Backman-The Decline and Fall of Medieval Sicily

THE DECLINE AND FALL
OF MEDIEVAL SICILY
Politics, religion, and economy in the reign of
Frederick III, 1296-133J
CLIFFORD R. BACKMAN
Boston University
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK
40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
Ruiz de Alarcon 13,28014 Madrid, Spain
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa
http://www.cambridge.org
© Cambridge University Press 1995
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1995

First paperback edition 2002
A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Backman, Clifford R.
The decline and fall of medieval Sicily: politics, religion, and
economy in the reign of Frederick III, 1296-1337 / Clifford R. Backman
p. cm.
Based on the author's doctoral dissertation, UCLA. Cf. Preface.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 52149664 0
1. Sicily (Italy) - History - 1282-1409. 2. Frederick II, king of Sicily,
1272-1337. I. Title.
DG867.5.B33 1995
945'.804-dc20 94-48333 CIP
ISBN 0 52149664 0 hardback

ISBN 0 521 52181 5 paperback
To Nelina
Contents
Preface page x
Note on currency and measures xix
List of abbreviations xx
Map: Sicily in the earlyfourteenth century xxii
1 The kingdom at risk i

2 The international scene: war without and within 29
3 A divided society I: the urban-demesnal world 85
4 A divided society II: the rural-baronial world 156
5 The religious scene: piety and its problems 186
6 In the margins: slaves, pirates, and women 247
Conclusion 303
Table 1 Judices of Palermo 308

Table 2 Juriste and xurterii ofPalermo 310
Table 3 Judices ofAgrigento, Catania, Messina, Polizzi 312
Table 4 Feudal dues 316
Bibliography 327
Index 348
IX
Preface
Sicily inspires strong emotions, and few who travel there fail to
come away with conflicting feelings about the island and its people.
Plato thought it a place of great potential until the harshness of
everyday life there became plain to him; in the end, he could endure
no more than a stay of a few weeks. Goethe fell in love with its
cloudless blue skies and scenic coastline - parts of which (such as at
Taormina and Monte Pellegrino) he reckoned to be among the
most beautiful spots on earth - and his insights into the culture and
economy led him to conclude that the island was "the key" to under-
standing all of Italy. But, even so, he recoiled from the poverty and
meanness he saw in each city and hurried back to the mainland as
soon as he could. And Bertrand Russell, who always had a sharp eye
for what pleased him and a sharper tongue for what did not,
thought the island to be "unimaginably beautiful" but the people to
be "a revelation of human degradation and bestiality." My own first
impressions remain vivid: blazing heat, a ubiquitous scent of
lemons, the flowers and songs of a saint's-day festival in a mountain
village, a riotous fishing expedition off Pantelleria, the mosaics of
the cathedral in Monreale. I also saw many of the sights that so
horrified Russell and Goethe, although to my eyes it was the
poverty in which the people were trapped, not the people them-
selves, that was degrading and bestial.
The bulk of the historical literature dealing with Sicily parallels
or mirrors the polarized nature of people's reactions to the island.
Ranging from romanticized waitings of outraged innocence (Sicily
as the victim of foreign tyranny) to irritable censures of outrageous
incompetence (Sicily as the victim of its own lack of talent and
superabundance of corruption), this literature has contributed
powerfully to popular bias regarding the island and its people.
These prejudices have a long genealogy and indeed, as I argue in
Preface xi
this book, they began to emerge as early as the first half of the
fourteenth century. But the problem of how to perceive Sicily has
taken on particular importance ever since the unification of Italy in
1870 - and the role of Garibaldi and his southern supporters in that
cause - highlighted anew the disparities between the economic and
social developments of northern Italy and the Mezzogiorno. This
"southern question" has troubled four generations of Italians and,
with the approach of a unified European economy, the issue now
lies before a larger audience: what to do with the poor, backward
south? What was it that caused this seemingly ineradicable under-
development? Can such persistent problems of ingrained poverty,
poor education, institutional corruption, and reflexive distrust of
outsiders be explained, much less solved? Opinions have varied
widely, but there has been a general consensus that, on the
economic level at least, Sicily fell permanently behind the rest of
Italy at some point in the later Middle Ages. 1
In the twelfth century the Norman kingdom of Sicily was one of
the strongest and wealthiest states in Europe. Roger II, in his
imposing new palace at Palermo, enjoyed revenues at least four
times greater than those of the contemporary king of England,
which he derived from a vibrant and variegated economy. By
the end of the fourteenth century, however, Sicily was in ruins
physically, economically, and morally. War, plague, and famine
had killed hundreds of thousands of people; the diverse rural
economy had taken a disastrous turn to grain monoculture; and
a once strong central government had given way to a petty
baronialism that eventually gave birth to a proto-Mafia. Yet,
remarkably, Sicily's fortunes rebounded in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries: the population and the economy grew
rapidly, government became more stable, and cultural life (at
the aristocratic level, at least) took on a new vibrancy under the
impact of Spanish Gothic and continental humanism. What, then,
caused the late medieval collapse? How permanent were its conse-
quences? And why did the recovery of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries fail to effect more widespread and long-lasting social
development?
1
Giuseppe Galasso, "Considerazioni intorno alia storia del Mezzogiorno in Italia," in his
collection of essays, Mezzogiorno medievale e moderno (Turin, 1975), pp. 15—59, summarizes the
debate.
xii Preface
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries two schools of

thought offered competing answers to these questions. The first
argued that, on account of fixed geographical and hereditary
factors, Sicily had always been doomed to failure. The story of the
late Middle Ages was not one of decline from an assumed earlier
golden period, but rather one of the same plodding poverty and
backwardness that had been there all along. Norman glories had
indeed been glorious, but they were Norman, not Sicilian. This
school, with its stress upon genetic factors and its implicit belief in
immutable historical fates, clearly betrays its nineteenth-century
origins. The second school, comprised chiefly of native Sicilian
writers, emphasized instead Sicily's victimization. Some argued
that the island's troubles actually began with the arrival of the
Normans who, by imposing a foreign and artificial feudal structure
on society, fundamentally crippled it at a time when urban-
commercial energies were first being released in the northern
communes. Others, most notably Benedetto Croce, identified the
revolution known as the Sicilian Vespers, and the two decades of
war it sparked, as the culprit. This struggle - which began when
Sicilian mobs rose against their Angevin rulers in 1282, bloodily
overthrew them, and ultimately offered the throne instead to the
royal family of the then fast-growing Crown of Aragon confeder-
ation centered in Barcelona - not only depleted vast amounts
of human and material resources during the twenty years of
fighting that followed, but even more disastrously resulted in
the permanent rupture of Sicily from its traditional political and
cultural partner in southern Italy — Naples. All the foreign
meddling that was involved in finding a solution to Sicily's dynastic
problem, this school asserts, resulted in a permanently structurally
handicapped Sicilian world. Croce's interpretation proved to be
remarkably resilient, and it still lives on in the works of Steven
Runciman and a few others. Behind this line of thought there lies a
firm assumption of the primacy of political and institutional factors
- an assumption no longer accorded much currency by most
historians, who instead seek the answers to the Sicilian problem in
economic factors.
Through most of the decades since World War II, a model
of "economic dualism" has steadily attracted support as the
best explanation not only of Sicily's underdevelopment but of
the backwardness of many decolonized lands all around the
Preface xiii
2
world. This model, in general, posits a traditional nexus of
complementary, or mutually dependent, economic relations
between two lands, or between discrete regions of the same state -
one being dominant or "advanced," the other acquiescent or "back-
ward" - that alone gives the territories involved economic viability;
but this linkage results actually in a "blocked" economy for the
subservient partner that merely survives and never thrives. The
"advanced" partner, being based on manufacturing and commerce,
adopts a quasi-paternalistic or even an overtly colonial attitude
towards the "backward" agricultural sector. As far as Sicily is
concerned, the dualists assert, the predominance of the rural basis
of the Sicilian economy, and its transition from varied agricultural
production to grain monoculture, made the island inescapably
dependent on the manufactures of the northern communes. The
trend to monoculture began with the Norman conquest and the
consequent shift of Sicily's foreign commerce away from north
Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, where there was ample
demand for a variety of Sicilian products, and towards continental
Europe, where demand for wheat predominated to the virtual
exclusion of everything else. As a consequence, the uncommercial-
ized nature of the rural economy made it increasingly impossible to
generate domestic industries, since greater outlays of capital were
required to start up a new manufacture, or to resuscitate a
moribund one, than were needed to maintain an on-going enter-
prise; moreover, the institutional and cultural constraints that
hampered the movement of labor from the rural to the industrial
sector made it more difficult for the populace to acquire the skills
it would need, even if capital were available, to initiate a more
advanced level of economic activity. Thus the more Sicily came to
depend on its agricultural production, the more impossible it
became for the overall economy, and the social structures that
depended upon it, to develop. This resulted in a "blocked" economy
and a structurally decreed state of underdevelopment. And this
increasing dependence on agriculture was made permanent by the
2
See, for example, the essays gathered in // Mezzogiorno medievale nella storiogrqfta del secondo
dopoguerra: risultati e prospettive, ed. Pietro De Leo (Cosenza, 1985), Atti del IV Convegno
nazionale dell'Associazione dei medioevalisti italiani: Universita di Calabria, 12—16
giugno 1982; and in Sviluppo e sottosviluppo in Europa e fuori d'Europe dal secolo XIII alia
Rivoluzione industriale, ed. A. Guarducci (Florence, 1983), Istituto internazionale di storia
economica "Francesco Datini," Pubblicazioni, 2nd ser., vol. x.
xiv Preface
cataclysmic Vespers struggle, for by losing its connections with

Naples, Sicily was left without the means of maintaining its own
economic diversity and viability, leaving it increasingly at the mercy
of the merchants from Catalonia, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, who
were interested in only one thing - grain.3
This model, with certain adaptations provided by writers like
Henri Bresc, Stephan Epstein, and David Abulafia, sheds much
light on the Sicilian problem and provides a useful starting point for
further study. Epstein's great contribution has been to indicate the
extent to which the interior, domestic economy of the island had
greater overall influence on society than did the foreign trade that
is so central to the dualist theory- and must therefore be taken into
account whenever analyzing the "Sicilian problem." Abulafia, by
contrast, highlights foreign trade but points out that it was actually
the northern communes, not the Sicilians, who were economically
"blocked." Being unable to feed themselves, the Genoese, Pisans,
and Florentines had no option but to industrialize and diversify;
without industry Sicily certainly would not thrive, but without
agriculture the north would not even survive.
The jury is still out on dualism as an interpretive model. Its
beauty lies in its simplicity, but like many such cases it is the very
simplicity of the theory that makes it suspect to some writers,
economists and historians alike.4 Apart from disagreement over
some specifics (such as the argument that Sicily produced nothing
else for which there was continental demand; in fact sugar, cotton,
and alum were easily available in Sicily and were highly prized
across Europe), my own objection is not with the theory itself but
with the nearly exclusive explanatory role its adherents have
assigned it. Among some of them, such as Henri Bresc, the dualist
diagnosis of Sicily's ills is asserted with a calm certainty that
resembles the self-confident belief in historical fate elucidated by
the historians of the nineteenth century.
In hopes of offering a subtler response to the Sicilian problem, I
suggest in this book that there were many more things "wrong"
3
The first person to put forth a fully developed dualist explanation for the Mezzogiorno was
Gino Luzzatto, Storia economica delVeta moderna e contemporaneay 4th edn. (Padua, 1955); and
Luzzatto, Breve storia economica delVItalia medievale dalla caduta delVImpero romano al principio
del Cinquecento, 2nd edn. (Turin, 1965).
4
See the discussion in R. Hodson and R. L. Kaufman, "Economic Dualism: A Critical
Review," American Sociological Review 47 (1982), 727—39.
Preface xv
with medieval Sicily than simply its economy, and that in order to
understand the enormity of the island's suffering in the fourteenth
century we must take into account aspects of Sicilian life that
certainly bore relation to, but were not entirely dependent on,
economic concerns. Among these other factors are a knot of ethnic
rivalries, persistent problems in spiritual life, faults and short-
comings in the physical infrastructure of the island, a set of
technological hurdles that made improvements in daily life
unnecessarily difficult, changes in demographic patterns
(especially the dramatic proportionate increase in women among
the populace), administrative failures at the royal and local levels,
and the development of an overbred sense of personal and family
"honor" and the violence it justified in the face of any perceived
threat to it. Many of these problems were of long standing, but for
a number of reasons, as this book argues, they came to a head
during the reign of Frederick III (i296-1337).
Frederick was the third of the Catalan kings of Sicily, successor
to his elder brother James who had relinquished the crown in order
to receive papal acknowledgment of his inheritance as ruler of the
Crown of Aragon. Intensely pious and idealistic, Frederick presided
over Sicily's post-war reconstruction, once the war with Angevin
Naples finally came to an end in 1302 with a limited Sicilian victory.
Though not a very gifted ruler, he nevertheless showed a fair degree
of acumen by recognizing that the island had become atomized:
petty baronies divided the interior between them, the coastal cities
acted as independent agents, domestic trade was limited to the
local level with virtually no trade at all between the larger zones
(valli) of the realm, and a plethora of local customs and tariffs made
efficient and fair administration virtually impossible. The central
policy behind the reconstruction, therefore, was to promote Sicily's
internal integration and to create a sense of the island as an organic
whole - as a true "Kingdom of Sicily" and not as a mere congeries
of loose-cannon towns and estates united only by the fact that they
all hated the Angevins more than they hated each other. For a
while, Frederick succeeded. Within a few years of the end of the
war, Sicilian life had improved so greatly that the king began to
believe the wild prophecies made about him by the apocalyptic
prophet Arnau de Vilanova, who eventually assigned Frederick the
role of the great reformer of Christendom who would lead the final
successful crusade against Islam, would root out all the corruption
xvi Preface
in the church and in European society, and would prepare the world
for battle with Antichrist. What's more, the Sicilian people began to
believe it too; and soon an ecstatic wave of evangelical fervor rushed
over the populace that inspired vast numbers of men and women to
abandon their families and farmsteads in order to follow itinerant
preachers and listen to their claims of how the world was soon to
end in glory, and how the Sicilians themselves were going to over-
throw Antichrist just as they had overthrown the Angevins in 1282.
But then, mid-way through Frederick's reign, a host of forces came
together to undo all that had been achieved: the recovery fell apart
and Sicily began a dismal slide into poverty and violence. An
integrated, reformed, and divinely favored "Kingdom of Sicily"
gave way, after about 1317, to a fractured and fractious society
upon which, they feared, God had turned His back, and where
Armageddon was still expected - but no longer with joyful
confidence. This book attempts to explain why.
Frederick's reign began with high hopes and ended in misery.
The real disasters were yet to come, when Frederick died: the Black
Death and a shockingly savage series of civil wars among the petty
lords who were tearing up the countryside. But the groundwork of
ruin was firmly laid by 1337, and this book argues that it was
precisely this groundwork that went on to undermine Sicilian
development in later centuries. The most remarkable thing about
Sicily's economic recovery in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
after all, is that it didn't solve Sicily's problems. If the island was not
"behind" the rest of Europe by that time (and I am so far uncon-
vinced by arguments that it wasn't), it was certainly a place set
apart, a pariah and a backwater, isolated and disdained.
The surviving records for late medieval Sicily are relatively meager
when compared to most western Mediterranean territories of the
age - the result of damage done to the archives during World War
II - and this makes it difficult to assert anything too boldly. But
enough remains to offer compelling glimpses of this intriguing
society at a point of unique challenge. In pursuing those glimpses, I
have tracked down virtually every surviving document and
manuscript from those forty-one years that I have heard of or seen
reference to. This would have been impossible without the personal
kindness and professional efficiency of many people and insti-
tutions. I am grateful to the staffs of all the following for their help.
Preface xvii
In Barcelona: the Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, the Biblioteca de
Catalunya, and the Biblioteca de la Universitat de Barcelona. In
Catania: the Archivio di Stato. In London: the British Library.
In Messina: the Archivio di Stato and the Biblioteca universitaria.
In Oxford: the Bodleian Library. In Palermo: the Archivio di
Stato, the Biblioteca centrale della regione di Sicilia, and the
Biblioteca comunale. In Trapani: the Archivio di Stato and
the Biblioteca Fardelliana. And in Vatican City: the Biblioteca
apostolica vaticana. Within the United States I have debts out-
standing in three principal sites. In Boston: Boston University's
Mugar Library, the Boston Public Library, and Harvard Univer-
sity's Widener Library. In Los Angeles: the University Research
Library of UCLA and the Institute of Medieval Mediterranean
Spain. And in Providence: the John Hay Special Collections Library
at Brown University. Generous financial assistance was given by the
Del Amo Foundation in Los Angeles (during this project's first
incarnation as my doctoral dissertation at UCLA), by the National
Endowment for the Humanities, and by both the Seed Grant
Program and the Humanities Foundation of Boston University. My
deepest thanks to all of them.
I wish to thank the two men who co-directed the dissertation
on which this book is based: Robert I. Burns, S J., and Bengt T.
Lofstedt. Much of whatever is good in this book is owed to
their knowledge and patience, and one of the best things about
publishing these results is the opportunity it affords to thank them
in public. Their recent retirements from active teaching leave a
great institution much diminished. David Abulafia (Cambridge
University) and Robert Lerner (Northwestern University) gave
advice and encouragement at critical times. My colleague at Boston
University, James McCann, split the rent with me and rallied my
occasionally sagging spirits during a memorable summer in Rome.
To William Davies, of Cambridge University Press, I owe thanks for
the interest he showed in this project.
It is rewarding to be able, at last, to thank all the members of
my family for the good-natured support they have shown over the
years to a wayward son who was determined to study "something
practical" (?!) like medieval history instead of pointless ephemera
like medicine or particle physics. My mother, Mary Betker, has
waited a long time to see this book finally in print. She and my step-
father Al Betker encouraged my love of books and taught me the
xviii Preface
virtues of hard work and of seeing a project through to the end. My
parents-in-law, Charles and Roelina Berst, unfailingly offered
sound advice, good humor, excellent meals, tragic puns, and
endless tales about George Bernard Shaw and the continuing
parking difficulties on the UCLA campus. Apart from the
exuberant generosity that marks everything they do, they gave me
the best and most exuberantly generous gift of all - my wife Nelina.
She has never been to Sicily, and yet she has patiently endured and
even encouraged all of my passion for the place. We met just before
I left for the Barcelona archives, in 1987, to start work on my
"Sicilian thing," and so it is a special pleasure to share its end with
her. She has loved me beyond all hope and sense. To her the book
is, like its author, entirely dedicated.
POSTSCRIPT
Portions of chapter 5 originated as articles: "The Papacy, the

Sicilian Church, and King Frederick III, 1302-1321," Viator 22 (1991),
229-49; and "Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals
in Sicily," Franciscan Studies 50 (1990), 3-29. I am grateful to the
publishers of each journal, for permission to reprint.
Note on currency and measures
The basic unit of currency in medieval Sicily, even though it was

never actually minted, was the gold ounce (Latin uncia, or Italian
onza). Smaller coins, actually circulated, were the tarinus (Italian
tari) and the granus (Italiangrano). A still smaller denomination, the
denarius (one-sixth of a. grano), existed but will not be used here. One
ounce represented thirty tari; and each tari was in turn worth twenty
grani. Thus 1 ounce = 30 tari = 600 grani = 3,600 denari. Omitting
denari, the following notation will be used in this book: 00.00.00.
Thus, for example, 12.16.09 represents 12 ounces, 16 tari, and ggrani.
Dry goods like grains and legumes were measured in a unit called
a salma (pi. salme). Two standards were used in the fourteenth
century: in western Sicily a single salma represented 0.128 bushels
(275 liters) or, to figure in the reverse direction, one bushel of grain
made up 7.8 salme. In eastern Sicily the salma was 20 percent larger
(or 1 salma = 0.154 bushels = 330 liters). But the smaller salma,
sometimes called the salma generate, is that most commonly used by
scholars, and I follow their convention. The unit derived as an
estimation of the minimum amount of grain needed to support a
single individual for an entire year.
xix
Abbreviations
(For full bibliographical citations, see Bibliography.)
ACA Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Barcelona

Acta curie Ada curie felicis urbis Panormi, ed. Francesco
Giunta et al., in 6 vols.
ArchStperSic Archivio storicoper la Sicilia
ArchStSic Archivio storico siciliano
ArchStSicOr Archivio storico per la Sicilia Orientate
ASC Archivio di Stato, Catania
ASM Archivio di Stato, Messina
ASP Archivio di Stato, Palermo
BCP Biblioteca comunale di Palermo
bk. book(s)
Cane. chancery, cancelleria, cancilleria
Cartas Cartas reales diplomaticas
ch. chapter(s)
CSIC Consejo superior de investigaciones cientificas
DSSS Documenti per servire alia storia di Sicilia
EEMCA Estudios de la Edad Media de la Corona de Aragon
FAA Ada aragonensia, ed. Heinrich Finke
GAKS Gesammelte Aufsdtzefur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens
Ada siculo-aragonensia, vol. n, ed. Francesco
GG Giunta and Antonino Giuffrida
Jean XXII (1316-1334): Lettres communes, ed. Guy
Lettres communes Mollat
Mediterraneo medievale: Scritti in onore di Francesco
MM Giunta, 3 vols.
Magna Regia Curia
MRC notary, notario, notario
Not. parchment, pergamena, pergamino
Perg.
List of abbreviations xxi
QFIAB Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven
und Bibliotheken
Reg. register, registro, registro
Reg. Benedict XI Le registre deBenedict XI, ed. Charles Grandjean
Les registres de Boniface VIII, ed. Georges Digard
Reg. Boniface VIII et al.
Regestum dementis papae V . . . cura et studio
Reg. Clement V monachorum ordinis S. Benedicti
Biblioteca scriptorum qui res in Sicilia gestas sub
RGBS Aragonum imperio retulere, ed. Rosario Gregorio
Sicilia sacra, ed. Rocco Pirri (3rd edn.)
RPSS Storia della Sicilia, ed. Rosario Romeo
SDS spezzone
Spez. tabulario
Tab. Capitula regni Sicilie, ed. Francesco Testa
Testa XI Congresso di storia della Corona dAragona
XI Congresso
c/3
CHAPTER I
The kingdom at risk
In the spring of 1314 King Robert of Naples consulted a soothsayer.

He was planning a new assault on Sicily, the island-kingdom whose
rebellious citizens had driven his grandfather from the throne in
1282 and placed themselves instead under the royal house of
Catalonia-Aragon, and he wanted to know his chances for success.
He had good reason to feel confident. The previous August, the
German emperor Henry VII of Luxembourg - Dante's hero,
Robert's nemesis, and the Sicilians' most powerful ally - had died
unexpectedly while campaigning to unite all of Italy under his
command. Moreover, the ever expanding Crown of Aragon con-
federation, of which Sicily was now a loose satellite, had for
the moment committed the bulk of its military resources to the
conquest of Sardinia. Sicily lay temptingly exposed, ripe for the
taking.
According to Nicola Speciale's racy Historia sicula, our only source
for this story, the augur told Robert (as augurs will) that he would
indeed gain "Sicily and all her possessions." These last words must
have clinched the deal in Robert's mind, for among Sicily's
possessions since 1311 was the duchy of Athens, a small but valuable
principality also previously under Angevin control and still much
coveted by the throne in Naples. Thus encouraged, Robert launched
his attack. His fleet landed at the far western end of Sicily's long
northern shore, near Castellamare. This was a rather desolate
region, but a good place to land because of it. From there his
soldiers, having avoided the harbor defenses of the major port
cities, could easily move inland and burn the poorly defended fields,
vineyards, and villages. Such tactics had served him well in the past:
apart from the damage caused to the local economy wherever he
struck, these rural raids had the additional benefit of aggravating
the seldom dormant peasant and baronial frustration with the
2 The decline and fall of medieval Sicily
Catalan regime in faraway Messina that so consistently failed to

protect the villagers. This discontent was strongest in the western
provinces, where Robert aimed the bulk of his attacks. After his
soldiers had secured a beachhead and had advanced a short way
inland, they came across a woman from nearby Alcamo who was
trying desperately to escape into the mountains, and captured her.
Although obviously a pauper and dressed "in the filthiest of torn
rags" she was evidently a comely woman, for the soldiers, after
questioning her about conditions on the island, sent her to Robert's
tent. There the king passed his eye over her and asked her what her
name was. She replied: "Sicilia."
At these words Robert started and, with the ironic twist common
to soothsaying stories, he suddenly understood the true meaning of
the prophecy given to him back in Naples: he would gain nothing
from his bold venture save this ruined woman and whatever
tattered possessions she carried. He reboarded his ships in a fury
and sailed further westward to Trapani, where he hoped to avenge
his hurt pride and salvage something of value from his efforts by
laying siege to the relatively well-to-do merchant center there. But
the Sicilians were ready for him, because their soldiers, who earlier
had rushed to join the emperor Henry at Pisa, only to learn upon
arriving there of his death, had returned to Sicily by way of Sardinia
and had themselves landed precisely there at Trapani only a short
time before. Stationed in Monte S. Giuliano (modern Erice) on the
high ground behind Trapani, they rushed to the city and held
the Angevins at bay while an urgent command from their king,
Frederick III (also present), soon brought a reinforcement
contingent of sixty-five galleys racing from Messina.
The Angevins were trapped. They controlled part of the city, but
were unable to advance on land or to retreat by sea. Caught
between an impenetrable defense line at their front and a pressing
naval counterattack at their rear, they appeared to be on the verge
of annihilation. By this stroke of rare good fortune the Sicilians'
dream of a definitive and successful end to their drawn-out conflict
with Naples seemed to be at hand. Battle was joined - a long and
trying double-sided siege.
But bad harvests in the three preceding years had resulted in a
severe food shortage throughout the kingdom; hunger gnawed at
both sides. The Angevin soldiers stalked through the city and found
sufficient stores of food to keep them, for the moment, relatively
The kingdom at risk 3
well supplied. But those supplies would not last long. The problem
for Frederick's forces, however, for those on land as well as for the
sailors ringing the city, was even more severe. They could not risk
sending any of their galleys off in search of supplies without giving
the Angevins a chance at escape (for sixty-five galleys, although a
large force, were barely enough to enclose the long, scimitar-shaped
promontory that Trapani inhabits); and the land forces held
positions largely outside the city, where salt-pans and alum mines
outnumbered crop fields. Food would have to be brought in from a
distance, provided that any could be found. But as month followed
month and expenses continued to mount, Frederick soon ran out of
money with which to buy new supplies or to pay his soldiers' wages.
When rations grew smaller and less frequent rebellion broke out,
and with it a total collapse of discipline. The soldiers saw little
reason to continue risking their lives for a king who could not pay
them or for a city that could not feed them. Frustrated, hungry, and
impatient, they began to desert in large numbers in order to
scavenge and pillage their own countryside, while the king looked
on in horror. Since neither side was thus able to continue the
fight, Robert and Frederick agreed to a truce that each felt was
humiliating.1
This episode from Speciale's history resonates with meaning. His
portrayal of "Sicily" as a ruined beauty is particularly apt, for by the
early fourteenth century the kingdom was indeed in a frightful
state of decline. It had been one of the wealthiest states in Europe
in the twelfth century and its rulers had controlled the central
Mediterranean, or had at least bullied people into thinking that
they did. The royal palace had played host to an exceptionally lively
troubadour and scientific court culture, while the realm's com-
mercial life had been enviably varied and profitable: to the rich
agricultural produce of the land (grains, citrus, olives, and wine,
chiefly) were added cotton and silk manufactures, dyeworks, alum
mining, and a prominent role in the lucrative slave trade. But hard
times had fallen on the island since then. Hohenstaufen rule, a
combination of rigid authoritarianism and careless neglect, gave
1
Nicola Speciale (Nicolaus Specialis), Historia sicula in VIII libros distributa ab anno
MCCLXXXII usque ad annum MCCCXXXVII, in RGBS i, see bk. n, ch. 4-6. See also
Salvatore Romano, "Sulla battaglia della Falconaria e sull'assedio di Trapani nel 1314/'
ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 25 (1900-1), 380-95.
way in 1265, by papal fiat, to seventeen years of detested Angevin
control. Under both of these dynasties local challenges to the
increasingly centralized monarchy had been suppressed with a
heavy hand. Charles I of Anjou, for example, had ordered the
torture and execution of the entire population of Augusta after its
inhabitants joined a rebellion against him. Landholdings had been
confiscated from Sicilian barons and awarded instead to the foreign
nobility. The underdeveloped but cherished communal institutions
of the coastal cities had been suppressed everywhere. Manufac-
turing had slowed as a result of the chaos in the cities; and whatever
profits did accrue had been largely siphoned off in order to fund
first Hohenstaufen adventures in the Levant and later Angevin
campaigns on the Italian mainland and in Greece.
Life changed dramatically for the Sicilians, if briefly, with the
arrival of the Catalans in 1282. Under kings Peter (1282-5) and
James (1285-95) an impressive recovery began, aided by the sudden
availability of Catalan arms, organizational skills, and cash. By the
time the so-called War of the Vespers ended in 1302 -with James's
younger brother Frederick on the throne, after six years of
energetic campaigning - the future looked promising. The Treaty
of Caltabellotta, signed in that year, confirmed Frederick as the
legitimate "King of Trinacria" (an anachronistic title designed to
keep alive Angevin claims) for the rest of his life; henceforth the
popular war hero could turn his energies to rebuilding his realm.
And, indeed, for a decade after Caltabellotta the Sicilians enjoyed
a surprising improvement in their fortunes, both commercial and
cultural, that would have seemed impossible twenty-five years
earlier. Freed from hated French control, they were, if not
independent, at least under the governance of a reasonably friendly
foreign regime that had sworn to preserve all local privileges and
customs and to institute a regular parliament that would possess a
measure of real power. The Catalans also offered a network of
commercial contacts that spanned the Mediterranean, and they
were committed to religious revival and reform, both of which Sicily
sorely needed.
Moreover, a military alliance with Catalonia, furtively arranged
after Caltabellotta, protected them from renewed Angevin attack
and seemed to ensure the new government's ability to put an end
to the unabated infighting of Sicily's belligerent inland barons.
Within a few years of the war's end the government managed to
standardize and liberalize the kingdom's burdensome tariff code
and to restore most of the lands and goods confiscated by
opportunistic barons and grasping clerics during the war. Scores
of new churches, schools, hospitals, and monasteries sprang from
the ground or were rebuilt from ruins and generously reendowed.
Frederick, true to his promise, convened an annual parliament and,
remarkably, gave it final authority over foreign policy. For the first
time in years, almost beyond the memory of anyone then alive,
Sicilians believed that a measure of peace and prosperity had come,
or would soon come, to their long-troubled land.
But the reemergence of hostilities with Naples signalled the end
of the brief ascendancy. At the midpoint of Frederick's reign a wide
variety of factors - of which the struggle with Robert was merely
one, and not necessarily the greatest - catalyzed to bring about a
startling unraveling of Sicilian life. Speciale's narrative suggests,
with the aid of hindsight, that this decline was in full swing as early
as 1314; but a case may be made for pushing that date forward to
1317 or even 1321. Nevertheless, by Frederick's death in 1337, fully a
decade before the arrival of the Black Death, Sicily was a ruin of
poverty, violence, and bitter discontent. A severe demographic
decline, one that would eventually reach staggering proportions,
had begun, leaving villages, farms, monasteries, and some whole
towns empty and lifeless and their buildings in decay. A crippling
burden of illiteracy still weighed down the populace that remained.
Angevin armies, having renewed their attacks in 1317 and 1321, by
1325 had penetrated the hinterland and laid waste vast stretches
of farmland; scores of villages were razed, and at least a handful of
larger towns raided, before the attackers were finally driven from
the island by the king's few remaining loyal troops. In the wake of
this campaign, a round of civil wars, between vendetta-driven
baronial families on one hand and between ersatz native patriots
and the dominant Catalan caste on the other, erupted; these
conflicts would not be wholly resolved until well into the fifteenth
century. The central government, as a result of its inability to
control all of this fighting, was increasingly hated and powerless.
And on the social level Sicilian life fared no better. Religious life
suffered from the despoliation of churches and monasteries, a
severe shortage of qualified clerics to guard their flocks, popular
confusion over widespread heterodox and heretical teachings,
and long periods of ecclesiastical interdict. A xenophobic cultural
isolation gripped all levels of society; foreigners of any sort were
distrusted, resented, and increasingly subjected to vituperation and
physical attack. The alliance with Catalonia had long since been
broken and was replaced by two useless pacts with the northern
Ghibellines that brought the islanders nothing and in fact only
added to their misery by further entangling them in peninsular
affairs. The economy, which had indeed rallied in the immediate
post-war years, stagnated around 1317-18, and entered a sharp
decline after 1321. Cities already groaning under severe financial
difficulties and high levels of crime and disease were choked with
peasant refugees from the fighting and poverty of the upland
territories. And a proto-Mafia, with its distinctive mentality and
violent methods well established, already controlled the interior of
the island.
It is challenging enough to summarize such chaos; but to explain
it presents special difficulties. The greatest of these is the relative
paucity of sources. Sicily's archival holdings are meager for the
medieval period, compared to other Mediterranean regions.
Centuries of invasion, rebellion, earthquakes, and fires have
exacted a heavy toll on the extant documents and have conse-
quently obscured our view of this complex society at the point of one
of its worst crises.2
The narrative sources provide a vivid if unreliable chronological
framework. These works focus inevitably on the political and
military events of Frederick's reign and are decidedly partisan
(either in favor of the Sicilians as opposed to the Catalans, in
general, or in favor of one region or city over all others). As a rule,
their unreliability is in direct proportion to their partisan zeal. In
addition to Nicola Speciale's chronicle there is the Historia sicula
of Bartolomeo di Neocastro (as patriotic a son as Messina ever
produced), yet another work of the same name by Michele da
Piazza, and an anonymous Chronicon Siciliae. Two short works in
Sicilian dialect survive, the better known of which - a fifteenth-
century work known as Lu rebellamentu di Sichilia - provided the plot
for Verdi's opera. Our knowledge of the rogue Catalan-Sicilian
2
On the Sicilian archives and chancery, see Adelaide Baviera Albanese, "Diritto pubblico
e istituzioni amministrative in Sicilia," ArchStSic, 3rd ser., 19 (1969), 391-563; Baviera
Albanese, "La sede delFArchivio di Stato di Palermo," in La presenza della Sicilia nella
cultura degli ultimi cento anni (Palermo, 1977), pp. 721—36.
seizure of the Athenian duchy comes chiefly from Ramon
Muntaner's Crdnica, a fascinating work by one of the more colorful
figures of the age. These narratives, with the exception of
Muntaner's, are unique since they represent the first histories of
Sicily to be written by native Sicilians rather than by scribes for a
conquering foreigner; consequently what they have to say is
important even when they are incorrect.3
More important is the documentary evidence. This book utilizes
several thousand records that survive in a series of patchwork
registers and portfolios (tabulari, in Italian) of scattered parch-
ments. These, plus a handful of extant notarial registers and
fragments (spezzoni), are housed in the state archives in Palermo. A
large number of documents dealing chiefly with diplomatic matters
are located in the Crown of Aragon archives in Barcelona. But apart
from these two collections little remains.
No less an obstacle is the problem of objectivity. Little enough
has been written about Sicily in these years, but much of what has
been published is no less blinkered than the fourteenth-century
texts on which the modern works have been chiefly based. These
biases are, to an extent, understandable. For many Sicilians the
Vespers era, taken as the decades from 1282 to 1337, is the most
romanticized period of their history after the gilded Norman
kingdom of the twelfth century. It is, after all, the story of their
great patriotic rebellion against foreign tyranny, a revolution
initially triumphant but ultimately tragic in its outcome. Pathos
and a kind of tired pride inform much of this sense of their past,
3
Bartolomeo di Neocastro (Bartholomeus Neocastrensis), Historia sicula ab anno 1250 ad i2gj
deducta, in RGBS 1; Michele da Piazza (Michaelis de Platea), Historia sicula ab anno
MCCCXXXVII ad annum MCCCLXI, ed. Antonino Giuflrida (Palermo, 1980), Fonti per
la storia di Sicilia, vol. in; Anonymous, Chronicon Siciliae ab acquisition ipsius insulae per
Graecos usque ad obitum Guillelmi duds Friderici II regis Siciliae filii, in Rerum italicarum
scriptores, ed. Lodovico Muratori, 25 vols. (Milan, 1722—51), x; Anonymous, Historia
conspirationis quam molitusfaitJohannes Prochyta, in RGBS 1; Ramon Muntaner, Cronica, ed.
Ferran Soldevila, in Les quatre grans croniques: Jaume I, Bernat Desclot, Ramon Muntaner, Pere
III, 2nd edn. (Barcelona, 1983), Biblioteca Perenne, vol. xxvi. Of the Sicilian works,
Speciale's is much the most interesting and has received the most serious attention; see
Giacomo Ferrau, Nicolb Speciale, storico del <(Regnum Siciliae" (Palermo, 1974), Bollettino
del Gentro di studi filologici e linguistici siciliani, Supplementi, ser. mediolatina e
umanistica, vol. 11. On Muntaner, see Roger Sablonier, Krieg und Kriegertum in der Cronaca
des Ramon Muntaner: Eine Studie zum spatmittelalterlichen Kriegwesen aufgrund katalanischen
Quellen (Bern, 1971), Geist und Werk der Zeiten, Arbeiten aus dem Historischen Seminar
der Universitat Zurich, vol. xxxi; and R. G. Keightley, "Muntaner and the Gatalan Grand
Company," Re vista canadiense de estudios hispdnicos 4 (1979), 37—58.
in a tradition that stretches from the fourteenth to the early

twentieth century; and with some praiseworthy exceptions it still
dominates much of Sicily's historical thought. In countless
histories, novels, stage dramas, operas, even puppet plays, from
Neocastro's chronicle to the fanfare that surrounds each new
edition of Michele Amari's Laguerra del Vespro siciliano, the Sicilians'
noble struggle against the horrors of oppression has been told over
and over again.4 Modern research has added detail but has failed to
alter the basic picture - indeed, it has all too often refused to alter
it. And inevitably, from this viewpoint, the dramatic failure of
Frederick's reign appears as tragedy, the ineluctable result of
continued foreign enmity, oppression, and meddling, only this time
by the once-friendly Catalans. The battlecry of 1282 "Morano
li francesi!" ("Kill the French!") had become by 1337 "Morano li
Catalani!" Except for the venerable king who had brought them
victory at Caltabellotta and a few stalwarts like Simon de
Vallguarnera, the Catalans were generally regarded at best as
privileged outsiders who had unintentionally but decisively brought
ruin upon the natives, and at worst as callous traitors to the trust
Sicily had placed in them. This is a lachrymose and damaging
tradition, one that portrays the Sicilian people as hapless victims of
international greed, fated by geography to repeated plunder and
colonization. And it has endured.
Conversely and perversely, a second historical tradition, rep-
resented chiefly by non-Sicilian historians, recognizes in Sicily's
decline evidence of the islanders' fundamental ungovernability
and truculence. The supposed tyranny of Hohenstaufen and
Angevin rule, this view maintains, was instead a much needed
attempt -justifiably stern by the standards of the age - to impose
order on an inveterately disordered society. By this reasoning the
Vespers war was less a heroic and ill-fated struggle than it was an
incident of rationalized pack violence, a mere riot that succeeded
only because it provided a convenient vehicle for Catalan expan-
sionism. And the collapse that occurred in the last half of
Frederick's reign resulted as much from innate Sicilian weaknesses
4
Michele Amari, La guerra del Vespro siciliano, gth edn. (Milan, 1886) established the
definitive text; it was initially published, and promptly banned by the Bourbon
government, in 1842. Now see the new edition in 3 vols. (Palermo, 1969), ed. Francesco
Giunta.
as from the king's bungling attempts to manage an impossible
situation.5
In any situation as polarized as this, there is something to be
said for each side. The war that the Angevins forced on Sicily by
refusing to relinquish their claim clearly left the Sicilians with no
choice but to fight back and to devote to that struggle resources
that were desperately needed elsewhere. By the time peace finally
came, in 1437 under Alfonso the Magnanimous, both Sicily and
southern Italy were devastated and cripplingly impoverished; the
gulf that separated them economically and socially from the more
prosperous north, and still separates them, here makes its first
tentative appearance.6 Moreover, the Catalans, like their German
and French predecessors, indeed conspired to control the most
profitable trades passing through Sicilian ports, just as they came
5
Leonardo Sciascia, "II mito dei Vespri siciliani da Amari a Verdi," ArchStSicOr 69 (1973),
183-92, discusses various interpretations of the Vespers period during the Risorgimento.
An interesting, idiosyncratic survey of responses to the Sicilian problem is Salvatore
Tramontana, Gli anni del Vespro: I'immaginario, la cronaca, la storia (Bari, 1989), Storia e
civilta, vol. xxv. Two examples of the contrasting scholarly traditions are Antonino de
Stefano, Federico III d'Aragona, re di Sicilia: 1296-1337, 2nd edn. (Bologna, 1956), with its
paeans to "la grande anima del popolo siciliano"; and Denis Mack Smith, Medieval Sicily,
800-1715 (London, 1968), a splenetic work that sees incompetence and corruption at every
turn. The larger debate over the Mezzogiorno's economic underdevelopment in relation to
the northern Italian regions (a phenomenon that is variously dated from the first century
BCE to the advent of industrialism) has received considerably more and better attention
from scholars than the forty-year period examined by the present book. The best overview
is Giuseppe Galasso, "Considerazioni intorno alia storia del Mezzogiorno in Italia," in his
collection Mezzogiorno medievale e moderno (Turin, 1975), pp. 15-59; s e e a ^ so t n e introductory
chapter to the excellent new work by Stephan R. Epstein, An Island/or Itself: Economic
Development and Social Change in Late Medieval Sicily (Cambridge, 1992), Past and Present
Publications, pp. 1-24.
6
This is not to say that Sicily's economic backwardness, in relation to northern Italy or the
rest of Mediterranean Europe, was established permanently at this time. Recent studies
have shown that the Sicilian economy recovered from the crises of the fourteenth century
(which were experienced at any rate by all of western Europe) to enjoy a wide-ranging
expansion of productivity and trade in the fifteenth. See Epstein, An Island for Itself ch. 8.
Epstein's thesis, admittedly tentative, that Sicilian underdevelopment did not become
permanently entrenched until the general European crisis of the seventeenth century, is
intriguing but needs further study. Such research would need to examine not only the
extent of Sicilian trade, whether foreign or domestic, and the productivity of manufac-
turing, but also the distribution of the wealth created by that trade — something that
Epstein was not able to examine in his fascinating book. Certainly a Val Demone weaver
or taverner of the sixteenth century would have disputed any claims that he was doing as
well as his compeers on the continent. While agreeing with Epstein that Sicily staged an
impressive economic recovery in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, this book contends
that there are more factors to consider than just the economic in assessing the overall
Sicilian crisis. Indeed, it is significant that Sicily, in the early modern period, continued
to lag behind the rest of Europe in so many aspects despite its economic recovery.
io The decline and fall of medieval Sicily
to hold more and more of the leading political and ecclesiastical
positions in the realm, especially in the latter half of Frederick's
reign.
Nevertheless, the Sicilians magnified their own misery in
important ways. Rather than capitalizing on their brief peacetime
prosperity by investing in new manufactures or developing a
carrying trade, for example, they sank their money into a vain
consumerism that was perhaps understandable, given their
wartime privations, but which in fact left effective control of non-
domestic commerce in the hands of merchants from Genoa, Pisa,
Venice, Marseilles, and Barcelona. Rather than using the proffered
royal parliament to establish a sense of communality and shared
interests, they remained intensely and unshakeably local in their
concerns, willing to obey the central government or to serve it
whenever doing so offered them a chance to wield power or earn
money, but never willing - as at Trapani in 1314 - to sacrifice for it.
Curiously, however, this stubborn localism never evolved into a
positive spirit of independence. We see one aspect of this in the
demesne cities, where the high degree of personal mobility that
evolved out of the collapse of serfdom in the thirteenth century
created large municipalities made up of nuclear families and
isolated individuals; the sudden absence of extended family net-
works, or of corporate structures such as trade or artisan guilds,
might have led, under different circumstances, to the creation of
an atmosphere of independence. But as the economic and social
problems of Frederick's reign deepened, the urban populace sought
refuge instead in quasi-paternalistic customs and institutions such
as joining the comitiva (an inchoate and ragtag group of followers or
hangers-on) of a member of the urban elite.7 Divided into factions
of "Catalanists" or "Latinists," of Ventimiglia supporters or
Chiaromonte champions, the people of the fourteenth century
increasingly sought to escape the misery of their lives by seeking
security in their local consuetudines or, in more dangerous times, in
the protection of the emerging grandees (Latin meliores, Italian
migliori, in our sources).8
7
Acta curie i, docs. 21 (29 Dec. 1311), 69 (26 Aug. 1312).
8
Henri Bresc, Un monde mediterraneen: economie et societe en Sidle, 1300-1450, 2 vols. (Palermo,
1986), p. 737 cites what seems to be the first appearance of the term migliori, in reference
to the dominant figures in the cities (referring here to Calascibetta). In Messina these
For both of these traditions, as for the compromise position this
book will argue, Frederick's reign holds a crucial place in the larger
debate. His forty-one years on the throne mark the most critical
decades in medieval Sicily's agonizing transition from modest
prosperity to deep-rooted poverty and social divisiveness.
He came to the island with his father's armies in 1283 and spent
his adolescence in the raucous capital of Palermo. Unlike his elder
brothers, who viewed the place as little more than a useful addition
to the growing Catalan hegemony, Frederick loved Sicily. The
troubadour culture of the royal court was much faded by that time,
compared to its heyday in the earlier part of the century, when
poetry from the so-called "Sicilian School" inspired mainland poets
like Guinizetti and Cavalcanti and eventually Dante himself; but
even in its decayed state that culture exerted a powerful influence
on the young Frederick. His father's campaign to wrest the
kingdom from Angevin control struck young Frederick as an
exciting and chivalrous quest. The heady atmosphere of a success-
ful revolution in an exotic new realm of bustling, crowded cities,
pleasure gardens, and majestic churches had a strong effect on him.
He was a young man of emotion and impulse - a sensualist, not a
man of thought.9 The conviction that his life was destined for some
divinely sanctioned adventurous purpose never left him, and this
accounts in part for the uncanny consistency of his life-long
devotion to lost causes, and for his woodenheaded inability to
compromise. There was, however, no doubt of his bravery or of his
affection for his realm - and herein lies the secret of his continued
popularity with his subjects, even after the Sicilians had begun
to resent the Catalan presence in general.10 To Sicilian eyes,
figures were described as nobiles even though they were not in all cases members of the
aristocracy; see Enrico Pispisa, Messina nel Trecento: politico, economia, societa (Messina,
1980), Gollana di testi e studi storici, vol. i, pp. 98-9.
9
In his younger years, he had a well-deserved reputation for sexual indulgence and head-
strong anger, even cruelty. Even allowing for a Neapolitan bias, Boccaccio knew his man
when he provided a thumbnail sketch of Frederick in // Decamerone 5.6.
10
In the last years of the fighting, from 1296 to 1302, Frederick delighted in his personal
command of Sicily's forces, organizing sieges in Calabria, constructing war engines,
leading small reconnaissance squadrons, and marshalling troops in open battle, all with
great brio. For a summary of these exploits, see Amari, La guerra del Vespro siciliano,
ch. 15—16; Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 119-124; and Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. 11,
ch. 18-19; bk. in, ch. 5-7, IO-II, 15, and 18. Shortly after the battle of Falconaria in late
1300 Frederick defeated Prince Philip of Taranto, the son of Charles II of Anjou, in single
combat and held him prisoner for two years at Cefalu; see Muntaner, Cronica, ch. 192; and
Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. v, ch. 10.
Frederick was the first king since the Norman era who was
unquestionably loyal to the island, a ruler who - unlike Frederick II
of Hohenstaufen or either Charles I or II of Anjou -viewed Sicily as
an end in itself and not merely as a geographical base or financial
resource for pursuing grander schemes elsewhere. He had a gift for
languages, wrote a good deal of troubadour verse as a young man
(although only one poem survives), and could speak to his subjects
in their own tongue. His cocky, idealistic manner inspired strong
emotions. His contemporaries outside of Sicily certainly found him
a compelling figure, although not so compelling that anyone rushed
to his aid when serious trouble with Naples began again. According
to one tradition Dante, grateful for Frederick's devotion to Henry
VII, considered dedicating part of the Commedia to him; Ramon
Muntaner once endured torture at Angevin hands for his loyal
service to him; and both the heretical leader Fra Dolcino and the
heterodox mystic reformer Arnau de Vilanova believed him to be
the "God-elected king" who would lead the final reform of
Christendom before the advent of Antichrist. A more sober
judgment came from Pope John XXII, to whom Frederick was
simply "an evil man who would be even worse if he had the
ability."11
The kingdom he ruled was a fractious and turbulent island where
life had never been easy and where sharp contrasts existed between
the economic and cultural development levels of the various
population groups. Sicily's strategic location accounted for much of
11
Antonino de Stefano, Federico III d'Aragona, I2g6-i^y, 2nd edn. (Bologna, 1956); see also
Rafael Olivar Bertrand, Un rei de llegenda: Frederic III de Sicilia (Barcelona, 1951); and the
very old Francesco Testa, De vita et rebusgestisFriderici IlSiciliae regis (Palermo, 1775), which
is still useful for some of the transcribed documents it contains. Frederick III (sometimes
referred to as Frederick of Aragon) was actually only the second of his name to rule the
island, and this has created a small though irritating degree of confusion among
historians and bibliographers. The Hohenstaufen ruler Frederick II was the first
Frederick to govern the island, but his numerature remained defined by his German
imperial inheritance. Since the Catalan Frederick regarded himself as the ideological as
well as the chronological heir of the Hohenstaufen Frederick, and since the majority of
the records of his time describe him as the Third, this book uses the citation "Frederick
III" throughout, although the reader should be aware that many of the archival sources
and secondary materials utilized are inconsistent in their taxonomy. Marjorie Reeves,
Joachim o/Fiore and the Prophetic Future (London, 1976), pp. 45-9 (Fra Dolcino); ACA Cartas
James II, no. 9944 (Muntaner's torture), and no. 3286 (John XXII's comment): "Verum
est, quod dominus Fredericus est malus homo, et esset peior, si haberet potestatem."
General context can be found in Corrado Mirto, // regno delVisola di Sicilia e delle hole
adiacenti dalla sua nascita alia peste del 1347-1348 (Messina, 1986).
what was best and worst in Sicilian life, for as Muntaner (who
understood such matters) wrote, "Whoever wishes to control the
Mediterranean must control Sicily." And throughout the centuries
many peoples, desiring the larger goal, had achieved at least the
lesser. What attracted these successive waves of invaders - Greeks,
Romans, Vandals, Goths, Byzantines, Arabs, Normans, Germans,
Angevins, Catalans -was an island of approximately 25,000 square
kilometers (9,800 square miles), moderately rich in resources but
desirable above all for its position at the nexus of the twin basins
that make up the Mediterranean. To this extent, for Sicily at least,
geography is history. Merchants or soldiers moving from east to
west, or vice versa, had to pass by the island, making it a natural
port of call. The preferred route passed through the narrow Strait
of Messina, so that sailors could take advantage of the large,
inviting harbors along Sicily's northern and eastern shores while
avoiding the Tunisian pirates operating further to the south. It was
the desire to control these harbors and the agricultural and mineral
produce of their hinterland that spurred such endless conquest and
colonization. These incursions seldom were successfully turned
back since the Sicilians were never able to mount a unified
resistance to invasion. In fact, nothing at all about the realm was
unified, owing to a dizzying variety of geographical and cultural
factors that combined to keep the people poor, uneducated,
backward, and as often as not hostile toward one another.
The landscape is dominated by mountains. Rising in some places

right from the coast, these mountains are broken into four distinct
chains that divide the island into discrete regions. From the Strait
of Messina the Peloritani chain stretches to the south and west,
reaching altitudes well above 1,200 meters (4,000 feet). In the
Middle Ages only its lowest reaches were cultivated, and even then
only on the southern and eastern sides of the chain; its long
northern coastal plain had no arable land, except for a small region
near Milazzo. Conifers covered the middle level, providing one of
the most densely forested areas on the island. This region provided
the timber for the busy shipbuilding industry in the Val Demone.
The upper reaches, however, had little or no vegetation and were
scarred by rapid currents that frequently produced flash floods
during the heavy rains of late autumn and winter. Further to the
west stand the Nebrodi and Madonie chains, climbing still higher to
over i,800 meters (6,000 feet). Stark and barren above and skirted
with beech and chestnut trees below, these mountains flatten west
of the watershed of the Belice river to form high limestone plateaus
thick with scrub and dotted with sulfurous massifs. Upland grasses
and olive trees grew well on these plateaus in the Middle Ages, but
little else since their lower altitude resulted in considerably
decreased rainfall. The mountains themselves produced consider-
able drainage, however, which ran (and still runs) to the north and
west and provided water ultimately to the capital city of Palermo.
The Iblei chain in the southeast promontory is considerably lower
than the other three. Volcanic in origin, it provided both the
greatest expanse of fertile land and the greatest variety of
vegetation in Frederick's kingdom. This region was, not coinci-
dentally, the site of many of the largest estates held by the nobility.
Limestone of excellent quality for building was also abundant in
this area, increasing in both quality and abundance as one moved
further south and east; the availability of such material, and the
superior quality of the soil, made this one of the longest inhabited
regions on the island, with a developed urban life dating to ancient
Greek times. Rising between the Iblei and Peloritani chains and
dominating the eastern coastline is Mount Etna, the highest point
in the realm, rising well above 3,000 meters (10,000 feet). It is one
of the most active volcanoes in the world, and the residue of its
many eruptions has made the surrounding hillsides and plains very
fertile, if more than usually vulnerable. Vineyards and citrus crops
grew well in this area, especially in the Catanian plain. This whole
region - from Catania itself (perhaps the third or fourth largest city
in the kingdom by the end of Frederick's reign) northward along
the coast to Acrireale and inland as far as Paterno and S. Maria di
Licodia - would be all but destroyed in a catastrophic eruption in
1329.12
Movement through these mountains was both difficult and
dangerous. By controlling only a handful of mountain passes or
roads a local baron could effectively seal off his territory from the
rest of the realm and become a law unto himself. In times of foreign
invasion, spreading disease, or social unrest, or simply in order to
express dissatisfaction with the government, these upland lords did
precisely that with considerable ease and usually with impunity.
12
See the dramatic eyewitness account by Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. VIII, ch. 2.
As if to invite their efforts, the roads they had to block were
surprisingly few and primitive. Indeed, considering that Sicily was
one of the longest settled sites in western Europe, the absence of
a network of usable roads linking the cities was a telling and
debilitating characteristic. By the fourteenth century the situation
had hardly improved from the seventh. The only thoroughfares that
could be considered major roads ran from Trapani to Palermo, from
Palermo to Agrigento, from Agrigento to Castrogiovanni, and
from Castrogiovanni to Randazzo; but even these were as often as
not in poor repair or, at some critical juncture, were under the
control of peevish local knights. Most other roads were little more
than tracks.
Riverine systems offered no alternative. The kingdom had no
rivers of any great size; but since it had likewise no useful network
of bridges the minor waterways that did exist provided obstacles
sufficiently large to frustrate trade or travel by land. Consequently,
internal trade was either immediately local (the largest economic
spheres that had meaning were the local valli) or else had to follow
a burdensome coastal orbit. Wines from central Caltanissetta, for
example, could reach the markets of northern Cefalu only by being
carted southward to Agrigento, whence they sailed around the
island to the northern coast (assuming they successfully avoided
Tunisian pirates), where they would likely be unloaded at Palermo
before being carted along the coast road eastward to Cefalu. But of
course so long a journey would result in the price of the wines being
raised to a level where they could not compete with local vintages.
For these reasons, there was relatively little trade between the
separate regions of Frederick's Sicily - although trade within
the valli was considerably more active than most scholars have
recognized - and hence relatively little sense of a shared fate or
responsibility in the kingdom as a whole. Only the river Salso had
any particular importance for the realm as a whole: stretching
northward from Licata (roughly the midpoint of the long border
facing Africa) to reach the Madonie mountains, it provided a
natural border for administrative and ecclesiastical districts. Royal
justiciars before 1282 and for a short time after Frederick's
coronation were appointed to serve "on this side" (citra) or "on the
far side" {ultra) of the Salso, in relation to the peninsula. But
the river itself had no considerable value as a thoroughfare.
The rivers, too narrow and shallow for navigation and too slow to
provide much hydraulic power for milling, were important chiefly
for irrigation. Since rainfall patterns generally did not coincide with
the growing season (almost all rains falling between November and
February), agriculture depended on continuous irrigation; and as a
result the great bulk of arable land lay adjacent to the scrawny
rivers, with fragile networks of carefully plotted ditches and the
occasional aqueduct spreading out from the stream. These farms
tended to be smaller affairs than those found on the continent or
peninsula, and a far-flung system of earthwork structures known as
il terraggio separated individual farms and crop fields while also
providing a primitive check on the erosion of the crumbling topsoil.
In so difficult a terrain and climate as this, water rights were as
highly prized and as stoutly defended as landownership itself, since
any field or vineyard whose water had been cut off would quickly
wither and die in the intense heat. Access to water was in fact one
of the few things that could inspire a small landowner or tenant
farmer to challenge the bullying tactics of the great lords - as when,
for example, a Monreale widow named Fioremille Luvetto sued in
1303 to break up the wealthy D. Guglielmo Abbate's seizure of the
"aqueducts and water channels" that issued from the river Garbele,
and for her trouble won not only the free use of the irrigation
network every Wednesday hence but also restitution of her legal
costs in pursuing her suit.13
The majority of the kingdom's small towns and hamlets also lay
along the rivers, with the result that most farms were worked by
leaseholding tenants with the help of day laborers hired in the town
or village rather than by a soil-bound peasantry. Indeed, by the
early fourteenth century, manorialism survived only on a handful of
ecclesiastical estates.14 The mobility thus available to the peasants,
13
ASP Tabulario S. Martino delle Scale, perg. 18 (i6Jan. 1303). For similar cases, see Pietro
Burgarella, "Le pergemene del monastero della Martorana," ArchStSic, 4th ser., 4 (1978),
55—110, doc. 69 (17 May 1329); and Salvatore Giambruno, // tabulario del monastero di
S. Margherita di Polizzi (Palermo, 1909), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xx, doc. 45 (4 Aug. 1331). See
also Giacomo Mustaccio's suit against Giovanni Chiaromonte in 1322—3, after the great
lord built a private aqueduct from the Oreto river to his vineyards that trespassed upon
Mustaccio's land; ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 77 (Giacomo di Gitella), fol. i26v; Ada curie in,
doc. 34 (Oct. 1325).
14
Illuminato Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro: uomini, citta e campagne, 1282-1376 (Rome, 1981),
pp. 57-9; Giuseppe Silvestri, Tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala e S. Maria di Maniaci
(Palermo, 1887), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xi, pp. 34—6, 57—8, 59-61; Epstein, An Islandfor Itself,
pp. 318-19.
as we shall see, was a crucial factor in the economic strategies of the
time: the common people, at least in theory, were free to move from
farm to farm, from farm to town, or from region to region, in
response to the economic opportunities (or lack of them) available.
Workers commonly plied a trade in the town and earned extra,
though paltry, wages by tending the crops and vines. Similarly
the village work-force was often comprised of day workers from the
surrounding rural areas; but in either case no hard distinction
existed between the town and rural economies. Peasant freeholds
were not numerous, especially in the poorer Val di Mazara, but
when they do appear in the extant sources they illustrate the
interpenetration of the two micro-economies. Sales of farm plots
were frequently accompanied by sales of their corresponding village
residences, as when Guglielmo and Margherita Truxavella, for
example, sold their paired domus and vineyard, located within and
without Petralia Soprana, respectively, to another local farmer.
And prosperous farmers often owned more than one field or
farmstead. In these cases the family typically resided in the patri-
monial village house and worked their various fields or vineyards
with the help of family members or hired laborers.15
The large, and largely empty, expanses of land away from the
rivers were either barren wastes or were given to cattle and sheep
rearing. These territories especially were the domain of the
powerful barons whose estates usually comprised a central manor-
house (casalis, in the sources; but castrum or fortilicium, if fortified)
and the surrounding regions of grassland and pasturage, dotted
with the occasional cattleman's station or shepherd's rest {rachalis
or rahallusy from Arabic rahl) that itself often formed the nexus of a
small settlement (such as Racalmuto or Rahalmingieri).16
As early as the middle of the thirteenth century, and certainly
by Frederick's time, the various regions of Sicily had developed
distinct cultural, social, and economic characteristics. This point
would not have to be made, were it not for the general failure of
non-Sicilian historians to appreciate the diversity that existed.
Traditionally, scholars have spared no effort to emphasize the
15
Giambruno, S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 6 (24 May 1286); see also doc. 31 (26 March 1328),
in which Pietro Dancia of Polizzi bestows a field and vineyard, plus corresponding town
residence, upon his German-born wife Maria.
16
Ibid., doc. 4; Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 135.
extent of social and cultural differences between the northern
Italian provinces, and even between the individual towns and
villages within each province; yet they have felt no compunction in
treating Sicily as a whole, a vast, unvaried, if unusually chaotic,
area of cereal production - the Mediterranean's breadbasket. The
reality, of course, was considerably different. Features of geogra-
phy, as described briefly above, divide the island into at least three
distinct zones, apart from the more fundamental division between
urban coast and rural hinterland. These zones, called valli,
correspond roughly with the contours provided by the mountain
ranges. The Val di Mazara, the largest of the provinces, comprised
the western portion of the island, reaching as far eastward along
the southern shore as the river Salso, and as far along the northern
shore as the town of Termini; inland, it reached to the Madonie
mountain range. Thus it was roughly equivalent with the ultra
Salsum justiciarate. The Val di Noto, second in order of size, was the
district east of the Salso and south of Mount Etna (or, approxi-
mately, the Iblei mountains and all the land within an 80-kilometer
[50-mile] circumference of them). Smallest, and the most moun-
tainous, was the Val Demone, in the sharp northeast promontory.
Made up chiefly of the Peloritani and Nebrodi mountains and their
coastal skirt, the Val Demone had the highest population density
on the island.17 These valli, which later became formalized as
administrative divisions, seem to have derived historically as well
as geographically: they correspond to the three major phases of
the Muslim conquest of Sicily, in the early, middle, and late ninth
century, respectively. This correspondence is important, for it
signals the major traditional ethnic distributions on the island. For
example, the Val di Mazara, being longest under Muslim control,
customarily held the largest Muslim population, whereas the Val
Demone, with its Byzantine heritage, had the most pronounced
Greek element in its ethnic and cultural makeup. The different
agricultural and mineral products of each vallo, combined with their
varying cultural characteristics, produced the distinctive life of
each. As we shall see, the valli experienced separate fates in
Frederick's reign, each succeeding or failing to the extent that it
17
Karl Julius Beloch, Bevolkerungsgeschichte Italiens, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1937-61), 1, pp. 153-4. For
a fuller treatment, see Vincenzo Epifanio, / valli di Sicilia nel Medioevo e la low importanza
nella vita dello stato (Naples, 1938).
adapted itself to the ever straitened circumstances from mid-reign
onwards.
The cities that lay along the coastal perimeter were crowded,
noisy, commercial centers where the produce of the interior was
bought and sold, where local manufactures were produced, and
where the most diverse populations were to be found. These
municipalities, plus a handful of larger inland towns like Corleone
and Castrogiovanni, belonged to the royal demesne but were
ostensibly self-governing as long as they paid their taxes to the
crown, especially the vital harbor duties, and preserved the peace.
But, as the reign progressed, the cities - especially those in the
west, which were most vulnerable to attack - found it increasingly
difficult to perform either task. From 1317 onwards a frustrating
downward spiral eroded urban life: foreign attack led to civic chaos,
which contributed in turn to economic stagnation. But this, of
course, only heightened the need to impose order, which necessi-
tated an increase in tax revenues. The presence of numerous ethnic
and religious groups only made matters worse once the decline set
in, as people wasted their energies on a search for scapegoats. The
Catalans were centered in these coastal cities - Trapani, Messina,
Catania, Siracusa, and the megalopolis (population near 100,000)
Palermo - and so were foreign merchants from the northern Italian
communes and the southern French cities. 18 Most of Sicily's
native Jewish and remaining Muslim populations also lived here,
especially in Trapani and Palermo, while eastern Messina sported a
sizable Greek population made up chiefly of Basilian clerics and
domestic servants but with a smattering of Byzantine merchants
still in evidence. All of these foreign groups were victims of popular
resentment and mob violence after 1321.19
18
Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 62—3; Ferdinando Lionti, "Le societa dei Bardi, dei
Peruzzi e degli Acciaiuoli in Sicilia," ArchStSicy 2nd ser., 14 (1889-90), 189-230; Carmelo
Trasselli, "Nuovi documenti sui Peruzzi, Bardi e Acciaiuoli in Sicilia," Economia e storia 3
(1956), 188-9; Henri Bresc, "Marchands de Narbonne et du Midi en Sicile, 1300—1450," in
Narbonne, archeologie et histoire: 45/e Congres de la federation historique du Languedoc mediterraneen
et du Roussillon, 3 vols. (Montpellier, 1973), m, pp. 93-9. See also ASP Cane. Reg. 2,
fol. 96-96V (31 May 1313) and 114-15V (12 Sept. 1332) for the trade privileges granted to the
merchants of Roussillon and Perpignan, and of Montpellier, respectively.
19
Eliyahu Ashtor, "The Jews of Trapani in the Later Middle Ages," Studi medievally 3rd ser.,
25 (1984), 1—30; David Abulafia, "The End of Muslim Sicily," in Muslims under Latin Rule,
ed. James Powell (Princeton, 1991), pp. 103—33 anc^ Abulafia, "Una comunita ebraica della
Sicilia occidentals Erice 1298^1304," ArchStSicOr 80 (1984), 157-90; Mario Scaduto, //
monachesimo basiliano nella Sicilia medievale: rinascita e decadenza, secoli XI-XW (Rome, 1982).
If life in the interior was a matter of land labor, small wages or
even barter, and dependence upon the local lord for protection and
justice, then life along the perimeter was altogether different.
These quasi-communes (universitates) were sites of Roman law
courts, municipal night-watch companies, armies of harbor
officials, schools, tariff codes, almshouses and hospitals, more tax
collectors, taverns, warehouses, and urban magistrates endlessly
copying, invoking, exercising, and seeking to expand their cities'
cherished and obsessively guarded consuetudines.20 Each community
followed its own customs but all remained open to outside contact;
and this frequently resulted in curious social tensions, since the
cities were exposed to all the new developments in Mediterranean
commercial and cultural life but lacked the ability or willingness to
adapt themselves easily to those changes. For example, the wave of
reformist apocalyptic fervor that swept over much of southern
Europe around 1300 worked its way into the cities with great ease
and resulted in, among other things, an urgent popular embrace of
a radicalized "evangelical poverty" that would help to purify the
people so that they would be able to withstand the destructive
power of the approaching Antichrist.21 The identification of
Frederick as the God-elected king who would lead the evangelical
mission only intensified these convictions among the illiterate
populace. Large segments of the urban crowd embraced the move-
ment, which had a large component of anti-clericalism; and the
papacy, as the force behind the original imposition of Angevin rule,
was popularly discredited for its political meddling and, from
Avignon, its perceived obsession with money. Thus when members
of the papally appointed inquisition arrived to restore discipline,
accompanied by a fresh corps of tithe collectors, they were met with
grumbling disobedience, heckling in the streets, and more than
once with outright assault. Yet adherence to the evangelical
For a sampling of these texts, see Santi Luigi Agnello, "II Liber privilegiorum et
diplomatum nobilis et fidelissimae Syracusarum urbis," Archivio storico siracusano 5-6
(1959-60), 32-81; D. Puzzolo Sigillo, "I privilegi di Messina in un Compendium spagnuolo
del seicento ed un Summarium latino del trecento," Archivio storico messinese, 3rd ser., 7
(1955—6), 25—107; 9-10 (1957-9), 207—50; Carmelo Trasselli, I privilegi di Messina e di Trapani
(1160-1355) con un'appendice sui consolati trapanesi nel secolo XV (Palermo, 1949); Raffaele
Starrabba and Luigi Tirrito, Assise e consuetudini della terra di Corleone (Palermo, 1880),
DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. 11.
See my article, "Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals in Sicily," Franciscan
Studies 50 (1990), 3—29; see also ch. 5, below.
movement was fitful and periodic, because many Sicilians, though
critical of church secularism, were reluctant to accept the
reformers' corollary that the church had vitiated its spiritual
authority. Unable to resolve their conflicting sentiments, the
crowds turned to a variety of prelates and popular preachers for
guidance - and of course received the contradictory answers they
might have expected, which only threw them into greater con-
fusion. Still others, who had long known poverty and had found no
particular benefit to result from it, found themselves embracing a
movement they did not truly understand while struggling to remain
loyal to a church whose policies they bitterly resented and whose
clergy they distrusted. With tensions like these constantly arising,
whether from religious developments or shifts in Mediterranean
commerce, political realignments, or inter-ethnic relations, the
coastal cities remained hubs of change, excitement, bewilderment,
and social strain.22
Compounding all of these difficulties, a fundamental rift existed
between the coastal societies and the inland world that prevented
any political or social cohesion from developing and that in fact
even kept economic relations between the two worlds to a
minimum. The baronial-rural world was altogether landlocked,
since the royal domain comprised not only the king's privately held
estates and the port cities but also the entire periphery of the island
to a distance "within a bowshot from the coast."23 Royal law also
forbade "any nobleman or baron" from interfering with town
government and punished anyone who sought to contravene the
liberties granted to urban citizens or who blocked the cities' access
22
Reg. Benedict XI, no. 834 (28 M a y 1304); A C A Cane. Reg. 337, fol. 336-336V (11 Feb. 1314);
Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 3871 (3 June 1314); Cartas James II, no. 4956 (1 Aug.
1314) and 5503 (5 Sept. 1316); ASP Tabulario S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 263 (11 July 1343,
but containing text of record from 20 March 1318); Ada curie v, doc. 8 (13 Sept. 1328); BGP
MS Qq H 3, fol. 243—243V (9 Oct. 1336).
23
An example (actually a feudal grant of estates in Calabria, then under Frederick's
control, to Blase d'Alago) is ACA Perg. James II, no. 641 (2 May 1296): "Si vero
pertinentie baronie, castrorum, terrarum, locorum, et bonorum ipsorum vel alterius
eorumdem currerent usque ad mare, jus dominium et proprietas totius litoris et
maritime pertinentiarum ipsarum in quantum a mari infra terram per jactum baliste
ipse pertinentie protenduntur tamquam ex antiquo ad Regiam Dignitatem spectantia in
nostro demanio et dominio reserventur." The stipulation was normally added even to
feudal contracts for fief estates far inland, to protect the king's rights in the event that
the landholding, through marriage or any other means, ever came to expand until it
confronted the sea; see also no. 856 (27 Aug. 1297), and 4051 (20 Feb. 1323).
24
to fresh water. These stipulations aimed to safeguard the govern-
ment's revenues and to prevent the possible control of the market
places by those who already controlled cereal production, but they
had the additional effect, whether intended or not, of cutting off the
interior world from trade and the embryonic communal-republican
style of government and social structure. As often as not, this
division suited the nobles, who preferred their traditional ways and
valued their virtual independence in the highlands. But in times of
crisis in the agricultural economy, which were frequent from 1311
on, rural Sicily had no alternative means of supporting itself. When-
ever disaster struck, those starving peasants and unskilled workers
who could do so streamed into the cities, seeking work or alms and
placing a terrible new burden on already overstretched resources
there. Urban crowding, and its concomitant crime and disease,
increased dramatically in the last two decades of Frederick's reign.
Small wonder, then, that urban unrest did the same, and that this
generally coincided with a decline in the upland economy.
As for the barons caught in the downward spiral, improvement in
their economic position was possible only by receiving additional
land through service to the crown, or, more simply, through
grabbing the land by force. Extortion and private war proliferated
throughout inland Sicily and resulted in the complete annihilation
of numerous aristocratic families. Shortly after Frederick's death,
but still before the Black Death, the counts of Antiochia, Cisario,
Maletta, Monteliano, Palizzi, Passaneto, Prefoglio, Sclafani, and
Uberti had all disappeared in baronial wars.25 Another alternative
was to move into the demesne cities, which they did in considerable
numbers. These "urban knights" as a rule did not participate in
trade, lacking both the expertise and the inclination; instead they
acquired urban wealth by assuming the lucrative administrative
roles that became available at mid-reign.26 In some cases they
24
Capitula regni Siciliae, quae adhodiernum diem lata sunt, ed. Francesco T e s t a , 2 vols. (Palermo,
1741-3): here see vol. 1, ch. 57 (Capitula alia); Luigi Genuardi,//comune nelMedioEvo in Sicilia
(Palermo, 1921), pp. 121-5; Enrico Mazzarese Fardella, "L'aristocrazia siciliana nel secolo
X I V e i suoi rapporti con le citta demaniali," in Aristocrazia cittadina e ceti popolari nel tardo
Medioevo in Italia e Germania, ed. Reinhard Elze and Gina Fasoli (Bologna, 1984), pp. 177-94.
25
Bresc, Un monde, p. 807.
26
Mazzarese Fardella, "L'aristocrazia siciliana," p. 184 argues that the barons a i m e d chiefly
not at capturing urban financial resources but at directly attacking the royal d e m e s n e as
an institution. Epstein, An Island for Itself, pp. 319—20 contends that economic concerns
predominated; gaining power in the cities was simply a consequence of the grab for cash.
simply usurped authority, but in most cases for which there is
explicit evidence they were established in office by the king, who
contravened his own constitution of 1296 in order to regain control
over municipalities that were degenerating into chaos; in some
instances baronial officers were given command of the cities at the
request of the universitas itself (although the urban officials thus
displaced later chose to ignore this fact, when complaining of the
knights' intrusions). The nobles' lack of alternatives, as matters
worsened in the 1320s and 1330s, only increased their bellicosity and
contributed to their reputation for rebellion and vendettas in the
highlands and for swaggering, heavy-handed bullying in the cities.
And as their reputations thus declined, the prejudice against them
held by the urban populace only increased. To coastal Sicily the
baronial world was a backward and brutal place where the rule of
law was ignored and the word of God had scarcely penetrated. As
early as 1285, for example, Kingjames referred to the upland world
as a foreign territory that lay outside the civilized realm, when he
complained about "the barons and other men outside the confines
of the realm who neither serve nor offer aid" to the kingdom as a
whole. And in 1328 thejudex of Catania, Simone Pucci, patronizingly
inserted into a court record a notice that he had rephrased the legal
details of the document (a simple property transaction) in the most
simplistic terms possible for the benefit of one of the participants,
a Val Demone miles, "because he is a knight, and is presumed to be
ignorant of the law."27 These "urban knights" were opportunistic
and frequently guilty of a certain hostile haughtiness toward the
town-dwellers whom they had been sent (they felt) to protect from
their own ineptitude. In some places they exercised near martial
law authority. Few, however, were as bad as D. Federico d'Algerio,
whose excesses rapidly led to mass protests in the streets of
Palermo: "He is a person of depraved nature, who has committed
numerous crimes in the city . . . And how many citizens, even
mothers and wives, has he ruined and treated ignominiously! . . .
This knight is so crammed with perversions, stains, and disgraceful
qualities that the cry of the common people has made it plain to us
27
Testa, ch. 39: "barones et alii extra regni confinia nee servire personaliter nee adiumenta
prestare cogantur"; and AGA Perg. Alfonso III, no. 184 (27 April 1328): "eo quod miles est,
et presummitur juris ignarus."
all... that he is a criminal and an evil-doer, whose house is a den of
thieves."28
The king tried to be the unifying force between these disparate
worlds and to provide some sort of standard justice without either
infringing on guaranteed privileges or appearing to favor any
particular group. It was a difficult balance to maintain, and in
the end Frederick failed on all counts. Blunt parochialism - the
entrenched concern for oneself, next for one's family, and at most
for one's city - was too powerful a force in Sicilian life to be over-
come easily by a dynasty that was, however capable, still suspected
by many rural and urban subjects to be merely the most recent
figures in a long series of crown-wearing foreign opportunists. Even
his much more capable brother had faced three murder attempts by
disgruntled subjects. Frederick, for his failures, was confronted
by at least two would-be regicides.29 More commonly, however,
those who felt themselves to be victims of monarchical abuse or
ineptitude satisfied themselves by simply ignoring the king's
commands. One early rebel against Frederick, for example, who
seized thefortalicium at Gangi and sought to live as an independent
petty prince, not only escaped punishment but was even brought
into the royal diplomatic service only two months after being
forced to surrender his stronghold.30 To hold the realm together,
Frederick had few tools at his disposal apart from his general
popularity, a currency easily exhausted. Sounding the alarm of a
new threat from Naples was usually one reliable way of rallying
popular support, since hatred of the Angevins was one of the few
sentiments his subjects held in common. Much more important,
however, was the resource of the royal demesne itself, which
Frederick was forced to parcel out in order to purchase peace.
Loyalty to the king, and by implication to the kingdom as a whole,
ran high only when the government had some largesse to share;
royal favors, administrative posts, tax immunities, pensions, and
28
Ada curie v, doc. 32 (23 Nov. 1328): "ipsum Fridericum fuisse et esse persona prave
condicionis, et commisse multiplices errores excessus in dicta urbe . . . et quamplures et
alii cives dicte urbis matres et mulieres que sibi ipse miles injuriatus extitit et cum
ignominia in eos processit... ipsum militem pravis, maculis, et ignominiosis irretitus et
plenus, ut de hiis est vox et fama publica manifestat, quod . . . eundem militem talem
fuisse sontem et maleficum, cum domus eius sit spelunca latronum."
29
Maria-Merce Costa, "Un atemptat frustrat contra Frederic III de Sicilia," in XI Congresso
11, pp. 447-60.
30
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10210 (3 Aug. 1299) anc * 10262 (24 May 1299).
commercial privileges were eagerly sought amid florid declarations
of fidelity to and affection for the king's desire to provide justice to
a unified realm. 31 It is not altogether surprising to find an element
31
A good example of the obsequious rhetorical lengths to which petitioners resorted is the
Palermo commune's plea for a royal pardon ofjudex Tommasso Benedetto, a prominent
figure in the city who had been convicted by the MRC of corruption in public office; see
Ada curie I, doc. 42 (4 May 1312) - here reedited by me, in order to clarify the text: "Sacre
Regie Maiestati, universitas felicis urbis Panormi fidelis sua, oscula et debite fldelitatis
obsequia. Justus es, Domine, et rectum judicium tuum fac cum servo tuo secundum
misericordiam tuam,' comendatur Justitia, qua reges et principes regnant, quibus nichil
dignoscitur adversari, dum ipsam exerceant juxta legum et canonum instituta. 'Hec a
morte liberat, nee timet qui Justitiam operatur,' sicut Sapiens in suis proverbiis
deno[t]avit. De hac Apostolus corde creditur ad Justitiam. Hanc desideravit Propheta,
postulans 'Concupivit anima mea desiderare justificationes tuas omni tempore.' In qua
Justitia Vestra Maiestas omni tempore conversatur et laudis preconio decoratur, ut
beneficia dominatrix vix posset in mundi climate reperiri sic principem Justitiam
assecutam esse, qui non solum se Justitie prestatorem exhibet incessantem. Verum
appetit Justitiam, requirentes dum minimis adversus potentes earn exuberat fructuosam,
qua exultant et Regem Regum exorant, ut in dierum longitudinem sempiternam vivere
faciat desideria omnium consolantem. Sed Justitie miscenda est misericordia, consulens
nam multum Justitia destituitur, si una sine altera teneatur. Debet itaque circa
subjectos inesse regibus et justi consulens misericordia et pie serviens [discijplina. Hoc
declaratur a Sammaritano, qui semivivi vixeribus et vinum in oleum immiscere curavit,
ut per vinum morderentur vulnera, per oleum foverentur in vino morsum districtionis
occurrit, in olio molliciem pietatis ostendit. Virga quis percutitur, baculo substentatur.
Idem Propheta, petens a Domino, demonstravit, 'Virga tua et baculus tuus ipsa me
consolata sunt.' Hoc cum Israelitico populo dum ipse ante Dei oculos pene inveniabilem
traxisset offensam, Moyses, pie Domino supplicans, ait, 'Aut dimitte eis hanc offensam,
aut, si non facis, dele me de libro, quern scripsisti.' Pensandum est quanto zelo
rectitudinis fuit accensus dum inquit, 'Ponat vir gladium super femur suum et occidat
unusquisque fratrem et amicum proximum suum,' et ceciderunt viginti tria milia
hominum mox, ut culpe venia daretur, obtinuit Domino dicenti, 'Dimitte me, ut irascatur
furor meus contra eos.' Intus Moyses arsit igne amoris, foris accensus virga Justitie —
causam Dei apud populum gladiis, causam populi apud Deum precibus, allegavit. Nee
mirum, si hoc mundi regibus illius exemplo committitur, ut post judicium viscera sue
pietatis ostendant et dampnatis in integrum restitutionis beneficium impendant et ad
omnia inhabilem, qui speciali dono gratie decorantur. Et propterea universi cives,
considerantes Justitie veritatem (qua Vestra Maiestas prefulget, ut sidus irradians
misericordie caritatem, qua obtinet pre cunctis regibus principatum) et clementiam (qua
non desinit petentibus gratiam habundare recurrere non diffundunt [sic] clementie)
Maiestatis Vestre humiliter et multipliciter supplicantes, ut judicem Thomasium de
Benedicto concivem suum tune judicem urbis predicte per Vestram Magnam Curiam
ex certa causa pecuniarum penam judiciali angulo spoliatum, ob quod ipsius fame
integritas lesionem substinuisse dignoscitur ipsumque tarn advocationis quam aliorum
bonorum civilium extorrem factum esse juris auctoritate perpenditur, in integrum
restituere dignetur, si placet, fame ac honoribus in civilibus aliis actibus quibuscumque,
ut sicut ceteri cives illese fame de nostre benignitatis gratia ipsis gaudeat et fruitur [sic],
cum tanto tempore sit afflictus et Vestra Serenitas consuevit aliis peccantibus in
integrum restitutionis beneficium impertiri. Et in Vestra urbe felice consilio et patrocinio
necessarius reputetur, et alias guerrarum tempore juxta suum posse serviverit, ut Vester
subditus etfidelis.Et cives Vestri hoc reputent ad gratiam specialem et ad obtinendum
premissa Orlandum de PhisaulofidelemVestrum concivem suum universitas dicte urbis
of self-interest in career politicians; but few Sicilians were as

forthright about the limits of their loyalties as was Leonardo
d'Incisa who, upon being appointed "treasurer of their Kingdom of
Sicily" in late 1311, announced in a letter: "I trust in the Lord . . .
that [the king and his court] will enrich [me] with ever more
generous gifts and benefices" in return for his faithful service.32
Frederick more than once expressed his amazement at this sort of
attitude. In this case he did not have to wait long to witness it again.
Only a month later he learned that the men of Palermo appointed
to the municipal night-watch company had refused to serve, citing
as their excuse an ancient consuetudo that exempted them, and so
had left the streets unguarded - "on account of which a great
number of crimes are being committed." Their strike was evidently
a protest against the king's introduction of a Catalan nobleman,
Pong Caslar, in the local justiciarate, since they had angrily
proposed that Pong should hire his own family members to patrol
the streets. Whether their complaint was justified or not, Frederick
wrote, he was astonished that local officials would sacrifice public
safety so thoughtlessly.33
Given such firmly rooted geographic and human obstacles to

social cohesion, the failure of this long reign is hardly a surprising
Maiestati Vestre suum nuncium destinare curavit, cui super hiis Maiestas Vestra credere
dignetur, si placet. Nichilominus tamen clementissime principum omnia supradicta et
alia arbitrio et voluntati Vestre pie relinquimus Maiestatis. Scripta in urbe felici
Panormi, ut supra."
There is no record of whether or not the pardon was granted (the request for clemency
was repeated on 23 June; see ibid., doc. 58). Tommasso, however, was elected judex in the
city at least three times more, in 1321, 1324, and 1329. See table 1 on p. 309.
32
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10124 (16 Oct. 1311): "meque noviter eorum regni Sicilie
thesaurarium ordinavunt; et spero in Domino, quod in anima eorum liberalitatibus
munificentie dextera, ut suis est solita facere, donis et gratiis largioribus ampliabunt."
33
Ada curie 1, doc. 19 (18 Dec. 1311, citing text of royal letter sent from Messina on 27 Nov.).
The local judices, for their part, denied Pong's claims and assured Frederick that the city
was safe. Four months later, however, the issue was still unresolved, and they confessed
that Palermo had been so overrun with "wretched vagabonds," especially near the harbor
where the opportunities for theft were greatest, that they had taken to registering the
vagrants. See ibid., doc. 35 (20 March 1312). In 1332 another Palermitan leader, Giacomo
Cisario, murdered a rival, and having waived his right not to be tried by any court outside
the city he was placed on trial and convicted by the MRC in Messina. The Palermo
universitas nevertheless appealed for an overturning of the verdict or at least for leniency,
given Cisario's standing in the community. The king responded, once again, with amaze-
ment: "There can be no exceptions for individuals; the law must be enforced with equal
severity for all." See Arta curie v, doc. 155 (7 Oct. 1332): "in cultu et administratione justitie
non est habenda personarum acceptio, sed procedendum est in singulos equa lance."
occurrence. A more talented king and a less avaricious set of
government officials (at all levels) might have mitigated, or even
solved, many of the problems besetting the realm. Frederick's
brash, petulant, and frankly woodenheaded nature brought a lot
of harm. His energy was considerable, as was his constancy in
pursuing what he thought to be the best path for Sicily, but his most
prominent characteristic was less idealism - contrary to what his
biographers to date have asserted - than it was simple credulity.34
As a young king, stirred by the romanticized chivalric deeds of his
father and his own undeniably impressive wartime exploits, he
displayed the cocksure certainty of a popular ruler who could
apparently succeed in whatever he attempted; and after his con-
version, ca. 1304, to the Spiritual reform program of Arnau de
Vilanova this self-assuredness was given an evangelical veneer that
never dulled. Whatever positive qualities may be ascribed to him,
profound thought - or even ordinary reflection - cannot be
numbered among them. In forty-one years on the throne he never
changed his mind on any major issue or admitted of any doubt. Such
constancy of purpose, while perhaps admirable in the abstract,
represented a profound political liability and an intrinsic personal
flaw which he was never able to overcome, and which the island he
loved barely survived.
Even so, when one considers the impact of the continued
hostility between Sicily and Naples - an on-again, off-again war that
ultimately lasted over one hundred years - it is very much to the
Catalans' and Sicilians' credit that the unraveling of the kingdom
was not more severe than it was. The Angevins had good reason to
desire to regain control: apart from the traditional strategic
benefits of possessing Sicily, the war in the south represented an
attempt to halt the growing power of the Catalans in the Mediter-
ranean world. "Nothing good ever comes from a Catalan," thought
Boniface VIII, for the Catalans threatened not only to upset Guelf
34
See for example, Francesco Giunta, Aragonesi e catalani nel Mediterraneo, 2 vols. (Palermo,
1953-9) a t x» P- *9: "Con Federico III la Sicilia inizia il suo periodo di piena autonomia
politica e rivendica quei ideali che la legavano all'ancora operante tradizione sveva.
Questa nuova realta politica costitui il punto fondamentale da cui si sviluppo il
programma politico del giovane re. Di fatti tutta la sua vita fu dedicata alia aflermazione
dei diritti siciliani sul piano europeo ed alia ricostruzione dell'antico regno normanno-
svevo. Nello stesso tempo Pelezione di Federico scindeva nettamente gli interessi
dell'isola da quelli delPAragona, mentre dava impulso ad un nuovo orientamento nei
rapporti internazionale."
authority in Italy, but also ecclesiastical authority in Christendom

generally, since their own land was a hotbed of some of the most
worrisome religious heterodoxies of the age. Naples and Rome,
then Naples and Avignon, had much to gain by wresting Sicily away
from its new dynasts, and consequently they each consistently
pledged their own strained resources and energies to the task. For
the Sicilians, this meant either capitulation to a detested French
regime and increased bitterness toward the church, or grudging
support for a Catalan caste that at least seemed to be less overtly
predatory than any of its predecessors.
Still, despite the collapse of the economy, the paralysis of the
government, the xenophobic ethnic hatred among the populace,
the growth of an embryonic Mafia, the undermining of republican-
ism, and the crisis of ecclesiastical administration and of popular
spirituality - all legacies, in some way, of Frederick's reign - it is
possible to overstate the severity of Sicily's decline. The fabled
brilliance of the Norman period was, after all, largely purchased or
stolen abroad and imported into Sicily, rather than achieved
natively; its noted wealth and religious or ethnic tolerance charac-
terized the royal and aristocratic courts (and even there only
briefly), but not the mass populace. The Hohenstaufen rule of
Frederick II was more autocratic and self-interested than effective.
And compared to the difficulties faced by other Mediterranean
societies in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the
problems besetting Sicily, for all their enormity, formed simply one
part of an overall pattern of decline and challenge. Although we
recognize that the period from the twelfth to the fourteenth
centuries represents one of the most crucial periods in Sicily's long
history, a period in which the painful transition from one of
Europe's wealthiest and most powerful states to an impoverished
and strifetorn backwater occurred, and although it is clear that
Frederick Ill's reign coincides with some of the most critical
decades in that transition, we have the responsibility not to
exaggerate the degree of the decline, nor to romanticize the
attempt made by some to avoid or alleviate the general ruin.
CHAPTER 2
The international scene: war without

and within
I ASSESSING THE DAMAGE
How great an impact did the international scene in general and the
war with Naples in particular have on Sicilian developments? Is
the decline so painfully evident in these years best explained as the
result of Sicily's forced war with the Angevins; of her diplomatic and
cultural isolation; or of the control of her international commerce
by foreign monopolies? Certainly these explanations have found the
greatest number of supporters, within Sicily and without; and
the assumptions that lie behind this line of reasoning also have
much to do with the current debate over the applicability of the
"dualist" economic model. The most influential figure here is
Benedetto Croce, whose classic History of the Kingdom of Naples
argued that Sicily's radical separation from her traditional
peninsular partner in 1282, and the acrimonious relations that
followed, was nothing less than a catastrophe that spelled the ruin
of both lands. This rupture, formalized at Caltabellotta in 1302,
according to Croce "marked the beginning of much trouble and
little greatness." Commercial and cultural contacts vital to both
lands were permanently severed, and a lasting enmity took their
place. The subsequent military conflict - a "Ninety Years War," as
Santi Correnti called it — wasted precious energies and resources,
and forced both the Sicilians and the Neapolitans, and their various
allies and opponents, to abandon efforts to expand Latin influence
into the Levant at a time when Acre was falling, or had fallen, and
when the most promising opportunities existed for strengthening
the western presence in Achaea, Constantinople, and parts of Asia
Minor. By implication, therefore, the harm engendered by the
Vespers afflicted all of Europe and indeed all of Christendom, both
Latin and Greek. The ubiquity of these dangers, the full range of
29
their possible consequences, accounts for the extraordinarily wide

diplomatic and economic entanglements we find in the eventual
working out of the conflict. Thus Croce and his followers see the
Sicilian problem as a Mediterranean-wide phenomenon, a conflict
equally as central to fourteenth-century Europe as the Black Death,
the Avignon Papacy, and the Hundred Years War between England
and France.1 Just as harmful, locally, according to this view, were
the wrenching economic adjustments made necessary by the loss of
the peninsular market for Sicilian grain; having lost their major
market, and crippled by the financial and social pressures of
interminable war, the Sicilians had no great reserves of capital to
invest in manufacturing, and hence became dependent on northern
Italian manufactures and on the capital of omnipresent foreign
merchants. The island's manufacturing potential was great,
although it needed considerable capital investment; the loss of the
Neapolitan market deprived Sicilian entrepreneurs of that capital
and left them dependent on northern merchants who, unlike the
Neapolitans, were interested almost solely in the island's grain.
This resulted in Sicily's slow slide into agricultural monoculture,
and began her chronic economic backwardness.2
There is some reason to credit this interpretation. While the
mortality of the war was not great outside of a few horrific battles,
the economic burden it created for both sides was indeed sub-
stantial. In the 1325-6 campaign alone, for example, the Angevin
government spent nearly 1,250,000 florins (an amount roughly
equal, for comparative purposes, to six times the regular annual
income of the king of England - without his continental territories
1
Benedetto Croce, Storia del regno di Napoli (Bari, 1925), Scritti di storia letteraria e
politica, vol. xix, pp. 10-11. Croce's most effective English disciple, in this regard, has been
Sir Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers: A History ofofthe Mediterranean World in the Later
Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1958). See also Santi Correnti, Laguerra dei novanti'anni e le
ripercussioni europee della guerra del Vespro, 1282-1372 (Catania, 1973).
2
Michel de Bouard, "Problemes de subsistances dans un etat medieval: le marche et les
prix des cereales au royaume angevin de Sicile, 1262—1282," Annales d'histoire economique et
sociale 10 (1938), 483—501; Gino Luzzatto, Storia economica dell'eta moderna e contemporanea, 2
vols., 4th edn. (Padua, 1955), 1, pp. 103-15; Bresc, Un monde, pp. 16-18, 20-1, 576, 917. See
also the important studies by David Abulafia, The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the
Norman Kingdom ofSicily and the Northern Communes (Cambridge, 1977); "Southern Italy and
the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370," Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 34 (1981), 377-88;
"II commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo Duecento," in XI Congresso, pp. 5—22; "Catalan
Merchants and the Western Mediterranean, 1236-1300: Studies in the Notarial Acts of
Barcelona and Sicily," Viator 16 (1985), 209—42; and "The Merchants of Messina: Levant
Trade and Domestic Economy," Papers of the British School at Rome 54 (1986), 196-212.
The international scene 31
- in the early fourteenth century) and still failed to unseat
Frederick; and Robert repeated the folly in 1334 when he spent
another 40,000 florins on shipping costs alone on another unsuc-
cessful invasion, all but deserting his obligations to his few
remaining Greek possessions in the process.3 Large as these sums
were, they were more than matched by Robert's obligations to
defend the Guelf cause in northern Italy - a struggle in which the
Sicilian affair played a large role since the Sicilians were allied,
from 1312 onwards, with the combined Ghibelline forces centered at
Savona.4 The scale of this spending over so long a period shows that
the dispute over the control of Sicily was a matter of the greatest
importance, and was considered, without exaggeration, a matter of
life or death by the participants.
Confronted by so determined an enemy, the Sicilians struggled
to find the resources needed to defend themselves. But the very
nature of the threat facing them required that they get involved in
the larger Mediterranean dispute. Thus they scrambled to meet
their obligations to the Ghibelline league, even while offering
continuous military and financial support for the newly founded
Catalan duchy of Athens (wrested from a cadet branch of the
Angevin house by veterans of the Vespers war who had refused to
demobilize after Caltabellotta), plus extending repeated assistance
to James's designs to conquer Sardinia. With burdens like these, it
is no surprise to find the government bemoaning its "numerous and
diverse debts . . . enormous and unimaginable sums of money."5
3
Roberto Caggese, Roberto d'Angid e i suoi tempi, 2 vols. (Florence, 1922—31), 11, pp. 224-37;
Norman J. Housley, "Angevin Naples and the Defence of the Latin East: Robert the Wise
and the Naval League of 1334," Byzantion 51 (1981), 54^-56 at 555; Bernard Guenee, States
and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe (Oxford, 1985), trans. Juliet Vale, p. 109 and Table 1.
4
This alliance was made initially with emperor Henry VII on account of "the many
injuries and offenses which [the Angevins] daily inflict" upon Sicily; the pact was later
reestablished in 1318 - this time between Frederick, Cangrande della Scala of Verona,
Matteo Visconti of Milan, Rainaldo Bonaccolsi of Mantua, and the exiled Doria and
Spinola families of Genoa. See Giovanni Villani, Cronica, ed. Francesco Gherardi
Dragomanni, 4 vols. (Florence, 1844-5), bk. ix, ch. 71-2, 86-92, 118; ACA Cartas James II
no. 6217, 10183.
5
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10222 (13 Jan. 1315): "pro variis multiplicibus et diversis
expensis guerre negotii imperatore ipso mortuo nobis mote per dominum Robertum
(quondam regis Karoli secundi filium) hostem nostrum, grandes et inextimabiles
effundimus pecunie quantitates; unde variis et diversis sumus debitis obligati." On the
duchy of Athens, see Kenneth M. Setton, "The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380," in A
History of the Crusades, gen. ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols. (Wisconsin, 1969-89), m,
pp. 167—224, with bibliography; also his older study, Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311-1388
(Cambridge, Mass., 1948), Mediaeval Academy of America Publications, vol. L.
And if we can take Frederick at his word, the constant fight with
Naples was all that stood in the way of his own desire to undertake
a crusade to the east. The anonymous author of the Directorium ad
passagiumfaciendum writes that Frederick "wanted nothing so much
in the world as to spend the rest of his life on crusade, if only he was
offered a secure and suitable peace." 6 By referring to the troubles
in the Levant in this way, the Sicilians obviously hoped to increase
public pressure on the papacy and the Angevins to give up the fight.
It was a strategic ploy, but one which nevertheless had much truth
in it.
Nevertheless, the war with Naples can hardly suffice to explain
the full extent of Sicilian difficulties. With the exception of the
1325-6 invasion, nearly all of the hostilities were waged at sea and
involved far more blockading, siegework and quick raiding than
face-to-face fighting between armies and militias. Even though
more than half the Sicilian population lived in the coastal demesne
cities, and thus lived under the daily burden of exposure to
hostility, most sites were spared direct attack. Only a few settle-
ments, such as that at Brucato (near Termini), were destroyed
outright. As with the Hundred Years War, it is easy to exaggerate
both the destruction caused by the war and the direct harm it
inflicted upon the economy.7
The indirect impact of the war, however, while it is more difficult
to measure, is no less important. The effects here are numerous,
if somewhat opaque. An atmosphere of suspicion and hostility
lingered after each aggression, particularly in cities like Palermo,
Trapani, and Mazara, which suffered repeated, indeed almost
annual, attacks either by the Angevins themselves or by Angevin-
supported Genoese and Pisan pirates. 8 Brawling and violence
against foreign merchants of every stripe - from individual assaults
to popular riots - commonly occurred after each attack, with
obviously harmful results for trade. These eruptions were not just
reflexive, sudden lashings out against any available victim, but were
6
Anonymous, Directorium ad passagium faciendum, in Receuil des historiens des Croisades, 14 vols.
(Paris, 1841—1906), 11, pp. 367—517 at 404—5; Georges Digard, Philippe le Bel et le Saint-Siege
de 1285 a 1304, 2 vols. (Paris, 1886), 11, pp. 226-7; Norman Housley, The Italian Crusades: The
Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254-1343 (Oxford, 1982),
p. 80.
7
Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 85-6.
8
AGA Cartas James II, no. 10238 (17Jan. 1316); Lettres communes, no. 7563 (20June 1318).
rather the bubbling over of long-brewing resentments. In the minds
of the rioters the trade privileges awarded to foreign merchants by
a central government desperate for any sort of aid had become
grossly excessive and in fact easily matched the physical harm
represented by the predations of those merchants' bellicose
compatriots.9 In fact, it was not uncommon for peaceful merchants
from the very states attacking Sicily to appear in the harbors
immediately after a raid had been repulsed or had turned away to
sea laden with booty. The sense of resentment and distrust created
by these occurrences clearly affected trade relations for the worse -
as when a Catalan trading ship leased by the Peruzzi firm in 1328
was seized by angry harbor officials in Trapani on the charge that
the ship was Florentine, and therefore Guelf, and therefore an
enemy of the Sicilian kingdom. The officials complained to the local
royal justiciarius that even in times of war "many ships belonging to
the Genoese Guelfs . . . arrive in the port . . . and they are there
at the king's will," loading their hulls with Sicilian grain while
parading their privileges. When the Peruzzi representative was
turned away in Trapani, he sailed for Termini, where "many of the
citizens rushed out to stop his ship, rousing themselves and crying
out against [him], saying that he should not be allowed to load his
ship in their port." On this occasion even the municipal court in
Palermo, usually ever at the ready to flatter the royal government,
protested to Frederick that privileged exports "have multiplied to
no small degree in recent days . . . such that they are prohibited to
nobody at all.™
9
See, for example, ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 48, which tells of a riot in
Palermo in 1328, after four galleys manned by Sicilian soldiers disappeared in a storm at
sea. The riot, which apparently originated with a dispute between the resident Catalans
and Genoese (who had made up most of the officers on board) who were being blamed for
the disaster, left more than 300 dead in the streets: "Diebus etiam proximis de predicta
Sicilie insula nova sunt habita, quod, dum dompnus Fredericus de Aragonia . . . aliquas
galeas armari fecisset, quibus preerat Corradus de Auria, quatuor ex eis in loco qui
nominatur 'Mortilla' maris insurgente turbine fracte sunt, et magna pars hominum
navigantium in eis mortui sunt et capti, et res existentes in eis in parte sunt perdite et
in parte ad manus fidelium pervenerunt. Predictus quoque Corradus de Auria qui vix
evasit exinde Messanam nudus aufugit. In civitate vero Panormi inter Catalanos et
Januenses magna briga est orta, in qua ultra trecentos de ipsis Januensibus sunt
occisi."
10
Ada curie v, doc. 14 (1 Oct. 1328): "lignum ipsum esse florentinorum vel guelforum,
hostium regiorum . . . et eo maxime quod cocke ianuensium guelforum quamplures
portum dicte urbis noviter advenerunt, et ibi sunt de voluntate regia"; and 26 (18 Nov.
1328): "in cuius portu fieri debet et iam hiis diebus multipliciter fuit acta exitura
Clearly the extension of trade privileges to foreign merchants,
and the resentment of such by domestic merchants and workers,
cannot be ascribed directly or solely to the wars in which the
kingdom was embroiled; still less can the deleterious effects of such
developments be quantified or understood in a systematic way. But
such indirect effects of international hostilities were present
throughout coastal Sicily in the latter half of Frederick's reign
and contributed significantly to aggravate already severe social
tensions. In Naples, Robert certainly understood the calamitous
effects his constant attacks had on the island; as he boasted to a
Catalan envoy, Pere Ferrandis d'Hixar, all he needed to bring about
Sicily's ultimate collapse was "to keep striking, not hard but often -
like a chisel hollowing out a stone."11
How extensive was the damage his chisel wrought? What were the
catastrophes that struck the island and turned it into the "ruined
beauty" of Speciale's narrative? Few reliable statistics survive,
unfortunately, and many of the repeated protestations of hardship
and suffering offered up by the cities were obviously calculated to
win royal subsidies - and hence were as likely to exaggerate local
troubles as to describe them with scrupulous accuracy. But the bulk
of the evidence indicates clearly that changes of a very dramatic
- indeed almost an astonishing - nature occurred in Frederick's
lifetime. Virtually every aspect of Sicilian life, from trade practices
and market structures to marriage patterns, religious life, and
social organization, differed significantly in 1337 from what it had
been in 1282, and continued to change as the island's internal
problems grew worse during the civil wars that followed Frederick's
death. Certainly the most striking and influential development was
a radical decline in the population.
Precise estimates have varied, but the central fact seems clear
enough: owing to war, the Black Death, famine, emigration, and
a declining birth-rate, Sicily lost as many as two-thirds of its
non modica, que nemini prohibetur . . . multi ex ipsis civibus intendebant concurrere
ad impendiendum cockam eandem insurgentes et clamantes contra dictum
Benchium [the Peruzzi representative] onerare volentem cockam existentem in portu
eiusdem."
11
FAA 1, p. 179: "guta que cavat lapidem, non vi sed sepe cadendo." Cf. ACA Gartas
James II, no. 5669, 10248, 10270,10272.
12
population in the years from 1282 to 1376. From a pre-Vespers high
of roughly 850,000 the demographic base collapsed to no more than
350,000. All considerations of what happened during Frederick's
reign must be viewed in this essential, appalling context, and all
judgments of the relative achievements and failures of late
medieval Sicily must take into account the extraordinary challenge
that this demographic hemorrhage represented for the island. Of
course, Sicily was not alone in this. The fourteenth century was
indeed, in the words of one historian, an "age of adversity" for all
of Europe; but no other European state of the time confronted so
disastrous and total a collapse of its demographic base as did Sicily,
an island that had been rather lightly populated even in palmier
days.13 The damage wrought by this decline was felt in every aspect
of life from agriculture, which responded to the challenge by
restructuring its farming and marketing techniques, to ecclesi-
astical administration, which hobbled along with an ever growing
number of vacancies on the parish level.
Tax assessments from 1277, 1283 (a partial record, for western
Sicily only), and 1374-6 document the decline. Val di Mazara suf-
fered the worst: Palermo's population (the city plus its surrounding
district) fell from a pre-Vespers height of nearly 100,000 to some-
where between 20,000 and 30,000 only a generation after Frederick's
death; Corleone shrank from 30,000 to 6,000; Castronovo fell
from 13,000 to 4,000; Sciacca from 8,000 to 5,000; and Calatafimi's
population dropped from 5,500 to less than 1,700. The Val Demone
records are inferior for 1376 (especially since figures for Messina are
missing), but the surviving statistics are somber enough: Cefalu
lost over 75 percent of its population, declining from 11,000 to 2,000;
Randazzo shrank from 20,000 to 6,000; and Gangi survived with
only 1,800, after a pre-Vespers high of 5,000. In the Val di Noto,
which was the most dynamic region in terms of its demography
since it received most of the emigrating population from the
ravaged Val di Mazara, the least amount of change in absolute
numbers is recorded: Terranova (modern Gela) collapsed ruinously
from 22,000 to 2,000, and Castrogiovanni's populace ebbed from
12
Franco D'Angelo, "Terra e uomini della Sicilia medievale, secoli XI-XIII," Quaderni
medievali 6 (1978), 51-94; Carmelo Trasselli, "Ricerche su la popolazione di Sicilia nel
2I
secolo XV," Atti delVAccademia di scienze, lettere, e arti di Palermo, 4th ser. 15 (1954—5), 3~7 I -
See also Bresc, Un monde, pp. 59-77; and Epstein, An Island for Itself, pp. 33-72.
13
Robert E. Lerner, The Age of Adversity: The Fourteenth Century (Cornell, 1968).
10,000 to 5,000; but Noto, Caltanissetta, Siracusa, and Modica all

