager.
●Sept. 18, 1989: the LBP filed a formal charge against Bernardo for gross
Doctrine: Causes which warrant the dismissal of a civil servant need not
neglect, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
necessarily be work-related or committed in the course of the performance of
bank and serious violation of CSC rules and regulations. That these acts
duty by the person charged.
are grounds for disciplinary action under Article IX, Section 36, P.D. No.
807, particularly par. (b), sub-pars. (3), (4), (24), and (27), and attended
The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object
with the aggravating circumstance of habituality.
sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement
●That from Jan 1 to 31, 1986, he engaged in pursuit of private
of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence
business by making himself as one of the incorporators, being a
in the government.
member of the Board and as a treasurer of MTMSI without the
permission and authority required by CSC rules and regulations.
FACTS:
●That with utter bad faith he attested and declared under oath in
●Bernardo entered the government service on Nov. 5, 195 as Claims
an official document “Treasurer’s Affidavit” that at least 25% of
Adjuster of LBP Balluag Branch, a government-owned and controlled
the authorized stock of MTMSI has been subscribed and at least
corporation. In 1986, he was the head of the Loans and Discount Division
25% of the corporation has been paid and received by Bernardo
of the bank. He also maintained a savings account with the said branch.
in the amount of not less than P5,000 in accordance with the
●Jan. 27, 1986: Bernardo deposited P500,000 in his savings account then
Corporation Code.
he photocopied that page in his bank passbook where the deposit of
●In another official document to support the declaration, he
P500,000 was reflected and on the same day, withdrew the said amount.
attested and declared that MTMSI has a deposit with LBP
He also executed in his capacity as treasurer-in-trust of the Markay
Baliuag Bulacan in Bernardo’s name in the sum of P500,000
Trading and Manpower Services (MTMSI), a Treasurer’s Affidavit, falsely
representing the alleged paid up capital, which is in the process
certifying that:
of incorporation when in truth, Bernardo knew fully well that such
●… at least 25% of the authorized capital stock of the corporation
statement is false, that there was no cash or property ever paid
has been subscribed and 25% of the total subscription has been
and received by Bernardo as treasurer nor any deposit of
paid and received by me in cash or property in the amount of
P500,000 with LBP Baliuag in his name as treasurer-in-trust for
₱500,000.00 in accordance with the Corporation Code.
MTMS.
●On the same day, Bernardo still in his capacity as treasurer-in-trust,
●During the formal investigation, evidence was presented that during the
executed a letter-authority to the SEC authorizing their office to examine
period of Nov. 13, 1986 to Aug. 24, 1987, checkbooks of MTMSI were
signed by Bernardo, as treasurer, and his wife. Bernardo adduced in
evidence the affidavits of Saturnino Dimatangal and Alicia Atienza,
incorporator and cashier of MTMSI, respectively, declaring that only
Maricar Butalid managed and operated the corporation after its
establishment and that Bernardo was never seen in the offices of the
corporation. Bernardo testified that he did not actually own any shares of
stocks in MTMSI, nor was he ever elected to any position of the
corporation. He declared that sometime during the last week of Jan. 1986,
he was approached and invited to be an incorporator of the MTMSI. He
stated that he was almost convinced, but rejected the invitation. He also
claimed that since he did not engage in business, he did not secure the
permission of the LBP.
●The hearing officer found Bernardo guilty on both counts. Firstlly,
engaging in business without securing the permission of LBP in violation
of Sec. 36 P.D 807 and secondly, for committing acts of falsification
amounting to grave misconduct. His 19 years of service was considered
a mitigating circumstance but Bernardo utilized the facilities of the Bank
and took advantage of his official position which are two separate
aggravating circumstances. Bernardo was meted out the penalty of forced
resignation.
●LBP approved the recommendation. The Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB) affirmed the LBP but modified it in that he was found guilty
of misrepresentation of a material fact amounting to dishonesty for
engaging directly in a private business without the permission required by
the CSC rules and regulations. It, likewise, affirmed the penalty of
dismissal from the service imposed by the LBP.
●The CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1834 affirming the penalty meted on
him by MSPB but it anchored its finding that Bernardo is guilty of grave
misconduct because he made use of being an employee of LBP to do an
irregular act. His being able to deposit and withdraw on the same date the
amount representing the supposed paid up capital of the MTMSI could
not have been effected if he was not connected with that Bank.
●CSC absolved Bernardo of the charge of dishonesty in connection with
his execution of the treasurer’s affidavit and the letter of authorization to
the SEC.
●The CA dismissed Bernardo’s petition.
●Bernardo’s arguments before the SC:
●He resigned from the MTMSI even before the corporation
started its business operations. He asserts that there is no
evidence on record that he actually engaged in business.
●No legal and factual basis for the decisions of MSPB and the
LBP as well as the penalty of dismissal.
●He was deprived of the right to be informed of the charge
against him and to adduce evidence in his defense.
ISSUES:
a.WON the CA erred in affirming the resolution of the CSC that he violated
Section 36(b)(24) of P.D. No. 807, implemented in Section 14, Rule XVIII
of the CSC Rules and Regulations
b.WON Bernardo was deprived of his right to due process when the CA
affirmed the resolution of the CSC finding him administratively guilty of
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service based on acts not covered by the formal charges lodged against
him.
RULING:
Petition is denied. The CA’s decision is affirmed.
●The SC does not agree with Bernardo’s first argument that there is no
evidence that he actually engaged in business. The evidence on record
shows that he was not only an incorporator, but was also a member of the
Board of Directors and was, in fact, the treasurer of MTMSI. Even after
the incorporation of the MTMSI, the petitioner remained as a stockholder
and a member of the Board of Directors. He was even elected treasurer
of the corporation. He and his wife signed numerous check vouchers of
the corporation during the period of November 16, 1986 to August 24,
1987. Bernardo also admitted that before he engaged in business, he
failed to secure the permission of LBP.
●The SC agrees with Bernardo’s second argument that the CSC erred in
finding Bernardo administratively liable for depositing ₱500,000 in his
name as treasurer-in-trust of MTMSI, and withdrawing the amount prior to
the incorporation in the absence of any resolution of its Board of Directors
authorizing him to do so, although not alleged in the formal charges.
Bernardo was deprived of his right to be informed of the charges against
him, and to accord him the right to adduce evidence to controvert the said
charges.
●But the SC agree with the CA that the CSC did not err in finding Bernardo
guilty of grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
based on the evidence.
●The SC rejects Bernardo’s claim that there was no legal and factual
basis for MSPB’s decision and the CSC’s resolution. LBP aduced the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove the second charge.
●Per certificate of the LBP, Baliuag, Bernardo had no deposit account as
treasurer-in-trust of MTMSI in the said bank. The petitioner deposited the
amount of ₱500,000 in his personal account, Savings Account No. 28-110
on January 27, 1986.This transaction was reflected in his passbook. A
cursory reading of the said page would lead one to conclude that Bernardo
had deposited the said amount, without disclosing, however, that he also
withdrew the said amount on the same day. Bernardo thus made a false
statement in his January 27, 1986 Letter to the SEC, when he stated that
as treasurer-in-trust of the MTMSI he had deposited ₱500,000 in his
account in the LBP, Baliuag, when the truth of the matter was, the money
was deposited in the petitioner’s personal savings account and was also
withdrawn on the same day.
●Bernardo himself admitted on cross-examination that he deposited the
said amount not in his capacity as the treasurer-in-trust of the corporation.
●The SC agrees with MSPB’s holding that Bernardo is guilty of
dishonesty.
●The statement of Bernardo in his own sworn affidavit certifying
that at least 25% of the authorized capital of the MTMSI has been
subscribed and at least 25% of the total subscription has been
paid and received by him, in cash or property, as the duly elected
treasurer of said corporation, is not true. There is no showing
that Bernardo ever paid and received such cash or property. His
letter addressed to the SEC, authorizing the latter to examine
and verify that the MTMSI has a deposit with the LBP, Baliuag
Branch, Baliuag, Bulacan, amounting to ₱500,000.00 in his
name as a Treasurer-in-Trust is contradictory to his statement
during the cross-examination conducted by Atty. Melissa M.
Samson (Prosecutor), that the money is not placed in his savings
account as treasurer-in-trust but in his savings account-personal
account.
●The LBP Baliuag Branch Cashier and Branch Manager clearly
certified that respondent Bernardo has a savings account with
the said Bank in his personal capacity but not as Treasurer-in-
Trust of MTMSI.
●The inconsistent statements of Bernardo destroys his credibility, putting
the same into serious doubt due to its weakness.
●The Board finds that this is a case of Misrepresentation amounting to
Dishonesty and not Falsification of Official Documents. To warrant
conviction for Falsification of Official Documents in the instant case,
Bernardo must have acted in his capacity as an employee or official of the
LBP and must have altered the genuine document or execute the false
document relevant to or in connection with the performance of his duty as
such.
●It is evident that Bernardo acted in his capacity as Treasurer of MTMSI,
