Nathalie Jean T.

Yap JD1D

People of the Philippines vs Bayya G.R. No. 127845. March 10, 2000 (Right to be Informed)

FACTS:

Some time in 1994, when victim was still 12 years old (Rosie S. Bayya), her father, Lodrigo
Bayya, the accused, forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with him. He
repeated the bestial act in their house about twice a week afterwards, and then later used her
four (4) times a month, the last she remembered being on July 5, 1995.

During the trial, appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter
twice but theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he committed the incestous rape. In view
of the facts established, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction, sentencing appellant to
suffer the ultimate penalty of death.

Upon appeal, appellant questioned thepenalty imposed under R.A. 7659, considering that
the Information filed against him was silent about the applicability of the same. He alleged denial
of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him

HELD:

Instructive in this regard is Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.

A careful perusal of the Information indicting the appellant reveals a crucial omission in its
averments of the minority of the victim. The objectives of the defendant's right to be informed are:
(1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make the defense; (2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may
decide whether the are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

The Information does not allege the minority of the victim although the same was proven
during trial as borne by the records. It matters not how conclusive and convincing evidence of
guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense not charged in the Complaint or
Information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included.

The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent are the special qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority which had the capacity of increasing the penalty by
degrees.

"WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is AFFIRMED with the

MODIFICATION that appelant LODRIGO BAYYA is adjudged guilty of simple rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua...."
Nathalie Jean T. Yap JD1D

People vs. Malansing, March 11, 2002

FACTS:
At around 8:00 A.M. on December 28, 1994, a concerned citizen informed the Cabanatuan
City Police Station of an alleged killing in a house at Bitas, Cabanatuan City. Immediately, a team
composed of P/Insp. Bienvenido Padua, SPO2 Castillones, and SPO1 Edgardo Pangilinan went
to the place. When they arrived at the Soriano residence, they spotted bloodstains on the ceiling.
Before they entered the house, they waited for Nestor Villa of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) who was tasked to take fingerprints at the crime scene. In the stockroom on
the first floor, they found the lifeless body of 70-year-old Magin in a pool of blood. There were
several wounds on his hands and arms, as well as cuts on his head. They took pictures of the
corpse. Upstairs, they found the corpse of his 68-year-old spouse, Jorja, on the floor, her throat
slit and her neck hacked. Her throat was stuffed with a small towel and bloodstains covered her
stomach. The investigators also took photos of the deceased. When they turned her body over,
they found a six-inch bloodstained knife, with the initials "JF" carved in the handle. The police
made rough sketches and took more photographs,while Villa lifted fingerprints from the scene
and the knife. These were sent to the NBI office in Manila. The cadavers were brought to the City
Health Office for autopsy.
This is an automatic review for the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City convicting appellants of two counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
death. Joey Manlansing denied participation in the killing but he admitted boxing Jorja in the face
to prevent her from shouting while Mario was assaulting her husband. Mario Mallansing claimed
he alone was responsible for the deaths. In open court, Mario affirmed his confession and
insisted that his brother had nothing to do with the deaths. He claimed that Joey woke up only
after he killed Magin and that Joey tried to unsuccessfully stop him from attacking Jorja. He
said he killed the couple out of anger after Jorja told him that he was going to be ejected as a
tenant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and taking advantage of night-time.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that none of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the
informations nor in the amended informations. Thus, conformably with Gario Alba, the offenses
committed by appellants only constitute two counts of homicide and not murder. Since the
penalty for homicide under 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to
sentence both appellants to death. In evaluating the circumstances that qualified the crimes to
murder, the trial court considered, aside from evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime, and
use of a deadly weapon, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
dwelling. The Supreme Court notes that abuse of superior strength and dwelling were not
alleged in the informations. In accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, abuse of superior strength and dwelling may not be appreciated to convict
the brothers. Further, should there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of superior strength is
absorbed by the former. At the outset, nocturnity is discounted as an aggravating circumstance
since in this case, the darkness of the night was not purposely sought by the offenders to
facilitate the commission of the crime nor to ensure its execution with impunity.
Nathalie Jean T. Yap JD1D

Both Joey Manlansing and Mario Manlansing, guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt for
the death of both Magin Soriano and Jorja Soriano, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Mario
Manlansing and Joey Manlansing are each declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of HOMICIDE defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Each appellant is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for an indefinite period of 17 years, and 4 months as minimum
to twenty (20) years as maximum for each count of homicide, with accessory penalties provided
by law.