increased in size, from 4,500 to 6,800, 750 to 3,300, 8,000 to 8,800,
and 1,500 to 3,000, respectively.14 The hardest hit region, the Val di
Mazara - always the poorest region in the kingdom, but the heart
of cereal production - lost over 250,000 inhabitants in total, falling
from 350,000 to 100,000, due to the fact that its population
traditionally had been centered in a small number of large settle-
ments with vast empty spaces between. When Angevin armies
attacked, or when famine and disease struck (or when they were
imposed upon them, as occurred in the civil wars of the 1340s and
1350s in the form of baronial sieges and deliberate starvings), these
large centers became scenes of mass death. So severe was the decay
that these cities, once thriving commercial and manufacturing
centers, became characterized by "overflowing cesspools lying
between houses, as in Trapani; mounds of filth heaped in the
streets, as in Palermo, and sometimes, as in Noto, piled so high as
to block the entrance to the church; chamber pots dumped on the
heads of passers-by, as in Nicosia; the corpses of animals lying
everywhere; streets cluttered with wild swine who knock to the
ground priests trying to bestow last rites on the dying, or who rush
to eat the dead bodies strewn in the cemetery, as in Corleone; and
offal thrown from town walls, as in Malta, until the very moats are
stuffed solid."15
In circumstances as calamitous as these one would expect to find
a breakdown of social order, and not surprisingly mass riots, the
spread of heresy, a sharp rise in crime, and other extreme acts
became commonplace. But so did less dramatic, though ultimately
just as important, phenomena such as migration and the gradual
14
All figures are approximate, of course. They are based on a simple calculation of the
number of assessed hearths, in each tax roll, at a rate of 00.03.00, with an average of five
persons per hearth. Thus Galatafimi, for example, was assessed a total tax of 110.00.00 in
1277, which represents 1,100 hearths, or approximately 5,500 people. In 1376 the assessor
counted 335 hearths, roughly 1,675 people. Calculating five people per hearth is not
excessive even in a period of much warfare, disease, and famine, when one takes into
account the number of tax-exempt individuals (clergy, aristocracy, those to whom special
privileges had been granted), who comprised perhaps 15 percent of the population.
Another consideration is that as the population decreased, many people (especially
widows and their children) lived together in multi-family (though not multi-
generational) households, which contributed to keeping the number of people per hearth
relatively constant. Nevertheless, using a lower multiplier merely decreases the absolute
numbers; the degree of decline remains the same. See Beloch, Bevb'lkerungsgeschichte
Italiens, pp. 92-9, 159—60; Epstein, An Islandfor Itself] pp. 40-50, with Table 2.1.
15
Carmelo Trasselli, "Aspetti della vita materiale," in SDS m, pp. 601-21 at 609.
alteration of market structures and trade techniques. These
responses to the island's challenges helped the economy to recover
significantly by the middle of the fifteenth century; but their
more immediate consequences, for the fourteenth, were severe
dislocation and poverty. Thousands of Sicilians streamed from
the poorer Val di Mazara into the more stable (because more
economically diversified) Val di Noto and Val Demone, deserting
farms and towns at roughly equal rates. Indeed, evidence of
neglect and desertion is everywhere.16 Giacoma Baldinoto's taverna
in Sciacca was reduced to "a ruin, wasted with age and practically
useless."17 Francesco Tuderto in 1305 bartered away lands he held
near Agrigento "because of the condition of the place, which would
require huge sums and expenses to maintain."18 The abbot of
S. Filippo di Fragala gave away-without seeking any compensation
whatsoever - the church building, lands, rights, and appurtenances
of the church of S. Nicola di Pergario, because they had "no
perceivable use or value; on account of the damage wrought by the
on-going wars the said church has been destroyed and devastated
. . . the vineyards have been cut down and demolished . . . and the
lands, on account of the defection of the farmers living there, have
been rendered barren and sterile."19 In 1321 the bishop of Cefalu
traded away the castellum of Monte Pollina because he could no
longer afford the upkeep of the site, mentioning particularly the
cost of repairing the stone walls, even though the annual income
from the castle was "perhaps thirty or forty gold ounces, or even
more."20 And in 1328-30 the bishop of Agrigento, who as one of
the largest landholders in the Val di Mazara saw his bishopric's
economic base erode catastrophically, lacked for cash so badly that
he was forced to sell "all the temporal rights, revenues, and profits"
16
Henri Bresc, "L'habitat medieval en Sicile (i 100-1450)," in Atti del colloquio di archeologia
medievale, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1976), 1, pp. 186-97 at 190.
17
ACA Perg. James II, no. 465 (8 Feb. 1294): "ruynosa et vetustate corrupta et prorsus
inutilis."
is BCP, MS Qq H 6, fol. 216-25V (2 July 1305).
19
Silvestri, Tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala, doc. 6 (4 March 1305): "nullam utilitatem seu
comodum extitit consecutum; cum quia preteritarum guerrarum discrimina predicta
ecclesia dirupta et devastata extitit; cum etiam quia quedam vinea spectans dicte
ecclesie per tune inimicos et hostes incisa, destructa et devastata fuit, et terre etiam
spectans dicte ecclesie defectu habitatorum non existentium in predictis partibus efTecte
sunt gerbe et steriles et nullius redditus et proventus."
20
A S P Tabulario Cefalu, perg. 95 (5 Sept. 1321): "forte unciarum auri triginta vel
quatraginta ad plus." See also pergs. 96-8.
of his own cathedral church to a local notary in return for 600 gold
ounces.21 As peasant laborers in the western districts fled to the
cities (where wages had doubled, and in some cases tripled, on
account of the labor shortage), baronial incomes fell precipitously,
causing many to resort to heavy-handed measures to shore up their
finances.22 In the Val Demone, by contrast, where the greatest
number of peasant freeholds existed, desperate smallholders who
could no longer support themselves or a family bequeathed their
lands to local churches in so great a number that the churches
themselves could not administer them and had to resort to a record
number of emphytheusis contracts, if any good was to be had of the
land at all.23
Destruction of the land and the movement, whether forced or
otherwise, of the populace undermined grain production and
resulted in decreased royal revenues - since the gabelle figured
among the most important sources of income - and in a recurring
series of food shortages. Food crises, variously severe, occurred in
1311-13, 1316, 1322-4, 1326, 1329, and 1335.24 And since the major
Angevin campaigns against Sicily - apart from the more common-
place smaller-scale pirate raids - occurred in 1314, 1316-17, 1321,
1323, 1325-6, 1327, 1333, and 1335, it is difficult not to posit their
complicity in the economic and social chaos of the second half of
Frederick's reign.
21
BCP, MS Qq H 6, fol. 480-3 (7 Sept. 1333): "omnia jura temporalia, redditus, et
proventus sue majoris Agrigentine ecclesie," to Notar Gofiredo Curatore.
22
Witness the fall in Francesco di Ventimiglia's finances; although he was one of the largest
landholders in the realm, by 1322 his agricultural income was less than three-quarters his
annual expenditures. See Enrico Mazzarese Fardella, Ifeudi comitali di Sicilia dai normanni
agli aragonesi (Milan, 1974), Pubblicazioni a cura della Facolta di giurisprudenza
dell'Universita di Palermo, vol. xxxvi, pp. 109-16. On labor wages, see Epstein, An Island
for Itself] p. 56 and notes.
23
Witness the bequests and subsequent sublets of Messina's abbey of S. Maria del Carmelo:
ASM Corporazioni religiose, S. Maria del Carmelo, perg. 32, 36, 37, 41, 87, 88; or of
Catania's church of S. Maria de Licodia: ASC Archivio dei Benedettini, Corda 56, fol. 5V—6
(listing eighteen such transactions). By 1329 the bishop of Siracusa had granted no less
than thirty-three emphytheusis contracts for excess lands that his church could not work
directly; see BCP MS Qq H 5, fol. 88-9V.
24
The best documentation exists for the shortages of 1311—12 and 1325-6, owing to the
survival of curial records for Palermo in those years, see Ada curie 1 and v,passim. See also
Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 136-50, with full notes. Food shortages of a temporary
nature occurred whenever there was a protracted siege of any city. The siege of Messina
ca. 1297-8, for example, reduced the populace to eating dogs and mice, until rescue
provisions arrived under the command of Roger de Flor (later the leader of the Catalan
Company in the east); see Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. vi, ch. 2.
But was the war itself so much at fault? The demographic shift
from western Sicily to eastern, and from unfortified settlements
to forticilia, actually began sometime in the 1220s as a result of
Frederick II Hohenstaufen's attacks on the numerous Muslim
communities in the realm.25 Hence the fourteenth-century decline,
for all its severity, was only an acceleration of a long-developing
trend. And certainly the Black Death - which arrived in Messina in
1347, ravaged the island for two years, and then recurred in 1366 -
accounts for much, perhaps even most, of the population loss from
1282 to 1376. Still, conditions established in Frederick's lifetime
undoubtedly prepared the way for the epidemic, since over 50 per-
cent of the population lived in the coastal demesne cities from the
start of the Vespers, and the percentage continued to rise through-
out the rest of the reign; crowding, poverty, poor sanitation, and
periodic though recurring undernourishment all ensured the
plague's effectiveness once it arrived in port. In the larger cities
fetid garbage heaps (sterquilinia) threatened public health from
mid-reign.26 Filthy conditions in Palermo, for example, led to an
outbreak of tertian fever in 1328 that nearly killed Frederick and his
co-regent son Peter, and afterwards prompted municipal officials to
hire a general physician-to-the-public.27 Moreover, dislocation of
the populace contributed to an observable decline in birth-rates. As
the economy grew unsteady more and more Sicilians delayed
marriage until they felt secure of their ability to support a family;
this inevitably resulted in a curtailment of the number of child-
bearing years for most women. Nor should the loss of life in the
wars, whether foreign or civil, be too readily dismissed. Six
thousand Sicilian men perished in the battle of Capo d'Orlando
alone, on 4 July 1299, for example. Extant wills and commercial
records denote a constantly increasing percentage of widows in
society. Marriages thus delayed, then cut short by early death,
25
Bresc, Un monde, p. 791; Abulafia, "The E n d o f M u s l i m Sicily," in Muslims under Latin Rule,
ed. James M. Powell (Princeton, 1991), pp. 108-9.
26
Ada curie vi, p. xlvi.
27
Ada curie v, doc. 42—5 (25—31 D e c . 1328), 4 6 (2 J a n . 1329). T h e physician hired, M. G i a c o m o
Corneto, was awarded a salary of 40.00.00, making him the highest paid civil servant in
the city. Since the universitas lacked the funds, however, his salary was guaranteed by a
group of ten barons (D. Giovanni Calvello, D. Giovanni de Milite, D. Guido Filangieri,
D. Giovanni di Caltagirone, D. Simone d'Esculo, D. Senatore di Maida, D. Giovanni
di Maida, D. Matteo di Maida, D. Guglielmo Podioviridi, and another D. Giovanni di
Caltagirone - a baron from S. Stefano); ibid., doc. 47.
brought about ever fewer births in relation to the ever rising

mortality.
Therefore, in order to evaluate the impact of Sicily's inter-
national relations and conflicts on her domestic economic and
social developments it is necessary to look at more than simply the
on-again, off-again violence along the Sicilian and Calabrian
coastlines, and to see the kingdom's relations in their full com-
plexity and interrelation. In one way or another, the Sicilian
problem affected nearly all the diplomatic concerns of the age
within the Mediterranean world. Without regaining the island,
Angevin hopes to press eastward into Byzantium were impossible;
James of Catalonia knew that he could not undertake his conquest
of Sardinia without first securing some sort of lasting peace for his
wayward brother in Messina;28 the northern Ghibellines recog-
nized, cynically but accurately, that their chances for success
depended heavily upon the Sicilians keeping Robert preoccupied
with matters close to home;29 and the papacy, still keen to promote
crusading, realized, in Boniface VTIFs words, that "the rescue of the
Holy Land depends for the greatest part on the recovery of Sicily" —
a fact that cost him "immense mental efforts, sleepless nights" and
"innumerable expenses."30 Everyone, in short, had some sort of
interest in the island. But the Sicilians had their interests too, and
were themselves fully engaged — albeit in a lesser degree, owing
to their more limited resources - in a tangled web of social and
political issues beyond their shores.
II EARLY SUCCESSES AND HEIGHTENED HOPES, I 2 9 6 - 1 3 1 3
A series of alliances, both formal and informal, provided the basic

framework for most of Sicily's foreign entanglements. In addition to
Catalonia, with whom an obviously close and necessary relationship
had been established, the islanders forged ideological and practical
ties with the duchy of Athens, Henry VII of Luxembourg, the
Ghibellines of northern Italy, and finally and perhaps most desper-
ately with Louis the Bavarian. With the exception of the Catalan
connection, though, none of these allegiances brought Sicily any
28
A C A Cane. R e g . 338, fol. 49-49V (17 Apr. 1320).
29
A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 6217 (27 J u n e 1319).
30
Reg. Boniface VIII, no. 2663, 3871, 5348.
particular benefit and indeed most had profoundly harmful results;
but reasons existed - sometimes compelling reasons - for the
formation of each link. By tracing the development of each tie, the
numerous pressures and constraints upon Sicily become apparent;
and what emerges from this is the fact that the "international
problem" of Sicily, while it did not create or directly cause the
island's radical social and economic difficulties, certainly catalyzed,
aggravated, and extended them. A Sicily left unmolested by
Angevin belligerence, unhobbled by papal interdict, unencumbered
by ruinous Ghibelline allegiances, and unhindered by Genoese,
Pisan, and Venetian economic warfare, would have fared better
against the various disasters of the fourteenth century. Neverthe-
less, the intrigues and entanglements that ensnared the kingdom
harmed it less by their directly damaging effects than by the
limitations they increasingly placed on the Sicilians' options and
thus their abilities to help themselves.
The Caltabellotta treaty (1302) recognized Frederick as legit-
imate sovereign of "Trinacria" (an ancient Greek name for the
island) for the remainder of his life, and awarded him control of
the surrounding islands of Malta, Gozo, Pantelleria, Limosa,
Lampedusa, and the Lipari. The odd title would later prove
troublesome, but for the moment it seemed an acceptable, if
awkward, compromise. Both sides agreed to exchange all prisoners
of war, to relinquish occupied territories, and to grant amnesty to
all subjects who had opposed them during the war. Of particular
concern were some Calabrian castles and settlements that the
Sicilians had captured - Reggio di Calabria, Motta S. Giovanni,
Bagnara, and some others - since ensuring safe passage through
the Strait of Messina was essential for the Sicilians until normal
economic relations between the Val Demone and the southern
peninsula recommenced. They were determined to hold firmly onto
all these sites. Naples, of course, demanded their return, but agreed
that the general peace could not be delayed on their account and so
consented to leave them in Sicilian hands until a separate agree-
ment regarding them could be reached. The treaty also arranged
Frederick's marriage to Charles IPs daughter, Eleanor. This had
significance beyond the symbolic, for the union drew the Catalan
royal house still closer to that of the Angevins, coming as it did on
the heels of James's own marriage to Charles's other daughter,
Blanche. Eleanor was a suitable match for Frederick - young,
attractive, and susceptible to the same evangelical spirit that soon

caught Frederick in its grip. Frederick in turn vowed to restore all
ecclesiastical possessions in Sicily to the status they had held prior
to 1282 - a major, though unavoidable, compromise on his part,
considering the extraordinarily high number of lands stolen during
the war by Sicily's aggressive barons. Finally, Caltabellotta stipu-
lated that the throne, upon Frederick's death, was to revert to
Charles II or his heir in Naples, who would in turn compensate
Frederick's own heir with military assistance adequate to conquer
a suitable substitute realm (possibly Cyprus), or with a single
payment of 100,000 gold ounces.31
The treaty did not please Boniface VIII - few things did.
Nonetheless, he dispatched two nuncios to lift the interdict under
which the island had labored for two decades.32 Ecclesiastical
reform took precedence over all other actions, once peace was
established, probably at Boniface's insistence. Episcopal vacancies
were filled, earlier appointments were reconfirmed, and efforts
were made to recruit new clergy and to reestablish ecclesiastical
discipline. Restored to communion with the church, Sicily was also
restored to its tax rolls: henceforth an annual census of 3,000 gold
ounces would be exacted, although, as we shall see, seldom paid.
Relations with Catalonia after 1302 did not so much improve as

simply become more overt. To explain this, a brief digression is
necessary. Catalan intentions for Sicily had been suspect ever since
Peter the Great died in 1285 - and indeed, for many Sicilians that
suspicion had never wavered since the Catalans' arrival in 1282. But
despite lurking fears, royal policy seemed clear enough while Peter
lived; Sicily would remain as a permanent, constituent part of the
Crown of Aragon, administered independently (as were Aragon,
Catalonia, Valencia, and Majorca) yet sharing the same monarch
as the Iberian realms. Far from being unique, this sort of confeder-
ation had typified Mediterranean empires since ancient times and,
within limits, suited the needs of both ruler and ruled. It gave the
31
Manuel de Bofarull and RafTaele Starrabba, "Documento inedito riguardante la
esecuzione di uno dei patti della pace di Caltabellotta (1302)," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 4
(1879-80), 189-92; Vicente Salavert y Roca, "Jaime II de Aragon: inspirador de la paz de
Caltabellotta," in Studi in onore di Riccardo Filangieri, 3 vols. (Naples, 1959), 1, pp. 361-8;
Vincenzo D'Alessandro, Politica e societa nella Sicilia aragonese (Palermo, 1963), p. 191.
32
Reg. Boniface VIII, no. 5023-4; for J a m e s ' s reaction, see A C A Cane. R e g . 334, fol. 89-89V.
Catalans access to a resource-rich and strategically placed foothold
in the central Mediterranean, leaving them in an enviable position
to dominate the trade of the western basin; and it offered the
Sicilians protection from peninsular aggression while making
available to them a host of new markets and a steady supply of
commercial credit. It is true that the Catalans and Sicilians were
foreign to each other, in terms of culture, language, and social
organization, and that successful assimilation would be a challenge;
but the difficulty of establishing a durable convivencia in Sicily in
1282 surely appeared less daunting a task than had the building of
a stable, or even a barely functional, modus vivendi in overwhelmingly
Muslim Valencia in 1254.
Peter's sudden death in late 1285, however, threatened to bring
all such hopes to ruin. Fearing reprisals from Rome, including even
a crusade against the entire Crown, once his considerable presence
left the scene, he stipulated in his will that his territories be divided
between his two eldest sons: the eldest, Alfonso IV ("the Liberal"),
inherited the Iberian titles, while second-born James ("the Just," or
sometimes "the Wily") received the Sicilian throne. For the next six
years the two kings worked to preserve the linkage between their
realms. Alfonso, facing baronial rebellion in upland Aragon while
trying to assert his claim over Majorca, needed the help that Sicily
could offer by way of foodstuffs, trade revenues, and men. James's
need to preserve the link even exceeded Alfonso's, since the island,
left to itself, had no chance of repelling Angevin advances even in
the best of circumstances; but the deep distrust with which Sicily's
barons (especially those in the Val di Mazara and Val di Noto)
viewed James seriously undermined his position, and hence that of
all the Catalans living under his rule. It was all he could do to pre-
serve a shaky status quo in the face of growing doubts of the viability
of the Crown's continued control of the island. When Alfonso
himself died, childless, in 1291, the total confederation fell into
James's hands. Had he been able to build up a measure of good-will
and trust with the Sicilians up to that point, James might have
succeeded in uniting permanently the vast territories he now
commanded, but Sicilian suspicions ran high on account of the news
that Alfonso, just prior to dying, had agreed to withdraw all Crown
support for Sicily in return for peace with the church in the Iberian
lands. The Sicilians, in other words, would once again be abandoned
and left exposed to the returning Angevins. James's efforts to
dispel rumors that he intended to sacrifice Sicily, but keep it

permanently within the union, failed to satisfy the islanders, who
gradually turned for protection, in no very organized way, to
James's younger brother Frederick, who had been left in control of
the kingdom as James's viceroy. Frederick was loyal to the Crown,
but was also passionately devoted to the Sicilian cause, and his odd
bravura, it was believed, would never allow him to surrender the
island while he thought that the fight could be won on the battle-
field. It is possible, and indeed likely, that James had counted on his
brother's obstinacy all along, and thus could retain Catalan rule
even while protesting that Frederick's refusal to relinquish the
island was a rogue campaign beyond his control. Matters stood thus
stalemated for four years after James's succession. But by 1295
Rome, Naples, and Capetian Paris had put together a unified front
against the growing Catalan hegemony. The pope excommunicated
James, placed an interdict on the Crown lands, and called for a
French crusade against Catalonia. Faced by such resistance, James
capitulated. In 1295 he agreed to the Treaty of Anagni, whereby, in
order to secure his Iberian titles, he renounced forever his claim to
Sicily and vowed to assist the Angevins in dislodging Frederick and
his now discredited supporters.33
After this, relations between Catalonia and Sicily under-
standably became greatly strained. Reaction to the news on the
island was characteristically swift and violent. Many urban and
rural elites called for the removal of all Catalans from the island,
and many indeed took up arms in open revolt. Those who supported
Frederick, however, carried the day, seeing in the young prince and
his retinue the only force capable of withstanding Angevin advances
while still holding the island together. Consequently, they chose
him to be their king, and he was crowned in Palermo. The new king
defeated the rebels in a few months, confiscated their lands, and
then renewed the campaign against Naples. After some initial
resentment over James's apparent betrayal, Sicily's new regime
recognized that James had managed to leave a loophole in the
treaty, one that made room for Catalonia's continued link with its
33
FAA 1, docs. 43-9; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. n, ch. 20-5; Vicente Salavert y Roca, "El
Tratado de Anagni y la expansion mediterranea de la Corona de Aragon," EEMCA 5
(1952), 209-360 and "La pretendida traicion de Jaime II de Aragon contra Sicilia y los
Sicilianos," EEMCA 7 (1962), 599-622.
newest satellite. James's gains by Anagni - recognition as king
of Aragon, lifting of the papal interdict on Catalonia, and the
cancellation of the French invasion - had been made conditional
not upon the actual removal of Frederick and his supporters but
only upon James's contribution, however slight, to achieving that
goal. It was a hazardous stratagem, but in the end it proved
successful. Catalan relations with Sicily, both economic and
strategic, continued right through to the end of the war. The
Catalans, indeed, managed to avoid direct involvement in the
conflict for two years after 1295, sending only enough ancillary
ships and recruits to Naples as needed to fulfill the minimum
requirements set by the pact.34 "Frederick could be captured if
James truly wanted it," wrote Roger de Lauria, the hot-headed
Catalan admiral who had a personal dislike for Frederick.35 But
James had no desire to capture his renegade brother, and instead
had every intention of keeping Sicily within the Catalan orbit. And
the scheme to wage a pseudo-war while secretly retaining relations
with the island was no surprise to the Sicilians. In 1298, after one of
James's minor contributions to the Angevin war-chest, Frederick
wrote of his great pleasure at the cleverness of it all: once again
James "has completely fulfilled his obligation to the Roman curia in
regard to the promises he made to it . . . and if he has not fully
rigged out [Charles's] armada . . . it's not his fault, and he cannot
be blamed."36
Exchanges of ambassadors, diplomatic pacts, and commercial
agreements continued unabated; and trade, though forbidden by
the pact, may actually have increased, although it was conducted
via third parties in a clandestine network.37 Sicilian grain, for
34
For the loophole, see Salavert y Roca, "El Tratado de Anagni," docs. 3 0 - 3 .
35
FAA 1, docs. 47 and 71. A m o n g the Angevins* strongest desires at this time was to have de
Lauria ( t h e most capable admiral t h e n alive) assigned to their c o m m a n d , but J a m e s
steadfastly refused his permission. See A C A Perg. J a m e s II, extra inventario, no. 503; and
Cane. Reg. 252, fol. 171. J a m e s , even after he had b e e n forced to mount a substantive
attack on Sicily (under threat of another interdict and French invasion), immediately
relinquished all the lands he had m a n a g e d t o take; see A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 1185. O n
de Lauria's personal vendetta against Frederick, see Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. m,
ch. 8-22; on his military career in general, see J o h n H. Pryor, "The Naval Battles of Roger
ofLauria,"Journal of Medieval History 9 (1983), 179-216.
36
FAA 1, doc. 35: "havia complidament feyt son deute envers la cort de R o m a de tot 50 que
promes li havia . . . s'il senyor rey d'Arago n o complia la armada . . . no era en falta sua
. . . no era culpa del senyor rey d'Arago." See also A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9775—6.
37
A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 3335, 10179-80, 10205-6, 10210, 10233, I O 273~4-
example, was sold and shipped to Genoa, and the Genoese

merchants then resold the grain to merchants in Barcelona. Money,
clothing, and arms were shipped from Barcelona to Palermo via
merchants in Tunis.38 And large numbers of Catalan adventurers
joined in the fight against Naples, many acting no doubt out of
mercenary motives, but many too fighting out of conviction. The
county of Empuries in particular supported the Sicilians fervently.39
But support for Sicily, whether based on principle or (more likely)
the practical concern for keeping the island in the Catalan orbit,
ran high in all quarters. Blase d'Alago, Marti Talach, Bernat de
Ripoll, Guillem Galcera, Pong Queralt, Bernat Queralt, Gerau
Ponts and Pere de Puigvert all formed companies of knights and
infantry — notably the almogavers - to join in the fight; and they were
joined at times by Guillem d'Entenga, Sang d'Antillo, and count
Ermengol X of Urgell.40 Worse yet for the Angevins, much of the
money used to pay for the Catalan contributions to the war came
from the Angevins themselves; the Catalans merely redirected a
portion of the grants and subsidies they received from Naples and
Rome, without which, they claimed, they could not hope to fulfill
their military obligation.41
With the war over in 1302, Catalan dissembling, transparent though

it had been, ended, and full diplomatic and commercial relations
were openly established. All the years of secrecy and suspicion had
left a mess, however, and a good deal of confusion had to be cleared
away first. Economic affairs between the two lands had become
considerably jumbled on account of the forced clandestine nature of
the trade and because many of the individuals involved, had they
been found out by the papacy and the Angevins, faced censure,
arrest, and confiscation of their goods until their claims could be
38
Abulafia, "Catalan Merchants" (see n. 2, above), pp. 232-41.
39
A C A Cane. R e g . 252, fol. 149; Speciale, Historia siculay bk. 11, ch. 25. A n o t h e r loyal recruiter
for the Sicilian cause was R a m o n Oulomar; see A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 756.
40
A C A Cane. R e g . 252, fol. 165V, 167, 219; Perg. J a m e s II, no. 629, 641, 855-6; Cartas
James II, no. 10207-9.
41
ACA Cartas James II, no. 334, 338; Perg. James II, no. 2019; Perg. James II, extra
inventario, no. 112, 120, 203, 601. See also Housley, The Italian Crusades (see n. 6,
above), pp. 177, 201—2, with notes. For examples of the military restrictions placed
upon those Catalans who did take the field against Sicily, see ACA Cane. Reg. 334,
fol. 23V—24V.
settled in court or pardons could be granted. Pong Hug d'Empuries,
for example, who had remained in Sicily after Caltabellotta to serve
as marshal, had had his Catalan lands and titles stripped from him
by a reluctant James, at papal insistence; Asnar Peris and his
brother Montaner had to plead for restoration of their confiscated
estates near Bolea, in Aragon; and a Barcelona woman, Saura de
Torrelles, had to sue for the return of certain commercial
properties in Sicily that had been in her family's hands since 1282.
Resolving these cases monopolized much of the Sicilian govern-
ment's attention in the first three years after Caltabellotta, but
were vital to assuring the access to capital and credit needed to
begin economic recovery.42
Unknown to the papacy and to Naples, however, a new clan-
destine alliance was forged between Sicily and Catalonia after
Caltabellotta that included another dynastic union, so that hence-
forth each realm would come to the aid of the other in war; and
should either king or their heirs die intestate, the two states would
become one under the surviving monarch, thus in effect recreating
the vast united kingdom of their father Peter. This arrangement
aimed to guarantee the Catalans' dominance in the western
Mediterranean and, from Sicily, to extend their influence further
eastward; and although the pact was short-lived, it offers proof of
Catalan intentions to hold onto Sicily permanently. The idea came
from Sicily and presumably from the parliament itself since that
body, by Frederick's grant in 1296, possessed full authority over
foreign policy. James initially hesitated at the offer, fearing the
possible repercussions from papal opposition; but ultimately he
endorsed the idea, and indeed it appears to have been he who
42
AGA Cartas James II, no. 9760, 9778, 9781-3, 9787, 9831, 9853, 9858-61, 9911, 10032; Perg.
James II, no. 1359, 1899. The two kingdoms ultimately expedited matters by integrating
their administrative records; the idea originated with James, who wrote to Frederick
on 9 June 1303 and proposed the consolidation of all records regarding land tenure,
commercial holdings, and trade privileges. See Ganc. Reg. 334, fol. 163V: "Cum scripta
receptarum aliarumque amministrationum contractarum et factarum per officiales
Cathalanos Aragonensesve, quocumque nomine, premissa nominaretur officia, a
tempore citra quo comunis pater illustrissimus dominus rex Petrus memorie recolende
insulam Siciliam suo submisit dominio, usque ad tempus quo nos eiusdem terre regimen
duximus . . . Fraternitatem Vestram ex corde precamur, quatenus omnia scripta
premissarum receptarum aliarumque amministrationum premissarum diligenter
proquiri mandetis et faciatis ac proquisita nobis per fidelem et familiarem nostrum
Riccardum de Bona Morte [sicl], quern hac ratione ad Vestram presentiam
transmittimus."
suggested the dynastic union aspect of the pact. The act was
formalized in August 1304.43
Expansionist ambitions in both realms were fed almost immedi-
ately. James's 1295 P a c t with the church had awarded him title to
the island of Sardinia, should he be able to muster the force needed
to take it from its Pisan masters. Sardinia's importance to the
Crown was comparable to that of Sicily itself: it offered both a
strategic location from which to protect the eastern approach to the
Balearics and to harass Genoese and Pisan trade routes, and a
steady source of staple items like grain and salt (although the
Catalans later profited most from the exploitation of newly
discovered silver mines there). But just as important, for James,
was the need to conquer something. For three generations the
rulers of Catalonia-Aragon had aggressively expanded their
borders in pursuit of new markets and in the name of Christ; and
the expectation that James would continue in the good cause was
high, especially after his appointment by Boniface VIII as "admiral
and captain-general of the church." With his Sicilian connections
assured by the new alliance, James began to prepare for the
campaign. The plan to take Sardinia proved to be surprisingly
popular in Sicily, where it was viewed as proof positive that James
had not wavered after all from the goal of upsetting the Genoese-
Pisan-Angevin balance of power that had so long dominated the
western sea. The pact obliged the Sicilians to help, and they were
eager to do so. Over the years they contributed exceptionally large
amounts of money, men, and materiel. 44 Corrado Doria, the
Sicilian admiral, was among the first to serve; he placed himself
under James's command almost immediately after the parliament's
confirmation of the new alliance. 45 But James, as during the last
years of the Vespers, when the papacy forced his hand against
Frederick, proved to be a reluctant warrior. From the moment of
Corrado Doria's signing on, and many times later, the Sardinian
campaign was initially delayed and soon thereafter cancelled
43
A C A C a n e . R e g . 334, fol. 162—162V, 162V—163,164,164V—165, i66v—167,169V-170, 170V; P e r g .
James II, no. 2035, 2037, 2039, 2042, 2052, 2070; Cartas James II, no. 9771, 9777, 9832-3,
9876. The only stipulation James added was that Catalonia need not support Sicily if the
Sicilians waged an offensive war on Naples.
44
V i c e n t e Salavert y Roca, Cerdenay la expansion mediterrdnea de la Corona deAragon, 1297-1314,
2 vols. (Madrid, 1956), CSIC estudios medievales, vol. xxvi, is the best study to date.
45
ACA Cartas James II, no. 9770 (6 Aug. 1304).
because of sudden pressing concerns in Spain (notably James's Vail
d'Aran dispute with France, and the campaign against Granada),
and because of James's innate overcautiousness. Sardinia was
always on his mind, but was always being deferred by other matters,
and in the end the invasion did not occur until 1325. But plans to
invade were prepared, money collected, arms purchased, ships
rigged, and men recruited, many times over the years. And in each
instance Sicilian subsidies were raised: in 1304, 1308,1311,1312,1317,
1320, 1322, and 1323. Many of these subsidies were quite large. In
April 1320, for example, Sicily rigged out forty galleys (each of which
usually represented between twenty-five and forty men, plus
supplies) and twelve horse-transport ships, and furnished between
150 and 160 knights; by December, hoping that this time the
campaign actually would come to pass, the kingdom had added an
additional thirty galleys and 120 archers to the total. 46 Such high
costs could not be supported for long. At stake were not only the
immediate expenses (severe enough) of procuring the necessary
equipment and paying the salaries of the fighting men, but also the
cost in lost revenues, since most of the ships assigned to these fleets
were simply trading ships commandeered for military service in the
traditional practice of the medieval Mediterranean. Thus the 1320
subsidy represented no fewer than seventy trading ships taken
out of commercial service for at least the period from April to
December. If we calculate that each galley had a load-capacity of
500 salme of grain (a very conservative estimate - many galleys were
capable of transporting over 800 or 1,000 salme), and that the price
of grain at that time was around 00.07.00 per salma, then each ship
represented a cost of 116.20.00 in terms of lost commerce, and the
total fleet represented a loss of well over 8,000 gold ounces.47 In
46
ACA Cane. Reg. 338, fol. 49-49V (17 April 1320), 51 (27Jan. 1321); CartasJames II, no. 6535
(9 Dec. 1320), prompting the Catalan ambassador to Sicily to write back to James,
regarding Sicily's contributions to the Sardinian war-chest: "Et en veritat, Senyor, que
tots los de son consell, son de cor et d'enteniment de servir a Vos en totes coses. Axi
propriament com al Senyor Rey Frederich, per 56 cor veen et entenen, que Vos et ell sots
una cosa et entenen lo gran profit et el salvament que al regne de Sicilia ve, que Vos aiats
Cerdenya. Senyor, yo Us dich en la mia fe, que si negun fill ne negun frare ha encor de
esser obedient a pare, ne a frare, sia lo Senyor Rey Frederich de esser obedient a tot 56
que Vos volguestets ne manasets."
47
ACA Cartas James II, no. 9802 (8 July 1304) details the shipment of 500 salme of grain, by
royal grant, to the Cistercian monastery of Sant Creu, in the diocese of Barcelona. The
load-capacity of trading ships varied widely, depending on the type of galley, and could
reach amounts considerably greater than what is factored here. I have taken 500 salme as
addition a direct loss of tax revenue (at 3 percent excise) of

250.00.00 was suffered for the entire fleet. Salaries had to be paid,
too. Those who fought for the king (either as permanent, career
sailors, or as temporary members of the coastal militia) earned
00.00.03 per day of service.48 Thus the seventy-ship fleet, com-
prising as many as 2,800 men serving for nine months, cost the king
an additional 3,780.00.00 in salaries and wages. To this one must
add as well the cost of supplies and food, which must have been
substantial but which we have no adequate means to calculate.
Omitting those expenses, the 1320 subsidy, in terms of actual cost
plus lost revenue, can already be figured at more than 12,000 gold
ounces - that is, well over half of the government's entire annual
feudal income. This is admittedly a hypothetical calculation, one
that assumes that each of the seventy ships was indeed a redirected
merchant vessel, and that each of the ships carried a full contingent
of men serving for the entire nine months; nevertheless, it is useful
for suggesting the approximate expenses caused by Sicily's com-
mitment to Catalonia. It is in the light of these continuing real costs
to his purse, as well as his cocksure bravura, that we must view
Frederick's brash offer, after he had grown impatient with his
brother's excessive caution and constant delays, to undertake the
entire conquest by himself and to deliver Sardinia to James as a
gift.49 Anything would be better than these endless and fruitless
expenses.
the most conservative estimate possible, on the unlikely assumption (since it was after all
a military mission being organized) that all seventy of the ships involved in 1320 were of
the smaller type used in 1304 by the Catalan monks. The Sant Francesc, a cargo ship
belonging to Mateu Oliverdau, transported no fewer than 2,500 salme, plus a crew of sixty,
out of Val di Mazara in 1298; see Le imbreviature del notaio Adamo di Citella a Palermo: 20
registro, I2g8-i2gg, ed. Pietro Gulotta (Rome, 1982), Fonti e studi del Corpus m e m b r a n a r u m
italicarum, 3rd ser., 11, doc. 25. O n t h e price o f grain, I have used A S P Notai defunti,
Reg. 1, fol. 12V-13 (9 Sept. 1323). S e e also Epstein, An Islandfor Itself ] p. 148 (Table 3.4).
48
S e e Frederick's coronation laws, the Constitutiones regales, in T e s t a , ch. 33: "Compacientes
marinariorum laboribus duris et mediis atque periculis edicimus et m a n d a m u s , quod
postquam ipsi marinarii in armata generali receperint soldos et coeperint a locis, in
quibus degunt, ad extolium proficisci, a die q u o abinde recesserint, et pervenerunt ad
portum ubi fuerit usque quo galea rubea, c u m extolio coeperit feliciter navigare, habeat
a curia quilibet pro sustenatione vite sue quo libet grana tria."
49
Antonio Arribas Palau, La conquista de Cerdeha por Jaime II de Aragon (Barcelona, 1952),
pp. 93-4. Assistance came from individuals within Sicily as well. Corrado Lancia di
Castromainardo, for example, in 1314 led his own comitiva into Sardinia at his own
expense, and while there acquired extensive information about Pisan defenses, supplies,
and morale, which he in turn passed on to Barcelona; see ACA Cartas James II, no. 10198
(31 May 1314); cf. Matteo Sclafani's offer of aid, Cartas James II, no. 10136 (26 Nov. 1312).
Besides, he had other things to spend his money on. Frederick's
immediate priority post-Caltabellotta was to reward those indi-
viduals and municipalities whose service had helped to win the war
and whose continued support was vital to keeping him on the
throne. Lacking alternatives, he did this by opening his purse:
he restored all municipal liberties and granted generous new
privileges in recognition of unique wartime sacrifices, and in the
uplands he turned a blind eye to many crimes and guaranteed all
feudal land tenures to virtually any baron who had not opposed
Catalan rule too openly, while awarding new tenures to members
of the urban elite whose peninsular connections had proved
valuable during the war.50 To spur investment in the economy, he
standardized the tangled tariff code and stabilized excise taxes on
most foreign trade at 3 percent; for domestic trade, he granted a
great number of toll franchises, or exemptions from royal gabelle di
dogana, both to reward wartime service and to attract capital to the
demesne. The most favored cities were Messina, Palermo, Sciacca,
and Siracusa, which together represented about one-fourth of the
total population. Coupled with large-scale Catalan credit and
investment, these incentives succeeded beyond expectation; and in
the first decade after Caltabellotta Sicily's overall economy grew at
a healthy rate, supplying the king with "an ample amount of
money" that one historian has estimated as an annual income of
between 120,000 and 168,000 gold ounces (or, according to his
conversion figures, over 230,000 florins per year, which was roughly
50
For example, see ASP Cane. Reg. i, fol. 39 (30 Aug. 1302), granting tax exemption to "the
burghers and inhabitants of Sciacca": "Considerantes integritatem devotionis et fidei,
quam universi homines terre Sacce fideles nostri, necnon servitia nobis devote prestita,
et que prestare possunt (dante Deo) gratiora, eis de liberalitate mera et speciali gratia et
ex certa nostra scientia concedimus, quod burgenses et habitatores terre predicte Sacce
pro mercibus et rebus eorum licitis et permissis per eos, tarn per mare quam per terram,
sint liberi et immunes, et pro eisdem mercibus et rebus eorum licitis et permissis
intrando, stando, et exeundo terra marique nullum jus dohane et alterius cuiuslibet
dirittus propterea nostre Curie debitam eidem curie vel officialibus ipius curie, ad
quorum hoc spectat et spectabit offlcium, exhibere et solvere teneantur. Quibus
officialibus et personis privilegii tenore injungimus, quod eisdem burgensibus et
habitatoribus Sacce penitam libertatem et immunitatem observent et faciant per aliquos
observari." Cf. Reg. 2, fol. 66-9V, 70-2V, 73-73V, 84V-85, 85-85V, 86-8, 89-89V, 95-95V,
105V-106, IO6V-IO7, 107-107V. For some of the feudal grants and re-grants, see Enrico
Mazzarese Fardella, // tabulario Belmonte (Palermo, 1983), DSSS 1st ser., xxx, doc. 13
(17 Oct. 1296); ACA Perg. James II, no. 856 (27 Aug. 1297); ASP Cane. Reg. 1, fol. 41-4.1v
(3 Apr. 1299); Sante Polica, "Carte adespote dell'Archivio Gargallo," Archivio storico
siracusano, 2nd ser., 3 (1974), 15-47, doc. 2 (29 Jan. 1302); ASP Tab. Ospedale di S.
Bartolomeo, perg. 1 (29 Dec. 1305).
equal to the estimated annual income of the papacy at Avignon or

of the Pisan commune at its height).51
They put this money to work advancing an ambitious campaign
for the restoration of the church within Sicily, to which they were
obliged by the Caltabellotta agreement.52 The government built
scores of new churches and monasteries, restored all ecclesiastical
privileges, confiscated from inland barons all the church lands and
possessions they had stolen during the war, and returned these to
the clergy. The government also helped to clarify the tangled
jurisdictional affairs of the dioceses (the church of S. Lucia in
Siracusa, for example, lay under the ecclesiastical authority of the
bishop of Cefalii owing to a donation in 1140). Frederick also began
to pay the annual census (3,000.00.00) to the Holy See, for which
Sicily was in arrears. These things the government did out of
obligation and expediency; but by 1305 matters had changed. In
that year Frederick, who had already been exposed to reform-
minded mysticism by Catalan visionaries and preachers, fell under
the spell of Arnau de Vilanova - the physician turned apocalyptic
prophet who had fled to Messina after nearly losing his life to
inquisitors at Perugia - and became convinced, as was Arnau
himself, that he (Frederick) had been chosen by divine grace to be
an instrument for the purification of Christendom. The end of the
world was fast approaching, Arnau believed, with Antichrist's
arrival expected as early as 1368, so there was little time to be lost.
Moreover, the transfer of the Holy See to Avignon in 1305 not only
validated but added potent urgency, in Frederick's eyes, to the call
for apocalyptic reform. Since the pope at that time, Clement V, was
a friend of Arnau's - although certainly one whose friendship
became more distant with the advancing radicalization of the
prophetic message — there was, for the moment, no need to
interpret the move to Avignon as the fall from legitimacy of the
papal office. Rather, it signified simply the dire need within
Christendom for a new champion, a "God-elected king," in Arnau's
words, who would save the church. Only later did the papacy's
inability or refusal to return to Rome appear to the Sicilian radicals
51
Chronicon siculum, ch. 80: "amplia pecunia pervenit." See also Guenee, States and Rulers,
p. 109 and table 1.
52
M y article "The Papacy, the Sicilian Church, and K i n g Frederick III, 1302—1321," Viator 22
(1991), 229-49 discusses this campaign in detail. See also ch. 5, below.
as a clear vitiation of spiritual authority; and the stubbornly anti-
Sicilian policies of John XXII would eventually guarantee the shift
in attitudes. But, in 1305, Clement's flight to France and Arnau's
flight to Messina meant only one thing to the Sicilians who boarded
the evangelical train: the Christian world was in the gravest
danger, and Frederick, of all people, had been given unique
responsibility for saving it.
Being "inspired with the flame of the Holy Spirit and wanting
with a most fervent desire to pass that Spirit on" to others,
Frederick devoted himself with extraordinary energy to his new
evangelical calling.53 He began to build "evangelical schools"
throughout the kingdom, "for men and women alike, where both
rich and poor are given instruction in that evangelical life which is
the true Christianity... Some will be taught to preach while others
will be trained in diverse languages, so that the truth of the Gospels
may be made known to all, both pagans and schismatics." He
appointed "evangelical teachers and writers in a number of tongues
. . . and caused to be preached throughout the island that all who
desire to live in evangelical poverty, from whatever land they may
be, may come [to Sicily], for there they will receive protection and
supply of all life's necessities."54 He welcomed to the kingdom
groups of Franciscan Spirituals, the heterodox group most wedded
to the idea of evangelical poverty, and encouraged the further study
of their (and others') apocalyptic reckoning.55
And he began to think about a crusade. A victorious campaign to
the Holy Land, combined with James's slow but steady successes
53
FAA 11, doc. 559; the words are James's. See also my article "Arnau de Vilanova and the
Franciscan Spirituals in Sicily" (see ch. i, n. 21, above); and ch. 5, below.
54
A r n a u d e Vilanova, Obres catalanes, e d . M i q u e l Batllori, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1947), E l s
nostres classics, obres completes dels escriptors Catalans medievals, at 1, pp. 220-1: "Lo
rey Frederich, per si a comencat a bastir e a continuar escoles evangelicals, de mascles
a una part e de fembres a altra, en les quals rics e pobres seran informats a vida
evangelical, 50 es, de ver christia; e aquels qui seran abtes a preycar, oltra ago seran
enformats en lengiies diverses, en tal manera que la veritat del Evangeli pusquen mostrar
a tots, pagans o scismatics. E, a promocio d'ac.6, a procurat ja maestres e escriptures
evangelicals en algunes lengiies, e procura en altres, e a feyt cridar per la ylla que tots
aquells qui volran en paupertat evangelical viure, de qualque nacio sie, vagen la, car ell
los dara proteccio e provisio en necessaris de vida."
55
A number of manuscripts dating to these years still survive: works on astrological
portents, alchemical treatises, copies of Abraham Abulafia's On the Light ofthe Intellect, etc.
See, for example: Messina, Biblioteca universitaria MSS 29-30, 149; Trapani, Biblioteca
Fardelliana MSS 9 (ex V.b.3), 12 (ex V.b.12); Palermo, Biblioteca comunale MSS Qq A 21,
Qq F 31, 2 Qq E 4, 2 Qq E 5, 4 Qq A 10.
against the Muslims in Granada, would surely prepare a purified

Christendom for Antichrist's challenge, and would as well prove the
House of Aragon's preordained role as the leader of the Christian
world. It is important to see Frederick's evangelical calling for what
it was - an extension, however radical, of his life-long belief in the
destined greatness of the House of Aragon. His and James's father
assumed near mythic proportions in his mind;56 and Peter's fight to
free Sicily from Angevin hands did more than lead to Frederick's
kingship: it defined his life's purpose. And this purpose was now
given a new luster and urgency at the hands of the persuasive
Arnau. How could he doubt it? Against long odds Sicily had won
the Vespers war and was prospering; liberties were restored, the
countryside was at peace, and churches, monasteries, and evangeli-
cal schools now dotted the landscape; James, with Frederick's help,
seemed on the verge of taking Sardinia; and another group of
Frederick's soldiers were well on their way to conquering Greece.
Surely this was no accident. In these years, from 1305 to 1312,
Frederick moved from strength to strength, and with utter
conviction that he was fated to succeed. Failure was impossible.
Thus, Sicily's eyes turned eastward. This was likely to have
happened eventually even without the evangelical influence, given
the island's traditional eastward orientation. The more prosperous
east had always naturally drawn Sicilian economic interest, and
was chiefly responsible for the more diverse, commerce-oriented
economy of the Val Demone and Val di Noto; and after the Norman
conquest in the eleventh century, Sicily's rulers had always had an
eye on extending political power in Greece as a means of gaining a
larger portion of eastern trade. A new opportunity appeared shortly
after Caltabellotta when an embassy from the Byzantine emperor
Andronicus II Palaeologos arrived in Messina, the center of the
Sicilian-Greek population, urgently seeking aid in the fight against
56
In the minds of some Sicilians, Peter evidently had not even died; see ACA Perg. James
II, no. 1495 (17 Dec. 1300), a property transaction in Catania dated "in the nineteenth year
of Peter's happy reign." Others compared Peter's rescue of Sicily to Moses' liberation of
the Israelites from the clutches of the Pharaoh; see De rebus regni Siciliae, ed. Giuseppe
Silvestri (Palermo, 1882), doc. 367: "Multiphariis oppressionum et afflictionum generibus
quibus tarn vos extra regnum Sicilie quam regnicole alii fideles nostri intus in regno ipso
per huiusmodi hostem suosque sequaces diutina fuistis vexatione contriti, quarum fontis,
si dici liceat, replevit ambitum orbis terre, pietatem humanitatis nostre subintrantibus et
ad compassionis miserationem flectentibus divino sumpto auxilio a diris Pharaonis
manibus Isreheliticum populum venimus liberare."
the Turks. Relations with Constantinople had been good ever since
Frederick's coronation, and indeed a marriage pact between
Frederick's sister Jolanda and Andronicus' eldest son and heir
Michael was briefly considered - which, had it been realized, would
have resulted in a substantial strengthening of Sicily's eastern
position vis-a-vis the Angevins and the northern Guelfs trading in
that region.57
The Sicilians were also eager to displace the large number of
Catalan mercenaries who, while they had proved to be indis-
pensable during the war, posed a threat to the post-Caltabellotta
world. These men, particularly the almogavers (specially armed
Catalan light infantry) among them, knew no occupation other
than war and did not adjust easily to the quieter life of farming and
trade. And indeed they evinced no desire for such adjustment.
Desclot's Crdnica describes these mercenaries as men who literally
lived for war, preferring to sleep out of doors and to forage for their
food; worse yet for a society trying to de-militarize, these men
prided themselves on hardship and self-denial and positively
disdained civilian life as a corrupt weakness. 58 In short, precisely
the sort of ruffians to send hurriedly on their way. Consequently,
the Sicilians signed a pact with the Byzantines, and a much relieved
Frederick personally saw the fleet off - a force of over 6,000,
together with their wives and children who followed in the hope of
finding eastern lands to colonize.59 This "Catalan Company," as the
group became known (although it contained a number of Sicilians),
scored a quick string of victories against the Turks, but in so doing
roused Andronicus' fears. He had grown chary that the Company's
charismatic leader, Roger de Flor - the man who had broken the
Angevin siege of Messina in 1298 - might aspire to more than
what the Byzantines were prepared to reward him with for the
Company's services. Consequently, Andronicus arranged Roger's
murder in 1305, at which the outraged Company turned on their
traitorous patron, allied themselves with the very Turks they had
57
A G A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10064.
58
Desclot, Crdnica, ch. 49, 67, 79; Muntaner, Crdnica, ch. 58. For background, s e e Ferran
Soldevila, Els almogavers (Barcelona, 1952), Colleccio popular barcino, vol. CXLIX.
59
Georgios Pachymeres, De Andronico Palaeologo (in Patrologia cursus completes, series graeca, ed.
J.-P. Migne, 161 vols. (Paris, 1857-87), vol. CXLIII), bk. 5, ch. 12, states that the force
numbered 8,000; Muntaner, Crdnica, ch. 199-201, 211 has an additional 300 cavalry and
1,000 almogavers following on the heels of the first contingent.
been fighting, and ravaged the Greek countryside for six years with
such ferocity that the curse "May the Catalan vengeance befall
you!" entered folk usage and is still to be heard in rural areas. They
attacked, in turn, Gallipoli, Thrace, and Macedonia, stopping
even to besiege the monastery of Mount Athos, until finally in 1311,
after some intrigues, they seized the duchy of Athens from the
Angevin-linked Gautier V de Brienne and settled into a permanent
occupation.60
By this point the soldiers, their wrath spent and their numbers
depleted, had tired of war and wanted to establish a state that
would be part of the same loose Catalan confederation that Sicily
had joined. Fierce though they were, they recognized that they
would need protection if they were to survive the inevitable
attempts by Naples, the papacy, Constantinople, and the Venetians
to drive them out; they would need some sort of administrative
guidance as well, given their relative ignorance of everything
but war-making. They preferred James's protection to that of
Frederick, but James kept them at more than arm's length out of
fear of upsetting his relations with Avignon and Paris, even though
he recognized the value of a Catalan outpost in the area.61 And so
they turned instead to Frederick who, after some initial hesitation,
appointed his five-year-old son Manfred as "duke of Athens" and
assigned Berenguer Estanyol d'Empuries to govern the duchy as
vicar-general until Manfred came of age.62 For the next quarter-
century Sicily held ultimate sovereignty over the province, which
added a painful complication to Sicily's effort to win a secure place
for itself among western states. Achaea, after all, had originated as
a papally bestowed Angevinfief.Now, whether by prophetic design
60
For t h e c a m p a i g n , see M u n t a n e r , Cronica, ch. 228—39; A n t o n i R u b i o i Lluch, Documents per
I'historia de la cultura catalana mig-eval, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1908-21), 1, doc. 36; R u b i o i Lluch,
Diplomatari de VOrient catala, 1301-1409: Colleccio de documents per a la historia de Vexpedicio
catalana a Orient i dels ducats d'Atenes i Neopatria (Barcelona, 1947),passim. See also Robert I.
Burns, S.J., "The Catalan Company and the European Powers, 1305-1311," Speculum 29
(1954), 75i-7i-
61
FAA 1, doc. 428.
62
When Manfred died, at Trapani, on 9 November 1317, Frederick appointed another son,
William, to the dukedom. William died in 1338, and was succeeded by yet another of
Frederick's sons, John. Of the vicars-general: Berenguer died in 1316 and was succeeded
by the king's bastard, and most talented son, Alfonso-Frederick. In 1330 Alfonso-
Frederick was replaced as vicar by Nicola Lancia; Alfonso-Frederick became count of
Gozo and Malta.
or simple accident, Frederick was in command of two of the
church's most important Mediterranean provinces. With every
Sicilian advance, papal and Angevin hostility increased.
Ties with the new duchy were somewhat tenuous, but constant.
According to the surviving fragments of the constitution drawn
up for the new state, Frederick had sole authority to appoint the
duke who would serve as the "true, legitimate, and natural lord"
exercising all pertinent (though unfortunately, unspecified) rights,
powers, and jurisdictions over the Company and its territorial
possessions. The Company in return vowed its allegiance in
perpetuity to Frederick and his appointed duke, plus the vicar-
general who would govern in situ as the duke's representative;
owing to the overwhelmingly Catalan makeup of the Company, the
duchy would be governed according to "the laws of Aragon and
the customs of Barcelona." 63 Thebes, not Athens, became the
capital. The major cities - Thebes, Athens, Neopatras, Levadhia,
Sidhirokastron, for example - belonged to the royal or ducal
demesne, and like the demesnal cities of Catalonia and Sicily they
were essentially self-governing corporations that handled their own
daily operations. Territories outside the demesne were held in fief
by members of the Company, who, similar to the barons of Sicily or
of Aragon, stood largely beyond the reach of royal authority.
Defense of the duchy was the responsibility of the marshal (a post
created in 1319), who was appointed by the duke. Ducal revenues -
remitted to Sicily for reallocation to the vicar-general - consisted of
the standard feudal aids and taxes, various rents and fees, and
above all the income generated by the demesne. 64
Frederick's determination to hold onto his new duchy and to
utilize it as a base for extending his reach still further east was clear
from the start. At one point, in fact, he was so encouraged by his
unlikely success (which had, after all, to be divinely ordained) that
he even entertained the typically unrealistic thought of conquering
all that remained of Byzantium. 65 Cautionary grumblings from
Venice forced a quick abandonment of that hope, but the victory in
Achaea nonetheless refueled his desire to lead a crusade to the Holy
63
Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, docs. 53, 133, 294, 391, 433.
64
Court cases could also be appealed to the royal court in Sicily, although no record of any
such case survives; see Setton, Catalan Domination (n. 5, above), pp. 17-20.
65
Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 11; FAA 11, doc. 431.
Land; after all, it was clear that the Turks could be beaten and that
the Byzantines, in disarray after the Company's rampage, could
not interfere with the would-be crusaders.66 Sicily's alliance with
Catalonia, he felt sure, would suffice to defend against any Angevin
attack while the Sicilian army was in the Holy Land. Thus the
House of Aragon would fulfill its destiny by seizing control of
the Mediterranean from west to east, becoming the indisputable
leader of Christendom and bringing to fruition its glorious
evangelical/apocalyptic purpose. Such schemes were obviously
grandiose, and the crusade plans were easily checked by the
announcement of Naples' pact with Guelf Genoa, which provided
for as many as 100 galleys and 5,000 archers, in addition to the
Neapolitan forces already mobilized, to invade Sicily as soon as the
prospective crusaders put to sea.67 But the point to emphasize is
that Sicily's sudden presence in Greece - whatever it brought to
Sicily in terms of commerce, prestige, or strategic alignment -
placed an additional and constant burden on the kingdom's already
strained resources. Moreover, it hardened Angevin and papal
resolve to undermine Sicily's developing political and economic
base by invading, or threatening to invade, either Sicily itself or the
Athenian duchy, or both, whenever it was even hinted that the king
was considering some new stratagem to capitalize upon his odd new
satellite. Naples increased the diplomatic pressure by suddenly
demanding the return of the Calabrian territories left over from
Caltabellotta. Naples also suddenly laid claim to the sizable tribute
paid annually by the Tunisian caliph to the Sicilian king, and
began harassing Sicily's eastward trade with an intensified piracy
campaign. All of these new offensives threatened to dislodge
Frederick's increasingly secure hold on Sicilian society by raising
the cost of popular support for his regime. But the sudden
possession of the duchy also exposed Sicily to a new and equally
66
A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9922 (2 May 1308).
67
GG doc. 51 (4 Jan. 1308). The citation given by the editors for this document - the capitula
for a Sicilian embassy to Barcelona - is incorrect. They cite the document as ACA Perg.
James II, no. 125. I have been unable to locate the document in either the series of
James's parchments or in the series of his Cartas reales diplomdticas, or in the extra inventario
appendices to those series. In any case, Sicily was forced to build and equip forty new
galleys in order to prepare for the invasion. It is also possible that Clement V considered
launching a crusade against Sicily at this time; see Reg. Clement F, no. 3611; and Housley,
The Italian Crusades, p. 177.
68
determined rival -Venice. Events in the south and east thus drew
the kingdom ever closer to the conflicts in northern Italy.
Sicily hardly profited from its accidental sovereignty in the east.
Virtually no records survive that indicate any heightened eastern
trade for Sicily at this time. Most of the prosperous manufacturing
and commercial territories in Byzantium lay at some distance from
Achaea by the fourteenth century, and whatever manufactures the
duchy did produce (wine, olives, saltmeat, leather, and textiles,
chiefly) were already available in Sicily. More likely, the duchy had
some short-term value as a market for Sicilian exports, particularly
grain; for whereas the region had been largely self-sufficient for
food through most of the Middle Ages the well-documented
destruction of the land by the conquering Company must have
caused at least a temporary decline in agricultural production that
would have been eagerly filled by merchants back in Messina.69 By
the time the duchy was established, the demographic decline and
compensatory shift in settlement patterns within Sicily had already
begun to accelerate, bringing ever more farmers, laborers, and
merchants to the eastern valli and hence within the trading orbit
with Greece, and the pace quickened right until Frederick's death.
A handful of Greeks - principally agricultural workers but with a
few artisans mixed in - took advantage of the link with Sicily to
emigrate: for example, Greeks comprised the third largest group of
permanent immigrants to Palermo (after Catalans and northern
Italians) between 1290 and 1339, and all of these arrived after
1311.70 And the flagging fortunes of the Basilian churches in the Val
68
T h e papacy was quick t o cultivate good relations with the V e n e t i a n s , in t h e hope that
V e n i c e might at least provide intelligence regarding the duchy's doings. For example, the
pope regularly appointed Venetians to the principal ecclesiastical positions within
the duchy, and from 1314 onwards the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople established his
regular residence in Venetian-controlled Negroponte, of which he eventually became
bishop. On the Tunisian tribute, see ACA Cartas James II, no. 10001—2; and Perg. James
II, no. 2570. The tribute amounted to 8,000 gold dirhams per year. The treatment of the
church within the duchy also contributed to papal ire. The Company not only forbade the
newly appointed Latin bishop of Thebes to enter his see, but further hindered the bishop
of Corinth from collecting his tithes to be sent to Avignon. Moreover, the constitution
written for the duchy forbade all testamentary gifts to the church, especially bequests of
land. See Reg. Clement, no. 3138, 7890-1, 8597; Muntaner, Crdnicay ch. 242; Rubio i Lluch,
Diplomatari, doc. 294, 391, 433.
69
Barisa Krekic, Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au moyen age (Paris, 1961), D o c u m e n t s e t
recherches, vol. v, doc. 106.
70
Bresc, Un monde, pp. 599 (Table 153), 601-2 (Table 154).
Demone likewise received a brief injection of popular support.71

Beyond this, however, the duchy was of direct value to Sicily for only
two things: piracy and slavery.
Neither trade came without risks, and in the end both may
have been more costly than profitable.72 The absolute necessity of
avoiding conflict with Venice was the chief reason for this. As early
as 1315 Frederick had made overtures to the Venetians, hoping to
calm their concerns about their new rivals by stressing his greater
interest in the duchy's expansion in the Peloponnesus (site of the
last Angevin strongholds in the region) rather than in challenging
Venetian dominance at sea, and asking in fact for Venetian help in
the land campaign.73 Venice demurred but was grateful for the
assurances. Relations remained cordial until 1317, when the duchy's
second vicar-general - one of Frederick's bastard sons, named
Alfonso-Frederick - married the heiress to several Angevin settle-
ments on the Venetian-controlled island of Negroponte (modern
Ewoia) and insisted, against good counsel, on taking possession
of them. 74 His insistence was based upon more than marriage
custom-rights; Alfonso-Frederick was the most talented and
energetic of Frederick's sons, but he had unfortunately inherited
his father's showy bravura and stubbornness. Seeing a chance to
prove his mettle, he had no doubt that he would be able to drive
Venice from the scene and thereby become the undisputed ruler of
Greece. 75 The Venetians were well aware of his talents as well as
his boorishness, and immediately dispatched 2,000 soldiers to
Negroponte. War seemed imminent. Frederick intervened directly
at this point, however, only to be confronted by an unshakeable
Venetian demand: if Sicily wanted peace, the duchy would have to
exempt all Venetian trading ships from pirate attack in perpetuity
and would have to disarm all its own ships in any territory it held
71
Ibid., pp. 516-17 (Table 126) notes an increase in the importation of Greek icons into
Sicily.
72
These trades will be discussed in detail in ch. 6, below.
73
Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 75.
74
Alfonso-Frederick married the daughter of Boniface of Verona, who had disinherited his
son (for reasons we do not know), leaving his daughter Maria the heiress of the castles of
Carystus and Larmena. According to Muntaner, Crdnica, ch. 243, Maria's inheritance
amounted to one-third of Negroponte.
75
Setton, "The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380" (see n. 5, above), pp. 178—9; Rubio i Lluch,
Diplomatari, doc. 96, 98, 100-2.
anywhere in the vicinity of Negroponte. Sicily had no choice but
to accept.76 This treaty, reconfirmed in 1321 and again in 1331,
managed to keep the peace, but in the end had disastrous effects on
the duchy, since it effectively granted full control of Aegean trade
to Venice and permanently ruptured any commercial links that the
Company might have developed with Sicily.77 After all, on account
of the ubiquitous piracy in the Mediterranean, armed escorts for
trading ships were standard procedure in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries - a necessity rather than a luxury. Ships with-
out escorts, even if they carried a contingent of their own weaponry
and fighting men, were vulnerable to easy plunder. Thus Venice's
demand that Athenian ships passing Negroponte (which meant, in
essence, every ship that sailed into or out of the duchy) had to be
disarmed meant that every merchant vessel following the trunk
routes between Sicily and Greece lay exposed to inevitable attack.
Few ships could have avoided Angevin attack as they rounded the
foot of the Italian peninsula, since prevailing currents and wind
patterns brought them inevitably within easy range of Neapolitan
galleys operating out of every southern port, and there is little
evidence that any made the attempt. Consequently, as was
increasingly the case with Sicily itself, the duchy's trade fell into the
hands of foreign merchants, to whom the Venetian strictures did
not apply. Revenues from piracy or corsairing also plummeted,
since the Company now had to venture much further out to sea in
order to find non-Venetian victims, which dramatically decreased
the chances of success. After this, Sicilian pirates tended to
operate out of domestic ports or out of Cyprus and perhaps Cilician
Armenia.
Stripped of its maritime ambitions, the duchy turned instead
towards expanding its control of mainland Greece. By coincidence,
just when the truce with Venice was being arranged, the ruler of
northern Thessaly -John II Ducas Comnenus - died unexpectedly
without an heir. Alfonso-Frederick, eager to make up for his
blunder, immediately organized the army and seized control of the
province. Attempts to conquer the Peloponnesus continued as
76
G e o r g e M a r t i n T h o m a s , Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum, sive acta et diplomata res venetas
graecas atque levantis illustrantia a 1300-1350 ( V e n i c e , 1880), M o n u m e n t i storici dalla
R. Deputazione veneta di storia patria, 1st ser., vol. v, doc. 64-5.
77
Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 109,116, 153.
well, though with less success. The results of this new wave of
land-fighting were several. First, it brought, principally on Tuscan
ships, a dramatically increased number of Greek slaves onto the
Sicilian market, so that they quickly became the most common
commodity available. Second, the cost to the crown of supporting
the duchy likewise increased. With piracy revenues curtailed and
with little regular trade revenue generated, the government could
support its busy eastern army only by alienating the royal-ducal
demesne. Extensive grants of land were made, which benefited the
soldiers and probably inspired other Catalan-Sicilian adventurers
to emigrate to Greece, as the only means of propping up the
regime. This quickly became the dominant, if not the sole, means
of keeping the duchy alive - and when no further lands could be
alienated the throne had to resort, as it did in Sicily itself, to
bestowing rights of civil and criminal jurisdiction to the fief holders,
thus making them, in effect, virtually autonomous figures. By
1328 Frederick recognized that this alienation had gone as far as it
could go, and henceforth denied the vicar-general's requests for
permission to have any new lands awarded. This action was surely
necessary, but it forced the duchy once again to seek new revenues
by renewing its piratical campaigns which, while scrupulously
avoiding Venetian ships, brought the Company into renewed
conflict with the (Guelf) Genoese and Angevins still trading in the
Aegean. And, consequently, in 1330 the papacy responded by
excommunicating the duchy's rulers and calling for a crusade
against them. On 14 June John XXII directed the Latin patriarch
and the archbishops of Corinth, Patras, and Otranto to condemn
the Company as "schismatics, sons of perdition, and children of
iniquity"; and one week later Robert granted permission to all his
Neapolitan vassals to seek the pope's offer of "full forgiveness for all
sins" by joining the fight. Gautier II de Brienne assembled his army
of 800 Angevin knights and 500 Tuscan infantry at Brindisi in
August 1331, and set sail.78 This crusade failed after two years,
however, since the Company - which could no longer defend itself
against so large an invasion because no aid was available from Sicily
- simply refused to meet the crusaders in open battle. Unable to
besiege their foes or to destroy them on the field, the Angevins
accomplished little apart from yet another ravaging of the Greek
78
Ibid., doc. 150-2.
countryside, although they made another attempt in 1334-5. It too
came to nothing.79
In the end the unplanned conquest of the Athenian duchy
brought Sicily only loss by deepening the resolve of her enemies to
oppose her on all fronts. The whole struggle to control Sicily, after
all, was in large part the struggle for a base from which to gain a
foothold in the east, and the Angevins and the papacy rightly feared
that a prosperous, peaceful Sicily would make it impossible to
dislodge the usurping duchy - just as a thriving, strong duchy
would encumber efforts to regain Sicily. Foolish though many of the
decisions made were - such as Alfonso-Frederick's insistence on
provoking the Venetians in Negroponte, or the duchy's continued
alliance with the Turks (which provoked the expected reaction in
Avignon) - there was little to fault the Sicilians for in the overall
adventure. Good sense had dictated getting rid of the troublesome
veterans after Caltabellotta; and had the Company not been
betrayed by the Byzantines the initial successes they scored against
the Turks might well have led to a substantial revival of the
crusading movement to the Levant and might have won for
Frederick some credit with the papacy. The treatment of the Greek
populace was relatively benevolent, once peace had been estab-
lished, as evidenced not only by the Greek emigration to Sicily but
also by the fact that virtually none of the local populace rose to aid
the Angevin crusaders in 1331-2 or 1334-5 when doing so likely
would have assured the Company's overthrow. The commercial
gain inspired by the influx of Greek slaves into Sicilian markets was
tempered, as we shall see later, by an evangelically inspired
attempt to modify and meliorate slave practice, to provide for the
more humane treatment of slaves and to make it easier for those
sold into slavery to gain their freedom. But the impossibility of any
substantial trade between the kingdom and the duchy (owing to the
decline of both manufacturing and markets), and the Venetian-
imposed restraints on the duchy's piratical activities as the price of
the Republic's political neutrality, in the end caused the duchy to be
a greater burden than boon to Sicily - a weakened satellite that
could be kept afloat only by the continuous depletion of the
royal-ducal demesne.
79
Ibid., doc. 154, 158; Lettres communes, no. 63,752; Setton, "The Catalans in Greece,"
p. 190.
At the moment the duchy was first established, however, none

of these harmful effects was foreseen; and indeed, in the heady
atmosphere of 1311-12, when the Sicilian economy was well
recovered after ten years of peace, when the government of both
kingdom and cities was stable, and when the Crown of Aragon
seemed (once again) ready to launch its Sardinian campaign, the
time seemed ripe for the final step in the loose confederation's
march towards dominating Mediterranean life. On every front
their principal rivals appeared to be in retreat or at least to be held
in check. This was the point when Sicily formed its alliance with the
German emperor Henry VII.
Ill THINGS FALL APART!
This marks the turning point in Frederick's reign too, at least in

terms of its political fortunes. From the moment when Sicily thrust
herself into the larger Guelf-Ghibelline conflict she faced not only
the active opposition of Avignon and Naples but of every Guelf
commune in the north - states which, while they had long been
energetic commercial rivals of the Sicilians and Neapolitans, had
taken no direct interest in the political struggle that engulfed the
Mezzogiorno. But by siding openly with the Ghibellines, Sicily altered
the situation entirely. The Angevins henceforth had in their Guelf
allies considerably larger resources of revenue, credit, and man-
power on which to draw; and Sicilian traders henceforth lost much
of what access they had had to the northern markets, which had a
dramatic effect on the economy. Between 1298 and 1310, no less
than 50 percent of Sicily's documented foreign trade was directed
towards northern Italy (Genoa, Pisa, and Florence being the most
important sites, and all being Guelf-controlled at the time of the
pact with Henry VII). The next nine years are uncertain, given
the paucity of records, but between 1319 and Frederick's death the
amount of trade directed to those same sites had declined to only
18 percent of all exports (and, needless to say, the total volume of
trade had likewise fallen sharply). 80 The burden of this collapse fell
especially hard on the Val di Mazara, the chief grain-producing
region, and must account for a large portion of the demographic
80
Bresc, Un monde, pp. 281 (Table 42), 286 (Table 46).
flight from that hardscrabble territory. Trading ships from
northern Italy had comprised 40 percent of all the vessels in the
ports of the Val di Mazara between 1298 and 1310; but for the
following period that figure fell to just over 25 percent - a
diminished share of an already diminished production.81
For a kingdom essentially to declare war on its most important
trading partners, which the Sicilians did in casting their lot with the
emperor, is an act that needs some explaining, and the government
went to considerable pains to explain itself to those most affected
by the decision: the urban merchants, the baronial farmers, their
Catalan creditors, and James. What makes the link with Henry so
perplexing is the fact that it was a popular decision. No opposition
was voiced in the parliament, and it was the parliament, after all,
that had the sole authority to make such an alliance; neither is
there evidence of resistance to the pact on the local level. Through-
out 1311 and 1312, even as the full scope of the crop failure was
becoming evident, Sicilians across the island believed that the pact
with the German empire was a boon, a necessity, and a kind of
fulfillment. Was their evangelically inspired sense of destiny so
strong that they would willingly act against their own best
interests? The answer is somewhat more complicated than that. In
order to understand Sicilian motives, we must first consider the
options that existed. What real alternatives did they have, given
the specific conditions of the time?
Many people in early fourteenth-century Italy, Dante among
them, looked hopefully to Henry VII to restore order to the
peninsula, seeing in him the first figure since Manfred - and
perhaps the last figure one could hope for - who possessed the
ability to unseat the Angevins.82 So long as the French were in the
south, they felt, the northern Guelfs could rely on their aid and so
continue to overthrow Ghibelline power; and so long as partisan
strife raged in Italy, the papacy would remain exiled in Avignon,
whence it necessarily devoted more and more of its energies to
secular matters rather than to the spiritual needs of Europe. These
feelings may or may not have been justified, but such was the view
held by many. And such has been the traditional explanation for
81
Ibid., pp. 282 (Table 43), 284 (Tables 44-5), 286 (Table 46).
82
W i l l i a m M . Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy: The Conflict of Empire and City-State, 1310-1313
(Nebraska, i960) is the best study to date.
Sicily's sudden allegiance to the imperial ideology.83 There is

some justification for this, given Sicily's historical link to the
Hohenstaufen dynasty, and especially when we have Frederick's
own words proclaiming that "since all kings are obliged to aid the
Roman emperor, for reasons both of charity and divine justice . . . I,
being zealous in the cause of that justice, have proposed to help him
achieve what is rightfully his . . . and have intended [thus] to give
glory to God, honor to the Holy Roman Church, useful service to
the Holy Roman Empire, and confusion to the enemies of the
Cross."84 But more practical reasons existed.
Caltabellotta had kept the peace for a decade, but several issues
that had been left unresolved in 1302 continued to plague relations
with Naples. The first of these was the problem of Frederick's title.
The treaty had granted him the title of "king of Trinacria" and had
reserved the exclusive use of the title "king of Sicily" for the
Angevin monarch. The anachronism seemed at first an acceptable
compromise; Paris may or may not be worth a Mass, but peace after
twenty years of war is certainly worth a Greek toponym. For a while,
the Sicilians used their odd new name while busying themselves
with the more important matter of putting their house in order; but
once the post-war recovery had begun in earnest around 1305, and
after Arnau de Vilanova had made his fateful first visit to the
kingdom, Frederick grew dissatisfied with his awkward title,
arguing that it detracted from his personal dignity and failed to
reflect political reality. Moreover, and more importantly, the sense
of political and social communality that the government was
attempting to foster in the island seemed unlikely to advance if the
king had to call upon his subjects to rally their collective spirits in
support of a diplomatic fiction.85 By 1308 the chancery began to vary
its use, referring to the king sometimes as "king of Trinacria,"
83
S e e especially D e Stefano, Federico IIId'Aragona re di Sicilia, i2gG-ijjyy 2nd edn. (Bologna,
1956), pp. 160—70, 249 on the "Hohenstaufen dream" attributed to Frederick; and Giunta,
Aragonesi e catalani nel mediterraneo, vol. i, p. 19.
84
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10183 (7 Aug. 1313), a letter from Frederick to James:
"quemadmodum universi reges tenentur juvare imperatorem Romanorum ex debito
caritatis et divine justitie . . . nos, zelo ipsius divine justitie, proponebamus eum juvare in
suis juribus . . . [et] intendebamus dare ad laudem Dei, et honorem Sancte Romane
Ecclesie, ac Sacri Romani Imperil rei puplice utilitatem, et confusionem hostium Crucis."
It should be noted that Arnau de Vilanova had emphasized in one of his works written
expressly for Frederick (the Allocutio christiani) that seeking justitia for all men, even those
who are subjects of another ruler, is God's first requirement of all kings and princes.
85
ACA Cartas James II, no. 9839 (8 March 1305).
sometimes as "king of the island of Sicily," and sometimes simply as
"king."86 When Avignon and Naples balked at this, the government
rationalized its violation of Caltabellotta with the claim that
Charles II had originally agreed to let Frederick choose either "king
of Trinacria" or "king of the island of Sicily," and when the Sicilians
chose the latter Charles changed his mind and insisted on the
"Trinacria" formula.87 Thus Frederick - over the strong objections
of James, who saw no reason to threaten the peace over a matter
of nomenclature - declared void his obligation to abide by a
fraudulent agreement, and began to style himself "king of Sicily" in
all domestic records.88 It was a foolish issue to risk war over, and it
reflects the petulant behavior of which Frederick (the God-elected
savior of Christendom) was capable. Under the guise of idealism,
he believed he was entitled to what he wanted.
More important than the problem of titles were two issues
related to it, one of which we have mentioned earlier. From the
twelfth century on, the wealthy Almohad, and later the Hafsid,
rulers in Tunis paid yearly tribute to the Sicilian throne in return
for useful trade connections and a guarantee against unchecked
piracy and slave gathering. Since this tribute was substantial (8,000
gold dirhams) the government had come to rely upon it to meet
their annual costs.89 But the Angevins, as legitimate possessors of
the "king of Sicily" title, claimed the tribute for themselves - and
not surprisingly found papal support for their claim. For years they
pressed Avignon to force Sicily to hand the money over to them, and
when the pope turned to his newly appointed "admiral of the
church" James to resolve the matter, extraordinary pressure was
placed on the Sicilian-Catalan alliance.
This problem was related to the larger issue of the Calabrian
strongholds still under Sicilian control. There were several of these
sites; in addition to Reggio di Calabria itself, Sicily maintained
garrisons in Bagnara, Calama, Catona, Motta S. Giovanni, Motta di
86
AGA C a r t a s J a m e s II, no. 9990; Ganc. Reg. 335, fol. 2 2 8 - 9 (24 April 1308), 314V-315 (7 May
1304)-
87
A G A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9914 (24 Feb. 1308).
88
Three years later, declaring himself tired of the dispute, he temporarily returned to the
"Trinacria" usage, but soon abandoned it again. See A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10120
(3 Sept. 1311).
89
Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 97 asserts, without citation, that the tribute stood at
200,000 "duplia miria," which is an outrageous figure; s e e instead A C A Perg. J a m e s II,
no. 2570 (28 Aug. 1308).
Mori, Scilla, and S. Niceto. A glance at a map shows their strategic

importance. For six years after Caltabellotta the Angevins voiced
no complaint over Sicily's control of the sites, a fact that may imply
recognition of Sicily's claim to them but more likely is evidence of a
desire not to upset the peace. In 1308, however, Robert formed a
pact with Genoa for a joint attack on Sicily, and cited as his justifi-
cation Sicily's unlawful possession of the strongholds. 90 It is unlikely
that Robert suddenly viewed the Calabrian sites as threats to his
security; after all, they had been peacefully administered by the
Sicilian chancellor Vinciguerra da Palizzi since 1302. What had
changed since then, however, was Naples' strategic position vis-a-vis
the north and the east. In 1308 Henry VII came to the throne in
Germany with his eyes already cast towards Italy where Robert was
hastily appointed leader of the Guelf faction; in that year also,
the Catalan Company, which had just plundered Thrace and
Macedonia, was clearly working its way towards the Greek
heartland, where it threatened to turn out the cadet Angevins'
only remaining beachhead in the east. And the Sicilians, newly
evangelized and eager to capitalize on the Company's successes,
were preparing to launch their self-proclaimed crusade to the
Levant.
Neither side wanted a renewal of the war, but with too little time
available to work out a permanent settlement, a temporary new
truce was patched together. The Angevins agreed to grant Sicily the
Tunisian tribute and to cancel the invasion they had planned with
Genoa, while Sicily in return cancelled its crusade and delivered the
Calabrian castles to Bernat de Sarria (admiral of the Crown of
Aragon), who would hold them until a permanent pact was
reached. 91 This compromise kept a shaky peace for the next
four years. But the creation of the Athenian duchy in 1311 and the
installation of a Sicilian duke and vicar-general, at the very time
when Henry VII had himself crowned emperor at Rome with
the intention of taking control of the entire peninsula, provoked the
Angevins to act. They felt literally besieged, and with good reason.
Now, with Sicily apparently getting stronger (or at least more
brazen), Greece newly fallen, and a hostile emperor already in
Rome and gaining support every day, the Angevins were forced to
90
GG, doc. 50-1; ACA Cartas James II, no. 9914; Ganc. Reg. 335, fol. 228—9.
91
ACA Cartas James II, no. 9930, 9992; Perg. James II, no. 2551.
take the offensive. This explains Naples' move towards war, and
it also explains the sudden Sicilian alliance with Henry. In 1312 it
appeared quite possible to the Sicilians to rid themselves of the
Angevin nuisance once and for all. Their confidence ran high; after
all, in the years since Caltabellotta they had managed to restore
stability to their realm, to reestablish their bruised ecclesiastical
institutions and to foster a passionate spiritual revival, to enhance
their foreign and domestic trade, and to conquer Greece. James,
having just completed negotiations with the Florentines for
subsidies, seemed about to launch his conquest of Sardinia (again).
And the newly crowned emperor offered the Sicilians the destruc-
tion of Angevin power in return for their assistance; Frederick, in
fact, was appointed "admiral of the Holy Roman Empire," although
in the end the title did him no good. Sicily had only to ally itself with
the bold, charismatic, capable Henry, and the result would be not
only the reestablishment of the empire (a necessary precondition,
it was thought, for the purification of Christendom in which
Frederick presumably had a crucial role) but also the incontestable
domination of the Mediterranean by the House of Aragon. 92
As it happened, this opportunistic alliance — whatever sensible
arguments could be marshalled for it in 1312 - sealed Frederick's
political fate. Because of Sicily's pledge to support the Ghibelline
cause throughout Italy (a pledge it honored, sending many tens of
thousands of gold ounces in ships, arms, equipment, food, and
fighting men, over the next twenty-five years) Naples' opposition
became not only more resolute, but more active. 93 Robert no longer
saw any reason to wait for the island to devolve to Angevin control
upon Frederick's death, and instead mounted an essentially
continuous campaign against the realm as soon as his own
resources permitted the attempt. Henry's unexpected death put an
end to the imperial threat and left the Sicilians badly exposed. The
campaign of 1313—14 (regarding which Robert had taken recourse to
the soothsayer, in Speciale's tale) was the first step. Thereafter,
with one exception, no period longer than three years ever passed
without a new invasion of the island, which forced the Sicilians to
92
A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 2956, 2957; Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10183; D e Stefano, Federico III,
pp. 160-5. For J a m e s ' s reactions, see A C A Cane. Reg. 336, fol. 122V—123V, 124.V, 153-153V,
157—158V; Cane. Reg. 337, fol. 2o6v—209V, 21 iv—214.V, 218—2i8v.
93
Henry had been crafty enough, in the original pact, to draw a solemn vow from Frederick
never to abandon the Ghibelline cause for any reason.
devote an ever higher portion of their revenues to their immediate

defenses even while fulfilling their pledged support of the northern
Ghibellines, the Athenian duchy, and the on-again off-again
Sardinian campaign. Folly and accident had entangled Sicily in
expensive commitments that it could ill afford; a sense of
chivalrous honor, and further folly, made the royal court nearly
bankrupt itself in order to meet those commitments. Unfortu-
nately, the German pact coincided with the three-year drought.
This was one of the worst droughts the island had suffered in well
over a hundred years, and its impact was considerable. Reserve
grain stores alleviated some of the suffering at first, but when the
crop failure extended into a second year, and then a third, much of
the population was reduced to famine, particularly in the west. The
search for food, combined with the difficulty of competing for
capital to reinvest in the next season's planting, accelerated the
abandonment of the land and the migration to the coastal towns.
This influx of labor decreased urban wages in the short term; but
the sudden presence of so many new mouths to feed stretched
resources to the limit precisely at a time when, on account of the
grain shortage, royal and municipal revenues were curtailed. This
reversal of fortunes was as much the result of simple bad luck as
it was of misguided evangelical idealism - but its consequences
were permanent. The pact with Henry was a point of no return,
strategically speaking. Having once entered the Guelf-Ghibelline
tangle, the kingdom could not extricate itself - and the tenor of
papal and Angevin opposition changed. But it seemed worth trying.
Frederick and his councillors (and the parliament that controlled
foreign policies) gambled everything on this tempting opportunity,
and Henry's unexpected death left them permanently exposed and
gravely overextended precisely at the moment when the bottom fell
out of their economy.
Nevertheless, they struggled to live up to their promises right up
until Frederick's death, and it is important to note that at no point
between 1313 and 1337 was there any expressed popular opposition
to the German connection. If anything, as matters worsened
through the second half of Frederick's reign, the imperial linkage
gained a kind of pathetic popularity, as if it were the kingdom's last
and most desperate hope; a contingent of "at least thirty galleys,
well-armed, and at our expense" for no less than three years'
service were delivered to the ragtag Ghibelline league organized in
94
1318; Gerardo Spinola the royal marshal, and Raffaele Doria the
admiral, ventured north again in 1323 at their own expense to aid
the Ghibellines with money, food, and supplies, when the govern-
ment was unable to send assistance because of "the great number
of armed galleys Robert had on the seas" around Sicily;95 at times
the ports were closed to grain exports in order to make sure that
sufficient food was available to feed the populace, and any surpluses
were immediately confiscated for shipment to the Ghibelline army
based in Savona.96 But by this point the costs of these commitments
were insupportable. Defending their own realm, propping up the
Greek duchy, assisting the northern Ghibellines, and helping with
the Sardinian campaign all at once placed an enormous burden
on the fast weakening economy. The wages alone for the fleet
committed to the northern Ghibellines in 1318 amounted to over
6,500.00.00. This is when we first begin to see the government
complaining about its "numerous and diverse debts . . . enormous
and unimaginable sums of money";97 it is also when we see the
parliament, for the first time, beginning to refuse the king
94
A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 6217 (27 J u n e 1319), comprising the twin a g r e e m e n t s of
the "Confederatio Lombardorum" and the "Confederatio Januensium." In the end, the
"Confederation's" attack on Genoa lasted until 1323. A s Giovanni Villani described it:
"Who could ever write or narrate the extraordinary siege of Genoa, or the remarkable
deeds performed there by the [Ghibelline] expatriates and their allies [the Sicilians]? For
it is reckoned, indeed, by those who know that not even the siege of Troy witnessed by
comparison a greater series of battles on land and sea — with armed galleys on the waters
constantly, such that the people there were struck time and again by shortage and want
of food; while twice the fleet (by the sea's fortuna) struck the coast, breaking its galleys
and losing a great number of the m e n on board (but still they did not quit the war, even
despite the continuous piracy at sea throughout the world, and each side despoiling the
other of more goods than a kingdom has need of); with the city assailed day and night by
attacks on land, resulting in many deaths; and with those inside the city hurling ruin on
those outside (and vice versa); with the city walls crumbling and falling; and with those
inside the city hurriedly repairing and restoring t h e m at great travail and cost — all such
that, if the whole of this book were written to tell this story alone, it would be full."
Villani, Cronica (see n. 4, above), bk. ix, ch. 118.
95
GG, doc. 133 (21 J u n e 1323). T h e Spinola and Doria families, of course, were o f Genoese
origin, and hence their involvement in the fight w a s motivated by immediate family
concerns. But even so, the fact that the government in Messina would allow both the
admiral and marshal to leave for Genoa w h e n Angevin fleets were attacking the kingdom
speaks of the depth of the realm's c o m m i t m e n t t o the northern allies, and of the
desperation of Sicily's condition. O n c e it had joined with the Ghibellines, the kingdom
had no choice but to continue to support the alliance and to pray for victory. But
neutrality in peninsular affairs was no longer possible.
96
A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10531 (31 Jan. 1323).
97
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10222 (13 Jan. 1315): "multiplicis et diversis expensis guerre . . .
grandes et inextimabiles pecunie quantitates."
the revenues he needed.98 Worse than the expenses involved was

the loss of life. Thousands of Sicilians perished in the fighting, both
at home and abroad. Storms at sea claimed hundreds of others.
Angevin offensives in 1313, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1320, 1325-6, and 1327
killed thousands more men and quite literally turned Sicily into a
nation of widows. Crops were destroyed, vineyards cut down, cities
burnt to ruins or starved into submission. In Palermo, during the
1325-6 campaign, Giovanni Chiaromonte ordered the very paving
stones of the city's streets and squares to be dug up, for use as
projectiles against the Angevin besiegers. In Greece, continued
warfare in the Peloponnese and two Angevin invasions took more
lives - primarily Catalan, but still Sicilian subjects - while the
piracy to which more and more of the duchy's inhabitants took
recourse became increasingly dangerous and violent. Strained to
the limit by these losses and the increased demands for more tax
revenues, the royal and municipal economies rapidly deteriorated.
Catalonia tried to help. But it could not afford, either financially
or diplomatically, to involve itself directly at least until Sardinia
had been achieved, so it tried instead an indirect method; through-
out the 1320s the Crown offered tax deferments (generally for a
period of two years) to any of its citizens who wanted to enter
military service in Sicily. Many took up the offer. These volunteers,
though, were hardly motivated out of high ideals or love for the
beleaguered island; they were mercenaries, eager only to fight and
to be paid - or better yet, not to fight, and still be paid. They armed
themselves, and came in retinues. Thus one Bartomeu Quineran,
for example, applied for such a deferment in 1321 and hastened
to Messina with a squadron of archers and infantry." Once the
Catalans had finally secured Sardinia in 1325 they were again
willing to offer direct military aid; by this time, however,
Catalonia's chief aims had been achieved and Sicily's fortunes were
fast fading. Consequently, those men who volunteered for service in
98
ACA Cartas James II, no. 9961 (27 Oct. 1322), rejecting the king's proposed new tariff on
wheat and millet (in this case, to raise money for Sardinia).
99
ACA Cartas James II, no. 6660 (27 April 1321). Applicants for deferments (litterae
elongamenti) had to pay a deposit to the government in Barcelona — money which
presumably would be used to ransom the soldier, should he be captured, but which
was also available for the government's use during the two years of service. Bartomeu
paid 3,000 Valencian solidi. Cf. no. 6946 (11 March 1323), 6950 (13 March 1323), 6956
(15 March 1323), where litterae were used to enlist soldiers for the (final) invasion of
Sardinia.
Sicily tended to be misfits and troublemakers. For example, a
company of ruffians hired out of Valencia in 1326 was shipped to
Trapani, where the men quickly terrorized the town. They refused
to take orders from the Sicilian command, sold the weapons given
to them by the Sicilians, used the cash to get drunk, and prowled the
streets looking for adventure while brandishing the weapons they
had brought themselves. By this point most of the local barons had
turned their backs on the royal government and shut themselves up
in their mountain fortresses, refusing to fight for a kingdom they
did not recognize and whose days appeared to be numbered. When
the government, in desperate need in 1325-6, offered even the most
suspicious-looking of mercenaries two months' wages up front if
they would only take action against the Angevins then marauding
the countryside, the mercenaries took the cash and promptly fled
the island.100 After this, Catalonia recognized that it had either
to provide more useful, organized assistance or risk losing Sicily
permanently; so after 1328 the Crown offered help directly, under
the command of Ramon de Peralta. 101
Even this failed to improve matters, however. Rioting in the
demesne cities forced the court to award more tax exemptions;
and to keep the remaining barons loyal, it had to grant them the
full civil and criminal jurisdiction (merum et mixtum imperium) that
they demanded over their baronies - in essence, making them
autonomous political entities in the highlands. 102 To offset these
losses, the court began aggressively to confiscate vacant fiefs, whose
numbers were fast increasing, especially in Val di Mazara, and to
sell government offices to whomever could, or would, pay for
them. 103 Still other offices were given away as hereditary fiefs. And
when no other option was available, the government went so far
as to begin confiscating ecclesiastical property. In May 1328, for
example, the king ordered the transfer of the annual revenues from
Ravennusa - until then the property of the archbishop of Monreale
100
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10076 (30 July 1326). In this letter to James, Frederick
mentions that of all the cavalry now serving in Sicily "la maior part eren Catalans e
Aragoneses."
101
ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3684 (26 April 1328), 3711 (27 Feb. 1331); Perg. Alfonso III,
extra inventario, no. 815 (4 Oct. 1335), 819 (2 Oct. 1335), 860 (Mar. 1335); Cane. Reg. 544,
fol. 89-89V (6 Sept. 1335), 90V-91 (22 Oct. 1335). See also Maria-Merce Costa, "Un episodi
de la vida de Ramon de Peralta," in MM 1, pp. 313-27.
'°2 ASP Cane. Reg. 2, fol. 95-95V, 96-96V.
103
ACA Cartas James II, no. 5935; Perg. Alfonso III, no. 351; ASP Cane. Reg. 2, fol. 92-92V.
- to D. Filippo Curto in return for his continued military service.104