hence, the Board finds him guilty of Misrepresentation amounting to
Dishonesty. In misrepresentation of a material fact, he made it appear that
his personal account in LBP belongs to the MTMSI placed in his name as
Treasurer-in-Trust, for purposes of issuance of certificate of incorporation,
by the SEC and by concealing the truth he committed dishonesty or deceit
and put the integrity of the Bank in jeopardy to the prejudice of the banking
operation and to the damage of the creditors, if any, of the corporation.
●By his conduct, Bernardo violated the yardstick of public service
imposed in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution which enunciates the
state policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. Being a public officer, Bernardo is
enjoined by no less than the highest law of the land and his employer, the
LBP, to uphold public interest over his personal interest at all times. This
Court has categorically pronounced that "the nature and responsibilities
of public officers enshrined in the 1987 Constitution and oft-repeated in
our case law are not mere rhetorical words, not to be taken as idealistic
sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should be
matched with actual deeds."
●The SC held that the causes which warrant the dismissal of a civil
servant need not necessarily be work-related or committed in the course
of the performance of duty by the person charged.
●Remalona v. CSC: (rationale) If a government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected
with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The
 Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official,
even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by
reason of his government position, he is given more and ample
opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men,
even against offices and entities of the government other than
the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he
enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which
renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and
dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to
counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an
employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty
inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to
continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.
●Bautista v. Negado: The principle is that when an officer or
employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment
of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public
service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence
in the government.
●The findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial
evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. It is settled that it is
not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within their
jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of
grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.None of these vices has
been shown in this case.
●Pabu-aya v. CA: Factual findings of administrative agencies are
generally held to be binding and final so long as it is supported
by substantial evidence. The SC is not a trier of facts. Its
jurisdiction is limited to review and revise errors of law imputed
to the lower court, its findings of facts are conclusive and not
reviewable by the SC.
10. GLORIA vs. CA
GR no. 131012
April 21, 1999
Topic: Law on Public Officers; Liabilities of Public Officers- Arias Doctrine
Petitioners: HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA
Respondents: AMPARO A. ABAD, VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A.
SOMEBANG and NICANOR MARGALLO
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
DOCTRINE: TWO kinds of Preventive Suspension: (1) preventive suspension
pending investigations; (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the
penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and,
after review, the respondent is exonerated.
We hold that employees who are preventively suspended pending
investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries if they are
exonerated, we do not agree with the government that they are not entitled to
compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually
they are found innocent. Private respondents were exonerated of all charges
against them for acts connected with the teachers' strikes of September and
October 1990. Although they were absent from work, it was not because of the
strike. For being absent without leave, they were held liable for violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations for which the penalty is a reprimand.
Respondents are therefore entitled to salaries from the time of their
dismissal/suspension until actual reinstatement.
FACTS:
There were strikes on September and October 1990, and respondents are
public school teachers who didn’t report for work during the strikes. As
consequence, they were administratively charged with: (1) grave
misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law
Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations. (4) refusal to
perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed
under preventive suspension. The investigation was resolved before the lapse
of 90-day suspension.
Results of the investigation: Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered
dismissed from the service effective October 29, 1990, while respondents
Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered
suspended for six months effective December 4, 1990.
Margallo appealed to Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB): ruled
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on
him a six-month suspension. Other respondents appealed but was dismissed
because their appeal memorandum was not filed on time.
Appeal to Civil Service Commission (CSC): (1) Affirmed with respect to
Margallo; (2) Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang guilty only of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations, by failing to file applications for a leave
of absence and ordered them reinstated to their former positions.
Respondents filed before SC petition for certiorari R65à referred to CA:
(1) affirmed CSC (Abad, Bandigas, Somebang); (2) reversed CSC
(suspension of Margallo); (3) Margallo is guilty of violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations and imposed on him the penalty of reprimand.
MR of Respondents: They contended that they should be exonerated of all
charges against them and that they be paid salaries during their suspension.
CA retained it’s resolution but added they are entitled to payment of salaries
during their suspension beyond 90 days.
Petitioner (Ricardo T. Gloria, Secretary of Education, Culture and sports)
filed MR: Denied.
Petitioner Argues: (1) The administrative investigation was concluded within
90 day period of preventive suspension; (2) the continues suspension of
respondents was due to their appeal; (3) respondents are still in preventive
suspension during the period of their appeal hence they should not be paid.
ISSUE: WON the teachers who did not participate in the strike but were
dismissed/suspended for failure to report for work and were ordered to be
reinstated have a right to their back salaries? YES, when respondents were
exonerated but were still suspended which was deemed illegal.
RATIO:
TWO kinds of Preventive Suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending
investigations; (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty
imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after
review, the respondent is exonerated.
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure
intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against
respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or any way influencing
witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not
rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent
will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found
innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.
Are respondents entitled to the payment of salaries during the period of
suspension? There’s no compensation due for the period of preventive
suspension pending investigation but only for the period of preventive
suspension pending appeal in the event the employee is exonerated.
●We hold that employees who are preventively suspended pending
investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries if they are
exonerated, we do not agree with the government that they are not entitled
to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if
eventually they are found innocent.
●To be entitled the employee must be found innocent and his suspension
is unjustified as such though the employee was placed under preventive
suspension for 90 days which the law authorizes, beyond the 90-day
period suspension is illegal. Hence, the employee is entitled to be
reinstated with full pay. The award should not exceed the equivalent of 5
years pay at the rate last received before the suspension was imposed.
●Private respondents were exonerated of all charges against them for
acts connected with the teachers' strikes of September and October 1990.
Although they were absent from work, it was not because of the strike.
For being absent without leave, they were held liable for violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations for which the penalty is a
reprimand.
●Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, the Court ordered that Petitioner
Mariano "be given back wages without deduction or qualification from the
time he was suspended until his actual reinstatement which, under
prevailing jurisprudence, should not exceed five years." The Court ruled:
"To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension would
be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges
which had caused his dismissal from the service."
Petitioner Secretary of Education contends, however, that respondent Abad,
Bandigas, and Somebang signed a letter in which they admitted having taken
part in the mass action. This question cannot be raised now. The Civil Service
Commission gave no weight to this letter in view of individual letters written by
three citing reasons for their absences, to wit: Abad, because he decided to
stay home to correct students' papers; Bandigas, because she had to
accompany her brother to the Commission on Immigration, and Somebang
because of "economic reasons." Petitioner did not appeal from this ruling.
Hence, he is bound by the factual findings of the CSC and the appellate court.