People vs. Alvarado, March 19, 2002

FACTS:
On the night of July 26, 1997, Accused-appellant Armando Alvarado and his friends had a
drinking spree near his house in Rawis, Donsol, Sorsogon, as a result of which he became drunk.
When he returned to his house, he saw his eldest daughter, complainant Arlene Alvarado, and kissed
her on the cheeks and on the lips.
At around midnight of the same date, Accused-appellant went home and proceeded to the room
where Arlene was sleeping. He removed Arlene’s shorts and panties and went on top of her. Arlene
could not shout because her father threatened to kill her and her family if she did so. Overcome with
fear, Arlene submitted to her father’s advances. Accused-appellant held her hands on her sides and
stretched her legs forward. He then inserted his penis into her vagina, which hurt her. After satisfying
his lust, Accused-appellant went to his room and slept beside his wife Lonelisa and their youngest
child Armando, Jr. Arlene cried and went to sleep. The following morning, Arlene had difficulty
urinating because her vagina was very painful. She saw blood coming out of her genitals.
Arlene told no one of her ordeal, lest her father harmed her. In August 1997, Arlene worked as
househelper and babysitter of a couple, Arnulfo and Mely Ocharan, who were also residents of
Donsol, Sorsogon. During her stay with the Ocharans, Arlene suffered dizziness and fainting spells.
This alarmed her employers, who summoned her mother. Arlene was taken to a doctor and given
some medicines, but Arlene’s condition did not improve. Arlene was often observed to stare blankly,
as if in deep thought, but she would not say what was wrong with her.
At the end of August 1997, the Ocharan couple informed Arlene that she was going home.
Arlene told them that she did not want to do so because she was afraid of her father. As the couple
insisted to know why, Arlene was prevailed to tell them that she had been raped by her father. Mely
Ocharan promised to help her, after which Arlene was sent home. In September 1997, she reported
complainant’s case to Nida Balictar, a social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development in Donsol, Sorsogon. Arlene was eventually placed in the custody of the DSWD.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch
52, finding accused-appellant Armando Alvarado guilty of rape of his 14-year old daughter Arlene and
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. Accused-appellant argues that complainant’s testimony
should not have been given credence. He contends that, although Dr. Villarosa found that
complainant had sexual intercourse recently, it could not have been with accused-appellant since the
examining physician testified that complainant might have had sexual intercourse either a week or a
month before her examination on September 19, 1997, and complainant had sexual relationships
with different men in August 1997. He contends that the trial court should have given greater weight
to his defense as the same purportedly conformed to the findings of the expert witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled disagree with the petitioner's contention. It is a time-honored rule that
the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost
respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate
judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. The only
Nathalie Jean T. Yap JD1D

exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case. In this case, the
Supreme Court finds no compelling reason to depart from this rule. Indeed, complainant proved
herself to be a credible witness. Her narration of how she was sexually assaulted by her own father
remained, as also noted by the trial court, plain, candid, straightforward, and unflawed by serious
contradictions in spite of the lengthy and tedious cross-examination by the defense counsel. It is also
noteworthy that, in the course of her testimony, Arlene’s eyes overflowed with tears, which only
revealed the depths of the shame and suffering she endured as a consequence of the violation of her
virtue and personhood, and the truthfulness of her charge. She was not impelled by any bad motive to
testify falsely against accused-appellant, as shown by the admissions by the latter and his mother
that they did not know of any reason why Arlene filed the rape charge against him. The reasons
offered by accused-appellant that Arlene had many boyfriends and that he would always scold her for
attending dances and entertaining suitors are flimsy. In fact, when the trial judge asked her if her
accusation against her father was true considering that the death penalty could be imposed on him,
Arlene unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative.
The decision appealed from finding accused-appellant guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon him is reduced to reclusion perpetua and the civil
indemnity to be awarded the complainant to P50,000.00.

Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, December 17, 2004

FACTS:
Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife, Teresita Z. Teves
seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting them of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center in Valencia. Upon their arraignment on May 12, 1997, the petitioners
pleaded “not guilty.” On 23 February 1998, the petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the
evidence offered by the prosecution and moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence.
On July 29, 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits “A” to “S” of the prosecution’s evidence
but rejected Exhibits “T,” “U,” and “V.” It also denied petitioners’ demurrer to evidence, as well as
their motion for reconsideration. On July 16, 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision.
The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable errors in
convicting them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor
Teves in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the
Anti-Graft Law. But they were convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991,
which is essentially different from the offense with which they were charged. Thus, the
petitioners insist that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was transgressed because they were never apprised at any stage of
the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being charged with, and arraigned and
tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991. The variance doctrine invoked by the respondent is but a
rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their constitutionally-guaranteed right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioners'constitutional right to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that petitioners can be convicted of second mode of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest considering that it
was not charged in the information.
In Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
Nathalie Jean T. Yap JD1D

of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those
constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense
charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense
proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby
warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
EDGAR Y. TEVES is convicted of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991, and is
sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000; and TERESITA Z. TEVES is hereby ACQUITTED of such
offense.

Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001 (Right to Speedy, Impartial Public Trial)
FACTS:
On May 11, 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada was elected as President of RP with GMA as
his vice-President. By the late 2000, word spread of Erap’s alleged involvement in jueteng and
his receiving jueteng money as “Jose Pidal.” Erap quickly lost popularity among different social
groups and public officials, and even high ranking members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started defecting from his agendas.
And because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on December 7, 2000.
Upon its resumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with P3.3 billion in
secret bank account cut short the impeachment trial as prosecutors walked out and joined the
rallying of people in the streets of Manila.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press
statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter
stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and
duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be
the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President
Pimentel on the same day.

ISSUE: Whether or not petioner’s prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that as of the issue of prejudicial publicity, this would not apply to
the present case. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible.
They’re essentially unrelated. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere
Nathalie Jean T. Yap JD1D

publicity. The Court also said that petitioner did not present enough evidence to show that the
publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform.
Finally, the Court said that the cases against petitioner were still undergoing preliminary
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and
that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution. “IN VIEW
WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.”

Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Trial, AM
No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011

Facts:

Almost a year after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news
reporters , the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media
entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television
and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices be permitted
inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to
govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners assert the exercise of the
freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to
petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of
Nathalie Jean T. Yap JD1D

association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Hence, this petition docketed as AM
No. 10-11-5-SC.

Issue:

Can there be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by
television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases but
subject to some guidelines which addressed also the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada.
Furthermore, the court held “that the impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a
courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or
accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable
number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the
courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.”