The clergy complained loudly, but there was little they could do
since the papal interdict which had been reimposed in 1321 had
severed links between the prelates and the court in Avignon.
One last desperate opportunity presented itself. After many
years of struggle Louis the Bavarian had emerged in Germany as
emperor, and like Henry VII before him he seemed to some of
his more hopeful contemporaries to be capable of reestablishing
imperial authority throughout Germany and Italy. He was of course
regarded as an enemy of the church, which had excommunicated
and deposed him in 1324, but that mattered little to Louis, who
simply proclaimed his own deposition of the pope and installed an
anti-pope (a Franciscan Spiritual, Nicholas V) more to his liking.
Thinking himself secure in Germany, he led his army into Italy
where in January 1328 he received the imperial crown from Sciarra
di Colonna in Rome. The Sicilians viewed his advance southward
with great excitement and frankly deluded optimism. If Louis were
able to subdue Guelf power, they hoped, Sicily might have a last
chance. The Angevins, caught between imperial forces to the north
and Sicilian arms to the south, might finally be overcome. Louis
played on those hopes and sent an imperial embassy to Palermo as
soon as he was crowned, offering to reactivate Sicily's original pact
with Henry VII.105 The embassy attempted to drum up local support
for Louis's anti-pope as well, thinking that the Sicilians' embrace of
the evangelical movement would assure their embrace of the rival
pontiff. At Frederick's command, however, the Germans were
forbidden to propagandize for the anti-pope, and were allowed only
to address the political and military issue.106 Sicily patched together
a force of 500-600 knights, nearly a thousand infantry, and fifty
galleys to join with the imperial forces stationed in Pisa. There they
were to link up with Ghibelline forces sent from Savona, and then
104
ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 154: "usque ad beneplacitum nostrum seu quamdiu
proventus et jura dicte Montis Regalis ecclesie, occasione presentis guerre, in manu
Curie fuerint pro ipsis unciis viginti novem et tarinis quindecim per annum pro parte
nostre Curie committatur."
105
ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3684; Cane. Reg. 562, fol. 26-26V (7 May 1328).
106
In Avignon, John XXII also assumed that the Sicilians would throw their support behind
Nicholas; at least two months passed before the rumor was dispelled. See ACA Cane.
Reg. 562, fol. 31—32V (28 June 1328) - a diplomatic capitula from Alfonso (James's son, and
ruler of the Crown of Aragon since 1327), still warning Frederick of the grave dangers of
accepting the false pope.
proceed to drive the Guelf forces from the peninsula. 107 But both
rulers had miscalculated. Louis had made the mistake of advancing
into Italy before quelling all resistance to his rule in Germany, and
had to retreat hastily when news arrived of an aristocratic rebellion
in the north; this spelled disaster for the Sicilians once again, since
the expected Ghibelline forces never arrived, leaving the Sicilians
exposed to the quickly deployed Guelf armies. They avoided
slaughter, but were nevertheless lost: they all disappeared in a
storm at sea as they sailed back to Palermo. News of the tragedy
prompted the worst rioting the city had seen since another ship-
wreck in 1321 - a loss of only four galleys under Genoese command
- had led to violence that left 300 dead in the streets. 108 From this
point on, urban unrest was commonplace throughout the realm. 109
Once again the kingdom, in seeking to capitalize upon what seemed
at the time to be a sound opportunity, had only further alienated
Naples, the papacy, and Catalonia itself (which had urgently
exhorted Frederick not to form any pact with Louis), and had made
any sort of negotiated settlement impossible. And indeed, for the
last ten years of Frederick's reign there was scarcely any concerted
effort even to speak of peace.
After this, everything, even Nature herself, seemed to conspire
against the Sicilians. In 1329, Catania - then perhaps the third or
fourth largest of the kingdom's cities - suffered heavy damage from
a disastrous eruption of Mount Etna. Nicola Speciale witnessed it
first-hand. He described it as follows:
In the year of the Lord 1329, on the 28th ofJune, as the sun was setting in
the west . . . Mount Etna shook violently in horrific upheaval and roared
with a tremendous thunder, which struck terror in the minds of all the
farmers on the mountain and of all the people throughout a wide stretch
of the kingdom. From the eastern face of the mountain (the cliff known as
"Musarra"), where white clouds hitherto could always be seen, the earth
suddenly ripped away and fire burst forth vehemently. Hideous fumes
gathered in the air like a foul cloud. At that moment the fire shot forward
rapidly, and a sound like the rumbling of monstrous wheels or of a
thousand thunders could be heard, even a far distance away. Once the sun
was gone and the evening shadows began to spread, fire fell from the sky
. . . and globs of molten rock belched forth with a horrible din. Suddenly
107
Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 98-9.
108
ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 48, 100.
109
See, for example, ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 2083 (18 Dec. 1331), 3711 (27 Feb. 1331).
the devouring fire grew stronger, running in a torrent over the slopes and
all the settlements below, destroying everything. All along the eastern
and southern sides (where the break in the mountain was greatest), where
many ancient buildings had stood (for those seeking solitary worship of
God), the powerful and ceaseless shaking of the earth either destroyed
them outright or left them broken and shattered; and the earth itself
opened so wide as to swallow whole streams that had [hitherto] flowed by
peacefully. Along the nearer coastline, many boats and skiffs, which had
just recently docked, sank on account of the countless quakings of the land
beneath the sea.
The volcano continued to erupt for more than two weeks. The
burning stream of lava and the rumbling of the land destroyed
building after building. The panic that had seized Catania
worsened daily when suddenly, as if to confirm fears that the
apocalypse had come at last, there was an eclipse of the sun, on
15 July. Speciale himself watched, he tells us, with a kind of
dreadful admiration. After the eclipse passed, lava still spewed and
fire raged.
As I watched the fire, and beheld the thousands of flaming rocks that had
been blown from the mountain, a terrific earthquake shook the whole
land, and the ground ripped open on this side and that . . . [The lava]
finally divided into three main streams, two of which ran eastward,
bringing great slaughter throughout the district of Aci. . . while the third
ran headlong to the limits of Catania.
Queen Eleanor, who happened to be in Catania at the time, led a
procession of the relics of St. Agatha, the city's patron, around the
city walls. The eruption grew louder and more frightening, and
clouds of sulfurous ash darkened the sky. So thick was the ash that
fell, he continues, that all the fish in a number of nearby rivers died,
and the whole plain beneath the city (its agricultural heartland) lay
buried. The saint saved her city, however, for the lava flow halted
just outside the city gates. Nevertheless, hundreds of people had
died, including some who, according to Speciale, were "seized by
demons, who, many people at that time had preached, would enter
peoples' bodies," and much of the agricultural and manufacturing
base of the region had disappeared. 110 Nor was this the end. Etna,
110
Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. VIII, ch. 2: "Anno Domini millesimo tricentesimo vicesimo
nono, die vero XXVIII Junii, cum sol ad vesperum declinabat . . . Mons Ethna horrifico
motu vehementer intremuit, magnisque videbatur mugire tonitribus, quod non solum
incolas montis perterruit, quin etiam passim habitantium plurima loca Sicilie mentibus
which had previous erupted only in 1323 (a blast that showered
ash as far away as Malta), exploded yet again in 1333. This latter
eruption fell far short of the violence of 1329 but did much to
reconfirm fears of divine displeasure and to uproot many of the crop
fields and vineyards that local farmers had replanted in the interim.
The ruin of the Catanian plain, however dramatic it was, did not
end the calamities of Frederick's last years. The last and most grim
legacy of his reign was only then coming to the fore. "Now the point
in the story has come," wrote Speciale shortly after bringing his
description of the volcano to a close, "when it is necessary to
describe the campaign of Giovanni Chiaromonte, the count of
Mohac, against Sicily, and to tell of the ensuing war . . . which was
the cause of the desolation [of the land] and the loss of so many
people."111 The struggle he refers to was the vendetta that broke
out between the Chiaromonte and Ventimiglia families, a shock-
ingly bitter and bloody feud that quickly escalated into full-scale
civil war among the barons. This war dominated the rest of the
fourteenth century, and when it finally ended in 1395, with the
coronation of Martin I, Sicily's countryside in many places was an
ashen wasteland. Vendettas possess a peculiar ferocity all their
own; and in this particular case, added to the dispute over family
honor was an otiose element of self-serving patriotism, of class
terrorem incussit. Et factu, quod subito ab ipsius montis latere sublimi [sic] ad partem,
que respicit orientem, super earn rupem (que dicitur "de Musarra") ubi gelate nives
hactenus perpetuo videbantur, subito visa est divulsa tellussubsidere, unde violenter ignis
erupit, quod etiam tetri fumi quasi atre nubis se tollentis in aera vestigia demonstrabant.
Egrediebatur quidem ignis cum impetu, et velut ingentium rotarum strepitus aut sonitus
diversorum tonitruum spectantes a longe audiebantur. Postquam vero sol occidit,
ceperuntque imminere crepuscula tenebrarum, in celum quasi flammarum globi
tollebantur incendia et liquefacti saxorum orbes, quasi avulsa montis viscera, cum
fragore terribili ructabantur. Tune protinus ignis edax invaluit, qui tamquam
impetuosus torrens iter agens in loca declivia et subjecta, cunctaque prosternens, iter
vastantis alluvionis agebat. Ab orientali vero, et meridionali parte, ubi montis concussio
plusquam in locis aliis videbatur erumpere, plurima edificia, que in eremo veneranda
vestustas ad Dei cultum fundaverat, ipse jugis et validus terre motus vel diruit vel in
rimas et fisturas plurimas separavit; placidos etiam rivos aquarum fluentium dehiscens
tellus absorpit. Insuper ad propinqua litora Mascalarum scaphas plurimas et faselos,
quas paulo ante subduxerant, ex crebris et validis terre concussionibus in mare deductas
. . . Cum spectarem, inquam, incendium et mirarer ignita saxorum millia, que ab ipsius
terre visceribus ructabantur, circa locum eundem terremotus efTecti sunt validi, tellus
ipsa vice alia et alia dissiluit . . . Cumque ipsius alluvionis igne vastans impetus per
certum terre spatium continuo defluxisset, ultimo in tres decursus divisa est, quorum duo
ad ortum in magna strage per districtum Jacii usque ad loca propinqua litoribus diebus
plurimis processerunt; tertius vero contra fines Cathaniensium se direxit."
111
Ibid., bk. VIII, ch. 6.
against class and of native against foreigner, which resulted in the

sort of capricious cruelty that Sicily had not witnessed since the very
beginning of the Vespers, when furious crowds reportedly ripped
people open simply on account of their accents. The new baronial
war, according to Giovanni Villani, was fought "as though by savage
beasts" who, at the height of the brutality, thought nothing of
starving whole towns into submission or of bursting aqueducts and
irrigation networks, which turned some valleys into dustbowls
and others into malarial swamps.112
The frustration that lay behind the brutality resulted from the
steady undermining of the barons' economic and social position
after 1311; but the particular timing of the rebellion was related to
the kingdom's international difficulties. Two marriages triggered
everything. Early in 1316 the king's illegitimate daughter, Eleanora,
was wedded to Giovanni Chiaromonte II, the ten-year-old son of
Manfredi Chiaromonte, the count of Modica and Mohac as well as
the royal seneschal. The previous year young Giovanni's sister
Costanza had married Francesco Ventimiglia, the count of Gerace
and along with Manfredi one of the wealthiest and most prominent
figures in the realm. But Francesco also kept a mistress, and by her
he had "a multitude of children" on whom he doted so excessively
that he apparently professed no desire for any legitimate offspring
who might displace those he already had. Costanza was "made a
stranger to his bedroom"; and soon Francesco began proceedings to
obtain an annulment of his loveless marriage (on what grounds it is
not clear) and the legitimation of his bastards - both of which ends
he achieved thanks to his contacts at the papal court, where he had
led an embassy on behalf of the government in 1318. This repudi-
ation of his sister bitterly angered Giovanni, who had become count
of Modica after Manfredi's death in 1321. He turned to Frederick,
his father-in-law, for justice; but when the king refused to take
action against Ventimiglia, Giovanni, his mind "seething with great
tempests of rage," left Sicily to join Louis the Bavarian in Germany,
in whose service he remained for several years.113
112
The indispensable source for the baronial war is Michele da Piazza, Historic, sicula ab anno
MCCCXXXVII ad annum MCCCLXI, in RGBS i, pp. 509-780 and 11, 1-106; there is a new
edition by Antonino GiufTrida (Palermo, 1980), Fonti per la storia di Sicilia, vol. in. See
also Salvatore Tramontana, Michele da Piazza e ilpotere baroniale in Sicilia (Messina, 1963).
113
Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. vm, ch. 6: "Dum Franciscus de Vintimilio comes Ghiracii
Constantiam sororem iamdicti Johannis de Claromonte comitis haberet in conjugem,
In his German exile Giovanni nurtured his anger until it became
an obsession. His sufferings were made worse by the fact that his
enemy Ventimiglia, although he suffered in the decline in which all
of Sicily was caught, never fell from grace with the king or from
power in the government. Indeed, Ventimiglia seemed immune
from all royal criticisms or attempts to undercut his commanding
position in society. Finally unable to bear matters any longer,
Giovanni returned with a band of German mercenaries, and
searched the streets of Palermo until they found Francesco, whom
they struck down but failed to kill. Giovanni and his men hastened
to their highland strongholds and rallied supporters to their cause
- now a movement against an ineffectual, corrupt, and unfair
foreign government as well as against a rival noble family vilified as
the privileged pet of the monarchy - with promises of assistance
from, once again, the German imperial court. This support, of
course, never materialized, since Louis had other priorities (besides
which, Frederick was a useful source of ships and men for conti-
nental Ghibellinism). Giovanni and his supporters, in the face of a
mounting campaign against them, decided to quit the island once
more, and his estates were quickly confiscated by the government.
Renouncing their links with the imperial court, Giovanni and his
cohorts threw in their lot instead with the Angevins, thus triggering
charges of treason, countercharges, a chain of rebellions and
repressions; and by 1335 the stage was set for ruinous civil war,
much to the glee of the Neapolitan court.114 So great was the
turba filiorum, quos idem Franciscus ex concubina susceperat, tanquam novelle

olivarum, ante patris oculos, adolebant, ipsique genitori, sublato moderamine rationis,
plus debito spectabiles videbantur . . . Unde actum est, quod in ea parte, pudoris
gravitate deposita, Franciscus ipse jactaret se in hoc numeros prole felicem, abjectaque
omni spe omnique desiderio suscipiende prolis ex conjuge, fecit illam de suo cubiculo
alienam, illosque filios, quos legitimus thorus non edidit, successores et heredes
relinquere meditatus est. Quocirca dato conjugi libello repudii, per diversas semitas et
amfractus divortium obtinuit, matrem filiorum sibi nuptam adhibuit et tandem
legitimationem eorum a Sede Apostolica impetravit. Tune Johannes, quern juvenilis
etas et objectum sororis repudium instigabant, moliri cepit de Francisco vindictam.
Sed quia Franciscus a Friderico rege tolerabatur in plurimis . . . Johannes experiri
quod mente conceperat effectu operis non audebat. Itaque magnis irarum fluctibus
estuans ad Ludovicum imperatorem, de quo iam fermo preteriit, tune parantem Italiam
invadere, profectus est, ubi cum in agendis bellicis ei prospere successisset, usque adeo
fama gloriosus excrevit, quod idem imperator eundem Johannem gloriosis titulis
insignivit."
114
Stefano Vittorio Bozzo, "Giovanni Chiaramonte II nella discesa di Ludovico il Bavaro,"
ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 3 (1878-9), 155-85; Roberto Cessi, "Giovanni di Chiaramonte, conte di
Modica, e Ludovico il Bavaro," ArchStperSic 10 (1913), 223-36. See also Laura Sciascia,
danger, that Frederick suddenly added a codicil to his will, stating

that, in the all too likely event that he and his entire family should
perish in the war, the throne should pass to Alfonso in Barcelona.115
The baronial war began after Frederick's death, with innumer-
able atrocities committed by all sides. But it is important to
recognize the extent to which this tragedy too owed its existence
to Sicily's international difficulties. The constriction of the
economy from mid-reign had caused tremendous hardship for
the landholding class, whose land rents and agricultural profits fell
precipitously; this paved the way both for their bitterness against
the urban sector of society (where their peasant laborers had fled,
and where other economic options held out at least the possibility
of recovery under the protection of their extensive privileges) and
against the prominent Catalan caste, but also for their opportunity
to increase their power-base in the highlands. Frederick after all
had made it possible, reluctantly perhaps but consistently, for them
to grow into a stronger and more independent-minded group by
removing the ban on subinfeudation, by granting them criminal
and civil jurisdiction (merum et mixtum imperium) over their terri-
tories, and finally by appointing many of them to military positions
within the cities they so disdained. The more that Sicilian life
decayed, the more the barons were in a position to dominate
society and to blame the prevalent ills on the government. And
the king's links with Ghibellinism on the mainland provided a
convenient justification for Giovanni Chiaromonte and his men
to turn to the German emperor, as theoretical overlord of the
recalcitrant monarch. When Louis failed to meet Giovanni's
expectations, the latter's indignation and frustration were
sufficiently great that he was willing, temporarily at least, to
champion the Angevins as once again the legitimate sovereigns.
That so many of the Sicilian elites would consider renewing
Angevin claims to the kingdom - even if only as a tactical measure
- speaks eloquently of the dreadful extent of Sicily's decline by the
time of Frederick's death.
"Scene da un matrimonio: Eleonora d'Aragona e Giovanni Chiaramonte," Quaderni

medievali 31-2 (1991), 121-9. ACA Cane. Reg. 544, fol. 89-89V (6 Sept. 1335), is a letter from
Alfonso to Frederick, offering assistance in putting down the coming war.
115
ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3718 (25 Feb. 1335). Text of codicil is included in this letter
from Ramon de Peralta to Alfonso.
It is easy to criticize Sicily's gross overextension of its power,

resources, and loyalties. Despite the impressive economic and
social recovery that followed Caltabellotta, entering into so many
overseas obligations was sheer foolhardiness. What the land needed
instead - and what, to be fair, the government tried to offer until
the temptations of 1311-13 arose - was an organized effort to
capitalize upon prosperity by developing new manufactures, a
carrying trade, a more effective parliament, more equitable means
of dealing with the social tensions caused by demographic shift,
more schools, better roads. Once Greece had been taken, an offer
to restore the duchy to Naples and to assist in further Angevin
expansion in the east might have won an Angevin renunciation of
claims upon "Trinacria" and brought peace. But the extraordinary
opportunities that appeared, or seemed to appear, in 1311-13 proved
irresistible both to the evangelically inspired royal court and
society at large. Whatever we make of this grandiose vision of
Mediterranean domination and spiritual purification, we must
recognize that for Frederick's Sicily such a vision did temporarily
exist, and that this vision tempted the kingdom into its web of
foreign involvements which, once begun, only kept the realm
entangled in difficulty after difficulty until Frederick's death. The
web, once entered, proved impossible to escape.
Thus, in order to evaluate the effect of the war with Naples upon
the dreadful unraveling of Sicilian life one must broaden one's
scope of vision and take into consideration more than the
immediate struggle along the Sicilian and Calabrian coasts. That
struggle was indeed an on-again off-again campaign of harassment
and siege, costly enough in men and resources and interrupted
trade, but hardly enough by itself to explain a kingdom's shattering.
Nicola Speciale, we have seen, pinpointed the decline's start to the
1311-13 period; but that may have more symbolic than literal truth
to it. There is clear evidence that serious social and economic
decline had begun as early as 1317, especially in Val di Mazara; most
papal negotiating offers from that time on were willing to give
Frederick permanent control of western Sicily (plus some other
overseas lands, like Albania or Cyprus), if he would relinquish the
more stable eastern valli.116 It seems more likely, though, that
116
FAA 11, doc. 449; Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 99.
serious decay did not set in until 1320 or 1321; once begun, however,
it accelerated rapidly throughout the 1320s. Successes overseas may
have taken attention away from the failures at home, for a while,
and may even have been pursued with greater vigor for that very
reason. But the collapse of any reasonable hope for international
success as a compensation or possible remedy for domestic
problems soon became apparent. After some brief initial benefit
caused by the formation of a new forced market, the Athenian
duchy represented a continual drain on the royal coffers and thus
an impediment to economic health. The more demesne land the
government had to alienate in order to prop up the regime, the
more it had to recoup those losses in another sector of the economy.
And the same held true of the ties with Catalonia and with the
northern Ghibellines. It is impossible to estimate the overall cost
to the kingdom of pursuing these wars. Surviving records simply do
not exist. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some impressionistic
conclusions.
First, tens of thousands of people were killed, and tens of
thousands more were pushed off the land, made homeless, sent into
exile, or driven into poverty. (It is no coincidence that most of the
Sicilian-based tales in Boccaccio's Decameron feature a young
widow.) Usually the displaced populace trailed into the nearest
demesne city where it was hoped the persistent labor shortages
might provide a chance to make a new beginning, but many pushed
eastward, or even emigrated abroad to Sardinia and Tunisia when
they found life in Palermo, Trapani, Mazara, or Agrigento no
easier than life in the desolate countryside. The economic effects of
this shift were devastating, since the erosion of the agricultural
base contributed to a dramatic loss of commerce within the cities -
and consequently to a decline in revenues to provide for the cities'
defense. Labor shortages there might be, but without adequate
capital or credit for the commercial sector there was little chance of
finding permanent work. In the 1325-6 campaign, for example, the
Angevins had stormed in succession Mazara, Salemi, Marsala,
Sciacca, Caltabellotta, Corleone, Cattolica, Agrigento, Licata,
Naro, Terranova, Caltagirone, Scicli, Modica, Siracusa, Noto,
Buccheri, Ferla, Palazzolo, Avola, Ragusa, Augusta, Lentini, and
Catania, destroying villages and farms, burning crops, tearing down
aqueducts, and cutting down vineyards as they went. The damage
cannot be calculated; commercial contracts for several years
afterwards, however, are filled with clauses stipulating the extent
of individuals' liability for failing to produce the promised goods or
services "on account of the war."117 Palermo itself, at which that
campaign had first aimed, had to spend great sums of money to
repair the city walls and other fortifications destroyed by the
Angevins, to buy emergency provisions, and to hire a number of
the private armies (comitive) that had appeared on the scene by
then, even though the commune was nearly insolvent. 118 But
trouble was evident in Palermo even before the invasion. The first
notarial register of Salerno di Pellegrino, for example, which covers
foreign trade in that city for the indictional year from September
1323 to August 1324, records fifty-eight transactions (approximately
40 percent of the total register) in which commodities were
purchased on credit, or loans were advanced, yet no repayment is
noted. (Debts that were repaid are carefully documented as such.)
These defaults, if such they were, represent a total value of over
I,2OO.OO.OO.119
The cost in social tension and mob violence was equally great, as
poverty and frustration pushed increasing numbers of people
towards a xenophobic search for scapegoats on whom to vent their
anger. The inland barons led the charge against the Catalans, who,
they contended, were avaricious traitors to the trust Sicily had
placed in them. "Morano li catalani!" was their cry, which could be
heard from 1321 onwards.120 In the cities, though, the victims tended
to be foreign merchants, especially those from Genoa (owing to
their increasing presence rather than the particularity of their
origin). The attacking mobs were ambivalent about the Guelf or
Ghibelline leanings of their victims, it would seem; foreign
merchants in general were viewed as privileged predators, and
at times foreigner even attacked foreigner in the overheated
atmosphere. 121
117
Muntaner, Cronica, ch. 282; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. vn, ch. 18-19; ASP Notai defunti,
Reg. 76 (Ruggero di Citella), fol. 65, 66, 68-9, 86V-87, 87V-S8V, 90V-91, 97-97V; Spez. 89.
118
Acta curie in,passim. The royal bailiff for the city in 1315 (D. Bertolo Cosmerio), the chief
official responsible for preserving peace, could not be paid his salary until 1323 owing
to the city's defectus pecunie, although urban intractability over the presence of a knight
as bailiff cannot be discounted as a reason for failing to find funds to pay him; see ibid.,
doc. 16.
119
ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 1 (Salerno di Pellegrino),passim.
120
Michele da Piazza, Historia sicula, bk. 1, ch. 3; Giunta, Aragonesi e catalani 1, pp. 22-3.
121
ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 48,100.
In sum, the international scene may not have caused Sicily's

depressing decline but it certainly aggravated that fall, and it
provides the necessary background or context for analyzing
domestic policies and developments. Sicily's possible responses to
worsening circumstances became consistently narrower. Whatever
the central and local governments wanted to do, in terms of
domestic development, their real options were few and were
constantly shrinking in the face of their international problems
that demanded immediate and urgent attention. The barons had
shown themselves, in the post-Caltabellotta settlement, to be
willing to work with the new government, and in the process peace-
ably divested themselves of territories they had seized during the
first phase of the Vespers even though the government had little
power to force their compliance. But the erosion of their economic
base spurred them to a rebellion which took a number of forms -
either moving into the demesne and disrupting life there, or
sealing themselves off in the highlands and establishing themselves
as independent petty princes, or openly breaking with the govern-
ment and taking arms against it.
Once the decline set in, the kingdom stumbled from alliance to
alliance and from crisis to crisis; but nothing could free it from the
constantly constricting web in which it was caught. At a certain
point, it became clear, there could be no peace with Naples, so long
as the Angevins wanted to prolong the war and the papacy was
willing to support their efforts, except for an all-out victory; and
opportunity for such a victory seemed to present itself twice, in the
persons of Henry VII and Louis the Bavarian. The Sicilians' hopes
were wholly unrealistic, but in the concatenation of events that
led to each new tie we can see the full extent of the appalling
difficulties they faced.
CHAPTER 3
A divided society I: the

urban-demesnal world
Urban-demesnal Sicily comprised both the coastal commune-

republics (universitates or urbes), several inland towns (like Polizzi,
Castrogiovanni, Naro, and Piazza) that were likewise governed
by elected judices and lesser municipal officials but which lacked
the more varied economic activity and demographic makeup of the
perimeter cities, and the personal estates of the crown. In addition
- although it was not strictly part of the demesne - Frederick's
queen Eleanor held an extensive independent apanage known as
the camera reginale, which she administered with her own corps of
officials; located in the Val di Noto, its most important component
was the city of Siracusa, but it included Francavilla, Lentini, Mineo,
and Vizzini as well. This camera grew rapidly in the 1320s and 1330s
and became a favorite resettlement site for immigrants from the
Val di Mazara, owing to certain tax advantages it enjoyed but
above all due to the relative absence of baronial influence there.
Whether as part of the king's demesne or as subjects to the queen's
administration, well over 50 percent of the total population of Sicily
lived within sixteen kilometers (ten miles) of the coastline at the
start of Frederick's reign; and the urban segment of the population
increased proportionally as the overall population declined. Thus if
we consider the demesne in the broadest context — that is, as all the
sites under royal control, whether that meant the king or the queen
- it is likely that from 1325 onward as many as two-thirds of all
Sicilians inhabited the crown's territories and paid taxes to the
royal fisc.
Administering so extensive a demesne obviously commanded
most of the king's attention. From the day he took the throne,
Frederick regulated municipal elections, guaranteed local
privileges, organized networks for defense of the ports, heard
judicial appeals, and manipulated the tariff system, all in order to
85
ensure urban prosperity. Although he liked to claim otherwise, he

owed his kingship to the support for him registered by the major
municipalities. Without urban backing he would not have received
the crown in 1296; and he knew that without the continuance of that
support he would not be able to keep it. Hence there was always a
certain contradiction or tension between what Frederick said, in
regard to the cities, and what he did. The cities, as the crucial
pillars of the economy, understood their importance to him very
well and never hesitated to remind him of it and to seek new grants
of privilege or assistance. After almost every Angevin or Genoese
attack, outbreak of disease, or conflict with baronial ambitions,
the beset town or towns turned to their lord for some form of
compensation for their sufferings on his behalf. Their petitions
frequently angered the king since they dealt inevitably with local
needs and desires, to the frustration of Frederick's larger aim of
promoting realm-wide unity. His transition from glorified war hero
to administrative supply clerk proved painful for him and might
well have driven him to despair if it had not been for his adoption of
the evangelical-reformist platform that gave so strong a sense
of divine purpose to his actions.
Frederick matured in his role. In his early years, from his
coronation to Caltabellotta, he displayed the brashness of a young
warrior-king living out what he deemed to be chivalric adventures
in the manner of his beloved father. After Caltabellotta, however,
he adapted to peacetime and engineered an ambitious and mostly
successful reform of the demesnal administration that resulted
in the standardization of the tariff code, the provision of orderly
elections within the cities, and a reasonably equitable adminis-
tration of justice. In this period, until roughly mid-reign, the cities
remained relatively peaceful and prosperous. The surviving
evidence records remarkably few incidents of urban unrest despite
the broad-ranging changes taking place in society, although some
must have occurred. The second half of the reign, however, is
another story. With the constant threat of war impinging on trade,
with displaced and starving peasants crowding into the cities, with
ethnic tensions on the rise, and with the gradual monopolization of
local wealth and power by handfuls of organized rival elites, the
cities became centers of considerable poverty, unrest, crime, and
disease. Faced with these mounting difficulties, the king turned
to members of the baronial world to restore order and began to
The urban—demesnal world 87
appoint them as bailiffs or pretors possessing extensive authority to
suppress unrest. He was also forced, in other instances, effectively
to buy the continued support of a town by awarding further
privileges and tax immunities that he could ill afford. Royal
popularity declined steadily, while requests for favors just as
steadily increased and in fact began to take on the character of
demands. In Val di Mazara the king's standing with his subjects
had sunk so low that after 1321 Frederick was hardly to be seen
anywhere west of the river Salso and seldom ventured even as far
west as Castrogiovanni. For the rest of the time he remained in or
near Messina, making it the de facto capital, and journeyed when
necessary to friendly sites like Lentini and Siracusa. 1
Frederick's sole surviving poem, asirvante written in an Italianate
Provengal in 1298, illustrates his early brashness; in it the cocky
new king views his monarchy as a stage upon which to play out his
chivalric dreams:
Ges per guerra non chal aver consir:
Ne non es dreiz de mos amis mi plangna,
Ch'a mon secors vei mos parens venire;
E de m'onor chascuns s'esforza e s'langna
Perch'el meu nom maior cors pel mon aia.
E se neguns par che de mi s'estraia,
No Ten blasmi che almen tal faiz apert
Gh'onor e prez mos lignages en pert.
Pero el reson dels Catalans auzir

E d'Aragon puig far part Alamagna;
E so ch'enpres mon paire gent fenir:
Del regn'aver crei che per dreiz me tagna.
E se per se de mal faire m'assaia
Niguns parens, car li crescha onor gaia,
Bern porra far dampnage a deschubert,
Gh'en altre sol non dormi nim despert.
Pobble, va dir a chui chausir so plaia
Ghe dels Latins lor singnoria m'apaia;
Per que aurai lor e il me per sert.
Mas mei parens mi van un pauc cubert.2
1
His favorite residence was his palace (today in ruins) at Castroreale, a small upland town
a few kilometers above Barcellona, roughly forty-five kilometers from Messina.
2
This poem appears in Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, PL XLI, Cod. XLVII, fol. 63, and
as document no. 54 in the appendix to Amari, La guerra del Vespro siciliano. "The events of
It is a bad poem, but it reflects the conceit he was capable of

and offers a hint of his political attitude, even as it illustrates
the decayed troubadour atmosphere that still lingered in the
aristocratic courts. He treats the Vespers as chivalric sport, an
opportunity to gain knightly renown and extend the honor of the
royal House of Aragon. He even lacks ill-will towards his enemies
and asks only that they declare themselves openly. He rejoices in
the support given to him by the Sicilians and their Catalan allies,
and declares his determination to retain the throne despite the
difficulties that loom ahead. This much of the sirvante is formulaic;
but a few complex political realities are also suggested. When he
penned this poem Frederick had been on the throne for two years,
after his election and acclamation by the parliament; but he states
that the crown sits atop his head rightfully as the son of King Peter,
whose conquests he aims to complete. As though he were antici-
pating later struggles with the urban leaders, he asserts that his
authority derives from inheritance. But Peter had held the twin
rights of conquest and legitimate succession through marriage to
the last Hohenstaufen, Constance; hence Frederick's inherited
rights have vague implications "as far away as Germany." This is
of course merely a reference to his Hohenstaufen lineage, but it
ironically presages the links with Henry and Louis which brought so
much harm to the kingdom. The poem's emphasis on hidden
enemies, secret abandonment, and betrayal refers to the treason of
Roger de Lauria (who defected in 1297) but it may also be an ironic,
and somewhat anxious, lament for the position taken by James
in the pseudo-war between Sicily and Catalonia. He sees the
monarchical authority above all as a thing to be enjoyed - as though
the ultimate purpose of the office were to please its holder rather
than to serve its subjects.
the war should not cause alarm, / nor is it right that I should despair of my friends, / for
I see my relations coming to my aid / and everyone striving and exerting himself for my
honor / so that my name may hold higher place in the world. / If anyone should abandon
me / I do not blame him, provided he deprecates openly/ the honor and worthiness of my
lineage. // But I can make the repute of the Catalans / and of Aragon resound as far away
as Germany, / and so complete the deeds of my father / whose realm I believe I hold by
right. / If any of my kin try to do injury to me on this account, / hoping to gain an increase
of honor for himself, / then let him well try his harm in the open; / for on this soil I sleep
not, and am ever watchful. // People, let it be said to whomever desires to hear: / that the
rule over the Latin people pleases me, / that I will have them and that they indeed will
have me. / But of my kindred I have some suspicion."
The urban-demesnal world 89
His published laws provide clearer evidence of his approach to
managing the demesne. Six main legislative efforts make up what-
ever constitutional legacy he may claim. His Constitutiones regales,
issued upon his coronation, established the main framework; they
were followed almost immediately by the supplementary Capitula
alia. In late 1309 or early 1310, after his evangelical conversion, came
the Ordinationes generates which are much the most interesting of his
promulgations, dealing with matters of the slave trade and broader
social reform. These bear all the fingerprints of Vilanova and
indeed are sometimes cataloged among his religious writings. After
this no new laws were issued until the Stratigoto civitatis Messane
(1321), the Constitutiones fade in Castro Johannis (1325), and the
Constitutiones facte in urbe Panormi (1332), all of which were weak,
reactive measures towards what were by then virtually intractable
urban problems.3
The cities made their demands clear from the beginning: first, an
unequivocal promise by the royal government to protect them from
any malefactor, whether lay or ecclesiastical, noble or common,
Sicilian or foreign, and to forgo any foreign involvements "without
the expressed consent and full knowledge of the people." Their
defensiveness and suspicion are plainly evident here. To their eyes
every monarch since Frederick II Hohenstaufen had abandoned the
island to pursue grander schemes elsewhere and had stripped the
merchants' commercial resources in order to finance adventures
overseas, only to leave the perimeter cities undefended against
aggressive barons or exposed to retribution from the overly
ambitious king's foreign rivals. And in order to ensure against any
attempt to evade this primary obligation the cities demanded, and
received, a parliament in regular sitting that held supreme
authority over all foreign policy; they were particularly concerned,
lest Frederick seek to escape from his oath, that the new king
3
Capitula regni Sicilie, quae ad hodiernum diem lata sunt, edita cura ejusdem regni deputatorum
Herculis Michaelis Branciforti, Buteras principis . . . , ed. Francesco Testa, 2 vols. (Palermo,
1741-3). Henceforth they will be abbreviated as Const. reg., Cap. alia, Ord.gen.,Strat. Messina,
Const. Castrogiovanni, and Const. Palermo. In Testa's edition the laws are numbered
sequentially from one work to another (e.g. the Ord. gen. closes with ch. 107 and the Const.
Castrogiovanni begins with ch. 108). Testa's dating, organization, and editing of the laws is
faulty. Yet, except for a new version of the Ord. gen. that has recently come to light, we
have to rely on his work as the only available version of the texts. Because of the great
rarity of his volumes, I will quote the laws in extenso in the notes that follow, with a few
editorial changes, to correct obvious mistakes.
"never seek, procure, or receive any absolution of this bond and

obligation."4 Next, they obliged him to recognize and confirm
"all grants, concessions, donations, gifts, privileges, liberties,
immunities, customs, constitutions, ordinances, and laws" pre-
existing in the cities, which would allow them to reestablish their
former commercial and manufacturing networks. Significantly,
they further extracted his promise that in all reasonably contested
cases the legal interpretation of the original privileges and grants,
if challenged, would always favor the individual or city on whose
behalf they had been initially awarded. This concession has too
frequently been overlooked by scholars. In effect, it gave each
municipality full autonomy over its own trade, or least over those
aspects of it for which an earlier grant had been given. 5 If Sciacca,
for example, failed to win for itself a new grant comparable to a
new award given to its rival port of Mazara, all it had to do was to
reinterpret an older grant in the desired manner and insist on
the king's acquiescence: a crude move, to be sure, but not an
uncommon one in the 1320s and 1330s. Recourse could also be had
to the vetting of royal officials. The parliament demanded by the
cities in 1296 - which within ten years had developed into a three-
4
Const, reg., bk. i, ch. i: "respondemus et dictis fidelibus nos et heredes nostros in
perpetuum obligamus Regnum Sicilie, precipue insulam ipsam Sicilie, homines et
habitatores ipsius, contra quascumque personas ecclesiasticas et seculares, publicas et
privatas, universitates, et singulares personas cuiuscumque gradus, ordinis, et dignitatis
extiterint, statui predicti Regni, et hominum eorumdem hostiliter adversantes protegere
ac defensare fideliter et toto posse, et quod, pretextu Regni alterius, dignitatis aut
prosperitatis cuiuslibet nobis undecumque et qualitercumque obvenientis nullo umquam
tempore, nulla ratione vel causa, ab ipsisfidelibusnostris Sicilie divertimus ... Adjicimus
etiam sponsioni et obligationi presenti, quod nullum tractatum concordie, guerre, vel
pacis incipiemus, habebimus, vel faciemus seu ceptum vel habitum hactenus
qualemcumque probabimus vel admittemus, cum Papa aut Ecclesie Romane prelato aut
hostibus et impugnatoribus nostris, et status Sicilie suprascriptis, sive cum sequacibus
et fautoribus eorumdem absque consensu expresso et aperta scientia Siculorum. Huic
insuper nostre adnectimus sanctioni et dispositioni firmissime, absque predictorum
fidelium nostrorum consensu, numquam a Romano pontifice seu quibuslibet ecclesiarum
rectoribus vel eorum nunciis aut ministris absolutionem sacramenti et obligationis
huiusmodi expetere, procurare, vel oblatam recipere, seu liberationi vel remissioni
talium nullatenus consentire."
5
Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 2: "omnes gratias, concessiones, donationes, provisiones, privilegia,
libertates, immunitates, consuetudines, constitutiones, ordinationes, et leges . . .
acceptamus, confirmamus, laudamus, et approbamus, et ex certa scientia robur illis et
efficaciam impartimur . . . adjicientes ut, si quid circa interpretationem privilegiorum,
gratiarum, et concessionum huiusmodi dubitationis emerserit, interpretatio fiat in
favorem et commoditatem eorum, quorum intuitu privilegia et predicta omnia
processerunt."
chambered body, with a house each for the clergy, the nobility, and
the representatives of the demesne cities - was mandated to meet
annually on All Saints, Day to review the actions taken in the
past year by all royal officials and "to reckon and renounce" their
inadequacies or corruption.6
Anger with the church still ran high, and violence in the streets
could result from an ill-advised accusation of Guelf partisanship.
Even during the peaceful decade after Caltabellotta passions still
ran feverishly enough to occasion mob riots whenever loyalties were
questioned - as was the case in Corleone in 1309, when a violent
struggle broke out between two factions "that seemed capable of
destroying the whole region."7 In order to avoid such confla-
grations, the Constitutiones included a prohibition against calling
anyone a Guelf or traitor, as well as explicitly forbidding the
king from forming any agreement with the papacy without the
parliament's consent.8 Clergy within Sicily were obliged to pay
the hated collecta tax whenever it was levied on the urban populace
as well; and local churches had to sell "within one year, plus one
month, one week, and one day" any and all demesnal property
bequeathed to them by the faithful.9 The church, in other words,
could be restored to the possessions and privileges it had held prior
to the Vespers, but further acquisitions were to be checked in the
6
Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 3: "providimus, anno quolibet, in festo scilicet omnium sanctorum, in Sicilie
partibus generalem curiam celebrari, in qua nobis adesse statuimus comites, barones, et
universitatum quarumlibet syndicos idoneos et sufficientes, instructos, et alios ad hoc
opportunos et utiles . . . ad examinandum etiam et puniendum justiciariorum, judicum,
notariorum, et officialium quorumlibet defectus, negligentias, et excessus." Gf. ASP Tab.
S. Martino delle Scale, perg. 11-12, 17, 51.
7
ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 65 (6 Jan. 1309): "briga sive sarra concitabatur inter
quosdam homines dicte terre projicientes immensos lapides . . . terra videbatur posse
vastari propter dictam brigam."
8
Const, reg., bk. 1, ch. 1 (papacy), 5 (Guelf).
9
Ibid., bk. 11, ch. 22: "Levius quidem facit, quod portatur a multis, et quod in communi
deducitur, lucidius elucescit. Itaque, cum fideles nostri Sicilie pro bonis eorum in
premissis casibus nobis teneantur et debeant subvenire, volumus, ut in subventionibus
necessariis . . . clerici et ecclesiastice persone pro bonis burgensaticis, patrimonialibus, et
que aliunde, quam ab ecclesiis habuerunt et tenuerunt, cum aliis habitatoribus terrarum
et locorum, ubi fuerint, pro modo facultatum bonorum ipsorum conferre et contribuere
teneantur"; and ch. 24: "statuimus, ut si per aliquem burgensem nostri demanii aut
vassallum dictorum feuda tenentium in ecclesias predium aliquod rusticum vel urbanum
quoquo alienationis titulo seu per aliquas voluntates ultimas alienare et transferre
contigerit, prelati ecclesiarum ipsarum . . . predia ipsa infra annum unum, hebdomadam,
mensem, et diem a tempore alienationis iamdicte vendere seu concedere teneantur et
debeant, si de demanio fuerint."
hope of putting a cap on ecclesiastical influence in the realm.

Fearful of other sorts of violence and abuses, the cities exacted
further injunctions prohibiting the bearing of arms in the munici-
palities (except for the aristocracy, whether higher or lower, who
were entitled to carry a knife and a sword), and guaranteeing that
criminal trials appealed to the royal courts would be heard and
decided within two months.
The tenor of urban—royal relations was thus set. Each munici-
pality governed itself according to its own traditions and
consuetudines, and pursued its own commercial strategies, while the
central government collected taxes and oversaw elections to
the urban magistracies, but otherwise had little direct control over
each town. But the cities had limits on them of a different nature.
Unlike the urban communes of northern Italy, Sicily's cities did not
own or control their surrounding districts, and without this control
over the contado each municipality was exposed to the potential
interruption of the surrounding resources on which its economy
lived. As more and more immigrants flocked to the urban centers it
became increasingly important for towns to acquire jurisdictional
and commercial authority over their environs. Thus the cities
determinedly sought either to gain direct control over their local
districts, through one stratagem or another, or to protect them-
selves from any potential loss by securing additional grants or
privileges based on their often asserted longsuffering on behalf of
the central government. As the decades passed, the general effect
of these strategies was to enhance the localist and isolationist
tendencies that were already present in each community, even if at
the expense of neighboring cities or the kingdom as a whole - and
sometimes especially at their expense.
I ECONOMIC STRATEGIES
Until mid-reign only Messina had any significant influence over its
contado. Its uniquely valuable location on the Strait combined with
the uniquely poor quality of its rural hinterland to create a manu-
facturing and commercial economy that required procurement of
raw materials from a wide expanse of the Val Demone. In order for
Messina to survive, much less thrive, it had to have unimpeded
access to the resources of the whole district, and consequently, the
Messinese merchants and urban elites had always been particularly
persistent in seeking concessions from the government. In order to
ensure the regular availability of galleys and other tradeships, for
example, Messina was granted control of Randazzo, situated above
the Alcantara valley and noted for its timber production, as early as
1199. The steady flow of good quality timber helped to make the
Messina shipyards the largest and most productive in the kingdom,
making it possible when necessary to build and rig ships for trade
or war with enviable speed. Particular care went into making the
city commercially and politically stable, and this did not preclude
the forging of privileges whenever it was thought useful. Most of
these forgeries were successful; owing to the decayed state of the
royal archives once the Angevins had departed, taking their records
with them, the government had no effective means of checking on
the authenticity of claims presented to it. Acting on one of these
false precedents, for example, Frederick confirmed Messina's right
to select the magistri jurati throughout the whole of its territory -
which by 1302 was extended to include the plain of Milazzo, the only
major grain production site in the Val Demone.10 This greatly
expanded the jurisdictional clout of the universitas and made it
much easier to consolidate control over the regional economy.
It furthermore enjoyed a monopoly on wine production (imports
being expressly forbidden) that provided considerable revenue for
the leading merchants. And the city's highest official, the stratigoto,
was awarded authority over several older jurisdictions reaching
as far as Castrogiovanni. But even as Messina grew in strength,
problems kept pace. Because of the strong demographic drift
eastward and because Messina attracted a disproportionate
percentage of the migration, grain supplies were always perilously
low. Even in years of high yield Messina had to import grain; but
since western Sicily directed its export grain to northern Italy,
Tunis, or Catalonia, Messina had to look elsewhere for supplies.
Consequently urban leaders sought to reestablish their traditional
trade links with Angevin Calabria. Animal products such as cheese
and salted meat, some timber, wine, possibly silk or even iron ore,
10
Neocastro, Historia sicula ab anno 1250 ad i2gj deduct a, in RGBS, ch. 33; Carlo Giardina,
Capitoli eprivilegi di Messina (Palermo, 1937), Memorie e documenti di storia siciliana, 2nd
ser., vol. 1, doc. 31, 33; Testa, De vita et rebus gestis Friderici II Siciliae regis (Palermo, 1775),
p. 263; F. Martino, "Una ignota pagina del Vespro: la compilazione dei falsi privilegi
messinesi," QFIAB, forthcoming. See also Abulafia, "The Merchants of Messina" (see
ch. 2, n. 2, above).
were available in sufficient quantity to trade for the grain produced

by the Angevins' large latifundia.11 Despite the acrimony that
existed between the realms, it is likely that the king was in favor of
such commerce even during periods of open warfare, since trade
with Calabria counted technically as foreign trade and was
therefore subject to royal duties. So important was trade with the
peninsula that the Messinese leaders even opened their own
consulate in Naples after the final phase of the Angevin attack on
Sicily began in the 1320s.12 Messina also traded extensively with the
Levant, particularly with Egypt; Pegolotti's handbook, for example,
offers conversion figures for the weights and measures used in
Messina and those used in Alexandria and Damietta.13 Eastern
spices and dyes were traded for local manufactures and for goods
from northern countries. Trade relations with Egypt had long been
a major concern of the Catalans, as a matter of course; but this
connection was noticeably strengthened under King James, whose
appointment as "admiral of the church" by Boniface VIII made him
responsible for protecting Christian merchants and pilgrims in
Egypt and the Holy Land.14 As with most of Sicily's foreign trade,
though, Messina's commerce with the east was largely in the hands
of the Catalans or other foreign merchants.
Other Sicilian cities, especially those in the west, failed to copy
Messina's success in gaining control over the contado for two
reasons: they lacked the options available to the Messinese in terms
11
Pegolotti's handbook describes Messina as one of the principal wine-exporting cities in
Sicily, having a clear eastern orientation; see Francesco Pegolotti, La pratica della
mercatura, ed. Allan Evans (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), Medieval Academy of America
Publications, vol. xxrv, pp. 39, 66. Indeed with the exception of Cefalu, virtually all of the
wine exporters in Sicily by mid-reign were in the eastern valli: Messina, Patti, Acireale,
Catania, Augusta, and Siracusa. There were known iron ore deposits south of Messina at
Ali and Fiumedinisi; see Epstein,^4n Island for Itself p. 229. On animal products, etc. traded
with the peninsula, see Bibliotheca historica regni Siciliae, sive Historica, qui de rebus siculis a
Saracenorum invasione usque ad Aragonensium principatum illustriora monumenta reliquerunt
amplissima collection ed. Giovanni Battista Caruso, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1723), doc. 489, 522-3,
591; Riniero Zeno, Documentiper la storia del diritto marittimo nei secoli XIIIe XIV (Turin, 1936;
rpnt. 1970), Documenti e studi per la storia del commercio e del diritto commerciale,
vol. vi, doc. 27, 33.
12
Georges Yver, Le commerce et les marchands dans Vltalie meridionale au Xllle et au XlVe siecle
(Paris, 1903), p. 197.
13
Eliyahu Ashtor, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton, 1983), pp. 31—2.
14
Aziz Atiya, Egypt and Aragon: Embassies and Diplomatic Correspondence, IJOO-IJJO (Leipzig,
1938), Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, Abhandlungen fur die Kunde des
Morgenlands, vol. xxm, Nr. 7 is the only study to date of this relationship. A new study is
sorely needed.
of the economic diversity of their land - Messina's district, though
extremely poor for grain production, had other resources that it
could exploit - and they failed to present the united front that
the Messinese merchants had done in pursuing that control. For
example, at least a dozen cities - notably Caltabellotta,
Castrogiovanni, Lentini, Licata, Marsala, Mineo, Nicosia, Petralia,
Terranova, Trapani, and Vindicari - had nearby saltworks that
offered one potential avenue for growth, yet none of them, with the
possible exception of Trapani, had production levels much above
what was needed for local consumption. Even more crucially, most
of these saltworks were enfeoffed and thus out of the hands of the
urban traders. Only Trapani was likely engaged in any significant
amount of trade.15 Deposits of alum, a mineral salt used as an
astringent in wool production, were likewise known in several sites
throughout the kingdom, but little of it was mined in a systematic
way: it lay in the volcanic soil surrounding Mount Etna, on the
Lipari islands, and near both Caccamo and Sciacca in the Val di
Mazara. But alum was not needed to produce the rough wool cloth
worn, for reasons of poverty rather than preference, by most
Sicilians and hence no significant local market existed for it.
Foreign demand, however, was quite high. Alum was used
extensively to refine higher quality cloths, and thus its production
might have been a very profitable industry for local entrepreneurs,
but what little evidence we have of an alum trade in Frederick's
time suggests that foreign merchants like the Bardi had command
of both distribution and consumption.16 Some sugar production
occurred near Palermo and Siracusa, but the manufacturing of
sugar was both capital- and labor-intensive (burdens that not many
local merchants could bear) and was heavily taxed, resulting in a
product that was too expensive for most Sicilians to use; what local
demand there was for sugar remained centered in apothecary
shops.17
15
Bresc, Un monde, p. 219, Table $i;Acta curie v, doc. 95; vi, doc. 61; Epstein,^4n Island for Itself
p. 224 (Table 4.4).
16
Bresc, Un monde, p. 285, n. 10, citing AGA Perg. Peter IV, no. 1 (which records Bardi
merchants leasing a ship from a merchant "de Yspania" to transport Sicilian alum to
Bruges in 1335).
17
ASP Notai defunti, Spez. 20 (2 Aug. 1329), 127 (9 Jan. 1324), 9N (22 Oct. 1331). The best
study is Carmelo Trasselli, Storia dello zucchero siciliano (Galtanissetta, 1982), Storia
economica di sicilia, Testi e ricerche, vol. xxv. Later in the fourteenth century and
With fewer options at their disposal, therefore, most cities

turned instead to securing privileges and controlling, wherever
possible, local prices and wages. They wasted no time in this, and
felt no compunction in seeking redress for their sufferings, whether
real or imagined. Demands for various grants reached the king
even before he had left Caltabellotta in 1302. The merchants'
representatives from nearby Sciacca were first in line: "considering
the full extent of the devotion, faithfulness, and service which all
the people of Sciacca have shown" to the crown in the just-
concluded war, Frederick was compelled to extend to them
immunity from all dohana duties, which was a concession of some
considerable size, since Sciacca was perhaps the third most
important grain-exporting city in the realm, after Palermo and
Agrigento.18 There was no choice but to make the grant (and those
that followed on its heels), and the effects of this royal weakness
were two-fold: first, there was a significant reduction in royal
income that, however modest it may have seemed at first, became
ever larger as time passed. Such tax discounting was a common
practice throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but those
were centuries of increasing population, heightened industrial
production, and increased demand. In a period of decline, by
contrast, such actions had a deleterious effect that increased
proportionally as the population declined. Second, and not to be
dismissed lightly, such continuous acquiescence on the part of the
central government only strengthened and encouraged the localist
prejudices that guided each city's thought. Even on the assumption
that the cities that received these exemptions had to pay for the
privilege - thus, in effect, paying compounded taxes for at least
several years in the future — the immediate cash gain to the royal
purse hardly made up for the revenue lost in the long term. This
throughout the fifteenth sugar manufacture developed into one of Sicily's most
important exports, owing in large part to technological advances that made production
more cost-effective and less labor-intensive.
18
ASP Cane. Reg. 1, fol. 39 (30 Aug. 1302): "Considerantes integritatem devotionis et fidei,
quam universi homines terre Saccefidelesnostri necnon servitia nobis devote prestita, et
que prestare possunt (dante Deo) gratiora, eis de liberalitate mera et speciali gratia
et ex certa nostra scientia concedimus, quod burgenses et habitatores terre predicte
Sacce pro mercibus et rebus eorum licitis et permissis per eos, tarn per mare quam per
terram, sint liberi et immunes, et pro eisdem mercibus et rebus eorum licitis et
permissis intrando, stando, et exeundo terra marique nullum jus dohane et alterius
cuiuslibet dirittus propterea nostre Curie debitam eidem Curie vel ofYicialibus ipsius
Curie, ad quorum hoc spectat et spectabit officium, exhibere et solvere teneantur."
sort of economic bunker-mentality had an obvious appeal at the
local level, but it worked directly against the government's own
policy of promoting greater cohesion in the realm. As with the
case of the rebel Giovanni Chiaromonte in the 1330s, dissatisfaction
with the royal court was easily translated into an opportunistic
alliance with anyone - even with the Angevins - who promised to
protect the individual community, even while harming others in the
process.
By mid-reign Frederick had given away an astonishing number of
immunities, privileges, and special grants. Most urban demands
came in the wake of foreign attack or crop failure; and at such
times, a royal failure to deliver opened the door to rebellion.
Consequently, within a short time full toll franchises, which
exempted the cities themselves and the individual citizens (in case
of their traveling to another location) from all dohana duties, were
enjoyed by (in chronological order of their awards) Messina,
Siracusa, Randazzo, Palermo, Sciacca, Monte S. Giuliano, Trapani,
Marsala, Mazara. 19 In gross terms, these exemptions covered as
many as 280,000 town-dwellers out of a total (pre-Vespers) popu-
lation of perhaps 850,000; in other words as much as one-third of
the total population that we know of- and well over one-half of the
demesne population - possessed some sort of exemption from
taxation. Many of these prizes were reconfirmed or extended
several times, too. And since the government relied on duty
revenues to provide administrative salaries and to fund the various
building and resettlement programs in which it was engaged,
budgetary problems ballooned and loomed over every meeting of
the court. Compounding the problem were the numerous privileges
awarded as well to particular individuals, often to foreigners but
mostly to natives, whose service commanded special treatment,
such as the Florentine merchant Guglielmo Rosso's 1312 exemption
from royal collectae for exporting one hundred salme of grain out of
Palermo (an award probably linked to the court's newly declared
Ghibelline allegiance), or Bartolomeo Iardo's tax immunity for
unlimited grain shipped out of "all the ports, gates, lands, and sites
19
ASP Cane. Reg. i, fol. 39; Reg. 2, fol. 73-73V, 73V—75, 84.V-85, 86v—88v, 95—95V, 104— 104.V,
io8v—109V; ASP Cane. Reg. 840 (unnumbered folio); Giardina, Capitoli eprivilegi di Messina,
no. 11, 32, 40, 60, 81, 93, 100; Testa, De vita et rebus, pp. 244—5, 255> 2^2» 272~3> 274> 2 76-8.
Randazzo's franchise was limited to its trade with Messina, a fact that merely
strengthened Messina's economic grip on the site.
20
in Sicily." Granting immunities to individuals may have served
a specific purpose, though they were hardly likely to promote
social cohesion. Franchises to the cities, on the other hand,
although they certainly strained the royal purse, probably had a
temporary beneficial effect on overall trade since they created
a network of enterprise zones that placed competitive pressure on
unfranchised cities and non-demesnal lords to lower their own
prices and taxes. And since the dohana duties in question applied not
to foreign-traded luxury goods (upon which a standard 3 percent
levy was imposed) but to the bulk commodities - like salt, cheese,
cotton, and cured meat - traded and consumed locally, the end
result, for a brief while, was to bring more affordable staple goods
to the general populace.
But clearly such concessions could not be extended ad infinitum;
and so the government sought other ways to meet urban demands
and to stimulate trade. One alternative was the institution of trade
fairs, which did much to encourage a livelier regional commerce. 21
Here again the major demesne cities led the way. At Frederick's
coronation Messina was awarded, or was reconfirmed in, a fair of
fifteen days, at the Feast of the Holy Sepulchre (23 April-7 May);
Trapani celebrated the Feast of St. George (23 April) with an
annual fair from 1302 on; Piazza followed in 1306, Termini and
Agrigento in 1312, and Trapani again in 1315 (a second fair, this time
for fifteen days in August - a likely reward for enduring, and a
mechanism to aid the recovery from, the Angevin siege of 1314);
Mazara was granted a month-long fair (6 August: Translation of
Corpus Christi) in 1318; Palermo petitioned in 1325 and received
permission for a seventeen-day fair centered on the Nativity of the
Virgin (8 September); and Corleone, from sometime before 1329,
marked each Feast of St. John the Baptist (24 June) with a fair of
its own of unknown duration. 22 These newly inaugurated fairs
supplemented those established before Frederick's reign, like the
20
Ada curie i, doc. 33 (10 March 1312), 51 (10 J u n e 1312).
21
T h e best study is Marina Scarlata, "Mercati e fiere nella Sicilia aragonese," in Mercati e
consumi: Organizzazione e qualificazione del commercio in Italia dal XII al XX secolo, 2 vols.
(Bologna, 1986), 1, pp. 477—94, replacing Alberto Grohmann, "Prime indagini
sull'organizzazione fieristica siciliana nel Medio Evo e nell'eta moderna, con particolare
riferimento alia fiera di Sciacca," Atti dell'Accademia pontaniana, n.s. 18 (196&-9), 295-341.
See also Bresc, Un monde, pp. 364-9, and Table 74; and Epstein, An Island for Itself,
pp. 107-20.
22
Bresc, Un monde, T a b l e 74; and Epstein, An Island for Itself T a b l e 3.2.
fairs at Lentini (1287: Feast of the Ascension) and at Naso (1254:
Feast of St. Marina), that presumably continued, even though
direct notice of them is lacking, on the strength of Frederick's
coronation guarantee of all preexisting municipal privileges. Like
the toll franchises just described, these fairs clearly aimed to
bolster the Val di Mazara communities, and so can be taken as
indications of some of the economic challenges posed by rural
decline and the flight of people and skills to the east. They also offer
evidence of the nature of local trade: by attracting regional business
to the enfranchised town square, each city's fair highlighted local
manufactures and provided a market for the various products
available in the town due to the influx of people and skills. Although
foreign merchants, who frequented these fairs in an annual circuit,
were interested chiefly in grain and wool, local merchants utilized
the fairs to make products like pitch, leather, salt, iron, cotton, and
sugar available for domestic consumption. In this way, cities unable
to exert direct authority over their contadi were able gradually to
extend some measure of economic control over them and thereby
reduce the costs of trading in bulk commodities for which no
significant foreign market existed. This contributed to an internal
specialization of the local, or at most the regional, economies; but
at the same time it catalyzed the self-reliance and self-interest that
increasingly characterized the western municipalities. As the years
passed, and particularly after the severe decline began in the 1320s,
the cities clung dearly to their privileges and betrayed an ever
increasing reluctance to sacrifice any aspect of their rights or
resources to offset any particular, or even critical, need felt
elsewhere in the kingdom.
In places where the local economy seemed particularly vulner-
able the municipal governments tried to stabilize matters by
controlling wages and regulating the labor market. As described
earlier, the initial consequence of the post-Caltabellotta flight to
the demesne was the creation of a surplus labor force that sharply
reduced manufacturing costs; and these reduced costs were an
important catalyst to the recovery after 1302. But the decline of the
population in absolute numbers after 1311-13 produced a shortage
of labor, especially skilled labor, that became severe throughout
the 1320s and 1330s. Skilled and unskilled wages in Palermo, for
example, nearly doubled between 1321 and 1337, even after taking
into account a currency devaluation in 1333. Many universitates
ioo The decline and fall of medieval Sicily
resorted to the rather heavy-handed control of workers. This

occurred at different times in different places, but few cities
avoided the practice altogether and the implementation of such
measures provides an impressionistic but useful key to the extent
and pattern of the economic problem. Southern Agrigento, for
example, forbade the emigration of laborers from the district
shortly after Caltabellotta; northeastern Patti moved to set ceilings
for labor wages in 1312; and western Trapani, like Agrigento,
prohibited the flight of workers in 1331.23 Actions like these
undermined the social mobility that characterized most of late
medieval Sicily and thus were unlikely to succeed as long-term
measures; but if they were necessary they had to be taken at the
municipal level, since no trade guilds existed. As it happened,
though, the gradual monopolization of municipal government by
small circles of urban elites often amounted to much the same
thing as a guild structure.
Beyond these artificial strategies, urban society tried any number
of other adaptive techniques. The post-war decade, like many such
periods, saw a momentary rise in the number of marriages that
reflected the rush to resettle the land and recommence full
commercial life. But the downward turn starting in 1311-13, and the
shrinkage of the credit market as the supply of available cash
dwindled, inspired considerable changes. Marriages, for example,
tended to be delayed until a measure of economic stability had been
attained by an individual or his or her family; extant wills from
Palermo indicate that as many as 60 percent of all adult sons and
nearly one-half of all adult daughters remained unmarried at the
death of the testators; and, moreover, one-third of all sons and
daughters mentioned in these wills are described as minors, which
suggests that the parents themselves had been rather late to the
altar. 24 While this pattern of delay may have had the desired effect
of temporarily stabilizing certain family finances it also contributed
to a decrease in the birth-rate that aggravated the general popu-
23
BCP MS Qq H 6, fol. 381 (Agrigento); Giovan Crisostomo Sciacca, Patti e Vamministrazione
del Comune nel Medio Evo (Palermo, 1907), DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. vi, p. 58 (Patti); Vito La
Mantia, Antiche consuetudini delle citta di Sicilia (Palermo, 1900), p. 1 (Trapani). On
Palermo's wages, and the currency devaluation (the denaro was devalued by roughly one-
third), see Genevieve Bresc and Henri Bresc, "Maramma: i mestieri della costruzione
nella Sicilia medievale," in / mestieri: organizzazione, tecniche, linguaggi (Palermo, 1983),
pp. 145-84 at 148; and Epstein, An Island for Itself p. 89, n. 37.
24
Bresc, Un monde, p. 77 and T a b l e 4.
lation decline already set into motion. By the end of the fourteenth
century, in fact, the birth-rate in Palermo - the only city for which
reasonably reliable statistics survive - had sunk to such a low level
that, on average, less than one surviving child is mentioned per
family in extant wills.25 Under these impulses the cities gradually
took on a strongly developed character of an inchoate, indeed
chaotic, mass of more or less atomized self-reliant individuals with-
out the traditional structures of extended families around which to
organize their lives. The records indicate both an ever increasing
number of urban citizens without significant local kinship ties, and
a growing number of isolated new immigrants - either from abroad
or, more commonly, from elsewhere in Sicily. In the first half of the
fourteenth century no fewer than one-quarter of all extant wills by
males are drawn up by immigrants to the cities (the percentage for
females cannot be calculated, since so few wills survived that they
cannot be a representative sampling); and surviving marriage
contracts suggest that for these same decades one-third of all urban
marriages involved a newcomer to the city.26
More successful were attempts to find new markets for local
manufactures and to attract foreign investment. Over 1,000 foreign
merchants are known to have resided in Sicily during Frederick's
reign - most Genoese, Pisans, and Catalans, but with some
Neapolitans, Venetians, Occitans, and Castilians in evidence as
well - and they carried Sicilian goods (grain and wool, especially)
throughout the Mediterranean. A few patterns or trends can be
traced. First, the destination of grain exports, calculated by
tonnage, altered dramatically with the realm's changing political
fortunes. Trade with Tunisia, for example, represented a solid one-
fourth of all grain shipped abroad (out of Agrigento and Sciacca,
principally) until the Caltabellotta treaty, after which north
African trade declined to less than 10 percent of the foreign market.
For the next ten years fully two-thirds of Sicily's exported grain
was shipped to the Italian peninsula, most of it to the northern
communes but with some going as well to the Angevin kingdom. In
this decade exports to Catalonia (one-fourth of the trade prior to
Caltabellotta) declined sharply, due mainly to uncommonly high
Aragonese yields that reduced the demand for imports. After the
re-ignition of the war in 1311, however, grain shipments to
25 26
Ibid., p. 80 and Table 5. Ibid., p. 651 and Table 163.
Catalonia all but monopolized foreign trade until 1329, since few
other sites seemed willing to rely on rapidly declining Sicilian
supplies or to risk papal or Angevin reprisals, and the Catalans,
then bent on their long-delayed Sardinian campaign, were
experiencing new shortages of their own. Then, from 1329 to 1337,
something like the initial equilibrium prior to Caltabellotta was
reestablished: sales to north Africa once again comprised one-third
of market share; Catalan purchases declined to about 40 percent
of total exports; and the remainder was taken up by Montpellier,
Perpignan, and the Slavic lands. By this time, however, total grain
exports had declined to less than one-fifth of their peacetime high
after Caltabellotta.27
Second, the importance of Palermo as the hub of this trade
increased dramatically in relation to every other city west of the
river Salso. This was mainly a consequence of the city's sheer bulk;
and no doubt our picture is skewed somewhat by the much greater
survival of Palermitan records over those of any other site in
Sicily. Still it seems clear that, as the western part of the kingdom
weakened, only Palermo was in a position to take advantage of
whatever resources, skills, and manufactures remained available
to strengthen its economic role vis-a-vis the other universitates.
Geography favored it, to a degree, since the urban basin has a
natural and well-delineated hinterland in the Conca d'Oro. This
sizable plain of citrus groves, vineyards, and carob trees, sweeping
an arc of approximately fifteen miles inland from the capital, from
Sferracavallo west of the city to Solunto east of it, was ringed by
high limestone hills that formed a natural border separating it from
the rest of the realm. Technically, this land lay outside Palermo's
legal jurisdiction until well into the fifteenth century, but the
capital was able to establish economic control over it in the four-
teenth by the sheer weight of its population and the relative
dominance of its market.
Palermo's tactics varied from those of the Messinese. Rivalries
27
Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 108-9; Bresc, Un monde, pp. 525-34; Epstein, An Island for
Itself] pp. 270-2. A relatively late entry in the grain trade network was Cilician Armenia,
where Sicilian merchants were permitted to sell their produce, and export local
manufactures, for a low 2 percent tariff, from 1331 on. The Armenian king made the offer
presumably in the hope of seeking a partner in his struggle against the Mamluks; but
since Sicily was then preoccupied with the newly called crusade against Athens, his hopes
were frustrated. See Le tresor des chartes d'Armenie, or Cartulaire de la chancellerie royale des
Roupeniens, ed. Victor Langlois (Venice, 1863), doc. 38.
between local merchants and the urban elites, and between

individuals or families within each group, prevented them from
presenting a united front, with the result that they were never able
to secure anything approaching the extensive monopolies granted
to Messina. But even if such a coordinated effort had been
mounted, it is unlikely that the royal court would ever have
been inclined to extend vast privileges. The plethora of tax breaks
and full exemptions given to lesser sites made it all the more vital
for the government to protect its ability to draw revenue from
Palermo - and this became all the more important as Palermo's
share in total overseas trade increased. Still, the Palermitans,
whose own constant shortages resulted from their huge population
rather than from any chronic lack of resources (in sharp contrast to
Messina's situation), were able to protect themselves by purchasing
larger shares of the Conca d'Oro lands and, when this still proved
insufficient to meet demand, by market strategies such as offering
a reduced excise tax on commodities, like wine, imported from the
district for local consumption. 28 As cities like Agrigento and Sciacca
declined, Palermo quickly emerged as the most important western
port and as virtually the only viable option for traders, given the
well-established inability of Trapani, Mazara, Marsala, and Sciacca
to protect the sea routes leading into and out of them. Palermo
relied principally on local suppliers like Termini and Castellamare
for its domestic needs, but it gradually provided, after 1319, the
principal trading place for foreign buyers of all Sicilian grain. 29
From 1298 to 1319, for example, most buyers (to judge from the
number of merchant ships present) went directly to the regional
centers in the grain-producing areas for their purchases: 39 percent
of recorded foreign trade ships in these years weighed anchor in
southern ports from Sciacca to Agrigento, while 13 percent appeared
in the west from Mazara to Castellamare, 18 percent along the
northern coast from Solanto to Cefalu, and 24 percent sailed
directly into the harbor at Palermo (5 percent sailed directly to
eastern shores). But between 1319 and 1339 the corresponding
percentages are 16 percent, 5 percent, and 12 percent for the
28
Privilegia felicis et fidelissimae urbis Panormi selecta aliquot ad civitatis decus et commodum
spectantia, ed. Michele de Vio (Palermo, 1706), pp. 10-11. Protectionist measures increased
throughout the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, to restrict foreign merchants
from competing with local city-controlled vintages; see ibid., pp. 247—52, 262.
29
Ibid., pp. 6 8 - 9 , 9 0 - 2 ; Ada curie 1, doc. 3 - 5 .
regional ports, while Palermo commanded 46 percent (with 20 per-

cent going to the eastern valli).30 While these figures ought not to
be taken at face value, given the much greater survival of Palermo's
commercial records, it is nevertheless clear that Palermo acquired
a much greater control of the Val di Mazara economy as that
economy declined (a trend that coincided with the growing
importance of Catalonia as the main shipping destination of goods
traded out of Palermo). 31 It is clear too that the increased share of
foreign trade held by the two eastern valli was a function of those
regions' more successful adaptation to the straitened circum-
stances of the 1320s and 1330s.
Could those straitened circumstances have been avoided or

mitigated in any way? As we have seen, the island's various inter-
national entanglements came at a high cost. Direct military
expenses continued to climb even as public revenues declined,
creating a constant state of public debt and shortage of capital. But
what of the private sector? Was capital lacking there, too? Why did
no new manufactures arise in the prosperous post-Caltabellotta
years? Why did Sicily's artisans and traders remain island-bound,
and not invest in a carrying trade of their own? The island, or at
least the eastern half of it, possessed ample natural resources that
opened the way to new industry, even as the mobility of the popu-
lation made it possible to draw on untapped skills and abundance of
labor to manufacture new goods and bring them to foreign ports;
yet neither the industry nor the trade developed. Why?
The peace treaty itself was partially to blame. By guaranteeing
the eventual return of Angevin authority after Frederick's death,
Caltabellotta effectively discouraged large-scale investment in new
industrial or commercial ventures, since it was assumed that the
Angevins, upon their return, would inevitably displace Sicilian
entrepreneurs in favor of their own supporters and clients, just as
they had done in 1265. It was certainly a reasonable concern. Why
risk capital that would only benefit the enemy? No one foresaw, in
1302, that Frederick would still be on the throne thirty-five years
30
Bresc, Un monde, p . 282 a n d T a b l e 43.
31
Catalonia received 5-10 percent of Palermo's foreign trade from 1298 to 1319, but from
1319 to 1339 no less than 40 percent of Palermo's exports were aimed at Catalonia. See
Epstein, An Island for Itself, p. 305 and Table 6.4.
later. On the safer assumption that his reign would last perhaps
fifteen years (after all, there had already been one assassination
attempt on him, by 1302), it made far better sense to devote one's
capital to ventures that promised an earlier return. That meant
investing in industries and businesses that already existed rather
than venturing into expensive new pursuits that might take years to
win back one's initial investment. Moreover, the sheer amount of
rebuilding that had to be done - of homes, warehouses, churches,
shops, and ships - left precious little excess cash at either the
public or private levels to devote to wholly new manufactures.
Hence the bulk of whatever venture capital the Sicilians had
went into the traditional bulk commodities that the island
had always produced: grain and wool. By the time the economy had
begun to recover and sufficient cash or credit was available for
Sicilians to take a stronger role in these trades throughout the
Mediterranean, it was too late to do so. By 1308, according to
Giovanni Villani, Sicily's annual wool cloth production had equalled
that of Florence itself, in terms of quantity. 32 Florentine cloth was
of much higher quality than rough Sicilian orbace, of course; but with
sufficient investment in new fulling mills and especially in the
production of alum, which was plentiful in the region around
Trapani, Sicily's textiles stood a chance of gaining a much larger
share of the European market - something that the king recognized
and tried to get others to recognize too. 33 But domestic investment
lagged until, finally, foreign merchants stepped into the breach.
Exchange rates at that time favored them: the florin, which had
earlier been reckoned at 00.06.00, in 1308 had gained in value by
a third, and stood at 00.08.00, making it considerably easier for
northern entrepreneurs to seize control of the island's textile
exports. This explains the dramatic increase in the number of
foreign merchants doing business in the realm; dozens of new
individuals and societatesflockedsouthward to buy consignments of
raw wool and to speculate in commodity futures. This commercial
invasion might easily have exacerbated ethnic tensions had not the
northern investors hit upon the idea of hiring locals to act as their
32
Villani, Cronica, bk. x n , ch. n .
33
Stephan R. Epstein, "The Textile Industry and the Foreign Cloth Trade in Late Medieval
Sicily, 1300-1500: A 'Colonial Relationship?"Journal ofMedieval History 15 (1989), 141-83 at
160-1.
procurators. The demographic drift then begun played directly to

the interests of the northerners, as each demesne town had
surpluses of recent immigrants - often individuals lacking local
family ties or a sure way to support themselves - who could do their
bidding for them. Thus, if we take the notarial register of
Bartolomeo di Citella for 1307-8 as our guide, we find purchase
agents from Agrigento, Bivona, Butera, Caccamo, Caltabellotta,
Caltanissetta, Caltavuturo, Cammarata, Castelvetrano, Castro-
giovanni, Castronovo, Cefalu, Ciminna, Corleone, Eraclea, Gangi,
Geraci, Licata, Mistretta, Monreale, Monte S. Giuliano, Naro,
Petralia Soprana, Petralia Sottana, Piazza, Polizzi, S. Mauro,
Salemi, Sciacca, Sclafani, and Termini all at work in Palermo on
behalf of merchants from abroad.34
Another conspicuous failing was the island's inability to develop
a carrying trade. As natural ports of call for ships passing between
the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean, cities like
Palermo, Trapani, Sciacca, Siracusa, Catania, and Messina had
long been accustomed to the sight of foreign trading ships sailing
into harbor, but had not developed sizable merchant marines of
their own. Messina's shipyards certainly were capable of producing
vessels of all sizes, often with considerable speed. But the over-
whelming majority of Sicily's seacraft were smaller vessels designed
for local fishing or for navigating around the island, bringing goods
from one port to the next, rather than for sailing on the open sea.
Long centuries of colonial rule explain much of this phenomenon,
since it was obviously in the interest of the island's rulers to
monopolize international trade. By controlling both the ports and
the available seacraft sailing through them, foreign dynasts could
secure the greatest profits for themselves. This accounts for one of
the earliest privileges demanded by the Messinese merchants from
their new Catalan monarchs - namely, that the tax on foreign trade
(dohana maris) in Messina's harbor be levied upon the shipowners
rather than on the merchants who used the vessels to transport
their cargoes.35 Here again the Sicilians reckoned that it better
served their interests to make use of existing commercial struc-
tures than to invest their own funds in an undoubtedly expensive
new venture of building up their own merchant marine. Outside of
34
Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 8 0 - 1 .
35
Epstein, An Island for Itself p. 244 and n. 8.
the large comitive of someone like the admiral Corrado Doria, who
owned many of his own ships, only a handful of explicit records exist
that attest to seagoing galleys and cogs with Sicilian ownership.
Occasional references to Sicilian-owned and Sicilian-commanded
ships can be found - usually in the eastern trade - but it is
important to note that even most of these references denote
shipowners who were "Sicilian" in name only. Messina, as we have
seen, owed much of its growth in the pre-Vespers era to merchant
immigrants from Arnalfi who brought their wares and capital, and
often their ships as well, with them. And as we shall see later in this
chapter, the influx of peninsular entrepreneurs continued long
after the arrival of the Catalans. Thus many of the confirmed
"Sicilian" carriers were Sicilian only in this minimal sense, a fact
that was understood by local rioters against foreign privilege.
Indigenous Sicilian shipbuilders and naval crews, in fact, seem to
have left the island in considerable numbers towards the end of the
war. They appear again mainly in the eastern seas, contracting
their services in Cyprus, Acre, Armenia, and as far as the Black
Sea.36 Such movement suggests that either they perceived the
impossibility, or anticipated the unlikelihood, of making a living on
the home front in the face of an inevitable Angevin return. Better
to take their skills and ships elsewhere. Moreover, those Sicilian
merchants who did invest heavily in foreign trade preferred to place
the risk of transporting their goods on the shoulders of others.
Grain and wine merchants operating out of Messina, Catania, and
Siracusa, for example, relied upon Pisan fleets to deliver their
cargoes to the Levant; this explains why Acre - where large
amounts of Val Demone and Val di Noto produce were regularly
sold to the Hospitallers - had no Sicilian consulate and the cargoes
were unloaded under the observation of Pisan officials.
Thus, while the demesne cities showed considerable adaptive
skills, the problems besetting them after the post-Caltabellotta
zenith proved in the end too great to overcome. Market structures,
limited resources, downward demographic pressure, cultural
differences, vulnerability to naval attack, and inter-urban rivalries
all conspired to impede realm-wide economic growth and to foment
36
See Notai genovesi in Oltremare: Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto, 3 luglio 1300-3 agosto
1301, ed. Valeria Polonio (Genoa, 1982), Collana storica di fonti e studi, vol. xxxi, doc. 204,
for example.
urban particularism. The central government tried to stabilize

matters by standardizing and codifying tariffs and collection
techniques, both of which had gone through several complicated
revisions since the Normans had first established a comprehensive
fiscal administration in the twelfth century.37 This effort likely had
as much to do with simplifying tax collection and record-keeping
as it did with fostering supra-regional trade, since no such trade
can be seen in any significant amount either before or after
codification. Still, some benefit accrued to the cities, which we can
see in Palermo's petition to the king in 1312 for admission into the
new tariff mechanism: "The city beseeches Your Sacred Majesty
that, on account of the great number and diversity of the royal
dohana tariffs, the cities whose lives depend on the imports and
export of goods, both by land and by sea . . . and the merchants
coming into them with their merchandise are being constantly
impeded and in countless ways hindered . . . And therefore might
Your Royal Majesty deign to reduce all those taxes into a single
code, as has been done in Messina."38 As the petition suggests,
Messina was the first city to be restructured in this way, followed by
Trapani, Agrigento, Terranova, and Siracusa.39 Because he was
about to formalize his link with Henry VII and begin their supposed
campaign to conquer the peninsula, and because he needed the
city's support in that cause, Frederick responded with a lengthy new
37
For a good overview of these changes, see Ada curie n, pp. 31-50. For specialized studies,
see Mario Caravale, "Uffici finanziari del Regno di Sicilia durante il periodo normanno,"
Annali di storia del diritto 8 (1964), 177—223; Enrico Mazzarese Fardella, Aspetti
dell'organizzazione amministrative dello stato normanno esvevo (Milan, 1966); Hiroshi Takayama,
"The Financial and Administrative Organization of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily,"
Viator 16 (1985), 129—57. And for the later period, see the articles by William A. Percy, "The
Earliest Revolution against the Modern State: Direct Taxation in Medieval Sicily and the
Vespers," Italian Quarterly 22: 84 (1981), 69-83; "The Indirect Taxation of the Medieval
Kingdom of Sicily," Italian Quarterly 22: 85 (1981), 73-85; and "A Reappraisal of the Sicilian
Vespers and the Role of Sicily in European History," Italian Quarterly 22: 86 (1981), 77-96.
38
Acta curie 1, doc. 5 8 (at pp. 94—5): "Item supplicavit dicta universitas e i d e m Sacre
Maiestati, ut, quia propter multas et diversas cabellas dohanarum regiarum, urbes
quarum jus consistit in mercibus immittendis et extrahendis, tarn per mare quam
per terram, mercatores venientes cum mercimoniis suis ad urbem eamdem sepius
impediuntur et diversimode molestantur, in eo maxime, quod per diversas solutiones eos
proinde facere oportet in cabellis eisdem et ideo mercatores ipsi venire desinunt urbem
ipsam et urbis ipsius condicio deterior est effecta, dignetur Maiestas Regia omnes
cabellas predictas Curie in unam tantum reducere sicut Messane solvitur et per
Maiestatem Regiam est permissum ibidem."
39
A S P C a n e . R e g . 2, fol. 29V—36 (Trapani), 37V—41 (Agrigento), 42—45V (Terranova), 45V—52V
(Messina).
code that established a sliding scale of tariffs for foreign imports
and exports, greater for some commodities and lesser for others,
but with a base rate of 3 percent. 40 But, even at this point, he was
administering an economy in which telltale signs of stagnation and
decay were already visible.
II ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES
Let's begin with the central administration. Frederick, despite his

grandiose claims of hereditary right and divine will, and further
despite the evangelical calling that dominated his thinking from
lt
i°bt 0 ltS2b> w a s in n o position to claim more direct authority over
his subjects than he could actually wield. Political debts and
economic pressures forced substantial concessions from the day of
his coronation, after which the royal court tried as best it could to
regulate and standardize its remaining administrative initiatives.
But in the short run, at least, it was surprisingly successful.
Government became highly professionalized under Frederick, a
fact which may owe something to the more developed parlia-
mentary and administrative traditions among the Catalans who
figured so prominently among his chief advisers. And the court had
sufficient wisdom to create an administration of Sicilians, rather
than repeating the Angevin mistake of monopolizing power for
themselves. Owing to the fairly well developed juridical culture
that had grown in the larger municipalities, an adequate, though
still modest, pool of talent existed that the court could draw upon.41
Still, those who entered public service were motivated more by
personal ambition than by commitment to a political ideal. The
rewards for government service were handsome — duty officers, for
example, frequently enjoyed salaries as high as one-third of the
revenues they took in - and appointments were secure so long as
one did not abuse one's authority too egregiously.
More important still, the central administration responded more
attentively to local needs than any previous government had done.
40
Ada curie n, pp. 211-321.
41
See Andrea Romano, "Legum Doctores" e cultura giuridica nella Sicilia aragonese: tenderize, opere,
ruoli (Milan, 1984), Universita degli studi di Messina, Studi giuridici, vol. iv; and his
earlier work, Giuristi siciliani delVeta aragonese: Berardo Medico, Guglielmo Perno, Gualtiero
Paternd, Pietro Pitrolo (Milan, 1979), Universita di Messina, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di
scienze giuridiche, economiche, politiche e sociale, vol. CXVII.
i io The decline and fall of medieval Sicily
It had no alternative. Government officials faced annual reviews of

their performances in the mandated parliament, where exposed
abuses resulted in dismissal and heavy fines. Each demesne city
sent a regular stream of envoys to court, where they expressed the
urgency of local needs, detailed the long-suffering service the
inhabitants had rendered the king, swore eternal outstanding
loyalty, and usually returned with some grant, award, or favor for
their pains. And the need to promote commercial growth became
increasingly important as demesnal and feudal revenues fell, which
fostered closer and more constant contacts between the court and
the perimeter universitates. The sheer availability of the government
formed the base of whatever popular support it commanded. It was
not uncommon, in fact, for individuals without formal credentials of
any sort to win access to the monarch himself. Despite declining
economic and political fortunes, most cities remained relatively
stable and law-abiding until sometime around 1320, after which
Frederick all but disappeared from the Val di Mazara. It was
this sense that the king had severed personal contact with any
particular municipality that occasioned the onset of serious dissent
and recalcitrance - which an illustration from Palermo amply
shows. In 1322 one of the city'sjudices, Ruggero di Caltavuturo, was
so angered over the monarchy's repeated equivocations and delays
in response to Palermo's pleas (in this case, the request that the
king forsake Messina and take up residence again in the official
capital, where he might better address the mounting local diffi-
culties) that he spat upon a newly received letter from Frederick,
thus prompting a warrant for his arrest.42
The core of royal government lay in the Magna Regia Curia, or MRC.
This amorphous group, comprised variously of the king's leading
officials and ministers, plus a miscellany of notables and hangers-
on at court, derived its juridical authority from the fact that it was
the body in charge of administering the demesne.43 Four groups,
42
Ada curie vi, doc. n (9 March 1322).
43
Past writers have had some difficulty in differentiating b e t w e e n t h e M R C a n d t h e
parliament, owing principally t o t h e fact that both institutions (a word which implies
greater constitutional development than actually existed) are described in the sources by
the oblique term curia. See Luigi Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano (Bologna, 1924; rpnt. 1968),
R. Accademia dei Lincei, Commissione per gli atti delle assemblee costituzionali italiane,
pp. xxxv-xxxvi; Antonio Rinaldi, // comune e la provincia nella storia del dritto italiano
(Potenza, 1881), p. 216. For background on the curia regis, see Erich Caspar, Roger II
broadly speaking, comprised its eligible membership: the major
palace officials, the members of the royal family, the Sicilian
bishops and archbishops, and certain magnates from the urban
aristocracy. The first three can be identified with some precision.
First, and most important, were the grand palace officials. These
men - the chancellor, the seneschal, the chief justice (magister
justiciarius), the treasurer, the harbormaster (magister portulanus),
the protonotary, the procurator general, the marshal, the grand
admiral, and the chief accountants (magistri rationales) -formed the
MRC's permanent core and carried the greatest influence within it.
Not surprisingly, they, unlike the other members, were in the most
constant attendance at court, and hence their influence derived as
much from default as design. Some lesser officials, such as the
various vice-magistri and the paymaster (stipendiarius), also sat
occasionally on the court. ThejudexMagne Regie Curie, a position that
emerged after Caltabellotta, was technically an officer of the MRC
(that is, a servant to it), although its possessor regularly sat with the
other members.44
Members of the royal family formed the second part of the curia.
The two queens - Frederick's mother Constance, and his wife
Eleanor, who was present as lord of the camera reginale - served
intermittently and were joined by the king's brothers Garcia and
Sang, by his eldest son (and co-regent from 1321) Peter, and by his
younger sons Manfred and William, the two dukes of Athens. No
evidence survives of involvement in the MRC by any of Frederick's
several bastards.45 The Sicilian bishops, the third component,
(1101-1154) und die Grundung der normannisch-sicilischen Monarchic (Innsbruck, 1904),

pp. 291-319; Horst Enzensberger, Beitrdge zum Kanzlei- und Urkundenwesen der normannischen
Herrscher Unteritaliens und Siziliens (Munich, 1971), Miinchener Historische Studien,
Abteilung Geschichtl. Hilfswissenschaften, vol. ix, pp. 101-15; Frederick van Cleve,
Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (Oxford, 1972), pp. 251-63; Emile Leonard, Les angevins de Naples
(Paris, 1954), pp. 29-35, 80-5; Leon Gadier, Essai sur Vadministration du royaume de Sidle sous
Charles Iet Charles IId'Anjou (Paris, 1891),passim.
44
See the introductory essay "De magistratibus," in Testa, vol. 1.
45
A C A Cane. Reg. 334, fol. 164, 165V, 165V-166; Cane. Reg. 335, fol. 228-9; Cane. Reg. 336,
fol. 122—i22v; Cane. R e g . 339, fol. 185—6; Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9775—6, 9782—3, 9895,
9911, 10109. An interesting drama involving another apparent family member arose in
the 1320s. A certain fellow from Messina named Melyadius came before the court with
evidence that he was a long-forgotten bastard son of Frederick and James's father, Peter.
For whatever reason, Frederick took Melyadius into service "not as a brother but just like
anyone else." Shortly thereafter another courtier quarreled with Melyadius; blows were
exchanged, and Melyadius killed his rival. Advised by the king to quit the kingdom,
Melyadius joined the Genoese Ghibellines in Savona and saw a great deal of action
numbered ten: seven bishops (Agrigento, Catania, Cefalu, Lipari-

Patti, Malta, Mazara, Siracusa) and three archbishops (Messina,
Monreale, Palermo). As major landholders, and as personal
advisors to the pious king, they all exerted a strong influence, but
only the three archbishops appear to have been present with any
consistency - and none of them appeared at court after the
reimposition of the papal interdict in 1321.
Most difficult to fix is the fourth component of the MRC, the
leading magnates of the realm. This group consisted of a select
company drawn mostly from the wealthy urban elite, but from the
ranks of the barony, the jurists, and other groups as well. What
united them was their possession of the vague quality oifamiliaritas.
To be a familiaris regis implied no particular constitutional
authority, but meant only that one had access to the royal court -
the right to be present before the king and, when called upon, to
be heard. But this did not oblige the king to ask their counsel;
Frederick had manyfamiliares, but called upon few to be consiliarii.*6
Those who were called - like Riccardo di Passaneto, Berenguer
d'Entenga, Giovanni di Cammarana, or Bertran Canyelles - were
principally figures of urban society, more likely to be found in the
town courts, squares, and markets than inland even though many of
them owned estates.47 They were also frequently non-Sicilians,
since discretion had dictated excluding most Catalans from land-
holding inland and from municipal office along the perimeter,
leaving only this branch of the MRC as a means of granting power
to those on whom the king relied.48
fighting throughout Lombardy, especially at Milan and Verona. He eventually returned

to Sicily, and led several forays against the Angevins; and in 1324 he signed on with James
to join in the Sardinian campaign. Although apparently not accepted as a family member,
the fact that he carried a sword at court shows that he enjoyed the status of a./amiliaris of
the king. See ACA Gartas James II, no. 10046-8.
46
T w o studies are i m p o r t a n t h e r e , for M e d i t e r r a n e a n context: J o h a n n e s V i n c k e , "Los
familiares de la C o r o n a a r a g o n e s a alrededor del afio 1300," Anuario de estudios medievales 1
(1964), 333-51; a n d H a n s Schadek, "Die F a m i l i a r e n der sizilischen u n d a r a g o n i s c h e n
K o n i g e i m 12 u n d 13 J a h r h u n d e r t , " GAKS 26 (1971), 201-348. N o t e thatfamiliaritas w a s a
gift that could b e revoked: t h e best e x a m p l e here is J a m e s ' s c o n d e m n a t i o n o f A r n a u d e
Vilanova in 1310; see ACA Cane. Reg. 336, fol. 22-3. The episode is discussed in Paul
Diepgen, Arnold von Villanova ah Politiker und Laientheologe (Berlin, 1909), Abhandlungen
zur Mittleren und Neueren Geschichte, Heft 9, pp. 80-4.
47
A C A C a r t a s J a m e s II, n o . 9757, 10001, 10181; C a n e . R e g . 334, fol. 162V-63; C a n e . R e g . 3 3 6 ,
fol. 122—122v.
48
V i n c e n z o D ' A l e s s a n d r o , "La Sicilia d o p o il V e s p r o , " in XI Congresso 1, p p . 5 5 - 8 1 at
A final factor influenced the makeup of the MRC - the king's
indebtedness. Quite apart from his political debts, Frederick owed
money - a very great deal of money - to more individuals than he
could hope to repay. These were war debts, either obligations of
money directly loaned to the crown or pledges to repay those who
had led comitive into battle at their own expense in the under-
standing that the king would reimburse them as soon as funds
were available. An initial wave of such claims poured in after
Caltabellotta, and, given the lack of royal cash, repayment was
made with appointments to government offices, or, when those
were lacking, with memberships in the MRC. Thus Bartolotto
Tagliavia, for example, who had assumed responsibility for the
physical protection of the queen-mother Constance from 1296 to
1302, became royal treasurer, while his brother Guglielmo took the
post of harbormaster at Agrigento. 49 Berardo Ferro of Marsala, a
wealthy trader who had made numerous loans to the king, became
magister rationalis and was further awarded an estate at Rometta. 50
The patrician Rosso family of Messina, headed by Enrico and his
son Russo, held bonds from Frederick in excess of 1,000.00.00, after
having financed the fortification of Agrigento and having
purchased a stable of war horses on the government's behalf.51 The
Rosso family in general preferred private life to government office;
but even they recognized the market-place value of connections at
court: Berengario Rosso served as magister rationalis in 1303.52 Enrico
himself became difamiliaris and consiliarius, appeared regularly at
convocations of the MRC, and began a long tenure as magister
rationalis in 1312.53
As guardian of the demesne the MRC exerted influence through-
out the entire realm. Only ecclesiastical holdings and the handful
of alodial plots scattered through the Val Demone stood outside its
49
D ' A l e s s a n d r o , "La Sicilia dopo il V e s p r o , " p . 61; P e r i , L a Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p . 27. Cf. A S P
C a n e . R e g . 1, fol. 41-41V.
50
Schadek, "Die Familiaren," pp. 278-9.
51
D'Alessandro, "La Sicilia dopo il Vespro," p. 65 and notes. He records also that the Rosso
family had loaned 400.00.00 to the commune of Florence, for an unstated purpose. See
ASP Arch. Trabia, 1st ser., vol. DXXIII, fol. 443. Note that Enrico had been declared a
traitor in the 1290s and a number of his estates were confiscated. Many Sicilian notables
changed sides during the debate, after Anagni, whether or not to give the throne to
Frederick. Eventually the Rosso family sided with Frederick and was restored to favor.
See discussion below, and ACA Perg. James II, no. 641; Gartas James II, no. 9774.
52
AGA Cane. Reg. 334, fol. 163V.
53
AGA Cane. Reg. 335, fol. 228-9.
reach. All baronial fiefs, for example, were held from the MRC
rather than from the king himself; and whenever a tenancy was
vacated it escheated not to Frederick but to his great council,
through which he either reallocated it or reabsorbed it into his
private domain. Even in the latter case, the MRC administered the
land in the king's name through a network of local secreti and vice-
secreti.5* These fiscal officers, and their judicial counterparts the
royal justiciarii, divided the demesne into four districts which,
confusingly, were also described as valli: the Val di Mazara, the Val
d'Agrigento, the Val di Noto, and the Val di Castrogiovanni e di
Demone. This division elaborated on the older administrative
division of the kingdom into "nearer" and "further" river Salso
provinces, but it also fostered a good deal of confusion among
the administrators and anger among the administered, since the
refinement of the extra and ultra boundaries recognized no obvious
geographic boundaries. The Val di Mazara justiciarate, for
example, wrapped around the western coast from Termini to
Sciacca, then cut across the promontory in a near direct line
between those two cities; no natural border or topographic
feature guided it. This inland border was marked by the towns of
Caltabellotta, Bivona, Vicari, and Caccamo. Thus the justiciarate
represented roughly one-half of the naturally defined vallo of
geography and economy. The Val d'Agrigento followed an even
more curious pattern: it stretched along the southern coast from
Sciacca to Licata, then reached inland to beyond the northern
Madonie mountains, thus cutting across three dioceses and
reaching into a fourth. Its northern reaches included Golisano and
Gratteri, only ten kilometers from Cefalii; the border then fell
directly southward, through the two main Madonie mountain
passes and along the river Salso. But it also extended across
54
For example, Blase d'Alago's fief at Salemi carried the stipulation "quod ipse et heredes
sui predictam terram sub predicto servitio in capite a nostra Curia teneant et cognoscant,
et exinde servire ipse Curie teneantur"; see ACA Perg. James II, no. 629. For Sicilian fiefs
in general, see Francesco San Martino de Spucches, La storia deifeudi e dei titoli nobiliari di
Sicilia dalle loro origini ai nostri giorni: lavoro compilato su documenti et atti ufficiali e legali, 10 vols.
(Palermo, 1924-41), here see 1, p. 1 (Caccamo), 1, p. 438 (Buccheri), 1, p. 500 (Butera), 11,
p. 412 (Castelvetrano), v, p. 137 (Floridia and Monastero), vi, p. 331 (Saline). See also ASP
Protonotaro, Reg. 2, fol. 316 (Roccella); Cane. Reg. 4, fol. 206. Cf. Giuseppe La Mantia,
Codice diplomatico dei re aragonesi di Sicilia Pietro I, Giacomo, Federico II, Pietro e Ludovico dalla
rivoluzione siciliana del 1282 sino al 1355 (Palermo, 1917)^ n, pp. 20,47,50, 77, 99, 205, 208, 211,
216, 221, 224; Rosario Gregorio, Considerazioni sopra la storia di Sicilia dai tempi normanni sino
presently 6 vols. in 3 (Palermo, 1808-16; rpnt. 1972-3), 11, pp. 151-2.
the Salso to include Caltagirone, while excluding Mazzarino. The
precise definition here is unknown and is nearly impossible to
imagine, sensibly, from a relief map. The Val di Noto justiciarate
took part of its irregular shape from that of its neighbor; its border
vaguely resembled that of the Siracusan diocese, with the two
exceptions of the sharp in-bite of the Val d'Agrigento to include
Caltagirone and the equally sharp extension of its own boundary
northward to include S. Filippo d'Agiro. Its jurisdiction thus swept
through the area roughly defined by Licata, Terranova, Scicli,
Siracusa, Catania, and S. Filippo, while avoiding Castrogiovanni,
Piazza, and Caltagirone. Last, the cumbrously named Val di
Castrogiovanni e di Demone began with the narrow coastal strip
from Termini to Cefalu, then plunged southward to Castro-
giovanni, whence it followed the main road to Nicosia and Troina
and continued eastward to the coast, skirting Mount Etna.55
Only one explanation seems possible for this chaos: the MRC
attempted to guarantee a rough equivalence of population under
the authority of each royal justiciarius, and hence to achieve a rough
parity of their power. These new zones appeared shortly after
Caltabellotta, when the government was busy codifying tariffs,
reviving municipal liberties and regulating municipal adminis-
tration, restoring ecclesiastical lands, and enacting the resettle-
ment program for entangled Sicilian-Catalonian affairs. This was
the most ambitious reorganization of government that Sicily had
experienced in a century, and it suggests something of the degree
of confidence and energy that characterized life at the end of the
Vespers. There is some evidence to suggest that these borders
were altered several times from mid-reign in response to the
demographic crisis. Certainly the bloated and agonized borders of
the Val d'Agrigento indicate an attempt to compensate for the
disproportionate decline of its population. As might have been
expected, the constantly changing borders created no end of
confusion about the jurisdiction of each sector's officers and opened
55
Gregorio, Considerazioni n, pp. 148—9, which takes its data from an inventory from the reign
of Martin I. I have emended and adapted this with individual judicial records from
various sites. Note that Gregorio assigns Roccella, a mountain townlet north of Randazzo,
to the Val d'Agrigento. It is impossible to add this as a contiguous portion of that district
and still retain any sense of order (already lacking) in the map. Either the data is in error,
or Roccella formed a non-contiguous component of the justiciarate. Naturally, the map
would be simplified if Galtagirone too represented a non-contiguous element of the
Agrigentine province.
the door to abuse. Throughout the 1320s and 1330s officials who
depended upon their service revenues for their livelihood grew
hostile towards any attempt by the MRC to curtail their juris-
dictions; and unless the central government cared to use force to
stop them, they simply asserted their power wherever they felt they
had a right to do so. Honest confusion, rather than naked greed,
may have lain behind most abuses in the early years, but it did not
take long for extortion to enter the picture. The MRG released
restatements of official itineraries and demarcations of bureau-
cratic districts with numbing regularity - a good example of which
is the 1322 survey of the borders of the camera reginale lands around
Vizzini - but these pathetic measures only made matters worse, as
often as not.56
In the decade after Caltabellotta the MRC chose its officers for
the four main sub-divisions of the demesne, and for the lesser
precincts into which each vallo was in turn sub-divided, from its own
class, that is, of the urban nobility - "nobles and natives of the
realm, secure in riches." 57 By 1312 or 1313, however, more and more
positions were taken up by milites who were no longer "secure in
riches" and who needed the available stipends to support them-
selves. At this time too the first milites appear in the cities, installed
in the roles of castellans, captains, municipal justices, bailiffs, and
pretors with wide-ranging administrative and policing authority. In
Palermo in that year D. Rainaldo Milite was installed as bailiff and
D. Pong Caslar as municipal justiciar, while in Messina D. Riccardo
Filangieri became stratigoto, and in Trapani D. Roderigo Garsia
assumed the captaincy. All four royal justiciars, from 1312 onwards,
also came from the knightly-baronial class; the first appointees
were D. Francesco Scarpa (Val di Mazara), D. Francesco Riciputo
(Val d'Agrigento), D. Enrico di S. Stefano (Val di Noto), and
D. Giacomo d'Aceto (Val Demone). Traditional urban-rural
tensions were quick to appear. Nicola Coppola, secrezie collector
around Carini, used his office to harass a personal rival for four
years by claiming jurisdiction over the rival's land; there was little
the MRC could do to stop Nicola, who simply ignored a series of
56
ACA Perg. James II, no. 3893 (1 Jan. 1322, updating a survey originally performed in 1293).
57
Const, reg., in Testa, ch. 7—8. For an example of local officials in action, see Mazzarese
Fardella, Tabulario Belmonte, doc. 17 (1 Feb. 1322), where Novello Montonino and Giovanni
Ripolla perform an annual inventory and audit of Francesco Ventimiglia's holdings and
revenues in the county of Geraci.
royal writs commanding him to forgo collecting taxes on the
disputed land until a settlement could be reached.58 Pedro
Fernandez de Vergua, an ambitious Aragonese nobleman who
married the wealthy widow of Frederick's first chancellor Corrado
Lancia, habitually abused his powers in Caltavuturo, Caltanissetta,
and Naro until the multitude of complaints brought against him
finally led the MRC to force his resignation in 1311.59 D. Federico
d'Algerio in Palermo, who used his new municipal power to begin a
spree of violence, theft, and rape that literally terrorized the city in
the 1320s, represented the worst of what was possible under such
conditions.60
The MRC and its underlings provided a rather rough-hewn
system of courts and appeals that heard civil and criminal cases in
addition to disputes over taxation and complaints of administrative
abuse. Most cases reached no higher than the four provincial
justiciarii, but appeals to the full MRC were not uncommon. In these
instances, if the king was not present, the magister justiciarius
presided.61 The bureaucracy was cumbersome. After the MRC
58
ASP Tab. S. Martino delle Scale, perg. n-13, 17 (8 Jan. 1297-14 July 1301). Carini was
the site of further difficulties in 1324, when D. Nicola Pipitone appealed to the MRC a
curious case of administrative fraud. D. Nicola Abbate, the great lord who dominated
life in Trapani, had evidently been extorting taxes from the Pipitone family, taking
advantage of the fact that the actual tax collector in that district also happened to be
named Nicola Abbate (but who seems to have been no relation to the nobleman). The
MRC ultimately convicted D. Nicola of impersonating a royal official and fined him
50.00.00. See ibid., perg. 51 (20 Dec. 1324).
59
There is a story behind Pedro. He was first employed by Eleanor as an official in the
camera reginale and as a personal emissary. Through his contact with the queen he was
introduced to his wife. After being fired by the MRC in 1311, and after his wife died shortly
thereafter, Pedro presented to the MRC a forged will which supposedly awarded him
permanent control of the entire Lancia family estate, including a legacy of 2,000.00.00
that Corrado Lancia had bequeathed to his nephew Pietruccio, which Pedro now claimed
as his own by virtue of the supposed fact that he was also the heir of the recently deceased
Pietruccio. The MRC ultimately banished Pedro from the realm. Only eighteen months
later he appealed to Frederick from Tunis, requesting to be reinstated at court, a request
that the king denied. Pedro meanwhile contracted a marriage with Bellina, daughter of
the late count Aldoino Ventimiglia. The Ventimiglia family successfully blocked this
marriage when it was brought before the MRC (as all marriages involving fiefs were).
Ultimately Pedro, frustrated and enraged, hired an assassin to murder Frederick, but the
conspiracy failed when government officials caught the would-be regicide as he prepared
to spring at the king. See ACA Cartas James II, no. 9823, 9895, 10029; Perg. James II,
no. 2790. The confession of the hired killer is in ACA Documents per incorporar, caixa 5,
no. 21. The murder plot is discussed by Costa, "Un atemptat frustrat contra Frederic III
de Sicilia" (see ch. 1, n. 29, above).
60
See ch. 1, n. 28, above.
61
Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano, p. xxxviii.
heard a case and made its ruling, the decision was handed over to
a royal vicarius or bailiff, who then issued a written mandate to the
litigants. The litigants then presented the mandate to their local
municipal court, where the official verdict or settlement was
formally effected. Thus when Rinaldo Maratta stood accused of
assaulting Angelo Muscanti of Palermo in 1308 with a knife, his case
- a serious felony in light of the ban upon weapons - was appealed
all the way to the MRC. The high court acquitted Rinaldo and the
bailiff issued a mandate freeing him from any liability, which
mandate Rinaldo then brought back to Palermo where a municipal
notary, at the command of the local court, produced the formal
acquittal.62 Some records give a specific sense of chronology and
show the system in its best light. In a commercial dispute, when
Pietro di Pontecorono and his son Bernardo sued Oberto and Enrico
Kairo of Corleone over a grain contract (involving eighty salme of
various grains), the MRC heard the case on 23 September 1329; it
issued its decision on 17 October; and the local court in Corleone
released the formal act settling the dispute on 23 October.63 In this
way the government hoped to promote a sense of organic involve-
ment among the independent-minded universitates, making a bow
towards local autonomy while hopefully fostering greater cohesion
in the realm. Towards that end the MRC and its subsidiaries even
employed a corps of advocati who represented, at a fee, litigants
without counsel.64
Ultimately, however, the system worked against itself, since the
MRC had no effective means of enforcing its decisions in the face of
local intransigence. If a local court failed to enact an MRC ruling,
or if it delayed in doing so, or if either of the parties involved in
a case simply refused to obey the mandate, there was little the
high court could do except to issue a new mandate with stronger
wording. When Bonsignore Unia of Naro refused to pay the rent he
owed to Nicola d'Amantea for a casalis outside of that town, Nicola
appealed his case all the way to the MRC. Despite repeated
judgments against him and a long series of harshly worded
mandates from the local bailiff, the justiciarius of the Val
d'Agrigento, and the MRC itself, Bonsignore simply continued to
62
A S P M i s c e l l a n e a archivistica, 2nd ser., no. 127A ( B a r t o l o m e o di C i t e l l a ) , fol. 168—i68v.
63
ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 170-1.
64
ASP Tab. S. Martino delle Scale, perg. 66, 68, 73, 75.
refuse payment for at least seven years, forcing Nicola to incur legal
expenses over ioo.oo.oo.65 The reason for the MRC's increasing
impotence is clear: as the kingdom's various crises grew more
urgent it had fewer resources with which to enforce its rulings. It
had no way to compel anyone to heed it and, consequently, from
1320 onwards, it tried to save face by refusing to hear many cases
rather than risk parading its impotence. Moreover, the custom of
reverting mandates to the municipal courts for enactment placed
responsibility for enforcing the law on local officials who thus bore
the brunt of popular resentment against the kingdom's failures,
whether real or perceived. As a result many local officials
dissembled and delayed when presented with an order from the
high court, figuring that an angry mob at the door presented a more
real danger to them than written decrees from non-plussed civil
servants in Messina. Thus when a property dispute in Palermo was
judged against Puccio Maccaiono in 1311, he armed himself with
knife and sword and marched into the local court seeking revenge
on the magistrates who had had the gall to impose the king's law
upon him.66 In the face of such dangers, the safest path for the
courts to follow was to fail to enforce the verdicts handed down to
them, or to enforce them in such a way as to remove the immediate
threat to themselves or to the city, as the magistrates in far-
southern Butera prudently chose to do in regard to Giovanni
Dagnone, another violent criminal; they removed the danger by
sentencing him to exile in Palermo, whence their own officers
delivered him.67 Such failures to deliver justice, and such capricious
ways of administering it, obviously did little to promote a sense of
shared involvement and mutual concern.
The parliament (colloquium generate, in the sources) might have
done better in this regard, had circumstances been different. By
the early fourteenth century most of the states in Europe had
developed centralized representative institutions of some sort, and
Sicily holds an honorable fifth place, chronologically, in the roll-call
65
Paolo Collura, Lepiu antiche carte dell'Archivio capitolare di Agrigento (Palermo, i960), DSSS,
1st ser., vol. xxv, see appendix 1, doc. 51, 51a, 51b, 53, 53a, 53b, 56, 56a, 56b, 56c, 59
(covering dispute from Nov. 1311 to Feb. 1318). There is no sign that Nicola ever received
his money or ever regained possession of his casalis, or that Bonsignore ever suffered any
sort of punishment for his recalcitrance.
66
Ada curie 1, doc. 46 (20 May 1312).
67
Ibid., doc. 62 (17 July 1312).
of parliaments - despite some fanciful popular claims to the

contrary.68 (England's parliament is usually dated to Simon de
Montfort's 1265 summons to London of all the shire knights and
town burgesses, or to Edward Fs convocation of the so-called
"Model Parliament" of 1295; Catalonia's Cort first assembled in
1225; and the kingdom of Leon can trace its parliament to 1188,
when Alfonso VII first summoned his townsmen to join the royal
council. Pride of place belongs to Iceland's venerable Althing, which
has met annually in an unbroken line since 930.) Earlier primitive
assemblies had been convened in Sicily under the Normans and
Hohenstaufens, but it was only with the establishment of the
Communitas Sicilie after the 1282 rebellion that any significant power
resided in the group. Under Peter and James, who introduced
representatives from the demesne towns into the assembly, it
began to take on muscle.69 At the assembly of 1285, for example, it
overturned James's acceptance of a two-year truce with Naples
negotiated on his behalf by Roger de Lauria, and compelled the
king to abrogate the agreement, even going so far as to pass a
sentence of capital punishment on de Lauria for his usurpation of
parliament's authority to determine foreign policy.70
A statute from the Constitutiones regales represents the closest
thing there is to a founding charter for the assembly:
I have it in my heart gladly to direct this proposal of mine to the Lord -
namely, to govern the said island of Sicily well, in the manner of a loving
tiller . . . so that the health of the republic and of all the Sicilian people
may be improved with every desirable good fortune and be restored with a
continuous increase of blessings, thus progressing from strength to
strength.
Therefore I order that a general parliament representing the whole of
Sicily be held each year on the Feast of All Saints, and to it I command the
presence, before me, of the counts, the barons, and the sworn syndics of
68
Some patriots have traced the origins of the Sicilian parliament directly to the court of
King David. See Carlo Piazza, II parlamento siciliano dal secolo XII al secolo XIX (Palermo,
1974). More informed are Carlo Calisse, Storia del parlamento in Sicilia dallafondazione alia
caduta della monarchia (Turin, 1887); Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano; Antonio Marongiu, //
parlamento in Italia nel Medio Evo e nelUeta moderna, 2nd edn. (Milan, 1962); and Marongiu,
"Sulle curie g e n e r a l i d e l r e g n o d i Sicilia s o t t o gli svevi, 1194-1266," Archivio storico per la
Calabria e Lucania 18 (1949), 21-43, a n d 19 (1950), 45-53.
69
L a M a n t i a , Codice diplomatico 1, p p . 31-2; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. 1, ch. 25: "post h e c ,
syndicos universitatum Sicilie, qui Messanam jussu regis convenerant, rex Petrus
alloqutus est." Cf. Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 23, 52-3.
70
L a M a n t i a , Codice diplomatico, doc. 190, 206-7; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. 11, ch. 11—12.
the universitates, sufficient in number and knowledge, and whomever else
may be suitable and useful, for the purpose of providing for, procuring, and
elevating . . . the good health and well-being of My Majesty, of the island,
and especially of all the Sicilian people. [I call this assembly] further for
the purpose of investigating and punishing any failings and negligent or
abusive actions taken by my justiciarii, judices, notaries, or any other
officials.
I command these syndics to show themselves fully informed [of these
affairs] in order [justly] to charge and denounce the errors of those
officials. At that time I will direct which of those charged officers it will be
expeditious (if it will be expeditious) to subject to inquiry, for their sins.
Thinking it most fair that a ruler too be held by his own laws and not to
be suffered to permit to himself what he forbids to others, I wish those
things which are ordained and established in that assembly to be observed
inviolably by myself as well as by my subjects.
Above all, I decree . . . that the counts, barons, and nobles of the land,
together with the aforesaid syndics, meeting in parliament, should elect
and appoint [a company of] twelve men of the kingdom, noble-born and
prudent who . . . either within my presence or that of someone appointed
by me, shall, following God's way, place on trial and investigate all
criminal cases and inquiries, shall issue verdicts and pass sentences
(whether of capital-, maiming-, or cbrporal-punishment) upon all nobles -
namely, the counts, barons, and feudatories . . . and their vassals living
within the said island of Sicily. There shall be no appeal beyond [these
twelve], and they shall remain in their office through the whole course of
the year, until the next parliament convenes. And from all other [persons
and institutions] this authority to investigate and adjudicate cases is
absolutely removed.71
71
Const, reg., bk. i, ch. 3: "Cordi nobis existit propositum nostrum Deo feliciter dirigere:
memoratam Sicilie insulam more diligentis cultoris et circumspecti rectoris provide
gubernare, evellendo, dissipando, edificando, plantando; et evulsis inde ac extirpatis
erroribus, et quibuscumque defectibus reformatis in certis virtutibus, et plantata justitia,
nostre reipublice status et omnium Siculorum optatis prosperitatibus amplietur, et
successivis beneficiorum augmentis de bono in melius reducatur. Ideoque providimus,
anno quolibet in festo scilicet omnium sanctorum, in Sicilie partibus generalem curiam
celebrari. In qua nobis adesse statuimus comites, barones, et universitatum quarumlibet
syndicos ideoneos et sufTicientes, instructos, et alios ad hoc opportunos et utiles, ad
providendum nobiscum, procurandum et exaltandum Nostre Maiestatis, ipsius insule et
omnium specialiter Siculorum statum salutiferum et felicem; ad examinandum etiam
et puniendum justiciariorum, judicum, notariorum, et officialium quorumlibet defectus,
negligentias, et excessus. Ac prefatos syndicos, pro referendis et denunciandis officialium
ipsorum erratis, apparere precipimus plenius informatos; ubi officiates eosdem de
cunctis eorum peccatis mandabimus, quos expedient (et sicut expedient) syndicari; et
que etiam in predicta curia ordinata fuerint et statuta, per nos et subjectos nostros
inviolabiliter volumus observari, existimantes aequissimum principem legibus teneri
suis, nee pati sibi licere, quod aliis interdixit. Ac insuper presenti nostra constitutione
decrevimus, in prescripta curia per comites, barones, et nobiles dicte insule atque
This decree marks a significant advance on earlier practice, and

shows as much the limits of royal power as much as the king's
supposed commitment to a parliamentary ideal. Through the
mandate of an annual All Saints' Day convocation (the date of
which commemorated Frederick IFs 1234 establishment of special
courts on that day to hear complaints against his royal officials) the
parliament in one sense summoned the king to its presence, rather
than the reverse. Moreover, the assembly was now empowered to
punish abuse and not merely to denounce it. Frederick tempered
this concession by reserving for himself the right to specify which of
the accused officials would actually stand trial, after complaints
against all were heard, and by compelling the syndics to submit to
an unspecified test of their qualifications. The "counts, barons, and
feudatories" had to pass no such test, being entitled by birth to
attend the assembly, but their power was somewhat checked by
the overall parliament's (including the syndics') jurisdiction over
criminal complaints against the landholding class.
Since the king's Constitutiones gave parliament final authority
over foreign policy issues - iri practice, through a veto of the king's
initiatives rather than through the right to formulate policies of its
own - the assembly had the potential to become an institution of
great influence. In several instances it was able to restrain both the
monarchy and the MRC. In 1322, for example, the assembly
rejected a royal request for funds to contribute to Catalonia's
newest plan to take Sardinia. Writing to his nephew Alfonso after-
wards, Frederick described with some embarrassment how "it had
been my intention to meet with my barons and other subjects" in
order to win approval for the new taxes, but "I found it to be
not only not easy but downright difficult," and in fact impossible.72
syndicos antedictos eligi et creari viros duodecim de dicta provincia, nobiles et prudentes,
qui omnes (vel eorum pars major) existentes in presentia nostra (vel alterius a Nostra
Maiestate statuti), questiones et causas criminales, vitam, membrum, vel corporalem
poenam nobilium, videlicet comitum, baronum atque feudatariorum integra feuda
habentium, seu vassallos dicte insule Sicilie contingentes, secundum Deum, et justitiam
audiant, examinent, sententialiter terminent et decidant — appellatione remota; eorum
officio usque ad anni circulum, et celebrationem sequentem curie duraturo; omnibus aliis
cognoscendi vel judicandi in causis et questionibus supradictis potestate prorsus adempta,
ut honorabilibus viris predictis honor debitus deferatur in eorum excessibus corrigendis."
72
AGA CartasJames II, no. 9961: "erat nostre intentionis propositum cum baronibus et aliis
nostris habere colloquium et tractatum, et subvenire vobis modo aliquo in predicto
pecuniario subsidio, si [cut esset] nostri desiderii commode valeremus . . . [quod] non
bene faciles invenimus, immo difficiles."
O n other occasions the parliament forbade Frederick to leave the