RULING: Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION

that the award of salaries to private respondents shall be computed from the
time of their dismissal/suspension by the Department of Education, Culture,
and Sports until their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five
years.

11. The Civil Service Commission v. Cruz
G.R. No. 187858
August 9, 2011
Topic: Law on Public Officers; Liabilities of Public Officers
Petitioners: The Civil Service Commission
Respondents: Richard G. Cruz
Ponente: Brion, J.
DOCTRINE: Before an employee may be entitled to back salaries he must first
meet two conditions; (1) the employee must be found innocent of the charges;
and (2) His suspension must be unjustified.
If the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete
exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of
the offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to
have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged,
the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the
imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. The employee found guilty
of a lesser offense may only be entitled to back salaries when the offense
actually committed does not carry the penalty of more than one month
suspension or dismissal.
FACTS:
The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (CMWD),
was charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General
Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes. He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and
damaging statement (Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at General Manager)
against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors (Board); four
of the respondent’s subordinates allegedly witnessed the utterance. The
dishonesty charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondent’s act of claiming
overtime pay despite his failure to log in and out in the computerized daily time
record for three working days.
The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave
misconduct, he stressed that three of the four witnesses already retracted their
statements against him. On the charge of dishonesty, he asserted that he
never failed to log in and log out. He reasoned that the lack of record was
caused by technical computer problems. The respondent submitted
documents showing that he rendered overtime work on the three days that the
CMWD questioned.
GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the
expiration of his preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the
approval of the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service.
CSC RULING
The respondent elevated the findings of the CMWD and his dismissal to the
CSC, which absolved him of the two charges and ordered his reinstatement.
In CSC Resolution No. 080305, the CSC found no factual basis to support the
charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The CSC ruled that the
respondent was not liable for grave misconduct and held that his utterance,
even if it were true, does not constitute a flagrant disregard of rule or was
actuated by corrupt motive. It was a mere expression of disgust over the
management style of the GM and the Board of Directors, especially when due
notice is taken of the fact that the latter officials were charged with the
Ombudsman for various anomalous transactions.
The CSC further found that the failure of Cruz to record his attendance on April
21 and 22, 2007 and May 5, 2007, while claiming overtime pay therefor, does
not amount to dishonesty. Cruz duly submitted evidence showing his actual
rendition of work on those days. The residents of the place where he worked
attested to his presence thereat on the days in question. The CSC did find
however, that the respondent is liable for violation of reasonable office rules
for his failure to log in and log out. It imposed on him the penalty of reprimand
but did not order the payment of back salaries.
The CMWD and the respondent both filed MRs against the CSC ruling. CMWD
questioned the CSC’s findings and the respondent’s reinstatement. The
respondent, for his part, claimed that he is entitled to back salaries in light of
his exoneration from the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The
CSC denied both motions.
CA RULING
Both the CMWD and respondent raised the case to the CA. The CA dismissed
the CMWD’s petition regarding respondents reinstatement and ruled in the
respondent’s favor on the issue of back salaries.
The CA applying, Bangalisan v. Hon. CA, awarded respondent his back
salaries from the time he was dismissed up to his actual reinstatement. The
CA reasoned out that CSC Resolution No. 080305 totally exonerated the
respondent from the charges laid against him. The CA considered the charge
of dishonesty successfully refuted as the respondent showed that he
performed overtime service. The CA thereby rejected the CSC’s contention
that the charge of dishonesty had been merely downgraded to a lesser
offense; the CA saw the finding in CSC Resolution No. 080305 to be for an
offense (failing to properly record his attendance) entirely different from the
dishonesty charge because their factual bases are different. Thus, to the CA,
CSC Resolution No. 080305 did not wholly restore the respondent’s rights as
an exonerated employee as it failed to order the payment of his back salaries.
The CA denied the CSC’s motion for reconsideration.
SC (Petitioners argument)
The CSC submits that the CA erred in applying the ruling in Bangalisan,
requiring as a condition for entitlement to back salaries that the government
employee be found innocent of the charge and that the suspension be
unjustified. CSC Resolution No. 080305 did not fully exculpate the respondent
but found him liable for a lesser offense. Likewise, the respondent’s preventive
suspension pending appeal was justified because he was not exonerated.
The CSC also contends that the CA misapplied the ruling Bangalisan Although
the employee in Bangalisan was found liable for violation of office rules and
regulations, he was considered totally exonerated because his infraction
stemmed from an act entirely different (his failure to file a leave of absence)
from the act that was the basis of the grave misconduct charge (the unjustified
abandonment of classes to the prejudice of the students).
The CSC argues that in the present case, the charge of dishonesty and the
infraction committed by the respondent stemmed from a single act – his failure
to properly record his attendance. Thus, the respondent cannot be considered
totally exonerated; the charge of dishonesty was merely downgraded to a
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.
SC (Respondents argument)
The respondent maintains that he is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries
because CSC Resolution No. 080305 exonerated him from the charges laid
against him; for the purpose of entitlement to back salaries, what should
control is his exoneration from the charges leveled against him by the CMWD.
That the respondent was found liable for a violation different from that originally
charged is immaterial for purposes of the back salary issue. The respondent
also asserts that the Bangalisan ruling squarely applies since the CSC formally
admitted in its Comment to CMWD’s petition for review before the CA that the
penalty of reprimand is not a reduced penalty for the penalty of dismissal
imposable for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
ISSUE/S:
Whether respondent is entitled to back salaries after the csc ordered his
reinstatement to his former position, given the csc ruling that he was guilty only
of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. YES
RULING: The Petition was dismissed and Respondent was found to be
entitled to back salaries.
HELD:
The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending
appeal, of a government employee who had been dismissed but was
subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction. The Court’s starting
point for this outcome is the "no work-no pay" principle – public officials are
only entitled to compensation if they render service. We have excepted from
this general principle and awarded back salaries even for unworked days to
illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the
constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law"; to deny these
employees their back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment after they
have been exonerated from the charge that led to their dismissal or
suspension.
The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987.
This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries
since it does not expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our
established rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the period
of preventive suspension as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its
legality is beyond question.
To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an
employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found
innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The
reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is
considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful
appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period;
hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be
compensated.
Applying those conditions in the present case the Court held that the CA was
correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during the period he was
suspended from work, following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his
former position. The records show that the charges of grave misconduct and
dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found, there was
no corrupt motive showing malice on the part of the respondent in making the
complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of dishonesty
was well refuted by the respondent’s evidence showing that he rendered
overtime work on the days in question.
The Court fully respects the factual findings of the CSC especially since the
CA affirmed these factual findings. However, on the legal issue of the
respondent’s entitlement to back salaries, we are fully in accord with the CA’s
conclusion that the two conditions to justify the award of back salaries exist in
the present case.
The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found
guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act
(failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming
overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged
with.
The second condition was met as the respondent’s committed offense merits
neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month),
but only reprimand.
In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was
dismissed by the CMWD until his reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for
the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his
preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to
any back salaries per the Court’s ruling in Hon. Gloria.
Jurisprudential definition of exoneration
The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government
employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him.
This is the Court’s teaching in City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA. In this case,
the employee was initially found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and
was given the penalty of dismissal by the City Mayor of Zamboanga. On
appeal, however, the CA limited the employee’s guilt to improper conduct and
correspondingly reduced the penalty to "six-months suspension without pay
with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely." The CA also awarded him "full backwages."
In the Zamboanga case the Court held that the CA erred in awarding back
salaries by reiterating the principle that back salaries may be ordered paid to
an officer or employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and
his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal.
The Court had the occasion to explain what constitutes "exoneration" in
Bangalisan v. Hon. CA, the respondent’s cited case. In this case, the Secretary
of Education found the public school teachers guilty as charged and imposed
on them the penalty of dismissal. On appeal, the CSC affirmed the Secretary’s
ruling but reduced the penalty imposed to suspension without pay. However,
the CSC found one of the teachers (Mariano) guilty only of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations, and only penalized her with
reprimand. None of the petitioning public school teachers were awarded back
salaries.
On appeal to the SC, the Court awarded back salaries to Mariano. They
explained that since the factual premise of the administrative charges against
him - i.e., his alleged participation in the illegal mass actions, and his
suspension - was amply rebutted, then Mariano was in effect exonerated of
the charges against him and was, thus, entitled to back salaries for the period
of his suspension pending appeal.
Bangalisan clearly laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the
employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry
into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed
must be made. If the administrative offense found to have been actually
committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot
be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser
penalty remains the same. The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may
only be entitled to back salaries when the offense actually committed does not
carry the penalty of more than one month suspension or dismissal.
Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of
suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered
reinstated, may be decreed only if the employee is found innocent of the
charges which caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified.
Unjustified suspension
On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met upon a
showing that the separation from office is not warranted under the
circumstances because the government employee gave no cause for
suspension or dismissal. This squarely applies in cases where the government
employee did not commit the offense charged, punishable by suspension or
dismissal (total exoneration); or the government employee is found guilty of
another offense for an act different from that for which he was charged.
12. MWSS v. COA
G.R. No. 195105 & G.R. No. 220729
Nov 21, 2017
Topic: Liabilities of Public Officers
Petitioners: Metropolitan Water Works and Sewerage Systems || Darlina
T. Uy, Leanor C. Cleofas, Ma. Lourdes R. Naz, Jocelyn M. Ceguerra &
Miriam S. Fulgueras
Respondents: COA || MWSS
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
DOCTRINE: Officials of the MWSS, were not members of the Board of
Trustees and, as such, could not be held personally liable for the disallowed
benefits by virtue of their having had no part in the approval of the disallowed
benefits. In turn, the recipients of the benefits, officials and employees alike,
were not liable to refund the amounts received for having acted in good faith
due to their honest belief that the grant of the benefits had legal basis.
FACTS:
●Before R.A. 6758 (Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989)
the BOT of MWSS approved the grant of certain benefits to its employees
over a period of time.
●Incld: mid-yr financial assistance granted on May21, 1987,
meal/ medical allowance, productivity bonus, Bigay-Pala
anniversary bonus, longevity pay, and year end financial
assistance
●August 15, 2000: Upon enactment of 6758, Lakambini Q. Razon
(resident auditor) issued a Notice of Disallowance (ND) effectively,
disallowing the payment of benefit to MWSS employees for the period of
Jan 2000 – Nov 2000.
●Oct 3, 2001: MWSS moved for the reconsideration of the ND’s. This
resulted with the COA Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate (COA-
LAO) modifying its decision and allowed the payment of the mid year
financial assistance, year-end financial assistance, bigay-pala
anniversary bonus, and medical allowance to employees already enjoying
 the benefits as of June 30, 1989, or on or before the July 1, 1989 effectivity
of R.A. No. 6758. It also allowed the PIB only to the extent of Php 2k per
filled position under A.O 161 and thregrhrnghgfghfrfgb
●July 1, 1989: MWSS appealed but the COA proper denied for lack of
merit. It was denied w/ finality on Jan 6, 2011
●Aug 6, 2015: COA Order of execution (COE) 2015-171 addressed to the
administrators of MWSS identified petitioners in G.R. No. 22079 along w/
8 other officials to be those personally liable to refund the disallowed
amounts (Totalling Php 8,762,948.31)
●NOTE: with this COE the COA applied COA Resolution No.
2011-006 w/c amended the 2009 COA Revised Rules of
Procedures
● Aug 20, 2015: Petitioners alleging such COE to be w/o basis filed a
motion to set aside said COE. This was denied by then coa Assistant and
General Counsel (Now Commissioner) Isabel D. Agito through a later-
reply dated Sept 7,2015. Thus this petition.
ISSUES:
a.WON COA committed GADALEJ in affirming the disallowance of the
above mentioned grants= NO
b.WON COA committed GADALEJ in ruling that the officials who
approved and authorized the grant benefits are required to refund the total
disallowed amount= NO but…(check ratio)
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court: (1) DISMISSES the petition in G.R. No.