island, when he had determined to negotiate personally at
the papal court. 73 Apart from these examples and a few others,
however, the colloquium generate never achieved the permanence
or the influence it might have done, and it never attracted
popular loyalty as an institution designed to protect urban interests
or to promote demesnal unity. There is no evidence that, despite
Frederick's decree, the parliament actually met every year;
specific references exist to assemblies in 1296, 1297, 1299, 1302,
1304, 1307-10, 1312-14, 1316, 1318-20, and 1322. After the final
recommencement of the war the assembly seems not to have
convened at all except for an urgent final meeting in 1327 to discuss
Sicily's international situation in the light of J a m e s ' s death in
Barcelona. 74
We know little about the meetings that did take place except that
they certainly did not follow the norms laid out in the Constitutiones.
Ignoring the All Saints' Day mandate, the 1304 meeting gathered in
July, the 1316 meeting in December. Nor did they convene at the
regular royal court in Messina: the 1313 parliament convened at
Castrogiovanni, as did the last meeting in 1327; Terranova was the
site of the 1314 assembly; and Palermo, the de jure capital, hosted
only the 1318 assembly. O n many occasions, although summonses
were issued to all constituent groups, the ecclesiastical branch
absented itself in deference to the on-again off-again papal
interdict and in protest over Frederick's confiscations of church
property after 1320.75 And the urban syndics sent to these meetings
were hardly free agents: after 1310 they were firmly under the
control of the royally appointed bailiffs who accompanied each
delegation. The king moreover could tailor each parliament to his
liking by dictating the precise number of syndics he wanted from
73
FAA in, doc. 166-7; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. in, ch. 14.
74
See Marongiu, II parlamento in Italia, p. 242; FAA 1, doc. 100; in, doc. 119, 121, 166, 167;
Johannes Liinig, Codex italiae diplomaticus, 4 vols. (Frankfurt, 1725—35), at n, p. 1087; Acta
curie 1, pp. 92-3,156; Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano, pp. xlviii-li, cxvii; Giuseppe Cosentino,
"Un documento in volgare siciliano del 1320," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 9 (1884), 372—81 at 378.
See also ACA Cartas James II, no. 9961, 10183; Cartas James II, apendice, no. 35; Perg.
James II, no. 2035, 2037, 2039, 2042, 2070; Calisse, Storia del parlamento in Sicilia, p. 107,
n. 1.
75
Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano, pp. civ-cv; Vilanova's Informacio espiritual inspired some of
the institutional shake-up; it appears in Batllori, Obres catalanes (see ch. 2, n. 54, above) at
1, pp. 223-43.
each city. For the 1327 assembly he even specified the individuals
whom the various universitates were to send.76
In its practice, the parliament followed the same cumbersome
methods as did the MRC. Decisions were formally enacted by the
municipal council of the colloquium's host city, assisted by a regius
publicus totius Sicilie notarius, rather than by the assembly itself, after
which they were forwarded to the local courts throughout the realm
for certification and official implementation.77 Although this
policy, like the MRC's, attempted to recognize the importance of
the autonomous universitates, it too had the effect of focusing
resentment over unpopular decisions on the local officials who had
to carry out the assembly's commands, since the parliament
increasingly engaged in - to the virtual exclusion of other matters
after mid-reign - the unpleasant task of raising new taxes
to finance war concerns, to pay the census owed to Avignon, and to
support the costs of a burgeoning bureaucracy. These three issues
clearly dominated most parliamentary meetings. The 1299
assembly gathered in a tense atmosphere to discuss the strategic
crisis caused by the disastrous defeat in the battle of Capo
d'Orlando;78 the 1304 meeting debated the military alliance and
dynastic union with the Crown of Aragon;79 the convocations of 1312
and 1313 focused on the new alliance with Henry VII, as the 1318
meeting did on the pact with the northern Ghibellines;80 in 1322 the
parliament assessed the renewed war with Naples and debated
responses to the famine of that year; and the last known parliament
76
Stefano Vittorio Bozzo, Note storiche siciliane del secolo XIV: avvenimenti e guerre che seguirono il
Vespro dalla pace di Caltabellotta alia morte di re Federico II I'Aragonese, 1302-1337 (Palermo,
1882), appendix, doc. 30: "Cum . . . certos electos per curiam nostram syndicos civitatum
et terrarum famosarum Sicilie in civitate Messane habere in proximo disponamus; qui
universitatum civitatum et terrarum auctoritate sufTulti, quilibet pro universitate sua,
ordinatione nostra predicta, interesse valeant . . . et de universitate ipsius urbis
[Palermo] Thomasium Tallaviam, judicem Raynaldum de Milite, et Manfridum Bucca de
Ordeo de eadem urbe, fideles nostros, in vestros syndicos in dicta civitate Messane
eligendos et habendos duxerimus, fidelitati vestre mandamus quatenus statim, receptis
presentibus, predictos Thomasium, judicem Raynaldum, et Manfridum syndicos vestros
ad Nostre Maiestatis presentiam ad predictam civitatem Messane . . . mittere debeatis."
77
For example, ACA Perg. James II, no. 1398, 2042; Cartas James II, no. 6217, 9874.
78
Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. rv, ch. 13-16 gives an exciting narrative of the battle, in which
over 6,000 Sicilians died. See also Heinrich Finke, "Die Seeschlacht am Kap Orlando:
1299 Juli 4," Historische Zeitschrift 134 (1926), 257-66; and Pryor, "The Naval Battles of
Roger of Lauria" (see ch. 2, n. 35, above). ACA Cartas James II, no. 10205-10 illustrate the
battle's aftermath.
79
ACA Perg. James II, no. 2042.
80
ACA Cartas James II, no. 6217, 10183.
in 1327 turned its attention to James's death and the arrival of Louis
the Bavarian's envoys.81 Given this context, it is hardly surprising to
find that the assembly's actions focused almost exclusively on the
raising of new revenues. After parliament began to resist demands
for new taxes, in 1322, the king simply stopped summoning the
assembly altogether (with the exception of 1327), and raised
the cash he needed instead by confiscating vacancies and ecclesi-
astical lands and by resorting, in the end, to the hated direct tax -
the collecta - that had proved to be the Angevins' undoing. 82
One key to the parliament's failure may be found in Frederick's
brief note to his nephew mentioned above: "it had been my
intention to meet with my barons and other subjects." The urban
populace by the 1320s had been relegated to secondary status, in
terms of their political importance; and the barons, since their
introduction into municipal government, had come to dominate
public life - or at least they were perceived to have done so.
Parliaments became occasions for requesting new taxes and
parading baronial advances at municipal expense, and under these
conditions the municipalities understandably lost whatever
enthusiasm for parliament they may have had initially. As one
example from Palermo illustrates, the colloquium generate after mid-
reign generated excitement at the urban level only because it
temporarily removed the baronial bailiff from the scene. In 1320
Senatore de Maida, the bailiff, led Palermo's syndics to the
assembly at Messina amid the usual pomp and fanfare; and as soon
as they had left the city the remaining judices rushed to enact a
handful of laws ordering, among other things, that a new sea wall
be built to protect against invasion, and that the costs be charged to
the magnate Perrello di Cisario; that the authority to preside over
the harbor be restored to a council of citizens drawn from each
quarter of the city; that the city walls be repaired, at the expense of
D. Rinaldo di Milite (the first baron-bailiff imposed on the city);
and that the principal aqueduct bringing fresh water into Palermo
from the river Ammiraglio also be repaired at baronial expense and
81
ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3684; Cane. Reg. 562, fol. 26-26V.
82
ASP Tab. Commenda della Magione, perg. 371, 393, 470; Giuseppe Pardi, "Un comune
della Sicilia e le sue relazioni con i dominatori dell'isola sino al secolo XVIII," ArchStSic,
2nd ser., 26 (1901), 22-65, 310-66; 27 (1902), 38-109, at 67; Giuseppe Di Martino, "II
sistema tributario degli Aragonesi in Sicilia, 1282—1516," ArchStperSic 4—5 (1938-9), 83-145
at 106. See Bresc, Un monde, p. 795, Table 183.
afterward be maintained equally by all those whose lands lay along-

side the aqueduct.83
When D. Senatore returned, he brought with him the king's
responsiones to the various petitions presented by the Palermitan
syndics. These illustrate some of the immediate concerns of
the universitas that year, but they also suggest, more valuably, the
growing distance between monarchy and municipality that was
characteristic of the entire kingdom. To the plea that he vow to
keep a number of Palermitans in his court at all times, the king
replied that he had enough in attendance at present and that the
composition of his advisory court was his concern and not theirs.
The request to have Monte Pellegrino - the beautiful headland
three kilometers north of the city, and home since the late twelfth
century of the hermitage of Palermo's patron saint Rosalia -
awarded to their jurisdiction was denied with a sharp rebuke to be
happy with the privileges they held already. He rejected their
request for permission to gather wood from and pasture animals in
the baronial and ecclesiastical estates throughout the city's
districtus. He consented, however, to petitions awarding control of
the armata Vallis Mazarie to Palermo, allowing the city's butcher's
market to be moved, guaranteeing royal contributions to the fund
needed to repair the city walls, and promising that either the king
or his co-regent son would visit Palermo at least three months out
of every year (to which he added the stipulation that they would
only do so provided that no "impediment" stood in their way).84
As urban support for parliament waned, and as the monarchy
effectively relinquished control of the western half of the kingdom
to baronial forces, the universitates were compelled to strengthen
their localist and self-preservationist tendencies. But in the face of
economic decline and mounting public debt municipal power
83
BCP MS Qq F 31, fol.38v: "Inprimis quod porta maria edificetur per monasterium Sancte
Katerine usque ad solarium, et deinde in antea edificetur per Sire Perrellum de Cisario,
eorum sumptibus et expensis . . . Item quod custodia maritime fiat per viginti homines
quolibet sero ana quatuor pro quolibet quarterio . . . Item quod defectus murorum
videatur per vicepretorem et aliquem de judicibus et aliquem de juratis, et viso defectu
predicto mandetur domino Raynaldo de Milite militi quod faciat reparari muros ipsos
. . . Item quod aqueductus descendens per viam Gatalanorum reparetur expensis illorum
qui reparare consueverunt, et quod dicto aqueductu reparato nunc ex necessitat[e]
predicta aqua revolvatur ad flumen Ammirati expensis tarn illorum qui habent predia
juxta predictam aquam tarn ex parte inferiori quam ex parte superiori."
84
Ibid., fol. 50V-51.
became monopolized by wealthy figures who alone possessed the
capital to seize control of administration and command loyalty
among a privately supported comitiva, and who increasingly
acquired a stranglehold on the availability of credit.85 The contest
for control of the universitates increased in bitterness throughout the
1320s and 1330s; but whether motives were ideological, political, or
economic, loyalty to the local commune as an institution remained
relatively strong. Whatever its faults, the universitas stood as the
sole possible mediator between the rival social groups, classes, and
families on each local scene. Jurists turned to it as a channel for
advancement, hopefully to reach a royal administration which may
have been disdained but which nevertheless offered handsome
rewards to its officers. The milites sought to control it as a due
recompense for the undermining of their traditional way of life in
the interior. And to merchants the commune still offered the best
opportunities for commercial growth, a mechanism to moderate
foreign competition, and a platform from which to address
complaints to the far-away king.86
Despite the animosity that existed between groups, a degree of
equilibrium was maintained until 1325-7. Not only did these groups
inter-marry, reside together, and do business with each other, but
they also, on occasion, worked together to secure each munici-
pality's economic and social autonomy. Hence their limited success
in gaining control of the contadi that technically still lay outside
their jurisdiction. Hence, too, the repeated instances of asserting
local privileges to secure pardons for important local leaders who
had broken the king's law, like Palermo's plea for mercy for
Giacomo Cisario, who was guilty of murder but was also vital to the
economic and political stability of the city.87 That equilibrium was
short-lived however. When economic troubles worsened as a result
of the two-year Angevin rampage through the countryside, and at
least five food crises gripped the realm through the 1320s, the
uneasy balance in the cities gave way to factional strife, family
vendetta, institutional corruption, and blood in the streets.
85
Ada curie v, pp. xlii-xliii, doc. 164, 197. The elites were largely of the entrepreneurial
classes, but they quickly developed close ties with the urban-knightly class in the 1320s
and 1330s. In Palermo, for example, the daughter of the well-to-do merchant Guglielmo
Ferrerio married D. Matteo Pipitone; ibid., doc. 21.
86
See Pietro Corrao's comments, ibid., p. xlv-xlvi, and doc. 23, 70, 74-5, 90, 95, 158-9, 192.
87
Ibid., doc. 155.
III SOCIAL TENSIONS AND CIVIL UNREST
Before the arrival of the barons the demesne cities drew their life
from the activity of the merchants, traders, and craftsmen whose
shops and workstalls surrounded the ports, lined the streets, and
filled the squares of each universitas. Although a number of
extremely wealthy entrepreneurs existed in each town, most
commercial activity took place among and between this lively,
disparate group of individual traders and tradesmen. Small
businesses predominated, since severed family connections and the
absence of artisan and trade guilds hindered the development of
large-scale commercial concerns. The demographic mobility that
brought new immigrants into the towns, especially in the eastern
valliy ensured a certain amount of flux and chaos on the local scene
but it also ensured the availability of a wide variety of skills,
interests, and new contacts that made it possible for the eastern
cities better to survive the challenges that emerged after 1320.
Those challenges, as we have seen, were severe. Agricultural
production in 1328 - a year of-relatively high yields in that decade -
was only one-fourth of what it had been twenty years earlier. Crime
increased when local governments could no longer afford to pay
for their own night-watch companies. Without sufficient public or
private funds to invest in the upkeep of buildings, many of Sicily's
cities literally fell apart. The open cesspools, garbage heaps,
unburied bodies decaying in cemetery grounds, and polluted waters
described earlier made unhealthy ruins of once thriving towns from
west to east. An atmosphere of hopelessness, of intense misery and
senseless rot came to dominate urban life and facilitated the
development of gang factionalism. Individuals left without secure
means to support themselves began to group under the leadership
of major merchants, powerful urban magnates, or the newly arrived
barons, to whom they gave whole-hearted political, economic, and,
when necessary, violent physical support. Curial halls and public
streets gradually filled with roaming bands of such partisan
followers, turning some cities into congeries of armed camps. 88
88
The complexity of the urban scene has inspired a great deal of research. Among the most
useful studies, see Vincenzo D'Alessandro, "Per una storia della societa siciliana alia
fine del medioevo: feudatari, patrizi, borghesi," ArchStSicOr 77 (1981), 193-208; Mario
Gaudioso, "Generi e aspetti della nobilita civica in Catania nel secolo XV," Bollettino storico
catanese 6 (1941), 29-67; Mazzarese Fardella, "L'aristocrazia siciliana nel secolo XIV" (see
On the political level, where public dignitates revolved among a
heterogenous caste of jurists, merchants, and the emerging "civic
nobility," the dominant figures were the judices, the chief adminis-
trators of the commune.89 These figures then appointed the
remaining municipal officers according to each city's particular
customs. Assisting thejudices were panels ofjuriste, apportioned one
to each precinct of the city, who helped to administer the laws,
heard pleas from their constituents, and organized the collection of
local taxes. In addition, communal leaders appointed officials to
preside over matters of public health, to undertake police work
(the xurterii), the organization of night-watch companies, the
maintenance of city walls and gates and, for harbor communities,
the port chains that provided the first line of defense against naval
attack. Service in the local government gave one considerable
prestige (those who served a term asjudex afterwards held the right
to adopt "Giudice" as an honorary lifetime title and practically as a
new first name) and the opportunity for wealth, less so because of
the salaries it paid than for the personal contacts it offered and
the chance it gave one to plead for special privileges. Political
patronage determined the makeup of urban government, since
most positions were filled by appointment. Notaries too, semi-
public officers who represented the chief point of contact between
local merchants and the urban administration, commanded
widespread respect and earned hefty fees for their services.90 On
ch. 1, n. 24, above); Illuminato Peri, "Per la storia della vita cittadina e del commercio nel
Medioevo: Girgenti, porto del sale e del grano," in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, 6 vols.
(Milan, 1962), 1, pp. 529-616; Enrico Pispisa, "Stratificazione sociale e potere politico a
Messina nel medioevo," Archivio storico messinese, 3rd ser., 32 (1981), 55—76; Romano, "Legum
doctores" e cultura giuridica nella Sicilia aragonese (see n. 41, above); Marina Scarlata, "I
Chiaromonte a Palermo nel secolo XTV: uso della citta e gestione economica," Bullettino
dell'Istitutostorico italianoperilMedioEvo eArchivio muratoriano 90 (1982—3), 303—29; Scarlata,
"Strutture urbane ed habitat a Palermo fra XIII e X I V secolo: U n approccio al t e m a
attraverso la lettura documentaria," Schedi medievali 8 (1985), 80—110; Scarlata, "Una
famiglia della nobilta siciliana nello spazio urbano e nel territorio tra XIII e XTV secolo,"
Quaderni medievali 11 (1981), 67-83; and Laura Sciascia, "I c a m m e l l e e le rose: gli Abbate di
Trapani da Federico II a Martino il Vecchio," in MM in, pp. 1171—1230.
89
T h e judices were elected annually according t o a standardized plan drawn up by the king
after Caltabellotta. This plan, in place throughout Sicily by 1311, called for the appoint-
ment each year of four probi homines in each city to serve as electors, each of whom would
then select six candidates for the top office; the electors then retired from the action, and
the incumbent officials - together with a tie-breakingpresidens electioni — would examine
the twenty-four candidates and select their successors from among them.
90
Henri Bresc, "II notariato nella societa siciliana medioevale," Estudios historicos y
documentos de los archivos de protocolos 7 (1979), 169-92.
account of these advantages, elections and appointments to public

office were highly prized and hotly contested, whereas admission to
the various corps of notaries was carefully regulated by royal and
communal law.
Owing to gaps in the extant records we know more about the
municipal offices, and the increasingly bitter fights to control them,
in the years after 1313 than in the years before. Quite full
documentation survives for Palermo and Messina, but for sites like
Agrigento, Catania, Cefalu, Polizzi, or Sciacca only a handful of
names and events has come down to us. Even so, what survives is
enough to suggest both the extent of internal rivalry that existed in
each city and the increasing monopolization of power in the largest
communities by a handful of wealthy families. The faintly
observable spirit of public-mindedness that characterized the first
decade after Caltabellotta decayed in these later years to a
depressing cartelization of authority that paralleled, and was in fact
directly linked to, the monopolization of commercial credit.
Tables 1 and 2 (see pp. 308-11) list the leading municipal officers
for the universitas of Palermo; This data, drawn from hundreds of
scattered records, becomes detailed only after 1320, when the
domination of city life by the bailiffs was firmly established. Never-
theless a number of important developments stand out, the most
telling of which is the relatively small number of family names that
appear and reappear in the chief offices. The Cassaro district, for
example, as the well-to-do neighborhood preferred by the elites of
Palermitan society (both urban and baronial), merited two judices
and juriste annually. Here the Benedetto, Tagliavia, Lentini, and
Milite families clearly formed the dominant core. Tommasso
Benedetto, even though he had been convicted of larceny in office
in 1311-12, returned asjudex in 1321, 1324, and 1329.91 The Milite
family - a branch of the baronial family based near Polizzi -
represented the district over a period of at least thirty-eight years,
from Vitale Milite in 1298 to Rinaldo Milite in 1336 (whereas Vitale
himself appeared again asjurista for Cassaro in 1323). A crude sort
of cursus honorum may have been in effect in the city, for we see
91
Ada curie i, doc. 42 (4 May 1312), in which the universitas petitions for a royal pardon of
Tommasso's crime on the spurious basis that "the harm done to his good name" works to
the city's disadvantage as well, and that similar crimes committed by others in other
municipalities have received the very grace and forgiveness from the Palermitans that
they now seek for one of their own.
several instances of individuals or families working their way into
ever higher offices, after 1320. In Albegaria, the southernmost
district in the city, Filippo Campsore served as xurterius in 1321 (the
same year in which his father wasjurista) and asjurista in 1329
(whereas his father advanced asjudex for the district in 1336). In
some districts offices seem to have circulated among a wider group
of families, yet it is likely that the recurrence of these individuals
and relations would prove even greater if our records were better.
Overall, municipal offices in Palermo were dominated by roughly a
dozen major families or their allies.
The data for Agrigento's, Catania's, Messina's, and Polizzi's
judices, summarized in table 3 (pp. 312-15), is more consistent for
the entire period and reflects a similar pattern of power revolving
among a coterie of wealthy families. Merchant families figured
large in Agrigento, since the port represented one of the chief
points of entry and exit for grain, salt, and slaves; but their power
was matched by the influence of local nobility.92 The Bernotto
family, for example, trafficked in slaves at least from 1307, bringing
into the market captives from one end of the Mediterranean to
the other - from Granada in the west to Rhodes and Russia in the
east.93 Local aristocratic families like the Mosca also exercised
authority, especially in the post-Caltabellotta decade, when the
resettlement program was in process, but still left many baronial
families in power. Federico Mosca., judex for 1303 and 1308 (while a
kinsman held office in 1305), was the count of Modica who had
distinguished himself during the Vespers by leading his own
comitiva of 500 almogavers in fighting in Calabria. His county of
Modica later passed to Manfredi Chiaromonte, who had married
Federico's daughter Isabella. In Messina the ruling caste remained
remarkably stable, with power monopolized by a small group of
families like the Ansalone, Salimpipi, Calciamira, Salvo, and
Coppola families. Other families such as the Laburzi, Golisano,
and Tattono appear less frequently but with some consistency.
Polizzi, a particularly lively town on the southern slope of the
Madonie chain, where fulling mills (bactinderia), cattle and sheep
92
Peri, "Per la storia della vita cittadina," outlines these relations.
93
ASP Misc. archivistica, 2nd ser., no. 127B (Bartolomeo di Citella), fol. 24V—25,57V, 89-89V,
125,151,179V-180; no. 127C (Bartolomeo di Citella), fol. io6v, 146V-148, 217, 310-310V, 351V,
382, 412, 426; Spezzoni notarili, no. 20 (Ruggero di Citella), fol. 191.
rearing, and wine production complemented a vibrant religious and

social scene, was long a favorite for settlers from northern Italy- as
shown by the surnames of the recurring judices.^ The Calvo and
Leonardo families held sway here in particular.
These families frequently exercised power far beyond the
confines of their cities, especially in the cases of Palermo and
Messina. The royal government commonly called upon them to
serve in administrative posts and on diplomatic errands. Thus
Guglielmo Saporito, for example, one of Messina's four judices in
1299 and 1302, and possibly afterwards, served as one of the three
judices Magne Regie Curie in 1310, before returning to municipal
service in 1317 and 1320. Moreover, his two partners on the MRC
for 1310 were also his partners in the Messinese court: Giacomo
Giordano and Santoro Salvo (his coterminous municipal judices in
1299 and 1302).95 Similarly, in 1335, three royal judgeships were held
by leading urbanites: Antonio Carastono, from the Cassaro district
in Palermo, and Franchino d'Ansalone and Ginuisio Porto, from
Messina. Such consistent pairings of figures within local govern-
ment and between the local and royal administrations illustrate the
extent of patronage and factionalization.
The leading demesne families were not always families of long
standing. The Vespers had dispelled or destroyed many of the older
urban-aristocratic and entrepreneurial families from Norman or
Hohenstaufen days, leaving behind ample opportunities for
ambitious and capable newcomers. A number of such families and
individuals emerged after 1282; and those who were able to promote
themselves through service to the new Catalan regime or who
were able to capitalize on old local rivalries and new local needs
established themselves as the new elites with surprising ease. This
social transformation has received a fair amount of study, since it
represents one of the most crucial developments of late medieval
Sicily, affecting everything from political events to the physical
layout of the municipalities. 96 Two examples will suffice.
94
Epstein, An Island for Itself, pp. 173, 195; Illuminato Peri, "Rinaldo di Giovanni Lombardo
'habitator terrae Policii'," in Studi medievali in onore diAntonino de Stefano (Palermo, 1956),
pp. 429-506 at 448. For background, see Statuti ordinamenti e capitoli della citta di Polizzi-, ed.
A. Flandina (Palermo, 1884), DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. 1.
95
Bresc, Un monde, pp. 771-2.
96
Scarlata, "Strutture urbane" and "I Chiaromonte a Palermo" (see n. 88, above) are two
excellent studies that map out some of these changes in Palermo.
Few families in Messina enjoyed higher regard, more solid wealth,

or broader influence than the Rosso family. As important in
commerce as in local politics, they exemplified in many ways the
new urban aristocracy; and like others elsewhere, they were relative
newcomers to the community they dominated. By means of service
to the crown, carefully diversified commercial investments, and
above all by a ruthless sense of family advancement at any cost, they
rose with remarkable speed. Their founder was Enrico Rosso, a
middling Val Demone miles who made, and twice very nearly lost,
the family's fortune in the tangle of rivalries, betrayals, and mis-
alliances after the Vespers. 97 Amalfitan in origin, Enrico probably
came to Sicily as part of the Angevin campaign to install peninsular
supporters on the island. However he arrived, he began his climb to
prominence when he secured appointment as Charles Fs chief tax
official (secretus) for Calabria sometime in the 1270s. Chancery
records of the time identify Enrico as a Messinese - that is, as a
citizen and town-dweller. His knightly status was honorific: grants
of land regularly figured in the compensation of the most important
officials.
When the rebellion began in 1282 some locals might have
regarded Enrico as an enemy. But he was lucky; had he been secretus
for the island itself instead of for Calabria his fate might well have
been sealed. His relatively benign presence within Sicily gave him
sufficient time to gauge the likelihood of the rebels' success. A few
days were all he needed to decide that Angevin power on the island
was doomed, and so make a show of breaking with his patrons and
cast his lot with the rebels. His administrative experience and
personal wealth secured him a place as one of the leaders of the new
commune. The former he put to use to help devise a workable
framework for the "Communitas Sicilie," while the latter was
carefully used to purchase arms and to hire soldiers. In a battle at
Milazzo, the Angevins, who slaughtered hundreds of well-armed
but poorly trained rebel troops, captured Enrico and held him
prisoner in Naples for over two years. 98 His captivity - no doubt a
97
Laura Sciascia, "Nascita di u n a famiglia: i Rosso di Messina (sec. X I V ) , " Clio 20 (1984),
389-418 is the best account. M u c h o f what follows is based o n her article, which focuses
chiefly on the recently discovered will left behind by Enrico; see ASP Archivio Trabia, 1st
ser., vol. DXXIII, fol. 443—81 (inserted a m o n g the records presented in a court case in 1564).
98
Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 35.
harsh experience, considering the treatment Charles I usually

meted out to those who had betrayed him - embellished Enrico's
image as a loyal servant of the city and made it possible for him,
once he had been released, to return to a position of influence,
which he did with great assiduity but also with an eye cast over his
shoulder, looking out for new rivals or threats to his position. An air
of cold-bloodedness and calculation surrounded his actions, and
those of his family, ever afterwards. The death of his wife's parents
in 1287, for example, inspired him not to selfless aid to his kinsmen
but to a lawsuit against the orphaned children of his wife's brother
(who had died previously, leaving his children in the care of their
grandparents) in order to gain control of their inheritance. His role
in communal government gave him access to detailed information
about the casualties from the war and the financial status of the
dead rebels' families - information which he used to pursue an
aggressive policy of purchasing real estate from cash-strapped war
widows throughout the region, thus enriching himself while
building a reputation as the supposed rescuer of the families of
Sicily's fallen heroes." By 1293 he had secured Frederick's appoint-
ment asjusticiarius for the Val d'Agrigento; but when James, in 1294,
blocked Frederick's further nomination of Enrico as royal treasurer
for Sicily, Enrico responded hot-headedly by rebelling against both
James and Frederick, declaring them usurpers, and calling for a
new popular uprising to drive out the Catalans.100 Frederick
ordered his possessions confiscated and might well have prosecuted
Enrico, on James's behalf, for lese-majeste, but the on-going
campaign in Calabria prevented any further action for the time
being. The treaty of Anagni changed nothing. At least until 1297 the
court in Messina considered Enrico a traitor.101
His brother Perrone and Perrone's son Federico, though, threw
their support behind the Catalans and were rewarded with several
military and ambassadorial missions; thus the Rosso family itself,
despite Enrico's disgrace, retained its honored status. When both
99
Sciascia, "Nascita di una famiglia," pp. 391—3, citing AGA Perg. Alfonso II, apendice, no.
1 and 425.
100
Peri, L a Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 27.
101
ACA Perg. James II, no. 641 (2 May 1296), 854 (27 Aug. 1297), both of which describe Enrico
as "rebellis noster," citing documents dating to 1294. Many Sicilians had abandoned
Frederick in 1298 after James's invasion of the island; but Rosso's actions clearly had
nothing to do with that, occurring as they did two years previously.
Perrone and Federico perished in the battle of Capo d'Orlando,
Enrico stepped forward again. Begging forgiveness from the
Catalan usurpers was a small price to pay, evidently, for winning
his brother's and nephew's inheritance. Besides, after the loss of
6,000 soldiers at Capo d'Orlando the royal court needed support
anywhere it could find it; a repentant Enrico, who still commanded
considerable popular support, would do just fine - especially
considering the financial assistance he could lend the faltering
throne. As early as June 1300, Enrico had been formally pardoned
and once again held public office - this time as magister rationalise a
position he held until his death in 1315.102 Meanwhile, other family
members likewise moved into public life. Enrico's remaining
brother, Cataldo Rosso, served asjudex of the MRC in the 1290s and
at least once as ambassador to Barcelona, whereas Enrico's four
sons - Damiano, Russo, Riccardo, and Vinciguerra - also began
public careers in law, commerce, and real estate. The family's
agricultural holdings grew exponentially after several more
purchases and the award of several new fiefs, post-Caltabellotta.
These gains were probably of a sort with Enrico's first wave of
estate-grabbing in the late 1280s and early 1290s, being cast in the
form of financial rescue operations for war-widowed families. Most
importantly, the Rosso family's wealth was held in common in order
to provide the largest possible pool of capital for investment. All
family members shared according to a set percentage in the profits
produced by the growing portfolio of farms, vineyards, taverns,
warehouses, commercial contracts, and workshops they owned; and,
as Enrico's will illustrates, this patrimony was to be held together
at all costs, for the benefit of all. Since economic strength and
political influence amounted to much the same thing in Messina, to
divide the collective wealth would seriously threaten the power of
the family itself and might even turn members of the family against
one another. The patrimonial manse in Messina itself, Enrico
102
Sciascia, "Nascita di una famiglia," p. 395. The document Sciascia cites (Ada curie 1,
doc. 58) actually dates to 1311—12. I have been unable to locate any direct confirmation
that Enrico was returned to office as early as 1300. On 5 August 1304, however,
Enrico wrote to James - whom he addressed flatteringly as "suo domino et benefactori
precipue" — and offered to perform whatever service James may request of him; see
ACA Cartas James II, no. 9774. It is certain that Enrico was restored to favor sometime
after Capo d'Orlando and before Caltabellotta; James's role in the matter is less
clear.
dictated, "ought to remain entirely intact in the control of the

family . . . and is not to be alienated outside of the family for any
reason or under any conditions; . . . moreover the manse and its
vineyard are not to be divided into separate, smaller [inheritances]
but is to be kept single, whole, and intact."103 Even the dowries
received by Enrico's sons when they married — and those who
married did so into wealthy, prominent families - were invested in
the collective patrimony, until finally the family's wealth included
well over a dozen residences and farms in and around Messina,
wheat fields near Milazzo, more rental properties, workshops, and
warehouses in Taormina, and taverns and vineyards as far away as
Catania. Added to this, by the 1320s and 1330s, Enrico's sons and
grandsons held in fief a number of large estates (casales) in the Val
di Noto, which elevated one branch of the family to comital status
and placed the rest among the most powerful barons in the
realm.
The Rossos showed this intense spirit of protecting themselves by
any means available not only in the acquisition of properties but in
the management of them as- well. Unlike the Ventimiglia family,
who generally increased their profits by reinvesting capital in the
improvement of its properties, usually at a rate of 10 percent
annually, the Rosso clan were notorious landlords who never
hesitated to raise rents, evict tenants, file law suits, break contracts,
and capitalize on their access to privileged information and local
channels of power. During the last two difficult decades of
Frederick's reign they kept a large corps of armed thugs who served
as bodyguards and kept those who opposed the family in any way in
a terrified silence. In the wars that followed Frederick's death, the
Rossos stood out even among the powerful gangsters of the time
for their brutal treatment of the lands and subjects under their
dominion, finding no action too extreme to stand in the way of
exercising authority, collecting a rent, or forcing a profit. "Rather
than following the path of the good shepherd who shears his sheep
without harming them," wrote Michele da Piazza, "[they] so badly
103
Sciascia, "Nascita di una famiglia," p. 396, n. 36: "Item voluit et mandavit dictus testator
quod quadam vinea magna... et predicta domus magna . . . semper remanea[n]t integra
apud familias eiusdem . . . et nullatenus teaneant vel possint alienari extra familia aliqua
conditione vel causa. Item voluit et mandavit quod predicte domus et vinea magna non
recipiant particolares divisiones minimatim, sed quod unus heredum habeat totam et
integram vineam ac domum eius."
tear [their underlings] to pieces that these . . . have all they can do
just to stay alive in their own homes." 104
The Rosso family exemplified the potential for advancement
that existed by skillfully allying oneself with the political and
commercial forces that governed the demesne cities. Originally a
part of the urban aristocracy, they evolved into feudal magnates by
virtue of service to the crown, but even so they remained centered
in Messina itself and simply administered their feudal holdings
through agents. To this extent they form an anomaly, an urban
elite who penetrated the baronial world, when the dominant trend
lay in the other direction. Nevertheless they provide a good
example of the means employed by demesnal families for
accumulating wealth and status, utilizing that position for gaining
followers, and then putting those followers to work to force others -
by violence, if necessary - into doing their will.
The Pontecorono family of Corleone provides an interesting
contrast. 105 Here too, although the physical setting differed starkly
from that of Messina, there lay a commercial crossroads that was
vital to the realm and provided promising means for family
advancement. Located some sixty kilometers (thirty-seven miles)
from Palermo along the poor road that stretched southward from
the capital and through Monreale, Corleone stood nestled in a
barren hillside beneath the mountain wall of Rocca Busambra.
Arabs had established the site in the tenth century and, in 1237,
under Frederick II, it became home to a colony of Lombard refugees
from Guelf-Ghibelline strife on the peninsula. 106 Despite the
unwelcoming wilderness of its setting, though, Corleone had two
key attractions: standing at the virtual center of the Val di Mazara,
it provided a natural collection point for the vast agricultural
produce of the region; moreover, from this point goods could be
104
Michele da Piazza, Historic sicula ab anno MCCCXXXVII ad annum MCCCLXI, ed. Antonino
GiufTrida (Palermo, 1980), Fonti per la storia di Sicilia, vol. 111, p. 305: "non sequutus
vestigia boni pastoris, qui oves tondit et non degluttit, immo in tantum ipsos dilaniabat,
quod quasi frigore pressi in proprios lares commorari satagebant."
105
Iris Mirazita, "Una famiglia 'lombarda' a Corleone nelPeta del Vespro," in MM in,
PP- 9!3"52.
106
Historia diplomatica Friderici secundi, ed. J. L. A. Huillard-Breholles, 6 vols. (Paris, 1852-61),
v, pt. 1, pp. 128-31. Polizzi, Castrogiovanni, Patti, and Randazzo, plus a number of sites in
the Val di Noto, likewise received large numbers of northern Italian immigrants in the
Norman and Hohenstaufen periods; see Illuminato Peri, "La questione delle colonie
lombarde in Sicilia," Bollettino storico-bibliograjico subalpino 57 (1959), 258-80.
transported with as much ease as western Sicily could offer, either

northward along the road to Palermo or southward along the Belice
river (near the upper reaches of which the town stood) to Sciacca or
Mazara. Corleone also stood only ten kilometers from the lower
reaches of the S. Leonardo river, whose fertile valley stretched
north and east past Vicari, Ciminna, and Caccamo, to reach the
coast near Termini. Thus, goods shipped from Corleone could, in
theory at least, be brought to any of four active ports. The
commercial possibilities of such a site account for its surprising
size; nothing else in the otherwise dreary landscape would lead one
to expect the presence of a successful settlement there. But
although it enjoyed numerous, if tenuous, links with the coast,
Corleone was likewise characterized by an oppressive and almost
impenetrable isolation. It felt, and still feels, cut off from the world.
This striking solitariness contributed to its suitability for refugees
like the Lombard immigrants, or for those who had need to hide,
such as the condemned Spiritual Franciscans who took up residence
around 1308 at nearby Calatamauro. 107 For such reasons, Corleone
ranked a surprising fourth among all the demesne cities in the tax
assessment of 1277, with nearly 7,000 hearths, or roughly 30,000
inhabitants. 108
The Pontecorono family numbered among those immigrants
from the north. The date of their arrival is unknown, although they
had probably settled there well before the Vespers. Bertolino
Pontecorono, eldest son of the family's Sicilian founder Bernardo,
appears in a record of May 1285 and is described as a citizen of
Corleone, of Pisan origin.109 Already he was a figure to be reckoned
with, engaged in trade with Tuscany, a business partner of
prominent Corleonese merchants, and, like Enrico Rosso in
Messina, the reputed leader of an armed gang - in this case a pirate
crew haunting the waters off the coasts of Trapani and Pantelleria.
A large family governed the large commercial fortune. Bernardo,
the patriarch, had five other sons in addition to Bertolino, all of
107
See discussion in ch. 5, below.
108
The town fell on hard times throughout the fourteenth century. By 1374—6 Corleone had
shrunk to just over 1,100 hearths, or 5,000 inhabitants. See Epstein, An Islandfor Itself
pp. 42,71.
109
ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 7. Mirazita, "Una famiglia 'lombarda' a Corleone,"
has published the text in the documentary appendix to her article, where it appears as
doc. 2.
whom worked with and for one another. 110 Marriage links with
leading native Corleonese families like the Cavallo and Nazano
introduced the Pontecorono clan to society; business contacts with
other families, such as the Cosmerio, helped secure their position.
Soon they owned several houses within Corleone and a number of
crop fields and pastures outside it, deriving considerable income
from urban and rural rents. They also engaged in money-lending,
traded in textiles and livestock, operated mills, and entered the
professions. For them as for many other new families the notariate
served as point of entry to public life.
Like other new families, too, the Pontecorono brood worked
together in order to compile a family treasure, a patrimonial
inheritance that symbolized their unity, provided for their general
welfare, and guaranteed their access to the avenues of power. A
well-calculated series of marriages was arranged for the various
females in the family, which linked them with other manses and
helped to bring other inheritances into the general purse; but
marriages for the men were actively discouraged, lest the family
weaken its position by splitting, the family's treasure among rival
inheritances. As with the Rosso clan, all the Pontecorono wealth -
including those properties and goods still held in Pisa - remained in
the main trust. 111 So strong was this concern for consolidation that
Guglielmo Pontecorono (one of Bertolino's many brothers, and one
of those who never married) bequeathed his portion of the manse
to all his surviving brothers and their families with the sole
exception of one brother, named Vanni, who had been so errant as
to marry and move away from Corleone. 112 Even bastard children
were brought into the collective economic campaign, and into the
family manse itself - as when, for example, provision was made
for Perino, one of Bernardo's illegitimate sons, and his family "and
his heirs in perpetuity, that they might have food, drink, and
lodging in the house of his brothers . . . free and without any
110
Bernardo's possession of the titles dominus and sire (see ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco,
perg. 23, 50, 59) indicates his early prominence in urban life. The meaning of these
honorifics is not always clear, but dominus tended to indicate landowners hip whereas sire
usually denoted prominence in the professions, in commerce, and in city administration.
See Pietro Corrao's introduction to Ada curie v, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii; Bresc, Un monde, p. 654;
Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 129.
111
Mirazita, "Una famiglia 'lombarda' a Corleone," pp. 923—5, and notes.
112
7&tfl\, p. 928.
payment."113 Wary of losing the freedom of action he possessed on

his own, Perino, in this case, resisted being brought into the family
network, until finally giving in to their continued cajoling two years
later.
The economic blows of 1311-13 spelled ruin for many in Corleone,
but the Pontecorono family, thanks to the diversity of their
activities and the prudent management of their pooled assets,
continued to prosper. The early deaths of several family members
had the effect of concentrating the wealth among the survivors.
An inheritance settlement between Perino and Giacomo in 1346
itemized their holdings; these consisted of no less than forty-eight
houses (both individual residences and multi-family dwellings) in
and around Corleone, two taverns, eight vineyards, a public oven, a
stable, a warehouse, a courtyard, and three grain and livestock
estates, in addition to the main family residence (hospitium magnum)
on the Corleone street that by then bore the family's name (ruga
pontecorono).114 In contrast to the Rosso family in Messina, Bernardo
Pontecorono's descendants did not play a large role in municipal
government and preferred instead to advance their interests
through social and commercial contacts. A few, however, did serve
the government in one way or another, beginning in the 1320s when
the fast-faltering economy necessitated new means of protecting
the family's position. Thus Pietro Pontecorono took office asjudex
in 1325-6;115 Gandolfo Pontecorono (perhaps his son) was regius
notarius terre Curilioni notarius in the same year.116 And in 1329-30
came the family's move to the capital and their political apotheosis,
with Guglielmo's appointment as pretor of Palermo together with
another kinsman's (the name is lost) selection as juratus for
Palermo's Seralcadio district. 117
The move to Palermo is significant. By the late 1320s and early
1330s conditions in Corleone were dreadful, and the town had
declined to a stagnant backwater. The decay of buildings, wells, and
walls discouraged trade, and recurring famines spread disease.
Mortality rose sharply, and when it became impossible to bury all of
113
Ibid., citing ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 44 (8 Aug. 1303): "et eius familia ac
heredes ipsius Perini in perpetuum habeant et habere debeant esum, potum, et
habitationem domus eorum dicti Guillelmi et Jacobi libere et absque aliquo pagamento."
114
ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 277; Bresc, Un monde, pp. 683-4.
115
ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 138 (8 Nov. 1325).
116 117
Ada curie HI, doc. 64 (4june 1326). Ada curie v, doc. 133 (9 Sept. 1329).
the dead, corpses were simply piled up in the cemetery, where, as
described before, they became the targets of herds of wild swine.
Crime increased as agricultural production decreased. The MRC
tried to bolster the economy by granting a fair to the city sometime
before 1329, but nothing helped.118 A new wave of emigration
ensued, as the town's inhabitants followed the very roads and rivers
that had earlier carried their produce and manufactured goods to
coastal markets, and abandoned Corleone by the hundreds.
Palermo was a favorite destination.119 By 1336 the town was unable
to pay its annual subvention to the royal court - the regular sum
owed by all demesne municipalities - and had to request a
restructuring of the gabelle that provided its funds.120
Unable to support themselves by commercial resources alone,
members of the Pontecorono family - and notably Guglielmo
himself, who was by then the patriarch - moved into government
and military service, thus following the pattern established by the
local barons of the vallo. They had also armed themselves and their
followers. Guglielmo's role as pretor of Palermo shows him to be in
command of a personal comitiva, since pretors at that time were
expected to provide their own soldiers and weaponry. It is likely
that his following was comprised of other immigrants from
Corleone, owing to his relative newness on the Palermitan scene.
Although the surviving documents fail us at this point, it is likely
that the sudden rise of this known, yet still foreign, band of
outsiders to police the capital did as much to frustrate on-going
tensions in Palermo as it did to alleviate them.
We can see in the examples of the Rosso and Pontecorono
families a number of similarities. They were both "new" families in
two senses: new to status and influence, and new to their cities as
well. The changes of the thirteenth century had effectively
reopened and reconfigured urban society, making it much easier for
ambitious outsiders to establish themselves. Under the Angevins,
the older urban elites from Hohenstaufen and Norman times had
118
Scarlata, "Mercati e fiere," p. 482.
119
See, for example, two grants of Palermitan citizenship to refugees from Corleone, in ASP
Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 197-8 (both dated 30 Aug. 1333).
120
Ada curie 11, pp. 125—30, 309-12 ("difficile et quodammodo impossibile eis fore quolibet
anno Curie nostre solvere pecuniam contingentem per eos ipsi nostre Curie ad
solvendum ratione annue subventionis nostre"). See also Starrabba and Tirrito, Assise e
consuetudini della terra di Corleone (see ch. 1, n. 20, above), pp. 159-61.
been largely purged - either sent into exile or put to death - if they
failed to accept Angevin rule. Those who had acquiesced and
supported Charles I and II found themselves out of favor as a result
of the Vespers, and were themselves either exiled or killed. This
left the demesne bereft of the older families who had traditionally
exercised power and guided local commerce, making it possible,
and in fact necessary, for new families to appear on the scene. The
possibilities for advancement were clearly inviting, in both the
commercial and administrative spheres. But whereas the Rosso
family utilized its administrative position to advance its com-
mercial interests, the Pontecorono family focused altogether on
trade and turned to local government only in response to collapsing
economic fortunes. In both cases, however, family ties remained
supreme and individual ambitions were sacrificed to the interests
of the clan. Public roles were not matched with a positive spirit of
public service. Leonardo d'Incisa, the baron who became "treasurer
of their Kingdom of Sicily" in 1311, exemplified the self-serving
nature of the worst of the baronial vultures who swooped down on
the courts, but Enrico Rosso's vacillating allegiances and crass
opportunism revealed the pettiness that the urban magnates were
likewise capable of. Even in the immediate post-war years,
administrative work too often aimed solely to bolster the standing
and wealth of the family, regardless of whatever arguments to the
contrary any of these individuals might have offered. Such intense
cohesion and single-mindedness had much to argue in its favor, but
it clearly worked to the detriment of the towns themselves, once
family fortunes were threatened. Faced with rising difficulties,
many of these urban magnates readily cloaked themselves with
auras of tired sacrifice and surrounded themselves with ragged, yet
deadly enough, corps of armed followers. Some of these, shortly
after Frederick's death, formed the most effective and brutal early
units in the larger baronial and mercenary armies that tore the
kingdom apart until 1398.
The cities, of course, had always known a degree of violence and

boisterous crime, even during the post-war decade. Passions
aroused by real or perceived slights, by business deals turned sour,
or by the simplest transgressions, easily erupted in fights, blows,
and stabbings. Much of this agitation owed something to the
violence of the climate. In the full blast of a Sicilian summer -when
the scirocco blowing northward from the Sahara desert can send
temperatures well above forty-four degrees Celsius (one hundred
and ten degrees Fahrenheit) for days on end - tempers ran as short
as the temperatures ran high. Much urban violence occurred
during these angry months. 121 Economic difficulties and lingering
grudges from the war added to the problem. As early as 1309,
factional disputes between supporters of one or another local
patron resulted in mass riots, property damage, and armed fighting
in Corleone. 122 Defaulted loans and commercial failures inspired
civil suits in Palermo regularly from 1308 onwards - and when the
court failed to resolve matters to the disputants' satisfaction,
conflicts were settled in the streets with knives. 123 These conflicts
were often pitifully petty. Manfredi Silvestri and Giovanni Rosso,
for example, fell victim to an armed gang of twelve hired by Notar
Giacomo di Salvaggio in Corleone when they complained that some
grain they had purchased was damaged by a few of Notar Giacomo's
cows, and having been rebuffed when they sought compensation,
they took matters in their own hands by stealing some empty
barrels from his barn. 124 In Txapani some personal insults that
Ciccio Testagrossa and a prominent widow named Anna flung at
one another - evidently over an unpaid debt left by Anna's dead
husband - resulted in Ciccio's hiring and arming enough ruffians to
assault an entire squadron of the municipal night-watch company,
solely because some friends of Anna's spouse happened to serve on
that squadron. 125
As intense and occasionally violent as local rivalries undoubtedly
were, large-scale and organized hostilities did not begin until the
arrival of the first barons, and then the response was immediate. In
121
In July 1312 Giovanni Dagnone, in a fit of anger, ran a sword through one Berceraimo
Cassio, with whom he had a longstanding grudge, in Butera, in the Val di Noto; see Ada
curie 1, doc. 62. Manfredi Laccani was murdered in Palermo the following month; see ibid.,
doc. 69. For other examples, see Ada curie in, doc. 65 (17 June 1326); BGP MS Qq H 6,
fol. 488-96 (24 August 1333); Ada curie 1, doc. 59 (3July 1312), 63 (3 Aug. 1312), 68 (26 Aug.
1312).
122 ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 65 (6 Jan. 1309).
123
ASP Misc. Archivistica, 2nd ser., no. 127A (Bartolomeo di Citella), fol. I68-I68V (24 April
1308): "[Angelus Moscanti - a merchant] dicebat dictum Raynaldum [de Maratta -
another merchant] percussisse ipsum Angelum cum quodam cultello mensali in capite
ita quod ex percussione ipsa sanguis emanavit." For other examples, see Ada curie 1,
doc. 10 (5 Nov. 1311), 17 (19 Nov. 1311), 24 (15 Jan. 1312), 44 (8 May 1312), 46 (20 May 1312).
124
Ibid., doc. 47 (30 May 1312).
125
Ada curie in, doc. 38 (16 Nov. 1325).
the earliest known case, in Palermo in 1312, the king appointed Pong
de Caslar as municipal justiciarius in order to restore order. It was
an unfortunate choice. From the Palermitans 5 point of view, Caslar
represented everything that the capital city should not have had
to contend with: not only was he a baron but, as a Catalan, his
jurisdiction over the city could only be regarded as unwarranted
foreign meddling. No sooner had Caslar and his retinue taken up
their posts than the local street patrols refused to perform their
duties, arguing that they would not work for foreign masters. 126
With no effective police force on the job, crime soared and
inevitably brought tensions between the Sicilians and Catalans to a
head. One local figure, Manfredi Laccani, ventured to arm his own
comitiva and drive out the foreigners. They failed, and sometime
later a punitive gang tracked down Manfredi and murdered him,
leaving his badly mangled body in the street. 127
The plague of violence prompted the royal government to repeat,
with ever increasing frequency and urgency, its prohibition of all
weapons - but to no avail. Indeed, the very repetition of the ban
suggests the intractability of the problem. At Castrogiovanni,
in 1325, the court issued several new laws. Clearly the increase in
weapons had to be curtailed, but so did the tendency of the rival
municipal leaders to organize themselves into factions and to grant
protection to their followers who did the dirty work in the streets:
In the desire that we might reign over a Kingdom of Sicily that is orderly
and peaceable - which is something that we shall not easily attain unless
we punish severely the patrons and protectors of those who commit the
crimes (without whose help those evil-doers would not long be able to hide
[from justice]) - we decree that no nobleman, count, baron, knight,
burgher, or anyone else in the kingdom shall dare or presume to harbor or
to hide anyone who has been accused or convicted by our royal officials.128
126
See ch. i, n. 33, above.
127
Most of Manfredi's killers were later identified. They included Simon de Caslar (a kins-
man of Pong), three other Catalans, one Angelono de Viccari, and a sixth, unidentified
man. SeeActa curie 1, doc. 69 (26 Aug. 1312).
128
Const. Castrogiovanni, in Testa, ch. 108: "Curantes, ut regnum Sicilie quietum pacatumque
regamus, quod non de facili obtinebimus nisi fautores et receptatores delinquentium
(sine quibus diutius malefici latere non possunt) acriter puniamus, presenti constitutione
sancimus, ut nullus regni nostri nobilium — sive sit comes, baro, miles, burgensis — vel
quicunque alius bannitum vel forjudicatum a quibuscunque ofiicialibus nostris in castris,
terris, massariis, domibus vel locis aliis receptare vel occultare audeat vel presumat, nee
occultatos vel receptatos deinceps detineat. Transgressores vero presentis laudabilis
sanctionis infrascriptis poenis sine venia feriantur: comes videlicet, vel baro magnus, si
But hidden henchmen were only part of the problem. Many faction
members had taken to wearing armor beneath their clothing to
protect themselves from the knives of their rivals.
It is fitting for the general health of the Royal Majesty not only to punish
evils already committed but to interdict the material and means by which
those evils are committed. Moreover, it is better to stop criminals before
they begin to act than it is to punish them with all the severity of the laws
after their crimes have been committed. And therefore, seeing it proven
that many of our subjects have begun the new and alien practice of
wearing protective vests or iron breastplates, and of carrying hidden
weapons beneath their cloaks, while passing themselves off as Sicilians, we
propose and decree that the secret bearing of arms is entirely forbidden in
the kingdom; for many murders and crimes of violence are easily brought
on by immature and capricious impulses, when these figures secrete
weapons under their clothing.129
So far had conditions degenerated by this time, the decree
intimates, that the factions controlling the streets and squares no
longer seemed to be of the same race as the people who had rebuilt
society after the Vespers, and hence were not to be treated as
such. They were an alien element in the eyes of the law. Although
"passing themselves off as Sicilians," they were more foreign to the
kingdom than the Pisan and Venetian merchants who traded in
contrafecerit, in unciis auri centum ipso facto multetur; ceteri vero in unciis
quinquaginta,fiscalibuscommodis applicandis. Ad quarum exactiones sine accusatore ex
officio judicis procedatur, cum genus receptantium delinquentes a sacratissimis legibus
pessimum reputetur. Jubentes nostris officialibus, quamcunque a nobis jurisdictionem
exerceant, quod si in exactione poenarum huiusmodi occasione aliqua fuerint tepidi vel
remissi, tantundem aerario Magne Nostre Curie persolvere teneantur — poenis aliis in
eos infligendis suo loco et tempore reservatis."
129
Ibid., ch. 109: "Regie Maiestatis salubre debet esse propositum non solum puniendi
maleficia iam commissa sed in committendis eisdem viam et materiam precludendi, cum
satis sit melius obviare principiis delictorum quam post perpetrata legum severitatibus
vindicare. Videntes igitur ab experto quosdam fideles nostros, morem novum et
alienigenum usurpantes, pancerias seu coyratias de maleis vel arma privatim vel
occulte deferre sub eorum coccardica vel indumento alio, sic alii a Siculis apparentes,
proposuimus et deliberate decrevimus huiusmodi occultam apportationem armorum in
regno nostro Sicilie penitus abolere, cum multa homicidia, multeque violentie juvenili
levique motu ex huiusmodi genere delationis armorum - cum aliis offensibilibus armis,
que secum portant, possent de facili evenire. Et volentes tanto pericolo tantoque facinori
obviare, presentis constitutionis edicto sancimus, ut nullus in regno nostro fidelis, vel
advena predicta arma occulta seu secreta modo et forma predictis deferre presumat, cum
tarn arma defensoria quam oflensoria palam deferre guerrarum tempore unicuique
sufficiat contra hostes. Contra presentem constitutionem Nostri Culminis venire
tentantes infrascriptis poenis ipso jure decrevimus esse damnandos — videlicet, si comes
fuerit vel baro magnus, uncias auri quinquaginta; si minor vel miles simplex, uncias
viginti quinque; si burgensis, uncias decemfisconostro componat."
the squares, the Greek slaves who worked in the shops and cleaned
the homes, or the Catalan traders, financiers, ambassadors, and
soldiers who sailed into the ports, guarded the royal garrisons, or
served in the king's court. In order to attract more recruits to their
bands or simply to impress cowed merchants and tradesmen into
obeying their will, gang leaders competed with one another to
promote the most convincing atmosphere of pomp, wealth, and
power, for the image of influence and strength mattered as much as
the reality. Thus among the new crowd of urban elites, whether
of baronial or commercial origin, we find impressive displays of
expensive dress, reckless gambling, ostentatious charity, and
dramatic expressions of outrage against real or perceived slights
against their honor. Giovanni Chiaromonte IPs smoldering
vendetta against Francesco Ventimiglia on behalf of his sister,
whom Francesco had repudiated as his wife in favor of his mistress,
had some of these qualities. There is no indication that Giovanni
had held any particular affection for his sister; rather, the insult
against the family's honor, as it was perceived, permitted of no
response other than violent revenge, even if that meant devastating
the whole island in the process.
In order to foster the proper image, many leaders even went into
debt, borrowing money in order to pay rude wages to their followers
or to provide themselves with the trappings fit for their assumed
station in life. This happened again and again in Palermo, in
Polizzi, in Messina, and wherever else influence could be bought or
won through bullying.130 Capital that might otherwise have been
directed at improvements in agricultural or industrial capacity
went instead into the pockets of armed dandies whose claim to the
cash was all the greater for coming on the point of a knife. Such
debts, compounding the general problem of public and private
indebtedness, led the government to produce ever stronger
prohibitions of gambling, excessive displays of wealth or expensive
clothing, and the providing of weapons to members of each faction.
Much of this was inspired by the royal court's evangelical spirit, but
much too resulted from simple pragmatism.131 Introduced in 1309,
this legislation against the "damned and damnable" sin of dice and
cards, "which leads to all manner of vices . . . since fraud, cheating,
130
Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 83—4, and notes.
131
On the evangelical issue, see ch. 5, below.
lying and blasphemy all too often make up part [of their practice],"
had little result in a society that craved diversion and in which those
with money felt a need to display it.132 Extravagant dress continued
to be a problem, as did lavish wedding and funeral arrangements
- occasions which the government not only disapproved of on
account of their sumptuous display, but which they positively feared
as potentially dangerous gatherings of crowds easily driven to
emotional or intoxicated excess.133
Attacks on political, social, and commercial rivals were common-
place. Among the best documented instances, Giovanni Cisario,
xurterius of Palermo in 1328-9 (and son of one of the immigrant
families from Corleone), marched with some armed followers upon
the house of D. Giovanni Aiello, the magisterjusticiarius for the vallo,
and taunted him "with many and enormous slanders" until a street
battle erupted between the two men's comitive.m Cisario's wrath
resulted either from disappointment in Aiello's performance of his
job, or more likely from envy that Aiello had secured the post in
the first place. As witnesses recalled the conflagration, Cisario's
followers advanced on the pretext of arresting a young client of
Aiello's on an unnamed charge; when Aiello refused to relinquish
the youth to the gang, sharp words volleyed back and forth until
finally blows were struck. If the recorded testimony accords with
the actual events, the first barbs were hurled in Latin, yet as
tempers rose both fellows resorted to vivid dialect. Cisario began:
"You whore with thieves, and I'll live to press my foot on your
throat!" Aiello countered: "You lie shamelessly, like the bastard son
of a priest - which you are!" To this Cisario, drawing out his sword
and ordering his companions to do the same, shot back, "You're the
132
Ord. gen.y in Testa, ch. 77: "Damnosum atque damnabilem alearum ludus, sub quo
comprehendimus tarn tabularem quam ludum quemlibet taxillorum, quern diversa
sequuntur genera vitiorum, inhibere volentes — cum fraus, mendacium, perjurium atque
blasphemie sepius committenrentur in ipsis, et ex ipsis postremo rerum damna et odia
sequebantur - statuimus, ut lex ilia Greca divi imperatoris Justiniani sub titulo 'De
aleatoribus' comprehensa, qua dictus usus alearum vetatur, que per contrariam consue-
tudinem quasi erat abolita, inviolabiliter observetur; tenorem cuius, ut reperiatur
facilius, hac constitutione de verbo ad verbum duximus inscribendum, qui talis est." Cf.
Codex Justinianus, bk. 3, tit. 43. Subsequent laws (ibid., ch. 73-81) reiterated the general
prohibition, mandated public beatings of gamblers, and ordered the destruction and
burning of any gaming tables.
133
Ibid., ch. 98-100,105.
134
Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 81—2 catalogs some of the wealth of the Cisario family in
Palermo.
disgusting liar, you filthy, wicked hoodlum! Rebel! Traitor! Woe to

us, if the leaders of Palermo are to be the likes of you!" Then the
bloodshed began.135
Their choice of words, interesting in itself, significantly reveals
another aspect of the tensions rending the demesne world. Personal
rivalries aside, Cisario hated Aiello, or at least rationalized his
hatred of him, for his ties to the Catalan throne. Relations between
ethnic Sicilians and the Catalans worsened steadily from the
moment baronial influence was introduced in the cities, despite
the fact that in several instances (such as Palermo) the king
installed baronial pretors, castellans, and justiciarii at the cities'
explicit request.136 Never warm, and often made much the worse
by endemic Catalan piracy in the waters around the island,
Sicilian-Catalan relations after 1317 cooled considerably, whether
one speaks of official relations between the royal court and the
populace, or of individual relations between merchants, tradesmen,
clergy, or laborers.137 Except at the aristocratic level, where a
handful of Catalan lords wedded available Sicilian noblewomen,
both groups had avoided inter-marriage and indeed even most
forms of everyday socializing, resulting less in the creation of a
social chasm than in a general failure to create social cohesion.
Complaints against Catalan trading privileges ("which have
multiplied in no small degree as of late . . . such that they are
prohibited to nobody") were commonplace, as were attacks on
individual Catalans.138
But Catalans were not the only victims. Attacks on Sicily's Jews
also suddenly increased.139 Numerically, Jews represented a tiny
135
Ada curie v, doc. 5 (12 Sept. 1328): "Tu es solitus tenere malandrinos tecum, sed amodo
tenebo tibi pedem in gulam . . . Tu mentiris per gulam sicut filius presbiteris bastardus,
qui tu es . . . Tu mentiris per gulam comu suczu malu ruffianu ravallasu tradituri. Ki eu
su, si bonu hamu ilia terra di Panormu comu si tu . . . Suzu traduturi, eu ti mictiro lu calchi
ala gula non ti cridi truvari ali altri . . . Suczu malu ruflianu raballasu maniaculatiki
misser merda, ki eu ti mustriro dumani ki eu sugnu milloromu di ti." The epithets, as
reported by the witnesses, continue for several pages.
136
Ada curie in, doc. 60-3; rv, doc. 42; vi, pp. xxiv—xxv.
137
On piracy, see ch. 6, below.
138
Ada curie v, doc. 26 (18 Nov. 1328). For a representative example of ethnic violence, see
Ada curie in, doc 65 (17 June 1326), recording judicial proceedings for the murder of a
Catalan hide merchant in Mistretta.
139
The crucial source for Sicily's Jews is Codice diplomatico deigiudei in Sicilia, ed. Bartolomeo
and Giuseppe Lagumina, 3 vols. (Palermo, 1884—1909), DSSS, 1st ser., vols. vi, xn, XVII.
Valuable studies are by Abulafia, "Una comunita ebraica della Sicilia occidentale" (see
ch. 1, n. 19, above); Ashtor, "The Jews of Trapani in the Later Middle Ages" (ibid.); Cecil
minority of the overall population. Even in a city like Trapani,
where they had one of their largest and most vibrant communities,
Jews made up no more than 5 percent of the populace. Many of
them had arrived in the middle of the thirteenth century when
Frederick II, who was then busily expelling Muslims from the
island, began to entice Maghribi Jews from Tunisia with offers of
royal protection, moderate taxation, religious tolerance, and oppor-
tunities for both administrative advancement and commercial
prosperity. He had lied, of course, but manyJews came nonetheless,
bringing with them skills in the production of dates and indigo that
helped to diversify the rural economy. The fact that they were all
Arabic-speaking made their assimilation somewhat easier, since
life in the western half of the island where most of them settled still
retained a strong Arab, if no longer Muslim, flavor. In most western
cities, in fact, Jews and Christians lived side by side until the very
end of the Vespers war. Relations between them were generally
smooth, even if only because mainstream Sicily reserved its hatred
for the Angevins; the Maghribi Jews, in fact, had greater difficulty
in winning acceptance from the older, native Jewish population. In
Palermo, disputes between the two proved so insurmountable that
a separate synagogue had to be established for the newcomers and
located outside the city walls. The Catalans probably imported
some anti-Jewish feeling when they arrived in the 1280s, but this too
lay in abeyance so long as the fight with Naples lasted. Things
began to change shortly after Caltabellotta. The Jews by then
had resolved most of their internal disputes, but suddenly had to
contend with the intense, if rather jingoistic, quasi-"patriotic"
feelings released by the successful conclusion of the war. The
Sicilians - by which they meant the Christian Sicilians - had at last
won their liberty and were free to create a "Sicilian" kingdom,
which necessarily involved, even if only as a minor point, a
reevaluation of the status of the Jews living in their midst. Distinct
Jewish quarters began to appear, or in some cases to reappear,
in cities with sizable Jewish populations. This happened first in
Trapani, although the precise forces at work in this are still poorly
Roth, "Jewish Intellectual Life in Medieval Sicily," Jewish Quarterly Review 47 (1956-7),
317—35; Shlomo Simonsohn, "Gli ebrei a Siracusa ed il loro cimitero," Archivio storico
siracusano 9 (1963), 8-20; and Carmelo Trasselli, "Gli ebrei di Sicilia," in his collection
Sicilianijra Quattrocento e Cinquecento (Messina, 1981), pp. 135—57. For general context, see
Attilio Milano, Storia degli ebrei in Italia (Torino, 1963), Saggi, vol. CCCXVIII.
understood. But after the evangelical wave struck in 1305, a fairly

systematic campaign to order and restrict Jewish life became
apparent.
Anti-Jewish legislation began with the Ordinationes generates of
1309, when restrictions were placed upon their professional and
social activities. Traditionally involved in commerce and the
professions - they held a virtual monopoly over the dyeing industry,
for example, in addition to being prominent in medicine — Sicily's
Jews suddenly found themselves subject to increasing constraints
on their public activities. Not all the laws were repressive. Certain
limited provisions protected Jews from excessive bigotry - such as
preserving the integrity of Jewish courts and administrative
records, or mandating prison sentences for anyone found guilty of
harassing Jewish converts to Christianity - but otherwise whatever
tolerance existed towards the Jews in everyday life resulted not
from the law of the land but from the casual, yet regular, ignoring
of it.140 The law forbade Jews to own Christian slaves, for example,
or to have "regular contact" with Christians, which included the
formation of commercial societates, yet in actual practice the needs
of the market place always took precedence over legal scruples, and
the law was easily circumvented by describing one's Jewish partner
as a conversus regardless of whether or not that was the case.141 But
while most merchants were willing to trade with Jews, few were
willing to enter closer relations or to permit them to express any
aspect of their faith in public. Jewish marriages and funerals, for
example, were subject to detailed prescriptions of what they could
include by way of clothing, demeanor, songs and chants, and
number of participants, for fear that such ceremonies, and the
heightened emotions that attend them, might easily lead to
unrest.142 Many comitive took advantage of these statutes to taunt
Jewish groups and to extort money from them. In Palermo one of
the magistri xurte, Simone di Notar Michele, and his men made a
140
Ord gen., in Testa, ch. 63, 67.
141
Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 14; Thomas, Diplomatarium veneto-
levantinum, doc. 12,14,18. Some figures — even clerics — were bold enough openly to create
societates with Jews regardless of the laws. Lorenzo Finocolo, a Palermitan friar who also
engaged in business, formed a corporation with Solomon Mahalufo "in tenendo et
faciendo et exercendo per dictum Salomonem mistio molaturie in apotheca Matthei de
Chinisi" in November 1326; ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 76 (Ruggero di Citella), fol. 43; see
also Reg. 2 (Salerno di Peregrino), fol. 49V-50 (9 Oct. 1336).
142
BCP MS Qq E 28, fol. 19V; cf. Ada curie 11, pp. 229-30.
habit of harassing the Jews of their precinct, threatening them with
immediate arrest for their having supposedly violated the public-
ceremony ordinances, precisely when those Jews were en route to
weddings, child-births, and funerals - that is, when they were in the
greatest hurry and had no choice but to pay.143 The ingrained
Sicilian tendency to distrust foreigners (in this case, perceived
foreigners, since most of Sicily's Jewish communities had
been established centuries earlier) here appeared in all its
strength. Belief in Jewish evil-doing and obstinate hatred of Jews
remained unabated despite the remarkably peaceful nature of
Sicily's Jewish communities; even more than most other areas in
Europe, the Jews of Trapani, Erice, Mazara, Messina, Palermo,
Corleone, Siracusa, Caltanissetta and wherever else they settled
had remained content to ply their trades quietly, avoid unnecessary
contact with the majority society that might lead to misunder-
standing, and adhere scrupulously to the laws of the land.
Nevertheless the distrust remained. A heavy penalty awaited any
Jewish physician who practiced medicine on or sold drugs to a
Christian patient, for example, since "we cannot have any faith in
those who do not share the Faith . . . and since they hate us"; any
Jew found guilty of such a transgression was "held in prison for a full
year, throughout which time he will eat the bread of tribulation and
drink the water of misery."144 Attacks on Jews increased, though
perhaps without any observably earnest intent (popular hatred of
Catalans and northern Italians always ran higher and more
durably). D. Federico d'Algerio and his comrades-in-arms, for
example, attacked "a certain Jew, a member of the royal camera" at
143
BCP MS Qq E 28, fol. 48V (2 May 1321), where Frederick reprimands Simone for his
actions and orders him "Judeos dicte civitatis non molestat nee ab eis aliquid exigat vel
accipiat... eosdem Judeos ad nuptias alicuius ipsorum Judeorum de nocte vel ad partum
alicuius mulieris Judee."
144
Ord. gen., in Testa, ch. 70: "In iis confidere non possumus, qui fidem non habent, nee aliis
poterunt esse fideles, qui eorum dominum prodiderunt. Eapropter providimus et
jubemus, ut nullus Judeorum, qui, cum de illius spectaremus consilio sive cura, forte
nobis (cum nos odio habeant) procurabit impendere dispendia vel nociva, medendi artem
in Christianis audeat exercere, vel medicinas pro Christianis conficere aut medicinas
eisdem Christianis vendere vel etiam ministrate. Quod si contrafecerint, jubemus, quod
Judeus ipse per annum unum carceri detineatur inclusus, ducens per tempus predictum
in pane tribulationis et aqua miserie vitam suam. Christianus vero, qui ad curam ipsum
vocaverit vel a Judeo medicinam sibi aut suis propinari vel confici fecerit, vel medicinam
aut medicinalia ab eo scienter emerit, carceri per tres menses detineatur in poenam, et
totum, quod dederat aut daturus esset ipsi Judeo, salarii aut pretii nomine, ad Curie
manus perveniat, per earn postmodum pauperibus erogandum."
Ciminna in late 1328, while two allied thugs, in an evidently related

action, murdered the prior of the church of the Teutonic knights at
Vicari.145 Fraud against, and litigation with, Jews also increased in
many sectors by persons trying to take advantage of an anticipated
Jewish acquiescence. In Palermo a notary calmly received an
itinerant Jewish merchant's money in deposit, to be paid to the
Jew's creditor when he arrived a few days later, only to assert, when
the creditor appeared, that the Jew had never left any funds in the
first place;146 and in Sciacca Riccardo Vassallo took advantage of a
law that gave ownership of a property, if two individuals offered the
same price for it, to whichever of them was a Sicilian rather than a
foreigner, in order to force a local Jewish resident to relinquish his
ownership of two houses in the center of the city.147
One factor worked in the Jews' favor. They still controlled
significant amounts of capital and had access to commercial
contacts and credit abroad. Cash-poor elites who needed funds to
further their schemes had good reason to cultivate beneficial
relations with their Jewish neighbors; and many Jews, tired of being
pressed for ever higher taxes by a government that already taxed
Jews at higher rates than it did any other group within Sicily,
eagerly sought refuge from the graspings of the court in Messina. 148
Consequently some unlikely alliances were formed, and some of the
oppressed entered the protective shadow of the new oppressors.
Many barons and urban magnates took individual Jews under
their personal protection, offering them safety, anonymity, and
guarantees of commercial contacts in return for financial support.
As Frederick complained in 1325: "It has come to our attention that
145
Ada curie v, doc. 28-32 (23 Nov. 1328).
146
BCP MS Qq F 31, fol. 27 (1 Dec. 1320).
147
ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 117 (30 March 1321). For a similar case, see ACA Perg.
Alfonso III, no. 624 (27 March 1332), in which Russo Rosso of Messina challenged a local
widow's sale of an orchard in Catania — one that happened to be contiguous with a land-
plot of his own, and hence desired by him - to a Catalan named Pere Llopis. Citing the
law that favored Sicilians, Russo offered to reimburse Pere for his purchase price
(25.00.00), plus an additional ounce "for the expenses incurred by Pere in this matter."
Pere had no choice but to accept.
148
Frederick's anti-Jewish feelings were tempered somewhat in 1311 when the Jews of
Trapani, where one of Frederick's sons had died, offered to provide a richly embroidered
covering for the young prince's tomb in the church of S. Domenico. Touched by their
offer, the king revoked a number of new statutes that restricted Jewish life, such as the
ordinance that the Jews of Palermo had to live outside the city walls "in order to separate
them from the Christian faithful." See Ashtor, "The Jews of Trapani," p. 3; Lagumina,
Codice diplomatico, doc. 35 (27July 1312).
some of ourfideles have had the audacity and temerity to take under
their protection the Jews whom we have hitherto regarded as
servants of the royal camera, and to establish themselves as their
'protectors,' not realizing in the process that by so doing they bring
great harm upon the royal court in regard to the dues owed by those
said Jews . . . O n this account we decree that no Sicilian count,
baron, knight, burgher, or anyone else shall take any J e w under his
protection or establish himself as intercessor or defender for those
Jews or for the duties and services owed by them to our officials or
our court." 149 But as usual, he acted too late. T h e rush to "protect"
Jews, to secure whatever financial prizes they represented or were
believed to represent, merely formed a more manic manifestation
of the earlier desire to hide Jewish business partners under the
guise of conversi. This offer of "protection" was probably coercive,
and the above-mentioned incident of the Palermitan magistrate
who extorted money from Jews as they ventured to their weddings
and funerals probably reflects the heavy-handed tactics employed
by most. But coerced or not, many Jews did accept whatever
protection society allowed, as can be seen in the otherwise
inexplicable rapid increase in the number of neophytes and conversi
recorded in notarial acts from 1320 to 1337.150
With so many forces working to rupture urban life, it is a wonder

that demesnal Sicily survived as well as it did. Broken into factions,
and wasting away in depopulated, rotting cities, the demesne
stayed alive thanks to the adaptability of the common artisans and
149
Const. Castrogiovanni, in Testa, ch. 112: "Ad Nostre Maiestatis pervenit notitiam nonnullos
nostrorum fidelium tante audacie tanteque temeritatis existere, quod Judeos, quos
servos nostre camere reputamus, in eorum protectionem suscipiunt et ipsorum se faciunt
defensores, non advertentes, quod ex hoc curie nostre juribus debitis per Judeos eosdem
vertitur detrimentum; circa quod merito providentes, presenti constitutione jubemus, ut
nullus regni nostri nobilium, comes, baro, miles, burgensis vel quis alius Judeum aliquem
sibi recommendatum accipiat nee eius se constituat protectorem; nee, cum a nostris
oflicialibus jura et servitia a predictis Judeis nostre curie debita exiguntur, pro eisdem
Hebraeis intercessor seu defensor accedat. Is autem, qui contrafecerit edicto presenti, si
comes vel baro magnus fuerit, unciarum auri quinquaginta; si minor vel miles simplex,
unciarum vigintiquinque; si burgensis vel aliquis alius, unciarum auri decem poenam
se noverit incursurum. Judei vero, qui se aliquorum ex predictis nostris fidelibus
recommendationibus, protectionibus et defensionibus modo et forma premissis, submitti
presumpserint, poenam unciarum quinque se noverint soluturos, fiscalibus commodis
applicandum. Quam poenam si dicti Judei solvere nequeant, eos luere volumus in
personis."
150
Bresc, Un monde, p. 630.
shopkeepers, many of them immigrants from greater ruins else-

where, to appalling circumstances and ever altering conditions.
Scenes of chaos from Marsala to Sciacca, Palermo, Caltanissetta,
Randazzo, Catania, and Noto provided numerous opportunities for
the ambitious, whether through admirable avenues like learning
new skills and extending one's contacts, or through less admirable
alternatives like preying upon desperate widows or bullying one's
way into communal offices with armed retainers. Fortunes were
won and lost with dizzying speed, and each grand new success or
miserable failure added a new twist to local rivalries, tensions, and
feuds. But many of the miserable changes that took place in the
fourteenth century made it possible for demesnal Sicily to recover
so well in the fifteenth. The system of fairs, franchises, and
privileges established in Frederick's time laid the basis for the
resurgence of commerce and social cohesion in the reigns of Martin
II and Alfonso V. Anecdotal horrors like Giovanni Chiaromonte II
or the later Rosso and Pontecorono taskmasters should not blind us
to the everyday toils of enterprising commoners - Sicilian, Jewish,
Catalan, and northern Italian alike - w h o worked to make the best
of straitened circumstances. For every loutish D. Federico d'Algerio
there was an honest and industrious worker like Giovanni
Gavaretta, a baker who began modestly in a small shop, married a
nearby cobbler's daughter, eventually entered a partnership with
another baker and purchased a taverna, and finally capped his career
with two terms as municipal gabellotus (once for mills, in 1322, and
once for bread, in 1333).151
Some credit is also due to the foreign connections of the new
elites. The importance of overseas trade has always been exagger-
ated for medieval Sicily (the best and most recent estimate of the
grain trade puts overseas exports at less than 5 percent of total
production), but international connections and access to inter-
national systems of credit played a vital role in the rise of most
non-baronial urban elites and thus helped to ensure a certain
amount of revenue in local markets. 152 To the extent that these
151
Ada curie vi, pp. xxxiv-xxxv, and notes.
152
On the grain trade figures, see Epstein, An Islandfor Itself, pp. 270-6. The calculation is
surprisingly simple. Grain exports at the start of Frederick's reign (wheat and barley, in
a three-to-one ratio) averaged 40,000 salme per year, rising occasionally to twice that
amount. Given that the population of Sicily at that time was somewhere near 850,000 and
that asalma itself was reckoned to be the amount of grain needed to keep one person alive
connections brought commerce to the island, they did well. But for
the Rossos in Messina, the Pontecoronos in Corleone, the Abatellis
in Palermo, and for others elsewhere, connections on the continent
provided armed support as well, either in the form of mercenaries,
family supporters, or weaponry, and thus worsened the plague of
corruption and violence.153 Given the persistence of the xenophobic
atmosphere that settled on the demesne after 1320-1, it would seem
that in regard to such people as these, as in regard to the kingdom's
too numerous entanglements, the disadvantageous aspects of inter-
national contacts predominated.
for a year, it seems safe to assume that Sicily produced at least 900,000 salme annually,
which places its exports at roughly 4.5 percent of production.
153
S. Sambito Piombo, "Una famiglia lucchese a Palermo nei primi decenni del secolo XTV,"
Rivista di archeologia, storia e costume 9 (1981), 37—44.
CHAPTER 4
A divided society II: the

rural—baronial world
Feudal Sicily - a crushingly poor, backward, agrarian world in which

dull peasants sweated in rugged fields, tended meager crops and
pathetic flocks, and bowed under the yoke of bellicose and brutal
overlords who held themselves above the law while dominating
their isolated fiefdoms from safe within their mountain fortresses
- is the image that persists in the historical memory. Here we see
Sicily's presumed backwardness in its fullest and most awful
display. But the image is a caricature. After twenty years of
suffering, rural-baronial Sicily sprang to surprising new life once
peace had been established, and it adapted creatively to a series of
upheavals in its economic and social organization. Certainly
poverty and violence were part of the rural scene, especially in the
Val di Mazara, but it would be an error to credit the common image
as a faithful representation of the truth. In the brief period from
1302 to 1311 the feudal sector of the realm prospered as much as the
fast rallying cities and showed a comparable, though somewhat
slighter, enthusiasm for many of the spiritual and political ideas
and developments emanating from the royal court. The combined
disasters of the three-year drought and the parliament's decision to
ally itself with Henry VII and the Ghibelline cause in northern
Italy, however, marked the crucial turning point in the feudal
world's fortunes, just as they did for the cities. Economic decline
forced tens of thousands of peasants and village artisans to abandon
their homes, and left their baronial landlords with insufficient labor
to try to recover from the blow. The barons' acceptance of the new
regime had been grudging and cautious from the start, and there is
some evidence that the concessions granted in 1296, coupled with
the prosperity that followed Caltabellotta, softened their resistance
somewhat, even to the point where some of the greater landlords
became evidently sincere supporters of the royal court. But among
156
The rural-baronial world 157
the lesser knights that court, with its foreign atmosphere of
Catalans, commerce, and compromise, deserved no more loyalty
than it paid for. They regarded developments like the Ghibelline
alliance, the Athenian duchy, and the adoption of Franciscan
Spiritualism as willful and self-serving actions that unintentionally
but surely undermined the great cause of Sicilian independence.
Why support a regime that had led the country into such troubles?
The island had been betrayed yet again, they felt, and the only thing
to do now was what should have been done all along: take whatever
action was necessary to protect oneself and one's family. Economic
integration and political unity for the kingdom as a whole meant
nothing, compared to stability - even a brutally enforced stability -
at the local level. Hence baronial intransigence and its occasionally
ruthless refusal to obey anyone's law but its own, and damn the
consequences, was as much a reaction to the kingdom's unraveling
as it was a cause of it. But before passing judgment on the feudal
world, we must recognize the extent of the changes and challenges
it faced.1
Feudal laws, and the rural societies they administered, were
intensely conservative in nature. Based in theory on a recognition
of mutual dependence and mutual obligation, feudal ties, once
established, experienced qualitative change only slowly and
reluctantly; the solemnities that accompanied the formal establish-
ment of each link discouraged change, since feudal relations
comprised a type of vow, and a vow's sacral nature did not allow for
temporizing and innovation. Thus the feudal organization of the
interior that confronted Frederick when he assumed the throne
had, despite the dynastic upheavals of the thirteenth century,
altered very little from Norman times. The names had changed, but
not the basic structures of life.
The Norman conquest represents the real and fundamental shift.
In regard to how land was divided, held, worked, and administered,
the Norman period marked a sharp break with the Muslim past.
1
The rural—baronial society has received considerable attention from scholars, and makes
a lengthy analysis unnecessary here. See, for example, Henri Bresc, "La feudalizzazione
in Sicilia dal vassallagio al potere baroniale," in SDS in, pp. 503-43; Alberto Boscolo, "La
feudalita in Sicilia, in Sardegna e nel Napoletano nel Basso Medioevo," Medioevo: saggi e
rassegne 1 (1975), 49—58; Mazzarese Fardella, Ifeudi comitali (see ch. 2, n. 22, above). San
Martino de Spucches, La storia deifeudi (see ch. 3, n. 54, above) is an important reference
work, but must be used with caution.
The change was not only the replacement of Muslim landholders

with Christian ones, but the very organization and atmosphere of
the rural world. Apart from the continuation from Muslim-
introduced crops like citrus and the preservation of Arabic
place-names (Caltavuturo = Qalcat 'Abu Tawr, or "the stronghold
of 'Abu Tawr"), Islamic ruralism largely disappeared, even though
a few tenacious Arab hangers-on could still be found near Sutera (as
remote a spot, lodged amongst dreary outcroppings of sulfurous
rock, as one could find in all the island) as late as 1250. No longer
independent domains of warlord-princes (qa'ids), rural lands were
distributed among a smallish, but zealous band of crusader-
conquerors who brought with them a considerable baggage of
assumptions about their obligations to higher powers, their
relations to their underlings, and their rights, whether commercial
or political, over the territories under their sway. Independent-
minded, and with a long tradition of stiff-necked rebelliousness
behind them, they tended from the start to regard themselves as
autonomous powers, to pay homage and fealty grudgingly and
only when it could not be avoided, and to exert virtually despotic
authority over their fiefdoms, populated, as these were, with
Muslim infidels.
The Norman kings, to be sure, had ideas of their own about rights
and responsibilities. The patchwork nature of their conquest, and
the polyglot nature of the realm, which included southern Italy,
produced a curious ad hoc miscellany of ideas regarding the nature
of the monarchy, drawn more or less equally from northern French,
Byzantine, Muslim, and papal sources.2 "Omnes possessiones regni
mei meae sunt," as Roger II phrased it, neatly sums up the result.
The entire kingdom was the personal possession of the king, his to
do with precisely as he pleased, without having to answer to any
higher authority and without having to justify himself to any of his
subjects. Roger and his successors fancifully saw themselves as the
descendants of the ancient Greek tyrants of Siracusa and even
2
Leon-Robert Menager, "L'institution monarchique dans les etats normands d'ltalie,"
Cahiers de civilisation medievale 2 (1959), 303-31 and 445-68 emphasizes French feudal
influence; Walter Ullmann, "Rulership and the Rule of Law in the Middle Ages: Norman
Rulership in Sicily,"Actajuridica 20 (1978), 157-85 stresses Byzantine factors. Others have
taken sides with either Menager or Ullmann, or have branched out in new directions. On
the whole, it is a dull debate. A good synthesis is Salvatore Tramontana, La monarchia
normanna e sveva (Torino, 1986).
minted coins that were fashioned after the ancients. The king was
the source of all law, but at the same time he stood absolutely above
it. "No one may question the king's judgments or decrees, for to
dispute his decisions . . . is comparable to sacrilege."
So long as fief holders paid their feudal dues and did not break
into open disobedience, relations between barons and the crown
remained generally stable. This was because the everyday life of the
baronies — despite the Sturm und Drang of royal pronouncements —
lay beyond the king's reach. Life for the peasant majority followed
local customs and laws; the multi-cultural makeup of the populace
meant that no central, standardized legal structure existed for the
entire kingdom. Barons administered the territories under their
control according to local practices, with themselves as the supreme
arbiters of right and wrong.
Two factors served to check their ambition. First, the problem of
underpopulation. Rural Sicily had been engulfed in war since the
fall of the Kalbite emirate in the tenth century; in the proliferation
of petty princedoms that followed, civil strife and brigandage
increased to the point that many peasant faithful quitted the island
entirely. The arrival of the Normans inspired many others to do the
same, either out of fear of persecution or in the belief that they had
a religious obligation, as Muslims, not to serve Christian masters. 3
Their flight affected the Val di Mazara the most, since that was the
most heavily Arabized territory. But it was also the center of cereal
production and the site of most of the fiefs established by the
conquering Normans. Countless entire villages were abandoned,
farms left deserted and ruined, and the rural labor force left
depleted. For safety, much of the remaining populace gathered
together to form larger, but necessarily more isolated, estates and
manses. Small freeholds slowly disappeared in favor of latifondi.
Others moved into fortified towns under baronial control - that is,
rural seats that were not part of the royal demesne; these sites, by
the Catalan period, came to be called terre. Hence economic need
served to check baronial excesses upon their local subjects, since
egregious demands would only aggravate rural flight. The kings'
efforts to draw settlers to Sicily from the continent, right through
the thirteenth century, earned a measure of baronial gratitude and
helped to smooth relations with the crown.
3
David Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (Oxford, 1988), p. 40.
Second, royal law prohibited sub-infeudation and the alienation

offiefs.Knights received their fiefs directly from the king, without
intermediaries, and could not further divide the land into parcels to
be granted out to vassals of their own. Roger established some 230
feudal families, tying the amount of land awarded to each to the
amount of military service rendered.4 Like the Norman kings in
England, he dispersed large grants over a diverse area; that is,
rather than awarding a large fief en bloc in the Val di Noto, he
parceled out the same amount of land in a sprawl of scattered
estates throughout the island. Thus sub-infeudation was rendered
impractical, and even the most powerful barons were denied a
strategic base from which to mount challenges to royal authority.
Holders of multiple estates tended to reside in one particular
casalis, which quickly became regarded as their patrimonial estate,
and worked the others through agents or family members.
The strife that marked the end of the Norman dynasty and long
periods of the Hohenstaufen era extinguished many of the knightly
families. The Angevin and Catalan arrivals replaced older families
with new supporters of their own. Ninety percent of the feudal
families established in the twelfth century were gone by 1296.
Consequently, each new king, upon his coronation, took the oppor-
tunity to install new milites in the available vacancies. But the policy
of non-alienation remained firm. As Frederick II of Hohenstaufen
had expressed it: "By this edictal law, which will be valid in
perpetuity, we forbid all thejideles of our kingdom -whether counts,
barons, knights, or any other person or cleric — to dare to transfer
any property upon which rents or services are due to our court, to
any other person by any type of alienation whatsoever, either while
they are living or [after death] by their wills; nor may they even
alter that property in any way that results in our court losing those
rents and services owed to it."5 This rigorous prohibition, coupled
with the superimposition of royal rights "to the distance of a
bowshot" over any fief that extended to the coast, effectively
isolated the inland community from the rest of the realm and
undercut its economic potential.
4
Bresc, "La feudalizzazione," p. 508.
5
Liber augustalis, bk. in, ch. 57, in Die Konstitutionen Friedrichs ILJursein Konigreich Sizilien, ed.
H. Conrad, T. von der Lieck-Buyken, and W. Wagner (Cologne, 1973). An English version
is available as The Liber Augustalis or Constitutions ofMelfi Promulgated by the Emperor Frederick
IIfor the Kingdom of Sicily in 1231, trans. James Powell (Syracuse, 1971).
Landlocked by design as by nature, and cut off from the
commercial centers of the demesne, the inland world formed a
separate society, one whose fortunes depended wholly on agricul-
ture. So long as demand for foodstuffs grew, this society was able to
support itself with ease. Domestic and international demand for
Sicilian wheat rose continually through the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, as the dramatic growth of Europe's population in those
years generated a need for food production. Sicily's particular
variety of wheat - a small, hard-kerneled species - grew abundantly
and when properly stored lasted as long as three years without
deteriorating, an important consideration in medieval times.6 (It
also made, and still makes, delicious pasta.) But the sharp demo-
graphic decline of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries -
a European-wide phenomenon - inevitably brought with it a
decreased demand for food. The downward turn in revenue
contributed to the further loss of the rural labor force, and made it
virtually impossible for landholders to maintain a stable economic
basis. In the west and south, labor-intensive crops like sugar, cotton
(grown chiefly on Malta), and indigo were abandoned in favor of
wheat monoculture; but the Val Demone retained its diversity. It
was traditionally wine and swine country, with heavy investment in
textiles, timber, and mining. But even many Val Demone milites
were buffeted by the sagging economy. For many, the only way out
was to enter the demesne cities as part of the "urban knighthood"
that assumed police authority over the municipalities, or else
to grab more productive farmland and pasturage from one's
neighbors.
The Vespers provided a golden opportunity for those who chose
to steal. Driven by economic need and by lingering resentments
between those who had opposed the Angevins and those who had
supported them, knights turned on one another avidly, sometimes
raiding and sometimes in essence conquering and appropriating
vast segments of the rural world. Ecclesiastical estates, being
unarmed, were a favorite target. So too were lands belonging to the
king's private demesne, in the apparent hope (a reasonable enough
one, given the circumstances) that the Catalan dynasty was
doomed. Weapons and the will to use them, not the royal court,
governed the interior. Giovanni Chiaromonte, for example, seized
6
Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 143—4.
a cluster of farms near Agrigento that belonged to the bishop;

Manfredi Lancia appropriated grain fields and mills near Noto;
D. Oberto di Cammarana snatched up farms and vineyards near
Monreale.7 Frederick's coronation hardly abated the land grab at
all and, in fact, in some cases it aggravated matters. Enrico Rosso,
Guglielmo Montacuto, Costantino di Naro and Guglielmo di
Maniscalco, among many others, declared open revolt and in effect
seceded from the realm, fortifying their manors and usurping
several that belonged to the crown.8 Giovanni Callaro seized royal
estates at Vizzini and Buccheri, while his brother sacked Noto,
Buscemi, Palazzolo and Ferla; Napoleone Caputo and Virgilio di
Scordia plundered demesne lands near Catania.9 Enrico Gioeni
(who held estates at Motta Camastra in the Val Demone) revolted,
as did Giovanni di Mazzarino (lord of Mazzarino, mid-way between
Naro and Piazza) and Manfredi Maletta (who held estates at
Cammarata, Pettineo, and Paterno).10
The mounting crisis led Frederick to change course and to alter
fundamentally both relations between the crown and itsfideles and
royal policies governing the administration of fiefs. This was the
most important institutional shift regarding rural Sicily since
the Norman conquest. The first thing he needed to do was to put
more people on the land. With some difficulty, he managed to
suppress the revolts that had broken out, which made it possible
to remove his most recalcitrant critics and replace them with more
loyal supporters - generally those knights, both Sicilian and
Catalan, who had campaigned with him in Calabria - and also to
make a show of leniency to others whose gratitude might some day
come in handy.11 Fortunately a sufficient number of the milites in
7
RPSS i, pp. 627, 706-7; 11, p. 1200. For other examples, see 11, pp. 1247, 1294, and 1297.
8
ACA Perg. James II, no. 641 and 854; Perg. Alfonso III, no. 351; ASP Cane. Reg. 1,
fol. 41-41V; Mazzarese Fardella,// tabulario Belmonte (see ch. 2, n. 50, above), doc. 13. See
also ACA Cartas James II, no. 10262 for a rebel seizure of the stronghold at Gangi.
9
Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. rv, ch. 5-7 (Buscemi, Palazzolo, Noto, and Ferla); bk. v, ch. 3
(Vizzini and Buccheri), and ch. 4-8 (Catania). Nearly the entire fifth book of Speciale's
history is taken up with baronial plunderings.
10
ASP Cane. Reg. 46, fol. 241—241V; La Mantia, Codice diplomatico dei re aragonesi, p. 427
(Mazzarino); San Martino de Spucches, La storia deifeudi 11, p. 140 (Cammarata), v, p. 230
(Motta Camastra), v, p. 436 (Paterno), and v, p. 461 (Pettineo).
11
The surrender treaty negotiated with rebels at Gangi and Pietraperzia, who had held out
for three years, reflects the confusing political aims held by some of the rebels. Some
wanted to evict all the Catalans and create a purely Sicilian realm; some rejected
Frederick's rule but still proclaimed allegiance to James; others advocated a return of
the regions of the two main cities remained loyal, or else his reign
might never even have begun. Among these lords were the Aspello,
Bagnolo, Bizino, Ebdemonia, Marchisano, Mastrangelo, and
Pipitone families in the region around Palermo, and the Ansalone,
Mostacci, and Scordia families near Messina. Other crucial support
came from the Palmerio family in Licata, the Mari clan in Marsala,
the Gavaretta and Lanzalotto families near Salemi, and the Abbate
and Manuele families of Trapani. 12 On the day of his coronation,
Frederick installed more than 300 new knights in inland fiefs and
confirmed many of the older loyalists in new estates. Still others
received higher honorific titles. 13 Inevitably, many of these awards
went to his Catalan supporters. There was no way he could have
avoided rewarding them, for they had not only dared Angevin and
papal wrath on his behalf but had also stood with him in the strange
pseudo-war against Catalonia itself, and many of them had
consequently suffered from James's confiscation of their Iberian
lands. 14 Local touchiness about landed foreigners, however,
demanded restraint; and consequently the land tenures awarded to
Catalans came from the royal estates themselves rather than from
the confiscated or vacant "Sicilian" lands. 15
Angevin authority; and still others seem not to have wanted anything in particular except
to rebel against anyone who held the throne. See ACA Cartas James II, no. 10262 (24 May
1299)-
12
Vincenzo D'Alessandro, "La Sicilia dopo il Vespro," in XI Congresso 1, pp. 55-81 at 65.
13
By Frederick's time the juridical distinction between milites and barones had blurred. In the
Norman period the term milites referred strictly to urban knights, that is, to members of
the garrisons defending each of the demesne cities, whereas the term barones referred
exclusively to the rural knighthood, that is, to those who held agricultural estates in fief.
By the fourteenth century no such solid distinction existed. The title of "baron" implied
some sort of higher social standing than "knight," but it carried no clear meaning
in terms of legal privilege or economic status. Indeed the term "baron" appears only in
narrative sources like Speciale and in the hortatory sections of royal proclamations. In all
legal documents — court records, land grants, commercial contracts, etc. — all members of
the military caste, even those who held "baronial" rank, are described solely as milites.
The honorific use of the prefix "Don" or "Dominus" before a knight's name was random,
and its appearance implies nothing about the supposed distinction between "barons" and
"knights." "Counts," however, were a distinct group, and will be discussed below. For
some of these awards, see ASG Arch. Paterno di Raddusa, perg. 2 (Arcudaci); ASP Cane.
Reg. 1, fol. 48-48V (Polizzi); Protonotaro Reg. 2, fol. 316 (Roccella); and San Martino de
Spucches, La storia deifeudi 1, p. 1 (Caccamo), 1, p. 438 (Buccheri), 1, p. 500 (Butera), n,
p. 412 (Castelvetrano), v, p. 137 (Floridia and Monastero), and vi, p. 331 (Saline).
14
ACA Cane. Reg. 252, fol. 149, 165V, 167, 219; Cartas James II, 756, 9787,10207—9; Perg.
James II, no. 629, 641, 855-6,1899; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. 11, ch. 25.
15
San Martino de Spucches, La storia deifeudi 1, p. 43 (Caltabellotta and Colamonaci, in the
Val di Mazara, given to Berenguer Vilaregut), vi, p. 101 (Raccuja and Mandanici, in
the Val Demone, given to Berenguer d'Orioles), vn, p. 417 (Palumba, in the Val di Mazara,
The toll taken by the wars on the native knightly class meant that
many of the most prominent surviving lords enjoyed multiple
holdings, some of which gradually assumed the status of counties.
This was partly an echo of the great Norman fiefs (more consoli-
dated in southern Italy, more scattered in Sicily), but was also
partly a new phenomenon. Not all possessors of multiple estates
were counts. The Lancia family, for example, within a short time
held a vast sprawl of fief estates at Naro, Delia, Borgetto, and
Savoca in the west; at Caltanissetta, Ferla, Giarratana, Limbaccari,
Osino, Longarino, Bonfali, Mutaxati, Scala, Pantano Gallo, and
Taquida in the Val di Noto; and at Mongiolino, Ficarra, Galati,
and Longi in the Val Demone. Yet theirs was not a comital family.
Counties emerged from the formation of discrete territories of
linked estates en bloc, and those who held them possessed juris-
dictional rights considerably greater than those enjoyed by normal
barons. In later years, when the monarchy was virtually paralyzed
and had to dole out awards left and right in order to buy even a
month's peace, the number of comital titles and grants of criminal
and civil jurisdiction over fief lands increased dramatically; but
originally there were only four counties.
The two largest and most influential were the county of Geraci
and Golisano, held by the Ventimiglia family, and the county of
Modica and Mohac, held by their rivals the Chiaromonte clan. Less
important were the counties of Garsiliato, awarded in 1301 to
Riccardo Passaneto, and of Malta and Gozo, which passed in 1298
from Guglielmo di Malta to his wife Clara, and eventually to their
daughter Lucchina. When Lucchina married into the Montcada
family, this became the only Catalan-held county.16 Garsiliato
consisted of a concentrated network of estates in the Val di Noto,
stretching eastward from Mazzarino, through Palagonia, and
towards Lentini; good farmland, it earned virtually all its income
through cereals. Modica and Mohac, by contrast, was far grander. It
was made up of the towns of Scicli, Modica, Ragusa, Monterosso,
given to Francesc Vallguarnera), and vm 125 (Tripi, in the Val Demone, given to Roger
de Lauria).
16
On the Chiaromonte, Ventimiglia, and Montcada families, see Vincenzo D'Alessandro,
Michele Grana, and Marina Scarlata, "Famiglie medioevali siculo-catalane," Medioevo:
saggi e rassegne 4 (1978), 105-26. To my knowledge no specific study of the Passaneto
family exists. I recently discovered Guglielmo di Malta's last will, in which he bequeaths
the county to his wife; see ACA Perg. James II, no. 1184 (8 Feb. 1298).
and Comiso, plus all the lands between, in the Val di Noto. This,
like the nearby camera reginale, was one of the fastest growing
regions in the kingdom, a favorite site for western immigrants to
settle. The Chiaromontes farmed, collected rents, ran mills,
engaged in commerce, and derived administrative income from the
large populace over which they had jurisdiction. They also acquired
an important sphere of influence in Palermo when the old county of
Caccamo, situated just south of Termini in the Val di Mazara,
became theirs by marriage with the defunct Prefoglio family; rather
than continuing as a separate county, however, Caccamo was
incorporated by royal decree into the county of Modica and
Mohac.17 Lastly, the county of Geraci, in the Val Demone. This, the
site of Ventimiglia power, had the physical characteristics, at least,
of the isolated mountain barony of stereotyped image. Located high
in the Madonie mountains, it centered on the patrimonial estates
(fortified, both) at Geraci and at Castelbuono. From here they
dominated the local towns of Petralia Soprana and Petralia
Sot tana, Polizzi, Golisano (Collesano), and Isnello. Their influence
reached all the way into the busy harbor at Cefalii, where they
engaged actively in trade in grain, wine, textiles, skins, and salt-
meats.
In addition to altering the roster of those who held lands from the
crown, Frederick also changed the terms under which those lands
were held. The majority of his coronation statutes were of a type
with most such proclamations - that is, they were essentially
conservative reiterations of longstanding customs, combined with
a solemn vow to recognize and uphold established privileges. To be
sure, he made a show of condemning the barons' most egregious
abuses of recent years, such as the illegal charging of fraudulent
"taxes," of forage and pasturage fees from peasants transporting
their goods to markets; 18 the extortion of market-keepers, forcing
17
Bresc, Un monde, pp. 807-8.
18
Const, reg., ch. 37: "Statuimus, quod nullus comes, baro, feudatarius, castellanus vel
quicumque alius ausus sit exigere vel aliquod ab aliquo jure carnagii accipere pro
animalibus per forestas et loca et territoria eorum transeuntibus, etiam si per duos dies
et noctes duas in terris, forestis et locis eorumdem et territorii eorumdem morari et
ibidem pascua sumere aliqua causa contigerint. Si vero ultra dies et noctes duas ibidem
steterint, jus carnagii consueti et debiti exsolvatur. Sin autem dicti comes, baro,
feudatarius, castellanus vel aliquis alius, huius nostre constitutionis contemptor extiterit,
ille, a quo jus carnagii auferetur contra formam predictam, denunciet baiulo proximioris
loci nostri demanii. Qui, constito sibi de hoc per sacramentum denunciatoris ipsius,
them to sell only those goods from the farms and fields of the
"potentes viri";19 or cattle rustling.20 But these actions, important
as they were, had far less overall impact on landholders than did an
extraordinary royal compromise: the Volentes law.
It merits close attention.21 Interpretations of the law have
differed, but its key significance is clear: the feudal monopoly on
land established and so jealously preserved since the twelfth
century had broken. Henceforth, fiefs were alienable.
solvat eidem pro proventibus baiulationis sue pretium carnagii supradicti, vel
carnagiorum; quo facto, scribat idem baiulus per suas litteras justitiario regis, quod
statim poenam unciarum auri duarum pro quolibet carnagio ab auferente prefato exigat,
utilitatibus curie applicandarum. Qui justitiarii ad litteras dicti baiuli, quibus fidem
habere volumus, premissa omnia exequantur. Si vero dictus justitiarius vel baiulus in hoc
negligens fuerit, solvat poenam eandem. Et si forte dictus justitiarius a prefato auferente
poenam ipsam non posset exigere, infra viginti dies denunciare Nostre Excellence
teneatur. Et si non denunciaveret nostre Curie, poene nomine teneatur in duplum -
semper tamen dominis auferens ad poenam obligetur eandem."
19
Ibid., ch. 38: "Ne potentes viri negotiatione licita uti prohibeant impotentes, et diversis
oppressionibus et injuriis humiliores afficiant, sed unicuique vendendi res suas quando
voluerit, facultas sit libera; et ut omnibus in observatione justitie servetur equalitas,
nostre provisionis oculos convertentes, statuimus, ut nullus potens vel nobilis occulte vel
publice prohibeat vel procuret macellarios, tabernarios et alios aliarum rerum venditores
non prius vendere aliorum carnes, vinum vel res alias, nisi prius carnes, vinum et alie res
ipsorum potentium vendite fuerint et distracte. Que ad solutionem baiulorum et judicum
terrarum et locorum, ubi hoc perpetrari contigerit, volumus pertinere. Quod si aliquem
presentis nostre ordinationis invenerint contemptorem, de quo tarn per sacramentum
unius tantum macellariorum et tabernariorum et aliarum rerum venditorum quam
quemcumque alium modum, eos scire volumus veritatem, statim ab eo unam libram auri
exigant, pro parte nostre curie dicto baiulo persolvendam."
20
Ibid.y ch. 39: "Preterea quia dicti p o t e n t e s et nobiles, eorum audaciam et potentiam
in damnum et injuriam impotentium extendentes, et eorum negligentiam (seu
procuratorum suorum) aliorum sollicitudini preponentes, animalia prius conducta vel
locata per alios pro deferendis eorum vino, victualibus et aliis rebus auctoritate propria
capiebant, et cum ipsis animalibus eorum victualia, vinum et res alias deferri primitus
faciebant, quod grave gerentes non modicum et molestum, if omnino de cetero fieri
prohibemus, statuentes, quod, si aliquis deinceps facere premissa tentaverit, ad
solutionem auri unciarum quatuor poene nomine per baiulum et judices compellatur pro
parte curie solvendarum. E[t] si dicti baiulus et judices in premissis duobus casibus
fuerint negligentes, tantumdem poene nomine curie teneantur. Et si per potentiam
aliquorum eos ad hoc compellere forte non potuerint, denuncient justitiario regionis, qui
premissa exequatur et compleat; et si hoc dicto justitiario minime denunciare curaverint,
ad poenam teneantur eandem. Sin autem dictus justitiarius negligens fuerit in premissis,
ad duplicatam poenam curie teneatur."
21
Indeed, it has received more attention than any other piece of his legislation. See Bresc,
Un monde, pp. 871-5; Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 165-6; Gregorio, Considerazioni sopra la
storia di Siciliay bk. rv, ch. 4, pt. 126-7. See also D'Alessandro, Politico e societd nella Sicilia
aragonese, pp. 56-7; D'Alessandro, "La Sicilia dopo il Vespro," pp. 71-2; Mazzarese
Fardella, Ifeudi comitali, pp. 66-8. Contemporary jurists had something to say about it too;
see Trapani, Biblioteca Fardelliana MS 230, fol. 107V-109, for instance.
Since we desire that the counts, barons, and noblemen [of the realm] who
hold counties, baronies and fief lands from our Curia might be able to
profit more greatly from those [lands] . . . and to find relief, for the time
being, from their growing expenses without attacking our royal rights [as
established in earlier laws forbidding the alienation of fiefs] . . . we decree
that any count, baron, or nobleman in possession of a whole or partial fief
may pledge [as collateral], sell, donate, exchange, and relinquish or
bequeath it, or as much of it as he desires . . . to any person of equal or
greater social standing (excepting all churches and clerics) - and may do
so without the expressed permission or license of the royal court. However,
a full tenth of the sale price is to be paid to our fisc. Moreover, Our Royal
Majesty retains the right to first purchase of that fief, and at the agreed
upon price.
Subsequent clauses asserted the need for the new owner of the fief
to perform homage and fealty to the throne, to owe the usual
feudal services for the land, and to recognize all previously
established royal rights over it.22 By liberating fief lands in this way,
the king recognized not only his own dependence upon the good-will
22
Ibid., ch. 28: "Volentes igitur comites, barones, et nobiles comitatus, baronias, et feuda
tenentes a Curia nostra comitatibus, baroniis, et feudis ipsis longius solito posse gaudere,
et eorum emergentibus pro tempore necessitatibus absque nostrorum lesione jurius
subvenire, intuitu servitiorum, que dominis regibus Sicilie predecessoribus nostris, et
nobis, devotione non modica contulerunt et conferre poterunt in futurum, Constitutiones
divi augusti imperatoris F[r]ederici (proavi nostri predicti) - per quas feudorum
alienationes sunt inhibite — corrigentes, statuimus, quod comes, baro, nobilis seu
feudatarius quilibet feuda tenens a Curia nostra, seu quandam partem feudi, absque
permissione seu licentia Celsitudinis Nostre, feudum suum integrum (seu quotam
partem predictam) possit pignorare, vendere, donare, permutare et in ultimis
voluntatibus relinquere seu legare, et quolibet alienationis titulo transferre in unam
tantum, eandemque personam digniorem vel eque dignam, seu nobilem, sicut venditor
seu alienator idem extiterit, preterquam in ecclesias et ecclesiasticas personas.
Dummodo de pecunia venditionis ipsius integre decima fisco nostro solvatur. Ita tamen,
quod tempore venditionis feudorum huiusmodi Maiestati Nostre liceat, pro pretio
venditionis ipsius, convento inter contrahentes eosdem, dictum feudum emere. Ita quod,
si infra mensem unum a die, quo ad notitiam nostram pervenerit numerandum, feudum
predictum vel quotam partem pro dicto pretio non elegerimus emere et pretium solvere,
ut predicitur, venditio valeat et sit firma - nunquam per nostram Curiam in posterum
infringenda. Si vero feudum in permutatione devenerit et pecunia intervenerit in
premutatione predicta, quod de pecunia ipsa, in recognitionem nostri dominii in feudo
vendito seu forsitan permutato, decimam habeat fiscus noster; et Nostra Maiestas ab
emptore predicto recipiat fidelitatis et homagii tanquam a barone seu feudatario solitum
juramentum. Sed si alio, quam emptionis titulo, feudum predictum alienari contigerit, ut
predicitur, persona, in quam fuerit alienatum, infra annum (numerandum a tempore
alienationis ipsius) Nostram adeat Maiestatem et in manibus nostris fidelitatis et
homagii pro feudo predicto prestet juramentum. In his tamen et quibuscumque
alienationibus terrarum feudalium et quote feudorum servitiis et integris juribus nostre
Curie semper salvis, in feudo ipso indiviso et integro perdurante."
of the milites whom he installed or reconfirmed on the land, but

also the hard fact that such good-will would be short-lived without
allowing them means to adapt to altered economic circumstances
just as the communes possessed in their fairs and tax franchises.
Royal intentions were laudable and probably somewhat more
limited than the dramatic exchange of lands that followed.23 The
fact that he aimed to provide debt relief "for the time being"
suggests that he may have intended this as a temporary measure, a
one-time-only spur to investment. If so, his hopes were quickly
dashed. The court knew that it needed to take some sort of action
to revive the agricultural sector and to provide landholders better
access to market potentials, even if only to avoid jealousy over the
urban world's newly awarded fairs and tax franchises. On the
whole, this seemed the best approach. Even though it emphasized
the transfer of entire estates, Volentes, in allowing for the partition
of fiefs, opened the flood-gates on small-scale purchases, leasings,
and barterings of farms and vineyards throughout the realm.
Indeed, the vast resettlement of land tenures after the war would
have been impossible without this concession, for it is unlikely that
the government could have forced most of the barons to relinquish
the lands they had seized without granting them some means of
recouping their losses. Many were glad to release their grip on
usurped territories in return for the opportunity to consolidate,
through strategic purchases and trades, their holdings in a single
region. Government insistence on limiting alienations to persons of
equal or higher status soon relaxed, in practice, in the face of the
continued need to place somebody on the land; consequently lands
that were nominally feudal passed increasingly into the hands
of the urban nobility, well-to-do merchants, and government
officers.24 And thus, contrary to some views, the law must be
seen above all as an act of economic strategy, and not as social
engineering or political reward-paying to the high and mighty.25
23
See, for example, ASM Corporazione religiose, Provenienze incerte, perg. 130 (5 Nov.
1298); ASC Arch. Benedettino, Corda 107, fol. ioov— IOIV (7 April 1310); Corda 283,
fol. 295-297V (30 Oct. 1301); BCP MS Qq H 6, fol. 216-225V (2 July 1305).
24
These land transfers do not include individual peasant farmers, whose alodial farms (a
small percentage of the arable land overall) were centered in the Val Demone, the least
"feudalized" region in the kingdom.
25
D'Alessandro (see n. 21, above) is surely wrong in asserting that the law limited alienation
to whole fiefs only, and only between nobles of equal rank, in order to reward the major
aristocrats to whom the king was most indebted.
Volentes certainly triggered the new investment it sought, and
contributed directly to the creation of more concentrated spheres of
land settlement. Thus when Francesco Ventimiglia, for example,
was offered Alafranco di S. Basile's casalis at Pettineo, in the Val
Demone, in exchange for his own larger casalis at Barrafranca, in
the Val di Noto, he leapt at the opportunity since Pettineo lay close
to Francesco's other holdings in the Madonie mountains. The
exchange also benefited D. Alafranco since it gave him another
land tenure near his own patrimonial estate outside Lentini. 26 The
ability to direct funds into concentrated areas made farming more
profitable and allowed many lords to dominate local markets. Of
course, they still needed to put labor on the land. The trend towards
formation oilatifondi was already well established, and the baronial
resettlement advanced that process. It provided an organized,
efficient structure, offered some degree of social cohesion, and gave
peasants a measure of protection, in violent times, within a central,
fortified castellum or fortalicium. These attractions drew sufficient
laborers to keep the enlarged, though isolated, estates functioning.
Thus, for example, the Chiaromontes drew new farmers to Favara
and Montechiaro in the Val di Mazara, and to Gulfi in the Val di
Noto, and Macalda Palizzi successfully rebuilt the once ruined
casalis at Cianciana, near Agrigento. 27 Certain casales and terre grew
so large as to become small towns. The handful of sites that
actually gained in population over the course of the fourteenth
century, even as overall population fell, illustrate the trend. In Val
di Mazara, Favara's population increased from roughly 100 to 250
persons, between 1277 and 1374-6; Racalmuto from 100 to nearly
700; Giuliana rose from 200 to 2,000; and Ciminna grew from 500
to 1,700. In Val di Noto, Palazzolo increased from 100 to 1,000,
Monterosso from 150 to 650, Sortino from 650 to 1,600, Caltanissetta
26
D'Alessandro, Politico e societa nella Sicilia aragonese, p. 53; A C A Perg. Alfonso III,
maltratados, no. 9. For later Ventimiglia purchases in and around Pettineo, see ACA
Perg. Alfonso III, no. 791, 840, and 900. From his strongholds, Francesco was able to
plunder the Madonie region at will — and his importance to the king left him largely
immune from retaliation (which was one of Giovanni Chiaromonte's chief complaints
against him). See Giambruno, Tabulariodi S. Margherita diPolizzi, doc. 29 (29July 1326), 33
(2 July 1328), 43 (22 July 1331).
27
D'Alessandro, "La Sicilia dopo il Vespro," p. 71; Carlo Alberto Garufi, "Patti agrari e
comuni feudali di nuova fondazione in Sicilia, dallo scorcio del secolo XI agli arbori del
Settecento: studi storico-diplomatici,"i4rcAiS/.Sic, 3rd ser., 1 (1946), 31—113; 2 (1947), 7—131.
See also ASP Tab. Ospedale S. Bartolomeo, perg. 1 (29 Dec. 1305).
from 750 to 3,300, and Modica itself (the center of the