195105 for its lack of merit; (2) GRANTS the petition in G.R. No. 220729, and,
ACCORDINGLY, SETS ASIDE COA Order of Execution 2015-174 dated
August 6, 2015; and (3) DECLARES petitioners DARLINA T. UY, LEONOR
C. CLEOFAS, MA. LOURDES R. NAZ, JECELYN M. TOLEDO, LOIDA G.
CEGUERRA, and MIRIAM S. FULGUERAS not personally liable to refund
the disallowed amounts. No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
[Issue No. 1]
● In the discharge of its constitutional mandate, COA is endowed with
enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds
were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended. The 1987
Constitution has expressly made COA the guardian of public funds,
vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government
revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property,
including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. There is no
GADALEJ on the part of COA in issuing the assailed Decisions. On the
contrary, COA only thereby steadfastly complied with its duty under the
1987 Constitution to exercise its general audit power.
[Issue No. 2]
●Sec 16 of the 2009 COA RnR on the settlement of accounts states
●Section 16.1: The liability of public officers and other persons
for audit disallowances/charges shall be determined on the basis
of (a) the nature of the disallowance/charge; (b) the duties and
responsibilities or obligations of officers/employees concerned;
(c) the extent of their participation in the disallowed/charged
transaction; and (d) the amount of damage or loss to the
government, thus:
●16.1.3 Public officers who approve or authorize expenditures
shall be held liable for losses arising out of their negligence or
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family
● Based on the evolving jurisprudence, and in view of Section 16 of the
2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts, the approving
Officers of the MWSS were personally liable for the amount of disallowed
benefits. Despite the lack of authority for granting the benefits, they still
approved the grant and release of the benefits in excess of the allowable
amounts and extended the same bene8ts to its officials and employees
not entitled thereto, patently contravening the letter and spirit of R.A. No
6758 and related laws when the law was clear, there should be no room
for interpretation but only application. Moreover, as we have earlier
pointed out, institutional practice is not an excuse to allow disbursements
that were otherwise contrary to law
HOWEVER
●Petitioners in G.R. No. 220727 rightfully contend that it should be the
board of trustees that should be held liable
● Although they were officers of the MWSS, they had nothing to do with
policy-making or decision-making for the MWSS, and were merely
involved in its day-to-day operations. The COA has not proved or shown
that the petitioners, among others, were the approving o2cers
 contemplated by law to be personally liable to refund the illegal
disbursements in the MWSS
●The Board of Trustees, in whom all the corporate powers and functions
of the MWSS were vested, governed the agency. In turn, the Management
of the MWSS was at the center of decision-making for the day-to-day
affairs of the MWSS. Nonetheless, it was the Board of Trustees, through
board resolution, that issued the authority granting the benefits and
allowances to the employees. The Management, acting by virtue of and
pursuant to the resolution, implemented the same. In this connection, it is
notable that the resolution approving the release of the mid-year 8nancial
assistance for CY 2000 facially indicated that the authority had emanated
from the Board of Trustees
●Officials of the MWSS, were not members of the Board of Trustees and,
as such, could not be held personally liable for the disallowed benefits by
virtue of their having had no part in the approval of the disallowed benefits.
In turn, the recipients of the benefits, officials and employees alike, were
not liable to refund the amounts received for having acted in good faith
due to their honest belief that the grant of the benefits had legal basis.
Other Issues / Discussion Points
a.W/N COA Resolution No. 2011-006 was applicable in this case= NO. It
constitutes GADALEJ
b.On RA 6758 repealing pertinent provisions of the MWSS charter
c.On the consolidation of allowances and compensation of Gov.
Employees
[OI No.1]
●Note that the petition in G.R. No. 195105 was filed on February 1, 2011
and COE 2015-174 was issued on September 7, 2015; and Resolution
No. 2011-006 was approved on August 17, 2011 and took effect 15 days
after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation. It is evident
that if the old rule on the finality of judgment were to be applied, the
petitioners would have no reason to apply for the temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent COA from deeming
the assailed decisions executory and issuing COE 2015-174, considering
that their salaries and other benefits were not in any danger of being
withheld pending the final resolution of their petitions by the Court.
Instead, COA retroactively applied Resolution No. 2011-006. Such
application constitutes GADALEJ
●To allow the retroactive application of Resolution No. 2011-006 would
really create a great injustice to the petitioners who were governed by the
previous rule at the time of the ruling of the petition of the MWSS to assail
the decisions. Such retroactive application would deprive them of their
salaries and compensation, and would not be fair to them, to say the least.
·
[OI No. 2]
●Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758, government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) were included in the Compensation and Position
Classification System under the law. As Sec16 indicates, R.A. No. 6758
has repealed all corporate charters of the GOCCs as likewise stated in
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit,
● Sec 16. Repeal of Special Salary Laws and Regulations: All
laws, decrees, executive orders, corporate charters, and other
issuances or parts thereof, that exempt agencies from the
coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix position
classification, salaries, pay rates or allowances of specified
positions, or groups of officials and employees or of agencies,
which are inconsistent with the System, including the proviso
under Section 2, and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 985
are hereby repealed
●COA rightly submits that the grant by the Board of Trustees of the MWSS
of the benefits constituted an ultra vires act. Verily, what is ultra vires or
beyond the power of the MWSS to do must also be ultra vires or beyond
the power of its Board of Trustees to undertake. The powers of the Board
of Trustees, who under the law were authorized to exercise the corporate
powers, were necessarily limited by restrictions imposed by law on the
MWSS itself, considering that Board of Trustees only acted on behalf of
the latter. Upon the effective repeal of the MWSS Charter, the Board of
Trustees could no longer fix salaries, pay rates or allowances of its
officials and employees upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758.
[OI No.3]
● It is the distinct policy of Sec 12 of RA 6758, to standardize salary rates
among government personnel and to do away with multiple allowances
and other incentive packages as well as the resulting differences in
compensation among them. Thus, the general rule now is that all
allowances are deemed included in the standardized salary, unless
excluded by law or by an issuance by DBM. The integration of the benefits
and allowances is by legal fiction. Without the issuance by DBM, the
enumerated nonintegrated allowances in Sec 12 remain exclusive.
●Sec 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation: All
allowances, except for representation and transportation
allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence
allowance of marine officers and crew on board government
vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of
foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other
additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may
be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the
standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other
additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated
into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized
Existing additional compensation of any national government
official or employee paid from local funds of a local government
unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or
employee and shall be paid by the National Government.
●Accordingly, the disallowed benefits and allowances of MWSS's officials
and employees, except for the RATA and the medical allowance, were