Chiaromonte's county) from 1,500 to over 3,000. Lastly, in Val
Demone, Petralia Sottana grew from a pre-Vespers population of
250 to a high of nearly 1,500, Petralia Soprana from 300 to 1,500,
Troina from 800 to 2,500, and S. Filippo d'Agiro from 2,800 to 3,100.
Such growth occurred at the expense of emptying the surrounding
countryside and leaving once thriving, if rather remote, villages and
farms desolate ruins.28
The lords - whether baronial, in the first half of the reign, or
urban and professional, in the second half- leased individual farms
orfieldsparceled out from the organized whole. These farms, called
massarie, measured anywhere from fifteen to forty hectares (six to
sixteen acres) and were worked by tenants or by hired laborers from
the village.29 The majority were engaged in cereal production. By
northern European standards, agricultural technology in Sicily
appeared backward, but was actually well suited to local
conditions.30 The stony terrain of the eastern half of the island,
where mountains predominate, and the heavy soil of the western
half (or at least of the arable portions of it) made slow oxen
preferable to horses for plowing. The island's rough wild grasses
also favored oxen, who survived better on coarse pasturage, and
made them considerably cheaper to keep. A horse, for example,
sold for up to five times the amount of an ox, and fared less well in
the countryside's intense heat and dryness.31 Moreover, that very
heat and dryness discouraged the deeper furrowing of the earth
associated with horse-drawn heavy plows, since such plowing
resulted only in the baking and crumbling of the topsoil. Hence
horses, of which there was a constant shortage anyhow, were
reserved for personal use by the milites.32 Mules, though, were
plentiful, sure-footed on the rugged terrain, and provided transport
for most farmers bringing their crops to market.
28
S e e t h e population figures reported, as for the d e m e s n e cities, in Epstein, An Island for
Itself, pp. 4 2 - 9 (Table 2.1).
29
Bresc, Un monde, pp. 115—16; Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 165—6.
30
Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 57—65 details the "abbondanza continua" a n d the
"ricchezza del paese" of the post-Caltabellotta economy.
31
A S P Notai defunti, Reg. 1, fol. 37 (27 Sept. 1323), D . R a i m o n d o d e Burdilio sells "equum
u n u m pili bay sauri" for 02.15.00; whereas in R e g . 2, fol. 61 (17 O c t . 1336) Lancia
Calanzono purchases two o x e n for 00.40.00.
32
ACA CartasJames II, no. 9981 (19 Feb. 1309), where the royal court sends representatives
as far as Castile and Portugal in order to find horses to bring to Sicily.
As on large feudal estates on the mainland, massari (the indi-
viduals who worked the massarie) shared tools and teams of
livestock, and benefited not only from mutual labor but also from
economies of scale: the ability to purchase seed and to transport
harvests in bulk. This, combined with the relatively low rents
charged by labor-dependent landlords, made farming profitable
despite the decreased general demand for food. The "continuous
abundance" of the post-Caltabellotta decade owed much to this
arrangement. It owed much, too, to the availability of a primitive
credit system.33 Lenders (often, though not necessarily always, the
landlord himself) advanced capital to the tenant farmer in the form
of land, livestock, seed, or tools, in return for a negotiated share in
the harvest. A second type of credit mechanism eventually emerged
in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries - the contralto di
meta - in which merchants loaned cash directly to the massari and
were repaid with grain at a price (meta, not meta) that included an
interest profit; but this played virtually no role in Frederick's
lifetime. Even during the profitable years the threat of default still
existed, which, considering as well the relative isolation of the
farms, made it likely that most of the lenders were well-known
figures to the borrowers, local people who "knew the borrower's
circumstances intimately and [were] able to enforce [their] claims
easily."34 Therefore while it is probably the case that most lenders
were the landlords themselves, it is almost certainly the case that
the lenders were Sicilians rather than foreigners - and hence the
eventual impoverishment of the rural world cannot be attributed to
foreign debt bondage any more than it can be attributed to the
collapse of foreign markets for, as we saw earlier, foreign trade
accounted for only 4 or 5 percent of Sicily's overall trade.
The vast stretches of open land created by population decline
offered an opportunity to increase involvement in animal
husbandry — either cattle, for meat, skins, and cheese, or sheep, for
wool. Relatively low operating costs (i.e. labor wages) compensated
for the high initial expense of establishing a herd, and hence for
those capable of making an original investment in livestock the
33
This system emerged in the second half of the thirteenth century; see discussion by
Abulafia, "II commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo Duecento," pp. IO-II; and Epstein,
An Island for Itself, pp. 166-7.
34
Epstein, An Island for Itself p. 167.
possibility of earning handsome rewards certainly existed,

especially in the first two decades of the century, when people had
more disposable income and could afford to supplement their diets
with animal products or to purchase greater quantities of wool and
leather goods. Some regional specialization can be identified.
Cattle predominated in the Val di Mazara; sheep in the Val di Noto.
Val Demone's livestock was divided roughly equally between cattle
and sheep, and also swine.35 Geographic and cultural distinctions
explain the pattern: the west, being the most heavily and
continually Arabized province, had a traditional disinclination to
swine-herding that the Muslim expulsion of the thirteenth century
was slow to overcome. Moreover, sheep require more water than do
cattle (not to mention the water power needed in the milling and
fulling of the wool they produce); hence Val di Noto and Val
Demone, with their superior rainfall and mountain drain-off, had
a natural advantage over the western half of the island for wool
production.36 Livestock raising certainly paled in significance when
compared to grain, yet the illustration of even one animal product
- cheese - suggests the extent of the structural changes taking
place in rural society. Between 1290 and 1299, according to notarial
registers, Sicily exported a total of some 27,500 kg. (30 tons) of
cheese to foreign markets; in the immediately succeeding decade,
however, exports increased five-fold, to 153,000 kg. (168 tons). 37 The
proliferation of sites with place-names rooted in the Arabic term
rahl - meaning a cattleman's station or shepherd's rest - provides
clear evidence of the growing popularity of animal husbandry. In
Val di Mazara: Rachali (near Partinico), Rachalgididi (one near
Trapani, another near Agrigento), Rachalmaymuni (near
Caltabellotta). In Val di Noto: Rachalmedica (near Avola), and
Rachalmeni (near Lentini). In Val Demone: Rachaliali (near
Polizzi), and Regalbuto ([Racalbuto], near S. Filippo d'Agiro). So
too does the growth of wool and wool cloth production which, on
account of the notably poor quality of the Sicilian product, never
overtook cotton textiles as a major manufacture, but did increase in
35
D ' A n g e l o , "Terra e uomini della Sicilia medievale" (see ch. 2, n. 12, above), pp. 82—4. H e
draws his figures from the agricultural tax levied by Peter in 1282.
36
Epstein, "The Textile Industry," is by far the best study of wool and cotton pro-
duction.
37
Bresc, Un monde, p. 569 (Table 147).
importance after 1302. Clearly the rural sector was seeking and
finding new ways to capitalize on the peace.
All of these changes were predicated, however, on reestablishing
order in the interior. The defense of the kingdom was at stake, too,
since many milites had been notably lax in supporting the cause in
the last years of the war. To that end the royal court insisted on the
regularization of land-tenure contracts and the faithful reckoning
of incomes, possessions, borders, and responsibilities. "For the good
of the republic, the preservation of peace, and the pursuit of
justice," the king wrote, "a carefully considered review of all feudal
goods and lands [shall] be initiated . . . and therefore we decree that
all baronies and fief lands shall be inventoried by the MRC - so that
at the next outbreak of war those holding fiefs might be more ready
and prompt in coming to the throne's aid." 38 He seems to have had
in mind the sort of registration of tenurial contracts undertaken by
Frederick IFs reintegratores in the 1230s. A few incidental references
to a central archive exist, so it is likely that such registers were in
fact compiled.39 This alone represents no mean achievement; even
greater, though, was the court's apparent success in persuading the
barons - those refractory toughs "presumed to be ignorant of the
law" - to recognize the authority of written charters as the final
arbiters of disputed rights and obligations. Unapologetic possession
by might, during the war, gave way to an insistence on possession by
right, afterwards, with surprising speed. When Da. Margarita di
Scordia's tenure of a casalis near Lentini, and the nature of her tax
obligation for it, was questioned in 1305, she instinctively went to
court with her personal records "and asserted that necessity
compelled her to present the aforesaid privilegia to the Royal
Majesty . . . in order to secure all her rights in regard to that casalis
. . . and since she fears that some evil might befall her in the
38
Const, reg., ch. 27: "lam Nostre Maiestatis d e m e n t i a circa Reipublice c o m m o d a oculum
sue provisionis advertens, ea, que circa tranquilli status ministerium et cultum justitie
necessaria visa sunt, constitutionibus salubribus atque benevolis declaravit; nunc autem
ad nobilium compendia se benigne convertens, benevolam provisionem constituit,
bonorum feudalium et feudorum reintegrationem perpensius subsequi in nostrorum
augmentum fidelium juxta formam hereditarii regni nostri. Eapropter baronias et feuda,
de quibus servitium nostro debetur demanio, reintegrare per nostram Guriam in forma
predicta decrevimus, et mandamus, ut opportunis guerrarum temporibus feuda ipsa
tenentes paratiores et promptiores ad nutum Nostre Maiestatis existant; sic enim
utrumque tempus bellorum et pacis recta dispositione gubernatum videbitur, ut decet
Regiam Maiestatem."
39
A C A Perg. Alfonso III, no. 595 (Nov. 1331), 631 (May 1332).
transmission and presentation [to the royal archives] of her

privilegia, she requests to have them redacted in public issue."40 She
had worse luck in November 1315, when the failure to locate an
original charter or registered copy resulted in her loss of full rights
to a network of vineyards, fields, a taverna, several castles, and a
cemetery near Catania that she had also claimed as hers.41 Such
behavior clearly marks a break with past belligerence such as that
shown prior to 1302 by Enrico di Ventimiglia, when he asserted his
right to a casalis usurped from the bishop of Agrigento solely
because he needed it more than the bishop did. But even he
eventually came around. Pressing his claim to the woodland at
Caronia, which had been stolen from him during the Angevin years,
yet unable to present any documentation to support himself, Enrico
agreed to let the issue be settled by an investigation "among the
old and honest men of the region" by the royal secretus and magister
procurator, Baldovino di S. Angelo.42
With tenurial order somewhat restored, or at least with its
problems brought into focus, the attempt to curb lawlessness and
to enforce feudal law continued apace. The fast developing concen-
tration of fiefs among the grander baronial families concerned the
court, but there was little that could be done about it; for the time
being, it generated new investment in the land and paid off
political debts. The lesser barons were more troublesome, since
their scattered holdings left them more vulnerable to economic
downturn and hence made them more likely to rise up in protest.
The best the court could do was to keep a close watch on royal
rights, influence or dissuade potentially dangerous marriage
alliances, and enforce the laws on childless or intestate vassals, all
40
A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 3446 (3 March 1305): "et exposuit, quod, cum sibi necessario
expediat predicta privilegia Sacre Maiestati Regie presentare seu facere presentari pro
ab e a d e m Sacra Regia Maiestate ipsius casalis juribus omnibus integre obtinendis, et
dubitet exponens prefata ne forte in transmissionem et presentationem privilegiorum
ipsorum (quod absit) e x privileges ipsis sinistrum aliquod eveniret, propter quod velit et
cupiat exponens predicta privilegia in formam publicam habere redacta."
41
A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 3413 (22 Nov. 1315).
42
Baldovino's investigation decided the matter in Enrico's favor, and consequently a new
charter was issued, awarding the woodland to Enrico, and as a precaution no fewer than
four separate copies were made of it. See Mazzarese Fardella, Tabulario Belmonte^
doc. 10-12. It should be noted that Enrico was not always so patient with the law. When
his claim to a vineyard outside Cefalu seemed unlikely to succeed, he hired a group of
thugs to assault his rival claimant's witnesses, to prevent them from presenting their
testimony at court; see ASP Tab. Cefalu, perg. 78 (12 April 1307).
in the hope of eventually regaining control of the estates and
reawarding them to milites more loyal to the crown or on a sounder
economic footing.43 All of these actions indicate the court's
awareness of the continued economic fragility of the interior.
Attempts could be made to organize land tenure in a more efficient
manner, to invest in new crops and herds, to curb political unrest,
and to establish a central, recognized register of holdings, rights,
and duties, but so long as the Mediterranean economy in general
continued to decline and the rural population, in consequence,
abandoned the land in favor of the coastal communities, danger
lurked throughout the interior. 44
That potential danger turned real with the crisis of 1311-13. Crop
failures were not uncommon in medieval Sicily, but this was worse
than most because the recurrence of the poor harvests not only
caused all reserves to be depleted but also eroded the capital
available for other investment. Landlords who had advanced the
usual credit to tenants - cash, livestock, seed, and tools - needed at
least some return. Most could survive a single year of bad yields, but
to endure three consecutive years without compensation was too
much, especially when the famine coincided with the new demands
placed on the realm by the German alliance and the Athenian
duchy. Whether the result of bad weather, bad luck, or neglect of
storage or distribution mechanisms, a shortage of grain plagued the
kingdom at the very moment when its needs were greatest, which
threw the entire economy into a tumble. 45 Making matters worse,
the refuge granted in 1314 to the Franciscan Spirituals in flight from
the mainland made Sicily a pariah just at the point when it had
43
A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 498 (25 April 1295), 4051 (20 Feb. 1323); A S P Tab. Ospedale S.
Bartolomeo, perg. 1 (29 Dec. 1305).
44
T h e feudal services owed o n these lands, as we shall soon see, varied considerably, but a
fee of 20.00.00 annually was not u n c o m m o n . Although these funds obviously were directed
to a great num ber of expenses, they provided a m e a n s of support for many of the migrants
from the interior to the coast. Since few o f the landholding milites actually fought for the
king after 1302, their military service w a s c o m m u t e d into cash payments that were
directed t o supporting the naval forces that now formed the chief e l e m e n t in defense. At
the base pay o f 00.00.03 per day given t o sailors and workers in t h e naval forces, the
knight's fee of a single miles, at 20.00.00, could pay the entire yearly w a g e s of eleven m e n .
It is wrong, of course, to assume a direct and complete transfer of feudal fees to maritime
wages; but it is significant that at no time in Frederick's reign, even in the difficult 1320s
and 1330s, was the government ever incapable of raising enough recruits to fill out a
fleet. If the money was there, so too were the volunteers. Awareness of this opportunity
doubtless drew at least some figures from the interior to the coast.
45
See ch. 1, n. 1, above.
started to recover from the blow. The first complaints of difficulties

emerged as early as June 1311, and by July of that year a number of
milites - who could not meet their expenses or who refused to serve
in the king's peninsular campaign while their estates were failing
at home - broke into open revolt.46 Within a year other barons -
generally those who held smaller fiefs, or scattered multiple
holdings - began for the first time to sell their lands for ready cash
to merchants from the demesne cities. 47 A new round of rural
violence ensued; knights once again began to seize whatever lands
they needed to survive, and even a dispute over a single cow could
trigger a murder. 48 One miles whose usurpation was condemned by
the local court reverted to old ways, stormed into the officials' hall
"armed with bow and sword" and asserted his rights as he under-
stood them, claiming, as he wrapped his hands around the bailiffs
throat, that he was entitled to whatever he needed to survive. "By
what right have you ordered that I may not see to it that those lands
are worked? I won't give them up on any account . . . I'm not a fool
like those other [barons] who come in here and [merely] file
complaints!"49 There was no mistaking the disdain such people felt
for the supposed new order of things, once that order failed to
deliver.
The absence of notarial registers or other detailed commercial
records makes it impossible to gauge the extent of the economic
harm occasioned by the crop failure and the violence it triggered.
But numerous indirect clues exist. 50 By summer 1311 the king's most
important backers, both urban and rural, began to press him for
greater privileges. The bishop of Cefalii, for example, suddenly
46
A S C Arch. T r i g o n a della Floresta, vol. rv, fol. 93 (18 J u l y 1311).
47
A S C Arch. B e n e d e t t i n i , C o r d a 283, fol. 299-301 (7 M a y 1312).
48
Ada curie 1, doc. 46 (20 May 1312), N i n o Maccaione grabbed a vineyard belonging to Nicola
Muschetto in Favara Vecchia; 64 (3 Aug. 1312), Nicola Coppola seized "quoddam casale
habitatum vocatum 'Sanctus Stephanus,' quod est m a g n u m pheudum quaternatum"
near Bivona; doc. 65 (19 Aug. 1312), Nicola Taguili usurped a "castrum et terram . . . quod
est p h e u d u m quaternatum, cuius cognitio principaliter spectare asseritur ad M a g n a m
[Regiam] Curiam" located near Aderno.
49
Ibid., doc. 4 6 (20 May 1312): "Quare mandasti, quod non facerem laborari in predictis
terris? . . . Ego non dimittam pro aliqua defensa, quin faciam laborari terras predictas!"
tenens manus in collo equi b a i u l i . . . [et] irruens contra judicem . . . dixit versus e u m "Tu
mentitus es per gulam! Quia e g o non sum fatuus supervenientibus quampluribus aliis
fidelibus regiis tune ibi presentibus et ipsum de premissis increpantibus." T h e Latin of
the court record no doubt fails to capture some of the color of what was actually said.
50
See especially the documents in Acta curie 1,passim for the economic and social difficulties
in Palermo caused by the famine.
demanded that his church be given a waiver from having to pay all
local gabelle and assizes to the local universitas.51 A new wave of
vacancies appeared among feudal holdings, which the king rushed
to fill; presumably, these arose from the abandonment of various
fiefs or from the throne's confiscation of them after their previous
tenant had staged a rebellion. 52 Trade privileges were extended to
merchants from Perpignan, allowing them to export grain and
other commodities at favorable rates, in the hope of regaining the
international market share lost by the inevitably higher prices
caused by decreased production. 53 The king, lamenting the "various
and diverse debts" he had suddenly accumulated, had to refuse aid
to Barcelona's Sardinian campaign for the first time. 54 Labor and
capital shortages led to a frustrating repetition of the problem.
Another poor harvest occurred in 1316, followed by failures in 1322,
1323,1324,1326,1329, and 1335. Even before the last cycle of famines
had set in, we can see the result in the market place: by 1322 the
prices of barley, oats, and wheat had doubled from what they had
been in 1310, which caused Sicilian grains to lose market share even
in the remaining years of good yields. 55
All of this accelerated the movement of peasants to the cities and
undermined the security of the more marginal and vulnerable
landlords. Seigneurial incomes dropped continually throughout
the 1320s and fell quite dramatically in the 1330s. Even Francesco
Ventimiglia, one of the wealthiest nobles, faced a severe drop in his
income; an end-of-year reckoning of the receipts and costs on
his extensive county of Geraci, made by his magister procurator and
magister rationalis in early 1322 (for the fourth indictional year, from
1 September 1320 to 31 August 1321), showed that his net profit
amounted to only 64.15.oo.56 Had it not been for the income he
51
ASP Tab. Cefalu, perg. 87 (20 July 1311).
52
ASP Cane. Reg. 2, fol. 90-90V (10 Feb. 1312).
53
Ibid., fol. 96—g6v (31 M a y 1313).
54
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10222 (13 Jan. 1315).
55
Ibid., no. 9961; GG, doc. 130: "quod victualia sunt modo in dupplo quam consueverint cariora."
56
Mazzarese Fardella, Tabulario Belmonte, doc. 17 (1 Feb. 1322). This document notes
Francesco's review and approval of his accounts' report. The report itself filled two
volumes, one devoted to "locationum, cabellarum et introitus pecunie, victualium,
leguminum, lini, animalium, gallinarum, ovorum et aliarum rerum" [or Accounts
Receivable], and the other devoted to "totius exitus sui predicte pecunie, victualium,
leguminum, lini, animalium, gallinarum, ovorum et aliarum rerum" [or Accounts
Payable]. See summary of the data in Bresc, Un monde, p. 676 (Table 170); and discussion
in Mazzarese Fardella, Ifeudi comitali di Sicilia, pp. 109-16.
derived from his juridical lordship over the county- that is, his fees
for supplying justice, providing mills and ovens, etc., which together
represented just over one-quarter of his income - his accounts
would have been deeply in arrears. In other words even this
powerful landlord, with his vast, centralized estates on some of the
most fertile land available in the realm, with his diversified
production of grain, wine, saltmeat, cheese, wool, and leather,
found that his agricultural income amounted to less than 75 percent
of his annual expenditures. The drop in the market value of farms
was quite astonishing. The two linked fief estates of Feminino and
Veneroso, near Castrogiovanni, had overall revenues of 85.00.00 in
1321; the following year they were bartered for a castellum near
Cefalu whose income was less than half that amount.57 The 1322
crop failure caused so widespread a famine that all grain exports
were halted.58 Few barons enjoyed the variety of resources available
to the grander barons, and hence faced a simple though harsh
ultimatum: either find new sources of revenue or abandon the land.
Some sought these new revenues by usurping lands that promised
higher returns. Others demanded from the government the right
to exercise over their fiefs precisely those lordship rights that
great magnates like the Ventimiglias and Chiaromontes wielded
over theirs.59 Still others, as we have already discussed, moved
aggressively into the cities to assume administrative, military, and
police duties.
All of these options had deleterious effects on the countryside.
Baronial extortion of bannitum vel forjudicatum — a bogus fee
demanded by landlords in recognition of their de facto (though
seldom de jure) possession of merum et mixtum imperium - became
commonplace in the highlands where the very remoteness of their
lands made it as easy for them to escape punishment as it made it
difficult for their victims to escape their demands. They even held
government officials for ransom.60 When the Angevins invaded in
57
Bresc, Un monde, p. 879; ASP Tab. Cefalu, perg. 95 (5 Sept. 1321); Mazzarese Fardella,
Tabulario Belmonte, doc. 16. Their decline continued unabated into the fifteenth century;
in 1433 their joint revenues amounted to only 15.00.00.
58
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10531 (31 Jan. 1323).
59
See, for example, ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 154 (25 May 1328) in which
Frederick awards various new lordship rights and revenues to D. Filippo Curto, over a fief
at Ravennusa.
60
The crown condemned this practice in 1325, and imposed a penalty of 100.00.00 upon
anyone guilty of such extortion. See Const. Castrogiovanni, ch. 108: "Curantes, ut regnum
1325-6, many knights demanded money in return for letting
peasants take refuge behind their walls. Not that the barons
were not also the victims of extortion. The demesne officials of
Castrogiovanni, for example, took advantage of the chaotic
conditions to assert the right to impose new taxes on local fief
holders.61 In the end, economic collapse and war drove so many
people from the land, both peasants and milites alike, that the king
appointed an entire new corps of feudal-relief collectors specially
empowered and solely devoted to impound the assets of any estate,
large or small, in order to raise the revenue needed to pay the
escalating costs of the kingdom's foreign wars. Too often, the court
complained, barons had escaped their relevium duties "via sham
contracts" - that is, by alienating all or part of their lands to absent
family members (usually younger sons or brothers who had gone off
to sea or to service in one of the urban comitive) who technically bore
the onus of paying the duty. Henceforth, if the relief was not paid in
full at the proper time, the king's new officers simply confiscated
whatever tools, equipment, animals, foodstuffs, linen, manu-
factured goods, cash, or valuables they found on the premises. 62
There is no indication that such heavy-handed measures produced
anywhere near the revenues the government needed; depopulation
and decline had made that all but impossible. Instead, they left only
Sicilie quietum pacatumque regamus, quod non de facili obtinebimus, nisi fautores et
receptatores delinquentium (sine quibus diutius malefici latere non possunt) acriter
puniamus, presenti constitutione sancimus, lit nullus regni nostri nobilum — sive sit
comes, baro, miles, burgensis vel quicumque alius — bannitum vel forjudicatum a
quibuscumque officialibus nostris . . . receptare vel occultare audeat vel presumat, nee
occultatos vel receptatos deinceps detineat. Transgressores vero presentis laudabilis
sanctionis infrascriptis poenis sine venia feriantur: comes videlicet vel baro magnus,
si contrafecerit, in unciis auri centum ipso facto multetur; ceteri vero in unciis
quinquaginta; fiscalibus commodis applicandis."
61
Acta curie in, doc. 76 (15 Aug. 1326). By this time, the Angevin invasion had turned inland,
driving still more people from the land and making it all but impossible for the central
administration to keep track of, much less to rectify, such actions as Castrogiovanni's.
62
Const. Castrogiovanni, ch. n o : "Eorum fraudibus obviantes, qui jura relevii pro comitatibus,
baroniis et feudis aliis ab antiquis constitutionibus nobis debiti per simulatos contractus
evitare nituntur, et cupientes in posterum, ne eorum machinationibus nostre Curie
damnum aliquod irrogetur, perpetuo edicto sancimus et consulte decernimus, quod, si
comites, barones et alii feudatarii comitatus, baronias et feuda in capite tenentes a Curia,
donationis titulo inter vivos, vel causa mortis seu divisionis causa, ipsa in filios vel in alios
eis ab intestato successuros alienaverint, si quis pleno jure sit adeptus possessionem
ipsorum ex causis predictis, jus relevii Curie nostre debitum incontinenti solvere
teneatur, non expectata morte donantis vel dividends." For two examples, see ACA Perg.
James II, no. 4388 (27 Aug. 1327); and Acta curie v, doc. 2 (10 Sept. 1328).
a lingering resentment and anger, one that flared into full-fledged

rebellion once it was sparked by Giovanni Chiaromonte's revolt.
Despite a promising start, therefore, the rural world after mid-
reign began to resemble the violent, impoverished, desolate place
of common image. The civil wars that followed Frederick's death
did far more damage to the countryside than the Vespers had ever
done, and might very well have spelled the permanent ruin of the
interior; but the positive changes commenced after 1296 - and
especially after 1302 - in freeing the real estate market, realigning
land tenure in order to allow a more efficient organization of agri-
cultural investment, the large-scale introduction of new crops and
herds, and the lowering of tariffs in order to preserve overseas
market share, all served to help the rural world recover even from
the savagery of the internecine strife from 1337 to 1396. Intimations
of the land's latent potential, and of the changes that had taken
place in it over the course of Frederick's reign, are visible in a
controversial and troublesome document reprinted in Rosario
Gregorio's eighteenth-century anthology of narrative sources and
discussed many times since.63 It is a detailed list of baronial fief
holders in Frederick's kingdom and of the feudal dues owed to the
central court. It appears here as table 4 (pp. 316-26).
The list presents difficulties at every turn. First is the problem of
its dating. 6 4 Gregorio entitled it a Descriptiofeudorum sub rege Federico
and found the original material in a still older volume, published in
Rome in 1692, called Sicilia nobilis.65 He dates the list to 1296, but
this is impossible since Queen Eleanor appears in the catalog and
she was not on the scene until early 1303. At the same time, listed
among Eleanor's possessions is the terra of Avola; but Avola was
awarded to Prince William in 1336 as part of his dowry. These, then,
63
RGBS 11, pp. 464-70.
64
This has received m u c h attention. See Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 293-7, for full dis-
cussion and notes.
65
Bresc, Un monde, pp. 670—1 (Table 169) s u m m a r i z e s the data by location. H e has corrected
the data provided by Gregorio by comparison with a seventeenth-century manuscript in
Palermo, Biblioteca della Societa siciliana di storia patria, MS Fitalia I B 2, fol. 237—47.
For my own table, I have organized the material by fief holder, in order to provide a
prosopographical approach. Gregorio's source was the extremely rare Sicilia nobilis sive
nomina et cognomina comitum, baronum et feudatariorum regni Siciliae anno I2g6 sub Federico II
vulgo III et anno 1408 sub Martino II Siciliae regibus eruta e celeberrimo Musaeo excellentissimi
domini Don Antonii Amato de Cardona principis Galati, ducis civitatis Caccabi, domini Asti, equitis
Alcantarae, etc., by Bartolomeo Muscia di Caccamo (Don Bartholomaeus Muscia
Caccabensem) (Rome, 1692).
would appear to be the termini a quo and ad quern. Pettineo appears as
a fief of Francesco Ventimiglia's, and since he acquired that site in
1334, it would appear that the catalog indeed represents the
tenurial picture in the last two or three years of Frederick's reign;
yet Cefala (in the Val di Mazara near Vicari) is assigned to Nicola
Abbate, from the powerful baronial family traditionally centered in
the region of Trapani. Nicola sold the fief to Giovanni Chiaromonte
in 1329. Hence a somewhat earlier date seems warranted. But if the
data presented are problematic, so too are the data omitted. Early
in 1327, for example, Nicola Abbate and his brother Enrico settled a
long-fought dispute with another baron, Riccardo Manuele, over
the lordship of Culcasi, with both sides agreeing to share the tenure
-yet Culcasi fails to appear among either Nicola or Enrico Abbate's
holdings, and Riccardo Manuele himself is not included among the
king's milites.66 Culcasi itself appears nowhere in the list. Neither do
the names or the holdings of the Pinzaguerra family, headed by two
brother barons, D. Lamberto and D. Nicola, who left behind them a
variety of estates, scattered fields and vineyards, urban dwellings,
and other goods that took five years to divide between their
contending heirs.67 To make matters worse, other sites appear
more than once, under different lords with different servitia
assigned to them. Avola is credited to both Queen Eleanor and
to Leone di S. Stefano. Giardinello appears under the names of
Gandolfo Sofudi (who owed for it and a second casalis called
Paranna a combined servitium of 20.00.00) and of Andrea Tagliavia
(who owed for it alone a. servitium of 50.00.00). Chipulla, a fief near
Castrogiovanni, also apparently served two masters: Filippo
Castellano and Federico Mohac. The duplication of place-names
explains some of these difficulties; medieval Sicily had two sites
called Favara, for example, one near Agrigento and one near
Caltagirone. Nevertheless, the list's shortcomings are evident.
Even with its problems, however, the descriptio feudorum has
much to teach us. Adjusting the figures to discount as many clear
66
Mazzarese Fardella, Tabulario Belmonte, doc. 19 (15 June 1344, containing the text of record
from 27 Feb. 1327).
67
Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 29,33,43. The years of litigation were
1326-31. Given the nature of the descriptiofeudorum and the troubled state of the kingdom
at that time, it is all the more surprising that these lands were omitted. The king's
reintegratores and relevium officials, one would expect, would be all the more assiduous in
recording the dues owed to the crown for these lands, once the possession of them was
resolved.
redundancies as possible, it puts the king's regular feudal income at

just over 20,000 ounces.68 A large sum, this still represented less
than a fourth of the crown's overall revenues. Direct demesnal
income and urban levies counted for much more. Moreover, the
descriptio catalogs only baronial fiefs, which were rapidly declining in
value, and omits all ecclesiastical estates and all non-landed fiefs
such as government offices, annuities, and privileged commercial
rights and holdings. Of those 20,000, over 10 percent derive from
holdings which cannot be identified with any degree of certainty.
The remaining 18,000 ounces clearly show the decline of the Val di
Mazara in relation to the two eastern valli. Val di Noto, by quite a
long lead, provided the most income for the throne - nearly
7,800.00.00. Val Demone supplied over 6,200.00.00. And Val di
Mazara accounted for only 5,900.00.00, a clear indication of the
decline in cereal production and the rural labor force. A second
feudal levy, in 1343, shows that the decline charted here only
worsened after Frederick's death; it gives total feudal revenues as
only 16,000 ounces - a drop of 20 percent in only four years.
The servitia covered a broad range, from the 03.00.00 owed by
Manfredi Cardona for his single casalis at Varnina to the 1,200.00.00
owed by Matteo Sclafani and the 1,500.00.00 that Francesco
Ventimiglia was responsible for, for his Val di Noto holdings. Two
striking features of the list are the prominence of the terre - that is,
the large rural townships that grew up around fortified estates at
the expense of the abandoned countryside - and the number of
merchants and professionals who made up the milites. Nineteen
sites are formally designated as terre and together represent over
4,500.00.00, nearly one-fourth of the total. Their distribution tells
much of the story. Only two terre appear in the Val di Mazara:
Castronovo and Caltavuturo, under the control of Raffaele Doria
(vice-admiral of the realm) and the heirs of Federico Manna,
respectively. Sixteen terre dotted the Val di Noto, by contrast. The
reason for this is simple. Such large settlements required greater
and more varied production of agricultural produce and manu-
factured goods in order to survive, and these were to be found only
in the east. Larger settlements also needed larger reserves of water,
which was found most easily citra Salsum.
68
The actual amount was no doubt larger, owing to lacunae in the catalog — most notably the
unfortunate omission of the amount owed by Giovanni Chiaromonte.
Terre or not, fully three-fourths of feudal dues came from indi-
vidual large holders paying at least 100.00.00 annually. Many of
these figures came from the merchant and professional classes
rather than the traditional military caste, and they provide further
evidence of the growing cost of maintaining rural lands. Russo
Rosso, scion of the great Messinese family, appears here as lord of
the casales of Scordia Sottana and Luppino, both in the Val di Noto.
His possessions included unspecified rights (jura) at Noto and
Aidone as well; these were probably export licenses or tax
immunities. In the 1320s and 1330s the king, no longer able to
reward supporters with lands since to many those lands were no
longer desirable, began to award larger numbers of the juris-
dictional authorities and commercial privileges suggested here. 69
Since well-to-do Catalans figured large among urban-dwellers, they
appeared with increasing frequency as landholding milites. No fewer
than nine of the fifty-seven landlords owing 100.00.00 or more
annually were Catalans or Aragonese: Ferrer d'Abella, Blase
d'Alago, Sang d'Arago (Frederick's bastard), Joan d'Arago (Sang's
son), Guillem Castellar, Guillem Ramon de Montcada, Simon de
Montcada, Montaner Peris de Sosa, Garcia Eiximenis de Yvar. Still
other Catalans, such as Josep Amat, the lord of three Val di Mazara
casales near Caltabellotta, figured among smaller fief holders. In all,
approximately one out of every seven landlords was Catalan or
Aragonese, by Frederick's death - a situation that was unavoidable,
given the need for investment in the falling rural market, but which
was untenable to many Sicilians who found themselves once again
in the very position that the Vespers revolution had attempted to
overturn — that of working the land for foreign landlords who
profited from special privileges granted by a foreign king while
siphoning off the profits of the land to foreign shores.
The changes that took place in rural life during Frederick's reign
were sweeping and, like most such periods of dramatic change,
much that occurred was for the better and much was for the worse.
69
ASC Arch. Trigona della Floresta, vol. rv, fol. 83 (21 May 1320), in which Frederick rewards
D. Enrico Trigona for his service against the rebels who rose against the throne when the
economic troubles of 1311 began. Unable to give Enrico more land, he grants instead the
right to export 500 salme of grain annually from the port at Sciacca without paying duties;
grant lasts until Enrico's death (which came in 1340). For other examples, see ASP Cane.
Reg. 1, fol. 29, 30V-31, 32, 32V.
Clearly the most important single phenomenon was the steady

depletion of the rural labor force. Most everything else that took
place, from vallo to vallo, was in some regard a response to or
consequence of the challenge of depopulation. Like urban society,
the rural world showed a surprising resiliency and adaptability,
once the economic fetters on it had been removed by Volentes. The
subsequent reorganization of the baronial world not only helped
put an end to civil strife, but also allowed for more cost-effective
management of the land through the gradual formation of
counties, centralized latifondi, and terre that possessed greater
economic diversity and therefore viability. The influx of investment
capital after 1296, and the clearly discernible increase in optimism
throughout society after 1302, sparked a heady if short-lived
economic boom in which cereal production increased and new
ventures in animal husbandry and viticulture began. Much of this
innovation and centralization came at the expense of the remoter
areas of the countryside, many of which emptied of nearly all
human habitation and became arid wastes. Curiously, while
depopulation and land abandonment became quite serious
problems by the 1320s, they may have helped inadvertently to
alleviate the destruction caused by the Angevin rampage of 1325-6.
The invaders, forced to march for dozens of miles at a stretch
without crop fields, food stores, animal herds, or maintained
aqueducts to sustain them, fell victim to starvation, thirst, and
exposure much more than they suffered at the hands of Simon de
Valguarnera, who pursued them with his own lean comitiva.
The decline of the rural economy, and of the delicate social
equilibrium that had temporarily appeared after 1302, began with
the concatenation of disasters that occurred from 1311 to 1314. Crop
failures meant, of course, not only insufficient food for the
populace, but also for the herds of cattle, sheep, and swine that
many landlords had recently invested in quite heavily, often on
borrowed funds. This blow, though severe enough, was exacerbated
by the contemporaneous diplomatic misfortunes and mishandlings
that brought on a dramatically increased public debt, cost the
island the majority of its continental markets, and left the realm a
pariah on account of its decision to follow the evangelical path. The
combination of vastly heightened financial demands and of
suddenly interrupted, if not curtailed, commercial and feudal
revenues, was a blow from which rural Sicily did not recover until
the fifteenth century. By that point, however, the savage baronial
struggles to dominate the interior had wholly altered the social
makeup and organization of rural life, and permanently altered the
relation of the interior to the coastal society. In sum, the weak-
nesses that had always existed in, and had always given shape to,
inland Sicily - weaknesses that had long lain dormant or partially
obscured under the often ruthless feudal centralization and
efficiency of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries - emerged in full,
dreadful flower in the fourteenth. Even the economic rebound of
the fifteenth century could not undo the damage that had been
done. By the time of Frederick's death, the inland world was a world
apart - still capable of producing foodstuffs and raw material for
textiles, and of generating considerable wealth for those in control
of that production. But demographic change and the weighty,
decayed feudalism of the great barons had created a world in which
power was held firmly in the hands of the strong - a group of
people determined to preserve their own petty princedoms, to mete
out justice within their own territories and according to their own
designs, and to reap all the benefits thereof.
CHAPTER 5
The religious scene: piety

and its problems
Church life, church-state relations, and popular piety in

Frederick's Sicily took place amid intense and opposing pressures:
local churches fueled by parochial rivalries, a distant and disdained
papacy intent on asserting its spiritual authority and restoring
ecclesiastical discipline, a king eager to promote his allies and
broaden the base of his political strength while furthering his
evangelical scheme for purifying the realm, and an illiterate
populace torn between its ardent piety, its confusion over wide-
spread heterodoxy, and its growing hostility to clerical authority.1
The clergy, especially the higher prelates, stood to gain the most
from a return to peace. They had traditionally exerted a pervasive
influence on everyday Sicilian life. Collectively they represented
one of the largest landholders in the realm, with fewer yet larger
estates in Val di Mazara, where a bound peasantry could still be
1
The most crucial source for ecclesiastical history in medieval Sicily is Rocco Pirri, Sidlia
sacra disquisitionibus et notitiis illustrata, ed. Vito Maria Amico, 2 vols., 3rd edn. (Palermo,
1733), cited hereafter as RPSS. See also Filippo Cagliola, Almae sidlianensis provindae
ordinis Minorum Conventualium S. Frandsd manifestationes novissimae sex explorationibus
complexae (Venice, 1644), reprinted with an introduction by Filippo Rotolo. O.F.M., as
SidliaJrancescana: secoli XIII-XVII (Palermo, 1984), Gollana Franciscana, vol. 1. Important
early studies include Mercedes van Heuckelum, Spiritualistische Stromungen an den Hofen von
Aragon und Anjou wahrend der Hohe des Armutsstreites (Berlin, 1912), Abhandlungen zur
Mittleren und Neueren Geschichte, vol. xxvm; and Karl Leopold Hitzfeld, Studien zu den
religibsen und politischen Anschauungen Friedrichs III von Sizilien (Berlin, 1930; rpnt. 1965). The
bulk of published documents appear in the DSSS series: in addition to Silvestri (see ch. 1,
n. 14, above) and Giambruno (see ch. 1, n. 13, above), see I diplomi delta cattedrale di Messina
raccolti da Antonino Amico, publicati da un codice delta Biblioteca comunale di Palermo, ed. Raffaele
Starrabba (Palermo, 1887-90), 1st ser., vol. 1; Catalogo illustrato del tabulario di S. Maria
Nuova in Monreale, ed. Carlo Alberto Garufl (Palermo, 1902), 1st ser., vol. xix; and Rollus
rubeus: Privilegia ecclesie Cephaleditane a diversis regibus et imperatoribus concessa, ed. Corrado
Mirto (Palermo, 1972), 1st ser., vol. xxix.
186
The religious scene 187
found in places, and with more numerous but smaller holdings in
the two eastern valli. With their extensive privileges the churches
also held prominent positions in trade and commerce, enjoying a
number of lucrative monopolies on such things as tunny fishing in
Cefalu harbor. 2 These assets had suffered greatly at Angevin hands
prior to 1282 and at baronial hands afterwards, which caused the
church to view itself as the maligned and battered bulwark of
stable society. Thus, when the higher prelates gave their approval
to the Catalan dynasty, and especially to Frederick's disputed
succession to James, they assumed - in their own minds at least -
the aura of national saviors. Consequently they found themselves in
the position of being able to dictate their demands to the king; that
is, they were near enough to that position to make the attempt.
Frederick, for his part, struggled to balance his own intense piety
and sincere desire to treat the church with due reverence, with his
equally intense need to curry favor with the barons and munici-
palities, without whose support also he could not long stay on the
throne. The spread of Franciscan-inspired evangelism brought an
emotive reformist urgency to the islanders' spiritual lives but
further complicated relations between faithful and clergy, clergy
and state, and kingdom and papacy.3
Caltabellotta released at a stroke two decades of pent-up
spiritual energy among the populace, both high and low, for a papal
interdict had long forbidden the performance anywhere within
Sicily of the sacraments that were necessary to salvation. Moreover,
all supporters of the Catalan regime (not to mention the regime
itself) had been repeatedly denounced and excommunicated by
every pope since Martin IV, on 7 May 1282, first likened them to the
crowds who had called for Jesus' crucifixion.4 However cheered they
were by their success in driving out the Angevins, the Sicilians could
hardly bear such condemnation with equanimity. The prohibition
of sacraments had been total. Although priests had remained free
to preach and to lead their congregations in prayer (prayers
2 ASP Tab. Cefalu, perg. 68.

3
See my articles "The Papacy, the Sicilian Church, and Frederick III, 1302-1321" (see
ch. 2, n. 52, above); "Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals in Sicily,"
(see ch. 1, n. 21, above); and "The Reception of Arnau de Vilanova's Religious Ideas," in
Christendom and Its Discontents, ed. Scott Waugh and Peter Diehl (Cambridge, 1995). The
present chapter draws heavily on these previous works.
4
Regestapontificum romanorum, ed. August Potthast, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1874-5), 11, pp. 1769-70.
focused, one might assume, on repentance and pleas for mercy),

no Sicilian had been baptized, confirmed in the church, forgiven
of sins in the confessional, strengthened in faith at communion,
married by a priest, or consoled with last rites since 1282. In other
words, by 1302 an entire new generation of Sicilians had arisen for
whom the church played little or no role in their daily spiritual
lives.5
The consequences of this were enormous. For older Sicilians the
long separation from the church caused considerable anxiety,
anger, and self-doubt. While they did not waver, or did not much
waver, in their opposition to Rome's political actions vis-a-vis their
island, they nevertheless remained uneasy about the spiritual
penalty their rebellion had brought upon them. What did it profit
them to gain political independence, if they lost their souls in the
process? The Vespers years were filled with such worries, and we
see this concern reflected in the great number of gifts showered
upon local churches and monasteries. By pledging one's wealth to
the religious houses one curried favor, they hoped, with those
figures whose prayers might do one the most good once the
interdict was lifted. Relief at being restored to the church in 1302,
though, was inevitably mixed with a lingering resentment over
what they viewed as unfairly heavy-handed treatment. This
resentment, as we shall see, easily bubbled over into zealous and
sometimes violent anti-clericalism. For younger Sicilians the
interdict had different results. They had grown to adulthood with a
faith no less vital than their parents'; but their faith had focused by
necessity on preaching, prayer, personal inquiry, and repentance
rather than on sacramental life and obedience to an ecclesiastical
hierarchy. It would be a mistake to overemphasize the subjective
or self-fashioning quality of their popular piety; these were still
committed, though rebellious, faithful who cherished the Catholic
tradition as they understood it. The fact, though, of their growing
5
There is evidence that some clergy, from 1282 on, refused to recognize the interdict and
continued to administer sacraments. They were probably few in number, and there is no
evidence surviving that tells of the extent of their following. Needless to say, they were
among the first individuals sought by authorities after the normalization of religious life.
Assuming that these rebel priests had at least some popular support, it is clear that the
effect of such open disobedience to the interdict would contribute to an atmosphere that
welcomed the reformist ideals of the Spirituals. See discussion, below.
up outside the church's sacramental life meant that there existed
among them a common, though certainly not universal, tendency to
view the clergy and their role in a new light, one that made it
easier to ignore ecclesiastical authority when it seemed preferable
to do so, and easier to oppose it outright when such seemed
necessary. Priests, bishops, and archbishops in the kingdom thus
found themselves confronted with an eager though hesitant sort of
congregation in the cities - a young flock that was just as likely,
under the right conditions, to suspect the clergy as to support them
(and to embrace anti-clericalism for religious rather than political
reasons), and an older group of faithful among whom relief was
tinged with resentment, who felt that they had as much to forgive
as to be forgiven.
Complicating a smooth resumption of traditional religious life
still further, a severe shortage of qualified priests existed through-
out the kingdom, owing to the fact that no ordinations had been
performed in twenty years. Vacant parishes and depleted canonries
dotted the countryside, leaving even those sites that most ardently
desired to return to ecclesiastical tradition bereft of spiritual
leadership. Thus, if the clergy were to resume their pre-Vespers
role in society, they had to pursue with great zeal a replenishment
of their ranks and a restoration of the ecclesiastical structure that
had been so battered by two decades of war. Organized religious
life, in short, entered a period of extraordinary opportunity and
challenge.
Sicily's ecclesiastical organization consisted of three archbishoprics

(Messina, Monreale, Palermo) and seven bishoprics (Agrigento,
Catania, Cefalu, Lipari-Patti, Malta, Mazara, Siracusa). It is
important to know the precise boundaries of these dioceses as well
as they can be fixed, since so much of the difficulty that the king
faced after Caltabellotta stemmed directly from the clashes
between individual churches' zones of ecclesiastical authority and
commercial interest. The diocese of Mazara is the most easily
distinguished. Its border was defined by the Belice and Iato rivers,
and it stretched eastward to the point where the rivers came
nearest to each other, on the main road from Palermo to Corleone.
The diocese's principal cities, apart from the cathedral town itself,
were Trapani, Monte S. Giuliano, Alcamo, Salemi, and Marsala; the
island of Pantelleria (important for cotton production and tunny
fishing) also fell under its jurisdiction. The bishopric of Agrigento,

to the south, is more difficult to specify. From the Belice it reached
down the coast to the river Salso; but its inland border followed an
indistinct line from Caltanissetta through Castronovo, then curved
below Corleone until it reached, once again, the Belice. The major
urban centers here included Sciacca, Agrigento, and Licata, along
the coast, and Camarata, Prizzi, Caltanissetta, and Castronovo,
inland. The diocese of Siracusa was the kingdom's largest in area.
The river Salso, reaching northward from Licata, marked its
western edge; thirty kilometers inland the border turned sharply to
the east - above Mazzarino but below Barrafranca - then continued
in a line along the Ferro river to the plain below Catania. In
addition to the cathedral town, Ragusa, Lentini, Caltagirone,
Scordia, Augusta, and Modica comprised the main municipalities of
the diocese. Above it lay the diocese of Catania, in whose cathedral
church Frederick lies buried. The southern border of this province
lay along the Ferro, and the diocese reached as far inland as
Castrogiovanni at the island's center. But the northern border is
more difficult to trace. Beginning at the coast a few kilometers
above Acireale, the border skirted the lower reaches of Mount Etna,
passed north of Adrano and Agira, then dropped, perhaps through
the mountain pass at Lago di Stelo, to reach the river Salso. North
of this, in the island's most sharply angled promontory, lay the
archdiocese of Messina. Excluding the episcopal see at Patti (whose
diocese consisted of the cathedral town and the outlying Lipari
islands), Messina's jurisdiction reached as far westward as the river
Pollina, then southward along the uppermost reaches of the Salso.
Its major cities included Randazzo, Troina, and Nicosia, as well as
coastal Taormina and Milazzo. Cefalii's diocese was much smaller
by comparison; it extended in a rough semicircle through a thirty-
kilometer sweep from the cathedral town, and included the towns
of Polizzi, Caltavuturo, Sclafani, and Mistretta. The remaining
territory was divided between the archbishoprics of Monreale and
Palermo, with the former comprising the narrow strip of land
connecting Monreale, S. Giuseppe Iato, Calatrasi, and Corleone,
and with the latter occupying the quadrant defined by Termini,
Caccamo, Lercara, Vicari, and Misilmeri. In terms of their ecclesi-
astical relations, Agrigento, Mazara, and Malta were suffragans of
the metropolitan see of Palermo, just as Cefalu and Lipari-Patti lay
under the jurisdiction of the archbishopric of Messina, and as the
dioceses of Catania and Siracusa deferred to the authority of
Monreale.6
Largely by coincidence, nearly all the episcopacies in the king-
dom became vacant after Caltabellotta. Mazara's see had been
empty since 1300, as had Cefalii's, leaving the churches there
without direction or defense until after the war. Agrigento's bishop
Roberto was translated to a see outside of Sicily in 1303. Catania's
Gentile Stefanneschi died early in 1304, followed a few months later
by Palermo's archbishop Tizio di Colle; and in 1305 death carried
away Monreale's Ruggero Dommusco and Siracusa's Domenec de
Zaragoza. Only the sees of Lipari-Patti and Messina remained
undisturbed.7 Many Sicilians, frankly, were glad to see some of
these figures depart. Gentile Stefanneschi, for example, a
Dominican from Rome, had no sooner been appointed to the see in
Catania in 1296 than he handed the city over to Angevin control,
in whose hands it remained until 1300.8 And Siracusa's bishop
Domenec, even though he was a Catalan who might therefore have
been expected to favor the new dynasty, was likewise a Dominican
appointee of Boniface VIII who continued to support the papal-
Angevin cause right through Caltabellotta.
The opportunities available between 1302 and 1305 drew Benedict
XI's earnest attention, for by regaining control of the episcopacies
he hoped to mitigate some of the harm done to papal prestige at
Caltabellotta; moreover, since the king was as beholden to clerical
support for his kingship as he was to baronial and municipal
backing, a strongly pro-papal roster of bishops offered a promising
means to rein in the ambitions of the new ruler of "Trinacria."
Consequently, citing his plenitudo potestatis, he insisted upon his
6
Rationes decimarum Italiae nei secoli XIIIe XIV: Sicilia, ed. Pietro Sella (Vatican City, 1944),
Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, Studi e testi, vol. cxn provides basic information, although
it lacks a map. I have supplemented this with information drawn from RPSS 1, pp. 1—313
(Palermo), pp. 414-50 (Messina), pp. 451—87 (Monreale), pp. 514-97 (Catania),
pp. 598-690 (Siracusa), pp. 691-765 (Agrigento), 11, pp. 769-96 (Patti), pp. 797-840
(Cefalu), pp. 841-99 (Mazara), pp. 900-47 (Malta), and pp. 948-68 (Lipari); from Vito
Maria Amico, Lexicon topographicum siculum, 6 vols. (Palermo, 1757—60), also available in
Italian as Dizionario topografico della Sicilia, ed. and trans. Gioacchino Dimarzo, 2 vols.
(Palermo, 1885-6; rpnt. 1975); and from Norbert Kamp, Kirche undMonarchic im stauftschen
Konigreich Sizilien (Munich, 1975), Miinstersche Mittelalter-Schriften, vol. x, no. 1, in
IO
4 pts.; see esp. pt. 3, pp. 1010-12, 1043—5, 7^-9> 1110-11, 1146-7, 1172—3, 1184—5, 1202—4,
1233-4-
7
RPSS 1, pp. 154-5, 408-10, 463-4, 536-7, 626, 706-8; Reg. Benedict XI, no. 233-9, 274» 3*5-
8
Reg. Boniface VIII, no. 3874 refers to the city of Catania "qui nuper ad nostra mandata et
Romane ecclesie redierunt."
right to overrule or frankly ignore elections by chapter and to

appoint his own candidates directly to the sees.9 His first "appoint-
ments" in 1304 merely confirmed men who were still in office,
perhaps simply a gesture but perhaps also a requirement resulting
from the lifting of the interdict.10 But he pressed hard in his designs
for the new vacancies and in so doing he precipitated the first
outbreaks of local resentment. Obviously a kingdom that had
explicitly forbidden its king to enter any sort of pact with the pope
- as it had done in 1296 - would be slow to warm to direct papal
reinvolvement in its ecclesiastical life. In 1305, when Benedict
attempted to install two loyalists - in Mazara, one Fulco "who is a
Catalan and was previous a deacon of Leon and a canon of Valencia
and Majorca," and in Siracusa, one Domingos Penitencieiro "a
Dominican from Portugal" - the chapters flatly rejected his
appointees and elected bishops of their own instead: Goffredo
Roncione and Felip Sang de Cisur, respectively, who were quickly
confirmed in office by their metropolitans.11 Benedict's choice to
succeed Gentile Stefanneschi in Catania was Leonardo Fieschi, a
Genoese cleric, whom the Catanian canons accepted reluctantly.
They and others in the diocese quickly found themselves at odds
with their new bishop, though. One of Leonardo's first acts,
implemented even before his arrival on the island, was to grant to
the local Benedictine nunnery of S. Giuliano thefacultas of electing
its own abbess; in 1306 he repossessed a woodland that had long
before been granted to one of Catania's dependent churches. But
9
By the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries direct papal appointments were
common but certainly not universally accepted. For dissenting arguments among
orthodox contemporaries, see Hostiensis, Lectura in quinque decretalium Gregorianum libros;
and Aegidius Romanus, De ecclesiastica potestate. For discussion, see Robert L. Benson,
"Election by Community and Chapter: Reflections on Co-responsibility in the Historical
Church," TheJurist 31 (1971), 54-80; and Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Making of a Bishop
in the Middle Ages: The Part of the Pope in Law and Fact," Catholic Historical Review 19
(1933-4), 275-319.
10
Reg. Benedict XI, no. 233, 235-8.
11
ACA Cartas James II, no. 4156 bis. This document is an unsigned and unaddressed report
to James from an agent at the papal court. The entire text reads: "Sciatis etiam, quod
dominus papa providit ecclesiis Scicilie [sic] omnibus de archiepiscopis et episcopis et
nullum ad partes illustris domini Frederici; et sic creditur, quod non recipiantur. Tamen
contulit episcopatum Marzariensis domino Fulconi, qui est catalanus et erat decanus
Legionis et canonicus Valencie et Maioricarum. Contulit episcopatum Siracusanensis
fratri Domenico Penitenciario, de ordine Predicatorum, qui est portugalensis. Omnes
alios posuit quos voluit." See also Reg. Benedict XI, no. 234, 239; RPSS 1, p. 464; Garufl,
Catalogo illustrato del tabulario di S. Maria Nuova in Monreale, doc. 147.
his greatest transgression was his decision in 1313 to establish a

station of the Dominican inquisition at the monastery of Castel
Orsini. After the monks there appealed to their metropolitan, and
the full roster of built-up complaints against Leonardo had been
presented at court, the unpopular bishop finally quitted the
island.12 This left Catania without a leader until 1331 and opened
the door to increased royal control, since traditionally the bishop
had wielded considerable political authority over the city itself.
After the Black Death, Catania became in fact the principal royal
residence on the island.
The king had an interest in the episcopacies as well, but was in
even less of a position to influence successions than was the papacy.
By asserting the legatine authority that Sicilian monarchs had
claimed since the eleventh century, Frederick in theory might have
claimed the right to appoint and confirm bishops, but his command
of the realm was far too tenuous even to permit the attempt. 13
Instead, he championed the clergy's right to elections. Thus when
the canons of Monreale elected Arnau de Rassach in 1305, only to
find their choice rejected and themselves excommunicated by an
unappreciative Benedict, Frederick intervened and negotiated
directly with Avignon. Benedict refused to relent, but the Sicilians
stood firm. Clement V's more conciliatory nature allowed him
to give up the fight, recognize Arnau, and rescind Benedict's
excommunication of the popular archbishop. 14 Frederick had
another reason, less ideological, to support Arnau: Rassach had
previously served as Frederick's treasurer and royal councillor;
hence it is tempting to see the king's vigorous championing of him
as another example of a political or personal debt to be paid. 15
If appointments were beyond his power, he was yet able to
influence the dioceses' economic and jurisdictional life by other
12
Reg. Benedict XI, no. 2y^;RPSS i, p. 537. Leonardo returned to Genoa and became prior of
the monastery of S. Leonardo di Calignano, although he never relinquished his episcopal
title.
13
Josef Deer, "Der Anspruch der Herrscher des 12. Jahrhunderts auf die apostolische
Legation," Archivum historiae pontificiae 2 (1964), 117-86 is the best study of the develop-
ment of this claim. The continuation of the legatine idea in the post-Norman period has
received much less attention.
14
RPSS 1, p. 464.
15
Arnau is probably the "Raynaldus de Raxaco" referred to by Reg. Clement V, no. 220, where
he is described as a cleric who had sided with Frederick during the war and was therefore
excommunicated.
means, the most important of which was the restoration of

ecclesiastical privileges. The churches unanimously welcomed royal
involvement in this regard and indeed came to expect it as the
implicit price of their support. He had, after all, promised. At
Caltabellotta it was agreed that Frederick would restore the
Sicilian churches to all of the properties and privileges they held
prior to 1282, which Frederick reiterated in a solemn decree to the
Sicilian primate in August 1303:
I further promise that I will allot and will cause to be allotted to every
church and every religious now existing in Sicily and its said islands all the
possessions, rights, and goods - both in Sicily and in the said islands -
which those churches and persons held therein from the time of king
Charles of blessed memory (father of the present Charles) to the time
when the Sicilians rebelled against the said Charles; and I shall do this
within one month from the day when the proper reckoning of the said
cities, lands, castles, villas, houses, and other fortified sites existing in the
said lands of Sicily and the islands adjacent to it has been made to me, or
to my representatives, by the said lord Charles or someone on his behalf
(as they have been identified above) . . . Therefore I command you,
Leonardo d'Incisa, knight and justiciarius of the Val d'Agrigento, that you
should cause to be reckoned all the possessions, rights, and goods of the
Palermitan church - both in the lands and areas of your jurisdiction as in
the other lands and places of Sicily - along with all its rights in regard to
the tenor of this said charter.16
The act exhibits a certain caginess on Frederick's part. He needed
to curry support with the clergy, but clearly could not afford to do
so at the expense of alienating the barons - and it was the barons,
chiefly, who had confiscated the churches' goods and lands. In order
to restore these, Frederick had to prove indisputably the churches'
16
RPSS 1, pp. 154—5: "Promittimus etiam, quod omnibus ecclesiis et personis ecclesiasticis
in Sicilie et predictis insulis assignabimus et faciemus assignari, infra mensem unum
a diem facte et complete assignationis predictarum civitatum, terrarum, castrorum,
villarum, casalium, et aliarum quarumlibet fortiliciarium locorum existentium in
predictis partibus Sicilie et insulis sibi adjacentibus nobis seu nostris nunciis per
predictum dominum Carolum et ducem vel alium et alterium seu alias per se vel alterius
eorum (sicut super plene distinguuntur) faciendum, in antea numerandum, omnes
possessiones, jura, et bona existentia in Sicilia et predictis insulis, que tenuerunt ecclesie
et persone ipse ibidem tempore bone memorie regis Caroli (patris dicti regis Caroli)
usque ad tempus quo Siculi contra predictum regem Carolum rebellaverunt... Ideo tibi
Leonardo de Incisa militi, justiciario Vallis Agrigenti mandamus, ut possessiones, jura, et
bona ecclesie Panormitane sita, tarn in terris et locis jurisdictionis tue quam in aliis locis
et terris Sicilie, cum omnibus juribus suis juxta tenorem predicti capituli assignari
facias."
legitimate claims to each holding, arrange suitable recompense for
the nobles when appropriate or unavoidable, and accomplish all
without offending either party. The clerics understandably wanted
the restoration carried out as quickly as possible, but the king
needed to set a more moderate pace. He therefore committed
himself to a complete and timely restoration, but placed the burden
for the pace of the process upon the Angevins, whom he required to
deliver all administrative records and land registers. Charles had
quitted the island too hurriedly, of course, to bring the entire royal
archives with him and had no particular reason for wanting to share
the information that he did have with the king who had just beaten
him. Thus, Frederick's charter simply masked his need for
adequate time to sort out the contested claims.
The quantity and complexity of those claims presented an
enormous problem, for the churches' lands and commercial
holdings were extensive and, as suggested by the charter, not
limited to their own dioceses. Compounding this difficulty, many of
the churches had conflicting jurisdictional rights over religious
establishments. The church of S. Lucia in Siracusa, for example, fell
under the ecclesiastical authority of the bishop of Cefalii, who
controlled the church precisely as though it lay physically within his
diocese, awarding prebends, collecting tithes, appointing church
officers, and overseeing the community's spiritual life.17 The
archbishop of Palermo controlled secular estates within the diocese
of Agrigento, and held ecclesiastical authority over the monastery
of S. Onofrio in the diocese of Mazara. 18 The archbishop of
Monreale in 1294 had authorized the construction and dedication of
the church of S. Anna delle Scale in the Palermitan diocese, and
owned, or claimed to own, lands held by the Basilian archimandrite
in Messina.19 And the monastery of S. Maria Valverde, in the
Messinese diocese, lay under Palermo's jurisdiction. 20
But the majority of problems concerned secular holdings - lands
and goods that had been lost to the barons. Confiscation or theft of
church property had been endemic during the war, energetically
17
ASP Manoscritti, Bacheca n, no. 5, fol. 72-87; RPSS 1, p. 626,11, pp. 807-9. T h e difficulty
began with the donation of S. Lucia to Cefalu by countess Adelicia of Aderno in 1140; see
RPSS 1, p. 655,11, p. 799.
18
RPSS 1, pp. 54-5, 158.
19
RPSS 1, p. 410. See also 1, p. 708,11, pp. 808, 846, for other disputes.
20
A S M Corporazioni religiose, S. Maria Valverde, perg. 9 4 (12 Oct. 1315).
committed by everyone from the great counts to the pettiest milites.

Giovanni Chiaromonte, the count of Modica, along with his cohort
Francesco Tuderto, for example, had stolen a handful of estates
from the bishop of Agrigento, while Manfredi Lancia, a kinsman of
Frederick's first chancellor, had seized a mill from the Benedictine
nunnery of S. Maria in the city of Noto.21 On a less elevated social
level, D. Oberto di Cammarana and his wife Giovanna had
snatched several estates near Monreale from the monastery of
S. Maria Nuova. Even the occasional municipality joined in the
land grab: the universitas of Caltagirone, for example, concocted a
fortuitous border dispute with the church of S. Filippo d'Agira in
order to justify its seizure of an estate at nearby Scopello.22 The
recovery and setting right of these holdings - a program that ran
concurrently with the post-war settlement of the tangled com-
mercial affairs between Catalonia and Sicily - occupied Frederick's
attention for several years. By 1309 he had successfully restored
dozens of holdings to their rightful owners by cajoling, persuading,
threatening, and bribing those who had stolen them to relinquish
their control, which had the beneficial effect of putting the king in
the clerics' good graces but at the cost of increasing his political
debt to the milites. The royal demesne also paid a price, since the
only way to secure a peaceful settlement and to soothe any residual
clerical or baronial resentment was, on many occasions, to com-
pensate one party or the other — and sometimes both parties — with
a new grant out of the king's private domain. Thus the Cistercian
abbey of S. Maria at Novara, a twelfth-century foundation roughly
forty kilometers southwest of Messina, gained for its sufferings
not only the return of a usurped estate but also a compensatory
package of new commercial privileges and control of a subsidiary
monastic church, S. Maria di Stella in Troina, some fifty kilometers
further to the southwest on the main road from Nicosia to
Randazzo.23 Inevitably, the sheer number of restorations to be
made, and the often intractable attitudes of both usurpers and
usurped, slowed the process considerably, and prompted Frederick,
in light of his vow at Caltabellotta, to request absolution from
21
RPSS 1, pp. 627, 706-7.
22
Garufi, Catalogo illustrate del tabulario di S. Maria Nuova in Monreale> doc. 131; RPSS 11, p. 1247
(S. Filippo d'Agira).
23
RPSS 11, pp. 1294, 1297.
Clement - an absolution that the pope, in an irenic mood, was
pleased to grant. 24
These rights and properties, once restored and supplemented,
provided a sudden increase in revenues ample enough to finance an
impressive expansion of ecclesiastical holdings, the construction of
new churches, the repair of others, and the operation of hospitals.
Indeed, the years after Caltabellotta witnessed the most feverish
activity in church building on the island since the twelfth century.
In the south, for example, construction began on the imposing
duomo of Agrigento, along with the abbey church of S. Spirito. The
Chiesa d'Assunta in Giuliana and the Chiesa di S. Gherlando in
Sciacca were both raised around 1305. Queen Eleanor, according to
one tradition, personally funded the construction of the duomo of
Castrogiovanni in 1307. In Nicosia, a portal inscription dates the
building of that city's duomo to roughly the same time. The foun-
dation of Taormina's Chiesetta di S. Antonio was laid, probably, by
1310 (although it was finished only in 1330). In western Trapani,
work on the cathedral began in 1314, along with the Chiesa
delPAnnunziata and the Chiesa di S. Agostino. And in 1315
Frederick himself built the Chiesa Madre in Monte S. Giuliano,
next to the impressive campanile erected next to the city gate only
three years earlier. 25 Nor was this all. A wide network of monas-
teries dotted the landscape and received new endowments. 26 Most
of these houses pre-dated Frederick, but a number of new estab-
lishments appeared and quickly grew. The monastery of S. Maria
del Bosco di Calatamauro, for example, was established near
Corleone and Sciacca. A community of hermits resided on the site
by 1308, and in 1309 bishop Bertoldo of Agrigento ordered the
consecration of the church erected there, while granting to the
24
Reg. Clement V, no. 4727. C l e m e n t was so taken with Frederick's efforts, especially after the
Sicilian campaign (led by R a m o n Muntaner) that seized t h e island of Djerba from
Muslim control, that he wrote, i n a very complimentary letter to t h e archbishop o f
Messina: "Zelo fidei et fervore devotionis accensus carissimus in Christo filius noster
Fredericus Trinacrie rex illustris, que D e i sunt, sapit, et que divini cultus et catholice
fidei incrementa respiciant, pro studio et laudabili intentione zelatur." Ibid., no. 6401.
25
G i u s e p p e Spatrisano, Lo Steri di Palermo e I'architettura siciliana del Trecento (Palermo, 1972),
pp. 229-30, 235, 238-40, 261.
26
A study of Latin monasticism in late medieval Sicily is sorely needed. Paolo Gollura,
"Vicende e problemi del monachesimo benedettino in Sicilia," Atti della Accademia di
scienze, lettere e arti di Palermo (Palermo, 1980-1), 4th ser., 40, pt. 2, 31-64 is a start. On the
earlier centuries, see Lynn White Jr., Latin Monasticism in Norman Sicily (Cambridge,
Mass., 1938), Mediaeval Academy of America Monographs, vol. xm.
brethren a licentia to hear confession for the local inhabitants.

Adopting the Benedictine rule, this monastery acquired a
considerable number of pious donations and enjoyed the particular
support of Frederick's magister rationalis Matteo Sclafani.27 Another
important new foundation was the Benedictine abbey of S. Maria di
Altofonte. Meanwhile, a group of Dominicans en route to the Holy
Land in 1313 received from Frederick a grant of housing in Trapani,
which by 1318 had been turned into a permanent conventus regalis,
with the friars appointed as royal chaplains and confessors.28 Many
nobles and lesser barons also founded or reendowed monastic
houses, perhaps to atone for their wartime sins, but it is just as
likely they did so because they were inspired by the same spiritual
revival that affected the rest of society. Giovanni Chiaromonte, for
example, to recompense for his predations throughout the Val
d'Agrigento, offered sizable grants to the Cistercian nunnery of
S. Spirito in that diocese. Not to be outdone, the Ventimiglia
family built the Abbazia di S. Maria del Parto near Castelbuono, to
complement Frederick's own new foundation there, the Convento
di S. Francesco di Polizzi. Artale d'Alagona established the
monastery of S. Maria di Nuova Luce, outside Catania. An obscure
baroness named Giovanna di Surdis funded the construction of a
new nunnery of S. Caterina Vergine e Martire in Mazara; and
an equally obscure miles, Rinaldo Bentivegna, and his wife built a
chapel of S. Croce in Cefalu, which later received - according to one
source - from Frederick's brother Sang the bequest of his entire
worldly goods.29
These efforts to restore ecclesiastical rights and to found new
houses for the propagation of the faith might have earned the Holy
See's grudging friendship and a decrease in political tensions, had
it not been for a combination of occurrences. The first of these was
27
ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 69, 528. See also P. Olimpio da Giuliana, "Istoria del
monastero di S. Maria del Bosco di Calatamauro della diocesi agrigentina, in Sicilia, nella
Valle di Mazara," BCP MS Qq A 12; and Achille Schiro, // monastero di S. Maria del Bosco di
Calatamauro in Sicilia (Palermo, 1894). Cf. RPSS 11, p. 1331.
28 RPSS 11, p. 877.
29
RPSS 1, pp. 575,733,11, pp. 808-9, 873, 1184-96,1262-4,1289. For more examples, see Peri,
La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 106—8; and Collura, "Vicende e problemi," p. 41. For a notable
later gift by the Chiaromonte family, see E. Carraciolo, "La chiesa e il convento di Baida
presso Palermo: rilievi e studi sull'arte gotica in Sicilia," ArchStperSic 3 (1936-7), 109—46.
Francesco Ventimiglia also funded the construction of a church, dormitory, and office
building for a group of Franciscan friars in the Messinese diocese, as late as 1318; see John
XXII, Lettres communes, no. 7796.
the establishment of the Athenian duchy, which flew in the face of
Angevin rights and papal prerogatives and also cut off an important
source of ecclesiastical revenue - since the Company not only
blocked census payments to Avignon but also expressly forbade
bequests to churches within the territories under their control.30
A second difficulty lay in Frederick's support for the Basilian
monasteries in his realm. A thin network of these houses still
stretched across Sicily-we know of thirty-three that existed in 1308
- from the archimandrite's church of S. Salvatore in Messina to the
abbey of S. Maria della Grotta in Marsala.31 Though very much in
decline, these churches still controlled a modest share of land and
wealth (in 1308 at least nine of them had annual revenues above
20.00.00), and the archimandrite himself, with an income over
100.00.00, commanded considerable respect at court.32 The papacy,
powerless to suppress them during the Norman and Hohenstaufen
eras, had tolerated these Greek communities in later years and
perhaps viewed them as a means to improve relations with the
patriarchate in Constantinople. But the archimandrite's support
for the Catalan dynasty - especially after his participation in
James's coronation in 1286 - forced the pope to act. Honorius IV
declared the archimandrite deposed and stripped the Basilian
church of all its holdings. This prompted many ecclesiastical and
lay lords, who were otherwise loath to condone meddling from
abroad, to seize Basilian churches and their holdings across the
kingdom. They plundered rapidly and repeatedly. The abbey of
S. Nicola di Pergario, for example, was beset so often by pillagmg
barons that by 1302 "it [had] no viable use or value . . . its vineyards
cut down, devastated, and ruined . . . its land void of inhabitants ajnd
left desolate and sterile."33 But Caltabellotta gave Frederick tjhe
30
Reg. Clement V, no. 3138, 7890-1, 8597.
31
Scaduto, // monachesimo basiliano (see ch. 1, n. 19, above) is the most complete study to date;
see esp. pp. 287—320. White, Latin Monasticism, pp. 3 8 - 4 6 estimates that as many as sijxty-
eight Basilian abbeys existed by the end of the twelfth century. O n the privileges held by
the archimandrite, see Raffaele Starrabba, "Di un codice vaticano contenente i privjlegi
delParchimandrito di Messina," ArchStSic 12 (1887), 4 6 5 - 9 , with its discussion of Vatican
Library, cod. 8201. A fragmentary text of the archimandrite's visitation registers survives,
containing his notes on liturgical regularity, administrative problems, and ecclesiastical
discipline within his subject churches for the years 1328-30,1332,1334, and 1336, see Codex
Messanensis Graecus 105, ed. Raffaele Cantarella (Palermo, 1937), R. Deputazione di storia
patria per la Sicilia, Memorie e documenti di storia siciliana, 2nd ser., vol. 11.
32
Bresc, Un monde, pp. 5 8 9 - 9 4 a n d T a b l e 152.
33
Silvestri, // tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala, doc. 6.
opportunity to rebuild the Basilian network as well as the Latin,

although in the end his efforts proved unable to stem the decline.34
John XXII eventually reconciled with the Basilians; but Frederick's
preemptive aid to his Orthodox subjects - coupled with the
accidental acquisition of Athens - stood in the way of smooth
relations with Avignon.
All of this activity signals a remarkable release of spontaneous
spiritual energy and enthusiasm. But it is clear that the spiritual
revival was inspired and promoted by the royal court as well.
Frederick, who was sincerely if conventionally pious in his early
years, in 1305 became an enthusiast for Arnau de Vilanova, the
Catalan physician turned mystic who took refuge in Sicily after
barely escaping with his life from an inquisitorial proceeding at
Perugia where he had not only stood accused of heretical prophecy
but was also briefly suspected of having murdered Benedict XL
This enthusiasm turned into ardent discipleship after Arnau's
second visit in 1309, at which time Frederick, in James's words, "was
inspired with the flame of the Holy Spirit, henceforth desiring to
spread It with a fervent passion."35 At this time Arnau explicitly
recognized Frederick as the "God-elected king" of Joachimite
prophecy, the divinely appointed ruler who would aid in the
purification of Christendom so that it could withstand the destruc-
tive workings of the approaching Antichrist - whose arrival, Arnau
had calculated, would be no later than 1376. Frederick's advocacy of
this apocalyptic reform undoubtedly lay behind his aggressive
church building and the spate of social reforms enacted in his
Ordinationes generates, and likely lay behind his appeal in 1309 for
papal absolution for the delays that had dogged his restoration
program. With royal support, the evangelizing spirit spread rapidly
through Sicily, especially among the lower orders who had already
begun to crowd urban streets.
A few traces of this spirit had appeared in Sicily prior to Arnau's
arrival, and likely came to the island with the Catalan army in the
1280s. Catalonia had long been home to an energetic tradition of
34
Frederick negotiated personally, for example, a border dispute between the archi-
mandrite and the church of S. Giorgio di Triocala, and granted additional forest rights
and the secrezie tax revenues from Troina to the abbey of S. Elia d'Ambula. See RPSS n,
PP- 983, 1008, 1012; Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 131.
35
FAA 11, doc. 559; Francesco Bruni, "La cultura e la prosa volgare nel '300 e nel '400," in
SDS rv, pp. 179-279 at 190-202.
religious speculation, evidenced most famously in the works
of Vilanova and Ramon Llull in Christian spirituality and by the
Jewish Kabbalists. A number of manuscripts - alchemical treatises,
works on astrological portents, a handsome copy of Abraham
Abulafia's On the Light of the Intellect - attest to the presence of some
of these ideas in Sicily. Abulafia himself is known to have visited
Sicily sometime prior to his death in 1291, spreading his teachings
among the Jewish community at Trapani. "Evangelical schools"
were established throughout the realm, Vilanova testifies, "in
which men and women, both rich and poor, are given instruction
in that evangelical truth which is the true Christianity." 36 And a
plethora of sermon collections, saints' lives, and catechetical
dictionaries suggest that not only were exciting new ideas circu-
lating but were being actively opposed by a suddenly present
Dominican inquisition. 37 Ramon Llull in 1312 praised Frederick as
"a most excellent, devout, and steadfast king," one who "has
ordered and directed his entire realm to the purpose of knowing
and loving God, and has pursued this goal with such tenacity that
one is frequently made to think of the command that God made to
all men" (namely, that they are to put God before everything else
in life); furthermore Llull visited Sicily in 1313-14 and while there
he wrote no less than thirty-eight opuscula to assist in the spiritual
regeneration of the kingdom that he saw around him.38
Arnau became Frederick's religious mentor in 1305, and during
this first stay on the island wrote a religious-political treatise for
him called the Allocutio christiani de hiis que conveniunt homini secundum
suam propriam dignitatem creature rationalis in which he explicated a
rationalist view of mankind as God's supreme creation, uniquely
endowed with the ability to perceive the divine plan of salvation in
nature.39 Since Arnau, borrowing a vocabulary from his medical
background, believed passionately that God's truth and heavenly
plan for mankind are visible in the physical world just as the
symptoms that identify an ailment are physically present in the
patient, awaiting only a physician talented enough to read correctly
36
Arnau de Vilanova, Obres catalanes, i, pp. 220-1.
37
For example: Messina, Biblioteca universitaria M S S 29-30, 149; Trapani, Biblioteca
Fardelliana MSS 9,12; B C P MSS Q q A 21, Q q F 32, 2 Q q E 4, 2 Q q E 5, 4 Q q A 10.
38
J . N . Hillgarth, Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France (Oxford, 1971), p. 109,
n. 258, and pp. 132—3.
39
Vatican City, Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, Vat. Lat. 3824, fol. 217V—226.
the evidence that is before the eyes of all, any man possessed of
reason (and guided perhaps by a visionary like Arnau himself), he
asserted, has the ability to perceive clearly the purpose to which
he ought to turn his energies. And a prince has a unique obligation,
in this view, to devote himself to bringing to effect those changes
and reforms that are needed to further the spiritual purification of
Christendom. Consequently, Arnau exhorted Frederick to continue
to reform Sicilian life and to administer the realm in a spirit
consonant with the duties of a perfect Christian king. "There are
two fruits of God's love present in this life: prosperity and security,"
he wrote; "therefore every ruler, whether king, duke, count, or
baron, who would govern men and exercise jurisdiction over them
ought by all means to avoid four things: injustice . . . injury to
others . . . the abuse of nature . . . and deceit against God or one's
neighbor." Arnau's conception of the just ruler, epitomized in the
God-elected king, merged secular and ecclesiastical concerns
precisely as the Sicilian post-war reconstruction attempted to do.
Individual spiritual reform had to be complemented by a conscious
program of collective reform - and Frederick's kingdom, deservedly
or not, appeared to meet those criteria.
A just ruler, the Allocutio continued, knows that the wealthy
always oppress the poor, and therefore he takes pains to ensure
adequate review of all the officials under his control and to halt any
favoritism in the administration of justice. Neither does he suffer
any rich man to be pardoned for any civil or criminal offense, nor
does he sanction the commutation of punishment in return for
cash. Such a just prince, Arnau assured Frederick, shall never be
defeated, whereas a ruler who neglects or abuses justice shall suffer
rebellion, upset, and (the physician speaks) illness in both mind and
body.40 The Allocutio prescribed few specific measures but clearly
added vigor to the king's on-going policies and concerns. From 1305
onwards the royal court increased the pace of its ecclesiastical
resettlement and church building, and made extra efforts to root
40
Arnau consistently merged his medical knowledge with his religious insight throughout
his writings, drawing direct parallels between physical health and spiritual grace and
employing a medical vocabulary both to describe the physical sensations of his mystical
visions and to diagnose the spiritual ills besetting corrupt Christendom. In a number of
works he invokes St. Luke as the prototype of physician—evangelists blessed with divine
intellectus, while in others he refers to Christ as the medicus supremus of this world and the
next. See my article, "The Reception of Arnau de Vilanova's Religious Ideas" (n. 3,
above).
out administrative corruption. From this time too Frederick
evinced the first symptoms of an acute concern for his own physical
health and for that of his family, evidently seeing in it a reflection
of his and his family's political performance and spiritual well-
being. Writing to James immediately after having read Arnau's
work, Frederick entreated his brother: "Since I yearn with the
greatest desire to be assured of the good health and happiness of
you and yours, I beseech you as earnestly as I can to reassure me
again and again in your letters to me that you and your family are
hale and flourishing . . . And I assure you that by the grace of Him
from whom all good things come I am enjoying the blessing of
health in my island of Sicily."41 It is obvious from this letter, and
many others like it, that Frederick took to heart Arnau's correlation
of physical vitality and political and spiritual destiny. In fact, most
of the extant letters of this sort date precisely to times of crisis,
when the government faced daunting hardships and crucial
decisions - in 1313, for example, when the court learned of
Henry VII's death; in 1319, when famine struck again and a renewal
of hostilities with Naples loomed; and in 1327, when James died.42
Arnau left Sicily in the spring of 1305 upon the election
of Clement V as the new pope; Clement, when still archbishop of
Bordeaux, had befriended Arnau around the time of an earlier
inquiry into his teachings by the Dominican masters, and Arnau
now hastened to the continent in the hope of gaining papal approval
of his apocalyptic prophecy. If Frederick's evangelical zeal waned in
his absence, there is no evidence of it. The successes of the Catalan
Company in the east raised the idea of leading, in conjunction with
James, the crusade against Islam that Arnau had urged upon him
during his winter stay. By 1308 the Sicilians were ready to sail, but
plans faltered when the Angevins, fearing the Sicilian build-up,
41
ACA Perg. James II, no. 9850 (30 Oct. 1305), writing to James: "Quam de salutari
consistentia persone vestre ac successuum felicitate vestrorum certificari magno
desiderio aflfectamus, Serenitatem Vestram qua possumus afiectuose rogamus quatenus
placeat Excellentie Vestre statum vestrum incolumen et vestrorum successuum
incrementa nobis per vestras litteras sepe sepius intimare, ut inde nostro desiderio
satisflat de nobis autem Magnitudini Vestre tenore presentium intimamus, quod per
Eius gratiam a quo bona cuncta proveniunt in insula nostra Sicilie pleno potimur
beneficio sospitatis." See also no. 9852 (same date, writing to James's wife Blanche).
42
A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10181 (23 M a y 1313), 10182 (29 J u n e 1313), 10184 (7 Aug. 1313),
9809 (28 Sept. 1319), 9440 (5 J u n e 1327). M a n y other e x a m p l e s exist, and indeed they m a y
almost be taken, despite their innocuous appearance, as indices of crisis in the realm.
threatened to invade. Instead, the court redoubled its effort to build

its network of "evangelical schools" that was growing under the
guidance of a company of friars - probably stayers-on from Arnau's
visit. In these schools "some will be taught to preach while others
will be trained in diverse languages, so that the truth of the Gospels
may be made known to all, both pagans and schismatics." These
last words evidently referred to Sicily's remaining Muslim popu-
lation and to the Basilian monks. To meet their evangelizing goals
these schools had "already procured evangelical teachers and
writers in a number of tongues . . . and caused to be preached
throughout the island that all who desire to live in evangelical
poverty, from whatever land they be, may come [to Sicily], for there
they will receive protection and supply of all life's necessities." Who
these friars were we do not know - but Arnau is clearly referring
to a distinct group dedicated to paupertat evangelical and therefore
certainly sympathetic to, if not fully part of, the Franciscan
Spiritual movement.
Inspired by Sicily's activity in this area, Arnau at this time -
around 1309 - recognized Frederick as the "God-elected king." He
had earlier been convinced that this figure would arise from the
Catalan royal house but had been unable or unwilling to specify an
individual. Frederick's evangelism though, coupled with Arnau's
dramatic falling out with James, led the mystic to pin all his apoca-
lyptic hopes on Frederick. The argument with James arose from two
works that Arnau had recently penned: the Interpretatio de visionibus
in somniis Jacobi et Frederici, and, in support of it, the Raonament
d'Avinyo. Arnau eagerly read the Interpretatio to Clement, still
hoping to win papal support. But so eager was Arnau to secure such
support before he died (he was then near seventy) that he evidently
tried to give greater credibility to his prophecies by claiming
explicit endorsements of them, in the Interpretatio and Raonament, by
James and Frederick. Clement, who by this time considered Arnau
to be merely a senile oddity of no real danger to Christian unity, let
the episode pass; but when James learned that he had been
implicated in Arnau's scheme, and when he was unable to get an
acceptable explanation of the ruse, he angrily broke off relations
with Arnau and encouraged Frederick to do the same.43
43
According to Clement: "While Arnau was reading I did not bother to apply my mind to
what he said, and rather sat thinking about other, more important, matters. I did not
Whatever its causes, Arnau's recognition of Frederick as the
divinely appointed reformer of corrupt Christendom brought
evangelical influence to a new peak, and apocalyptic expectations
assumed an unprecedented urgency following Arnau's return to the
island later in 1309. There he wrote another work on the king's
behalf, one bolder and more prescriptive than the earlier Allocutio
christiani: the Informacio espiritual. Here Arnau exhorts Frederick to
a more rigorous and disciplined commitment to personal reform
and a more diligent observance of his two greatest duties as an
evangelical king - namely, to promote "la utilitat publica," and to
provide justice equally for all his subjects, whether rich or poor,
native or foreign. Arnau was keenly concerned with matters of
economic status and social class, since the belief in the sanctity of
poverty, at least in this period leading up to Antichrist's arrival, lay
at the core of his religious thought. Thus he directed Frederick to
support the poor against the rich; to keep a dozen paupers close
to hand, whom he should faithfully feed before sitting down to his
own meals; and to visit the ill in poor-hospitals at least three times
a year (at Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost) and to bathe them and
help administer their medicines. Frederick had also to bring his
wife into the evangelical process by urging her to take an active role
in charitable work, which she did with great energy and commit-
ment for the rest of her life, as evidenced in part by her activity in
church building noted earlier. Eleanor was also given two rather
curious duties in the Informacio, First, at the same times that
Frederick was to minister to the sick, Eleanor and two ladies-in-
waiting were to dress themselves in gowns of fine linen and, thus
representing Faith and her handmaidens Hope, they were to visit
the major churches and the poor and sick in the hospitals of
whatever city they happened to be in, "so that in this way some of
the people may have a vision [like that] of the Mother of God
entering a place of misery to comfort those who are there." Second,
then or later understand what his book said; nor have I ever placed any faith or credence
in his ideas." See Miquel Menendez y Pelayo, Historia de los heterodoxos espanoles, ed. Enrique
Sanches Reyes, 8 vols. (Santander, 1948), at VII, p. 315: "Verumtamen sciat Regalis
Sinceritas, quod ad scripturam illam . . . nos, dum legebatur, cogitantes circa alia negotia
graviora, que nostris tune cogitationibus imminebant, mentem nostram non curavimus
apponendam, nee ad ilia, que prelibata continebat scriptura, tune vel postea direximus
intellectum, neque illis fidem vel credulitatem aliquam diximus adhibendam." For
James's breaking off of relations with Arnau, see AGA Cane. Reg. 336, fol. 22—3 (24 Sept.
1310).
she bore the responsibility of censoring the books held by the royal
family, and of purging from the library all "romances and books
of worldly vanity"; she was also to read the Scriptures in the
vernacular to all the royal children every Sunday and feast day. All
the evidence we have suggests that the king and queen adhered
closely to Arnau's directions. As noted, they both constructed and
maintained many churches, schools, and hospitals - Eleanor at one
point even sold off her personal jewelry in order to provide funds for
her charitable work. Frederick, for his part, in his last known act
before dying ordered the revenues from the county of Modica,
which he had confiscated from Giovanni Chiaromonte II, to be
distributed to all the poor in Sicily. By 1329, in fact, both king and
queen had dispensed with so much of their personal wealth to
churches and hospitals that there was little left for new grants
to either baronial or ecclesiastical adherents; instead, they gave
away their royal jura over lands held in fief from them. Arnau's
message obviously hit its mark.
Moreover, and more importantly, this treatise exhorted the
Sicilians to implement a number of immediate reforms: ordering
the public reading of Scripture in the vernacular; completing the
restoration of the churches; expelling all "divines, sorcerers, and
superstition-peddlers" from the island; reforming the practice of
slavery; directly appointing, if possible, all the realm's prelates - or
failing that, confirming and certifying their qualifications for
church office; urging all Sicilian Jews to convert within one year or
face uncompromising ostracism; and, finally, building special
hospitals and hostelries for the poor in all major cities.44 The court
responded with new legislation, the Ordinationes generates, that
incorporated Arnau's instructions so thoroughly that they were
long cataloged among Arnau's own writings. "So that we should not
appear to have taken up in vain the name of Christ," these laws
began, "it is fitting for our salvation that we should pass on the
evangelical truth handed down to us by Him, to the praise of His
name and the exaltation of the Catholic faith, and that we should
44
The Informacio espiritual appears in Obres catalanes, at i, pp. 224-43. For the reforms cited,
see pp. 231—5. Note also the conclusion on p. 242: "E, jasie ago que tot princep de crestians
me'n fos bo, e de qual que fos seria aytant alegre com si ere mon fiyll, pero natural amor
me destreyn a desiyar e parcagar que vos o vostre frare fossets aquell. Mas yo veyg
clarament que Deus appelle vos especialment a aquest ministeri, e, si en vos no roman, a
vos vol donar aquesta honor."
be watchful, with purified minds, that the errors of the unfaithful
be checked effectively."45 This is an altogether different tone from
that of the Constitutiones regales or the Capitula alia, which were the
predictable products of a grossly indebted and still distrusted
newcomer. Here we see an energized, activist Sicily, a kingdom with
a mission to accomplish - a mission not to secure the recognition of
individual privileges and the redress of legalistic grievances, but
to attain salvation, to purify minds, to pass on a newer vision of
Christendom. Accordingly, the laws mandated the baptism of all
slave children and strongly urged slave holders to have evangelical
Christianity taught to their adult slaves, while the beating or
branding of slaves was prohibited.46 Moreover, local customs - such
as those at Messina - which forbade Christians to testify against
Jews were remanded, and all Christian subjects were warned
against "excessive familiarity and speech" with them. 47 The laws
45
Ord. gen., ch. 59: "Ut Christi nomen, quo vocamur et dicimur Christiani, in vanum
assumpsisse non videamur, expedit pro salute, ut illud efiectu operum inducamus in
evangelicam veritatem ab e o nobis traditam ad laudem sui nominis et exaltationem
catholice fidei, necnon ut infidelium revocentur errores efficaciter et puris mentibus
observemus." Note that Testa's organization of the laws, and his dating, are faulty. Cf.
ACA Cartas J a m e s II, no. 3792.
46
Ibid., ch. 60: "Qualiter autem ipsos post dicti fontem baptismatis tractare debemus, docet
Apostolus ad Philemonem, dicens 'Suscipe ilium i a m non ut servum sed ut fratrem
carissimum in Domino, etc., in carne"'; ch. 61: "Ipsos siquidem servos eosdem, renatos
baptismate, et penes suos dominos tarn salubre beneficium consecutos, dominis sui
ferventius atque devotius servire mandamus, secundum verbum ipsius Apostoli, dicentis
ad T i m o t h e u m 'Quicumque sunt sub jugo servi dominos suos omni honore dignos
arbitrentur, ne nomen Domini et doctrina blasphemetur.' Q u i autem fideles habent
dominos non contemnant quia fratres sunt, sed magis serviant quia fideles sunt, et
delecti, ac participes in beneficiis. Servos enim oportet dominis suis subditos esse, in
omnibus placentes, non contradicentes, non fraudantes, sed in omnibus fidem bonam
attendentes, ut doctrinam Salvatoris Nostri ornent in omnibus"; and ch. 62: "Ut autem
dicta fraterna tractatio et humana benignitas inter alia pateat, qua ipsos neophytos
prosequi debent ceteri Christiani, nullis licere providimus Christiana mancipia
vulneribus ac flagellis afflcere aut aliquod membrum illis incidere vel devastare, in facie
vel in fronte signare, aut in ea aliquatenus insaevire, cum, licet sint domini servorum
suorum, tamen suorum membrorum domini non existunt. Eos tamen a dominis castigari
permittimus, cum culpa precesserit et Christiana sint, juste, leviter, et benigne. E u m
tamen, si fugitivis contumax fuerit vel protervus, poni in compedibus non vetamus."
47
Ibid., ch. 67: "Prave constitutionis seu consuetudinis observantiam, qua Christianorum
testimonia adversus Judeos in quibusdam locis Sicilie non admittebantur in causis, tolli
volumus et jubemus, statuentes amodo standum fore super hoc juri communi, canonico,
et civili"; and ch. 68: "Quoniam Judeorum mores et nostri in nullo concordant, et ipsi de
facili ob continuam conversationem et assiduam familiaritatem ad suam superstitionem
et perfidiam simplicium animos inclinarent, statuimus, ut Christiani cum Judeis de
cetero nimiam familiaritatem et assiduam conversationem non habeant, nee cum eis
comedant vel discumbant, nee Christiani Judeorum ipsorum servitiis in eorum domibus
pro mercede aliqua aliquatenus se exponant."
banned the evil practices of "sorcery, magic incantation, augury,

divination, and soothsaying,"48 along with the sin of gambling at
dice and gaming tables.49 Judicial fines for unlawful slaving
practices were reserved for distribution to the poor; and wasteful
(and sinful) expense upon luxury goods faced heavy penalties up to
20.00.00.50 Since circumstances did not allow this God-elected
monarch to lead a crusade to the Holy Land, his holy mission could
instead be accomplished through the spiritual reform of his own
land by gradually suppressing Islam and Judaism, wiping out
resurgent beliefs in pagan or folk magic, and rejuvenating the
evangelical spirit in the Christian community. This charismatic
enthusiasm was not a phenomenon of the king and queen alone.
Frederick's brother Sang bequeathed his entire worldly estate,
according to one source, to the church of S. Croce in Cefalu, and
much of the money and effort put into the restoration of churches
and monasteries came from the high magnates and lower barons -
48
Ibid., ch. 76: "Nulli restat ambiguitatis suspensum, qui veneficiis, magicis
incantationibus, auguriis, divinationibus, sortilegiis, ceterisque talibus innitentes,
perversores sacre religionis fidei a Christi fidelibus reputentur, qui prophetie spiritum et
habitum divine sapientie simulantes, humanas posse m e n t e s divertere, et scripturarum
inspectione futura predicere falso promittunt, volentes D e o similes esse videri,
prescientia futurorum, quam sibi D e u s ipse singulari privilegio reservavit. Igitur, ut, tarn
causa profani erroris dissipentur actores, q u a m huiusmodi superstitionis materia
precludatur et curiositas (scilicet divinandi antiquas leges ad hoc editas, que sub
dissimulatione transibant), jussimus observandas, statuentes, ut nullus deinceps audeat
in talibus perfidiis laborare, et quicumque post hoc edictum inventi fuerint in regno
nostro, quacumque ex causa, magicas, veneficia, incantationes, auguria, divinationes,
sortilegia, et huiusmodi talia exercere, tarn facientes quam ipsos ad huiusmodi
provocantes, per officiates nostros ad quos tale spectat judicium poena capitis (videlicet
exercentes) et deportationis (videlicet provocantes), prout leges ipse sanciunt et
distinguunt, irremissibiliter puniantur nisi poenas ipsas in alias arbitrati fuerimus
commutandas. Quicumque a u t e m predictos exercentes aut provocantes in publicum
detexerint a curia nostra unciam auri unam in premium consequentur."
49
Ibid., ch. 77: "Damnosum atque damnabile alearum ludus, sub quo comprehendimus tarn
tabularem q u a m ludum quemlibet taxillorum (quern diversa sequuntur genera
vitiorum), inhibere volentes — c u m fraus, m e n d a c i u m , perjurium, atque blasphemie
sepius committerentur in ipsis, et e x ipsis postremo rerum d a m n a et odia sequebantur -
statuimus, ut lex ilia Graeca divi imperatoris Justiniani sub titulo de aleatoribus
comprehensa, qua dictus usus alearum vetatur, que per contrariam consuetudinem quasi
erat abolita, inviolabiliter observetur. T e n o r e m cuius, ut reperiatur facilius, hac
constitutione de verbo ad verbum duximus inscribendum, qui talis est." There follows, at
ch. 78, the text of Codex Justinianus, bk. 111, ch. 43.
50
Ibid., ch. 106: "Quod uxores c o m i t u m , m a g n a t u m , militum, et aliorum curialium n o n
possint indui panno, cuius pretium transcendat tarinos X X V sub poena arbitraria a b
unciis viginti infra, s e c u n d u m conditionem persone; et quod possint indui bis in anno ad
plus, et habere duo guarnimenta et non ultra, de quolibet indumentorum absque vayris
tamen, quos portare non audeant nisi in mantello, sub eadem poena."
figures who were also commonly the very officials charged with
enforcing the new laws, such as Ruggero Gala, the magisterjuratie for
Paterno whose first responsibility in office was "to capture all
blasphemers of God, the Blessed Virgin, and His saints."51
Encouraged by these developments, Arnau left Sicily, but before
departing he extracted a solemn vow from the king never to with-
draw his offer of protection to all observers of evangelical poverty.52
Shortly afterwards, in 1311, Arnau died in Genoa en route to the
papal court, where he had hoped to plead once more on behalf of his
prophetic reform movement. Meanwhile, further events in Sicily,
many of them violent, illustrated the extent of local resentment
against Avignon and its constant concerns for money. The
parliament grudgingly gave the king the funds needed each year
to pay the 3,000.00.00 census owed to the pope for a decade after
Caltabellotta but, by 1315, when the economy had begun to
constrict, the money was no longer forthcoming, which left the
throne in arrears and resulted in extended periods of renewed
interdict and numerous excommunications.53 Still more indicative
of popular sentiment, overt anti-clericalism began to rise through-
out the kingdom and to express itself in increasingly violent terms
and actions. The Holy See had earlier attempted to repair relations
with the common people not only by actively encouraging the
ecclesiastical reestablishment program, but also by sending
companies of mendicant friars, chiefly Dominicans, to preach
throughout the land. The need for this was quite urgent owing to
the severe shortage of clerics. These friars, armed with their
51
RPSS 11, pp. 808-9 (Sancio); ASP Cane. Reg. i, fol. 55-55V (Ruggero Gala). Note that
fourth on the list of his duties is the responsibility of bringing to justice all those caught
playing at dice.
52
Jose Maria Pou y Marti, "Visionarios, beguinos y fraticelos catalanes: siglos XIII-XV,"
Archivo ibero-americano 11 (1919), 113—231 at 221. This article comprises the first installment
in a series of twelve, all published in the same journal. The articles were later gathered
and published as a volume: Visionarios, beguinosyfraticeloscatalanes: siglos XIII-XV (Vich,
1930), here see p. 102.
53
In 1304 only 2,000.00.00 were paid; a full payment was made in 1305, and regularly there-
after until 1315. From 1315 to 1318 Sicily was again in arrears; John lifted the interdict
when Frederick paid the 1^18 census, although the money for the preceding years was still
lacking. There is no evidence that the census was paid after the final renewal of war in 1321,
and indeed since at that time Caltabellotta was considered a dead letter, it is likely that
the Sicilians considered their financial obligation to Avignon nullified. From 1321 onward
Sicily was again under interdict. Reg. Benedict XI, no. 1279; Mansilla, "La documentation
espafiola del Archivio del Castel S. Angelo, 395—1418," no. 107, 115; John XXII, Lettres
communes, no. 5952, 7824.
sermons and catechisms, traveled everywhere and did much to

inspire the spirit of good feeling and high hope that characterized
the post-war decade. In addition to the holy Word, they also brought
gifts from the papal office in the form of indulgences, which aimed
not only to encourage piety and repentance but also to provide
revenue for the restored churches by bringing people into them.
Thus, for example, Benedict XI in 1304 granted an indulgence of
one year and forty days to anyone who had aided, or would yet aid,
in the construction of the Dominican priory in Messina; a one-
hundred-day indulgence to all who visited the church of S. Filippo
d'Agira for his feast; another forty-day indulgence to whomever
visited the church of S. Maria Virgine in Messina on any of Mary's
recognized feasts and memorials.54 Clement V followed with
awards of one hundred days' indulgence to all penitents who
attended the cathedral church of Siracusa on the feasts and octaves
of Mary, St. Lucy, and St. Marcianus; and a year and forty days'
indulgence to all attending S. Giovanni Battista in Butera on the
feasts of either John the Baptist or John the Evangelist.55 Whether
these grants, and others like them, succeeded in their aim is
difficult to tell. Certainly in the second half of the reign the need or
desire to attract more of the faithful to the churches was clear: with
the population in rapid decline and anti-clerical sentiment rising
just as rapidly, many of the new and restored churches began to fall
into disrepair and decay, owing more to a lack of active support than
to Angevin attack. In 1323, for example, the cathedral in Palermo
was in such a derelict state {diruta est et consumta . . . ecclesiam
derelicturam) that the prelates awarded a forty-day indulgence to
anyone who visited the church on any of thirty-eight feast days,
hoping thereby to increase revenues.56
54
Reg.Benedict XI, no. 327 (27 J a n . 1304), 588 (2 Mar. 1304), 1083 (10June 1304).
55
Reg. Clement V, no, 896 (3 Mar. 1306), 2356 (9 J a n . 1308).
56
BCP MS Qq H 3, fol. in-iiiv (14 Apr. 1323), indulgences on festivals of Assumption,
Annunciation, Nativity, Conception, Purification, St. Nicholas, Christmas, Circumcision,
Epiphany, Visitation, Presentation, Resurrection, Ascension, Pentecost, Corpus Christi,
St. John the Baptist, SS. Peter and Paul, St. Andrew, All Saints, Holy Cross, St. Michael,
St. Laurentius, St. Vincentius, St. Martin, St. Stephen, St. George, St. Ambrose,
St. Jerome, St. Gregory, St. Augustine, St. Margaret, St. Catherine, Mary Magdalene, St.
Agatha, St. Anne, St. Agnes, the eleven Noble Virgins, and St. Elizabeth; thus, observing
octaves as well as feasts, it was possible to receive the indulgence for almost any visit to
the church at any time. See also fol. 257V-258 (26 Aug. 1323): "diruta est et consumta";
and fol. 261 (30 Aug. 1325): "ecclesiam derelicturam."
But dissatisfaction with the regular clergy, and especially with
the papacy, expressed itself in more concrete ways. The first point
of contention was one of the oldest: indignation at foreign control
of domestic matters. Diocesan chapters - that is, the major
demesne cities - again provided the venue. Local stubbornness
had succeeded in checking Avignon's attempt to appoint its own
episcopal candidates; but when the papacy failed to install bishops
to its liking, it sought instead to control the canonicates within
each cathedral chapter. This campaign - which had the immediate
goal of controlling the various prebendary revenues associated with
each canonry, and the long-term goal of eventually controlling
episcopal elections - was undoubtedly a legitimate right of the Holy
Pontiff; but it was also guaranteed eventually to foment bitter
resentment and hostility among the Sicilians, both religious and
lay, who saw no reason to have endured twenty years of war
and interdict only to find their local churches once again under the
direct control of a papal administration that had introduced
Angevin rule.
Throughout the post-war decade Avignon appointed, either
directly or via those anti-royalist bishops whom they had managed
to introduce in Sicily, scores of new cathedral canons, deacons,
archdeacons, and prebendaries.57 The shortage of clerics provided
the opportunity as well as the pretext. Many of these canons and
deacons held double or triple tenancies, both within Sicily and
without, which had the effect of enfeebling spiritual life on the one
hand, since no church thus ever operated with a full complement of
its servants, and of rousing public displeasure on the other hand,
since the faithful in attendance not only saw their churches being
administered largely in absentia but also witnessed the revenues
associated with each canonicate leaving the parish, the diocese, and
even the kingdom. Clement V, for example, appointed the young
son of one of the papal court's advocati to the cathedral chapter of
Palermo while bestowing upon him also the "beneficium, dignitas,
et personatus" associated with the canonicate of the church of
Perugia, in 1306, and in 1310 arranged a double tenancy for one
Francesco Guidone Frangipani to hold the "canonicatus et
57
On Leonardo Fieschi, see Reg. Benedict XI, no. 315 (30 Jan. 1304), 636 (28 Feb. 1304).
Benedict described the difficulties posed by the severe shortage of clerics in a letter to
archbishop Tizio di Colle of Palermo, see ibid., no. 1093 (3 Apr. 1304).
prebenda" of the Palermitan church along with (his true residence)

that of the church of S. Maria Trastevere in Rome.58 The following
year a young canon of Lichfield, who was also archdeacon of
Stafford, was made canon of Agrigento; and the year after that the
bastard son of a northern Guelf nobleman was placed jointly in
the priorate of S. Pietro fuori della Porta at Spoleto and in the
archdeaconate of Messina.59 Apart from any ideological opposition
to this manipulation of the cathedral chapters that the Sicilians
might have felt, they certainly had cause to be jealous of the sums
of money thus drained away from local communities. The young
cleric from Spoleto, for example, drew an annual income of ioo gold
florins (roughly 35.00.00-40.00.00) from his Sicilian posting; nor
was this the richest canonry available. One cathedral prebend in
Siracusa in 1317 was valued at 300 florins (100.00.00-120.00.00)
annually. On average, however, these positions enjoyed revenues
of roughly twenty florins (08.00.00) a year - a small enough sum
individually, perhaps, but one which meant in the aggregate a
considerable loss of hard currency every year; perhaps 2,000.00.00
or more drained away to the continent annually.60 Inevitably the
redirection of clerical revenues, coupled with more general
economic problems, left many churches incapable of responding to
the spiritual and material needs of the local communities. And
what many concerned clergy lamented as an inability, angry
populaces regarded as a callous refusal to help. Hence the
otherwise inexplicable "mounds of filth heaped in the streets . . .
piled so high as to block the entrance to the church" described in
an earlier chapter. What better way to display animus towards a
failed clergy than to block the entrance to their churches with offal
and refuse? By 1318 resentment of this manipulation of the
churches ran sufficiently high that the revenues owed to absentee
canons were halted outright. The catalyzing event may have been
John XXIFs appointment, in that year, of his personal chaplain
(Guglielmo di S. Vittore) to the cathedral chapters of Palermo and
Agrigento, adding the prebends of several rural churches in the
diocese of Agrigento to the pot as well. At any rate, after 1318 all
58
Reg. Clement V, n o . 812 (17 M a r . 1306), 6054 (22 M a r . 1310).
59
Ibid., n o . 6628 (10 M a r . 1311), 7726 (22 J a n . 1312).
60
J o h n X X I I , Lettres communes, n o . 5970 (9 D e c . 1317), 300 florins; n o . 7723 (10 J u l y 1318),
20 florins.
monies to non-resident canons were effectively and angrily
stopped.61
More spectacular displays of anti-Avignon hostility abounded. In
part, these were consonant with other expressions of resentment to
the papal exile found throughout Europe, although the Sicilian
actions were a good deal more severe than most. Signs of defiance
emerged as early as 1310, when local churches and monasteries first
refused to pay their tithes, and met papal tithe collectors with open
hostility. It would seem that economic or demographic pressure had
little to do with such rebellion by this date, since serious economic
and social difficulties did not set in until three years later. Hence
the likely cause is the long simmering resentment of papal
attempts to reassert direct control over the island's churches. In
1310, Fr. Blasio d'Ardia, the abbot of the Cistercian monastery
at Maniaci, refused to pay his house's annual dues to the Holy
See, and fearing that his own superior (the archbishop of
Messina) might not support him he fled instead to the court of
archbishop Arnau de Rassach at Monreale. Clement V, in the
full excitement then prevalent at the newly begun Council of
Vienne, dispatched several representatives (another Cistercian
abbot and a number of his monks) to Monreale to deal with the
recalcitrant Blasio and his unrepentant protector. That is when
the trouble began.
Then Fr. Blasio and the archbishop's men - who acted not without the
knowledge and consent of the archbishop - dared, sacrilegiously, to seize
the abbot and monks [sent from Avignon], to tie them up, and to wound
them with the most grievous injuries. Finally they even presumed to throw
them into the most dire prison cells. But when they were not content even
with these actions, they next besieged the monastery of Maniaci with an
assembled army, in order that they might break in by force and strike
down as their enemies those monks who were there having come with the
[visiting] abbot and monks, and then they despoiled the monastery of all
its goods.62
61
Ibid., no. 41804 (4july 1328, stating that no revenues have been forthcoming in ten years),
43622 (23 Dec. 1328).
62
BGP, MS Qq H 4, fol. 198-201, at 198-198V: "Idem frater Blasius et gentes ipsius
archiepiscopi, non absque eiusdem archiepiscopi conscientia et assensu, dictos abbatem
et monachos ausu sacrilegio capere, ligare, gravibus injuriis lacessire, et demum diris
detrudere carceribus presumpserunt. Nee hiis contenti, subsequenter congregato
exercitu dictum monasterium Maniachi temere obsederunt, et tandem fratros eius
Blasio, Arnau, and their soldiers then threatened the Sicilian
monks and forced them to renounce all their memberships, rights,
and loyalties to the monastery, evidently concluding that the only
way to guarantee the liberty of the monastery, at that point, was to
dissolve it. At a papal inquiry that ensued, under the direction of
cardinal Pietro Colonna, none of the Sicilians agreed to show up or
participate, although they did submit an affidavit that mentioned
that their opposition arose not only from their refusal to pay the
tithe but more particularly from their resentment over the pope's
forced placement of their monastery under the jurisdiction of the
mainland Cistercian abbey of Marmassolio. This placement, in
their eyes, was wholly unwarranted and merely provided a new
example of how Avignon was trying to undermine Sicilian liberty in
the monasteries, just as it was doing with the cathedral chapters.
Similarly in 1312, the pope sent two Beneventan legates -
Bernardus Regis and Leo de Montecaveoso — to the prior of the
church of S. Giovanni di Gerusalemme in Messina, Fr. Marti Pere
de Ros, who as prior and as locumtenens magistri of the Knights
Hospitallers throughout the kingdom had also refused to pay his
dues. Once again words turned to blows:
Then that prior, among his other acts, told the said archdeacon
[Bernardus] that he would never pay the decima, shouting angrily that
Bernardus had no right to treat with any other archbishop, bishop, or
prelate [on the island]. To this . . . Leo took issue. And then the prior - this
took place in the hospice where the archdeacon was staying - erupted in
abusive words against Leo, showing no deference to the Apostolic See, and
crying out that Leo was lying shamelessly. Placing a furious hand upon his
sword he did not fear to run it through Leo and two others who were
staying with him; and lest archdeacon Bernardus should respond he issued
him too a grievous wound. Finally [Fr. Marti], still not content with the
audacity of such rashness, and not fearing to add worse deeds to what he
had already done, [ran off and] armed six friars from the convent of the
Hospital and many other clerics and lay residents besides. They returned
to Bernardus' hospice in order that they might again attack the arch-
deacon and magister Leo, and might forcibly take away all the money
destined for the papal court that they had gathered and had with them.
When they arrived at his room, where the severely wounded Bernardus
was lying in bed, they were unable to advance any farther because of the
hostiis monasterium ipsum violenter intrantes monachos, qui pro dictis abbate et
conventu inibi morabantur, ausu nephario vulnaverunt ipsos et dictum monasterium
Maniachi bonis omnibus spoliando."
resistance given to them by the archdeacon's familiares. They turned
instead to the weapons which the familiares had left in the hospice's front
hall, and at the prior's command they carried these away.63
But rather than risk storming Bernardus' protecting, though
unarmed, corps of familiares, the mob instead ran outside, into the
stable, and stole the horses on which the papal party had arrived.
We do not know what became of any of the participants in this
fight. Frederick, feebly, tried to patch relations with Clement by
presenting him with new horses to replace those which had been
stolen.
Such happenings clearly betoken a profound depth of feeling. To
Sicilian eyes not only was the church guilty of having initiated all of
Sicily's long suffering, but in allowing the people to languish under
a decade-long interdict and then in trying to undermine - first
overtly, then covertly - the liberty of the Sicilian churches, all for
the suspected purpose of raising revenues to provide for another
Angevin attack, the church had done more than anger the faithful
who had responded with such zeal and joy to the reestablishment of
peace - it had, for many, vitiated its spiritual authority. And thus,
with the ground prepared for them by boiling popular resentments
and by the preaching of Arnau de Vilanova's evangelical friars, the
63
Reg. Clement V, no. 8859 (23 Aug. 1312): "Idem prior inter alia archidiacono predicto
[Bernardo] respondit se huiusmodi decimam nullatenus soluturum, dicens animo
provocatus, quod ipsum sicut ceteros archiepiscopos, episcopos, et prelatos alios tractare
non poterat nee debebat; ad quod, cum dilectus filius magister Leo de Montecaveoso,
canonicus Beneventanus socius archidiaconi memorati, ibidem presens respondisset
eidem. Prior ipse tune in hospitio dicti archidiaconi constitutus, nobis et Apostolice Sedi
non deferens, contra eundem magistrum Leonem ad verba injuriosa prorupit, et sibi quod
mentiebatur per gulam, insultans in eum, posita manu furore concitatus ad gladium,
cum duobus domicellis suis, qui tune assistebant eidem, irruere non expavit; et nisi ei
prefatus archidiaconus restitisset, lesissent eum graviter in persona. Et demum prefatus
prior tante temeritatis audacia con contentus, sed peiora prioribus coacervare non
metuens, sex ex fratribus de conventu predicti sui hospitalis et quamplures clericos et
laicos domicellos eius armus munitos, ad hospitium dicti archidiaconi, ut eum et dictum
magistrum Leonum in personis offenderent et pecuniam ad Gameram nostram
spectantem (quam idem archidiaconus secum habebat) per violentiam asportarent,
dampnabiliter accedentes. Cum ad cameram ubi gravatus infirmitate dictus
archidiaconus discumbebat, familiaribus ipsius archidiaconi resistentibus eis, non
possent ascendere; se ad arma, que familiares ipsi in eiusdem hospicii aula dimiserant,
converterunt, illaque ad dictum priorem, prout eis mandaverat, detulerunt. Duos equos
violenter de stabulo ipsius archidiaconi, in nostrum et dicte Sedis contemptum propria
temeritate subripere, et secum ad prefatum priorem ducere presumentes." For the
unfortunate Bernardus' appointment to Sicily, from his archdiaconate in Nimes, see ibid.,
no. 6371 and 6381.
Spiritual Franciscans who arrived in Sicily in the autumn of 1312

found a warm welcome.
Forty Spirituals from Tuscany, perhaps an offshoot of Henry of

Ceva's group, fled to Sicily after the publication of Clement V's bull
Exivi de paradiso at the Council of Vienne. This bull asserted the
supremacy of ecclesiastical authority over the spiritual authority
of St. Francis's rule in the on-going usus pauper controversy - the
dispute over the wealth permitted to Franciscan friars (and by
implication, to all clerics) - and although it avoided for the moment
a formal decision on that vital question, the bull made Clement's
intentions clear enough.64 Rather than wait for the inevitable
suppression of their observance of poverty, the Spirituals - the
Franciscan splinter faction devoted to the most radical form of
evangelical poverty - fled to Sicily. Encouraged by the island's long
tradition of granting refuge to dissident groups and by its apparent
success in reforming society along the lines dictated by Arnau de
Vilanova, they turned first to the local evangelical friars and clergy
for support, but eventually pleaded their case before the royal court
in Palermo.
News of their arrival spread quickly. As the friars offered their
prayers for Frederick's soul and pledged to preach for peace and
repentance among all the Sicilian people, the Franciscan minister-
general back in Avignon loudly condemned them as "degenerate
sons . . . frauds made angels of Satan, who feign the image of
sanctity" yet are "moved by diabolical motives."65 Clement cursed
Frederick and recruited James in an attempt to dissuade the
Sicilians from harboring the rebels. But he failed - perhaps because
64
For background, see David Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty: The Origins of the Usus Pauper
Controversy (Pennsylvania, 1989). Franz Ehrle's work on this topic was path-breaking, see
esp. "Die Spiritualen, ihr Verhaltniss zum Franciscanerorden und zu den Fraticellen," in
Archiv fur Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, ed. Heinrich Denifle and Franz
Ehrle, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1885-1900), at 1, pp. 509—69, n, pp. 106-64, 249-336,111, pp. 553—623,
rv, pp. 1-190. Still useful are Malcolm Lambert, Franciscan Poverty: The Doctrine of the
Absolute Poverty of Christ and the Apostles in the Franciscan Order, 1210-1323 (London, 1961);
and Lambert, "The Franciscan Crisis under John XXII," Franciscan Studies, 2nd ser., 10
(1972), 123-43. For Clement's bull, see Corpus iuris canonici, ed. Emil Friedberg, 2 vols.
(Graz, 1959), at 11, pp. 1193—1200; and the discussion in Geroldus Fussenegger, "Ratio
commissionis in concilio Viennensi institutae ad decretalem Exivi de paradiso
praeparandum," Archivumfranciscanum historicum 50 (1957), i55~77-
65
ACA Cane. Reg. 337, fol. 336V-337: "degeneres filii . . . imitatores efTecti angeli Sathane
. . . pretendunt imaginem sanctitatis . . . diabolicis agitati stimulis."
James himself, although he saw clearly the potential dangers in
supporting the Spirituals, had a certain sympathy for the
evangelical reform movement - and soon many other dissidents
from the continent joined the first group of forty.66
As the pressure from Avignon increased, so too the government
in Naples began to press hard its claim upon the Calabrian
strongholds still under Sicilian control. Rumors spread of a possible
crusade against the kingdom. As the threat grew worse, local
discords and rivalries flickered into new life. These matters might
have caused Sicilian enthusiasm for the renegade friars to flag but
for the oblique encouragement given to their efforts by Ramon
Llull, who made his first and only visit to the island in May 1313 at
the venerable age of eighty-one. Llull was less an enthusiast for
poverty than he was a champion of evangelical missions to Islam,
and it was the Sicilian campaign of reform and mission - rather
than the radical impulse behind it — that he admired. "[Frederick]
has ordered and regulated his entire kingdom to the need to know
and love God," he wrote with characteristic praise, "and he has
done this with such fervor that it frequently calls to mind the
commandment that the Lord made to man" - namely, that man's
first and overriding obligation in life is to seek, serve, and love the
Creator of all.67 It is unlikely that Llull had had any contact with
Frederick before 1313, although he must have been aware, through
Vilanova's writings, that the king had openly expressed his
opposition to the papacy's policies, prior to the Council of Vienne,
regarding evangelization of Muslims and Greeks, as early as 1308.
During his year-long stay at the royal court Llull wrote no less than
thirty-eight essays and tracts on Frederick's behalf, encouraging
him to turn away from his domestic reforms and to devote his full
evangelical efforts towards supporting a mission to Tunis. This
mission, to be led by "christiani bene literati et lingua arabica
habituati," would capitalize upon the reportedly imminent con-
version to Christianity by the Tunisian ruler 'Abu Yahya Zakariya
'al-Lihyani, who owed his throne to aid he had received from Sicily.
66
P o u y M a r t i , "Visionarios," p p . 222—6; A G A C a n e . R e g . 337, fol. 337.
67
Ramon Llull, Liber de quinqueprincipiis, Munich, Stadtbibliothek, Codices latini medioevali
10495, f°l- ! 9^ : "Ordinavit et regulavit totam suam provinciam ad Deum cognoscendum
et diligendum, et in hoc conatu totis suis viribus, quare frequenter reminiscitur iussum
quod Deus hominibus fecit." See M. C. Diaz,Indexscriptorum latinorum medii aevi hispanorum
(Madrid, 1959), no. 1896; and Hillgarth, Ramon Lull andLullism, p. 109 and n. 258.
In addition, Llull hoped, "well-educated Saracens would likewise

come to Sicily, to dispute with knowledgeable Christians in regard
to their faith; and perhaps in this way there might be peace
between Christians and Muslims [in Sicily] - which would set a
model for the entire world, and henceforth Christians [from any
locale] would not need to set out to destroy Muslims, nor Muslims
kill Christians."68 Such a mission appealed to the Sicilians, who
stood to gain much by improving relations with their southern
neighbors, not least an end to fighting for control of Djerba, and
safer commerce out of Sciacca and Agrigento; but in 1313 their eyes
were drawn northward and eastward, to Itafy and Greece, where
they had already committed themselves. Thus their evangelical
efforts aimed only at preaching to the Muslim and Greek popu-
lations already present within the kingdom. Llull's presence no
doubt encouraged the evangelicals; but their failure to respond to
his call for international action caused him to quit the island in May
of 1314.69
The most crucial factor in the Spirituals' success was their
welcome reception by the local clergy who initially were no doubt
somewhat suspicious of the friars' orthodoxy but who were eager to
accept any help they could offer for revivifying religious life on the
island. The Spirituals, having made their way to the royal court and
having gained the royal family's support, agreed to submit to an
inquiry into their teachings by the chief Sicilian prelates. This
inquiry was conducted on 3 June 1314, only days after Llull
abandoned the island; the proximity of the two events makes it
likely that Llull foresaw the outcome of the inquest, and that he left
Sicily precisely because he recognized that the Spirituals would be
68
R a m o n Llull, Liber departicipatione Christianorum et Sarracenorum, in Miscelldnia lulliana, ed.
Helene Wieruzowski (Barcelona, 1935), pp. 425-6: "Raymundus . . . proposuit venire ad
nobilissimum virtuosissimiim dominum Fredericum regem Trinaclie, ut ipse, cum sit
fons devotionis, ordinet cum altissimo et potentissimo rege Tunicii, quod Ghristiani bene
literati et lingua arabica habituati vadant Tunicium ad ostendendum veritatem de fide,
et quod Sarraceni bene literati veniant ad regnum Gecilie disputatum cum sapientibus
Christianis de fide eorum; et forte per talem modum posset esse pax inter Ghristianos et
Sarracenos, habendo talem modum per universum mundum, non quod Ghristiani vadant
ad destruendum Sarracenos nee Sarraceni Christianos." See also Charles-Emmanuel
Dufourcq, "Les activites politiques et economiques des Gatalanes en Tunisie et en
Algerie orientale de 1262 a 1377," Boletin de la Real Academia de Buenos Letras de Barcelona 17
(1946), 5-96 at 60-4, 73-6.
69
Hillgarth, Lull andLullism, pp. 132-3. Frederick, ever impressionable, s e e m s to have taken
m u c h o f Llull's m e s s a g e t o heart, for h e nurtured t h e dream to lead a crusade-cum-
mission to Tunis as late a s 1316, and possibly later; see FAA 11, p. 715.
successful in seeking refuge, which meant that Sicily's eyes would
remain inward-turned, towards domestic reform, rather than
outward, towards missionary work on the international scene. Of
course, it is also possible that the inquiry into the friars' teachings
was intentionally delayed until after Llull left the island, for a
formal ratification of their religious program might have resulted
in a highly publicized rebuke from the prominent Llull, who, after
the Council of Vienne, was at the height of his respectability within
Latin Christendom; but LlulPs writings give no clue of his
sentiments at the time he set sail. At the end of the Liber de civitate
mundi, the last work he wrote while in Sicily, he introduced the
allegorical figure of Justitia, who directed him to venture to
the papal court in Avignon and other princely courts throughout
Europe, in order to broadcast his teachings there. This was, for
Llull, a common device for ending a treatise and a stay at court. But
here, interestingly, he adds that he will reject Justitia's suggestion,
since he is tired of parading his inspired ideas before princes who by
and large have only mocked him, on occasion struck him, and called
him, derisively, a "phantasticus." Instead, he declares, he will go
directly to the Muslims in Tunisia "and see if he can win them for
the Catholic faith."70 It is difficult not to see in these words a veiled
complaint against the refusal of the Sicilian high court to accede to
his missionary appeals.
The inquiry that met in late May or early June, according to a
letter from Frederick to James, convened at the king's request
after the rebel Franciscans pleaded with the crown for refuge. The
investigating council apparently was headed by Archbishop Arnau
de Rassach of Monreale; he was joined by a vicarius of Archbishop
Francesco d'Antiochia of Palermo "and various other prelates and
religious trained in theology, plus several doctors of both canon
and civil law."71 The choice of Arnau de Rassach was significant and
70
R a m o n Llull, Liber de civitate mundi (see Diaz, no. 1941), in Raimundi Lulli opera latina, ed.
Fridericus Stegmuller, 3 vols. (Palma de Mallorca, 1959), n, pp. 200-1: "Sed Raimundus
excusavit se. Et dixit, quod pluries fuit a Curiam et ad pluries principes fuit locutus, quod
fides esset exaltata per universum mundum; et fecit libros, in quibus ostenditur modus
per quern totus mundus posset esse in bono statu; sed nihil potuit impetrare cum ipsis; et
pluries fuit derisus et percussus et phantasticus vocatus. Et sic Raimundus excusavit se
et dixit, quod iret apud Saracenos, et videret, si posset ipsos Saracenos ad fidem sanctam
catholicam reducere." See Hillgarth, Lull and Lullism, p. 133.
71
ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 3871: "ac convocatis ibidem ad nos venerabili
in Christo patre archiepiscopo Montis Regalis et vicario venerabilis in Christo patris
virtually guaranteed the outcome. Arnau was the king's closest

confidant among the island's prelates and remained one of his most
trusted advisors and familiares until his death in 1324.72 It was
Arnau, for example, who had harbored Fr. Blasio d'Ardia in 1310
when he refused to recognize papal authority over his Cistercian
monastery at Maniaci, and who had placed extra arms and men into
the rebel abbot's hands in order to attack the papal envoys then
inhabiting the settlement. 73 Arnau was, moreover, a Catalan; and
thus while he may or may not have been an overt supporter of the
evangelical movement, he was at least likely to be familiar with it,
since the Catalan pedigree of religious heterodoxy was by then
entering its third decade. Catalan evangelicals had been at work in
Sicily for at least ten years by 1314, if we can take Arnau de
Vilanova's writings at their word, preaching poverty, repentance,
and reform in their schools; and a link between Vilanova and the
Spirituals existed at least from the time of the trial at Perugia.
The specific issue confronting Arnau's panel was whether or not
to accept Clement's judgment in Exivi de paradiso that whereas the
Franciscan vow of poverty, being a vow sub certo, bound one only
to those obligations specifically and explicitly demanded by the
Franciscan rule, the vague wording of Francis's precepts required
that final authority for determining the rule's meaning lay with the
order's ecclesiastical superiors - and thus, ultimately, with the Holy
See. The council, however, put the question in a much simpler
manner; they sought to determine solely "whether or not the
friars were true Catholics and faithful disciples of Jesus Christ"
and whether they were "true servants of the Holy Gospels." The
friars offered in their defense a copy of the Franciscan rule and
Clement's bull. After examining both, the court concluded that
"these friars agree with and adhere to both documents" and
that "in their Gospel truth and purity the brethren live justly
as zealous followers of the Franciscan rule, and thus, by the
clemency of the Supreme Pontiff of blessed memory . . . they are
Panormitani archiepiscopi, et quibusdam prelatis aliis necnon personis religiosis in

theologica facultate peritis ac juris doctoribus utriusque." The entire text of this hitherto
unknown letter (about a hitherto unknown inquiry) appears as an appendix to my article
"Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals in Sicily."
72
Garufi, Catalogo illustrate del tabulario di S. Maria Nuova in Monreale, doc. 144; Reg. Clement F ,
no. 220.
73
See n. 62, above.
received into the apostolic protection of the Holy Roman Mother
Church."7*
Despite appearances, the panel emphasized, this decision did not
refute papal claims; rather, it represented the bull's pronounce-
ments in action. Clement had died in April, and a hopeless split in
the College of Cardinals had left a vacancy in the Holy See that
ultimately lasted two years. Thus the Sicilian council represented
the very ecclesiastical superiors referred to in Exivi deparadiso, upon
whose judgment, in the absence of papal leadership, the fate of
the Spirituals was to be decided. "In receiving these poor Catholics
into our land, fugitives that they are from undeserved attack and
persecution, we do not offend God or the church; neither do we
detract from the religious teaching of Blessed Francis, nor do
we displease any of the Catholic faithful, nor do we do anything
which may reasonably be refuted."75 Since the Spirituals were
merely adhering to a rule already sanctioned by the Holy See, and
since the Council of Vienne had not only failed to condemn the
Spirituals dogmatically - and had even approved of one aspect of
their overall program (namely, the training of missionaries in
Arabic and Hebrew) - there could be no alternative but to welcome
them.
The two-year vacancy in Avignon provided the friars with a
temporary respite and gave the Sicilian action the chance to stand
unchallenged. New protests arrived from mainland and main-
stream Franciscans when still more groups of evangelicals took
advantage of the hiatus to join the group already at work in Sicily,
but these admonitions were easily ignored.76 The rebel friars set to
74
ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 3871: "factaque coram nobis per eos
examinatione solenni de Fratribus antedictis, utrum essent vere Catholici et fideles
discipuli Jhesu Ghristi, ad nostram conscientiam serenandam Fratres ipsi per predictos
prelatos et personas alias sunt inventi veraces Sancti Evangelii servatores. Ipsique eisdem
prelatis et personis aliis atque nobis cum declaratione papali Beati Francisci regulam
ostenderunt. Hos enim Fratres invenimus consentientes et adherentes eis, qui pro
Evangelica veritate et puritate eorum recte existunt prefate Beati Francisci regule
zelatores et a dementia summi pontificis memorie recolende (prout continebatur in suis
sanctitatis apicibus bulla papali plumbea roboratis) in protectione apostolica et Sancte
Romane Matris Ecclesie sunt recepti."
75
Ibid.: " p a u p e r e s G a t h o l i c o s . . . i n t e r r a n o s t r a r e c e p i m u s t a m q u a m a v e x a t i o n i b u s e t
persecutionibus indebitis fugientes, non Deum et Sacrosanctam Romanam Ecclesiam
Matrem nostram offendimus, non religioni Beati Francisci detrahimus, non viris
Gatholicis displicemus, non aliquid agimus, unde nobis redargutionis nota rationabiliter
impingatur."
™ ACA Cane. Reg. 337, fol. 337.
work principally in the two eastern valli, spreading their message

among the poor immigrants from the west. Val di Mazara, with the
exception of Palermo itself, saw relatively little evangelical activity.
Additional churches and schools were built, more sermons on
poverty delivered, more Greeks, Muslims, and Jews pressured to
convert, and Frederick once more took up the idea of a possible
mission to Tunis.
But the election of John XXII in 1316 brought swift changes.77 His
opening salvo was surprisingly restrained - a polite letter that
bemoaned the Spiritual controversy as an obfuscating element in
Christian life and sought the Sicilians' help in healing the church's
wounds.78 But he was determined not to yield. A delegation of
Spirituals from the Midi who arrived in Avignon to explain their
teachings and to seek clemency was refused a hearing and
imprisoned; eventually four of them were burned at the stake. As
tensions escalated it became evident that a doctrinal decision on
poverty could no longer wait. But John, as his detractors then and
now have delighted to point out, had no formal theological training,
which made it unlikely that he would soon be able to render a
sufficiently knowledgeable decision that would be accepted by all.
Nevertheless he set himself to intense study of the doctrinal issues
at stake.79 In the meantime he exerted a variety of pressures on the
Sicilians in order to persuade them to relinquish their support of
the rebels, including a long series of cajoling letters, appeals to
James, threats of military reprisal, and an effective campaign
to solicit the assistance of Sicily's anti-royalist bishops, notably
Leonardo Fieschi of Catania and Giovanni of Lipari-Patti.80 On
15 March 1316 he wrote a scathing letter to Frederick, demanding
the immediate arrest of the Spirituals on the island, whether of
Tuscan or other origin - a command which suggests that some
of the friars who had fled to Sicily may have come from the Midi,
since Tuscany and the Midi were at this time the two principal
77
Lambert, "The Franciscan Crisis under J o h n X X I I , " pp. 128, 132.
78
ACA Cartas James II, no. 5503.
79
Lambert, "Franciscan Crisis under J o h n X X I I , " pp. 126-8.
80
A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 5567-8, 5697, 10248, 10257, 10264—7, 10272, 11766; Cartas J a m e s
II, apendice, no. 36; Pou y Marti, Visionarios, beguinos y fraticelos catalanes, pp. 107-8;
Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 32, 36; Harold Lee, Marjorie Reeves, and Giulio Silano,
Western Mediterranean Prophecy: The School of Joachim of Flore and the Fourteenth-Century
Breviloquium (Toronto, 1989), Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts,
vol. LXVIII, p. 45.
centers of Spiritual activity, and that the friars had picked up some
native Sicilian adherents as well.81 There is no evidence of a
continued flight of evangelicals to the island after this point, so it is
possible that John's action had the chilling effect it desired, even
though it failed to engineer the surrender of those friars already
granted refuge.
By autumn of 1317, however, John's intense study of the theology
of poverty was well advanced, and he stood ready to promulgate his
three bulls that permanently altered the situation, for Sicily as for
the rest of Europe: Quorumdam exigit (October 1317), Sancta Romana
(December 1317), and Gloriosam ecclesiam (January 1318).82 The
pronouncements, even though they still avoided the vexing issue
of clerical poverty jter se, largely settled the matter by mandating
obedience to the Holy See as the unfailing arbiter of the Franciscan
rule. As John wrote: "Poverty is great, but unity is greater, and
obedience is the greatest good . . . for the first is concerned with
objects, the second with mortal flesh, but the third with the mind
and spirit."83 Church opposition to the radical Franciscans, while it
still stopped short of doctrinal censure, now wielded as much force
as that censure; in other words, whereas the Spirituals' teachings
were not declared explicitly heretical (a declaration that would not
come until November 1323, with Cum inter nonnullos), to persist in
their practice despite papal orders to the contrary could now be
condemned not merely as ecclesiastical disobedience but as
heresy.84 Specifically, Quorumdam exigit asserted the church's unique
and insuperable authority to define poverty, both as a virtue and a
practice; Sancta Romana condemned various recalcitrant bands of
"fraticelli seu fratres de paupere vita aut bizocchi sive beghini,"
whether these were comprised of professed friars or tertiaries, who
broke away from the main Franciscan order; and Gloriosam ecclesiam
censured for the first time certain of the evangelicals' apocalyptic
views, notably those on the advent of Antichrist (or indeed his
supposed arrival already in the person of, according to some, John
81
Bullariumjranciscanum, ed. Conrad Eubel ( R o m e , 1898), vol. v, no. 256.
82
Ibid, v , no. 289, 297, and 302, respectively; s e e also Corpus iuris canonici 11, pp. 1213-14,
1220-4, 1225-9.
83
Bullarium franciscanum v , n o . 2 8 9 (at p. 130b): " M a g n a q u i d e m paupertas, s e d maior
integritas; bonum est obedientia maxima... nam prima rebus, secunda carni, tertia vero
menti dominatur et animo."
84
For Cum inter nonnullos, see ibid, v, no. 518; cf. Corpus iuris canonici 11, pp. 1229-30.
85
himself). Of these three, the last aimed directly at the
Tuscan-Sicilian faction, whose apocalyptic convictions had reached
the most radical development. John identified four principal errors
in their beliefs, which taken together were tantamount to heresy:
namely, the dual existence of a "carnal church" and of a "spiritual
church" in contest for the mastery of Christendom; the denial of
the Roman church's spiritual authority and ecclesiastical juris-
diction; the assertion that sacraments performed by a priest in
mortal sin were void of grace; and the belief that only the Spiritual
brethren represented the ideal of evangelical perfection. "All these,
which I recognize as part heresy, part insanity, and part pure lies, I
condemn as things to be damned outright," he decreed, before
ordering the Sicilian clerics and government to proceed immedi-
ately with the friars' arrest and extradition.86
After this, there was little the Sicilians could do, at least
officially. Now that Avignon had finally pronounced a formal
decree regarding the Spirituals' teachings, they announced their
willingness to conform. Indeed, they even anticipated the Holy
See's decision. A parliament had convened at Messina in May of
that year, and the high clergy used the forum to announce a change
of heart in their support for the rebels. To defend traditional
ecclesiastical rights was one matter, they asserted, but to oppose
declared doctrines of the church was quite another. As one eye-
witness described it: "the notables at Messina told [the king] that
they would suffer anything for him except to be branded heretics."
A charge of heresy, if it came, would invite a crusade against the
kingdom, and the island's resources were already stretched beyond
the breaking point. Thus the council altered course and ordered the
Spirituals to be arrested and deported without delay to Tunis,
where 'al-Lihyani had already agreed to receive them in peace
provided that they refrained from preaching.87
85
Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty, p. 181.
86
Bullariumjranciscanum, no. 302: "quae omnia, quia partim haeretica partim insana, partim
fabulosa cognoscimus, damnanda potius cum suis auctoritatibus quam stilo prosequenda
aut repellanda censemus." The bull further condemned the Spirituals' apocalyptic
prophesies and their rejection of the sacrament of marriage.
87
ACA Gartas James II, no. 5669 (in 6 folios), at fol. 6: "Sabet encara Senyor que'l rey Don
Fradrich envia en Tunez todos los Frayres Menores, aquellos qui seran hexidos de la
horden, de los quales el se era enparado, e deven partir d'aqui en una terida dentro en
VIII dias de la data d'esta carta; e entiende acabar con el rey de Tunez que finguen en su
terra assi enpero que nohi prehiguen; e en aquest comedio manda que finguen en Gerba
The specifics of this notice are of great interest. First, the
chronology of events. This action followed closely upon the pub-
lication of Gloriosam ecclesiam, and yet by the time the parliament
had met, arrangements had already been concluded with the
Tunisian ruler to grant refuge to the friars. Clearly the parliament
took seriously the implied threat of a punitive crusade, since the
intervening months had provided sufficient time for an attacking
force to be marshaled and the sailing season was entering its high
point. Thus the parliament had no sooner made its decision than an
urgent embassy set out for Avignon to inform the pontiff of its
change of heart. John welcomed the news, and rewarded the
Sicilians by ordering the withdrawal of Angevin raiding forces who
had been harassing the northern coast of the island for over a
year.88 Second, the friars who were transferred to Tunis embarked
upon a single ship, a terida. These were far from the largest ships in
Mediterranean fleets; most galleys and cogs were considerably
larger. Used principally to accompany galleys and cogs on long
voyages, or for coastal shipments or fishing expeditions, the
average terida in the fourteenth century had a maximum load
capacity of thirty to forty persons for a voyage of the length such
as that from Messina to Tunis, which could take up to a week.
Allowing for the size of the crew, and assuming that part of the ship
was laden with commercial goods as well as the emigrating rebels
(perhaps as gifts for the accommodating 'al-Lihyani), it is unlikely
that all of the Spirituals — of whom there were, according to sources,
at least fifty by 1317 - were intended for deportation. Rather, the
ship probably carried whatever Spirituals wished to move to North
Africa and left many others in Sicily - either to be hidden or to
continue openly in their rebellion against Avignon.
Having at least gestured towards compliance with John's
directive, the Sicilians' relations with Avignon rallied briefly. But
the gesture was not likely to placate John for long, and therefore the
et entendet que aquesto non faze el plazentament antes muyt forcado por miedo que'l
papa les le mande prender e enviar a su poder; en en aquesto ay tenido buen lugar lo
que'l rey Don Fradrich assentido en los Sezilianos, 50 es, que'l querian hitar las coces
d'aquest feyto, que paladinament et acordada le dixieron los prohomens de Mecina
que toda cosa sufririan por el mas que non sufTririan titol d'erges, 50 es, factores et
mantenedores d'ereges."
88
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10144,10270,11766. The Angevins had attacked first at Marsala,
with a fleet of seventy ships, and then had moved successively eastward until they reached
Reggio di Calabria.
parliament suddenly announced its eagerness to resolve the

Calabrian castle dispute and agreed to deliver the strongholds into
church hands until a final solution with Naples could be reached. In
return for the double compromise, John granted a forbearance of
the census payments owed to the Holy See, which were then deeply
89
in arrears.
Most of the Spirituals found asylum in Tunis, but a few others
migrated to Naples where Queen Sancia received them into her
care and where they perhaps encountered fellow exiles from the
evangelical movement at Ancona.90 But a fair number remained in
Sicily, hidden under new habits and relying on the collusion of the
local clergy and populace for their safety. Monasteries such as
S. Maria Nemoris Clausa, near Paterno, and S. Placido di Calonero
Vecchio, in Scaletta Zanclea, were two such houses.91 Both were
good choices, for purposes of hiding. Scaletta Zanclea, though near
to the coast, was all but immune from outside interference. A
thirteenth-century castle, lying just beneath Monte Poverello at
one of the highest points in the Peloritani chain, defined the site; it
could be approached, and today can still be approached, only by a
single, narrow road that stretched upwards from the coast at a point
roughly fifteen kilometers down the coast from Messina. Paterno,
located some twenty kilometers northwest of Catania at the base of
Mount Etna, was an even safer site, inhabiting a sprawling ledge
beneath another thirteenth-century tower from which the entire
Simeto valley is visible. Anyone approaching either town could be
immediately spotted, leaving more than ample time to secrete any
resident evangelicals in prepared hiding places or in the wilderness
beyond.
Other monastic houses were built specifically to shelter the
evangelicals. The site of S. Maria del Bosco di Calatamauro, for
example, had been settled by a group of evangelicals as early as
1308. Bishop Bertoldo of Agrigento consecrated the church there on
22 June 1309. After Gloriosam ecclesiam and the expulsion order
in 1317, this church became a central haven for the remaining
89
Mansilla, "La documentation espanola del Archivo del Castel S. Angelo," doc. 113, 115;
A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10265; GG, doc. 114.
90
Ronald G. Musto, "Queen Sancia of Naples (1286-1345) and the Spiritual Franciscans," in
Women in Medieval Europe, ed. Julius Kirshner a n d Suzanne F. W e m p l e (Oxford, 1985),
pp. 179-214.
91
RPSS 11, pp. 1137-50,1314.
Spirituals, and was in fact given even stronger support by Bertoldo,
who raised the church to the status of a priory (under the
Benedictine rule) and appointed one of the original Tuscan
refugees, Giovanni Castelluccio, to be its first prior.92 Popular
support for S. Maria was widespread; Frederick's magister rationalise
Matteo Sclafani, reportedly figured among its most generous
patrons.93 The evangelicals who took refuge there included, to
judge from their names, a number of Sicilian adherents, suggesting
that the friars had succeeded in converting at least some of their
protectors.94
From these places the evangelicals continued to preach their
radical reform in the countryside, while a few brave souls still
haunted the streets of the major cities and summoned large crowds
to reform and poverty. It did not take long for word of their
continued activity to reach Avignon. In 1321 John complained that
the Sicilians were still harboring the Spirituals "and others who go
by the tainted name of Beguins." No new expulsion ruse was
attempted this time, since the renewal of the war with Robert and
John's renewal of the interdict (because of royal confiscation of
ecclesiastical lands to help pay for the new war effort) made further
dissembling pointless; and consequently the kingdom openly
repeated its offer of refuge to the Spirituals and all other dis-
affected religious groups.95 Many friars emerged from seclusion
and redoubled their preaching efforts in the cities, some of which
were now in quite desperate condition. Throughout Castro-
giovanni, Catania, Corleone, Palermo, Sciacca, and Trapani the
bodies of starved paupers and bloodied victims of factional
struggles were strewn everywhere.
Hatred of the clergy and the fear of apocalyptic portents grew.
One of the most telling phenomena was a widespread renewal of an
ancient folk custom called the ripitu, which reappeared as early as
1309 and regularly after 1322, as a means of lamenting the dead
92
ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 69,528; see also RPSS1, pp. 707—8. Giovanni remained
in office until his death in 1334.
» BCPMSQqAi2,fol. 18.
94
A S P Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 263 (dated 11 July 1343, but containing t h e text o f
an earlier d o c u m e n t dated 20 March 1318). T h e n a m e s given are Nicola d'Alcamo, Andrea
di Corleone, Pace di Corleone, Marchio di Messina, Nicola di Messina, and Alessandro
di Milazzo. The letter also cites two Spirituals from the mainland: Pietro di Catanzaro
and Angeluccio di Marchia.
95
A C A Cane. Reg. 338, fol. 31V—32; Pou y Marti, Visionarios, beguinosyfraticelos catalanes, p. n o .
whose bodies were piling up in the streets. Despite the interdict,
priests could officiate at burials but the crowds no longer desired
their presence and indeed seem to have regarded their partici-
pation as an evil to be avoided. Mass burials and individual funerals
alike became occasions of apocalyptic keening, led by female
"wailers" (reputatrices) who organized and directed the proceedings.
Crowds filled the squares and by-ways, beating drums, ringing
bells, waving crosses, striking their breasts, and weeping
inconsolably - lamenting not only the death of those being buried
but also the very hopelessness of life when men and women must
come to judgment without even the benefit of worthy clergy to
guide and support them. This was by no means strictly a lower-class
phenomenon. In a particularly long and passionate series of ripitu
ceremonies in Palermo in 1336, for example, the streets filled with
such large crowds of elites, merchants, and workers that the
universitas had to request aid from the king in dispersing the people
and in persuading the local clergy to overcome popular sentiment
against them and to take some sort of action to restore order:
When people die in the city, whether they be magnates, burghers, or
commoners, the clergy and monks of the city refuse to attend to the
ceremonies [of the dead] or to their burial. . . Instead the people take up
crosses, strike bells, and carry the bodies of the dead to the church, where
they bury them in the cemetery, utterly inconsolable and without the
presence of any religious or clergy. Indeed, the people of the city are often
in such turmoil that they cause riots and no end of unrest. And so, in order
to quell this tumult, this war and rumble, may Your Benign and generous
Excellency (upon whom your faithful citizens have always relied in times
of adversity, and which others, given the evils of the present times, are
frequently willing to accept) provide some relief and, we pray, a solution.96
96
Ada curie vi, doc. 214 (9 Oct. 1336); cf. BCP MS Qq H 3, fol. 243—243V, for a nearly
identical text, probably a draft. My translation is based on the BCP manuscript, which
provides a more readable text: "Maiestatem Vestram scire cupimus presentium serie
litterarum, ut, cum aliqui in urbe ipsa tarn magnates et mercatores quam populares
obeant, clerici et religiosi urbis predicte in eorum exequiis et sepulcris noluerint adesse
nee vadere, velati cum superpelliceis vel sine ipsis sed homines per se accipientes crucem
et pulsantes campanam corpora mortuorum deferunt ad ecclesia et sepeliunt in ipsorum
cimiterio inconsolabiliter et absque illorum religiosorum presentia et clericorum; et iam
exinde sepius homines urbis predicte turbati sunt et fecerunt et faciunt tumultum et
murmur non modicum inter eos; et ad eximendum ab hominibus ipsis tumultum,
guerram et rancorem, Vestra se interponat Benignitas et Excellentia generosa (que
semper suis fldelibus consuevit in adversitatibus huiusmodi, et aliis quibuscumque quas
nequitia temporis faciente sepius sunt perpessi adhibere) consolationem et remedium
juxta votum."
The wording of the request was hardly likely to win royal sympathy
for the communal leaders, but the urgency of such occasions is
nevertheless evident. A large mob wild with grief and fear, in times
of extraordinary hardship, can pose a significant danger, especially
if a part of their misery is directed at the religious or political
authorities whom they blame, rightly or not, for their difficulties.
Frederick had explicitly forbidden such demonstrations as early as
1309, although it is unclear how widespread the phenomenon was at
that date.97 Laws in the Ordinationes generates had established firm
restrictions on female participation in burials throughout the
kingdom; it is difficult, given the wording of these laws, not to
associate the behavior they aimed against with ripitu:
No woman, noble or common, shall dare to proceed with a bier, or to
follow it, as it carries its dead to any church or burial site, regardless of the
woman's relation to the deceased, or whatever tie of affection joined her
to the dead. The penalty for this of 4.00.00. All bodies of the dead are to be
brought covered to the church or graveyard; failure to comply with this
entails a penalty of 4.00.00.98
Since cries, chants, and wailings offered on behalf of the dead throw the
spirits of any nearby women into a state of grief and persuade them to
behavior [that is] injurious to Our Creator, we forbid criers (reputantes)
to be present at all funerals, along with all other women who customarily
attended to funereal matters . . . Neither shall they ring bells, play
musical instruments, or beat drums . . . at a penalty of 4.00.00 . . . If any
such criers are unable to pay this penalty on account of their poverty, they
are to be driven through the city and countryside with cudgels."
97
Bresc, Un monde, p. 621, n. 167. A noteworthy wave of ripitu riots plagued P a l e r m o through-
out 1329 and 1330 a s well, and prompted Frederick t o order the public whipping o f the
reputatrices w h o led the processions; seeActa curie v, doc. 141 (6 Sept. 1330).
98
Ord. gen., c h . 100: "Quod nulla d o m i n a sive mulier audeat ire c u m feretro, s e u
post feretrum, c u m corpora defunctorum deferuntur ad ecclesias vel sepulturas,
quantumcumque defunctus consanguinitate vel afiinitate sibi junctus fuerit, sub poena
unciarum quatuor. I t e m quod huiusmodi corpora defunctorum deferantur cooperta
per totum ad ecclesias vel sepulturas easdem; et si quis contrafecerit, solvat uncias
quatuor."
99
Ibid., ch. 101: "Item quoniam reputationes et cantus et soni, qui propter defunctos
celebrantur, muliebriter animos astantium convertunt in luctum et movent e o s
quodammodo ad injuriam Creatoris, prohibemus reputantes funeribus adesse, vel alie
mulieres, quae earum utantur ministerio nee in domibus seu ecclesiis vel sepulturis vel
alio quocumque loco; n e e pulsentur circa funebria, guideme vel timpana vel alia solita
instrumenta . . . poena unciarum auri quatuor . . . que reputatrices, si poenam solvere
propter pauperitatem non possint, ne poenalis prohibito eludatur, fustibus caedantur per
civitatem et terram ubi prohibita tentaverunt."
We prohibit all women, noble or common, regardless of their relation to or
affection for the deceased, to visit churches or burial sites on feast days
or on any other occasion when they might be expected to bewail the dead
. . . at a penalty of 4.00.00. And we decree that only the sons, daughters,
and wives of deceased persons - and no one else - may dress the dead in
burial clothes, at a penalty of 6.00.00.100
No one, regardless of relation to or especially affection for the deceased,
may go unshaven for eight days beyond the death of the person involved,
except for sons and brothers ... who may grow beards and wear mourning
clothes for one month . . . Penalty: 4.00.00.101
Obviously, the reputantes described here are related, etymologically
at least, to those involved in ripitu. This concern with funerals had
nothing to do with decorum; the law clearly prohibited what it
feared - massive ritual outpourings of uncontrollable grief and
dismay, ceremonial expressions of wild hopelessness and misery
that are wholly consonant with apocalyptic fears. Such spontaneous
riots frightened both local and royal government not only for the
potential damage to property they could bring but also for their
debilitating effect on the general social outlook. Recovering from
disease and economic depression, not to mention continuing the
kingdom's multiple war efforts, required, if not straightforward
optimism, at least a sustained sense of stoic determination and
resolve, neither of which was given much encouragement by
the ripitu's enervating surrender. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the
various factions and comitive contending to control the cities
throughout the 1320s and 1330s directly promoted this cult of
despair by their conspicuous expenditures on public ceremonies
like funerals in order to display their wealth and the supposed
extent of their popular following. Few things better symbolized
the respect or fear in which comitive leaders were held than
ostentatious mass grief over the death of one of their fallen
members.
100
Ibid., ch. 102: "Prohibemus etiam a dominabus et mulieribus aliisque quantumcumque
consanguinitate vel affinitate jungantur iam mortuis ire ad ecclesias seu sepulcra
defunctorum diebus festivis vel aliis occasione consuetudinis ad plorandum ibidem
propter defunctos . . . Item statuimus, quod filii, filie et uxores defunctorum, et non alii
vel alie, lugubria induant ob interitum eorum."
101
Ibid., ch. 103: "Nullus preterea consanguineus vel afFinis maxime defunctorum audeat
ultra octo dies barbam deferre, propter obitum eorum, exceptis filiis et fratribus, qui
juste dolorem prosequuntur, quibus permittetur usque ad mensem, si voluerint barbam
et lugubres vestes portare."
Still other signs indicate the continued influence of the evangeli-
cals. As late as September 1328 an evangelical friar named Roberto
preached throughout the Val di Mazara - his base of operations was
likely S. Maria di Calatamauro, although there is no direct evidence
of this - on the doctrine of Christ's poverty and the necessity of
defying ecclesiastical authority. When he spread his message in the
streets of Palermo, and was contradicted by various Dominicans,
the people were thrown "in magna perplexitate," according to
curial records. The archbishop - Giovanni Orsini, a papal appointee
installed early in 1320 to restore order - had Roberto seized and
brought before an ecclesiastical hearing. Roberto flatly refused to
speak at the inquest, and was imprisoned for heresy. But so great a
"rumor et turbatio in populo" erupted that the archbishop's
inquisitors ordered Roberto to be released.102 It is significant
that this "riot and mob-scene" resulted less from the supposed
confusion between Roberto's message and the orthodox teaching
of the Dominicans than from Roberto's imprisonment. The
evangelical message was deeply rooted. This particular crisis
was further complicated, however, by events on the mainland. Louis
the Bavarian, who had recently entered Rome to receive his
imperial crown, had appointed an anti-pope (Nicholas V) who
was a Franciscan Spiritual. Louis's emissaries to Palermo
attempted to propagandize on behalf of the rival pontiff, in addition
to their principal mission of renewing the Sicilian-German
alliance. Frederick, however, balked at recognizing Nicholas;
John XXII might be Sicily's implacable foe, an evil-doer and,
perhaps even, to the most radical friars, Antichrist himself, but
he was the sole legitimate pope. To reject John's legitimacy
would be to invite the crusade that the Angevins had long
wanted but had thus far failed to secure. Frederick forbade the
German ambassadors to speak on Nicholas's behalf; but this
prohibition was ignored, causing ever greater confusion in the
streets of Palermo as the word was spread from square to
square. Eventually the government was able to silence the
propaganda, but matters only grew worse when, after asserting
the dangerous errors of the German position, the kingdom then
'°2 BGP MS Qq H 3, fol. 268-9V (13 Sept. 1328); cf. Ada curie v, doc. 8; Bozzo, Note storiche,
doc. 59.
renewed its pact to support and defend the now openly heretical
Louis.103
Other figures, not affiliated with the evangelicals but still
engaged in popular, personal ministries among the urban poor, also
acquired significantfallowings.One of these was Guillem de Cut, a
Catalan friar of the Teutonic order, housed at the church of
S. Trinita in Palermo. When Guillem had been in charge of the
local chapter it had been renowned for its goodness and charity. He
had allowed the people full access to the church's lands and
pastures and shared with them the food and goods at his disposal,
even while caring for the inmates at a leper hospital that was under
his administration. His successor, however, proved to be such a
disappointment - "one who acts atrociously to the people in regard
to the woods and pastures, and who daily engages in law suits
regarding his properties, causing riots and demonstrations to
become a regular event. . . and who has loosed the lepers, allowing
them to wander everywhere throughout the city, spreading disease
and fouling the air" - that the universitas petitioned to the grand
master of the Teutonic order in Italy for Guillem's return.104
Another popular figure was Salvo di Messina, an Augustinian monk
noted for his piety and charity. The examples of Salvo and Guillem
illustrate a growing problem: as social conditions worsened, many
members of local churches, monasteries, priories, and chapter-
houses turned rapacious, and either halted whatever charitable
activities they had earlier engaged in, opting instead to guard with
increasing jealousy what little remained to them in straitened
circumstances, or they took advantage of chaotic social conditions
to ignore their obligations and devote their energies instead to
increasing their holdings. Often only a single, saintly leader like
Salvo or Guillem kept their ambitions in check. Once these figures
were gone, however, the others "in acting like vipers bring about
the ruin of their own church . . . which causes the people of the city
to abandon them and to forsake the churches altogether."105
103
Joachim Leuschner,Deutschlandim sp'dten Mittelalter, 2nd edn. (Gottingen, 1983), Deutsche
Geschichte, vol. in, pp. 134—41; FAA 1, doc. 296; AGA Gartas Alfonso III, no. 3683; Cane.
Reg. 562, fol. 26-26V, 31-32V; A;ta curie v, doc. 8.
104
Ada curie v, doc. 49 (5 Jan. 1329).
105
Ada curie vi, doc. 212 (8 Oct. 1336): "ut vespiliones, qui ecclesiam ipsam spoliant, nedum
sanctitate intacta verum etiam rebus eiusdem quas dilapadant evidenter... ob qua causa
persone prenominate urbis . . . ab ecclesia ipsa totaliter deseruerunt et deserunt."
Fr. Salvo and Fr. Guillem may have been saintly, but they were not
saints. Only one figure from Frederick's long reign achieved that
status - William the Confessor, or Beato Guglielmo, a hermit from
Polizzi, whose cult was established as early as 1326, according to the
surviving text of his celebratory officium.106 Guglielmo died, the text
says, in 1321 after a lifetime of pious service, solitary penance, and
prayer in the region of Petralia Soprana - a settlement on a rocky
spur at the foot of the Madonie mountains fifteen kilometers west
of Gangi. Living as he did within the county of Geraci, Guglielmo
became a special patron of the Ventimiglia family. He died an
old man, we are told, but was in the prime of life at the time of
Frederick's coronation; hence he may have been born sometime
around 1250. His officium offers a fascinating glimpse into the
spiritual and moral world of the Vespers era. Its general tone and
message is penitential, portraying as it does a tortured soul whose
better nature is forever attacked by evil temptation; his is a
desperate soul, hobbled by weakness, in a parlous and malevolent
world.107
Guglielmo's embattled life was representative of a strain of
Basilian asceticism that had close links with the Franciscan move-
ment - both orthodox and heterodox - within Sicily, but especially
in the Val Demone. Records from 1308 count no fewer than 101
abbeys and priories in the Val Demone, thirty-four of which were
isolated hermitages where souls such as Guglielmo's sought to
escape the ruins of the world and to prepare themselves for
judgment. Guglielmo was particularly active in promoting the
ascetic movement as the sole, or at least the best, means to
salvation; he is credited with establishing at least five isolated
cloisters in the Madonie mountains. In these hermitages the
brethren turned to the urgent business of reform, repentance, and
attacking sin in all its forms.
Guglielmo's officium consists of eleven readings, each of which is
devoted to a particularly important episode in the saint's life and
106
BCP MS Qq F 32, fol. 14.V-23.
107
On the ten Sicilians canonized between 1260 and 1360, see Ottavio Gaetano, Vitae
sanctorum siculorum ex antiquis graecis latinisque monumentis et ex MSS codicibns collectae aut
scriptae et animadversionibus illustratae, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1657), 1, pp. 230—51; see also Henri
Bresc, "L'eremitisme franciscain en Sicile," in Francescanesimo e cultura in Sicilia, secoli
XIII-XV (Palermo, 1982), pp. 38-42; Bresc, Un monde, p. 607.
which illustrates his heroic virtue. They also provide us with a
glimpse of the concerns and values of the intensely felt spiritual
existence and worldly concern of the ascetic movement. The first
reading tells us that Guglielmo spent four years in solitary life at
Gonato, a barren site near Castelbuono, in honor of the Blessed
Virgin. But as his saintly reputation spread and the settlement
filled with other seekers after God, Guglielmo was beset by "various
temptations sent by demons." Those demons ultimately led him to
journey to Petralia Soprana, where he hoped to purify himself by
performing acts of charity on behalf of the poor. En route to his
purification, however, he stopped at an inn for the night where he
was tempted in the middle of the night by the brazen female
innkeeper. Having driven her, shame-faced, from his room he fell
back into a fitful sleep, only to have a vision of the same woman
slipping into the bedroom of another unsuspecting boarder;
although he remained asleep, the office says, he sent his spirit into
the dream in order to castigate the woman a second time, from
doubly afar. From this episode alone, it is clear that Guglielmo's
great weakness, and the great lesson of the reading, is the evil of the
carnal, material world, exemplified chiefly in the female form,
although there is a clear suggestion that his first temptations
focused upon the male would-be ascetics who had clustered around
him at Gonato.108
Having returned at some point to Gonato, the readings continue,
Guglielmo found that life in the hermitage still presented too many
temptations and distractions; hence he departed abruptly to seek
peace in a nearby mountain cave. Entering the cavern, however, he
came upon "two black-skinned Ethiopians, their eyes burning [with
fear] and their hands tied behind their backs." Obviously, these
were runaway slaves. But rather than take pity on them, he turned
q p 32, foi ^v: "devertet annis ibi completis quatuor et in honore Virginis
reparata ecclesia ad locum solitarium, qui 'Gonatum' dicitur . . . Cum autem fratres ibi
aliquos aggregasset, et varias demonum temptationes perferret, contigit virum beatum
pro helemosina Petraliam Superiorem accedere. Quern videns inproba quedam, ut
videbatur devota mulier, hospitio invitavit; sed dum de nocte vir Dei Guillelmus, divus
orationi vacans corporis lassitudine nuda humo cepisset dormitando quiescere, mulier,
temeraria spiritu diabolico istigata, surgens de stratu servum Christi ad opus illicitum
invitabat. Ipse vero Dei famulus 'Desine!' ait, *O infelix mulier, Sathane vinculis alligata!
O mente perdita impudens et effrons desine talia dicere, que nefanda sit.' Que, rubore
suffusa, ad stratum rediens; sed temptamenta diaboli non obmittens, denuo intempeste
noctis silentio surgit et tractare manu illicite cepit juvenem dormientem."
on them in fury before they scarcely had time to ask for food or to
beg him not to turn them in to the authorities. "O, most vile and
stupid of men!" he cried, cuffing one of them on the head. "Your
entreaties will win nothing from me. A place stands prepared for
you already in Hell!" The text is obscure, but Guglielmo seems to
have been angered by their intrusion of his planned solitude, rather
than by their obvious status as runaways. It is likely, too, that the
poor slaves may have been Muslims - most African slaves in Sicily
were at least nominally Muslim, until the legislation of 1309
heightened efforts to convert them to Christianity - and thus
earned his enmity for religious reasons. At any rate, he drove them
from the cave - "I advise you to return to the world, and not to bring
your evils into this lonely place; by entering, you may have already
assured your [eternal] death!" - by summoning a deep "sound like
a terrible thunderclap" from the depths of the cave; after this he
always kept the entrance to the cave blocked, whenever he was not
there.109
He was next summoned, in the fifth reading, by another vision
of the Virgin, this time to build a new church at Fabaria, on the
northern side of the Madonie mountains. But his plans fell apart
when he suffered "a sickness while on the midpoint of his journey
- a rupture of his bowels" that forced him to return to Gonato.
Overwhelmed by his sense of failure, he prayed constantly for
forgiveness before a statue of Mary. If he stopped praying for even
the briefest moment the "infestations of countless demons made
him tremble violently"; and hence he halted his prayers only when
overcome by sleep. But as soon as he was asleep recurring dreams
of falling from the top of a tall tree plagued him until, desperate for
reassurance and rest, he took to tying himself to his bed, lest he fall
out.110
Eventually his nightmares and sense of shame at having failed
Mary passed, and with this passing Guglielmo had survived his own
109
Ibid., fol. I6-I6V: "duos Ethyopes intus nigerrimos cernit oculis ardentibus et manibus
post terga ligatis. Sed ut clarius ut qui essent agnoscerent [sic], vir Dei caput altius
extulisset, alteri dixit Ethiopei: 'O vilissimi hominum! Insensate! Nihil vel modicum tibi
tua deprecatio prodest, quia pars tua reservatur InferniP . . . 'Revertere,' inquit alteri, 'ad
mundum. Revertere consulo, et ne in hac solitudine male port as. Et tuum hie intrando
forte interitum procurasti!'... Subito sonus ut tonitrui terribilis de spelunca intonuit, et
eos in momento fugavit."
110
Ibid., fol. 17V—18: "recessus in itineris medio rupture infirmitatem viscerum passus e s t . . .
demonum infestationes nimium perhorresceret."
long dark night of the soul. Henceforth his life increased in holiness
and peacefulness. Not coincidentally, Guglielmo's realization of a
brightening future corresponded temporally with Frederick's
coronation; according to the office, the saint foresaw all the
difficulties of the reign that was then just beginning, and predicted
the wars and famines that would ensue. But rather than bewail the
new king as the bringer of evil times, Guglielmo instead saw
the coming hardships as opportunities to bear witness to the Holy
Spirit and turned joyfully to widespread preaching among the rural
populace. He did not have to wait long for the hardships to arrive.
The eighth reading (the last substantive passage, before a rather
formulaic treatment of his death) tells us of a dire famine in the
land - probably the crop failures of 1311-14 - that brought starving
peasants from miles around to the doors of the hermitage. The
brethren at Gonato, whose own stores were low, carefully rationed
small portions of grain to the miserable wretches; but when
Guglielmo saw what they were doing, he hurried over to them and
asked with a kindness that the two African slaves would have
thought impossible: "Why do you ration? There is no charity in this.
God will provide for all!" And when the brothers consequently
threw open their entire granaries to the poor, they found that their
stores were miraculously replenished and that each vessel in
their storehouse was filled to the brim. This marks a clear break
from his past. No longer the tortured ascetic, he devoted himself
wholeheartedly to preaching and to the practical care of the poor,
and in so doing took on a role comparable to that of the itinerant
friars. His concern with sin was not yet over, but his reaction to it in
others softened. When another vision came to him, in which he
sensed evil-doings in the hermitage, he rose from his bed and found
one of his fellow monks, one Fra Alberto, in the cellar cavorting
with a young woman. Guglielmo hesitated, though, to lash out
against the girl, as he would certainly have done in the earlier
phase of his career, and instead urged penance on Alberto, who
eventually, we are told, bolted from the hermitage and rejoined the
world. The girl was evidently seeking food by whatever means lay at
her disposal in dire times, and was thus more to be pitied and cared
for than punished. Still more remarkably, when on a different
occasion another young unmarried woman (femina, not mulier),
nearly dead from an exhausting and difficult childbirth, was
brought to the hermitage to receive the holy man's prayers, he sadly
refused, saying with regret that as a sinner himself his prayers
would be of no use to the poor girl. Just as the girl was on the brink
of death, however, the Holy Mother - taking pity, we are told, on
Guglielmo's sorrow rather than the girl's suffering - appeared and
assured him that his prayers were heard in Heaven. Thus consoled,
he prayed; the child was born, and the young mother recovered.111
This qfficium is a highly suggestive and fascinating text. The bulk
of the readings deal with the pre-Caltabellotta years, when war
filled the land. Too sick at heart to be part of the world yet too weak
to avoid its temptations, Guglielmo took flight into the raw
countryside where he devoted himself exclusively to the honor of
Mary, the intercessor. His reputation for sanctity - a reputation
based on his contemptus mundi and his frightened repentance -
earned him an avid following, but his physical temptations (initially
homoerotic, then, when brought into contact with women,
exclusively heterosexual) forced him to seek a more complete
ascetic life. It is clear that the saint, and those devoted to him,
whether in his lifetime or afterwards, viewed the world as a
malevolence, a pitiless abode of sin and evil. Even helpless and
hungry runaway slaves cowering bound in a remote cave rep-
resented not objects of pity but agents of Satan sent to bring the
ruin of Guglielmo's soul. Guglielmo's God, in these readings, is
the Supreme Judge rather than the beneficent Creator and loving
Redeemer, and His judgment is close at hand. After the darkest of
his trials, though, it is significant that he turned, seemingly for the
first time, to preaching; this change of heart and of practice directly
coincided with Frederick's accession to the throne and the end of
111
Ibid., fol. igv—2ov: "Cum autem nocte quadam in cella quiesceret, vidit per sompnium
hircumdamule commisceri, sed cum de tarn rubitu disparim miraretur vox a Deum Toras
pollitum, foras veneficium' ei celeriter facta est. Ad cuius vocem perterritus surgens
cellasque visitans cum femina fratrem Albertum colloquentem invenit. Qui cordis tactus
dolore intrinsecus utrumque pro peccato corripiens feminam cum ignominia procul
pulsa, Albertum vero aspere increpans, ut culpam propriam hortatum penitentia purget.
Sed cum post dies aliquod dum in stratu quiescens pater dormiret, super montem de
quatuor turribus unam cadere et redigi in pulverem videns, vocem Babilon 'cecidet'
audivit dicentem sibi. Qui citus surgens eundem fratrem, qui quartus erat, in consortio
reperit afifugisse. Fama tandem sanctitatis vulgate beati Guillelmi nimium crebrescente,
contigit feminam de Asinello, cui vis pariendi non erat morti iam proximam sibi, per
intimos presentari, ut earn suis precibus a tarn gravi mortis periculo liberet, deprecantes.
Qui, omnino renuens hoc cum sit peccator se non posse facere affirmet, tandem
propinquiore femine devictus, instantia ad periclitantem accedens Sancta Maria succurre
miseris devotissimi dicere cepit. Sed cum verbum innapusillanimes iam proferret, ibi
continuo puerum peperit femina et incoluminis iam surrexit."
the war. It also corresponded with the reintroduction of evangelical

missions from Catalonia, some of which had begun as early as the
1280s but which received an additional burst of popular and royal
support around 1300. Guglielmo was not a Spiritual, but the
message he began to propound after 1300 and his sudden activity on
behalf of the poor clearly reflects a vital new element in Sicilian
religious life, one that is consonant with Spiritual beliefs. In citing
(as the ninth reading) the parable of the lamp from Luke's gospel —
"No one lights a lamp and puts it in some hidden place or under a
bowl, but on the lampstand so that people may see it when they
come in" - the office suggests that Guglielmo's sudden evangelical
activity resulted from a spiritual enlightenment, a new charity
that came to him as reward for his longsuffering penance and
faith.112 Like the parable's lamp, Guglielmo, after 1300, had a
need to be seen and be useful to the needy people around him.
The tortured ascetic turned into a holy and beloved popular
preacher.
The text also provides an example of a local cult, and how it was
used to promote local ends. The Ventimiglia family is referred to
three times, suggesting that they played an instrumental role in
establishing and promoting the cult. Guglielmo's church at
"Fabaria, where the land is abundant with water" was built, we are
told, "out of the neverending generosity of D. Aldoino, the great
count of Geraci."113 It is possible, too, that D. Aldoino or another
family member was the "certain man" who appeared one day, at
the end of the third reading, at the entrance of Guglielmo's cave,
bearing a loaf of bread and inviting the saint to share with him in a
Mass. Aldoino, who died in 1289, was the one who restored the
family fortunes; his father, Enrico Ventimiglia, had been an ardent
supporter of the Hohenstaufen ruler Manfred, and had lost his life
at the battle of Benevento in 1266, after which the county of Geraci
had fallen into Angevin hands. Aldoino had been among the first to
support Peter of Aragon in 1282, and as a result had the patrimony
returned to him. In 1289 he built the stronghold of Castelbuono and
transferred to it the populace from his casalis at Fisauli. Hence the
establishment of the new site and Guglielmo's rise to prominence
112
Ibid., fol. 20V-21.
113
Ibid., fol. 17 (fourth reading): "vulgo enim Tabaria' ubi aquarum est habundantia locus
dicitur . . . domini Aldoyni magnified Giracii comitis assiduis helemosinis."
114
were linked from the start. The county of Geraci is mentioned
next in the seventh reading, when the saint made his prophecies
regarding Frederick's reign, noting with particular dismay that
there would be "war spreading throughout Sicily and Gangi on
account of the shortage of food."115 Since this manuscript dates to
1326, the reference clearly is to the destruction of the land caused
by the massive Angevin invasion. The final passage, left incomplete,
appears at the end of the text, where after detailing the saint's
peaceful death the manuscript concludes: "In the year of Our Lord
1326, on the 25th day of the month of February - the first day of Lent
- the magnificent D. Francesco Ventimiglia [Aldoino's son and
heir] the count of Geraci and Ischia Maggiore, who has remained
devoted all his life to the aforesaid Beato Guglielmo on account
of the purity of his life, acting as much out of great honor and
reverence as on behalf of many priests and laymen, and especially
in honor of Holy Mary, went devotedly to the church of S. Maria de
Partu taking [the remains of] Guglielmo with him . . . " [text
abruptly ends]. 116
From this it is clear that the great count was the chief force
behind the establishment of Guglielmo's cult, having personally
conducted his translatio into Castelbuono's principal church (the
Matrice Vecchia, which still stands, though much restored). And
given the prominence accorded in the office to Guglielmo's miracle
of the grain stores, it is equally clear that one purpose of the cult
was to allay fears regarding the continuing shortages in the region
from 1323 onwards. This famine had not only driven people from the
land, but it had also seriously undermined Francesco Ventimiglia's
own economic position. Long one of the kingdom's most prosperous
and capable landlords, one who regularly reinvested at least a tenth
of his revenues back into his lands (diversifying into cotton crops,
vineyards, and milling, in the process), by the time of Guglielmo's
114
D. Aldoino died in September 1289 in a storm at sea as he was returning to Sicily from
Gaeta, where he had journeyed while on an embassy for James.
115
BGP MS Qq F 32, fol. igv: "cum autem guerra in Sicilia et castro Gangii crebrescente ex
victualium defectu quasi et elemosine defecissent."
116
Ibid., fol. 23: "Item anno Domini M CCC XXVI mense Februarii die XXV, prima die
Sancte Quatragesime, magnificus dominus Franciscus comes Vintimilii Giracii et Issclie
Maioris, qui predicto beato Guillelmo in vita sua ex sue vite puritate semper fuit devotus,
tarn maximo honore et reverentia quam pluribus sacerdotibus et populis, inprimis Sancte
Marie de Partu devote accedens Guillelmo secum venire ad una locum Sancte Marie de
Partu."
canonization Ventimiglia's agricultural revenues had declined

severely and according to extant records made up barely three-
fourths of his annual expenditures.117 Indeed the very fact of the
new cult indicates the extent of the famine, since the text tells us of
the enormous crowd that had gathered at the site.
Since the kingdom in 1326 still languished under the reimposed
interdict, Guglielmo's canonization was of necessity popular rather
than formal. No clerics appeared at the parading of the relics
and the establishment of the cult; but it is also indicative of the
prevailing anti-clericalism in the kingdom — here the rural segment
of it - that the new saint himself was not a member of the insti-
tutional hierarchy. At no point in the text does Guglielmo have the
slightest contact with any ecclesiastical figure. He is in every way a
popular saint and one fit for the specific society in which he lived:
a man of obscure birth, a lonely seeker after God, a despiser of sin
yet no friend of any churchman, a zealous ascetic hostile to and
suspicious of this world and everyone in it, though gradually,
through the patient workings of divine grace, reconciled at least
to pitying the sinful poor who surrounded him. In Guglielmo's
spiritual world and in the cult that came to venerate him, he stood
as a solitary figure in a blasted landscape, outside the reach of any
sacramental priesthood. His salvation, the officium suggests,
depended wholly upon grace, which in turn depended wholly on the
reform of his heart - that is, on his transition from a furious hermit
who drove frightened slaves from their refuge with blows and curses
to a saddened but softened popular preacher who urged spiritual
reform among the poor and boundless charity towards them, and
who was able at last to have mercy even upon desperate
temptresses and unmarried mothers. There is no sign that his cult
was recognized outside the confines of the county of Geraci. Never-
theless, Guglielmo's life as described and honored in the office of
his celebration was strangely emblematic of the fiery, profound,
and problematic piety of his times.
Evangelical challenges and popular anti-clericalism were not the

only difficulties confronting the religious establishment. Economic
problems dogged Sicily's churches and monasteries despite royal
117
Epstein, An Islandfor Itself, p. 316; Bresc, Un monde, pp. 675-6 and Table 170; Mazzarese
Fardella, Ifeudi comitali, pp. 109-16.
support and the extraordinary recovery of the post-Caltabellotta
years. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the very
success of the clergy in recovering their estates and privileges
contributed to the troubles after 1313, since many religious houses,
eager to capitalize on their restoration to wealth and power,
invested too aggressively in real estate and trade and consequently
found themselves overextended once the economy began to falter.
Making matters worse, much of their investment came on borrowed
funds, with church properties and goods used as collateral; thus,
when the economy constricted, those churches with heavy debt
loads lost not only their investments but also large portions of their
recently recovered patrimonies. The most spectacular case was the
cathedral church of Agrigento. After lengthy efforts to win back its
vast territorial holdings in the Val di Mazara, the cereal-producing
heartland, the Agrigentine church earned robust profits for a few
years but saw those profits melt away as exports declined and
peasant laborers joined the exodus of people to the two eastern
valli. The church's investments lay almost entirely in cereal and
vine production, there being few mining or manufacturing options
available in that part of the realm until the fifteenth century, and
consequently the collapse of its grain-based wealth meant the
painful collapse of its overall vitality. Continuing struggle with
aggressive barons after the poor harvest years from 1311 to 1313
are thus a result of, rather than a cause of, this decline. Since the
landholding barons suffered just as much as the church, their only
alternative to ruin was to acquire more land by force. Giovanni
Chiaromonte thus seized a hillside estate called "Mosarius" on the
simple excuse that he needed it - although he later offered the
bishop another casalis in exchange after the bishop had appealed all
the way to Avignon for help in ousting him. 118 The church became
increasingly dependent on loans in order to meet the operating
costs of its extant estates and of the church itself. When credit ran
short, the bishop was forced to sell property. By 1329 Agrigento's
slide into insolvency had become precipitous. It defaulted on a loan
made to it by a local baron, D. Ugolino Labro, who responded
by arming some thugs and snatching up "various estates and
118
John XXII, Lettres communes, no. 7690 (8 July 1318) \RPSS 1, p. 627. The casalis that Giovanni
offered in exchange, called Margidirani, was one which he had previously stolen from the
church during the war.
landplots, a mill, 170 salme of grain, a number of horses belonging to

the bishop, the bishop's pearl-encrusted miter, his silver-and-gold
crozier, various rings, robes and accoutrements, and several books
on civil and ecclesiastical law." D. Ugolino still held these goods two
years later, in 1331, and there is no evidence that they were ever
returned.119 Two years later Agrigento's fortunes had sunk so low
that the bishop was compelled to sell "all the temporal rights,
revenues, and receipts of the principal church of Agrigento for two
years" to a local notary for ready cash of 600.00.00.120
This may have been the worst case, but comparable difficulties
beset all the other major religious houses. The archbishopric of
Palermo, which began borrowing money for investment purposes as
soon as the ink on the Caltabellotta treaty was dry, was defaulting
on loans by the 1320s.121 Here too ecclesiastical property used as
collateral to secure the loans was lost, along with the investment.122
Many of the predations on church lands after 1313 probably resulted
from bad loans and the resentment they created, and among their
consequences was the ruin of contested estates, houses, and mills,
along with the gradual decay of the principal churches themselves,
owing to a lack of funds for their upkeep.123 Palermo's cathedral was
"derelict and decayed" by 1323, well before the ruinous Angevin
119
BCP MS Qq H 6, fol. 38&-93 (8 Oct. 1329): "casalia seu tenimenta, videlicet unum quod
dicitur Facuma et alius quod dicitur Margidirami [the stolen estate returned by Giovanni
Chiaromonte in 1318] . . . et molendinum unum . . . necnon salmas frumenti centum
septuaginta, ac certos equos dicti quondam episcopi, et mitram cum perlis, et crocem
seu baculum pastorale de argento cum capite deaurato, annulos, et alia pontificalia et
paramenta, et libros legales utriusque juris." The dispute was appealed to the archbishop
of Palermo, who decided, in 1331, in favor of the church. D. Ugolino then angrily refused
to relinquish his booty, claiming that justice from Palermo was impossible and
announcing that he would, in effect, secede from the kingdom. At the time when the case
was delivered to the archbishop, the Agrigentine church and D. Ugolino had both sworn
to abide by his decision regardless of its outcome. When declaring his secession from the
kingdom, however, Ugolino justified himself by declaring that his promise to abide by
Palermo's decision was not binding since he was an excommunicate and, besides, the
island lay under interdict. See ibid., fol. 457—70V (20 Aug. 1331), esp. 464—5V.
120
Ibid., fol. 480-3 (7 Sept. 1333). The inhabitants of a number of estates refused to pay their
rents to the notary, one Goffredo Curatore, which forced the church to send agents into
the countryside along with GofTredo's men, to explain the situation.
121
Reg. Benedict XI, no. 1090 (3 April 1304), in which Benedict gives permission for a
particular loan of 1,000 florins. For the start of the defaults, see ASP Notai defunti,
Reg. 76, fol. 17V-18 (29 Sept. 1326), after failing to repay a large loan within the five years
stipulated by the original contract.
122
Reg. Clement V, no. 9324 (5 June 1313) is an example.
123
Ibid., no. 9680 (9 Oct. 1313), which describes the dilapidated state of the church of S. Maria
d'Ustica and the pillaging of its treasures.
attack of 1325, because of the community's inability or refusal to
come up with funds for its care.124 In Catania, despite the city's
constant growth in population and in importance as a commercial
center, the cathedral church by mid-reign was in danger of falling
to the ground because of its decrepitude. As the pope pointed out in
1318, the church had become so desolate and neglected a site that
whereas thirty canons had resided there before the Vespers, only
five remained to carry on religious services in spite of the city's
growth.125 He might as well have considered this a blessing, for no
sooner did the Catanian church profit from some new investments
than it began to use those funds to aid the northern Ghibellines.126
But cathedral churches were not the only religious houses to suffer
from the general economic malaise. Parish churches and monas-
teries everywhere saw their financial bases erode, and here too the
problems appear to have arisen with the crop failure that began in
1311. A handful of ecclesiastical estates, located chiefly in the Val
Demone, still utilized bound peasant labor and thus were partially
immune from the worst blows the market could deliver; but by the
early 1320s few houses failed to feel the pinch.127
Faced with declining agricultural incomes and insufficient public
or private largess, churches and monasteries throughout Sicily took
to leasing their lands rather than working them. The resulting
income was smaller but more reliable. Most church estates and
farms had been worked by tenant farmers in the past, with the
church landlord receiving an annual rent plus a percentage of the
harvest; in the second half of the reign, however, these leases were
jettisoned in favor of direct emphytheusis contracts whereby the
churches eschewed crop percentages and demanded instead
heavier direct cash rents, thus becoming, in effect, distant absentee
landlords. These new arrangements appeared everywhere in the
124
BCP MS Qq H 3, fol. 257V—258 (26 Aug. 1323): local universitas grants 20.00.00 "in
subsidium reconstructionis magne domus majoris Panormitane ecclesie secus eandem
ecclesiam existentis, que ob ipsius vetustatem diruta est et consumpta." Cf. Ada curie 111,
doc. 17. Physical decay had set in even before this; the walls of the church itself were "ex
corrusione . . . vastata" as early as 1317; see Qq H 3, fol. 241V-242 (1 July 1317).
125
John XXII, Lettres communes, no. 7688 (8 July 1318).
126
Ibid., no. 14102 (22 Sept. 1320).
127 B C P MS Qq H 6, fol. 386 (1 May 1322), discussing the decayed state of the monastery of
S. Nicola Gonfessore, beneath the city of Agrigento in the Valley of Temples. The church,
which was indeed rebuilt in 1322, still stands. For an example of Val Demone bound
peasant labor, and the attempt by some laborers to escape it, see Silvestri, Tabulario di
S. Filippo di Fragala, doc. 10 (29 June 1335).
1320s and 1330s. The church of S. Maria Latina in Agira, for

example, between 1327 and 1336 began to lease houses, workshops,
farmlands and vineyards throughout the region by emphytheusis to
the virtual exclusion of all other economic activity, even though its
records suggest the complete lack of such arrangements in earlier
years.128 Likewise in Paterno, above the broad Simeto valley at the
southernmost edge of the slopes of Mount Etna, the church of
S. Maria di Licodia began abruptly to lease by emphytheusis the
farmlands and estates under its control that otherwise would be
"of no use whatsoever to our said monastery" owing to its lack of
capital to work the lands itself.129 These arrangements often
centered on farms and vineyards that had fallen into disrepair and
consequently needed an immediate and considerable expenditure
of funds merely to restore them to operation, such as, for example,
S. Maria del Carmelo's decision to lease to Guglielmo Panturno, a
wealthy notary from Messina, "a certain homestead of ours that is
now empty and wholly destroyed on account of fire."130
These arrangements quickly became the norm in the eastern
valli. Indeed, they provided an ideal vehicle for the reestablishment
of the dislocated populace and offered an alternative to merely
crowding people into dead cities. With so much rapid change in
land tenure, the government took notice and did its best to keep
abreast of the altered picture. The results of one government
inquiry into the leasing patterns of a church has survived more or
less intact, and offers a useful illustration of the situation. The royal
justiciarius of the Val di Noto in 1329 compiled an inventory of all
those who held lands in emphytheusis from the bishop of Siracusa,
plus the amount of the rents they owed. Although the lands
themselves are not identified, nor are their sizes given, the list is
instructive.131 It identifies thirty-four separate landholdings, held
128
Mons. Pietro Sinopoli di Giunta, // tabulario di S. Maria Latina di Agira (Catania, 1927),
doc. 323-34.
129
ASC Arch. Benedettini, Corda 107, fol. 103V-104.V (10 June 1322), leasing "quandam
clausuram cum terra vacua et arboribus domesticis et silvestris in ea existentibus sitam
et positam in territorio Paternionis . . . de qua nulla utilitas predictum nostrum
monasterium contingebat"; also fol. 102-102V (15 June 1322), and 102V—103V (20June 1323).
130
ASM Corporazioni religiose, S. Maria del Garmelo, perg. 37 (8 May 1321): "quoddam
casalinum nostrum vacans et derutum totaliter propter ignis incendium"; see also perg.
87 05J u ty I32I)> 88 ( l 6 A u g- J32I)y a n d 41 (27July 1332).
131
BCP MS. Qq H 5, fol. 88-9V (22 Feb. 1329). The lessees appear as follows. Bartolomeo
Galfono: 01.03.00; Silvestro Golfo and his brothers: 01.18.00; Marchisio Giafierno:
by thirty-three separate individuals or families (one trio of brothers
had two leaseholds). The rents charged were with one exception
uniformly low, ranging from 00.01.00 owed by Giacomino Traversa
to 19.09.04 owed by Gregorio Maniscalco. Gregorio's census is
entirely out of scale with the rest, however; only two others paid
rents above 03.00.00, and the average of all rents owed (omitting
Gregorio) is just over a single ounce per year. The Siracusan bishop
received a total income of slightly more than 60.00.00 from these
leaseholds - all of which appear to have been vineyards. Moreover,
each of these holdings was rather small, with the exception of
Gregorio Maniscalco's, and was leased, with two exceptions, to a
commoner rather than a member of the baronial class. Clearly the
bishop wanted to avoid excessive commercial dependency on a
coterie of wealthy and powerful barons and preferred instead to
offer contracts to the many common laborers available in the
region. The list suggests as well the continuing relative vitality of
the Val di Noto economy, in comparison with the west, since these
vineyards, though small, were highly valued and profitable. Their
average census of approximately 01.20.00 was many orders of
magnitude greater than those for leased vineyards elsewhere in the
kingdom. Vineyards of comparable size near Polizzi, for example,
leased at that time for as little as 00.00.05 o r 00.00.07 P e r y ear > even
though they often included a house as well as the vineyard itself.132
This difference cannot be attributed solely to the relative quality
of these two sites for wine production; in the fifteenth century
Polizzi became one of the largest wine producers in the realm, far
surpassing Siracusa. The high value of the Siracusan vineyards
resulted instead from the high demand for leaseholds created by
the influx of free laborers in the district and the church's eagerness
01.02.00; Pachio Guigia: 00.15.00; Giacomino Traversa: 00.01.00; Bertino Salimbene:

00.12.00; Giovanni Nicodemo and his brothers: 01.12.00; Nicola Comiti: 00.24.04; Enrico
Giunta: 02.26.08; Gregorio Maniscalco: 19.09.04; Giacomo Manchino: 00.12.00; Giacomo
Traversa: 01.24.08; Orlando Galvano: 00.12.06; Stefano Galfono: 00.20.00; Lorenzo
Arubella: 01.18.00; Antonio Burgo: 01.25.12; Bernardo d'Abruzzi: 01.06.00; Giovanni
Falabrino: 00.18.16; Orlando Pica: 01.06.00; Nicola Gucciana: 01.04.16; Silvestro
Francomisso: 02.26.00; Giovanni Mergulensis: 01.27.00; Bartuccio Favaciu: 00.21.12;
Andrea Favaciu: 02.16.08; Francesco Scanavino: 05.17.04; Bartuccio Gucciano and his
brothers: 00.16.00; iidem: 01.07.04; Nicola Gucciano: 01.22.00; monastery of S. Maria
Moniale: 02.04.00; idem: 01.27.00; idem: 00.10.08; N. Parisio de Mabilia: 05.25.12;
D. Manfredi: 01.24.00.
132
Giambruno, Tabulario S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 35 (1 Aug. 1329), and 42 (16 June
1330-
to take advantage of that demand by forming contracts with as

many of these workers as possible.
Siracusa's relative prosperity was, however, a rather lone
phenomenon. The churches and monasteries throughout the king-
dom attempted to alter and reform their commercial strategies, as
the economy worsened, but there was little they could do in the face
of mass depopulation in the rural sector and passionate anti-
clericalism in the cities. With their numbers declining radically,
their economic base crumbling and their spiritual authority
ignored, resented, and attacked, the Sicilian clergy had little to
hope for except that a change in royal policy, if not a change in the
dynasty itself, might someday bring about a change in Avignon's
relations with the rebellious island, a lifting of the interdict, a
rescinding of excommunications, an end to the war, a halt of
baronial theft and thuggery, and everywhere a renewal of "that true
spirit of Christianity" which Arnau de Vilanova had promoted with
such vigor and which had produced such surprising and disturbing
results.
CHAPTER 6
In the margins: slaves,

pirates, and women
At a distance from the main developments of politics, the economy,

and spiritual life, though still intimately connected to each, lay
a number of important, if marginalized, groups and activities.
Documentation for them is both scattered and scanty, and our
narrative sources - so copious for battles and intrigues - are all but
silent regarding their more mundane activities; yet enough survives
to allow us an occasional glimpse of their actions and stratagems.
They seem at first a strange trio: slaves, pirates, and women.
But they shared a number of characteristics apart from their
marginalized fates. Of the three, slaves numbered the fewest; it is
unlikely that the total slave population - that is, the slaves who
lived and toiled in Sicily, as opposed to those who appeared briefly
on local auction blocks en route to miseries elsewhere - numbered
more than a few thousand, far less than it had been only a century
before. But they were important beyond their number and affected
developments in government policy, regional commerce, and
family dynamics, for they stood at the nexus of the kingdom's inter-
national and spiritual crises. Their history in the early fourteenth
century illustrates powerfully the variety and strength of the forces
that were at work in altering the fabric of Sicilian society.
Slaves spent their lives well away from history's spotlight, but
at least they can be identified as a discrete group. Few medieval
individuals could be classified exclusively as pirates, by contrast
(although one does occasionally encounter a bold signature like
"Ego Petrus, piratus, testatus sum" in the witness lists of otherwise
bland documents), because of the nature of piratical activity. A
quasi-legal enterprise, piracy was practiced in one way or another
by all Mediterranean states and by most seagoing merchants. The
threat of piracy haunted the sea lanes as fully as the danger of
highwaymen plagued ground routes, for the simple reason that
247
such avenues stood well outside the de facto ability of most states,
whether large or small, to patrol them. Unlike land-based theft,
however, piracy followed more or less universally accepted rules,
and so long as any would-be buccaneer obeyed them his activities
were regarded as an acceptable liability of trade on the high seas,
a risk that international merchants willingly assumed in return
for large potential profits. Sicily's activities in this area were
unremarkable - especially in comparison with the notoriously
aggressive Genoese and Catalans - but they engaged the energies
of most people with access to ships and weapons. As with slavery,
late medieval Sicily's relatively minor involvement in piracy had
major consequences and affected everything from diplomatic
relations with Catalonia to the weakening of trade in the eastern
valli and the collapse of the royal-ducal demesne in Athens.
Hardly a minority group, women made up well over half the early
fourteenth-century population and their number increased
proportionately to men with every decade from 1300 to 1350. The
vast slaughter of males in foreign and civil wars accounts
sufficiently for this, but other factors existed too. Yet Sicily's
women to date have received virtually no attention from scholars. It
is an undeserved fate, for women played crucial roles in economic
and religious life. War casualties created tens of thousands of
widows who found themselves, temporarily at least, in control of a
considerable share of property. Moreover, the traditional home-
keeper role ascribed to them limited many of their activities but
elevated the significance of their child-rearing duties in the face of
Sicily's long periods of interdict, clerical shortage, and hostility
to institutional faith; they became the chief transmitters of rudi-
mentary religious education and thus bear much responsibility for
the direction that Sicily's spiritual life took. The queer significance
of the reputatrices is but one aspect of their pervasive influence.
As with the more prominent groups of merchants, officials,
clergy, and baronial landlords, the daily lives of these three groups
confronted ever increasing challenges and disappointments; and
like their mainstream compatriots, they frequently displayed
considerable ingenuity and adaptability in rising to those
challenges. The picture that emerges from our poor records is all
too often little more than a sketch, but one that can enlighten, and
at times move, anyone interested in understanding the cause
and extent of the decay of Sicilian life.
Slaves, pirates, and women 249
I SLAVES
From the time of the Norman conquest, and indeed even earlier,
slave labor and slave trading played prominent and emblematic
roles in Sicily's economic and social life.1 Whereas pride of place -
in terms of the amount of revenue produced, the bulk of goods
brought to market, and the number of people involved - belonged
to the grain trade, medieval Sicily owed much of its renown to its
reputation as a clearing house for slaves. Its location at the nexus
of the east-west sea lanes made the island a natural and much
coveted base for the gathering and distribution of captives. Slaves
were brought in from many areas: from Muslim North Africa and
the sub-Saharan lands, from Greece, the Black Sea, and especially,
for a time, from the Levant. Indeed, apart from providing the
setting for Richard the Lionheart's famous quarrel with Philip
Augustus and his furtive meeting with Joachim of Fiore, Sicily's
main contribution to the crusade movement was its role in bringing
to European markets the captive Muslims of the Holy Land. And
from Sicily this cargo was transported throughout both
Mediterranean and northern Europe. Traders from Iberia, the
Italian communes, Provence, and the Midi, as well as England and
Germany, all appeared in the major ports to buy and sell slaves.2
The importance of this trade is suggested by an 1190 contract
between a Genoese slaver, Enrico di Buonfantello, and a fellow
merchant, Rubaldo Mallone, for the purchase of a Muslim slave
from a section of the southern Regno that was then outside Sicilian
control. Enrico accepted liability for the safe delivery of the slave
against all impediments "except any violence from the king of
Sicily," whose forces stood ready to interdict any such commerce
that circumvented Sicilian restrictions or trespassed Sicilian
commercial rights. The kingdom, in other words, clearly was willing
to use force of arms to protect its share of the trade.3
1
These comments originated as a paper on "The Sicilian Slave Trade ca. 1300," presented
at a Festschrift conference "Medieval Spain in the Western Mediterranean: A Con-
ference in Honor of Robert I. Burns, S.J.," sponsored by the UCLA Center for Medieval
and Renaissance Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 25-6 October 1991.
2
Only Palermo, Messina, Trapani, Agrigento, and Siracusa have left any consistent record
of involvement in the slave trade. Other sites (like Sciacca, Marsala, and Catania) played
a much smaller role, owing in part to tariff barriers and in part to geographic features.
3
Abulafia, The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the
Northern Communes (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 179-80 and notes.
By the Vespers era, however, the slave trade had undergone a

number of important changes.4 First and most important, the sheer
volume of trade had declined sharply. Several hundred slave
records survive for the years from 1282 to 1337, some of which
describe whole shipments of slaves brought into or out of the
kingdom; but the overwhelming majority of these documents
involve only the purchase, sale, or manumission of individuals or of
solitary slave mothers and their children. This trade is a mere
shadow of its heyday. The intense piety of the age had relatively
little to do with this radical downturn, although strong efforts
were made to convert slaves to Christianity, with consequent
implications for their legal status. Far more important factors were
the now familiar pattern of economic hardship, depopulation, and
social factionalization. These were local causes with local
consequences, but the decline of slavery was a Mediterranean-wide
phenomenon, as well, that resulted from the simplest of causes: as
Europe's international expansion halted in the face of Turkish
strength and Mongol aggression, fresh supplies of slaves
diminished. The Iberian reconquest brought few captives to the
auction block since the defeated Muslims were needed in situ to
continue working the land and producing their manufactures;
indeed, Muslims from yet unconquered territories were actively
courted for resettlement in Christian-held areas. With fewer slaves
available, trade inevitably diminished and the costs - whether
monetary or personal - of acquiring slaves for trading rose precipi-
tously, which drove many would-be slavers from the profession. For
Sicily, this meant that control of the trade passed largely outside
Sicilian hands, for few natives had the capital to devote to the risky
venture and fewer still had the inclination, given all the other
difficulties at hand. The Sicilians who appear in the 1282-1337
records are consumers rather than traders, individuals seeking or
disposing of domestic servants, but not otherwise engaged in the
large-scale commerce.
4
The only specific study to date is Charles Verlinden, "L'esclavage en Sicile sous Frederic
II d'Aragon, 1296-1337," in Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1965—7), 1,
pp. 675-90. More wide-ranging are Bresc, Un monde, pp. 439-75; D. Ventura, "Aspetti
economico-sociali della schiavitu nella Sicilia medievale, 1260-1498," Annali della Facolta di
Economia e Commercio dell'Universita di Catania 24 (1978), 77—130; and Matteo Gaudioso, La
schiavitu domestica in Sicilia dopo i Normanni: legislazione, dottrinayformule (Catania, 1926; rev.
edn. 1979), Biblioteca siciliana di storia e letteratura, vol. in.
The collapse of the crusader states in the Levant (Acre fell
only five years before Frederick's coronation), the protectorate
established over Tunisia, and the growing dominance of Pisan and
Venetian merchants in Egypt meant the loss of the most important
sources of new Muslim slaves. Muslim slaves, whether of
Levantine or African origin, had long comprised the majority of
captives brought to Sicily's markets. Since the island's native
Muslim population decreased throughout the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, large numbers of new captives could be
brought to market only through foreign conquest.5 But the
conquest of Djerba was Sicily's only success against international
Islam; consequently a diminution of supply had its expected effect
on overall trade.6 Sicily was successful, however, in another arena:
Greece. A ready supply of captive Greeks "de Romania" did much
to fill, after 1305, the need left by the declining availability of
Muslim servants, but in the process, as we shall see, it profoundly
if inadvertently altered the tenor of slave practice. Arnau de
Vilanova's second visit to Sicily in 1309 came at a high point of his
interest in Greek Christendom. An embassy of monks from Mount
Athos, which was then under siege by the Catalan Company, had
met with Arnau at Marseilles in 1308 as they journeyed westward to
seek James's aid in lifting the siege. That meeting fired Arnau's
mind with the idea of utilizing Frederick's increasing hold in
Greece as a means of bringing the lost, schismatic Greeks back into
the fold of true - evangelical - Christianity. He arranged for, and
perhaps personally prepared, a Greek translation of nine of his
eschatological works, and sent the manuscript eastward with the
returning monks.7 Thus, when he arrived for the second time at
Messina, he urged the government to undertake a vigorous reform
of its slave legislation, both in regard to Muslim slaves but
5
Abulafia, "The End of Muslim Sicily" analyzes this decline.
6
On the Djerban campaign, see Muntaner, Crdnica, ch. 248-59.
7
The manuscript is now in St. Petersburg, Publichnaja Bibliotheka, MS CXIII, in 222
folios. To my knowledge, none of the Greek texts has ever been edited. One of the texts
is the only surviving version of an otherwise lost work (De humilitate etpatientiajesu Christi).
For a description of the manuscript, see Joaquim Carreras i Artau, "Una versio grega de
nou escrits d'Arnau de Vilanova," Analecta sacra tarraconensia 8 (1932), 127—34. Miquel
Batllori, "Opusculum Arnaldi de Villanova nondum editum," in Miscellanea Melchor de
Pobladura, ed. Isidorus a Villapadierna, O.F.M. Cap., 2 vols. (Rome, 1964), Bibliotheca
seraphico-capuccina, vols. xxn—xxni, at 11, pp. 215—23, offers a Catalan translation of the
Greek version of De humilitate et patientia, in an attempt to approximate Arnau's lost
Catalan original.
especially regarding the Greeks who were, as a result of the