not excluded by R.A. No. 6758 or any issuance by DBM. It is understood
that as a general rule such benefits and allowances were already included
and given to the officials and employees when they received their basic
salaries. Their receipt of the disallowed benefits and allowances was
tantamount to double compensation. It is thus incumbent upon the MWSS
to prove that the disallowed allowances were sanctioned by the order of
the President or DBM, as the laws required.
 13. Lanto v. COA
G.R. No. 217189
April 18, 2017
Topic: Liabilities of Public Officers
Petitioners: Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, in her capacity as then Administrator
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
Respondents: Commission on Audit, represented by Chairman Reynaldo a.
Villar and Commissioner Juanito G. Espino, Jr.
Ponente: Reyes
DOCTRINE: It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the
presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties, such that, in the
absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or bad faith,
he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result
from the performance of an official duty. Good faith is always presumed and
he who alleges the contrary bears the burden to convincingly show that malice
or bad faith attended the public officer’s performance of his duties
FACTS:
The petitioner seeks to annul the COA Decision No. 2009-121 dated October
29, 2009 that affirmed the Notice of Disallowance dated January 18, 2006 as
well as the Notice of finality of Decision dated January 7, 2010 and the Orders
of Execution dated OCtiber 26, 2011 and November 25, 2013 where she was
held personally liable in her capacity as Director II of the Administrative Branch
of the POEA to refund the amount representing the P1,740,124.08.
Petitioner was the then Director II of the Administrative Branch (now Director
IV of the POEA) in the case of Dimapilis-Baldoz v. COA. In that case, the
POEA was charged by COA of illegally disbursing the salary of one Labrador
despite the promulgation of a Sandiganbayan decision terminating his
employment. Dimapilis-Baldoz, as Director of POEA, along with petitioner
Lanto, was deemed directly responsible in a Notice of Disallowance and thus
liable to refund the salaries.
Petitioner, along with other officers, was held personally liable based on Book
V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 9, Sec. 52, EO 292 and Sec. 103, PD 1445 which
provides that “expenditures of government funds or uses of government
property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the
official or employee found to be directly responsible therefore.”
In a letter dated May 31, 2000, the COA, no longer entertained their MR since
the COA Secretary issued a Notice of Finality of Decision dated January 7,
2010, stating that the COA Decision had already become final and executory
since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed within the reglementary
period.
POEA moved for reconsideration. On January 26, 2010, POEA Administrator
Jennifer Jardin-Manalili took over the post of Dimapilis-Baldoz.
When Jardin-Manalili’s second MR was denied, Dimapilis-Baldoz filed a
petition for certiorari. The COA issued the Order of Execution on October 26,
2011. On July 16, 2013, the Court promulgated the ruling in Dimapilis--Baldoz
v. Commission on Audit on July 16, 2013. The entry of judgement was made
August 13, 2013. On November 25, 2013, the COA issued the assailed Order
of Execution to enforce its decision against other responsible officers of the
POEA except for Dimapilis-Baldoz
Lanto, one of the respondents in the case, having become aware of the
foregoing developments, wrote a letter dated January 2, 2014 to COA
Chairperson Grace Pulido-Tan seeking the reconsideration of the November
25, 2013 Order of Execution on several grounds, namely: lack of due process
as far as she was concerned; regularity in the performance of her official
duties; and her good faith. Denied She filed a special civil action of certiorari
Lanto’s Arguments
1. COA GADALEJ finding her personally liable despite the fact that she acted
in good faith and with due diligence in the lawful exercise of her duties and
functions as the former Director II of the POEA Administrative Branch in
certifying that the payroll is correctly stated and services rendered by Labrador
(he came back to work despite the SB Order)
2. COA GADALEJ in disallowing the payments and making Lanto personally
liable. Such would result in a denial of due process on the part of the petitioner
as she was not duly notified of the criminal proceedings vs. labrador nor did
she receive any notice/order Mr. Labrador was dismissed. more so, petitioner
was not furnished copies of the decision dated october 29, 2009 and notice of
finality of decision dated january 7, 2010 and respondent coa’s order of
execution dated october 26, 2011. She acted in good faith as there were
records from Labrador’s supervisors he arrived and attended to his work
Moreover, she had no information showing there was a pending criminal case
against Labrador nor did it receive the decisions of the Sandiganbayan
COA: Petitioner was not denied due process because the Notice of
Disallowance forwarded by POEA Administrator Cacdac to the Audit Team
Leader contained her signature across her name, thus she was properly
served.
On April 14, 2015, the Court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
respondents from enforcing the assailed Orders of Execution dated October
26, 2011 and November 25, 2013.
ISSUE:
Did the COA commit gad in holding the petitioner personally liable to refund
the disallowed salary payments?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for certiorari; and
AFFIRMS Decision rendered by the Commission on Audit affirming Notice of
Disallowance No. 2006-002, the Notice of Finality of Decision, and the Orders
of Execution subject to the MODIFICATION that the portion pertaining to the
personal liability of petitioner Nini A. Lanto is DELETED.
PARTLY MERITORIOUS.
The petitioner is essentially assailing the Decision of COA and the Order of
Execution dated November 25, 2013 she had received on December 18, 2013.
The time within which an aggrieved party may seek the review of an adverse
judgment or final order or resolution through the special civil action governed
by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is 30 days from notice of judgement or final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
She filed the petition assailing the Order of Execution 31 days beyond the
reglementary period. Generally such is dismissible for being filed out of time
resulting in the Order of Execution dated November 25, 2013 unassailable and
immutable to her. Also, and more significantly, Decision No. 2009-121 had by
then attained finality and become immutable. As such, the present recourse
might not avail her anymore, for a decision or final order that has acquired
finality may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, whether by the court
that rendered or the SC.
General Rule: Any act that violates this principle of immutability must be
immediately struck down.The doctrine of the immutability of a final judgment
or order serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (1) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge
of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk
of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.
This principle, however, is not without exceptions. The only exceptions to the
rule on the immutability of final judgments are: (1) the correction of clerical
errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any
party; and (3) void judgments (Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 178366, July
28, 2008, 560 SCRA 362, 373).
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several justifications to suspend the
strict adherence with rigid procedural rules like the doctrine of immutability,
such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (e) lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
CASE AT BAR: Justifications (a) (b) and (c) apply in this case.
First of all, the adverse result would surely make her personally liable for a
substantial sum of monetary liability from which she had not directly benefited,
thereby prejudicing her right to property.
Secondly, her good faith as she caused the distribution of the salaries
based on her absolute lack of knowledge regarding the case and the
presence of valid records constituted compelling circumstances that justified
applying the exception in her favor. Only convincing proof of the petitioner’s
malice or bad faith in the performance of her duties could have warranted the
rejection of her plea of good faith.