Company's military successes, appearing in ever larger numbers on
the Sicilian market. The Sicilians responded quickly with their
Ordinationes generates, in 1310. But before these new laws are
examined, the normative practices of the trade up to that point
require attention.
Slaves were generally not used for farming. This had long been the
norm in Mediterranean practice, but particular reasons existed for
Sicily's avoidance of putting slaves in the field. These reasons were
largely structural, as outlined earlier. In those few places where
bound peasant manorialism was still practiced, slave labor would
have been redundant. 8 And the great bulk of agricultural labor was
drawn from the nearby towns and villages, owing to the mingling of
the rural and village micro-economies; workers were hired in the
towns and given wages in lieu of plots of land. Moreover, the war
years before 1302 and after 1317 disrupted agricultural life to a
sufficient degree that despite the flight from the land surplus pools
of agricultural labor still existed in many areas, which forced a
decline in wages for field workers. Putting slaves, whom it required
a significant outlay of capital to acquire, to work on the land was
thus neither necessary nor financially sensible.
Thus slavery remained essentially an urban phenomenon, and
the slaves, whether Muslim or Greek, female or male, were pressed
either into domestic service or shop labor. A general sense of their
tasks and relative status emerges from a close reading of the extant
documents, since slave records utilized a consistent vocabulary in
describing types of slaves. Among females, for example, an ancilla
was a general house-servant or lady's maid, whereas a serva
commonly worked at menial tasks either in the family shop or in the
kitchen. Thus the wealthy Messinese merchant Nicola Cappellano,
in his 1296 will, bequeathed the ancilla Giovanna to tend to his
widow's personal needs in the house in which, although he
bequeathed it to the Greek monks of S. Giorgio, his wife would live
out her days.9 References to ancillae appear most frequently in wills
like this, especially in well-to-do merchant and professional
families, and reflect a dying husband's last attempt to provide for
8
Silvestri, Tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala, pp. 34-6, 57-8, 59-61.
9
ASM Corporazioni religiose, S. Maria del Carmelo, perg. 26.
the wife he is leaving behind; but they are common as well in
records of purchases made directly by the wives themselves, either
when their husbands were still alive (in order to acquire the
necessary help in maintaining the daily household) or after their
deaths. 10 Widowhood prompted many women to purchase new
domestics, possibly as much for companionship as for services
rendered. In these cases, the ancilla was usually purchased with
funds specifically bequeathed for that purpose. Other widows,
needing ready cash to settle their late husbands' debts, found it
necessary to sell their ancillae as soon as their mates had departed.
This was the case with Margarita Ricci of Palermo, who had to sell
her "ancillam nigram sarracenam nomine Misuda" in June 1308 in
order to cover an outstanding debt to the Messinese merchant
Filippo Lacerta. 11 Lastly, foreign merchants residing in Sicily,
prominent figures who required servants to provide for them on
their travels, also owned domestic workers. Resident traders from
Majorca, Barcelona, Tarragona, Genoa, and Pisa all purchased or
sold ancillae in Palermo, for private domestic use, in a single nine-
month period according to Bartolomeo di Citella's notarial register
for 1307-8.12 The higher price commanded by ancillae, compared to
servae, and the fact that no minor age ancillae appear anywhere in
the extant records, whereas servae are documented as young as two
years of age, further suggests that just such a division of labor
existed among female captives.
A differentiation between male slaves can also be discerned. The
fundamental distinction lay between slaves used for the most
menial tasks - perhaps including some field work but more likely
centering on brute labor such as heavy carrying - and those who
were shop servants of some sort. Several records classify slaves as
laboratores rather than servi - as, for example, in D. Lamberto
d'Ingorgiatore's sale of his "laboratorem Sarracenum nomine
Jacob" to the Palermitan Rinaldo Ruggero - while others carefully
identify certain slaves as possessing physical handicaps (epilepsy,
the possession of only one eye, etc.) that rendered them useful for
only limited tasks. These laboratores may well have been employed
10
ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 29-29V.
11
Ibid., fol. 194.V (5 June 1308). For another example, see fol. 99 (3 Dec. 1307), in which the
newly widowed Macalda Scaletta leases the "servitia et operas" of Anna, her "ancillam de
Romania" to M. Pagano Barberio for twenty-two years, in return for 4.15.00.
12
Ibid., fol. 29-29V, 38V, 39V, 57V, 184.V, 213.
in loading and unloading cargo in the ports, where no particular
quality other than physical strength mattered.13
Purchasers of slaves for personal use expressed concern for a
broad range of qualities in their servants. Most common among the
characteristics given overt mention were whether or not the slave
{laborator or servus) was mentally ill, a fugitive, a noted thief, a
drunkard, or, curiously, a bed-wetter.14 Any of these qualities
rendered a slave less desirable, though not necessarily unsellable.
One record from S. Filippo d'Agiro documents the purchase of a
male slave from a merchant in Catania despite the fact that the
slave was "possessed of every possible vice and weakness" that
the Sicilians most dreaded.15
The great majority of slaves, whether female or male, were
Muslim; prior to the eastern conquests, only 5-10 percent of slaves
were Greek. No Jewish slaves were to be found, of course, since Jews
remained technically under the protection of the church and were
therefore supposedly immune from slavery - but also because, by a
longstanding cultural tradition, any captive Jew who might have
shown up in port was usually purchased and manumitted by a
fellow Jew. Slaves were brought to market from Rhodes, from
"Turkia," from "Russia," from "Dalmatia," and from the "partibus
Sclavonic," showing the broad compass of the international
shipping that passed through Sicily's waters.16 Females were
strongly preferred to males, as shown not only by their more
frequent appearance in sales records - they represented 60-65 per-
cent of all slaves sold - but also by the higher price they
commanded. The mean price of a young adult female slave was
5.15.00, compared to 4.15.00 for males. The domestic uses to which
slaves were put did not generally require the males' superior
strength. Female procreative ability, quite apart from whatever
specialized skills they might have possessed, clearly was the
dominant factor in causing their higher price levels, as the children
of female slaves - fathered at will, presumably, by the slave owners
themselves - were likewise enslaved, thus giving the slave owner a
13
Ibid., fol. 22, I8IV.
14
ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127B, fol. 41 v; Notai defunti, Reg. 1, fol. 25V-26; BCP MS
QqF3i,fol. 15V.
15
ASP Tabulario S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 71 (12 May 1310).
16
ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 24.V-25, 57V, I8IV; no. 127B, fol. 412; no. 185,
fol. 14V, 45, 46V.
steady supply of captive labor without the additional expense of new
purchases. Moreover, Muslim slaves, unlike Greek or Slavic ones,
were always identified as being either white (albus), olive-skinned
(olivacius), or black (niger), with the lighter-skinned captives being
much preferred. These classifications may delineate ethnic
differences between Arabs, Persians, and Turks; but they also help,
on occasion, to identify slaves of sub-Saharan origin, when they
are accompanied in the document by the slave's name. Thus, for
example, the olive-skinned Fatima whom Pachomeo Bernotto sold
to Giovanni Malfrida on 26 September 1307 was likely an Arab
woman, whereas the black-skinned Busa sold the following day by
Nicoloso Mostardo of Genoa to Orazio Cansario of Palermo was, to
judge by her name, perhaps Ethiopian. 17 Other names of dark-
skinned Muslims that suggest African origins are Massandi, Amiri,
Hamutus, Ashera, Musata, and Sadona, although such attributions
are tentative, owing to problems of medieval orthography.
Two remaining factors determined a slave's value: faith and age.
To be disarracenus in Sicily was a matter of race rather than religion,
and consequently the market differentiated between Muslim
Saracens and Christian Saracens - that is to say, slaves who had
been baptized. The latter comprised two types, those who had
voluntarily converted to Christianity, and those fathered by the
Christian slave owner, who automatically received baptism, though
not freedom, at birth. No clear pattern emerges when one compares
the data on baptized Muslims with unbaptized, except for the fact
that Jews were not allowed to own Christianized slaves. (They
appear frequently as owners of Muslim slaves, however.) 18
Mean prices for converted and unconverted captives are virtually
identical, although the figures may be somewhat misleading since
the ages of Christianized slaves were, for reasons that are not clear,
seldom recorded.19 Age was an important factor, though one not
applied systematically. In general, slaves under the age of five were
of little value, since health hazards made their survival a matter of
some doubt; they often sold for as little as 00.15.00. Similarly, slaves
over the age of thirty saw their market value decline sharply unless
17
ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 37V, 38V.
18
Ibid., fol. 41,45V, 46V, 68v; Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 14; Thomas,
Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum, doc. 14, 18.
19
Two exceptions: ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 102; no. 185, fol. 7.
they possessed a unique skill. The price required, however, for their
manumission, if they were in a position to bargain for it, rose
steadily beyond that age. This trend possibly hints at the general
life expectancy of slaves, and certainly suggests a cynical attempt by
slave owners to take advantage of a growing sense of desperation
felt by aging slaves - a willingness to pay even grossly inflated prices
in order to live free in one's last years. Thus Matteo Synga of
Palermo and his wife Giovanna were able to demand 10.00.00 (the
price of two average-sized houses in the capital) from their aging
Fatima, although in this case they mercifully granted her freedom
on credit.20
Slave owners came from the professional classes; they comprised
a cross-section of the leading merchants, artisans, jurists, and
urban magnates. Silk weavers, dyers, cloth merchants, grain
merchants, goldsmiths, coopers, shipbuilders, notaries, judges, and
tax officials, plus a dozen other professions, made up the caste of
slave holders. Merchants and artisans purchased their slaves
indiscriminately, apart from market influences: cutlers, for
example, evinced no discernible preference for Muslims over
Greeks, apart from the greater availability of Muslim slaves prior to
1305. But if surviving records provide a representative picture,
municipal officials, notaries, and judges unanimously preferred
Greek slaves to Muslim. These slaves, coming from the more
literate east, may have been put to use as elementary tutors to
children or else employed in minor clerical tasks. It is likely too that
the possession of literate Greeks played a role in asserting one's
social prominence in the status-conscious juridical classes.
Slaves were brought to Sicily in a variety of ways. Some
adventurers, like Guglielmo di Malta, captured individuals from
the Muslim and Greek communities on the peninsula during the
recurrent struggles with Naples. Guglielmo's will, dated 3 February
1298, directed that compensation be made to those people in
Calabria from whom he stole money, horses, and servants during
his campaigns there.21 But most slaves were brought to the island
by professional slave traders who traversed the sea lanes in galleys
20
A S P Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127B, fol. 137, 244V. Cf. Polica, "Carte adespote
dell'Archivio Gargallo," doc. 3 (20 Oct. 1325), in which 10.00.00 could purchase "quoddam
palatium . . . sine solario, cum domo antigua" in Siracusa.
21 A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 1184.
filled with fresh war captives or with slaves purchased in one
location and sold in another. Once arrived in port, the slavers
presented their inventory to the harbormaster (magisterportulanus),
who was responsible not only for collecting duties on imported and
exported goods but also for authorizing and advertising all slave
cargoes to be sold.22 At Sciacca in June 1310, for example, the royal
harbormaster Corrado Lancia di Castromainardo posted the
following representative notice:
Nos Gonradus de Castromaynardo miles tenore presentium notumfieri
volumus universis, quod comitiva comitis Francisci de Viginti Miliis, cum
galea Henrici de Manria, ducit de conscientia nostra in Siciliam de insula
Gerbarum, quod habuit in cavea ad certum pretium servos Sarracenos
subscriptos - videlicet, servum unum nigrum nomine Adde, annorum
undecim; servum alium olivacium nomine Aris, annorum quindecim;
servum alium olivacium nomine Yseyt, annorum decem et octo; et servum
alium olivacium nomine Ayre, annorum viginti sex. De quo presentem sibi
ad sui cautelam fieri fecimus nostro sigillo munitum.23
These four slaves, captured during the fight for Djerba, probably
were not sold at Sciacca, which was simply the first port that
the ship put into upon returning to Sicily. Instead, Francesco
Ventimiglia, armed with this royal confirmation of his cargo,
probably moved on to the large bazaars at Trapani or Palermo
before auctioning off the slaves.
Slave traders usually worked as asocietas, or ad hoc corporation, in
order to share the burdens and risks of the profession. Those risks
were considerable. Compounding the general decline in the
trade itself were the difficulties of trying to make a profit in a
Mediterranean beset with piracy and with closely guarded
privileges in every port. In 1304, for example, a Genoese slaver
named Ottobono della Volta joined with one Georgios Grecos, a
merchant from Crete, "and a certain Simone Gavata of Sicily, plus
another [Sicilian] fellow who used to be a Jew but is now a Christian
going by the name of Marco Cantareno," in an attempt to unload a
large shipment of more than fifty slaves at a Cretan port without
paying the heavy Venetian duties. The Venetian duke of Crete
caught the traders in the act, and, in addition to collecting the
22
Pietro Corrao, "L'uflicio del maestro portulano in Sicilia fra Angioini e Aragonesi," in
XI Congresso n, pp. 419-32.
23
ASP Tabulario S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 72.
necessary dues and a penalty, confiscated the slaves themselves;

the traders lost well over ioo.oo.oo.24 A successful venture could
pay handsomely, however. Pachomeo Bernotto and his socii sold a
shipment of seventeen slaves, all Muslims, in auction at Palermo
after arriving in port on 26 September 1307; their gross receipts
totaled over 50.00.00. Unsold slaves would then be placed back on
the ship and taken to the next port, where they would be auctioned
yet again.25
Frequently a single slave would be bought and sold several times.
An unfortunate woman named Aziza, a white-skinned Muslim
ancilla from Nocera, was owned by Tommasso Lamatu, a goldsmith
who probably captured or purchased her during the war and
took her to his home in Messina. At some point she converted to
Christianity and took the name Rosa. In May 1308 Tommasso sold
Aziza/Rosa to a Catalan merchant from Tarragona with the
unlikely name of "Aglinus Pagllarisius," who returned with her to
Tarragona. Once there, Aglinus promptly sold her to another
merchant, Ramon Peris. In December of that year Ramon, deciding
for whatever reason to be rid of her, gave Aziza/Rosa to his
procurator (a Valencian, Jaume Tredes) who took her to Palermo,
where on 8 December she was at last sold to 'Abdul 'al-Salaam ibn
Il-fa'it, a prominent Muslim merchant from her native Nocera. 26
The slave trade prior to 1310, then, was in many ways emblematic
of the overall Sicilian experience - a chaotic struggle during the
war, in which trade declined sharply and foreign investment fell
largely into the hands of the Catalans, followed by a rapid rebound
after 1302, when Sicily once again had wide though weakened
trade connections but was increasingly dependent upon foreign
merchants to brings goods into and out of Sicily's ports.
The Ordinationes generates had much to say about slave practice. As

discussed earlier, the legislation of 1310 evinces a powerful sense of
dread and urgency, a conviction that Sicily stood at a crossroads no
less fateful and permanent in its implications than the rebellion of
1282; but unlike the merely political and economic consequences
24
T h o m a s , Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum, doc. 12,14, 16,18.
25
A S P Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 37V, 38,39V—40,41,47V, 53V, 57V, 57V—58,58 (top,
middle, and b o t t o m ) , 59V, 59V-60, 78V.
26
Ibid., fol. 184V; no. 127B, fol. io6v, 107V-108. It is possible that Abdul al-Salaam purchased
her in order to ransom her from a Christian faith that had been forced upon her.
of the Vespers, the issue confronting the kingdom in 1310 was
nothing less than the fate of its soul, and indeed (in some minds, at
least) the kingdom's role in the salvation of Christendom itself.
Only by such a thoroughgoing reform could Antichrist be overcome.
Essential to these apocalyptic concerns was Sicily's new position in
the east, where the Company, having moved from Asia Minor to
Greece, was gradually securing its control of a large portion of
the Greek heartlands, and where Arnau de Vilanova's teachings
had arrived, thanks to his hastily prepared manuscript. One
assumes, although no evidence attests to it, that at least one or two
evangelicals followed the book-laden monks to Mount Athos, in
order to assure the propagation of their message, either among the
Greek populace or among the Company members settling in
the Greek lands.
The laws, like the Informacio espiritual which inspired them, sought
to root out evil rather than injustice, and to promote piety rather
than social equity. In addition to condemning all forms of gambling,
promoting public, vernacular, Scripture readings, and ordering the
expulsion of all "spell-casters, divines, sorcerers, and superstition-
peddlers," this new program aimed to promote "the evangelical
truth handed down to us by Him, to the praise of His name and
the exaltation of the Catholic faith" by regulating all aspects of
inter-faith and inter-ethnic contact within the kingdom. But in the
normally segregated life of medieval cities - in which Sicily was,
despite the heterogeneity of its ports, no exception — most of
the regular contact between Latin, Greek, Jewish, and Muslim
populations was limited to the market place. The persistence of
slavery in the demesne cities meant that, by Frederick's time, the
greatest amount of inter-ethnic or inter-religious contact occurred,
as it were, under captive circumstances. As Arnau saw it, the
imminence of Antichrist's arrival demanded the immediate
removal of all potentially harmful contacts, if possible; but if such
drastic surgery proved impossible, the only other course was to
promote the Christianization of the contaminating influences.
Thus, most of the new slave laws aimed to bring slave ownership
more in line with Christian values as the evangelicals understood
them, and to make it easier to spread the faith among the Muslim
and Greek captives.
All slave owners, for example, were henceforth forbidden, on
penalty of a year in prison, to oppose or hinder such conversion
27
attempts. Conversion did not bring freedom, however; at best it
merely protected the slave by entailing the owner with a legal, in
addition to a moral, obligation to treat the convert with the respect
and brotherly love required of, and towards, all Christians. If
anything, baptism placed an increased burden upon the slave, since
he or she, as a Christian, henceforth was expected to treat his or her
owner with an increased respect; to violate one's duty to a fellow
Christian added a moral stain to the merely legal transgression
of one's obligation to one's dominus. Citing Paul's first epistle to
Timothy:
All slaves "under the yoke" must have unqualified respect for their
masters, so that the name of God and our teaching are not brought into
disrepute. Slaves whose masters are believers are not to think any the less
of them because they are brothers; on the contrary, they should serve
them all the better, since those who have the benefit of their services are
believers and dear to God.
The new law placed the slave owner in the position of spiritual
mentor, at whose urging the slave had been brought to baptism,
and to whom the saved slave should henceforth remain especially
27
Ord. gen., ch. 59: "Ut Christi nomen, quo vocamur et dicimur Christiani, in vanum
assumpsisse non videamur, expedit pro salute, ut illud efTectu operum inducamus in
evangelicam veritatem ab eo nobis tradita ad laudem Sui nominis et exaltationem
catholice fidei, necnon ut infidelium revocentur errores efficaciter et puris mentibus
observemus. Cum igitur veritate non agnita Saraceni servi vel liberi vendant cum eorum
erroribus in sue salutis dispendium, et ruinam, quos forte, aut ipsorum aliquos,
doctrinam Christi sepius audientes, ad sancti fontem baptismatis divina dementia
revocat, evangelica inspirante doctrina, providimus illos coadunari ad audiendum sepe
sepius verbum Dei, proponendum ab apostolicis religiosis et aliis personis, ad quas
huiusmodi spectat offlcium predicandi, ut ingrediendi ad januam omnium
sacramentorum, que est ipsum baptisma, liber sit aditus, et introitus planus pateat et
suavis, omnem clausure materiam ad impedimentum huius itineris providimus removeri.
Hac igitur perpetuo valitura constitutione sancimus, ut nullus de cetero tante temeritatis
existat, ut servum suum Saracenum, qui ad idem baptisma adductus aspirare voluerit, vel
huiusmodi sancto proposito retrahat, revocet vel perturbet, quinimmo ipsum ad hoc
aspirantem, tanquam id gratum habens, adjuvet, et moneat, et si forte quis contravenire
presumpserit, de hoc apud judicem loci contra dominum ipsi servo deponendi querelam
tribuimus potestatem; qui dominus in judicio presentatus ad consentiendum baptismati
servi sui post aliquos dies, juxta arbitrium Ecclesie, coercione debita compellatur, et per
unum annum continuum in vinculis deputetur. Idem de extraneo, qui alienum servum
Saracenum vel liberum baptizari volentes impediat, duximus ordinandum. Si vero
domini presentia haberi non poterit, vocatus ad hoc per duos dies vel tres expectari,
nichilominus absque molestia baptizentur. Et nihilominus prefati servi ad assumendum
ipsum baptisma per suos dominos impediti, hoc legitime constito, statim sine calumpnia
baptizati adipiscantur premia libertatis, nisi poenas ipsas in alias arbitrati fuerimus
commutandas."
loyal.28 But the slave owner likewise faced heightened responsi-
bilities to treat his slaves humanely. The branding of slaves, and the
infliction of any form of physical punishment, stood condemned.
The prohibition of branding served two purposes: first, it protected
the slave from a harsh and potentially dangerous practice; second,
it ensured that baptized Muslims would be treated, in the event
they ever gained their freedom, as Christians. The brandings
suffered by many slaves had served not only to mark them as slaves,
but also as Muslims. Unless a second brand were to be added,
identifying a person as a baptized Christian, a freed slave faced the
potential danger of being mistaken for a Muslim - and hence being
forced back into slavery.29
A desire for the humane treatment of all Christians, whether
slaves or not, and regardless of ethnicity, inspired the next law in
the code. It forbade anyone, but especially the owners of converted
slaves, from hurling the insult of "renegade dog!" at anyone known
to be a Christian or capable of proving his or her faith, whether the
person vilified was Arab, African, Jewish, Greek, or of any other
nationality. 30 This epithet was, and indeed still is, a particularly
28
Ibid., ch. 60: "Qualiter a u t e m ipsos post dicti fontem baptismatis tractre debemus, docet
Apostolus ad Philemonum [v. 16], dicens: 'Suscipe ilium iam n o n ut servum, sed ut
fratrem carissimum in D o m i n o et in carne'"; and ch. 61: "Ipsos siquidem servos eosdem,
renatos baptismate et penes suos dominos tarn salubre beneficium consecutos, dominis
sui ferventius atque devotius servire m a n d a m u s , secundum verbum ipsius Apostoli,
dicentis ad T i m o t h e u m [16.1—2]: 'Quicumque sunt sub j u g o servi dominos suos omni
honore dignos arbitrentur, ne n o m e n D o m i n i et doctrina blasphemetur.' Q u i a u t e m
fideles habent dominos n o n contemnant, quia fratres sunt, sed magis serviant, quia
fideles sunt et delecti ac participes in beneficiis; servos enim oportet dominis suis
subditos esse, in omnibus placentes, non contradicentes, non fraudantes, sed in omnibus
fidem bonam attendentes, ut doctrinam Salvatoris Nostri ornent in omnibus."
29
Ibid., ch. 62: "Ut a u t e m dicta fraterna tractatio et h u m a n a benignitas inter alia pateat,
qua ipsos neophytos prosequi debent ceteri Christiani, nullis licere providimus
Christiana mancipia vulneribus ac flagellis afTicere, aut aliquod m e m b r u m illis incidere
vel devastare in facie vel in fronte signare, aut in e a aliquatenus insevire; cum, licet sint
domini servorum suorum, t a m e n suorum membrorum domini non existunt. Eos t a m e n a
dominis castigari permittimus, c u m culpa precesserit, et Christiana sint [sic], juste,
leviter et benigne; e u m tamen, si fugitivus contumax fuerit vel protervus, poni in
compedibus non vetamus."
30
Ibid., ch. 63: "Verumtamen, quia predicti neophyti post tantam divinam baptismatis
gratiam non sunt afTiciendi contumeliis ac injuriis exprobandi, quinimmo caritate
fraterna ac humana debent benignitate tractari, statuimus, quod nullus dominorum
neophytorum dictorum, vel extraneus tarn temerarius existat, quod predictos servos
neophytos de cetero audeat exprobare conviciis et contumeliis afficere, videlicet vocando
eos vel aliquem ex eisdem sends, canes renegatos. Per que videatur eidem baptismati
derogari, quoniam sic eos vocando et exprobando videatur innuere, quod de fide ad
perfldiam et de veritate declinaverint ad errorem; c u m renegare secundum fidem hoc
offensive insult in Sicily, one that probably entered the culture with
the arrival of the Arabs, among whom it is also a strong vulgarism.
Dogs, because of the dirt and disease associated with them, were
considered to be among the lowest forms of life, and were never
domesticated. Instead, they roamed the streets, eating scraps of
refuse and spreading filth. To throw such an epithet at anyone, but
especially at a co-religionist, was an offense that could not be
ignored, and one which usually resulted in an altercation. Sicilians,
with their highly developed sense of personal honor, were particu-
larly sensitive to any such personal slight. A commercial dispute
between Ruggero di Giudice Marchisio and Filippo Carastono, in
1312, for example, turned abruptly violent after a careless personal
snub interrupted the hitherto peaceful proceedings. Similarly the
public quarrel between Giovanni Aiello and Giovanni Cisario in
Palermo, for all its bitterness, seemed about to subside until Cisario
offended his rival's personal honor by calling him "as great a liar as
any bastard son of a priest - which you are!" Such name-calling
could not be condoned, and knives emerged.31 The concern for the
"renegade dog" insult shows a sensitivity to the particular disgust
held by Sicily's Muslims for that epithet. By prohibiting the insult,
the law hoped to forestall any hotheaded reaction to it that might
result in charges being brought against the slave.
The Ordinationes dealt with many other issues. All children born
of slaves, regardless of the race or religion of the parents, were
ordered to be baptized; and if any owner attempted to prevent this
action, the child automatically received his or her freedom. Clearly,
such an order effectively sealed the future of Islam in the realm.
Few free Muslims remained in the kingdom except for an active
community on the western island of Pantelleria, and mandatory
baptism of all slave children assured the gradual winnowing of the
community still further. The law had a second consequence as well.
It guaranteed the eventual nullification of the rights of Sicily's Jews
to possess slaves, since all Muslims were to be converted at birth,
and since Jews were expressly forbidden to possess Christian slaves.
sapiat veritate relicta erroribus ad errorem et canes vocari, secundum usum loquendi,
Judei tantum sint soliti ac pagani. Hoc idem de Judeis ad fidem Catholicam redeuntibus
duximus statuendum. Quod si quis contra fecerit per annum unum stet in vinculis
carceratus, nisi poenas ipsas in alias arbitrati fuerimus commutandas."
31
Ada curie 1, doc. 24 (15 Jan. 1312); v, doc. 5 (12 Sept. 1328): "Tu mentiris per gulam sicut
filius presbiteris bastardus, qui tu es!"
Thus Jews retained the right of slave ownership, but eventually
would have no slaves left to own.32
Turning finally to the question of the increasingly numerous
Greek slaves in the realm, the laws stated that any Greek who
returned to Roman Catholicism was to receive his freedom
automatically - that is, without compensation for the owner - after
a period of seven years.33 Clearly, the court (and Arnau) hoped that
by winning substantial numbers of Orthodox faithful back to
Catholicism, they might significantly improve their relations with
Avignon, and so assume their proper place as the leading Christian
state in the reform and evangelization movement. The seven-year
delay had two aims: to placate those who had recently purchased
Greek servants and did not wish to see their investment wasted,
32
Ord. gen., ch. 64: "Ad pullulandum etiam et augmentandum dictam fidem Catholicam, et
ut parvuli, in infantia baptizati, crescant et roborentur in ipsa, perpetuo mandamus
edicto, ut domini servarum — sive Christianarum sive Saracenarum parientium - partum
ipsum, postquam ad lucem pervenerit, sicut assuetum est, in suis filiis facere, baptizari
procurent. Quod si contrafecerint, infantes ipsi nihilominus sine calumnia per ecclesiam
baptizati, liberi statim fiant." And ch. 65: "Cum indignum sit Christianos servos per
baptismatis dignitatem efTectos Christi filios et fideles Judeis, quos propria culpa
suppressit, perpetue servituti vel ceteris etiam infidelibus ministrare; itaque volumus et
districte mandamus, ut nulli Judeo aut Saraceno vel alicui alii infideli baptizatum vel
baptizari volentem emere liceat vel in suo servitio retinere. Quod si quern nondum ad
fidem conversum causa mercimonii emeret et postmodum factus sit vel fieri desideret
Christianus, datis pro eo duodecim solidis, ab illius servitio protinus subtrahatur. Si
autem infra tres menses ipsum venalem non exposuerit vel ad sibi serviendum tenuerit
eundem, nee ipse vendere nee alius audeat comparare, sed nullo dato pretio, perducatur
ad premia libertatis. Venditor autem, qui servum Christianum scienter vendiderit
infideli, poenam carceris per annum continuum sustinebit; et nihilominus servus ipse
premio gaudeat libertatis, nisi poenas predictas in alias arbitrati fuerimus commutandas.
Si vero servi Judeorum, non emptitii sed nati in domibus fuerint eorumdem, statim cum
baptizati fuerint, eisdem dominis nullo dato pretio, libertatis premia consequantur."
33
Ibid., ch. 72: "Licet Greci de Romania hucusque se ab obedientia Sedis Apostolice
subtrahentes fuerint abominati Latinos; tamen quia eis, qui oderunt nos, benefacere ac
esse misericordes, evangelica doctrina constringimur, etiam Grecis ipsis providimus
caritatis opera non negari — quapropter, salva ordinatione ac provisione Sedis Apostolice
(cui, si circa hoc aliquid ordinavit ac statuit, quod penitus ignoramus, aut de cetero
forsan statuetur, sincere capita nostra submittimus Eius provisioni atque arbitrio, stare
ac obedire), protinus disponentes statuimus, ut quicunque de predictis Grecis Romanie
emerit captivum et detulerit tanquam servum, eum non nisi per septem annos audeat
retinere, cum ipsum dicto completo septennio reddi providimus sue pristine libertati.
Quam constitutionem non tarn ad emendos extendimus, quam iam ad emptos. Hoc
tamen beneficium ad eos porrigimus, qui firmiter credent et simpliciter satebuntur
articulos fidei, prout Sancta Romana Mater Ecclesia credit et tenet, ad veritatem rede-
untes ipsius, earn unam et solam omnium ecclesiarum magistram et dominam
recognoscant. Quod tempus septennii ex eo tempore jubemus incipere, ex quo coeperint
credere et firmiter confiteri articulos fidei, ut Sancta Romana Ecclesia credit et tenet, ut
superius declaratur."
and, more importantly, to guard against any relapse to Orthodoxy

on the part of the slaves. Seven years of adherence to the Latin
faith, it was felt, adequately proved the sincerity of the conversion.
Another statute offered them a unique, extraordinary protection:
no Greek slave, whether Catholic or Orthodox, could be resold
without his own expressed permission. If a slave, or any other
involved person, declared any reservation over the morals or
character of the proposed new buyer, the sale was illegal; anyone
contravening this law, except in cases of urgent necessity, forfeited
the price received for the slave and was further sentenced to a
month's imprisonment.34 And finally, fearing the reputed Hellenic
predisposition to "perform acts hateful to Christ and contrary to
evangelical truth," unlawful - i.e. homosexual - sexual contact with
Greek slaves was vehemently forbidden.35
These laws, and others in the package that deal with topics other
than slavery, are more than reformist. They do not represent an
attempt merely to regulate an important trade that was under-
going profound change, or to rejuvenate a commerce in decline.
Rather, they provide further evidence of the storm of evangelical-
ism that swept over the land. By seeking to take one aspect of a
spiritual ethic that was gathering force, and to turn it into the law
34
Ibid., ch. 73: "Quoniam durum interdum atque crudele videbatur, Christiana mancipia
videlicet de partibus Romanie de dominio unius ad alterum quacunque alienationis causa
transferri, c u m forte ipsa mancipia sub dominio patroni prioris pacifice honeste
devoteque diutius conversata, doleant ad alium ignotum dominum transitura verentia, ut
sub novi emptoris dominio honeste vivere nequeant, n e e per emptoris abusum absque
detrimento anime conversari, providimus, ut nullus aliquod mancipium Christianum de
Grecis de Romania vendere audeat persone suspecte, de qua evidenter appareat aut
conjecturari possit aperte, ipsum non nisi ad turpe servitium sive questum velle habere,
aut si forte ipsum mancipium tarn magnam devotionem ad dominum priorem habuerit,
ut nullo modo videatur eidem cum alio vivere bene posse. Q u o casu sine voluntate dicti
mancipii de ipso alienatio ulla fiat, nisi forte urgens causa atque necessitas immineret.
Quod si contrafecerit, servus protinus fiat liber, pretio, quod venditor inde perceperit,
emptori protinus restituto. Et nihilominus venditor ipse per unum m e n s e m carceri
mancipetur, nisi poenas predictas in alias arbitrati fuerimus commutandas; hoc tamen,
ut supra."
35
Ibid., ch. 74: "Quamvis mancipia suis dominis obedire teneantur, domini tamen ipsi
eisdem mancipiis, et maxime Christianis, nihil audeant injungere vel mandare, quod sit
in Christi opprobrium, qui est Dominus Dominorum et prejudicium evangelice veritatis.
Quapropter dominis ipsis, sub poena heretice pravitatis, injungimus, ut aliquod tale
dictis eorum mancipiis non audeant injungere vel mandare." Compare Arnau's teaching
in the Allocutio christiani that "every ruler - whether king, duke, count, or baron - who
would govern men and exercise jurisdiction over them ought by all means to avoid four
thing: injustice . . . injury to others . . . the abuse of nature [i.e. homosexuality] . . . and
deceit against God and one's neighbor."
of the land, the new slave legislation, and the extent to which those
laws were obeyed, provide a measure of the extent to which that
new ethic was felt.
As it turned out, these laws may have been the only ones that
Frederick had anything like complete success in persuading his
subjects to observe; this was especially true in regard to Muslims.
Efforts to convert Muslim slaves and to cater to the perceived needs
of the Greeks continued throughout the second half of the reign.
Surviving records go to some pains to emphasize their full
compliance with the new laws. As early as 4 January 1311, for
example, Giovanni Guini purchased a "mulierem de genere
Grecorum Romanie," whom he acquired, it is emphasized, "juxta
ordinationem regiam huiusmodi Grecis de Romania specialiter
factam, prout hec et alia in quodam instrumento publico de
venditione et traditione serve predicte plenius continetur."36 Most
purchase contracts of Greek slaves after this date make a specific
point to emphasize, often laboriously, that the sale was performed
"secundum statuta." But other sorts of records reflect the spread of
the evangelical reform. The last will and testament of Giovanni
Fidanza of Catania, for example, dated 30 August 1317, provides an
inventory of the slaves he left behind for his heirs:
item servam unam nigram veteram Ghristianam, nomine Benevenutam;
item servam unam Ghristianam, nomine Geram; item servum unum
Christianum, nomine Philippellum, fllium dicte Gere; item servam
unam Ghristianam, nomine Soldellam, filiam dicte Gere; item
servum unum puerum, nomine Faivum [?], fllium dicte Cere.37
These were all converted Muslims, since not only were Greeks
always identified as such, regardless of their Orthodoxy or
Catholicism, but only converts from Islam took Latin names.
Efforts to convert adult Muslim slaves, and the required baptism of
all Muslims born into slavery, had resulted in the virtual
disappearance of Islam in Sicily's captive populace as early as six
years after the Ordinationes. The conquest of Djerba temporarily
added a large number of new Muslim slaves to the scene; but the
evangelical project ran its course in regard to them as well. In 1336,
when the brothers Giovanni and Bartolomeo Garresio inherited
36
Verlinden, "L'esclavage e n Sicile," p. 680.
37
A S C Arch. B e n e d e t t i n i , Corda 283, fol. 1-4.V, at 3V (record d a t e d 11 D e c e m b e r 1317 but con-
taining text of will from 30 August).
their parents' estate, they were able to itemize the family's slaves
as follows:
servum unum Christianum, nomine Petrucium; item alium servum
nigrum, nomine Sayd; item alium servum nigrum, nomine Musudum;
item alium nigrum Christianum, nomine Guillelmum; item servam aliam
Girbinam Christianam, nomine Griginninam, cum filio, nomine
Marachio; item servam aliam nigram Christianam, nomine Agatham;
item servam aliam nigram Christianam, nomine Franciscam . . . servum
unum nigrum Christianum, nomine Matthaeum Coscinum; item
servum alium Christianum, nomine Gerlandum; item servam aliam,
nomine Zarolam, cum filia, nomine Palmucia; item servam aliam, nomine
Luchiam.38
The final decline of Muslim Sicily is here on display. But what of the
enslaved Greeks who came to dominate the market?
Charles Verlinden, in his well-known article, proceeded almost
document by document through the extant records, carefully
noting for each one that it scrupulously adhered to the 1310 laws.
The phrase "secundum statuta" appears over and again, in these
documents; but clearly not all Sicilians were pleased with the new
regulations and the consequent curtailment of their slave profits. A
slave who could veto his owner's attempt to sell him to another had
an obviously declining commercial value, especially as he grew
older and became more aware of the advantages given to him by the
Ordinationes. And the mandated manumission of Catholic converts,
without compensation, could hardly have delighted many slave
owners. Since the penalties for disobeying any of the ordinances
were quite severe, however, one had to find other means of
avoiding the force of the law. Verlinden failed to notice, or
neglected to emphasize, that many slave-owning Sicilians indeed
found a way to circumvent the legal constraints placed upon them.
Rather than sell the slave, they sold his labor. These work-leases, as
one might call them, became increasingly common after 1320. The
owner sold (vendidit) the "work and labor" (servitia et operas) of the
slave for periods ranging from twelve to twenty-five years; but they
often fixed no specific time to the contract. Perro Cisario, for
example, purchased the servitia et operas of Ioannes, a sixteen-year-
old Greek, from Pere Ancaroll of Tortosa, on 16 June 1327, on the
understanding that he would free Ioannes after twelve years. But
38 BCP MS Qq H 6, fol. 530-5, at 531V-532.

Perro remained free to sell Ioannes' labor and service to another
buyer at any time before 1339; this new buyer, should he follow upon
the terms of Perro's original contract with Pere, had until 1351 to
"liberate" the lad's labor, unless he chose to sell that service to still
another purchaser. In this way Ioannes could theoretically pass the
remainder of his life in slavery, being traded from one "lessor" to
another, while Pere Ancaroll, technically, retained ownership over
his person, back in long-forgotten Tortosa.39 Some contracts
stipulated that the slave in question was to be "liberatus ab omni
vinculo servitutis" after the initial leasing; but these were rather
few in number.40 The overwhelming majority of Greek slave sales
after 1320, and particularly those of males, follow the servitia et operas
stratagem.
In brief, the changes that took place in Sicily's slave trade
mirrored the challenges that rocked the island in the Vespers age.
From an international commerce that it had dominated in the
central Middle Ages, slavery had become an increasingly minor
affair in terms of its economic importance; and it had become
increasingly under the control, even within the kingdom itself, of
foreign merchants who commanded the sea lanes and therefore, in
a sense, commanded the Sicilian ports. The religious crisis altered
for a time the way that Sicilians viewed the world and the way that
they practiced slavery, although even here they found ways to
circumvent the demands of their own faith. As with the larger
economic strategies of the demesne cities, Sicilians showed a
resilience and adaptability that no one expected but which enabled
them to continue their activities profitably for at least another
decade. But finding ways to escape legal strictures and moral
scruples, however unfair or unworthy these may have been
regarded, is not necessarily the same thing as a positive social or
economic advance. Political coincidence provided a fresh supply
of Greek captives at the precise moment when the availability of
Muslim slaves ran short, and allowed a temporary continuance
of the trade even while it introduced a new element in the spiritual
debate that engulfed the island. And the development of the
39
A S P Notai defunti, Reg. 76, fol. 121V-122.
40
Ibid., Reg. 77, fol. 132—132V (10 May 1329), leasing the "servitia et operas unius sclavi de
genere Sclavorum de Sclavonia, nomine Martinus" to a hosteller of Palermo for a period
of twelve years, with the stipulation: "ita quod completis dictis annis duodecim dictus
sclavus sit liber et absolutus a servitute."
work-lease allowed slavers to dodge the force of evangelical

legislation for which they had little empathy. But these evolutions
did not resolve the central problem at issue. That issue is not
slavery jter se. It is wrong to judge fourteenth-century activities like
slave trading and slave owning by the standards of twentieth-
century morality. The issue at stake is instead one of social
commitment and self-deception. Urban Sicily's glad seizure of
Greek slaves, despite the economic motives that lay behind it, made
no sense in light of the numerous political and spiritual troubles
that gripped the island. Hauling shiploads of captives to Messina
hardly ingratiated the Sicilians with their new subjects in the
eastern duchy and did nothing to foster better relations with
Naples, whose subjects they were enslaving. It also widened and
deepened the rift that existed between the commercial and the
administrative sectors of society, as the communal jurists and
officials feigned a cultivated air in their high-gated mansions with
supposedly more civilized Greek servants, whereas the cities'
merchants toiled away with their less chic Muslim maids and
retainers. Moreover, the work-lease loophole represented a sensible
but callous avoidance of self-imposed constraints and commit-
ments. Far better to repudiate the law than to mock it - and
certainly the coastal towns never shirked from repudiating or
cheerfully ignoring any other royal mandate with which they did
not agree or which they felt ran contrary to local needs. Only on
this issue, out of all the problems confronting the kingdom, did the
communes consistently pay lip-service to the law's ends while
openly repudiating its intent and its content. Statutes regarding
marriages, arms-bearing, inheritances, taxation, dress, and
assembly could be, and were, avoided or ignored with impunity and,
indeed, a certain brio. But when it came to the high moralism of
slave owning and slave trading, they deemed it better to trumpet
their faithfulness to the law's letter while avidly avoiding its
intent. And that trumpeting is the problem. Too many Sicilians
accommodated their own understandable, indeed practical, desires
with arguments fit for that purpose alone, without seeing a
contradiction between what they professed, rightly or wrongly, and
what they did, rightly or wrongly. Emblematic of many of the
difficulties confronting them in the early fourteenth century,
"evangelical slavery" was a problem that they never solved but only
rephrased.
II PIRATES
For the merchant societies of the medieval Mediterranean piracy

was a growth industry, one that afforded handsome opportunities
for financial gain, personal notoriety, and risky pleasures. It was not
a new phenomenon. Robbery on the seas had been commonplace
since ancient times and had figured large in the political fortunes
of many individuals and states; but the decline in Mediterranean
trade during the early Middle Ages inevitably brought about a
concomitant decline in maritime thievery. To the pirate enthusiast,
these were indeed the dark ages. The commercial revolution of the
central Middle Ages, however, had allowed this shadow industry to
spring to new life. From the twelfth century onwards, piracy was
rampant, indeed endemic, throughout the Mediterranean. Every
maritime city or state, and often, it seemed, every individual, with
access to ships and weapons engaged in it. Crews were cosmo-
politan, made up of volunteer adventurers from all locations; and
they were ecumenical in their targets, caring far more for the size
and contents of the victimized ship's hull than for the religion or
ethnicity of its crew. The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries - that
is, the period when the western Mediterranean societies surpassed
their Byzantine and Muslim rivals and seized effective control of
the entire sea — marked a high point in piracy, as the newly
victorious Latin states competed for individual mastery of the sea
lanes. Certainly this is the period, too, when the distinction
between pirates and corsairs sharpened. It had to be so, for the moral
question of what one might call "confrontational commerce" only
became ambiguous when the attackers' victims were no longer
infidels or schismatics, but fellow Latin Christians.41
41
These pages are based on a paper, "Piracy and the Kingdom of Sicily," that I delivered
at a conference on "European Expansion before Columbus, 1250-1492" at Fordham
University, New York, 27-8 March 1992.
On medieval piracy in general, see P. Adam, "Esquisse d'une typologie de la course
et de la piraterie," in Course et piraterie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1975), XVe Colloque international
d'histoire maritime 11, pp. 917-55; Helene Ahrweiler, "Course et piraterie dans le
Mediterranee orientale aux IVeme—XVeme siecles (empire byzantin)," in Course et
piraterie 1, pp. 7-29; Henri Bresc, "Course et piraterie en Sicile, 1250-1450," Anuario de
estudios medievales 10 (1980), 751-7; Robert I. Burns, S.J., "Piracy as an Islamic-Christian
Interface in the Thirteenth Century," Viator 11 (1980), 165-78; Peter Charanis, "Piracy
in the Aegean during the Reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus," Annuaire de VInstitut de
philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves 10 (1950), 127-36; M.-L. Favreau, "Die italienische
Levante-Piraterie und die Sicherheit der Seewege nach Syrien im 12. und 13.
Sicily in particular had a long experience with piracy. From the
Athenian seizure of the Siracusan coastline in the fifth century BGE,
to the Company's seizure of the Athenian duchy, piracy was
inextricably part of the warp and woof of daily life. It was also one
of the most useful tools of colonial rule by Sicily's many conquerors;
the success story of the Norman kingdom, for example, was largely
a hymn to the potentialities of piracy, as any of the press-ganged
silk weavers of Thessaloniki could have attested. Dominion over
Sicily changed repeatedly over the centuries, passing continually
from eastern to western hands, but the importance of piracy as a
tool of that dominion remained constant.
Only with the arrival of the Catalans, however, did the Sicilians
themselves become true aggressors in the sea lanes; prior to this
they - virtually alone among Mediterranean peoples - had not
developed a maritime capability of any considerable size. Their
foreign rulers had seen to that: control of the ports and of all ships
larger than fishing vessels had rested almost exclusively with the
colonial powers. As we saw earlier, very few Sicilian merchants
sailed the seas or brought Sicilian goods to continental markets on
Sicilian ships. This had an enormous, and wholly deleterious, effect
on the island's economic and social development, for not only did
the bulk of commercial profits follow the goods themselves
(namely, away from the island), but the Sicilians never developed
a carrying trade of their own, neither did they grow in maritime
capability and exposure to more developed financial and
commercial technologies. And since naval warfare in the Middle
Ages, whether individual pirate sorties or full-fledged war between
states, depended heavily on naval militias made up of merchant
vessels and merchant crews, Sicilians had not developed any
organized capability of defending themselves or of exerting a force
of their own in the Mediterranean. Under the early Catalan rulers,
however, things began to change. The Catalans certainly strove to
protect their own controlling share of overseas trade and command
Jahrhundert," Vierteljahrschriftfor Wirtschafts- undSozialgeschichte 65 (1978), 265—338; Michel

Mollat, "Guerre de course et piraterie a la fin du moyen age: Aspects economiques et
sociaux - Position des problemes," Hansische Geschichtsbldtter 90 (1972), 1—14; Mollat, "De la
piraterie sauvage a la course reglemente, XTVe—XVe siecle," Melange de I'Ecolejrangaise de
Rome 80 (1975), 7—25; Carmelo Trasselli, "Naufragi, pirateria e doppio giuoco," in La gente
del mare mediterraneo, ed. R. Ragosta (Naples, 1981), pp. 499-510; and Anna Unali, Marinai,
pirati e corsari catalani nel basso medioevo (Bologna, 1983).
of the ports; but from the 1280s onward we begin to encounter the
first notices of Sicilian-owned and Sicilian-controlled seagoing
vessels.42
A good example of the new Sicilian merchant marine was the San
Giorgio, a two-masted galley owned by the Palermitan merchant
Giuliano di Bennama. Giuliano used the San Giorgio to trade in the
east, principally with Constantinople but also with Egypt and
Athens. 43 He also leased the ship and its crew to other merchants.
In 1334, for example, Filippo Parisio of Catania rented the ship for
a trade voyage to Negroponte, paying a hefty price of ninety-five
perperi of gold for the privilege. The San Giorgio came prepared for
action — "well furnished, armed, and staffed with a crew of twenty-
four oarsmen" - as a safeguard against piracy. But the presence of
a large armed crew betrays the ship's own military capacity; the San
Giorgio also doubled as a pirate ship. 44
Having given the Sicilians their first significant access to the sea,
the Catalans also introduced them to their own long tradition of
piracy and corsairing. It is worthwhile repeating the distinction
between the two activities. Corsairs plied their trade legally, either
with the tacit consent or explicit license of their governments,
whereas pirates acted without sanction. Corsairs in fact rep-
resented a branch of the military, a type of ad hoc naval militia, and
their campaigns were aimed at specific enemy targets with the goal
(apart from making money) of disrupting the trade and harbor life
of the state against which the corsairs' government had already
begun hostilities. Pirates on the other hand acted independently,
chose their targets indiscriminately, and worked solely for their
own profit and perhaps adventurous enjoyment. Of the pleasure
involved it is difficult to speak, but the profits for corsair or pirate
42
Charles De Simon, "Actes passes a Famagouste de 1299 a 1301 par devant le notaire
Lamberto de Sambuceto," Revue de I'Orient latin 1 (1893), 58-139, 275-312, 321-53; see
doc. 324, 338.
43
Trade with Egypt remained brisk, partially on account of commercial relations forged by
Peter and James of Catalonia. See, for example, ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 77, fol. 27V, 28,
99; Reg. 79, fol. 170V. Pegolotti's handbook cites the weight conversion for dry goods, for
comparing measures of Messina and those of Alexandria; see Pegolotti, La pratica della
mercatura, p. 74.
44
A S P Tab. Ospedale Grande di Palermo, perg. 7: "bene furnitam, a r m a t a m et preparatam
remigeris viginti quatuor." O n the interchangeability of merchant and military vessels —
a common phenomenon in the Mediterranean, though much less so in in the North and
Baltic seas — see Richard W. Unger, "Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval Europe,'*
Technology and Culture 22 (1981), 233-52.
were consistently good and could on occasion be spectacular. Roger
de Lauria, the Catalan admiral of the Sicilian fleet, acquired a
personal fortune from his booty sufficiently large that he was able
to make loans to the government. 45 Ramon Muntaner claimed to
have gained more than 25,000 gold ounces in coin and jewelry in a
single campaign to the east in 1308, only to lose it on the voyage
back to Messina to a band of Venetian pirates who, as he described
it, "came against our ship, and especially against mine, for the news
was out that I was carrying from Byzantium the greatest treasure
in the world."46 By 1363, when the Venetian doge Lorenzo Celsi
ordered a reckoning to be made, Sicilian pirates and corsairs had
stolen approximately 21,000 ducats from Venetian merchant ships
in the Aegean sea alone. 47
Under kings Peter and James, the Sicilian fleet, whether
military-cum-corsair or private-cum-pirate, remained firmly under
Catalan control with only a handful of Sicilians added to the
fighting force. But in Frederick's time the makeup of the maritime
forces began to change, to include ever larger numbers of native
Sicilians. It had to be so, since the defection of Roger de Lauria's
forces during James's pseudo-war after 1297 left many vacancies in
the naval ranks that had to be filled immediately. Sicilian rowers
and Sicilian deck-hands were to be found in every port, but
Sicilian officers were still in short supply. Their inexperience at
sea, in relation to the Genoese and Catalan veterans who were
available, made it difficult for them to move into officer ranks, and
this became a constant source of irritation in later years, as when,
for example, the 1321 loss of four galleys to a storm at sea instigated
a riot in the streets of Palermo. The majority of the men who had
died were Sicilian sailors; but the officers who had failed to guide
them safely through the storm had been Genoese. Until the
islanders became more at home on the sea, Sicily's early naval and
pirate efforts tended not to roam far from native shores. Most
45
ACA Cane. Reg. 90, fol. iv-2, gv, 6iv; Cane. Reg. 192, fol. 3V-4; Cane. Reg. 260, fol. 1-3.
See also Hans Rohde, DerKampfum Sizilien in denjahren i2gi-ijO2 (Berlin, 1912), p. 79; and
Pryor, "The Naval Battles of Roger of Lauria" (see eh. 2, n. 35, above).
46
Muntaner, Crbnica eh. 234-7 narrates the entire tale; quotation at ch. 235: "E con fom e n
terra, les galees del venecians v a n correr sobre les nostres, e senyaladament sobre la mia,
cor era veu que j o traia de R o m a n i a tot lo tresor del mon."
47
Irene B. Katele, "Piracy and the Venetian State: The Dilemma of Maritime Defense in
the Fourteenth Century," Speculum 63 (1988), 865-89 at 882 and n. 115.
pirate activity prior to the Company's opening up of the east
focused on the Straits of Otranto. 48
The court's policy towards piracy was of a sort with that of most
Mediterranean powers: it avidly sponsored corsair activity and
sought to curb piracy - the latter out of concern for lost licensing
fees rather than to promote peaceful trade. Virtually the first
action Frederick took after seizing command of the naval forces in
1291 was to organize a privateering raid. After some adventurers
returned from plundering the Greek island of Khios and the
Peloponnesian harbor city of Monemvasia, "with the greatest part
of the wealth of that island" and the archbishop of Monemvasia in
tow, he organized a large-scale corsair force of forty galleys "along
with 2,000 almogavers and a like number of Messinese foot-soldiers"
to scourge the Amalfitan coast.49 Court-supported privateering
continued right up until the king's death, although various political
and economic pressures forced a curtailment and redirection of the
activity after 1325. The eastward drift of the population, combined
with the near monopolization of Val di Mazara ports by Catalan
and Genoese merchants, meant that piratical efforts focused
increasingly on eastern waters. Sicily's seagoing ships after 1325
were to be found in Messina, Catania, and Siracusa rather than
Palermo, Sciacca, and Marsala, which resulted in the forced focus
on piracy in Aegean waters (while avoiding Venetian territories, of
course) and the sea around Cyprus and Crete.
Corsairs attacked specific targets selected or approved by the
government at the time of the licensing. In addition to the licensing
fee, the king also received a percentage of the booty, the calculation
of which was one of the duties of the magistri portulani. Strict rules of
engagement applied. These were, naturally enough, the customs
eventually codified in the Catalan Consulate ofthe Sea. Specific cities,
ships, and sometimes specific merchants were identified as the
target of the raid. A crew was appointed, and their wages or
percentages of acquired booty established. Any merchants who
wished to invest in the campaign - underwriting the costs in return
for a share in the spoils — received full information about the target,
48
J o h n H . Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the
Mediterranean, 640-1571 (Cambridge, 1988), Past and Present Publications, p. 157.
49
Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 122-3: "cum maxima parte divitiarum suarum illius insule
. . . XL galeas armare propono, et II M almugabarorum ac totidem Messanensium
peditum mecum ferre."
the ships, and the crew; investors furthermore had the right to
inspect the corsair fleet, in order to determine whether or not
to proceed with their investment. An interesting provision of the
Consulate stated that the corsair commander "shall carry out all
the promises he makes to anyone, whether that be a shareholder in
the ship, an outfitter, a navigator, a section-leader, an armed sailor,
servant, or merchant - whether any of these parties be a Saracen, a
Christian, or a Jew." If the attack failed, the investors lost their
capital, but the government lost only its anticipated portion of the
booty. The licensing fee was always paid in advance.
The government, in fact, could lose money only in two ways:
either through the proliferation of unsanctioned piracy, which it
understandably struggled to check, or through the demand for
reparations made by the attacked party. Victims of corsair attack
appealed to their government officials, who in turn brought suit
against the government that had sponsored the strike in the first
place. If the victim was able to identify his attackers - a difficult
task, given the common practice of leasing ships to merchants of
different nations and the polyglot makeup of the crews - and could
accurately itemize the goods stolen from him, the sponsoring
government would pay reparations out of the royalfisc.In Sicily, as
elsewhere in the Mediterranean, the expense of paying reparations
evidently never matched the income derived from successful
privateering, since government sponsorship of corsairs never
slackened either throughout Frederick's reign or throughout the
century.
The ubiquity of the practice is striking, but so is its routine
character. Since nearly all Mediterranean communities were guilty,
few were outraged. Working through the extant records, one gets
the impression that nearly everyone with access to a ship tried their
hand at piracy at one time or another.50 Indeed, some documents
even record foreign diplomats interrupting their embassies briefly
to race out to sea in order to plunder approaching trading ships,
only to return afterwards, and without embarrassment, to their
official duties at their victims' government's courts. In June 1308,
for example, Bernat de Sarria - Catalonias' chief admiral, a
personal friend of both James and Frederick, and the duly
50
Mediterranean communities were not alone in all of this. See ACA Perg. Alfonso III,
no. 908 for a reference to English pirates preying upon Mediterranean trade routes.
appointed ambassador to the Sicilian court - abruptly cut short his
diplomatic mission in Messina upon hearing of a large merchant
ship then returning to Siracusa, laden with spices, silks, and gold
from Alexandria. Bernat and his men, on board the government
ships that had brought them to Messina in the first place, hurried
to Siracusa, robbed the returning merchants (who were Catalan
residents of Sicily) of all their goods, and then held both the ship
and its crew for ransom. Having filled his purse, Bernat then
returned with a straight face to Messina to resume his diplomatic
duties.51 Given the curious and embarrassing circumstances of this
51
ACA Gartas James II, no. 9939 (7 July 1308). As Frederick pointed out, in this letter to
James about the incident, the kingdom had suffered numerous similar outrages in the
past, some at Bernat's hands and some at the hands "of various others under your
command." The complete text runs as follows:
Serenissimo et spectabili principi domino Jacobo Dei gratia illustri regi Aragonum,
Valencie, Corsice et Sardinee comitique Barchinonie ac Sancte Romane Ecclesie
vexillario, ammirato et capitaneo generali, reverendo et karissimo fratri suo,
Fridericus tertius eadem gratia rex, cum fraterna dilectione salutem et prosperos ad
vota successus.
Dum infra proximo preteritum mensem Junii huius sexte indictionis, Matheus
Oliverdarii de Barchinonia mercator (fidelis vester, devotus noster) cum quadam
navi sua diversis eius et ceterorum aliorum mercatorum Catalanorum rebus et
mercibus onerata, de partibus Alexandrie in Siciliam sub nostri securitate dominii
veniens pro suis mercationibus exercendis, ad portus Syracusie declinasset, hoc
audiens nobilis Bernardus de Sarriano miles ammiratus et fidelis vester, devotus
noster, cum duabus galeis (cum quibus ipsum ad nos in vestrum ambassatorem et
nuncium pridie destinastis) ad portum ipsum festinanter se contulit, et inventa
ibidem navi predicta, exonerata tamen in dicta civitate predictis rebus et mercibus
dictoque etiam patrono et personis aliis eiusdem navis ob ipsius ammirati metum in
eadem latitantibus civitate, navim accepit, eandem securitatem nostri dominii inibi
violando. Et requisivit deinde baiulum et judices civitatis ipsius, ut merces et res
ipsas caperent et assignarent eidem, quas, cum eas propterea iidem baiulus et
judices accepissent, assignare tamen eidem ammirato penitus recusarunt diversas
causas rationabiles pretendentes et maxime quia nullum a nobis mandatum exinde
receperunt.
Sed tandem predictus Matheus, cum secus inde facere non valeret, eisdem rebus
et mercibus per eum a predictis baiulo et judicibus cum instancia petitis et habitis,
assignavit eas ammirato predicto per eum abinde cum predicta navi Messanam
ferendas et sub nostro posse et dominio deponendas, ut de hiis fieret id quod exinde
diceremus, sicut ex pacto adjectum extitit inter eos et constat nobis per litteras
predictorum baiuli et judicum proinde nobis missas, quas quidem navis merces et res
sibi retinens ammiratus predictus penes nos aut aliquem alium deponere deinde non
curavit easdem in predictorum Mathei et aliorum mercatorum prejudicium atque
dampnum, et omnia quamquam patienter tulerimus et feramus, ob vestri tamen
reverentiam et honorem, cum multo certe graviora, ubique locorum nostri dominii
nedum per dictum ammiratum, verum etiam per quoslibet alios de vestro dominio
fieri similiter pateremus, omneque onus proinde quantumlibet importabile ultronei
subiremus. Tamen, quia firmiter credimus et tenemus talia vobis admodum
displicere, providimus ad vestram notitiam deferenda Fraternitatem et Serenitatem
incident, Frederick sent his complaint to James under his small, or

privy, seal, hoping thus to bring the matter directly to the king's
eyes and to keep word of the incident from spreading. But this was
an exception. Most notices of corsair or pirate attacks, and the
demands for reparations that accompanied them, were routine
matters. Indeed the most surprising characteristic of the extant
demands for reparations is their civility, the sheer dull monotony of
their bureaucratic tone. In January 1297, for example, James
described for Frederick how a Sicilian captain acting "on your
behalf" pirated a shipload of cotton cloth from a Catalan trading
ship that was returning to Barcelona from Armenia. Without any
note of rancor or alarm, he noted that the captain "took the ship,
with the cloth and other goods aboard it, and proceeded to hand
them over to your Curia," and then calmly asked for the usual
compensation.52 In April 1302, when a Sicilian corsair company
commanded by Ruggero di Brindisi plundered several targets along
the Catalan coast, James again filed the usual complaint. But this
time Frederick, while accepting responsibility for the attack, simply
postponed the reckoning of reparations until sometime "at the
beginning of next year, when it will be more convenient" because he
was at present busy with more important matters. 53
Problems arose, and tempers with them, whenever corsairs
either attacked the wrong targets or used unnecessary force to
accomplish their ends. Exposure to risk in international waters was
one matter - an acceptable hazard or a bearable liability in a region
where profits could be made if one accepted responsibility for one's
own safety, being beyond the protection of any law - but senseless,
unnecessary violence could not be condoned. Piracy, for good or ill,
was an aspect of business - indeed, it was itself a type of business.
Vestram aflectuose rogantes, quatenus consideratis premissis eidem Matheo et

mercatoribus aliis super restitutione et emenda navis, rerum et mercium
predictarum debitum complementum justitie fieri jubeatis, necminus misericordem
gratiam nostri a nominis intuitu et precium nostrarum instantiam conferre velitis,
si placet.
Datum Messane sub parvo sigillo nostro secreto VII Julii, VI indictione.
52
Ibid., no. 297.
53
Ibid., no. 10259 ( I2 April 1302): "Super quo Excellentie Vestre rescribimus, quod pluribus
et diversis negotiis multipliciter propediti ad expeditionem dictorum vestrorum fidelium
quo ad presens intendere et vacare non possumus. In principio autem sequentis anni
prime indictionis nuncii eorum ad presentiam nostram accedant et ad expeditionem
predicti negotii, prout conveniens fuerit, procedimus."
But to take lives, to inflict needless and gratuitous harm, or to cause
senseless destruction on the seas where one's life was already at risk
every moment, was nothing more than cheap, hateful villainy, and
it never failed to raise a protest. In the summer of 1317, for
example, the court awarded privateering licenses to Guglielmo
Limogia and Francesco Guallacia of Messina - "to perform certain
tasks in foreign lands" is the coded phrase - and provided them with
two armed ships. Those "certain tasks" most likely included the
forced gathering of slaves, as well as commercial plunder; but that
is not how the affair turned out. Guglielmo and Francesco, whether
they had planned all along to do so or not, used their king's forces
to lead a series of attacks on nearby merchant ships who had
themselves just returned to Sicily from the east, laden with high-
quality textiles. The outrage resulted in, as Frederick recollected,
"a tremendous complaint to be brought before me"; and at least
part of the extreme anger expressed by the victims in this case
resulted, as did the attack itself, from ethnic tensions. The
attackers were Sicilians, while the victims were Catalan. Guglielmo
and Francesco may have acted out of mere opportunism, and may
have taken a certain delight in using the arms and ships of
a Catalan king, sailing under his license, to attack Catalan
merchants. But a commercial rivalry of long standing inevitably
played a role, too. The pirates had deposited their booty with their
friend and presumed accomplice Benenat Sevellera, an entre-
preneur from Barcelona, who raced back to Catalonia with the
goods. Upon arriving in port, however, Benenat lost the treasure
to the local bailiff, who had been informed by a harbor official
about the suspicious cargo, and had sequestered the goods. Thus
Frederick, in trying to arrange the proper compensation for the
original victims, found himself in the embarrassing position of
begging the return of goods which his own privateers had stolen
with his own ships from his own subjects.54
54
Ibid., no. 10268 (30 Aug. 1317): "Cum Guillelmus de Limogiis et Franciscus Guallacia de
Messana, fideles nostri, olim infra presentem annum quintedecime indictionis missi
fuerint per Curiam nostram cum duobus lignis armatis eiusdem Curie ad diversas partes
pro certis Curie nostre servitiis, iidemque Guillelmus et Franciscus cum predictis lignis
disrobaverint quosdam amicos et devotos nostros, per quos gravis querimonia est coram
Celsitudine Nostra proposita; et eis de predictis disrobationibus emendam facere nos
oportet; ac inter alia res et merces violenter captas et ablatas per eos a devotis et amicis
nostris eisdem fuerint panni et res subscripte, quos et quas iidem Guillelmus et
Franciscus recomendaverant Benenato Sevellera, civi Barchinone devoto nostro, per eum
The curious moral world of piracy reserved its greatest venom for
the extreme use of physical force. Lost goods could be returned or
recompensed, but lost lives were another matter altogether. And
while some sort of compensation could, in theory, be expected for
the loss or destruction of a ship, the extraordinary expense it
represented gave incentive to the desire to curb unnecessary
violence. Thus we find the strongest expressions of outrage
reserved for pirates or corsairs who followed up their successful
thefts with wholly gratuitous violence, or who violated the safe
harborage granted to merchants who had survived their perilous
voyages. In June of 1318, for example, two Genoese privateers
attacked a ship laden with foodstuffs that Frederick had sent from
Messina to Trapani, in order to alleviate yet another food shortage
there. According to the complaint lodged against them, the
Genoese not only captured the ship but had jettisoned all the food-
stuffs they did not care to steal, and had subjected the ship's
captain, one Antonio Cumarello, to a number of severe beatings.
They then scuttled the ship. Outside of Palermo harbor they
encountered another vessel, bearing a physician who was being sent
to treat the outbreak of disease that had also occurred in Trapani.
He too was beaten; the pirates hurled his medical books into the
sea and dragged him back to Marseilles, where they demanded
100 florins in ransom, lest he be killed. Outraged by these excesses,
the Sicilians appealed directly to John XXII. The pope shared in
their wrath, and personally directed the Genoese commune to pay
compensation, which he reckoned at 200.00.00 for the scuttled ship,
plus whatever could be determined to be the just reparation for the
captain's beatings, the physician's ransom, the cost of the lost
books, and the value of the grain.55
A still graver case occurred in 1322, when four Genoese ships
entered the port of Trapani, attacked a number of Barcelonan
merchants docked there, and stole their entire cargo "which was of
ad partes Sicilie deferendos, ac Guillelmus de Lacias, baiulus civitatis Barchinone,

predictos pannos et res a predicto Benenato abstulerit et sequestraverit... [Then follows
an inventory of the stolen goods] . . . Fraternitatem et Magniflcentiam Vestram [i.e.
James] rogamus, quatenus predictos pannos et res discreto Petro de Montemulono
(generali procuratori agendorum nostrorum, et Magne Nostre Curie magistro rationali
consiliario, familiari, et fldeli nostro) vel cui ipse requisiverit assignari mandetis et
faciatis, si placet, deferendos aut mittendos nobis, ut eos personis a quibus ablatos
fuerunt restitui faciamus."
55
John XXLItLettres communes, no. 7563 (20June 1318).
inestimable value." Not content simply to steal the goods, the
Genoese, who had gained entrance to the port by pretending to
represent the Ghibellines at Savona, had "cruelly murdered" some
of the Barcelonan crew. "It is unheard of and absurd," the court
complained, "that merchants and friends in commerce should fall
upon one another violently... and make enemies out of friends over
such things." 56 The seizure of goods could be pardoned as common-
place thuggery, but to assault Catalan merchants while they were
under the Sicilian king's protection in harbor - and to do so by
means of posturing as the Sicilians' Ghibelline allies - exceeded all
bounds of acceptable piratical behavior. The Genoese, in breaking
the most central rules of engagement, had caused the Sicilians to
suffer "a molestation whose excesses are so enormous . . . that it is
thought that they cannot ever henceforth be removed or wiped
away."57
This case was upsetting not only because of the gratuitous
murders but because all the ships and crews involved, both the
attackers and the attacked, were under the king's peace. Sicilian
law, like that of most Mediterranean realms, granted royal
protection to all men, ships, and cargoes admitted into port. A
welcoming port, after all, was the safe haven guaranteed to all who
survived the parlous voyage over the seas; hence a pirate or corsair
raid upon ships in port represented not only an assault on the
victimized merchants but an attack on the royal authority itself.
Such trespasses presented continuous concerns to the attacking
pirates' home governments as well, for such unwarranted attacks
could, by their very nature, occasion a state of war. Indeed most
full-blown naval attacks in a declared war took place precisely in
harbors, rather than on the open seas; tactical reasons were the
main cause of this (it being far easier to attack a ship that is at rest),
but nevertheless harbor raids were associated in Mediterranean
minds with open war. Pirates were expected to assume their own
portion of risk by venturing further out to sea. Whenever untoward
56
A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9948: "inauditum et absurdum videtur, quod mercatores et
amici in mercatores irruant et amicos eosque violenter capiant predentur et de amicis
propterea tales et tantos sibi faciant inimicos."
57
Ibid.: "Quapropter quantum predictus dominus noster rex moleste gerere habeat
excessus predictos sit enormiter, ut prefertur, commissis, et cogatur nee ab re proinde
moveri multipliciter et turbari maxime propter dispendia gravia que dicta pars gybellina
proinde incurrere posset sane menti clarissime indicatur causis et rationibus
infrascriptis."
port violation occurred, the Sicilians responded, as in 1322, not only

by seeking reparation and apology from the raiders' home country
but by sending out punitive raiding forces of their own, either to
apprehend the culprits and return them to Sicily, or to seek
retribution upon their sponsors. These transgressions also broke
the routine civility of reparation demands and inspired distinctly
angry, indeed outraged, responses.
In the forty-one years of Frederick's reign, Sicilian piracy passed
through three distinct phases in terms of its venues and victims.
Until 1302 all activity centered upon the western Mediterranean
and involved all the participants in the war and their occasional
allies. Thus direct military strikes were made against the Angevin-
held coastline, as a matter of combat; but private-sector priva-
teering attacks were launched upon the merchant ships of Genoa
and Pisa (the Angevins' on-again, off-again allies) in order to raise
revenue. So long as the Sicilian adventurers did not violate safe-
harbor statutes in those republics, such privateering was generally
regarded as part of the normal risk of trade; and demands for
reparations followed the regular bureaucratic channels. Other sites
were targeted too. Interestingly, a considerable amount of priva-
teering took place between the Sicilians and the Crown of Aragon,
their not-so-secret allies in the Vespers fight. This constant give
and take paralleled the tangled diplomatic and economic relations
that existed between the two realms in the last seven years of the
war. Perhaps in order to mask Catalonia's feigned involvement in
the war - although that imposture fooled no one - Catalans and
Sicilian preyed upon each other's commerce from 1296 to 1302 even
while Catalan arms and materiel poured into Sicily in order to
further the fight against Naples. Ironically, some of the priva-
teering and piratical attacks that Barcelona and Palermo launched
against each other were comprised of the same ships and crews that
brought Catalan arms to the island and Sicilian grain to Iberia.
Licensing fees and booty were collected and distributed at either
end of the journey, just as commercial goods passed constantly to
and fro.58 Given the mutual benefits garnered by this curious
relationship, excessive violence (such as that committed in 1298 by,
once again, Bernat de Sarria and his accomplice Berenguer
Vilaregut) or unlicensed raids - anything that resulted in true
58
See, for example, ACA Cartas James II, no. 297 (24 Jan. 1297).
harm to the delicate diplomatic and military arrangement -
merited the fiercest cries of outrage. 59 Such excesses clearly did not
ease Sicilian anxieties about the Catalans in general and forced the
government to exaggerate the outrage that it no doubt sincerely
felt, solely in order to placate and assure the more suspicious
natives. This accounts for the almost exhibitionist tone present in
the fiercest of the diplomatic protests. 60
During the fifteen years after Caltabellotta, Sicily turned its
59
Ibid., no. 10158 (13 Feb. 1298). This is an open letter from the Sicilian court to the people
of Barcelona, fulminating against Bernat and Berenguer's senseless violence in a series
of unwarranted attacks on Pantelleria, Malta, and Gozo. Here is the central portion of the
lengthy text: "Nam Beringuerius Villaragutus, qui Siculos et fideles nostros offendere
causam et materiam non habebat, recepti honoris et gratie tanteque acquisite opulantie
ingratus et immemor, pro dilectione odium, pro utilitate dampnum, et pro honoribus
injurias inferens, plures et diversos fideles nostros cum una navi et una galea armatis
cepit, disrobbavit, et carceri mancipavit, comburendo vassella et alios excessus graviter
irrogando. Subsequenter etiam Bernardus de Sarriano cum viginti galeis et aliis vassellis
armatis, necnon militibus et navibus, insulam nostram Pantellerie perveniens et
depopulare disponens, cepit non modicam quantitatem Sarracenorum eiusdem insule
cum pluribus et diversis rebus eorum, et contra plures ex eis quos habere non potuit
clades exercuit; et tantis excessibus non contentus immo desiderans prioribus graviora
committere, et ad insulas nostras Malte et Gaudisii hostiliter proficiscens obsedit
easdem, combuxit casalia, et homines tarn in mari quam in terra cepit, disrobbavit,
et diro carceri maceravit. Que quam sint gravia quamque detestabilia advertere et
considerare potestis, unde credimus in premissis absque predicti domini fratris nostri
conscientia et voluntate fuisse processum, et dampnorum emenda seu restitutio dampna
passis fieri de jure deberet. Sane multorum frequens et crebra docet relatio, quod
predictus dominus frater noster, ad suggestionem et instantiam quorumdam emulorum
et inimicorum nostrorum et domus nostre, contra nos et Siculos fideles nostros suum
extolium preparat suamque gentem et exfortium aggregat, ut insulam nostram Sicilie a
nostris manibus et hereditate eripiat, ipsamque comitis Provincie nostri nostreque
domus antiqui hostis et emuli subiciat potestati. O Deus, destruatur et tabescat hostium
nefanda malignitas, dolosa seductio, prevaricationis congeries et totius calliditatis
inventio et inexecrabilis cause misterium, que inter fratres discordias seminant, bellicos
actus astruunt, eorum mortem et stragem scitientes appetunt, in quo probabiliter et
manifeste cognatur predictum comitem Provincie et eius fautores esse tante pravitatis
auctores. Quorum detestabiles et frequens austutia anelanter intendit fratres (immo
patrem et filium) ad bellum adducere, ut (quod absit) nostram altero patiente ruinam,
quid de facili dubius bellorum requirit eventus alterius strages et excidium, per eos
facilius procurentur."
In order to broadcast the outrage further, similar open letters were sent on the same
day to Daroca (no. 10143), Palma de Mallorca (no. 10144), Lerida (no. 10147), Burriana
(no. 10149), Cardia (no. 10150), Gerona (no. 10151), Tortosa (no. 10152), Murella
(no. 10153), Tarascon (no. 10154), Valencia city (no. 10155), Calatayud (no. 10156),
Tarragona (no. 10157), Xativa (no. 10159), Jaca (no. 10160), and Castellon (no. 10161).
60
It also accounts for the concern many natives showed for improving their defenses.
Weaponry, harbor chains, port towers, etc. began to be gathered and built, either at
communal expense or under the aegis of the urban elites; see, for example, Giuseppe
Agnello, "Le torri costiere di Siracusa nella lotta anticorsara," Archivio storico siracusano 9
(1963), 21—60; 10 (1964), 25—74; 15 (1969), 2—29; and 2nd ser., 1 (1971), 17—30.
pirating eyes eastward. From 1302 to 1317 those eyes focused almost
exclusively on the vulnerable Byzantine rump states in the Aegean.
The Catalan Company, after severing its loyalties with
Constantinople, fended for itself and remitted none of its booty
homeward until after the duchy was established; but Sicily
continued to send privateers of its own, either to offer the Company
some sort of indirect strategic aid or to gather its own treasure.
Here Pong Hug d'Empuries, one of the strongest supporters of the
post-Vespers kingdom, again proved himself an invaluable ally by
directing privateering campaigns away from Achaea and into
regions further to the south and east. In so doing he spared the
kingdom the papal wrath that would inevitably have followed upon
any semi-official Sicilian encroachment upon Athens and would
consequently have threatened the 1302 peace. Better to leave
Athens to the renegade Company, for a while. In fact, Pong Hug's
campaigns in the eastern reaches of the Mediterranean even
pleased Clement V, who was delighted to see Venetian dominance
in the region challenged.61 The establishment of the duchy in 1311
made further excursions easier, at least in the tactical sense of
having a foothold in the region, until the disastrous treaty with
Venice of 1317 made privateering out of Athens much more difficult.
These sorties, when they occurred, had two principal objectives: to
prey upon the eastern trunk routes for booty, and to raid the
vulnerable Aegean islands and coastal villages for slaves. It is in fact
not uncommon to find privateering investment contracts in these
years that provide ships, personnel, and arms for voyages to the east
to seek out "slaves and other treasure." The sudden domination of
the Sicilian slave market by Greek captives "de Romania" resulted
directly from these privateering ventures, since there is no evidence
that the new slaves were taken from the duchy itself; indeed, given
the underpopulation of the duchy's rural lands, such a mass
deportation made little sense. Hence the connection between
Sicily's slave practices and its piratical activities stands out clearly.
After 1318 Sicily's pirate and privateer campaigns became
markedly random, dispersed, and largely uncontrolled by the
government, and for these reasons far less effective but far more
likely to increase diplomatic tensions. Pirates and corsairs roamed
61
Mansilla, "La documentation espafiola," doc. n o (21 Dec. 1310); cf. Reg. Clement V,
no. 6438.
everywhere and chose their targets indiscriminately. The
Ghibelline alliance of that year reopened the Tyrrhenian and
western Mediterranean seas to raids out of Messina and Palermo,
and the permanent renewal of hostilities with Naples after 1321
heightened the importance of the Gulf of Otranto as a venue, since
this latter region, being a poorer zone of the Angevin kingdom, had
fewer defenses. This meant that Sicily's already stretched maritime
forces were henceforth divided between the proximate war in the
Mezzogiorno and the northern wars precisely when Venice, prompted
by Alfonso-Frederick's arrogance, opened a new offensive against
the Athenian duchy. So a two-front naval war became a battle on
three fronts; and when the Catalan sailors in Sicily, who still
dominated the officer class in both the commercial and military
fleets, wanted to assist James in his renewed campaign to conquer
Sardinia, Sicily's maritime forces, both licit and illicit, were
scattered to the seas. Renegade piracy prevailed over licensed
privateering throughout the 1320s and 1330s, as more and more
individuals, faced with economic ruin, sought to secure their
fortunes by reckless attacks on whatever ships they encountered.
They preyed upon all shipping everywhere, and for that reason
proved to be both annoying and ineffectual; but the indiscriminate
nature of the attacks did produce one wholly negative result: a
growing general avoidance of Sicilian ships and harbors by inter-
national merchants, which only exacerbated the commercial
decline. Far better to avoid the island altogether than to risk
ubiquitous harassment and loss of one's goods. Moreover, the
Sicilians also found themselves increasingly the victims of
indiscriminate attacks. Sailors out of Catalonia, angered by the
harassment they faced by their supposed allies and quasi-
compatriots, especially in the waters around Sardinia, armed
their ships and turned them once again towards Sicily,
whose harbors they assaulted repeatedly and with increasing
violence. These attacks focused on the poorly defended coastal
cities of the Val di Mazara and nearly brought their commercial
life to a standstill at times.62 Trapani, the most difficult port to
62
AGA Gartas James II, no. 9960 (27 Oct. 1322), 8536 (10 Feb. 1327); Cartas Alfonso III, no.
1453 (Feb. 1331), no. 2630 (2 May 1334), no. 2643 (20 May 1334) - these last two being angry
complaints from, respectively, the Portuguese royal court and the jurati of Majorca that
their trade with Sicily has been repeatedly interrupted by Gatalan pirates operating in
Sicilian waters.
defend because of its large exposed promontory, was the favorite

target.
Complicating matters still further, Catalonia's conquest of
Sardinia, when it finally came about, opened a new round
of hostilities between the Crown of Aragon and the Genoese and
Pisans whom they had displaced. Both the Guelfs, who were in
power in each commune, and their hapless Ghibelline exiles, had a
stake in regaining control of the island, and both took advantage of
the conditions in Sicily to strike back at the Crown. Throughout the
1330s Genoese and Pisan ships, both Guelf and Ghibelline, as they
traded for Sicilian grain, used the harbors at Palermo, Trapani, and
Mazara as bases from which to attack trading ships out of
Barcelona and Cagliari. The Sicilians, whose central and local
governments were by then all but paralyzed, were helpless to do
anything about it, but they nevertheless showed little compunction
in allowing their ports to be used in such a way, since they
desperately needed whatever commerce the northerners had to
give them. When Alfonso voiced the growing complaints of his
Barcelonan merchants, the royal court responded peevishly that
the Genoese were just as often the victims of Catalan attacks in
Sicilian waters, and hence the government "ought reasonably to be
excused" from doing anything about it. The most the Sicilians
would offer was a half-hearted promise to dissuade any Sicilian
officials from actively assisting the Genoese and Pisans — a promise
which suggests that a number of those officials had in fact already
taken part.63
Sicily's active role in piracy declined sharply throughout the 1320s
and 1330s as a result of the indiscriminate nature of its attacks,
since the consequence of its actions was simply a dramatic increase
in attacks upon the island itself. Furthermore, as Catalan
resentment of Sicily's oblique assistance to Genoese and Pisan
piracy increased, many of those Catalans who made up the officer
class in Sicily's merchant and military fleet cut off Sicily's access to
the seas by resigning their posts and taking up new positions in
63
ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3837 (20 December 1331): "nos attente rogastis, ut substinere
nolemus quin potius prohibere ne in mari seu portubus ditionis nostre subditis vestris
dampna seu injurie per dictos Januenses aut alios aliquatenus irrogentur, nee ipsis
Januensibus aut aliis dictis subditis vestris nocumentum inferre volentibus subsidium seu
refriscamentum aliquod per officiates nostros aut subditos prebeatur . . . nos exinde
habere debetis rationabiliter excusatos." See also no. 3681 (26 Dec. 1331).
defense of Sardinia, which left the kingdom with ships but an
insufficient corps of experienced navigators to guide them. In
piracy, as in the diplomatic and political goals of which it was once
a part, Frederick's realm had vastly overplayed its hand.
Ill WOMEN
Sicily's women have always been shadowy figures, crouched quietly

in doorways or gazing down the crowded streets from balustraded
or shuttered windows. For most of the medieval period they have
left no direct record of themselves, since, with a few exceptions,
they could neither read nor write - and even the possession of
literacy, for those few lucky enough to enjoy it, did not give one the
right to act or speak independently. As a consequence, very few
records survive to shed light on their activities, and virtually none
of the records we have present the women in their own voices. In the
intensely conservative society of Sicily, women lived their lives
under tight constraints; the traditional roles that society gave them
gravely limited their freedom to act and ours to behold. Local
customs, in general, were designed to isolate and protect women
from the outside world, to keep them safely ensconced in their
fathers' homes until they could be safely and just as absolutely
ensconced in their husbands' homes, or, for the devout and
dowry-less, dedicated to God in a nunnery. Not until the Vespers
era - an era inaugurated with a rebellion sparked by an Angevin
outrage against a native woman - do Sicily's women come into
view with any meaningful detail of focus. Our view of them is
still partial and imperfect, given the limitations of even this
improved documentation. But the extant evidence holds a few
surprises.64
64
The study of medieval women has progressed remarkably in the last twenty years; but in
this area as well medieval Sicily has been all but ignored. On medieval women in general,
see Shulamith Shahar, The Fourth Estate (London, 1983), Edith Ennen, Die Frauen im
Mittelalter (Munich, 1984), and Susan Mosher Stuard, Women in Medieval History and
Historiography (Pennsylvania, 1987), the last of which contains a fifty-page bibliography of
scholarship on women in England, France, Germany, and northern Italy. For Sicily, there
are only a few incidental remarks; see Jean-Pierre Cuvillier, "Famille et societe en
Mediterranee orientale chretienne: analyse comparative des modeles sicilien et Catalan,"
Melanges de la Casa de Velasquez 15 (1979), 187-204; D'Alessandro, "Famiglie medioevali
siculo-catalane" (see ch. 4, n. 16, above); Carlo Alberto Garufi, "Ricerche sugli usi nuziali
nel Medio Evo in Sicilia," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 21 (1896-7), 209-307.
The most visible figures belong of course to the aristocracy. After
1282, and as a result of it, Sicily's queens played important roles
in society. The Catalan dynasty placed the bulk of its claim to
the throne on its marriage link with Constance, the last of the
Hohenstaufens. Consequently, the right to inherit title and
property through the female line was well established. Frederick's
and James's father, although he had conquered the realm and had
received the acclamation of the Communitas Sicilie, consistently
emphasized his right to rule through his marriage to Constance;
and Frederick too, as we saw earlier, asserted his inheritance of
Constance's patrimony, rather than his election by parliament, as
the chief legitimation of his kingship. As queen, Constance began
the practice of sitting in the MRC and taking her place in the king's
inner circle of advisers. Extant records show her working to
reconcile the church to the new dynasty, to foster greater unity of
action among Sicily's contending factions and regions, and to
educate the new ruling caste to Sicilian customs. When Peter left
the island in order to tend to matters in Catalonia, Constance
headed the lieutenancy council that governed the realm in his
absence; and she continued to advise the throne during James's
reign. As late as 1296 her aid was still sought by those who wanted
to influence decisions at court, although the extent of her influence
by that time had clearly waned.65
Frederick's wife Eleanor likewise was a member of the council
and exerted a fair share of influence. As with Constance, this
influence had more to do with economics than ideology. As
independent ruler of the camera reginale, the queen controlled a large
segment of the vital Val di Noto, the most important city in which
was Siracusa, with a steady population of nearly 8,000 throughout
the reign. Adding the other sites that made up the apanage, she
ruled a population of some 20,000 individuals. Her camera was
the site of two of the most important trade fairs - at Siracusa,
beginning on the Feast of the Nativity of the Virgin, and at Lentini,
at the Feast of the Ascension - and represented as well a significant
venue for wine, grain, and salt exports.66 Siracusa itself, in fact, held
a monopoly on all exports from the confines of the city northward
65
Mansilla, "La d o c u m e n t a t i o n espafiola," doc. 103 (2 J a n . 1296); cf. Reg. Boniface VIII,
no. 858.
66
Caruso, De rebus siculis, no. 708.
67
through all the coastal territory of the Gulf of Augusta. So
important had the city become as a trading center, especially for
the eastern and southern trade routes connecting Sicily with
Greece, Egypt, and Malta, that the Siracusan salma was made the
standard measure for all agricultural produce in the eastern half of
the kingdom.68 In 1299 the government awarded the city a toll
franchise that freed its produce of the inland duties levied upon
other domestic trade; the franchise was to be lost, however, if the
land under the city's control was alienated or enfeoffed. This
resulted in a rather static social structure, since land seldom
changed hands. In later years, when the queen wanted to reward
anyone or felt the need to make additional grants in order to
purchase loyalty, she circumnavigated the prohibition of alienating
the land by granting instead various rights (pasturage, herbage,
water access, etc.) over the land, but not the land itself.69 The
general strength of the commercial economy, however, made
Siracusa, and the entire camera, for that matter, an attractive site
for the thousands who fled the decay and poverty of the Val di
Mazara. It was the sole region in the kingdom that experienced an
increase in its population, in absolute numbers, during Frederick's
reign.
Eleanor held full powers of criminal and civil jurisdiction over
the district, and, through her hired agents, administered an
independent machinery of tax collection. Few records survive from
her administration. But what evidence we have indicates that she
took her responsibilities seriously, even though she did not always
choose well in appointing her officials. A personal favorite whom
she introduced at court in 1307 and to whom she entrusted some
minor diplomatic errands, Pere Ferrandis de Vergua, proved to be
a flatterer and opportunist, a corrupt official who wooed and
wedded a series of wealthy widows and young heiresses. On
Eleanor's recommendation, the MRC appointed Pere Ferrandis
royal tax collector for Caltavuturo, where his flagrant abuse of
his position led to vehement popular protests and ultimately to his
67
A S P Cane. Reg. 2, fol. 73V-75, 116; T e s t a , De rebus et gestis, pp. 244-5; Serafino Privitera,
Storia di Siracusa antica e moderna, 3 vols. ( N a p l e s , 1978-9), 11, pp. 4 9 8 - 9 ; Speciale, Historia
sicula, p. 338.
68
Epstein, An Island for Itself, p. 121. Scholars today use the Siracusan salma as the standard
for all studies of the Sicilian economy.
69
A S C Arch. Benedettini, Corda 50, fol. 9V—10 (23 J a n . 1334), 10-12V (15 J a n . 1334).
impeachment; and when Pere later was found to have forged a

number of documents - most notably his first wife's will, arranging
a bequest of 2,000.00.00 to himself - he was banished from the
realm. Ultimately, he conspired to murder Frederick, whom he
blamed for his failure to win the position in society that he felt
he deserved.70
Eleanor was intensely pious. From the day of her arrival in Sicily
- she married Frederick as a stipulation in the Caltabellotta
treaty - she threw her considerable energy into rebuilding the
kingdom's shattered churches and monasteries, and to raising new
houses, hospitals, and evangelical schools. She funded the
construction of Castrogiovanni's duomo in 1307, according to
tradition, by selling the entire collection of her royal jewels. She
generously endowed any number of religious houses, within her
camera and without. In the area around Paterno, for example, she
granted lands, curial rights, and cash to the monastery of S. Maria
di Licodia, in return for the monks' prayers on behalf of the royal
family. The gift was prescient, in its way, since Frederick died in
Paterno while en route to Castrogiovanni. 71 Her advocacy for
religious houses continued well after their founding and endow-
ment. Especially in the case of nunneries, Eleanor remained
involved in their daily lives by observing elections to abbacies, the
recruitment of nuns, the regularity of their worship, and their
treatment of relics.72 She visited nunneries throughout the realm,
often with her children in tow, and regularly participated in their
worship, showing an early preference for Franciscan houses. 73
Above everything else, she seems to have considered it her
fundamental responsibility to promote religious observance and
moral reform. Although overt, specific evidence about her
relationship with the evangelical movement is lacking, a number of
clues survive that show her to have been an enthusiast for the
Spirituals. We have seen already that she took seriously Arnau de
Vilanova's injunction that she and her handmaidens should
perform public rituals in every duomo and hospital in every city they
70
ACA Cartas James II, no. 10029 (14 June 1311), a long letter to James which narrates Pere
Ferrandis' brief career. The murder plot is discussed by Costa, "Un atemptat frustrat
contra Frederic III de Sicilia."
71
ASC Arch. Benedettini, Gorda 50, fol. gv (13 July 1329).
72
Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 40 (30 Nov. 1330).
73
Reg. Clement V, no. 1042 (3 March 1306).
visited, dressed as personifications of Faith and Hope, "so that in
this way the people may have a vision [like that] of the Mother of
God entering a place of misery to comfort those who are there."74 It
was probably in such garb that she led the procession of the relics of
St. Agatha around the confines of Catania, during the eruption
of Mount Etna. She not only held vernacular readings of the
Scriptures on Sundays and feast days, but she further commissioned
a vernacular translation of the Dialogues of Gregory the Great, for
the edification of the royal children, one of the few substantial texts
in Sicilian dialect that survives from Frederick's reign.75 Even in a
mundane duty like appointing a new bailiff to preside over her
territory at Paterno her concern for the spiritual life of the com-
munity dominated all other considerations. When she appointed
Ruggero Gala to be bailiff, in 1311, at the height of Sicily's flirtation
with Arnau's prophesies of the kingdom's apocalyptic role, she
specified that his first and foremost duty was "that he should take
diligent care, if he should find anyone blaspheming against God,
the Blessed Virgin, or the saints, or anyone speaking ill of the Royal
Majesty, that he should take no sureties [i.e. promises to appear in
court as summoned] from them, but should immediately seize their
persons and take them captive to the justiciar of the province."
Under Sicilian law, most accused criminals had the right to post
bail and remain free until their trial; but the passionate
atmosphere of the evangelical realm would permit no such freedom
to those who were even rumored to be guilty of blasphemy. In
lock-step with Arnau's teachings and the Ordinationes generates, the
queen directed her bailiffs also to arrest anyone caught playing at
dice or cards.76
74
S e e A r n a u d e V i l a n o v a ' s Informacio espiritual, in Obres catalanes i, pp. 229—32.
75
Rome, Biblioteca Vittorio Emmanuele, MS 20. The manuscript (150 folios, in total) is
in two parts. Folios 107—37 a r e m a Sicilian hand and date to Frederick's reign. The
remaining folios are in a Calabrian hand, dating to the second half of the fourteenth
century. The text begins with bk. 1, ch. 5 of the Dialogues. The translation was the work of
Fra Giovanni Campulu, a Messinese cleric. Two later manuscripts also survive, both from
the fifteenth century: Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale, MS 7703 (it. 88); and Florence,
Biblioteca Ricciardana, MS 1310 (P.I. 35). See Lu Libru de lu Dialagu de Sanctu Gregoriu per
Jratri Iohanni Campulu da Messina, ed. G. B. Grassi Privitera and A. de Sanctis (Palermo,
1913), DSSS 1st ser., vol. xi (an edition of the Rome manuscript only); and Libru de lu
Dialagu de Sanctu Gregoriu traslatatu pir Frati Iohanni Campulu de Missina, ed. Salvatore
Santangelo (Palermo, 1933), Atti delFAccademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Palermo,
Supplement no. 2 (an edition of all three manuscripts).
76
ASP Cane. Reg. 1, fol. 55—55V: "Inprimis, curet attente predictus baiulus, quod, si tempore
sui oflicii aliquos blasfemantes Deum, Beatam Virginem et sanctos suos ac maledicentes
But Eleanor, for as much as she helped to establish a general
atmosphere of family concern and reformist piety, was merely one
woman, and hardly representative of the majority. For the rest of
Sicily's women, life in the early fourteenth century still followed the
norms and constraints of its traditional, conservative society, a
society that sought above all to protect its female members from
the harshness of life by restricting their involvement with the
world. Women, so long as they were marriageable or married, kept
the homes, cared for the children, worked as midwives, worked in
family-owned shops, and occasionally, though seldom, received a
modicum of education. For the most part, their lives were
dominated, if not dictated, by the needs of their families. Only with
widowhood did women achieve a degree of socially sanctioned
independence. Having carried out their duties to their families, it
was felt, and having relatively little hope of remarriage after the
child-bearing years had passed, they received society's imprimatur
to control their own fates. But the straitened circumstances of the
1320s and 1330s effectively denied them even that temporary
reprieve, as their economic independence (for those fortunate
enough to have achieved it) eroded along with the urban structures
around them, forcing them in many situations to pool resources and
live in groups.
Law and custom set the sexual style of the period. Despite the
unique circumstances that led up to them, Sicily's laws regarding
women were consonant with cultural norms of much longer
standing. Above all, those norms mandated modesty. Juridically as
well as culturally, modesty, humility, and obedience were the
supreme virtues demanded of Sicilian women. Hemlines of gowns
could be no higher than four palm-widths from the ground - at a
penalty of 06.00.00 to the woman who wore the dress and of 03.00.00
quoscumque de Celsitudine Regia in terra ipsa contingent inveniri, nulla ab eis