It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of

good faith in the discharge of official duties, such that, in the absence of any
proof that a public officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not be
charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the
performance of an official duty. Good faith is always presumed and he who
alleges the contrary bears the burden to convincingly show that malice or bad
faith attended the public officer’s performance of his duties (DimapilisBaldoz
v. Commission on Audit)

Thirdly, she was on a foreign assignment overseas when the COA rendered
the assailed issuances. Even if POEA filed in her behalf a MR during her
absence from the country on a foreign assignment without indication she
expressly authorized POEA do not preclude her from being heard. Only she
could have exercised the right to be heard upon a matter that would subject
her under the law to personal liability.

As to the validity of COA’s issuance

In light of the circumstances, the COA directives are void and of no effect.
Thus, a void judgement has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for
any purpose. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or
proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps
to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored .

Accordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of

any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and
any writ of execution based on it is void: “x x x it may be said to be a lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever
and whenever it exhibits its head.”

14. Miralles v. COA
G.R. No. 210571. September 19, 2017
Petitioner: Orestes Miralles
Respondents: Commission on Audit
Topic: Liabilities of Public Officers -The Arias Doctrine
Doctrine: Arias Doctrine: The heads of offices could rely to a reasonable
extent on the findings and recommendations of their subordinates provided
that there was no reason for them to go beyond the recommendations of their
subordinates.
Facts:
●Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (QUEDANCOR) is a
government financing institution created, and organized under RA 7393.
●It is mandated to accelerate the flow of investment and credit
resources into the countryside to trigger the growth and
development of rural productivity and employment through
various credit and guarantee programs.
●Performed direct lending activities through financing programs
and schemes such as the Food and Agricultural Retail
Enterprises (FARE) Program, and the Sugar Farm
Modernization (SFM) Program.
●QUEDANCOR’s Governing Board issued corresponding policies,
implementing guidelines and SOPs for each program to cater to the needs
of its clients (individual farmers, farmers’ organizations, consumers’
cooperatives, general rural populace).
●SFM Program, outlined in Circ. 102, S. 1999, enunciated the
primary purpose for the loans to finance the purchase of brand-
new or second-hand tractors and implements.
●FARE Program, covered in Circ. 079, S. 1997, stated the
purpose for the loans as the augmentation of the working capital
of retailers, specifically those selling raw, semi-processed or fully
processed agricultural, aquatic, poultry, livestock and other agri-
related commodities.
●The Audit Team Leader assigned to QUEDANCOR issued an Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) relative to the loans granted by
QUEDANCOR under the SFM Program for QUEDANCOR Management’s
failure to collect on the loans.
●Regional Cluster Dir. Horacio Oida of the COA Regional Legal
Adjudication Office for Region III concurred and issued a Notice of
Disallowance (ND), dated April 7, 2005, for the amount of P3,092,900
representing the amount of uncollected loans.
●Held Miralles personally liable for having approved the loan
transactions, and other officers for having failed to verify the
veracity of the financial documents submitted by the loan
applicants.
●The COA Legal Adjudication Office for Region III created a Special Audit
Team (SAT) with the task of validating the observations embodied in the
AOMs relating to uncollected or unsettled accounts of various
QUEDANCOR debtors.
●SAT found that the QUEDANCOR Management had not
adequately verified the existence of viable businesses or
projects of the borrowers, a requirement for qualification under
the FARE Program. Some borrowers had never engaged in retail
business at the time when their loan applications were
processed and approved, contrary to their representations in
their applications.
●Based on the findings of SAT, Regional Cluster Dir. Oida issued a ND,
disallowing the amount of P4,450,000 representing the loans granted to
various borrowers who had no viable businesses or projects as required
under the FARE Program.
●Held Miralles personally liable as the authority
approving/recommending the approval of the delinquent loans.
●Miralles appealed the NDs.
 ●He should be excluded from liability under the 1st ND
considering that his approval of the SFM Program loans had
been in faithful compliance with the requirements of applicable
rules, and only after rigid credit and background investigations
and upon favorable recommendations from the Credit Guarantee
Committee and Sugar Regulatory Administration.
●He was not personally liable under the 2nd ND as his approval
of the FARE Program loans had been based on the review and
recommendation of the Quedan Operations Officers (QOO) and
invoked the Arias doctrine.
●COA’s Legal Services Sector (LSS) denied his appeal, observing that
Miralles’ function was crucial because it eventually led to the release of
government funds.
●Miralles appealed to the COA but it was denied, and refused to extend
the Arias doctrine to his case, holding that it was unlikely for a supervisor
like him not to know of the anomalous activities that were happening in
the area under his responsibility.
Issues:
W/N the Arias Doctrine is applicable –YES
W/N Miralles can be held personally liable under the NDs –NO
Held:
The Court nullifies the 1st ND and lifted the personal liability of Miralles, affirms
the 2nd ND but holds that Miralles is not personally liable for the disallowed
amount.
Regarding the 2nd ND
The disallowance of the transactions worth P4,450,000 the 2nd ND was based
on the COA's finding of "absence of viable business qualified under the loan
program availed of," referring to the FARE Program loans involving 9
borrowers whose loan applications had been approved or recommended by
Miralles. The COA arrived at the finding after the Operations Audit Division of
QUEDANCOR and the SAT had conducted separate investigations that
revealed that the borrowers involved had never engaged in the food or
agricultural retail business as required under the FARE Program. The
QUEDANCOR Management even conceded that their QOOs could have been
guilty of fraud or negligence in the discharge of their duties to verify the
qualifications of the borrowers thus, the QUEDANCOR Management
guaranteed the filing of appropriate charges against the erring QOOs.
Under these circumstances, the Court sustained the validity of the 2nd ND for
being factually and legally warranted.
However, even though the ND was valid, the fact that Miralles was the final
approving authority of the grant of the loans under the FARE Program did not
necessarily mean that he should be held personally liable for the disallowed
transactions.
It was shown that there were about 11,152 beneficiaries of loan releases in
Miralles’ department for the year 2002 alone. It would have been impracticable
for him to have checked all the details and to have conducted the necessary
physical inspections and verifications of the merits of all the lean applications
due to the voluminous paperwork and legwork to such undertaking. In
discharging his task of approving the loan applications, his relying largely on
the certifications and recommendations of his subordinates was unavoidable,
and could not be wrong, unreasonable or unwarranted due to the applications
having already undergone processing, review and evaluation by two QOOs.
The COA's refusal to apply the Arias doctrine was arbitrary because the refusal
stood on highly speculative grounds. First, the COA made no definitive finding
about Miralles having been aware of the illegal activities involving the loan
applications committed by his subordinates in the area under his responsibility.
And, secondly, even QOO Manahan's affidavit, which the COA cited as its
basis for stating Miralles’ awareness of the illegal activities going on in Bataan,
did not at all show that he had been aware of such activities as to have been
prompted to go beyond the recommendations of his subordinates, and to
inquire more deeply into the borrowers' applications and supporting
documents.
The COA's submission that Miralles was negligent in discharging his duty as
the final reviewer of the loan documents because he did not notice the
deficiencies and inconsistencies noted in the loan folders of the borrowers was
similarly unwarranted. The supposed deficiencies and inconsistencies
included home addresses indicated by the borrowers, non-submission of ITRs
by some borrowers, and the amounts of declared business capitalizations.
However, the borrowers' ITRs and information on their initial capitalization
were not required under the guidelines of the FARE program.

Regarding the 1st ND

The 1st ND referred to an indorsement letter which stated that the disallowance
was intended to insure the collection or settlement of delinquent loan accounts
granted through QUEDANCOR’s SFM Program. Thus, the disallowance was
issued by the COA only because it is concerned about the failure of
QUEDANCOR Management to take the appropriate legal action for the
collection of the delinquent accounts. Such ground cannot validly justify theπ
allowance considering that the NDs were not meant to be tools to insure
compliance with the COA’s directives. Furthermore, there was no finding that
the disallowed transactions had been irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, illegal, or unconscionable. Thus, the basis for the issuance of the
1st ND did not fall within the recognized grounds for valid disallowance.

It is also unfair to hold Miralles personally liable for the disallowance if the
COA’s justification for issuing the ND was the inaction of QUEDANCOR
Management in pursuing the collection of unpaid loans. Miralles was not
directly involved in the task of collection. The responsibility of taking legal
actions against the delinquent borrowers pertained to the Legal Affairs
Department of QUEDANCOR and not to its Operations Department where
Miralles worked. His responsibility was limited to the endorsement of the
delinquent accounts to the Legal Affairs Department for legal action.

Section 19.1 of COA Circular No. 94-001 dated January 20, 1994, which
prescribes the use of the Manual of Certificate of Settlement and Balances,
provides that the liability of public officers and other persons for audit
disallowances shall be determined on the basis of:
(a) the nature of the disallowance
(b) the duties and responsibilities of the officers/employees concerned
(c) the extent of their participation or involvement in the disallowed transaction
(d) the amount of losses or damages suffered by the Government

Based on this, the Court found no reason why Miralles was declared and held
liable under the ND despite his responsibilities as the Regional Assistant VP
not having included the filing of foreclosure proceedings or collection suits
against defaulting borrowers.

15. In the Matter of the Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
In favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 191805
November 15, 2011
Topic: Immunity of Public Officers
Petitioners: NORIEL RODRIGUEZ
Respondents: GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO,
PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN.
NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE
W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT.
COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY,"
ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN
Ponente: Sereno, CJ
DOCTRINE: In Estrada v. Desierto, we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting
President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during
the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look
with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent
of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only
with his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.)
FACTS:
Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial
Review on Certiorari, and (2) Petition for Review Both Petitions assail the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is
GRANTED.
The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
on account of her presidential immunity from suit.
(SHORT FACTS)
Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan
(Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP).
Rodriguez claims that on Sept 6, 2009, he was abducted by military men and
taken to several places including the mountains and a military camp where he
was repeatedly tortured and made to sign documents (containing statements
that he was an NPA member, he was never subjected to torture etc.). 12 days
later he was freed with the coordination of the CHR.
Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of
Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition
was filed against former President Arroyo and PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt.
Santos, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina, officers of the
PNP, among others.
In their Return, respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered
to the military after he had been put under surveillance and identified as “Ka
Pepito” by former rebels. Upon his voluntary surrender, he acted as a double
agent, returning to the NPA to gather information. However, he feared that his
NPA comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator. Thus,
with his knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage a sham
abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double agent. Hence, the
abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.
ANTECEDENT FACTS (LONG):
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay
Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos),
when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle
were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber
pistol. Subsequently, three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a
gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the others rode on the tricycle

The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved
around the area until about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced
Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New People's Army (NPA), but
he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military
camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the
word "Bravo" written on it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged
to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering
him to confess to his membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he
unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on the head to wake
him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow
him to sleep.
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez,
blindfolded him and made him board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the
soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the
car stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room,
removed his blindfold, and forced him to confess to being a member of the
NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head.
Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought
them to Bugey and Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men
asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a
soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family.
Because he remained silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle
returned to the military camp at past 1:00 p.m., where he was again subjected
to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged
NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer
At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with riLes took Rodriguez and
made him their guide on their way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying
them was a man named Harry, who, according to the soldiers, was an NPA
member who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and
called him a member of the NPA. He also heard Harry tell the soldiers that the
latter knew the area well and was acquainted with a man named Elvis.
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a
certain Elvis and told him that Rodriguez had identiAed his whereabouts
location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to disclose the
location of the NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both
were threatened with death. When the soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told
them that he would reveal the location of the NPA camp if they let Elvis go
home. They Anally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The soldiers and
Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.
On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to
identify the location of the NPA camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get
ready because they would beat him up again in the military camp. Upon arrival
therein, they brought him to the same room where he had Arst been detained,
and two soldiers mauled him again.
On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents
declaring that he had surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and that the
soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When
he refused to sign the document, he received another beating. Thus, he was
compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature to show that he was
merely coerced.
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked
him if he knew the men appearing therein. When he told them that he did not
recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers instructed him to write
down the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers
then wrote something on the paper, making it appear that he was the one who
had written it, and forced him to sign the document.He did not only receive
another beating, but was also electrocuted.
In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers asked him to take a bath
and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to the Enrile
Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him. When the
doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that
he sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr.
Ramil's medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in
the epigastric area, chest and sternum.
Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign
a piece of paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up.
Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned
not to report anything to the media.
Rodriguez and his family missed their Light. Subsequently, the soldiers
accompanied them to the CHR o1ce, where Rodriguez was made to sign an
a1davit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate
to return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to
Ale a case against his abductors because they had already freed him. The
CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR Toyota Tamaraw FX
service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed them.
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the
International Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez
and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of
torture.
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez Aled before this Court a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection
Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties dated 2 December 2009. 26 The petition was Aled against former
President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General
(Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De
Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan
and Callagan.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the
basis of presidential immunity from suit
2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and
habeas data cases.
3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held
responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R.
No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W.
Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent
Callagan for lack of merit.
(1) No.
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or
criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go
as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability,
for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
Ale the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability , on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases,
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing
the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and
security are restored.
As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not
enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure;
that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of
immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right.
It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the o1cer who acts illegally is not acting as such
but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser
We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the
policy that a public o1ce is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
committed while a sitting President.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent
of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only
with his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.)
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former
President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield
herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of
amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez
(2) Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains
to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict." Although originally used for
ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also
found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in
the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the
application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not
criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may
likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of
amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be
used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty
to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise
remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court
from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings
to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo
cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to
effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In
such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but
merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect
the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and
accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal
liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the
appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative
liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied
to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
(3) Yes. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility,
the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused
as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or
had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily
possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the
purview of the command responsibility doctrine
(4) No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the
basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R.
No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have
known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on
members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting
these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military
men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy
allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do
not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and
every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguez’s general
averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility
or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to
show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty
or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.