fideiussione recepta, statim capiat de personis, et captos ad justiciarium regionis sub fida
custodia debeat destinare cum litteris suis continentibus nomina et cognomina illorum,
quos propterea capiet, et mittet causam, per quam capti fuerint, et nomina et
cognomina custodum, per quos ipsos ad eundem justiciarium duxerit destinandos." And
later: "Item, quod, si contingat predictum baiulum invenire aliquos ludentes ad azardum,
idem baiulus recipiat ab eorum quolibet fideiussionem ydoneam de solvenda pena statuta
in talibus dicto justiciario et statim per suas litteras nomina illorum, quos ludentes ad
azardum invenerit, et fideiussores, quos ab eorum singulis propterea receperit, eidem
justiciario debeat nunciare." Cf. Ord. gen., ch. 77-81.
77
to the one who made it. No more than seven plain buttons were
allowed on any woman's attire. 78 Not wanting to hinder commerce,
the law allowed dressmakers to make fancier outfits for non-
Sicilian women, provided that a special government license was
first acquired; and an unintentional effect of this was that ethnic
tensions in the 1320s and 1330s were easily exacerbated by the
perceived affluence of foreigners resident in the kingdom, as they
enjoyed their finery while Sicilian females sweated under their
heavy, rough orbace woollens. Silks were likewise forbidden, even
to women of the nobility. Since the penalties for violating this
prohibition were particularly high - 12.00.00 to the wearer of the
garment, and 06.00.00 to the garment's maker - it is likely that
the law aimed not only to mandate modesty of dress but also to
maximize the availability of silks, whether raw or finished, for
export.79 The center of silk manufacture lay in the Val Demone
(silkworms were bred in Messina and at the royal residence at
Castroreale, in addition to Aci and Catania); and the export duty
on silk provided significant income to the government's coffers.
Further statutes regulated the wearing of pearls, decorative
feathers, and jewelry.
These sumptuary laws, like all medieval sumptuary legislation,
illustrate the paternalistic attitude of the lawgivers who considered
it their responsibility to guide the moral as well as the economic
activity of their subjects. Luxury was disdained as an unnecessary
expenditure of wealth and as a sign of moral decay. Only by
demanding propriety and strict personal economy could the
77
Ord. gen., ch. 90: "Quod nulla domina sive mulier audeat portare sive induere vestes cuius
fimbrie sive falde sint ultra palmos quatuor, et quod nullus sutor audeat facere vestes
habentes majores faldas seu fimbrias, sub poena unciarum videlicet sex, a portantibus, et
unciarum trium, a facientibus, exigenda."
78
Ibid., ch. 91: "Item quod non audeant portare in vestibus, quas induerint, nisi septem
bottonos ad plus, quorum cuiuslibet pretium non possit transcendere tarenos vigintiduos,
et quod nullus aurifex audeat facere bottonos majoris pretii nee ponderis, et quilibet
bottonorum ipsorum sit ponderis uncie unius ad plus, sub poena libre auri unius."
79
Ibid., ch. 93: "Item quod nulla domina sive mulier audeat portare cappam pro equitando
de samito vel de aliquo panno aureo vel serico, nisi tantum de panno laneo vel jamellocto,
absque omni infrixatura, cuius panni pretium sit ad libitum earum; et quod nullus sutor
cappam pro equitando facere possit, nisi de panno laneo vel jamellocto, ut supra, sub
predicta poena unciarum duodecim, a portante, et unciarum sex, a faciente, ut supra
ponitur, exigenda. Sed si aliquis sutor alicui extero, qui non sit incola predicte insule,
cappam alio modo, quam quo supra notatur, facere voluerit, petat idem sutor licentiam
a curia, et concedatur sibi per eandem curiam ipsa licentia, sicut supra." "Jamelloctum"
refers to camel hair.
particular reform of urban society begun in 1302 reach fruition.
These laws thus reflect the strength of the post-war recovery - for
the royal court, no matter how unconditional its acceptance of
evangelical dictates and warnings, need not have bothered to
restrict women's use of silks, gold, pearls, and precious stones
unless a significant number of women actually were in a position to
afford them. The "euforia dei consumi" described by Peri affected
monied females fully as much as it did the men. With surplus
income at hand, the stage was set for a joyous reaction against the
material deprivations that the Vespers had occasioned; and hence
the indulgence in finery occurred hand in hand with, and perhaps
in part as a personal reward for, the popular reendowment of
monastic houses and parish churches after 1302. This was indeed a
widespread phenomenon. The fact that the laws emphasized that
these prohibitions extended even to the nobility clearly indicates
that noblewomen were not the only figures capable of affording
such luxuries; if anything, it suggests that the non-noble women of
urban society predominated in the aggregate, though not per capita,
consumption of luxury items. But where did this wealth come from?
For the landed class, the key lay in an old statute. "So that no
doubt at all can arise in the future regarding the inheritance of
counts, barons, and all who hold fiefs from us, we order . . . that
children, then grandchildren, then great-grandchildren and so on
ad infinitum . .. can freely and absolutely inherit [lands and wealth]
regardless of sex . . . But the prerogative of gender must be
preserved, so that the male is preferred to the female, and the elder
to the younger." In the absence of a male heir, women had the right
to inherit full control and ownership of land; the law applied equally
to the demesnal and rural worlds, and guaranteed the right of
female ownership of farms and estates, businesses, commercial
rights, and trade privileges.80 Given that thousands of men had
died in the wars and that hundreds more had fallen victim to
banishment or execution, a large share of land and a large
percentage of urban businesses and wealth — we cannot know the
precise figures - had fallen into female hands by 1302; moreover,
the continued loss of lives in the foreign and civil wars from 1321
onwards placed even more wealth, proportionally speaking, in the
hands of widows and orphaned daughters. Thus, for example,
80
ASM Corporazioni religiose, Ospedale di S. Giovanni, perg. 93 (20 Jan. 1310).
Macalda da Palizzi, the daughter of the royal chancellor
Vinciguerra da Palizzi, inherited the family estate in the barony of
Cammarata in 1305 upon the death of her father and her elder
brother Cristoforo. Although married at the time of her
inheritance, Da. Macalda received the estate as her personal
possession, over which her husband had no authority, and her later
decision to lease the estate provided her personally with an income
of 20.00.00 a year. Such women knew their rights. When Margherita
da Scordia inherited a manor near Lentini which her father had
received as a papal fief, and an unscrupulous tax official attempted
to extort feudal dues from her on the assumption that she was
ignorant of the law, she sued the official and presented an arsenal
of documentation to prove the legitimacy of her inheritance and the
manor's tax-exempt status. She won her case, and the official was
dropped from the rolls.81
These were hardly isolated incidents. The surviving records of
land tenure, purchase, cultivation, litigation, rental, and leasing
are thick with references to widows and heiresses, giving ample
testimony to a significant, and long overlooked, demographic
change. Widows and orphaned heiresses appear everywhere in the
archival remains, and must have appeared everywhere in society at
that time. It is in fact hard to avoid them. No less than 20 percent
of all extant land transactions from 1291 to 1337 involve individual
women - usually widows, less so heiress daughters - as one of the
principal actors, and the percentage increases for the years from
1322 to 1337. The fact that widows outnumber daughters, especially
in the later years, points to the increased mortality rate for men,
who evidently died before producing either male or female heirs.
From Iaquinta Viola's inheritance of her father's Val Demone
vineyard just outside of Messina, valued at 40.00.00, in 1291, to Da.
Perna Fisaula's leasing to D. Giovanni Calvellis of a small farming
residence in Cassaro that she had inherited from her late husband,
an exceptionally large portion of Sicily's land lay in female hands. 82
81
A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 3446 (3 March 1305).
82
A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 144 (22 July 1292), d o c u m e n t i n g Iaquinta's suit for the balance
owed her from t h e sale of half o f her vineyard o n 20 July 1291 t o D . Federico Rosso of
Messina; B C P M S 2 Q q H 230, fol. 379 (7 Nov. 1334), recording Da. Perna's emphytheusis
contract with D . Giovanni for a two-thirds portion o f her domicellus in Cassaro. O t h e r
e x a m p l e s are t o o numerous t o cite in extenso. A sampler: Giambruno, Tabulario di S.
Margherita diPolizzi, doc. 20 (10 Sept. 1310), 27 (14 Sept. 1324), 28 (8 March 1326), 29 (29July
1326), 39 (6 Sept. 1330); B C P M S 2 Q q H 230, fol. 363 ( i o j u n e 1331), 370 (7 Nov. 1334).
A clear majority of these holdings were to be found in the Val
Demone and the Val di Noto, where landholdings were smaller and
more numerous. One such smallholding near Aidone belonged to
Sybilla Calvino "and her wife Ruggero" who resided in Castro-
giovanni, along with Sybilla's daughter from an earlier marriage;
Sybilla and her daughter controlled the land outright. When they
decided to sell a portion of it to a local farmer, the hapless Ruggero
could only stand by and consent to the sale, although he no doubt
muttered under his breath about the notary's slip of the pen when
he reviewed the deed.83 The accidental survival of more records
from these two regions may account for this distribution; but the
Val Demone, although its economic diversity made it more secure
than the rest of the kingdom, was also the site of much of the most
intense baronial infighting as well in the later decades, owing
largely to the wide Ventimiglia and Chiaromonte holdings located
there. Hence the prevalence of female-controlled estates and
vineyards illustrates powerfully and soberly the extent of violent
social unrest and rivalry in the rural sector.84
Women figured large in the urban economy too, where we find
them engaged in a range of trades. Most often, of course, they
worked in the shops of their husbands and fathers, commonly
engaging in some manufacture like weaving or dressmaking, or
working in a taverna, or collecting rents. Given the relative
prosperity of the post-Caltabellotta years and the fact that women
retained possession of the resources they brought into marriage,
the possibilities for generating wealth were everywhere. But women
83
A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 2433 (28 J u n e 1307): "Sybilla d e Alberto Calvini . . . habitatrix
Castrijohannis . . . et uxor sua Rogerius."
84
Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizri, doc. 20 (10 Sept. 1308), D a . Giovanna d e
Galatafimi (widow of D . Giovanni di Ventimiglia) appoints a procurator to negotiate a
dispute over properties near Petralia Soprana and Petralia Sottana; doc. 27 (14 Sept.
1324), the widow of Piero de Paricia sells a "plantam et terram vacuam" near S. Maria de
Latina for 01.04.00; doc. 28 (8 March 1326), Isola Pinziguerra (widow o f D . L a m b e r t o
Pinziguerra), along with her daughters Giacoma and Giovanna, inherits fief estates at
Pinziguerra, Rassafica, and Malconsiglio (see also doc. 29-30, 33); doc. 35 (1 Aug. 1329),
selling a vineyard and land-plot owned by Da. Matilda d'Augusta (see also doc. 37);
doc. 39 (6 Sept. 1330), Genova Castellana (widow of Pregadeo Carella) sells a
"tenimentum terrarum" to the same Da. Matilda; ACA Perg. James II, apendice, no. 94
(22 Feb. 1322), challenging Da. Belladonna di Scordia's ownership of a Val Demone
vineyard; Perg. Alfonso III, no. 624 (27 March 1332), Bella Markisana (widow of Gualtiero
Markisana) sells an orchard valued at 25.00.00 to Pere Llopis, a Catalan inhabitant
of Catania; BCP MS 2 Qq H 230, fol. 363 (10 June 1331), Galgana Sardo (widow of
M. Giacomo Sardo) sells a domus in Cassaro to a local notary.
were greatly restricted, at least during their wedded years, in
the types of business they were allowed to conduct. They were
prominent as urban and rural landlords, for example. Some women,
like Rosa Nazano in Corleone and Giovanna d'Esculo in Monreale,
owned and operated mills.85 A woman in Cefalu named Margherita
Romano had the distinction of being landlady to the bishop;
evidently a pious woman, she charged him an annual rent of only
00.01.00 for a large domus in the town's upper piazza, near the
cathedral.86 Female tavern- and inn-keepers were particularly
numerous and had particularly varying fortunes, ranging from
Giacoma Baldinoto's taverna in Sciacca, which was described in a
court record of 1294 as "a ruin, wasted with age and practically
useless," to Vircella Garsia's inn at Palermo, which she sold in June
1318 for 30.00.00, or to Genesia Lentini's establishment in Siracusa,
valued in 1325 at io.oo.oo.87 Still more spectacularly, Donna
Abinanta, a woman of Castrogiovanni, owned a profitable
tenimentum in Naro which she leased to a variety of tenants until
September 1334 when she sold it for no less than 130.00.00.88
For the majority of women, however, life was a more modest and
mundane affair, centered around the home and the daily cares of
family life. Marriage was for most of them the defining event in
their lives, the rite of passage that largely determined their
economic and personal fates. As a sacrament and a means for the
transfer of wealth, marriage stood at the center of urban life. It
established one's position in society and provided society with one
of its most traditional and popular festivals (and one that leaders of
rival comitive quickly seized upon as occasions for broadcasting their
real or claimed wealth, status, and influence). Among traditional
wedding customs was a torch- or candle-lit parade through the
streets of the city or village by the crowd in attendance, or by
the wedding party itself, stretching usually from the bride's house
to the church where the ceremony was performed, and then from
the church to the home of the bride's new husband, where
the crowd stood vigil until the marriage was consummated. The
85
A S P T a b . S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 22 (7 Sept. 1299).
86
A S P T a b . Cefalu, perg. 8 4 (6 March 1309).
87
ACA Perg. James II, no. 465 (8 Feb. 1294): "ruynosa et vetustate corrupta et prorsus
inutilis"; ASP Tab. S. Martino delle Scale, perg. 36 (18 July 1318); Polica, "Carte adespote
dell'Archivio Gargallo," doc. 3 (20 Oct. 1325).
88
A C A Perg. Alfonso III, no. 823 (14 Sept. 1334).
revelries that followed could easily last the entire night and, like
many such affairs, lead on occasion to unintended turmoil. Local
officials in the 1320s and 1330s came to dread weddings as much
as they dreaded ripitu processions. Like most popular festivals
weddings drew large crowds, and given the centrality of the torch-
lit consummation vigil to the overall festivities, this raised the
danger of accidental fires. The cities, of course, were still
constructed of wood; usually only the royal residence, the duomo
church, grand elites' residences, and the castellan or bailiffs
quarters (and their prison cells) were built of stone. Mass revelries
could easily raze the entire city. Cynical manipulation of these
enthusiasms by rival gang leaders only heightened the general
danger. And hence the feeble attempts by local and central govern-
ments to limit the size and zeal of urban festivals - as much out of
an inherent fear of all crowds as out of concern for fires.89
Weddings proliferated after 1302. This is often the case when a
society readjusts to peace after protracted war, and Sicily was no
exception. With a modicum of order restored and the potential for
a reinvigorated economy looming on the horizon, men scurried
to win brides for themselves. There was certainly no shortage of
marriageable women available.90 Marriages multiplied accordingly,
which led to the government's concerns over the potential dangers
of excessive urban revelry. Moreover, the new evangelical
atmosphere cautioned against immodesty.
A sole capitulum in the Ordinationes generates was devoted to
wedding solemnities. Custom required that all marriages be
celebrated "solemnly and publicly" - that is, with a priestly
blessing. Moreover, all marriages wherein either the bride or her
groom were landholders had to apply for a government license
before the wedding could take place. But for the rest of the
festivities, the law sought to curb popular enthusiasm by decreeing
that:
89
T h e only study of marriage customs is Garufi, "Ricerche sugli usi nuziali" ( s e e n. 64,
above).
90
Six thousand Sicilian m e n had died in the battle of C a p o d'Orlando alone, leaving behind
numerous widows. Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. iv, ch. 13-16 describes t h e battle, which
took place o n 4 July 1299; s e e also Pryor, "The Naval Battles o f Roger of Lauria,"
pp. 204-8; and Finke, "Die Seeschlacht a m K a p Orlando" (see ch. 3, n. 78, above). For the
battle's aftermath, see ACA Cartas James II, no. 10205-10. For Sicilians killing Sicilians,
see Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 75; Desclot, Crdnica, ch. 100, 119; and Peri, La Sicilia dopo
il Vespro, pp. 4, 14, 33, 36.
no one shall be allowed to travel to any wedding that takes place thirty
miles or more from the city or village in which he or she lives, under
penalty of 04.00.00, unless he or she is the mother, father, son, daughter,
brother, sister, or first cousin of either the bride or groom. Moreover there
are to be no costumes worn, and no superfluous theatricals performed . . .
on penalty of 04.00.00. It is permitted to celebrate the solemnities as one
wishes during the daytime; but at night no one may attend the nuptials, or
remain at them, regardless of whether or not they are carrying torches. If
the people getting married are widows, however, then six people for the
groom and six people for the bride may accompany them to the church and
thence to their home, carrying torches; but the number of torch-bearers
may never exceed twelve . . . and afterwards they must return immediately
to their own houses . . . All rings, jests, gifts, and surprises that have
customarily been given to the bride on the second day after her nuptials
are prohibited, on penalty of 04.00.00. And all large-scale celebrations are
prohibited; this applies equally to those related to either the bride or the
groom, regardless of degree, and to those who have come to the wedding
from a distance. It is permitted for them to celebrate during the day of the
wedding and no more, on penalty of 04.00.00.91
From this it is clear that the municipalities feared spirited
gatherings on at least two levels - one the quite sensible level of
wishing to ensure against fires in the crowded, wood-built cities,
and the other the less overt level of dreading excessive, immodest
comportment among the populace. This latter was not necessarily
the result of concern over the possible incitement of political
passions and social riots, although there was probably a measure
of that at work. Cultural taboos against any public display of
strong emotion, whether it be wine-induced revelry or personal
affection, ran strong and deep, and still do. Modesty, and the aura
91
Ord. gen., ch. 98: "Quod nemini liceat ire ad nuptias faciendas extra civitatem vel terram
de qua vel in qua habitat ultra milliaria triginta ad plus, nisi forte sit pater vel mater,
filius vel filia, frater vel soror, primus consobrinus vel consobrina sponsi vel sponse, sub
poena unciarum quatuor. Item quod in nuptiis non fiant indumenta donantia sive dari
solita histrionibus . . . sub poena unciarum quatuor. Item quod licitum sit de die facere in
nuptiis solemnitates ad libitum; de nocte autem nullus vadat ad nuptias vel moretur
in eis cum blandonibus vel sine blandonibus — nisi nubentes sint vidue, ad quas liceat ire
cum eis ad ecclesias et deinde redire ad domos suas cum blandonibus usque ad sex, qui
sint sponsi, et sex sponse. Ita quod numerus blandonorum duodecim nullatenus
excedatur. Volumus tamen quod persone ipse possint ire de domibus earum ad domos
nuptiarum et abinde redire ad domos suas . . . Item quod annuli, jocalia, et alia dona et
exenia dari consueta sponse secundo die post nuptias eodem die vel alio dari prohibentur,
sub poena unciarum quatuor. Item prohibentur generalia convivia nuptiarum, et quod
tantum illis, qui attinent sponso quam sponse in primo et secundo gradu, et iis aliis
venientibus de exteris partibus ad nuptias, possit parari et fieri convivium durante
tempore nuptiarum per diem unum tantum, sub poena unciarum quatuor."
of self-mastery that it creates, ranked high among popular values.
To allow one's emotions to take control of one's behavior violated
society's comfortable norms and threatened social order. Urban
Sicilians especially placed a high value on maintaining a
public image of self-discipline, of reserved strength and cultivated
ease, and found emotional behavior - especially any behavior
that betrayed the weakness or indiscipline of the reveller —
discomforting and distasteful. But the tight lid placed on everyday
passions, at least in their public expression, occasionally failed and
triggered precisely the sudden bursts of rage that plagued the cities
in times of distress. The explosive and immediate violence of the
Vespers rebellion on Easter Sunday 1282 is only the best-known
example of the phenomenon; the sudden riots that shook the cities
from 1321 onwards are less well known but in the end proved to be
more harmful.
It is interesting that so many of these occurrences were associ-
ated, in Sicilian minds, with women. As passionate creatures and as
the cause of passion in others, women figured prominently in the
social outlook of the culture. The Vespers riot erupted after an
Angevin soldier offended the modesty of a Sicilian woman as she
made her way to church (either raping her or attempting to do so,
depending on the source). Within hours nearly every Frenchman in
Palermo was dead, and within a week the rebellion had spread
throughout the realm. Giovanni Chiaromonte's insurrection, which
so many disgruntled barons were so quick to join, justified itself
by asserting the dishonor done to his family by Francesco
Ventimiglia's repudiation of his sister. To judge from the dedi-
cations of churches and abbeys, medieval Sicilians venerated far
more female saints than most communities did, and most of these
were martyrs who died as a result of the erotic, political, or religious
passions that they had inspired in their killers. Weddings obviously
were feared as much as they were celebrated, for their potential to
draw and stir a crowd; and the torch-lit processions from home
to church and back again, followed by the outside vigil maintained
during the wedding-night's consummation, all worked to solemnize
male possession and mastery of female passion. And perhaps most
strikingly, women were associated with emotive unrest in regard to
the popular death rituals led by the female "wailers" or reputatrices,
who organized and presided over the ripitu. The law feared their
power as early as 1309, decreeing that "no woman shall dare to
accompany or follow any funeral biers that carry the bodies of
the dead, whether these go to the church or to the graveyard,
regardless of however closely the deceased was connected to her by
either blood or affection," for fear of their ability to incite mass
outpourings of woe, rage, and despair.92 The folkloric power of
these women dated to ancient Roman times and the dirge singers
mentioned by Cicero and Horace.93 Their ability to drive crowds
wild with grief still was not doubted. "Since the wailings, songs, and
chants offered on behalf of the dead by women turn the souls of
those present to grief and move them to the injury of the Creator,
we prohibit these wailers from being present at all funerals, along
with all other women who work in their line; neither may they
appear in homes, churches, or graveyards . . . nor may they ring
bells, pluck strings, pound drums, or play any other of the
instruments which their art uses to bring men as much to a state of
joy as to one of grief." These wailers, despite their folkloric origins,
evidently had some connection, or were perceived to have some
connection, with the evangelical movement as well, since the law
added that they could not escape paying for their actions "propter
paupertatem." If necessary, they were to be paraded through the
streets of the city and beaten with cudgels.94
If the emotive power of women represented so grave a danger to
society, then it was better to ban them from occasions which might
give rise to that emotion and its power to disturb, distract, and
intoxicate a crowd. Consequently all Sicilian women, whether
they were reputatrices or not, were forbidden to mourn their dead
in any church or at the grave on any feast day, "regardless of
however closely the deceased was connected to her by blood or
92
Ibid., ch. 100: "Quod nulla domina sive mulier audeat ire cum feretro seu post feretrum,
cum corpora defunctorum ad ecclesias vel sepulturas, quantumcumque defunctus
consanguinitate vel afflnitate sibi junctus fuerit, sub poena unciarum quatuor."
93
Cicero, De legibus, 2, 24, 62; H o r a c e , Carmina, 2, 20-1; s e e also St. A u g u s t i n e , De civitate Dei,
bk. vi, ch. 9.
94
Ord. gen., ch. 101: "Item, q u o n i a m reputationes et cantus et soni, qui propter defunctos
celebrantur, muliebriter animos astantium convertant in luctum et movent eos
quodammodo ad injuriam Creatoris, prohibemus reputantes funeribus adesse, vel alie
mulieres, que earum utantur ministerio, nee in domibus seu ecclesiis vel sepulturis vel
alio quocunque loco; nee pulsentur circa funebria, guideme vel timpana, vel alia solita
instrumenta, que ars magis ad gaudium, quam ad tristitiam adinvenit, poena unciarum
auri quatuor multandis iis, qui eas admiserint circa hoc, et ipsis reputatricibus similiter,
que reputatrices, si poenam solvere propter paupertatem non possint, ne poenalis
prohibitio eludatur, fustibus cedantur per civitatem et terram, ubi prohibita
tentaverunt."
95
affection." And they were permitted to wear mourning clothes
only for the death of their husbands.96 This association of women
with mourning and death, with uncontrollable emotion and a kind
of seductive hysteria, accords with the evangelicals' teachings about
the approaching apocalypse and the urgency behind the reforms
that sought to save the kingdom, and all Christendom, from the
spiritual rot that threatened it. But this regulation of women
further suggests that the death rate in the kingdom, and especially
in the cities, was on the rise as early as 1309, for it is extremely
unlikely that such severe regulations would have been crafted and
enforced - regulations, as too with the wedding laws, that uprooted
centuries-long popular traditions - unless a powerfully felt need for
them had arisen.
But what caused these deaths? No major food crises occurred
until 1311, and war with Naples did not recommence until 1312.
Pirate attacks on the port cities can hardly have caused so many
deaths; even brutes like Bernat de Sarria and Berenguer Vilaregut
killed no more than a handful of people. No doubt some of the
mourning was for the fallen members of the Company that was just
then settling into Achaea; as the Company tightened its relations
with Sicily, the full extent of their losses over the years probably
only then became well known. But even this accounts for several
hundred deaths, at most. Instead, the increase in mortality was
likely the result of demographic displacement. Peasants driven
from the land, or willingly fleeing from it, streamed into the
demesne cities in order to create new lives for themselves, and in
so doing placed intolerable burdens on the resources of the
unprepared municipalities. Despite the skills brought by traders
and artisans who migrated, especially for those who made the
difficult trek eastward from the Val di Mazara, integration into
their new communities could not have been easy, given the
different trade practices and market structures of the eastern valli.
95
Ibid., ch. 102: "Prohibemus etiam a d o m i n a b u s et mulieribus aliisque q u a n t u m c u n q u e
consanguinitate vel affinitate jungantur iam mortuis ire ad ecclesias seu sepulcra
defunctorum diebus festivis vel aliis, occasione consuetudinis ad plorandum ibidem
propter defunctos, vel temporibus statutis, poena unciarum auri quatuor transgressore
multando."
96
Ibid., ch. 104: "Item quod domine vel plebee, scilicet maritate, propter mortem
consanguineorum non mutent sibi vestes, nee aliquam novitatem in vestibus et habitu
faciant, sicut hactenus consuevit, nisi pro morte maritorum suorum tantum, sub poena
unciarum auri sex a transgredientibus petenda."
The difficulties of cultural dislocation should not be overlooked
either; compounding many Sicilians' ingrained distrust of strangers
was the simple, though substantial, problem of dialect. The city of
Ragusa, for example, had three separate dialects spoken within its
confines, which must have made it hard for newcomers to adapt and
establish themselves. Inevitably, unemployment resulted, and the
proportionate increase in the urban labor pools drove wages down
and resulted in the formation of those crowds of urban poor who
became the targets of the preachers and later of gang recruiters. As
city streets filled with the poor, despair rose and public health
declined even while many thrived. The build-up of resentment
against the monied, and especially against the monied Catalans,
Pisans, Genoese, and Florentines present in their fine silks,
continued without abatement. Hunger, disease, and crime did the
killing.
In this atmosphere women who had acquired property of any sort,
whether from their dead husbands or dead fathers, became the
targets of ardent suitors and the objects of aggressive economic
opportunism. Some women, like the young widow Isabella di
Federico in Palermo, found that their very bodies became the key
objects of inheritance disputes. When Isabella's husband died in
late 1320 she was pregnant with their first child; but her brother-
in-law Bernardo di Federico was suspicious of her claim. Fearing
that Isabella was dissembling, or worse that she might suddenly get
herself pregnant in order to keep her husband's inheritance under
her control, Bernardo petitioned the universitas to force Isabella to
submit to an inspection by four court-appointed midwives. When
the midwives confirmed that Isabella was indeed pregnant and was
in fact already in her sixth month, the matter appeared to have
been settled. But as her pregnancy came to term the dispute took a
suspicious turn. On 28 February 1321 Bernardo again petitioned the
court, this time to force Isabella, then in her ninth month, to leave
her own house and to take lodgings instead with another woman,
named Fia Murchio, who would presumably care for her and the
child. Isabella had misgivings about this strange request. Her
inheritance from her husband certainly was sufficient to enable her
to afford a midwife's attention and a servant or two to help her in
the first months after her child's birth - and so Bernardo's new
petition could not be based on altruism. If anything, she feared, Fia
Murchio was in Bernardo's hire and was plotting to kill the baby
(Fia is described only as a "widow," not as a midwife). Despite a
court injunction to move herself into Fia's house, Isabella refused,
declaring that she would remain in her own house until well after
the child was born, after which she would decide for herself where
she wanted to live. In her condition, she could not be physically
forced, and her defiance was brave. Nevertheless she had to bear
the insult of receiving a court-appointed notary, one Matteo de
Notario, as "curator of her womb" until she delivered.97
The study of Sicily's women in the late Middle Ages has scarcely
begun. Admittedly they left few records, but enough remains to
encourage us that such a study is possible and worthwhile. As these
pages have tried to show, they had an importance in the life of the
realm that has been altogether unappreciated and misunderstood.
That importance may perhaps be an indirect and strangely passive
one for the historian, for the women of Frederick's Sicily were more
acted upon than actors; but in viewing the forces that were at work
in shaping and controlling women's lives, we come to understand
the range and power of the forces that were at work unraveling the
social fabric. The dramatic ubiquity of widowhood, the scramble to
seize control of female inheritances, and the popularity of, yet too
the dread of, the apocalyptic "wailers," all bear witness to the
desperate conditions within the realm and the desperate remedies
for them it sought.
97
BCP MS Qq F 31, fol. 31 (17-18 Dec. 1320), 42-42V (27-8 Feb. 1321): "notarius Matheus de
Notario idem curator datur per curiam ventris dicte Ysabelle." Coercion was used in
other cases too, often to force an unwilling woman to wed, in order either to secure a
commercial link or to rid the family of an unwanted burden. One such case was Costanza
di Monteleone of Milocca who, in 1330, was forced by her parents and brothers to marry
one Paolino di Castronovo "per vim et metum cohacta minis et verberibus ac cruciatibus
parentum et fratrum suorum." See BCP, MS Qq H 6, fol. 476-8 (23 Nov. 1332), which is
the record of Costanza's successful suit to have the marriage annulled; and Collura, Le
piii antiche carte (see ch. 3, n. 65, above), doc. 76. For another annullment, see BCP MS. Qq
H 6, fol. 276-80 (11 June 1313); cf. Collura, Lepiu antiche, doc. 55,55a. See also ACA Perg.
James II, no. 3374 (6 July 1315).
Conclusion
Could anything have been done to avoid the social and economic
decay portrayed here? Certainly the challenges confronting
the island were great, when Frederick first took the throne, but the
situation was hardly hopeless. Indeed it was the very persistence of
hope for the future that brought an end to the war and inspired the
creative adaptations of the post-Caltabellotta years. In some ways,
that decade was the high point not only of Frederick's reign but
of the entire medieval era for Sicily, for it was the time of the
greatest native achievement in commerce, spiritual renewal, public
building, military strength, and rudimentary education. The
romanticized Norman era, by contrast, had achieved most of its
glories - which were, anyways, limited to the royal court - by the
importation of what had been accomplished elsewhere. A palpable
atmosphere of excitement and confidence was present. As it
happened, the excitement was justified, but not the confidence.
The coincidence of political, economic, and religious disaster in
1311-14 turned the tide and exposed all the weaknesses in Sicilian
life.
No single explanation can suffice to account for what happened
to Sicily. The unraveling of the kingdom in the first third of the
fourteenth century progressed so relentlessly, and to so great an
extent, that in order to explain it one must look for either a
single, cataclysmic event that suddenly and irretrievably altered
everything - something along the lines of the Turkish conquest of
Anatolia, for Asia Minor - or for an entire network of innate local
weaknesses, a congeries of fault lines in the very structure of
society that prevented it from adapting to the challenges that
confronted it. For many commentators from the fourteenth century
to the present, from Nicola Speciale to Benedetto Croce and his
disciples, the Vespers conflict alone answers all; it was the
303
cataclysm that altered everything in Sicilian life and initiated the
downhill slide from which the island has even yet to recover. As
Speciale wrote, Sicily (the ruined beauty with whom this book
began) had become a land with "an abundance of grain and many
other fruits, which are taken from her shores by foreign sailors and
sold at terrific prices . . . [a kingdom] attacked by foreign kings
and princes . . . cut by the wounds of war . . . coveted by people from
the remotest lands. And for this reason it is a land reared in the
calamity and strife of war, where peace and quiet have long been
unknown." Belief in the centrality of the Vespers undergirds all the
thinking of the economic "dualists," for whom Sicily without her
peninsular territories was an unviable society doomed to failure.
But the war with Naples, for all its severity, can hardly be blamed
for everything that went wrong, or simply was wrong already, in
Sicilian life. The recovery after Caltabellotta alone shows this. War
inevitably aggravates, deepens, and embitters ethnic hatreds, for
example, but it is not necessarily the cause of them. Bigotry and
xenophobia have genealogies all their own. Nor does the war
sufficiently account for the kingdom's economic difficulties. Val
Demone's trade with Calabria, long regarded as so crucial,
continued, after an initial hiatus after 1282, throughout the period
of Frederick's reign and contributed greatly to Messina's consider-
able resilience. Moreover, whatever trade was lost with the
peninsula was amply made up by commercial links with Catalonia,
Tunis (long the most important consumer of Sicilian wheat), and
temporarily at least with Athens and the rest of rump Byzantium.
Vespers lamenters have long emphasized the permanent harm
done to the economy by the omnipresence of foreign traders and
their omnipotent control of exports, but foreign control of inter-
national commerce, while it may no doubt enrich the foreigner,
does not necessarily imply the impoverishment of the native.
Sicily's domestic economy was always more crucial to its overall
well-being than its overseas commerce, and the conflict with the
Angevins affected domestic trade only marginally.
Moreover, as shown most convincingly by Epstein, Sicily's
economy recovered to an astonishing degree in the fifteenth
century, when the kingdom was still, or was once again, under
the rule of Aragon-Catalonia: the population increased, manu-
facturing expanded and diversified, credit and market structures
became more sophisticated, wages rose, and prices stabilized. Had
Conclusion 305
the Vespers caused the irrevocable ruin that many claim for it, such
a recovery would be difficult to explain. Epstein, of course, accounts
for the recovery by arguing precisely that the Vespers was of little
importance for Sicily's long-term development, and that the local
economy, when examined in terms of its domestic rather than its
foreign trade, possessed hitherto unappreciated strengths and an
admirable ability to adapt to radically new circumstances. Thus the
roots of Sicily's now entrenched poverty and backwardness must be
sought elsewhere - as he suggests, in the seventeenth century.
The argument of this book had been two-fold. First, any attempt
to evaluate the impact of foreign affairs on the kingdom, whether
political and dynastic or social, economic, and religious, must
examine those affairs in a broader context than scholars hitherto
have done. Sicily's difficulties with Naples formed only one thread
of an enormously tangled web of alliances, animosities, commit-
ments, reluctant obligations, and desperate hopes - a web in which
the Vespers has appeared to be the most important thread only
because of the politically driven bombast that makes up most of the
extant narrative sources — the sources on which so much modern
scholarship has depended. By broadening one's field of vision, and
by focusing instead on the archival records that lie scattered
between Palermo, Messina, Barcelona, Naples, and Rome, a
different picture emerges, one of an island society made newly
vibrant and activist by its separation from the rest of the Regno - a
kingdom with an extraordinarily energetic zeal to reform itself and
the larger Mediterranean world of which it was, in more than one
way, the center and linchpin. Freed from the war, Sicily rebounded
with impressive speed and in a relatively short period of time had
standardized its system of weights and measures, codified and
simplified its cumbersome tariff code, reorganized land tenure,
created a system of government as near to efficiency and fairness as
anything it had seen in previous centuries, built or rebuilt scores of
churches and monasteries, established a network of evangelical
schools, reformed its slave practice, improved its manufacturing
base, and (accidentally) conquered much of Greece. Clearly the
physical destruction caused by the Angevin war, and the obstruc-
tion or diversion of trade it contributed to, had not dealt anything
like a death blow to society.
Indeed, the first half of Frederick's reign was singularly success-
ful. Catalan cash and organizational ability accounts for some of
this, but the majority of the credit must go to the long-frustrated

desires of the Sicilians themselves for peace, a surer prosperity, a
measure of self-determination, and a fuller spiritual life. Once
presented with the opportunity, however brief or tenuous, to pursue
these goals with a minimum of interference, they responded
with ingenuity and energy. Immense problems remained, yet
demographic mobility gave people the chance to pursue a better life
elsewhere if they were unable to make a living on the land. Social
tensions and rivalries remained sharp, but disputes were increas-
ingly settled in court rather than on the street. Difficulties with the
Holy See persisted, but Sicily worked as well with Avignon in these
years as did any other state in Europe. Had Frederick died at mid-
reign - perhaps, as he might have hoped, on a battlefield next to
Henry VII - he would likely have been remembered as one of
Sicily's greatest kings, and his reign as a time of prosperity and
promise rivaled only by that of "Good King William" (who really
wasn't so good, anyhow) in the twelfth century. But the successes of
his early years, though impressive, were painfully short-lived; even
with its relentlessly dreadful last years from 1317 to 1337, Frederick's
reign has been portrayed all too frequently with an undeserved
roseate glow by writers in the lachrymose tradition.
Second, innate weaknesses existed in the social fabric that
affected the island much for the worse and prevented its long-term
recovery from the fourteenth-century disasters, even in spite of the
impressive economic recovery of the fifteenth century. Once again,
one must broaden one's view. Just as more factors than the Vespers
alone must be considered in order to understand Sicilian history in
these years, so must one recognize that the Sicilian crisis was more
than just economic. Despite an encouraging new beginning after
1302, political development was arrested, stunted, and paralyzed.
Government - whether central or local, demesnal or feudal - could
not deliver even the minimum of what society expected of it, once
trouble began, and hence could not command popular support.
Allegiance to "their Kingdom of Sicily," as Leonardo d'Incisa so
revealingly phrased it, was a sham, an empty platitude mouthed
whenever a favor was sought. Demographic mobility had done
nothing to relieve the island's intense and unshakeable localism.
The concern for individual self-preservation and felicity is a
universal trait, but Sicily's belligerent particularism was a species
apart. For most, nothing beyond oneself and one's family mattered.
Conclusion 307
It is, of course, anachronistic to expect to find modern notions
of public service or communal identity fully developed and
championed by a considerably pinched fourteenth-century world,
but Sicilian society cheerfully evinced a cynical loyalty to the notion
even long after it had failed to uphold the ideal. The realm as a
realm, or the local community as a community, had value only in
order to justify, with a suspiciously convenient constancy, violence
against the perceived tyranny and meddling of foreigners.
The Vespers did not directly cause all of this suffering, but it did
serve to catalyze, highlight, and extend the forces so furiously at
work in tearing apart Sicilian society. When Frederick died, the
worst crises were yet to come, in the forms of the Black Death and
the baronial wars. But the groundwork of ruin had been firmly laid,
society's fault lines and frayed nerves exposed. In the face of
economic collapse, political disaster, and spiritual crisis, Sicilians
turned ferociously inward - and like Giovanni Chiaromonte they
nursed passions of anger and suspicion, resentment and outrage
over wounded honor. The dreadful consequences of their suffering,
both real and imagined, ought not to cloud the record of their
accomplishments, however. The odds against Vespers-era Sicily
succeeding and prospering had been against it all along. So long as
the Angevins were determined to regain the island - "striking not
hard, but repeatedly, like a chisel hollowing out a stone" - there was
little the Sicilians could do but to fight back as best they could.
Unfortunately Henry VIFs promised conquest of the peninsula and
Arnau de Vilanova's promised apocalypse never materialized,
which left the kingdom worse off than it had been in decades. Even
so, the record of the adaptability, resourcefulness, and industry of
the people in the face of such awful difficulties, their stubborn
refusal to submit and their determination to keep struggling -
either to win a permanent political independence, on the large,
public level, or merely to scratch a better life for oneself from the
soil under a blazing sun, with the sounds of war and wailing all
round, on the small, private level - is a tale of admirable courage
and strength.
3 o8 Table i
Table i. Judices ofPalermo
Porta
Year Gassaro Albegaria Seralcadio Chalcia Patitellorum
1296 (IX) _ _ _ _ _
1 2 9 7 (X)
1298 (XI) *Vitale de
Milite
1299 (XII)
1300 (XIII) *Giovanni
Lampo
1301 (XIV)
1302 (XV)
i3°3 (I)
1304(11) •Leotto
Grillo
1305 (HI) Tommasso *Andrea
Benedetto Graziano
1306 (IV) •Atterio
d'Attelorio
1307 (V)
1308 (VI) *Gerardo
Cavalcanti
1309 (VII) Bartolomeo *Simone di
de Capua; Marco
Filippo
Carastono
1310 (VIII)
1311 (IX)
1312 (X) J. Ruggero J. Alderisio J. Simone J. Corrado J. Rinaldo
Carastono; Lanfredi Baratta Firma Ruggero
J. Piacenzo
da Capua
1313 ( x i )
1315 (XIII)
1316 (XIV) *Bernardo
Marca
1317 (XV) •Filippo di
Giudice;
*Riccardo
da Lentini
1318 (I)
1319 TO
1320 (III)
Table 1 3O9
Table 1 (cont.)
Porta
Year Cassaro Albegaria Seralcadio Chalcia Patitellorum
1321 (IV) J. Tommasso N. Andrea J. Enrico Lemmo Ruggero

Benedetto; di Geraci Martino Paganello d'Alberto
Andrea
Murra
1322 (V) *Angelo Alderisio
Palumba Lanfredi
1323 (VI) J. Filippo J. Giacomo J. Filippo J. Ricco J. Giacomo
Lentini; Lanfredi Gorsibile Ricomanno Arenzano
J. Piacenzo
da Capua
1324 (VII) J. Tommasso J. Bartolomeo Bernardo Vanni de Francesco
Benedetto Guerrisio Bicaro Gampo Graziano
1325 (VIII) - - - - -
1326 (IX) - - - - -
•327 (X) - - - - -
1328 (XI) J. Rinaldo J. Simone J. Matteo N. Matteo Federico
de Milite; d'Esculo Sergio Salvatico Arenzano
Giovanni
Maramma
.329 (XII) J. Tommasso J. Stefano J. Filippo Cinno M. Matteo
Benedetto; d'Atterio d'Albaneto Vernacalli Scarano
J. Tommasso
Tagliavia
1330 (XIII) *Fazio da
Lentini
1331 (XIV) •Nicola
Tancredi
1332 (XV) •Matteo
Sergio
>333 (!) J. Rinaldo Stefano Bartolomeo Massimo Bartolomeo
de Milite; d'Accio di Gitella Michele d'Afflitto
Antonio
d'Afflitto
i334(H) - - - - -
1335 (HI) J. Stefano
d'Atterio
1336 (IV) J. Rinaldo Perri J. Tommasso Puccio Bartolomeo
de Milite; Gampsore Garbonito Giacomo d'Afflitto
Michele
Iardo
•337 (V) - - - - -
Years are indictional, revolving on the preceding 1 September. Thus "1312 (X)"
represents the tenth indictional year from 1 September 1311 to 31 August 1312.
When the precinct is unknown, name appears with an asterisk.
310 Table 2
Table 2. Jurist e and xurterii of Palermo
Porta
Year Cassaro Albegaria Seralcadio Ghalcia Patitellorum
1321 (IV) Andrea Pietro Matteo Puccio Giacomo

Falcilia; Campsore di Maida Giacomo Arenzano
Pietro // II II II
Diomiludedi M. Filippo Giulio M. Enrico M. Riccardo
11 Gampsore di Emma Carpinterio Fartitario
Simone de
N. Michele
1322 (V) - - - - -
1323 (VI) J. Vitale J. Simone N. Andrea Puccio J. Nuccio
de Milite; d'Esculo Pipitone Guercio de Sanguino
Nicola // II II II
Monteliano Raimondo Fulco di
11 Battista Emma
Riccardo
Villano
1324 (VII) Francesco N. Enrico Angelo Lombardo Nicola
Lignamine de Burgio d'Aquino di Roberto Rustico
II // II II //
Muni Giacomo Simone M. Nicola Giovanni
Michele Torrrello de Ginnario Arnono Busacca
1325 (VIII) - - - - -
1326 (IX) - - - - -
1327 (X) - - - - -
1328 (XI) Simone N. Enrico Princivallo Lando Nicola
Puteo; Burgio di Pietro Pullisio Gabriele
Michele // II II II
Iardo N. Giovanni
II Mursello
Giacomino
Malaspina
1329 (XII) Nicola M. Filippo Manfredi Cancellario Andrea
d'Algerio; Gampsore Bocca de Beni Dandi
Matteo // de Ordeo II II
Misudo N. Giovanni II Colo Vinci
II Cisario Tommasso Bambuccio Bondi
Giunta d'Afflitto
Vilano
1330 (XIII) - - - - -
1331 (XIV) - - - - -
1332 (XV) - - - - -
1333 (I) - - — - —
Table 2 3 11
Table 2 (cont.)
Porta
Year Gassaro Albegaria Seralcadio Chalcia Patitellorum
1334 (H) - - - - -
1335 (HI) - - - - -
1336 (IV) Nicola N. N. Blasio Vanni Guglielmo
Vermilla; Guglielmo Giacomo Gampo Martino
Matteo Panevino II II II
Capusudo II
II
1337 (V) - - - - -
Unknown prior to 1321. Names ofjuriste precede those of xurterii, separated by
double diagonal lines //.
312 Table 3
Table 3. Judices ofAgrigento, Catania, Messina,
Year Agrigento Catania Messina Polizzi

1296 (IX) Bartolomeo
d'Ansalone
1297 (X) - - - -
1298 (XI) - - - -
1299 (XII) - - Buonsignore -
d'Ansalone;
Gualtiero
Bonifazio;
Nicola Salimpipi;
Guglielmo
Saporito;
Santoro Salvo;
Giacomo
Giordano
1300 (XIII) - - - -
1301 (XIV) - Filippo Geremia Nicola Salimpipi -
1302 (XV) Tomasso Santoro Salvo;
Ravello Guglielmo
- Saporito; -
Giacomo
Giordano
1303 (!) Federico Mosca Roberto Giovanni
Calciamira; Mancusio;
- Filippo Ricco; Ruggero
Filippo Perricoli;
Calciamira Ruggero Lazaro
1304 (II) Perrono
Guercio;
Nicoloso
— — Chicari; —
Bartolomeo
di Maestro;
Nicola Salimpipi
1305 (HI) Guglielmo Giacomo
Vallariano; Sanduccia
Urso Mosca; _ _
Ruggero
di S. Filippo
1306 (IV) Filippo Bartolomeo Nicola d'Egidio
Manganario di Parigi;
Roberto
Calciamira
Table 3 313
Table 3 {cont.)
1307 (V) Orlando Calvo;

Stefano Rosa
1308 (VI) Federico Mosca Roberto Orlando Calvo;
- Galciamira; Stefano Rosa
Antonio Gangi
1309 (VII) Gaddo Gallo Roberto
Galciamira;
_ Bartolomeo _
d'Isola;
Nicola Tattono
1310 (VIII) Salimbene Nicola Salimpipi;
Medico; Giovanni
Perino _ Calvarosso; _
Bonaposa Francesco
Manna
.311 (IX) Nicola Bella; Simone
Bartolomeo Verticula
Peregrino;
Nicola Chicara;
Ansalone
di Castiglione
1312 (X) Giovanni Pisis Ginuisio Porto;
Antonio
Geremia;
Filippo Ricco
1313 (xi) Francesco Nicola Costa
Marino de Rami
.3.4 (XII) - - - -
13.5 (XIII) Roberto Giovanni
Galciamira Marino
1316 (XIV) Giacomo Bartolomeo Orlando Calvo
Sanduccia Peregrino
1317 (XV) Federico Giacomo Giovanni
di D. Massaro Saporito; di N. Pagano
Francesco di Milite
Coppola
1318 (I) Gaddo Giovanni Pisis Franchino
Marrono; d'Ansalone;
M. Pietro Federico
de Spina di Perugia
Table 3
Table 3 (cont.)
I3i9 TO Francesco
Marino;
Buongiovanni
Familiare
1320 (III) Dato Mohac; Giacomo
Nicola Saporito;
Crissenco Gregorio
di Gregorio
1321 (IV) Dato Mohac; Franchino
Pietro da Patti d'Ansalone;
Francesco
Coppola
1322 (V) Teodoro Guido Diamanti
Gutrone
1323 (VI) - - - -
1324 (VII) - - - -
1325 (VIII) Giovanni Lapo Tusco
Laburzi
1326 (IX) Dato Mohac; Simone
Parisio Conventi;
Bonaposa Andrea
Fornerio;
Bartolomeo
di Catanzaro
1327 (X) Francesco
Coppola;
Franchino
d'Ansalone;
Bartolomeo
Peregrino
1328 (XI) Ruggero di Giovanni Orlando
Gastrogiovanni; Laburzi Leonardo;
Simone Pucci Rimbaldo
di Ducatu; di N. Matteo;
Guglielmo Puccio
di Squillace di Giovanni
1329 (XII) Guglielmo Simone Fagilla; Bentivigni
di Squilacce Rinaldo Ghicari; d'Oddone
Francesco
Bonifazio;
Damiano
Golisano
Table 3 315
Table 3 (cont.)
1330 (XIII) Giacomo Adinolfo Manetto Giovanni di

Luparello da Alaimo Tattono Ruggero Longo
1331 (XIV) Giacomo Pulet to Soris; Giovanni di
Luparello; Filippo Cultellis; Ruggero Longo;
Ruggero Teodoro Pagano
Bernotto; Cutrone; Guastalacqua;
Filippo Arcario Riccardo Rizari Orlando
Leonardo
1332 ( x v ) Puletto Soris; Simone Fagilla; Rimbaldo
Filippo Cultellis; Riccardo Porto; di N. Matteo;
Teodoro Orlando Roberto
Cutrone; Maniaci; Fasano;
Riccardo Rizari Damiano Rimbaldo Calvo
Golisano
J
333 W Ceppo Sigerio N. Giovanni
_ _ di Cosenza;
Ruggero Massa
1334 (n) Ceppo Sigerio Giovanni
_ Laburzi; _
Nicola Astasio
1335 (I«) Vanni de lu Riccardo Rizaro; Gandolfo Orlando
Gransignore; Enrico Leone; Perromagno Leonardo
Ruggero Ruggero di
Bernotto Castrogiovanni;
Giacomo
Migliarisio
1336 (IV) Antonio
di Giovanni;
Bernardo
Bonainsinga
1337 (V) Filippo Arcario N. Guido
di Caltavuturo
Indictional years, as in tables 1 and 2. Precincts unknown.

316 Table 4
Table 4. Feudal dues
Name Holdings Location Servitium
Abbate, Enrico Sala (c) M: Salemi p

Abbate, Nicola Isnello M 600.00.00
Cefala M: Vicari
Chamirichi M
Ciminna M: Termini
Terrasini M: Carini
Cabiscudia M: Monte S. Giuliano
Inici M: Monte S. Giuliano
d'Abella, Abello "certe terre" N: Scicli 25.00.00
d'Abella, Ferrer S. Filippo d'Agira D 200.00.00

Milazzo D
Oliveri D: Milazzo
d'Abella, Jaume "certe terre" N: Scicli 15.00.00
Abrazaleni, David Scanzafriddi (f) p 20.00.00
d'Alagd, Blase Naso (t) D 150.00.00

Capo d'Orlando (c) D
Aci (t) D
d'Alagd, Roberto Valcorrente N: Paterno 70.00.00
Monforte N
Alberti, Lupo Butera (t) N 100.00.00
Alberti, Ugolino "certe terre" N: Scicli 06.00.00
Aldoini, Aldiono di Venetico D: Milazzo 05.00.00
Aloisio, Nicola Burdiscati (f) p 10.00.00

Carmiti (f) p
Aloisio, Vitale Mirto (f) M: Partinico 40.00.00
Capri (f) M: S. Marco
Fitalia (f) M: Vicari
Altavilla, Enrico Ganziria (f) N: Caltagirone 10.00.00
Amat,Josep Scilinda (c) M: Caltabellotta 30.00.00

Villanuova (c) M: Bivona
Callisi (c) M: Caltabellotta
Ansalone, Ansalono Longarino (f) N: Siracusa 20.00.00
Antiochia, Federico Boccetta D: Messina 20.00.00
Antiochia, Pietro Mistretta N 300.00.00

Regitano N: Mistretta
Capizzi N
Cerami (2/3) N
d'Arago, heirs of Sang S. Marco (f) D: Patti 600.00.00
Cammarata (t) N
Xibeni (f) N: Noto
Table 4 317
Table 4 (cont.)
d'Arago,Joan Bovario (c) M 115.00.00

Monaci (c) N: Mineo
d'Asciz, Gil Danchiridie (f) p 20.00.00
d'Augusta, Giuliano Bombunetto (f) N: Noto 25.00.00
Barba, Accardo Tavazia (f) Malta 100.00.00
Stafende N: Noto
'Cartini' p
'Changemi'
'Gerardi' (c) p
Barresi, Abbate Pietraperzia N: Galtanissetta 350.00.00
Militello D
Galtabellotta (0 M
Baxerio, Guglielmo Busascuti (f) p 10.00.00
Berga, Michele Sigona (f) p 160.00.00
Nicosia (t) D
Fessima (t) N: Piazza
Bergerio, Enrico Grandinille (0 p 05.00.00
Bombarone, Guido p 20.00.00
Bonguido, Nicola Darfudi (c) M: Caltanissetta 40.00.00
Branciforte, RafTaele Mazarino (c) N 200.00.00
Gilbiseno N
Brindisi, Bartolomeo di Chincave (c) M: Cammarata 50.00.00
Mortilli M: Monreale
Fontana Rossa N: Gatania
Bubitello, Teodaldo Bubitello (f) p 36.00.00
Bucalta, Soldano Bucalta (0 p 15.00.00
Bufalo, Giacomo Pantano Salso N: Lentini 30.00.00
Gacciaguerra, Antonio Catuso (f) M: Polizzi 03.00.00
Caldarera, Guglielmo Favarotta (f) M: Licata 30.00.00
Gallaro, Federico Piscasia (f) p 20.00.00
Callaro, Manfredi Gavaniorum p 20.00.00
Rachalburduni (f) p 05.00.00
Galtagirono, Giovanni di Misilmeri M: Palermo 100.00.00
S. Stefano (c) D: Cefalu 250.00.00
Calvellis, Giovanni Ficalda (c) D 200.00.00
Sirronti (c) p
Malcellorii (c) p
Asinello (c) D: Cefalu
Cancieri, Giacomo "certe terre" N: Scicli 10.00.00
3i8 Table 4
Table 4 (cont.)
Cannata, Pietro Baccarato (f) N: Aidone 80.00.00
Cannariato, Luca Salma Eraclea p 50.00.00
Gapece, Mariano Bocale M: Agrigento 250.00.00

Gomiano M: Agrigento
Diesi M: Agrigento
Mulotta M
Ragalmalo M
Cappello, Nicola Dammisa N: Naro 10.00.00
Carbonelli, Orlandizio Ghamemi (f) p 15.00.00
Gardona, Manfredi Varnina (c) p 03.00.00
Garpinsano, Goflredo "certe terre" N: Scicli 30.00.00
Garresi, heirs of Rinaldo Chicallo (f) p 30.00.00

S. Lorenzo (f) N: Noto
Gasaromana, Pietro Galligano (c) p p
Gassaro, heirs of Giovanni Gassaro (f) N: Siracusa 60.00.00
Diodino (f) p 80.00.00
Castellano, Filippo Ghipulla (f) D: Gastrogiovanni 03.00.00
Castellar, heirs of Guillem Bibino (f) N: Palazzolo 100.00.00

Palazzolo (t) N
Gatalano, heirs of Accollo Michiforo p 03.00.00
Ghaula, Guglielmo "certe bone" p 50.00.00
Ghiaromonte, Giovanni Gomiso (c) N p

Favara M
Muxaro M
Ragalnoto p
S. Vioganni M: Gaccamo
Chiaromonte, Giovanni Mistretta (c) D 40.00.00
Ghiaromonte, Manfredi Risigalla (f) D: Castrogiovanni 130.00.00

Favara (f) D
Ciullo, Guillotta Murbano (f) p 04.00.00
Gochumino, Riccardello Gochumino (f) p 08.00.00
Golari, Manfredi Butraido (c) M 15.00.00
Gurla, heirs of Guglielmo "certe terre" N: Ragusa 60.00.00
Gurtibus, Simone de "certe feuda" M: Salemi p

Dena, heirs of Sancio Musubini (f) N 30.00.00
Alfana (f) N
Bumusti (f) N
Doria, heirs of Brancaleone Galatabiano D: Acireale 400.00.00
Racalmuto M
Table 4 319
Table 4 (cont.)
Doria, Raffaele Gastronovo (t) M 230.00.00

Rachalmeni (f) N: Lentini
Ebdemonia, heirs of Montesi (f) ? 50.00.00
Filippo de Momlisano (f) ?
Eleanor, the queen Silvestri (c) N 120.00.00

Avola (t) N: Siracusa
Gastelluccio (f) N: Noto
Gisira (0 N
"certe terre" N: Ragusa
Esculo, Giovanni Ghavestri (f) p 60.00.00
Falcone, Pietro Protonotaro (c) D: Milazzo 20.00.00
Ferrisi, heirs of N. Caropepe (f) N: Gastrogiovanni 80.00.00
Fieschi, heirs of Luca Alfano (0 N: Noto 15.00.00

Bommurmusino p
Filangieri, Anastasia Linguaglossa D: Messina 70.00.00
Filangieri, heirs of Rachalmeni (f) N 15.00.00

Goffredo
Filangieri, Riccardo Licodia (t) N: Vizzini 140.00.00
Montemaggiore (f) M: Termini
Fimetta, Simone Fiumefreddo (c) D: Calatabiano 80.00.00
Folio, Giacomo "certe terre" N: Scicli 25.00.00
Folio, Giacomo (idem) "pro Ampellono di p 40.00.00

Ferla"
Formica, Pietro Marineo (c) N: Vizzini 40.00.00
Fratta, Bartuccio de Fratta (f) p 10.00.00
Genovese, Simone Renda (f) N: Siracusa 40.00.00

Alfano (woodland) N
Gerardo, Ugolino "certe terre" N: Ragusa 08.00.00
Geremia, Giovanni Rachalgiovanni (f) M 80.00.00
Gollesio, Manfredi "certe terre" N: Scicli 20.00.00
Graffeo, Orlando Partanna (c) M: Monreale 200.00.00
Gregorio, Atanasio Randacino (c) N: Lentini 30.00.00

S. Martino (c) D: Milazzo
Guadagno, Nicola "certe terre" N: Scicli 10.00.00
Guarna, Giovanni Callari (c) N: Militello 30.00.00
Guercii, Andrea Rapsi (f) N: Lentini 40.00.00

320 Table 4
Table 4 (cont.)
Gurgia, Pachisio Bufanini (f) p 15.00.00

Giffira (0 p
Homodeo, heirs of Nicola Maletta (f) D: Mt. Etna 100.00.00
Frazzano (f) D: Naso
Li Martini (f) D: Patti
Incisa, Aloysio di S. Bartolomeo (c) M: Sciacca 30.00.00
Incisa, Giovanni di Misilini (c) M: Sciacca 250.00.00
Inveges, heirs of Berenguer Galamonaci (f) M: Sciacca 06.00.00

Rachalmaymuni (f) M: Caltabellotta
Isola, Guglielmo di Ucria D: Patti 30.00.00
Jaconia, Ruggero Rachali (f) M: Partinico 30.00.00

Rachalgididi (0 M: Trapani
Buchalef (0 p
Jusia, Allegisto "certe terre" N: Scicli 20.00.00
Lac, Lanzalono di Arcudachi (f) M: Trapani 60.00.00
Lamia, Giovanni Mazzarone (f) N: Galtagirone 60.00.00
Lamia, Nicola Ghadra N: Lentini 130.00.00

Lamia N: Mineo
Sabuchi N: Licata
Lancia, Blasio Menyolio p 400.00.00
Ficarra D
Galati D
Longi D
Lancia, Manfredi Sinagra (c) D: Patti 20.00.00
Lancia, Nicola Giarratana (t) N 300.00.00

Ossena (c) N: Militello
Ferula (t) p
Murchella (c) p
Delle Scale (f) p
Mangone (f) N: Piazza
Burgio (f) M
Bolo (wood) M
Bonfala N: Noto
Longarino N: Siracusa
Mutassaro N
Pantano Salso N: Lentini
Taguida p
Lancia, Pietro Naro (t) N 1000.00.00
Galtanissetta (t) N
La Delia (t) p
Sabuchi (c) N: Licata
Table 4 321
Table 4 (cont.)
Lancia, Ugolino Limbaccari (c) p 20.00.00
Landolina, Giovanni Fargintino (f) p 115.00.00

Grampolo (f) N: Noto
Cannatini (f) N: Noto
Cammarata (f) M
Lentini, Alfonso Ixiri (f) p 15.00.00
Licchari, Liveto S. Basilio (c) p 15.00.00

Laudi (c) p
Licodia, Gualtiero Tursi (0 p 15.00.00
Limogiis, Aloysio Gallura (f) p 110.00.00

Racagliusi (f) N: Lentini
Linguida, Guglielmo Abbice (0 p p
Linguida, Pietro Grimasta (c) p 130.00.00
Burgarami (c) p
Cazulutu (c) p
Lochirra, Giovanni Gatani (c) p 50.00.00
Lopis, heirs of Asuero Burgatello (f) p 20.00.00
Lopis, wife of Miquel Lalia (0 N: Licodia 80.00.00
Luchisio, Nicola Scanzafriddi (f) p 20.00.00
Maida, Matteo and Ficarazzi M: Vicari p

Giovanni
Maletta, Matteo Misilcassimi (c) M: Sciacca 250.00.00
Manganello, Riccardo Rahalmingino (f) M: Cammarata 20.00.00
Maniavacca, Francesco Adernico (c) p 30.00.00
Maniscalco, Bartolomeo Furnari (c) p 40.00.00
Manna, heirs of Federico Galtavuturo (t) M 100.00.00
Manna, heirs of Giovanni Bavuco (c) D 250.00.00

Rapano (c) D: Milazzo
S. Andrea (c) D: Milazzo
Paradiso (c) D: Milazzo
Roccavaldina (c) D: Milazzo
Valdina (c) D: Milazzo
Rasinacchi (c) p
Gattaino D: Randazzo
S. Lucia (c) D
S. Pietro Patti (c) D
Girami (c) p
Manuele, Gorrado Menfi (c) M 100.00.00
322 Table 4
Table 4 (cont.)
Manuele, Rodolfo Burgo de Gristani (c) M 50.00.00
Marquet, heirs of "certe terre" N: Scicli 25.00.00

Berenguer
Marrasio, Giovanni Mazanchini (f) ? 20.00.00
Marti, heirs of Pere Ghanu (f) N: Augusta 15.00.00
Marturano, Matteo Rahalmallino (f) M: Licata 30.00.00
Medico, Cristoforo Gisira (c) N: Augusta 08.00.00
Michele, heirs of Martino "certe terre" N: Scicli 15.00.00
Michele, Massimo Galbace (c) p 80.00.00
Migiiotta, heirs of Ghandicatini (f) N: Siracusa 60.00.00

Buongiovanni Racaglia (f) p
Maronno (f) p
Rachalceri (f)
Milia, Orlando Odogrillo (c) N 150.00.00
Milite, heirs of Matteo Lalia (c) N: Licodia 10.00.00
Milite, Orlando Carbinicauli (f) M: Polizzi 20.00.00
Miroldo, Donadeo "certe terre" N: Scicli 25.00.00
Mohac, Federico Riesi (0 N: Gastrogiovanni 100.00.00

Ghipulla (0 N: Gastrogiovanni
Mohac, Giacomo Gonforti (f) ? 12.00.00
Burchidiano (f) ?
Mohac, Pietro Sortino (f) N 300.00.00

Barchiferza (f) p
Ridino (c) p
Bimisca (c) N: Noto
Rimadali (c) p
Buxello (c) p
Burgilferza (f) N: Modica
Monachella, Pietro Racharchitira (f) N: Noto 30.00.00
Buffato (f) N: Noto
Montalbano, Nicola Nadufri (f) N: Galtanissetta 20.00.00
Montalto, heirs of Gerardo Buccheri (t) N 160.00.00

Rachalmeni (c) N: Lentini
Montaperto, Bartolomeo Libigini (c) p 300.00.00
Rachalcirachi (c) p
Gontessa (c) M
Luchatini p
Butumu p
Guastanella M
Raffadali M: Agrigento
Antichellis p
Table 4 323
Table 4 (cont.)
Montcada, Guillem Scordia Soprana (f) N: Lentini 400.00.00

Ramon de Bulfida (0 N: Lentini
Chaliruni (f) N: Caltanissetta
Augusta (f) N: Augusta
Curcuraci (f) N: Augusta
Melilli (0 N
Caltagirone (p) N: Caltagirone
Montcada, Simon de Bivona (c) M: Bivona 300.00.00
Montefusco, heirs of Enrico p p 05.00.00
Monteliano, Nicola Minalai (f) p 04.00.00
Mortillari, heirs of Adinolfo Gadra (c) N 80.00.00

Sabuchi (f) N: Noto
Mosca, Giovanni ?(o M: Vicari 30.00.00
Vaccaria (f) p
Muletta, Francesco Dardara (f) N: Butera 20.00.00
Mulotta, Antonio Milocca (f) M: Mussomeli 30.00.00

Cipunia (f) p
Mustaccio, Federico Tumbarello (f) N: Lentini 18.00.00
Rahalbiato (f) N: Naro
Mustaccio, Giacomo S. Teodaro (c) M: Trapani 15.00.00
Mustaccio, Leonardo Grimasta p 05.00.00
Mustrola, Oberto La Targia (f) N: Siracusa 15.00.00
Obertis, Berengario Raccuja D: Messina 40.00.00

Mandanici (c) D: Messina
Olea, Gonsalvo terragium of M: Caltabellotta 30.00.00
Caltabellotta
Olea, heirs of Graziano Safridi (c) M: Sciacca 40.00.00
Oliva, Gualtiero Solarino (f) N: Siracusa 10.00.00
Padula, Guglielmo Chanzeria (f) p 100.00.00

Fabare Galtagirone (f) N: Galtagirone
Padula, heirs of Guglielmo Mulara (f) p 06.00.00
Palermo, Guglielmo di Capodarso (f) N: Caltanissetta 15.00.00
Pancaldo, Roberto Pancali (c) N: Lentini 20.00.00
Pardo, heirs of Alaimo Ghiri (f) p p

Passaneto, heirs of Baida p 100.00.00
Bernardo Trapani(p) M
Passaneto, Ruggero Garsiliato N: Mazarino 900.00.00
Palagonia (c) N: Siracusa
Passaneto (c) N: Lentini
Tavi N: Assoro
324 Table 4
Table 4 (cont.)
Passaneto, Salvo Magliauti (f) p 15.00.00

Li Milgi (f) M: Naro
Patti, Nicola da Cattail (c) M 10.00.00
Pelisdarbes, heirs of Miquel Monasteri (f) N: Siracusa 25.00.00
Peris de Sosa, Montaner Gagliano (t) D 150.00.00
Perrutta, heirs of Enrico Rainerio (c) p 15.00.00
Petramala, Bartolomeo Longi (c) D 45.00.00
"certe terre" N: Scicli
Pifliculi, Giovanni Magione (f) M: Salemi 20.00.00
Pipitono, Matteo Rahalmingino (f) M: Cammarata 40.00.00
Podio, Gombaldo Grignorum (f) N: Noto 70.00.00
Pomar, heirs of Garsia Casibili (f) N: Siracusa 25.00.00
Pullicini, Giordano Tortorici D: Capo d'Orlando 60.00.00
Raimondo, Bernardo Manchina D: Taormina 40.00.00
Rainerio, Bartuccio Carcari (c) D: Randazzo 70.00.00
Rainerio, Roberto "certe terre" N: Scicli 03.00.00
Regina, Gorrado di Rieni (c) M: Castronovo 20.00.00
Rhetis, Riccardo de Gulustu (f) p p
Risigalla, Andrea Risigalla (f) N: Castrogiovanni 30.00.00
Rocca, Appollonio "certe terre" N: Scicli 25.00.00
Romeo, Francesco S. Martino (c) p 20.00.00
S. Anna (c) p
Partiniti (c) p
Crippati (c) p
Pichuli (c) p
Floccari (c) p
Rosso, Andrea Piedaci (c) N: Lentini 90.00.00
Xirumi (c) N: Lentini
Randasino (c) N: Lentini
Rosso, Russo Scordia Sottana (c) N: Lentini 260.00.00
Luppino (c) N: Monterosso
Noto (j) N: Noto
Aidone (j) N: Aidone
RufTo, heirs of Guglielmo Anichara (f) p 10.00.00
Salvaggio, Pandolfo Monte Glimiti N: Siracusa 40.00.00
Salvaggio, Porcotto de Milgis M: Licata 20.00.00
Salvo, Aldoino Catalimita (c) D: Milazzo 20.00.00
Gurafti (c) D: Petralia
Table 4 325
Table 4 (cont.)

S. Basilio, Alafranco S. Basilio (f) p 264.00.00
Siccafari (f) M: Licata
Gommichio (f) M: Caltabellotta
S. Gregorio, heirs of Dardara (f) N: Butera 120.00.00
Riccardo
S. Miniato, Giorgio Rachali (f) M: Partinico 50.00.00
S. Lucia, Antonio Amimello (f) p 06.00.00
Dardara (f) M: Butera
S. Stefano, Leone Avola (f) N: Avola 50.00.00
S. Stefano, Oddone "certe terre" N: Ragusa 30.00.00
Sano, Nicola Nasari (f) D: Gastroreale 100.00.00
Rachalmingi (f) p
Saporito, heirs of Perrone Rasalgone (f) N: Piazza 15.00.00
Sciacca, Nicola di Darfudi (c) N: Galtanissetta 50.00.00
Sclafani, Matteo Adrano N: Adrano 1200.00.00
Genturipe N: Paterno
Ghise (c) p
Sclafani M
Ciminna M: Giminna
Ses Gudines, Ursett Manchina (c) D: Taormina 20.00.00
Sicamino, Ambrosio Sicamino (c) p p
Sigonia, Federico Monte Pellegrino (f) M: Palermo 60.00.00
Mutonello (f) p
Ralbamitri (f) p
Siracusa, Bernardo di Gollesano D 300.00.00
Garruba (f) p
Sofudi, Gandolfo Giardinello (c) M: Agrigento 20.00.00
Perana (c) p
Sosa, Eximenis de Rambici (f) p 20.00.00
Bordonari (f) N: Gastrogiovanni
Sosa, heirs of Eximenis de Raululia (Q p 40.00.00
Bordonari (f) N: Gastrogiovanni
Spatafora, Damiano Roccella D: Randazzo 150.00.00
Speziario, Federico Gomiso (f) N: Gomiso 15.00.00
Tagliaferza, heirs of "certe terre" N: Ragusa 10.00.00
Guglielmo
Tagliavia, Andrea Giardinello (c) M: Agrigento 50.00.00
Tagliavia, Nicola Ravanusa (c) M: Agrigento 50.00.00
326 Table 4
Table 4 (cont.)
Tagliavia, Nino Summaci (c) p 150.00.00

Castelvetrano (c) M: Gastelvetrano
Petra de Belici (c) M: Castelvetrano
Tavelli, Nicola Bunello (f) p 20.00.00
Trara, Andrea Ghamirichi (f) M: Palermo 30.00.00
Tratto, Goflredo Serravalle (0 M: Lentini 06.00.00
Turla, heirs of Giovanni "certe terre" N: Scicli 30.00.00
Ubertis, Scaloro Assoro N: Assoro 250.00.00

La Gatta (f) N: Piazza
Chindrono (f) p
Vallano, Giordano "certe terre" p 20.00.00
Vallono, Ruggero Nicosia (p) D: Nicosia 160.00.00

Rachalsuar (p) p
Fiumedinisi (c) D: Messina
Vassalo, Vassallo Giacomo Bauso (0 p 03.00.00
Ventimiglia, Francesco Sperlinga D: Nicosia 1500.00.00

Crista D
Pettineo D: Pettineo
Ventimiglia, Guglielmo Buscemi (c) N 50.00.00
Barcluni (c) p
Yvar, Garcia Eiximenis de Milia p 200.00.00
Belripairi (wood) p
Billichi p
(c) = casalis (f) =feudum (j) —jura (p) = proventus (t) = terra
D = Val Demone M = Val di Mazara N = Val di Noto
Wherever possible, I have indicated the nearest town or city.
Bibliography
UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
BARCELONA, ARCHIVO DE LA CORONA DE ARAGON,

REAL CANCILLERIA
Gartas reales diplomaticas Jaime II

Gartas reales diplomaticas Jaime II, apendice
Pergaminos Jaime II
Pergaminos Jaime II, apendice
Pergaminos Jaime II, extra inventario
Pergaminos Jaime II, maltratados
Registros Jaime II (289 registers in 339 volumes), esp. registers 90, 192,
235-50, 251-4, 260, 318, 323, and 334-9
Gartas reales diplomaticas Alfonso III

Gartas reales diplomaticas Alfonso III, apendice
Pergaminos Alfonso III
Pergaminos Alfonso III, apendice
Pergaminos Alfonso III, extra inventario
Pergaminos Alfonso III, maltratados
Registros Alfonso III (115 registers in 159 volumes), esp. registers 504-7,
5I9~3°J 53 1 - 6 * 544> 5 6 2 , and 582
Documents per incorporar
CATANIA, ARCHIVIO DI STATO

Corporazioni religiose: Archivio dei Benedettini, no. 50, 56, 107, 117, 130,
and 283
Archivi di famiglie e di persone:
Paterno di Raddusa, perg. 1-5
Trigona della Floresta, vol. rv
327
328 Bibliography
MESSINA, ARGHIVIO DI STATO

Gorporazioni religiose, pergamini:
Monastero di S. Maria del Garmelo
Monastero di S. Maria della Scala
Monastero di S. Maria delle Moniali
Monastero di S. Maria Valverde
Ospedale di. S. Giovanni
Provenienze incerte
MESSINA, BIBLIOTEGA UNIVERSITARIA

MSS 29-30, and 149
PALERMO, ARGHIVIO DI STATO

Arch. Trabia, 1st ser., vol. DXXIII
Manoscritti, Bacheca II, no. 5
Real Gancelleria, Reg. 1-4, 840
Protonotaro, Reg. 1-5
Pergamini:
Tabulario Gefalu
Tabulario S. Maria del Bosco
Tabulario Ospedale di S. Bartolomeo
Tabulario Ospedale Grande di Palermo
Tabulario S. Martino delle Scale
Tabulario Universita di Gorleone
Tabulario Universita degli studi di Palermo
Tabulario S. Maria Maddalena di Valle Giosafat
Tabulario Gommenda della Magione
Tabulario S. Maria delle Giumarre di Sciacca
Tabulario S. Maria della Grotta
Tabulario S. Maria di Malfino
Tabulario S. Maria Nuova detto la Martorana
Tabulario S. Margherita di Polizzi
Tabulario varie provenienze
Miscellanea archivistica, 2nd ser., no. 127 A, B, G (=Bartolomeo di Gitella,
1306-9), no. 185
Notai defunti, Reg. 1-5 (= Salerno di Peregrino, 1323-40), 76 (= Ruggero
di Gitella, 1326-9), 77 (= Giacomo di Gitella, 1328-9), 78-9
(= Enrico di Gitella, 1331-56), 80 (= Bartolomeo d'Alemanna,
1332-3)
Spezzoni notarili, no. 20, 80, 89,122, 127-8,141-2, 233, 9N, 19N, 16A
Enti ecclesiastici, Gommenda della Magione, no. 151, 410-13
Bibliography 329
PALERMO, BIBLIOTEGA GOMUNALE
MSS Qq A 12; Qq A 21; Qq E 28; Qq F 31; Qq F 32; Qq H 3-9; Qq H 10;

QqHi3
2 Qq D 121; 2 Qq D 141; 2 Qq E 1; 2 Qq E 4-5; 2 Qq E 14; 2 Qq G 31; 2 Qq
G 39; 2 Qq H 230
3QqB69
4 Qq A 10
TRAPANI, BIBLIOTEGA FARDELLIANA

MSS 9,11-12,16,18-19, 230
PUBLISHED COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS

(listed by editor except for first two items, listed by title, and all papal
records, which appear under each pope's name)
Ada curie felicis urbis Panormi: Collana di atti medievali delta citta di Palermo,
6 vols. (Palermo, 1982-7), gen. eds. Francesco Giunta, Romualdo
Giuffrida, and Pietro Gulotta. Vol. 1: Registri di lettere, gabelle epetizioni,
1274—1321, ed. Fedele Pollaci Nuccio and Domenico Gnoffo (anastatic
rpnt. of Palermo, 1892 edn.); vol. 11: Fisco e societa nella Sicilia aragonese:
Le pandette delle gabelle regie del XIV secolo, ed. Rosa Maria Dentici
Buccellato (documents rpnt. from Le pandette delle gabelle regie antiche a
nuove di Sicilia nel secolo XIV, ed. Giuseppe La Mantia [Palermo,
1906]); vol. in: Registri di lettere, 1321-132G: jrammenti, ed. Lia Citarda;
vol. rv: Registro di lettere, 1327-1328, ed. Maria Rita lo Forte Scirpo;
vol. v: Registri di lettere et atti, 1328-1333, ed. Pietro Corrao; vol. vi:
Registri di lettere, 1321-1322 e 1335-1336, ed. Laura Sciascia
Acta siculo-aragonensia, 4 vols. (Palermo, 1972-8), gen. ed. Francesco Giunta.
Vol. 1 (in 2 parts): Documenti sulla luogotenenza di Federico d'Aragona, ed.
Francesco Giunta, Nicola Giordano, Marina Scarlata, Leonardo
Sciascia; vol. 11: Corrispondenza tra Federico III di Sicilia e Giacomo II
d'Aragona, ed. Francesco Giunta and Antonino Giuffrida; new series
vol. 1: // cartulario della famiglia Alagona di Sicilia (documenti 1337—1386),
ed. Antonino Giuffrida; new series vol. 11: Documenti sulla luogotenenza
di Federico d'Aragona (i2g4~i2gj), ed. Marina Scarlata and Leonardo
Sciascia
Alibrandi Intersimone, Maria. "Pergamene delPArchivio di Stato di
Messina provenienti dal Museo nazionale, 1225—1770," Rassegna degli
Archivi di Stato 32 (1972), 477-507
Benedict XI. Le registre de Benedict XI, ed. Charles Grandjean (Paris,
1883-1905), Bibliotheque des Ecoles frangaises d'Athenes et de Rome
330 Bibliography
Benedict XII. Benoit XII (1334-1343): Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se
rapportant a la France, ed. Georges Daumet (Paris, 1920)
Benoit XII (1334—1342): Lettres closes et patentes interessant les pays autres que la
France, ed. J.-M. Vidal, 2 vols. (Paris, 1913-50)
Benoit XII (1334-1342): Lettres communes, ed. J.-M. Vidal, 3 vols. (Paris,
1902-11)
Boniface VIII. Les registres de Boniface VIII, ed. Georges Digard, Maurice
Faucon, Antoine Thomas, and Robert Fawtier, 4 vols. (Paris,
1884-1939), Bibliotheque des Ecoles franchises d'Athenes et de
Rome
Burgarella, Pietro. "II protocollo del notaio Adamo di Gitella delPanno
1286-1287," ArchStSicOr 75 (1979), 435-553
Le imbreviature del notaio Adamo di Citella a Palermo, i° registro: 1286-1287
(Rome, 1981), Fonti e studi del Corpus membranarum italicarum,
3rd ser., vol. 1
"Le pergamene del monastero della Martorana," ArchStSic, 4th ser.,
4 (i978), 55-"o
Gantarella, Raffaele. Codex Messanensis Graecus 105 (Palermo, 1937),
R. Deputazione di storia patria per la Sicilia, Memorie e documeni di
storia siciliana, 2nd ser., vol. 11
Casula, Francesco C. Carte reali diplomatiche di Alfonso III il Benigno, re
d'Aragona, riguardanti Vltalia (Padua, 1970), Pubblicazioni delPIstituto
di storia medioevale e moderna delFUniversita degli studi di Gagliari,
vol. xv (also Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Collection de
documentos ineditos, vol. XLJV)
Ciccarelli, Diego. // tabulario di S. Maria di Malfi.no (Messina, 1986),
Biblioteca dell'Archivio storico messinese, Testi e documenti, vol. vi
Clement V. Regestum Clementis papae V (annus primus-annus nonus) ex
Vaticanis archetypis sanctissimi domini nostri Leonis XIII pontificis maximi
iussu et munificentia nunc primum editum cura et studio monachorum ordinis
S. Benedicti anno MDCCCLXXXIV-MDCCCLXXXVIII, 9 vols. in 7
(Rome, 1884-8)
Collura, Paolo. Le piu antiche carte delVArchivio capitolare di Agrigento
(Palermo, i960), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xxv
De Simon, Charles. "Actes passes a Famagouste de 1299 a 1301 par devant
le notaire Lamberto de Sambuceto," Revue de VOrient latin 1 (1893),
58-139, 275-312, 321-53
De Stefano, Francesco. "Contributo alia storia della Sicilia nel secolo
XTV," ArchStSicOr 26 (1930), 176-215
De Vio, Michele. Privilegiafelicis etfidelissimae urbis Panormi selecta aliquot ad
civitatis decus et commodum spectantia (Palermo, 1706)
Finke, Heinrich. Ada aragonensia: Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen,
jranzosischen, spanischen, zur Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte axis der
diplomatischen Korrespondenz faymes II, 1291—1327, 3 vols. (Berlin,
1908-22, rpnt. 1966)
Bibliography 331
"Nachtrage und Erganzungen zu den Acta Aragonensia Band 1—3,"
GAKS 4 (1933), 355—536; appended to 1966 rpnt. ofActa aragonensia
Flandina, A. Statuti, ordinamenti e capitoli della citta di Polizd (Palermo, 1884),
DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. 1
Garofalo, Luigi. Tabularium regiae ac imperialis capellae collegiatae in regio
palatio panormitano (Palermo, 1835)
Garufi, Carlo Alberto. Catalogo illustrate del tabulario di S. Maria Nuova in
Monreale (Palermo, 1902), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xix
Giambruno, Salvatore. // tabulario del monastero di S. Margherita di Polizzi
(Palermo, 1909), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xx
and Luigi Genuardi. Capitoli inediti delle citta demaniali di Sicilia approvati
sino al 1458 (Palermo, 1918), DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. ix
Giardina, Carlo. Capitoli e privilegi di Messina (Palermo, 1937), Memorie e
documenti di storia siciliana, 2nd ser., vol. 1
Giudice, Giuseppe del. Codice diplomatico di Carlo I e Carlo II d'Angio, 3 vols.
(Naples, 1863-1902)
Giuffrida, Antonino. // cartulario della famiglia Alagona di Sicilia: documenti
1337-1386 (Palermo, 1978), Fonti per la storia di Sicilia
Guccione, M. Silvana. Le imbreviature del notaio Bartolomeo de Alamannia a
Palermo, 1332-1333 (Rome, 1982), Fonti e studi del Corpus
membranarum italicarum, 3rd ser., vol. in
Gulotta, Pietro. Le imbreviature del notaio Adamo di Citella a Palermo: 2°registro,
I2g8-i2gg (Rome, 1982), Fonti e studi del Corpus membranarum
italicarum, 3rd ser., vol. 11
Honorius IV. Les registres de Honorius IV, ed. Maurice Prou (Paris, 1886-8),
Bibliotheque des Ecoles franchises d'Athenes et de Rome
Jados, Stanley S. Consulate ofthe Sea and Related Documents (Alabama, 1975)
John XXII. Jean XXII (1316-1334): Lettres communes, ed. Guy Mollat, 16 vols.
in 19 (Paris, 1904-47)
Lagumina, Bartolomeo and Giuseppe. Codice diplomatico deigiudei in Sicilia,
3 vols. (Palermo, 1884-1909), DSSS, 1st ser., vols. vi, xn, xvn
La Mantia, Giuseppe. Codice diplomatico dei re aragonesi di Sicilia Pietro I,
Giacomo, Federico II, Pietro e Ludovico dalla rivoluzione siciliana del 1282
sinoal 1355, con note storiche e diplomatiche (Palermo, 1917), DSSS, 1st ser.,
vol. XXIII
"II testamento di Federico II Aragonese, re di Sicilia," ArchStperSic 23
(I93 6 -?). I3-5O
La Mantia, Vito. Antiche consuetudini delle citta di Sicilia (Palermo, 1900)
Lampros, Spyridon P. Documents Relating to the Medieval History of Athens
(Athens, 1904)
Langlois, Victor. Le tresor des chartes d'Armenie, ou Cartulaire de la chancellerie
royale des Roupeniens (Venice, 1863)
Lanhers, Yvonne and Robert Fawtier. Tables des registres de Clement Vpubliees
par les benedictins, 2 vols. in 1 (Paris, 1948—57), Bibliotheque des Ecoles
franchises d'Athenes et de Rome
332 Bibliography
Loenertz, Raymond-J., O.P. "Athenes et Neopatras: regestes et notices
pour servir a l'histoire des duches Catalans, 1311--1394," Archivum
fratrum praedicatorum 25 (1955), 100-212
"Athenes et Neopatras: regestes et documents pour servir a l'histoire
ecclesiastique des duches Catalans, 1311-1395," Archivum fratrum
praedicatorum 28 (1958), 5-91
Liinig, Johannes C. Codex italiae diplomaticus, 4 vols. (Frankfurt,
725-35)
Mansilla, Demetrio. "La documentation espafiola del Archivo del Gastel
S. Angelo, 395-1418," Anthologia annua 6 (1958), 285—448
Martinez Ferrando, J. Ernesto. Jaime II de Aragon: su vida familiar, 2 vols.
(Barcelona, 1948), GSIC, estudios medievales, vol. ix
Mazzarese Fardella, Enrico. // tabulario Belmonte (Palermo, 1983), DSSS,
1st ser., vol. xxx
Mir to, Gorrado. Rollus rubeus: Privilegia ecclesie Cephaleditane a diversis regibus
et imperatoribus concessa (Palermo, 1972), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xxix
Mortillaro, Vincenzo. Catalogo ragionato dei diplomi esistenti nel tabulario della
cattedrale di Palermo (Palermo, 1842)
Oliger, Livarius. "Documenta inedita ad historiam Fraticellorum
specta.ntia.," Archivum fanciscanum historicum 3 (1910), 253-79, 505-29,
680-99; 4 09 1 1 ), 688-712; 5 (1912), 74-84; 6 (1913), 267-90, 515-30,
710-47
Orlando, Diego. Un codice di leggi e diplomi siciliani del Medio Evo, che si conserva
nella Biblioteca del Comune di Palermo (Palermo, 1857)
Polica, Sante. "Carte adespote dell'Archivio Gargallo," Archivio storico
siracusano, 2nd ser., 3 (1974), 15-47
Polonio, Valeria. Notai genovesi in Oltremare: Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di
Sambuceto, 3 luglio 1300-3 agosto 1301 (Genoa, 1982), Collana storica di
fonti e studi, vol. xxxi
Puzzolo Sigillo, D. "I privilegi di Messina in un Compendium spagnuolo
del seicento ed un Summarium latino del trecento," Archivio storico
messinese, 3rd ser., 7 (1955-6), 25-107; 9-10 (1957-9), 207-50
Riezler, Sigmund. "Urkunden zur bairischen und deutschen Geschichte
aus den Jahren 1256-1343," Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte 20
(1880), 233-75
Rubio i Lluch, Antoni. Diplomatari de VOrient catala, 1301—1409: Colleccio de
documents per a la historia de Vexpedicio catalana a Orient i dels ducats dAtenes
i Neopatria (Barcelona, 1947)
Documents per Vhistbria de la cultura catalana mig-eval, 2 vols. (Barcelona,
1908-21)
Salavert y Roca, Vicente. Cerdehay la expansion mediterrdnea de la Corona de
Aragon, 1297-1314, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1956), CSIC, estudios medievales,
vol. xxvn
"El Tratado de Anagni y la expansion mediterranea de la Corona de
Aragon," EEMCA 5 (1952), 209-360
Bibliography 333
Savagnone, F. Guglielmo. "Le pergemene inedite delFArchivio Comunale
di Palermo," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 26 (1901), 367-410
Silvestri, Giuseppe. Tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala e S. Maria di Maniaci
(Palermo, 1887), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xi
Sinopoli di Giunta, Mons. Pietro. // tabulario di S. Maria Latina di Agira
(Catania, 1927)
Sparti, Aldo. // registro del notaio ericino Giovanni Maiorana, 1297-1300, 2 vols.
(Palermo, 1982)
Starrabba, Raffaele. "Catalogo ragionato di un protocollo del notaio
Adamo di Citella delFanno di XII indizione 1298-1299, che si conserva
nelPArchivio del comune di Palermo," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 12 (1887-8),
56-70, 366-75, 394-400; 13 (1888-9), 134-88, 291-306, 443-50; 14
(1889-90), 165-82
"Documenti riguardanti l'abdicazione di Giacomo II di Aragona al trono
di Sicilia (1295)," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 7 (1883), 275~93
I diplomi della cattedrale di Messina raccolti da Antonino Amico, publicati da un
codice della Biblioteca Comunale di Palermo (Palermo, 1887-90), DSSS,
1st ser., vol. 1
and Luigi Tirrito. Assise e consuetudini della terra di Corleone (Palermo,
1880), DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. 11
Testa, Francesco. Capitula regni Sicilie, quae adhodiernum diem lata sunt, edita
cura ejusdem regni deputatorum Herculis Michaelis Branciforti, Buteras
principis . . . , 2 vols. (Palermo, 1741—3)
Thomas, George Martin. Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum, sive acta et
diplomata res venetas graecas atque levantis illustrantia a. 1300-1350 (Venice,
1880), Monumenti storici dalla R. Deputazione veneta di storia
patria, 1st ser., vol. v
Trasselli, Carmelo. / privilegi di Messina e di Trapani (1160-1355) con
un'appendice sui consolati trapanesi nel secolo XV (Palermo, 1949)
Vincke, Johannes. Documenta selecta mutuas civitatis arago-cathalaunicae et
ecclesiae relationes illustrantia (Barcelona, 1936), Biblioteca historica de
la Biblioteca Balmes, 2nd ser., vol. xv
Zeissberg, Heinrich R. von. "Das Register Nr. 318 des Archivs der
aragonesischen Krone in Barcelona," Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akademie
der Wissenschqften (Wien), philosophisch-historischen Klasse, vol. GXL (1899),
Abhandlung 1, pp. 1-91
Zeno, Riniero. Documenti per la storia del diritto marittimo nei secoli XIII e XIV
(Turin, 1936; rpnt. 1970)
NARRATIVE AND TEXTUAL SOURCES

Acensi, Athanasio. De adventu Catanam regis Jacobi narratio, in RGBS 1,
pp. 275-82
Anonymous. Chronicon Siciliae ab acquisitione ipsius insulae per Graecos usque
ad obitum Guillelmi ducis Friderici II regis Siciliae Jilii, in Rerum
334 Bibliography
italicarum scriptores, ed. Lodovico Muratori, 25 vols. (Milan, 1723-51),
vol. x
Anonymous. Chronicon siculum ab anno MCCCXX usque ad MCCCXXVIII, in
RGBS 11, pp. 107-268
Anonymous. Directorium ad passagium faciendum, in Receuil des historiens des
Croisades, 14 vols. (Paris, 1841-1906), 11, pp. 367-517
Anonymous. Historia conspirationis quam molitus fuit Johannes Prochyta, in
RGBS 1, pp. 241-74
Anonymous. Historia sicula vulgari dialecto conscripta ab anno MCCCXXXVII
adMCCCCXII, in RGBS 11, pp. 269-302
Anonymous. "Quaedam profetia," in La Magna Curia: la scuola poetica
siciliana, ed. Camillo Guerrieri Crocetti (Milan, 1947), Europea:
storia e documento dei movimenti letterari europei, vol. vn, at
pp. 469-91
Bibliotheca historica regni Siciliae, sive Historica, qui de rebus siculis a Saracenorum
invasione usque ad Aragonensium principatum illustriora monumenta
reliquerunt amplissima collectio, ed. Giovanni Battista Caruso, 2 vols.
(Palermo, 1723)
Bibliotheca scriptorum qui res in Sicilia gestas sub Aragonum imperio retulere, ed.
Rosario Gregorio, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1791-2)
Campulu, Fr. Giovanni. Lu libru de lu Dialagu de Sanctu Gregoriu perfratri
Iohanni Campulu da Messina, ed. G. B. Grassi Privitera and A. de
Sanctis (Palermo, 1913), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xi
Desclot, Bernat. Crdnica, in Soldevila, Les quatre grans croniques
Les quatre grans croniques, ed. Ferran Soldevila, 2nd edn. (Barcelona, 1983),
Biblioteca Perenne, vol. xxvi
Llull, Ramon. Selected Works by Ramon Hull, 1232-1316, ed. and trans.
Anthony Bonner, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1985)
Muntaner, Ramon. Crdnica, in Soldevila, Les quatre grans croniques', English
trans. The Chronicle of Muntaner, Lady Goodenough, 2 vols. (London,
1920-1), Hakluyt Society, vols. XLVII, L
Neocastro, Bartolomeo di. Historia sicula ab anno 1250 ad 1293 deducta, in
RGBS 1, pp. 1-240
Pachymeres, Georgios. DeAndronico Palaeologo, in Patrologia cursus completus,
series graeca, ed.J.-P. Migne, 161 vols. (Paris, 1857-87), vol. GXLIII
Pegolotti, Francesco Balducci. La pratica della mercatura, ed. Allan Evans
(Cambridge, Mass., 1936), Medieval Academy of America Pub-
lications, vol. xxrv
Peter III of Catalonia. Crdnica, in Soldevila, Les quatre grans croniques;
English trans. Chronicle, Mary and J. N. Hillgarth, 2 vols. (Toronto,
1980), Mediaeval Sources in Translation, vol. xxra
Piazza, Michele da. Historia sicula ab anno MCCCXXXVII ad annum
MCCCLXI, in RGBS 1, pp. 509-780,11,1-106; see new edn. by Antonino
Giuffrida (Palermo, 1980), Fonti per la storia di Sicilia, vol. in
Rerum italicorum scriptores, ed. Lodovico Muratori, 25 vols. (Milan, 1723-51)
Bibliography 335
Speciale, Nicola. Historia sicula in VIII libros distributa ab anno MCCLXXXII
usque ad annum MCCCXXXVII, in RGBS 1, pp. 283-508
Testa, Francesco. De vita et rebus gestis Friderici II Siciliae regis (Palermo,
1775)
Vilanova, Arnau de. Obres catalanes, ed. P. Miquel Batllori, S.J., 2 vols.
(Barcelona, 1947), Els nostres classics: obres completes dels escriptors
Catalans medievals, vols. LV-LVI
Villani, Giovanni. Cronica, ed. Francesco Gherardi Dragomanni, 4 vols.
(Florence, 1844-5)
SECONDARY LITERATURE
Abulafia, David. A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca
(Cambridge, 1994)
"Catalan Merchants and the Western Mediterranean, 1236-1300:
Studies in the Notarial Acts of Barcelona and Sicily," Viator 16 (1985),
209-42
"Charles of Anjou and the Sicilian Vespers," History Today 33 (1982),
38-42
Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (Oxford, 1988)
"II commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo Duecento," in XI Congresso,
pp. 5-22
"Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370," Economic
History Review, 2nd ser., 34 (1981), 377-88
"The End of Muslim Sicily," in Muslims under Latin Rule, ed. James M.
Powell (Princeton, 1991), pp. 103-33
"The Merchants of Messina: Levant Trade and Domestic Economy,"
Papers ofthe British School at Rome 54 (1986), 196-212
The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and
the Northern Communes (Cambridge, 1977)
"Una comunita ebraica della Sicilia occidentale: Erice 1298-1304,"
ArchStSicOr 80 (1984), 157-90
Agnello, Giuseppe. "Le torri costiere di Siracusa nella lotta anticorsara,"
Archivio storico siracusano 9 (1963), 21-60; 10 (1964), 25-74; 15 (1969),
2-29; 2nd ser., 1 (1971), 17-30
Agnello, Santi Luigi. "II Liber privilegiorum et diplomatum nobilis et
fidelissimae Syracusarum urbis," Archivio storico siracusano 5-6
Amari, Michele. La guerra del Vespro siciliano, 9th edn. (Milan 1886); now see
new edn. by Francesco Giunta, 2 vols. in 3 (Palermo, 1969)
Amico, Vito Maria. Lexicon topographicum siculum, 6 vols. (Palermo, 1757-60);
also available in Italian as Dizionario topogrqfico della Sicilia, ed. and
trans. Gioacchino Dimarzo, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1885-6; rpnt. 1975)
Arribas Palau, Antonio. La conquista de Cerdena por faime II de Aragon
(Barcelona, 1952)
336 Bibliography
Ashtor, Eliyahu. Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton, 1983)
"The Jews of Trapani in the Later Middle Ages," Studi medievali, 3rd ser.,
25 (1984X 1-30
Backman, Clifford R. "Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals in
Sicily," Franciscan Studies 50 (1990), 3—29
"The Government of Sicily in the Reign of Frederick III, 1296-1337,"
2 vols. Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1989
"The Papacy, the Sicilian Church, and King Frederick III, 1302-1321,"
Viator 22 (1991), 229-49
"The Reception of Arnau de Vilanova's Religious Ideas," in Christendom
and Its Discontents, ed. Scott Waugh and Peter Diehl (Cambridge, 1995)
Batllori, Miquel. "La Sicile et la Couronne d'Aragon dans les propheties
d'Arnaud de Villeneuve et de Jean de Roquetaillade," Melanges de
I'Ecolejrangaise de Rome: Moyen Age 102 (1990), 363—79
Battista Palma, Giovanni. "Lu rebellamentu di Sichilia," ArchStSic, 2nd
ser., 35 (1910-11), 399-417
Baviera Albanese, Adelaide. "Diritto pubblico e istituzioni amministrative
in Sicilia," ArchStSic, 3rd ser., 19 (1969), 391-563
"La sede delFArchivio di Stato di Palermo," in La presenza della Sicilia
nella cultura degli ultimi cento anni (Palermo, 1977), pp. 721—36
Beloch, Karl Julius. Bevolkerungsgeschichte Italiens, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1937—61)
Bofarull, Manuel de and Raffaele Starrabba. "Documento inedito
riguardante la esecuzione di uno dei patti della pace di Caltabellotta
(1302)," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 4 (1879-80), 189-92
"Documenti riguardanti Pabdicazione di Giacomo II di Aragona al trono
di Sicilia, 1295," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 7 (1882—3), 275~93
Bonifacio, Achille. "II monastero benedettino di S. Placido di Calonero e
la sua biblioteca," Archivio storico messinese, 3rd ser., 26-7 (1975-6),
9M77
Boscolo, Alberto. "La feudalita in Sicilia, in Sardegna e nel Napoletano nel
Basso Medioevo," Medioevo: saggi e rassegne 1 (1975), 49-58
"La politica mediterranea dei sovrani d'Aragona," Medioevo: saggi e
rassegne 3 (1977), 39-51
Bottari, Salvatore. "II casale Mallimachi, secoli XTV-XV," Archivio storico
messinese, 3rd ser., 33 (1982), 215-23
Boiiard, Michel de. "Problemes de subsistances dans un etat medieval: le
marche et les prix des cereales au royaume angevin de Sicile,
1262—1282," Annales d'histoire economique et sociale 10 (1938), 483—501
Bozzo, Stefano Vittorio. "Giovanni Chiaramonte II nella discesa di
Ludovico il Bavaro: saggio critico," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 3 (1878-9),
155-85
Note storiche siciliane del secolo XIV: Avvenimenti e guerre che seguirono il Vespro,
dalla pace di Caltabellotta alia morte di re Federico II VAragonese, 1302-1337
(Palermo, 1882)
"Quaedam proktia.," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 2 (1877), 41-81 and 172-94
Bibliography 337
Brandileone, Francesco. "Contributo alia storia della comunione dei beni
matrimoniali in Sicilia," in his collected papers Scritti di storia deldiritto
private italiano (Bologna, 1931), pp. 321-42
Bresc, Genevieve and Henri Bresc. "La casa del 'borgese': materiali per
una etnografia storica della Sicilia," Quademi storici 31 (1976), 110-29
"Maramma: i mestieri della costruzione nella Sicilia medievale," in
Imestieri: organizza&one, tecniche, linguaggi (Palermo, 1983), pp. 145-84
Bresc, Henri. "Contributo a una etnografia della Sicilia medievale: i
marchi del bestiame," Archeologia medievale 4 (1977), 331-9
"Course et piraterie en Sicile, 1250-1450," Anuario de estudios medievales
10 (1980), 751-7
"II notariato nella societa siciliana medioevale," Estudios hist&ricos y
documentos de los archivos de protocolos 7 (1979), 169-92
"La chasse en Sicile: XTVe-XVe siecles," in La Chasse au Moyen-Age: Actes
du collogue de Nice, 22-24 juin *979 (Paris, 1980), Publications de la
Faculte des lettres et des sciences humaines de Nice, vol. xx,
pp. 201-17
"La feudalizzazione in Sicilia dal vassallagio al potere baroniale," in
SDS in, pp. 503-43
"La Sicile et la mer: Marins, navires et routes maritimes, Xle-XVe
siecles," in Navigation et gens de mer en Mediterranee de la prehistoire a nos
jours: Actes de la table ronde du groupement d'interet scientifique — sciences
humaines sur Vaire mediterraneenne (Paris, 1980), pp. 59-67
"L'eremitisme franciscain en Sicile," in Francescanesimo e cultura in Sicilia,
secoli XIII-XV (Palermo, 1982), pp. 38-42
"L'habitat medieval en Sicile (1100-1450)," in Atti del colloquio di
archeologia medievale, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1976), 1, pp. 186-97
Livre et societe en Sicile, I2gg-i4gg (Palermo, 1971), Centro di studi
filologici e linguistici siciliani, Supplementi al Bollettino, vol. 111
"Marchands de Narbonne et du Midi en Sicile, 1300-1460," in Narbonne,
archeologie et histoire: 4^ Congres de la federation historique du Languedoc
mediterraneen et du Roussillon, Narbonne, 14-16 avril 1972, 3 vols.
(Montpellier, 1973), 1, pp. 93-9
"Societa e politica in Sicilia nei secoli XIV e XV"ArchStSicOr 70 (1974),
267-304
Un monde mediterraneen: economie et societe en Sicile, 1300-1450, 2 vols.
(Palermo, 1986), Bibliotheque des Ecoles frangaises d'Athenes et de
Rome, vol. GGLXII
and Franco D'Angelo. "Structures et evolution de l'habitat dans le
region de Termini Imerese (Xlle-XV siecles)," Melanges de VEcole
Jrangaise de Rome 84 (1972), 361-402
Burns, Robert I., SJ. "The Catalan Company and the European Powers,
i3<>5-i3">" Speculum 29 (1954), 751-71
Cabestany, Joan Ferran. Expansio catalana per la Mediterrania (Barcelona,
1967), Quaderns de cultura, vol. xxrv
338 Bibliography
Gaggese, Roberto. Roberto d'Angib e i suoi tempi, 2 vols. (Florence, 1922-31)
Cagliola, Filippo. Almae sicilianensis provinciae ordinis Minorum Conventualium
S. Francisci manifestationes novissimaesexexplorationibus complexae (Venice,
1644); reissued as Sicilia jrancescana: secoli XIII-XVII, ed. Filippo
Rotolo, O.F.M. (Palermo, 1984), Collana franciscana, vol. 1
Calisse, Carlo. Storia delparlamento in Sicilia dallafondazione alia caduta della
monarchia (Torino, 1887; rpnt. 1973)
Cam, Helen M., Antonio Marongiu, and Giinther Stokl. "Recent work and
present views on the origins and development of representative
assemblies," in Relazioni del X Congresso internazionale di science storiche,
6 vols. (Florence, 1955), 1, pp. 1-101
Caravale, Mario. "La legislazione del regno di Sicilia sul notariato durante
il Medio Evo," in Per una storia del notariato meridionale (Rome, 1982),
Studi storici sul notariato italiano, vol. vi, pp. 95-176
Cardillo, Vincenzo. "II castello Conte Luna a Ribera," Archivio storico
messinese, 3rd ser., 20-2 (1969-71), 165-76
Carini, Isidoro. Gli archivi e le biblioteche di Spagna in rapporto alia storia dltalia
in generale a di Sicilia in particolare, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1884)
Cessi, Roberto. "Giovanni di Chiaramonte, conte di Modica, e Ludovico il
Bavaro," ArchStperSic 10 (1913), 223-36
Collura, Paolo. "Vicende e problemi del monachesimo benedettino in
Sicilia," Atti della Accademia di science, lettere e arti di Palermo, 4th ser., 40,
pt. 2 (Palermo, 1980-1), 31-64
Corrao, Pietro. "L'uflicio del maestro portulano in Sicilia fra Angioini e
Aragonesi," in XI Congresso 11, pp. 419-32
"Per una storia del potere feudale nelParea madonita in eta aragonese,"
in Potere religioso e potere temporale a Cefalii nel Medioevo: Atti del Convegno
internazionale, Centro di cultura Cefalii (Cefalu, 1985), pp. 71-96
Correnti, Santi. Laguerra dei novant'anni e le ripercussioni europee della guerra del
Vespro, 1282-13J2 (Catania, 1973)
Cosentino, Giuseppe. "Un documento in volgare siciliano del 1320,"
ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 9 (1884), 372-81
Costa, Maria-Merce. "Un atemptat frustrat contra Frederic III de Sicilia,"
in XI Congresso n, pp. 447—60
"Un episodi de la vida de Ramon de Peralta," in MM 1, pp. 313-27
Croce, Benedetto. Storia del regno di Napoli (Bari, 1925), Scritti di storia
letteraria e politica, vol. xix
Cusimano, Franco Antonio. "Gli aragonesi nella storia del parlamento di
Sicilia," Archivio storico messinese, 3rd ser., 3-4 (1950-2), 43-217
Cuvillier, Jean-Pierre. "Famille et societe en Mediterranee occidentale
chretienne: analyse comparative des modeles sicilien et Catalan,"
Melanges de la Casa de Velaquez 15 (1979), 187-204
D'Alessandro, Vincenzo. "In Sicilia: dalla massa alia masseria," in
Medioevo rurale: sulla tracce della civilta contadina, ed. Vito Fumagalli and
Gabriella Rossetti (Bologna, 1980), pp. 247-57
Bibliography 339
"La Sicilia dopo il Vespro," in XI Congresso 1, pp. 55-81
"Paesaggio agrario, regime della terra e societa rurale: secoli XI-XV,"
in SDS in, pp. 409-47
"Per una storia della societa siciliana alia fine del medioevo: feudatari,
patrizi, borghesi," ArchStSic 77 (1981), 193-208
Politico e societa nella Sicilia aragonese (Palermo, 1963)
"Sulle assemblee parlamentari della Sicilia medievale," ArchStSicOr 80
(1984), 5-17
Michele Grana and Marina Scarlata. "Famiglie medioevali
siculo-catalane," Medioevo: saggi e rassegne 4 (1978), 105-33
D'Angelo, Franco. "Terra e uomini della Sicilia medievale, secoli
XL-XIO," Quaderni medievali 6 (1978), 51-94
De Stefano, Antonino. Federico IIId'Aragona re di Sicilia, 1296-1337, 2nd edn.
(Bologna, 1956)
De Stefano, Francesco. "Per la storia di Sicilia nel XTV secolo: il papa
Giovanni XXII e la quistione siciliana," ArchStSicOr 18 (1921),
32-104
Delehaye, Hippolyte. "Catalogus codicum hagiographicum graecorum
monasterii S. Salvatoris nunc Bibliothecae Universitatis
lAessanensis," Analecta bollandiana 23 (1904), 19-75
Di Giovanni, Vincenzo. "Sopra alcune porte antiche di Palermo e
sull'assedio del 1325," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 6 (1881-2), 21-98
Di Martino, Giuseppe. "II sistema tributario degli Aragonesi in Sicilia,
1282-1516," ArchStperSic 4-5 (1938-9), 83-145
Dufourcq, Charles-Emmanuel. "Les activates politiques et economiques
des Catalans en Tunisie et en Algerie orientale de 1262 a i$]j," Boletin
de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona 17 (1946), 5-96
Epifanio, Vincenzo. / valli di Sicilia nel Medioevo e la low importanza nella vita
dellostato (Naples, 1938)
Epstein, Stephan R. An Island for Itself: Economic Development and Social
Change in Late Medieval Sicily (Cambridge, 1992), Past and Present
Publications
"Cities, Regions, and the Late Medieval Crisis: Sicily and Tuscany
Compared," Past and Present 130 (1991), 3-50
"Govemo centrale e comunita locali nella Sicilia tardo-medievale: le
fonti capitolari," in Atti e communicazioni del XIV Congresso di storia della
Corona d'Aragona, 5 vols. (Cagliari, 1990), v, pp. 403-38
"The Textile Industry and the Foreign Cloth Trade in Late Medieval
Sicily (1300-1500): A 'Colonial Relationship'?" fournal of Medieval
History 15 (1989), 141-83
Ferrau, Giacomo. Nicold Speciale: storico del "Regnum Siciliae" (Palermo,
1974), Bollettino del Centro di studi filologici e linguistici siciliani,
Supplementi, serie mediolatino e umanistica, vol. 11
Ferrer i Mallol, Maria Teresa. "Nobles Catalans arrelats a Sicilia: Guillem
Ramon I de Montcada," in MM 1, pp. 417—31
340 Bibliography
Finke, Heinrich. Aus dem Tagen Bonifaz VIII: Funde und Forschungen
(Miinster, 1902; rpnt. 1964)
"Die Seeschlacht am Kap Orlando: 1299 Juli 4," Historische Zeitschrift 134
(1926), 257-66
Fodale, Salvatore. "Stato e chiesa dal privilegio di Urbano II a Giovan Luca
Barberi," in SDS in, pp. 575-600
Fugaldi, Salvatore. Descrizione dei manoscritti della Biblioteca Fardelliana
(Palermo, 1978)
Gaetano, Ottavio. Vitae sanctorum siculorum ex antiquis graecis latinisque
monumentis et ex MSS codicibus collectae aut scriptae et animadversionibus
illustratae, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1657)
Galasso, Giuseppe. "Considerazioni intorno alia storia del Mezzogiorno in
Italia," in his collected essays, Mezzogiorno medievale e moderno (Turin,
1975). PP-J5-59
Garufl, Carlo Alberto. "Patti agrari e comuni feudali di nuova fondazione
in Sicilia, dallo scorcio del secolo XI agli arbori del Settecento: studi
stOT\c\^\\Aoma.t\c\," ArchStSic, 3rd ser., 1 (1946), 31-113; 2 (1947), 7—131
"Ricerche sugli usi nuziali nel Medio Evo in Sicilia," ArchStSic, 2nd ser.,
21 (1896-7), 209-307
Gaudioso, Mario. "Generi e aspetti della nobilita civica in Catania nel
secolo XV," Bollettino storico catanese 6 (1941), 29-67
Gaudioso, Matteo. La schiavitu domestica in Sicilia dopo i Normanni:
legislazione, dottrina, formule, 2nd edn. (Catania, 1979), Biblioteca
siciliana di storia e letteratura, vol. 111
Genuardi, Luigi. "Berardo de Medico: giurista siciliano della prima meta
del secolo XTV,"ArchStSicOr 4 (1907), 466-73
Ilcomune nel Medio Evo in Sicilia (Palermo, 1921)
"La formulazione delle consuetudini di Palermo," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 31
(1906-7), 462-92
Parlamento siciliano (Bologna, 1924; rpnt. 1968), R. Accademia dei Lincei,
Commissione per gli atti delle assemblee costituzionali italiane
Giannone, Amalia. "II codice di Fitalia," ArchStSic, n.s., 39 (1914), 93-135
Giardina, Camillo. "Le fonti della legislazione siciliana nel periodo
&e\YaatonomidL " ArchStperSic 1 (1935), 69-93
Giordano, Nicola. "II diritto marittimo siciliano dalle origini al secolo XTV:
Contributo alia storia del diritto siciliano," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 41
(1916-17), 359-87; 42 (1917-18), 20-49; 43 (1920-1), 251-78; 44 (1922-3),
53-69
GiufTrida, Antonino. "Aspetti e problemi del commercio dei panni in
Sicilia dal XIV al XVI secolo," ArchStSic, 3rd ser., 21-2 (1973),
"Giustizia e societa," in SDS m, pp. 545-73

"Itinerari di viaggi e trasporti," in SDS 111, pp. 469-83
Giuffrida, Tino. Catania: dalla dominazione sveva alia dominazione spagnola
(Catania, 1981)
Bibliography 341
Giunta, Francesco. Aragonesi e catalani nel mediterraneo, 2 vols. (Palermo,
1953-9)
Civilita siciliana: Sicilia angioino-aragonese (Vincenza, 1962)
"Federico III di Sicilia e le repubbliche marinare Tirreniche," in Genova,
Pisa e ilMediterraneo tra Due e Trecento (Genoa, 1984), Atti della Societa
ligure di storia patria, 2nd ser., vol. xxrv, fasc. 2, pp. 481-97
"II Vespro e Pesperienza della 'Communitas Sicilie': il baronaggio e la
soluzione catalano-aragonese dalle fine dell'indipendenza al
Viceregno spagnolo," in SDS m, pp. 305-407
Gramunt i Subiela, Josep. Els llinatges Catalans a Sicilia (Tarragona, 1931)
Grana, Michele. "Corona, ufficiali regi e fondazioni monastiche nella
Sicilia aragonese: il caso di S. Maria di Altofonte," in MM 11,
pp. 561-83
Gregorio, Rosario. Considerazioni sopra la storia di Sicilia dai tempi normanni
sinopresenti, 6 vols. in 3 (Palermo, 1805-16; rpnt. 1972-3)
Grohmann, Alberto. "Primi indagini sulForganizzazione fieristica
siciliana nel Medio Evo e nelPeta moderna, con particolare
riferimento alia fiera di Sciacca,"i4//i delVAccademiapontaniana, n.s., 18
(1968-9), 295-341
Guenee, Bernard. States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe (Oxford, 1985),
trans. Juliet Vale
Heuckelum, Mercedes van. Spiritualistische Stromungen an den Hqfen von
Aragon und Anjou wdhrend der Hbhe des Armutsstreites (Berlin, 1912),
Abhandlungen zur Mittleren und Neueren Geschichte, vol. XXXVIII
Hillgarth, J. N. Ramon Lull andLullism in Fourteenth-Century France (Oxford,
1970
The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire, 1229-1327 (London, 1975),
English Historical Review, Supplement, vol. VIII
Hitzfeld, Karl Leopold. Studien zu den religibsen undpolitischen Anschauungen
Friedrichs III von Sizilien (Berlin, 1930; rpnt. 1965)
Hopf, Karl. Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis aufunsere
Zeit, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1867-8), Allgemeines Encyklopadie der
Wissenschaften und Kunste, vols. LXXXV-LXXXVI
Housley, Norman J. "Angevin Naples and the Defence of the Latin East:
Robert the Wise and the Naval League of 1334," Byzantion 51 (1981),
548-56
"The Franco-Papal Crusade Negotiations of 1322-1323," Papers of the
British School at Rome 48 (1980), 166-85
The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against
Christian Lay Powers, 1254—1343 (Oxford, 1982)
Jacoby, David. "Catalans, turcs et venitiens en Romanie, 1305-1332: un
nouveau temoignage de Marino Sanudo Torsello," Studi medievali 15
(1974), 217-61
"La Compagnie catalane en Grece,"fournal des Savants avril-juin (1966),
78-103
342 Bibliography
Jehel, Georges. "Angevins, Genois et Siciliens aux temps des Vepres,
1276-1337," in XI Congresso m, pp. 257-78
Keightley, R. G. "Muntaner and the Catalan Grand Company," Revista
canadiense de estudios hispdnicos 4 (1979), 37-58
La Mantia, Giuseppe. "II testamento di Federico II Aragonese re di
Sicilia," ArchStperSic 2-3 (1936-7), 13-50
Laguerra di Sicilia contro gli Angioini negli anni 1313-1320 (Palermo, 1910)
"La Sicilia ed il suo dominio nelFAfrica settentrionale dal secolo XI al
XVl,"ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 44 (1922-3), 154-265
"Su Puso della registrazione nella Cancelleria del regno di Sicilia dal
Normanni a Federico III d'Aragona, 1130-1377," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 31
(1906-7), 197-219
Laiou, Angeliki E. Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of
Andronicus II, 1282-1328 (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), Harvard Historical
Studies, vol. LXXXVIII
Lionti, Ferdinando. "Le societa dei Bardi, dei Peruzzi e degli Acciaiuoli in
Sicilia.,9' ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 14 (1889-90), 189-230
Lo Forte Scirpo, Maria Rita. "Societa ed economia a Palermo: il conto del
tesoriere Bartolomeo Nini del 1345," in MM 11, pp. 667-751
Luzzatto, Gino. Storia economica delVeta moderna e contemporanea, 4th edn.
(Padua, 1955)
Mack Smith, Denis. Medieval Sicily: 800-1715 (London, 1968)
Mancini, Augusto. Codicesgraed monasterii Messanensis S. Salvatoris (Messina,
1907)
Marietta, Giovanni. "La nobilita siciliana del secolo XIV," ArchStSicOr 74
(1978), 279-85
Marongiu, Antonio. IIparlamento in Italia nel Medio Evo e nelVeta moderna, 2nd
edn. (Milan, 1962); in English as Medieval Parliaments: A Comparative
Study (London, 1968), trans. S. J. Woolf, Studies presented to the
International Commission for the History of Representative and
Parliamentary Institutions, vol. xxxn
Martinez Ferrando, J. Ernesto. Els descendants de Pere el Gran: Alfons el Franc,
Jaime II, Alfons el Benigne (Barcelona, 1957)
Jaime II de Aragon: su vida familiar, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1948), CSIC
estudios medievales, vol. ix
Jaume II e el seny catala, 2nd edn. (Barcelona, 1963)
Martino, F. "Una ignota pagina del Vespro: la compilazione dei falsi
privilegi messinesi," QFIAB forthcoming
Mazzarese Fardella, Enrico. I feudi comitali di Sicilia dai normanni agli
aragonesi (Milan, 1974), Universita di Palermo, Pubblicazioni a cura
della Facolta di giurisprudenza, vol. xxxvi
"L'aristocrazia siciliana nel secolo XIV e i suoi rapporti con le citta
demaniali: alia ricerca del potere," in Aristocrazia cittadina e cetipopolari
nel tardo Medioevo in Italia e Germania, ed. Reinhard Elze and Gina
Fasoli (Bologna, 1984), pp. 177-94
Bibliography 343
"Sulle curie generali del regno di Sicilia sotto gli svevi, 1194-1266,"
Archivio storico per la Calabria e Lucania 18 (1949), 21-43; 19 (1950), 45-53
Mediterraneo medievale: Scritti in onore di Francesco Giunta, ed. Centro di studi
tardoantichi e medievali di Altomonte, 3 vols. (Cozenza, 1989),
Biblioteca di storia e cultura meridionale, Studi e testi, vol. 11
Milano, Attilio. Storia degli ebrei in Italia (Torino, 1963), Saggi, vol. cccxvm
Mirazita, Iris. "Una famiglia 'lombarda' a Corleone nelFeta del Vespro,"
in MM in, pp. 913-52
Mirto, Corrado. // regno delVisola di Sicilia e delle isole adiacenti dalla sua
nascita alia peste del 1347-1348 (Messina, 1986)
Mollat, Guy. Lespapes d3Avignon, 1305—1378, 5th edn. (Paris, 1924)
Musto, Ronald S. "Queen Sancia of Naples (1286-1345) and the Spiritual
Franciscans," in Women of the Medieval World, ed. Julius Kirshner and
Suzanne F. Wemple (Oxford, 1985), 179-214
Nicolau D'Olwer, Lluis. L'Expansio de Catalunya en la Mediterrania Oriental
(Barcelona, 1926; rpnt. 1974)
Nigro, Gino and Maria Alibrandi. "L'Archivio di Stato di Messina e i
documenti che custodisce: 1184-1955," Archivio storico messinese, 3rd ser.,
17-19 (1966-8), 57-92
Olivar Bertrand, Rafael. El nostre Frederic de Sicilia (Barcelona, i960)
Un rei de llegenda: Frederic III de Sicilia (Barcelona, 1951)
Orlando, Diego.il/eudalismo in Sicilia: storia e dirittopubblico (Palermo, 1847)
Pardi, Giuseppe. "Un comune della Sicilia e le sui relazioni con i
dominatori delFisola sino al secolo XVIII," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 26
(1901), 22-65, 310-66; 27 (1902), 38-109
Percy, William A. "The Earliest Revolution against the Modern State:
Direct Taxation in Medieval Sicily and the Vespers," Italian Quarterly
22: 84 (1981), 69-83
"The Indirect Taxes of the Medieval Kingdom of Sicily," Italian Quarterly
22: 85 (1981), 73-85
"A Reappraisal of the Sicilian Vespers and the Role of Sicily in
European History," Italian Quarterly 22: 86 (1981), 77-96
Peri, Illuminate "Economia agricola e crisi nella Sicilia medievale:
Interpretazioni e prospettive storiografiche," in Storiogrqfia e storia:
Studi in onore di Eugenio Dupre Theseider, 2 vols. (Rome, 1974), 1,
pp. 95-104
"La questione delle colonie lombarde in Sicilia," Bollettino storico-
bibliografico subalpino 57 (1959), 258-80
La Sicilia dopo il Vespro: uomini, citta e campagne, 1282-1376 (Rome, 1982),
Gollezione storica
"Per la storia della vita cittadina e del commercio nel Medioevo:
Girgenti, porto del sale e del grano," in Studi in onore di Amintore
Fanfani, 6 vols. (Milan, 1962), 1, pp. 529-616
"Rinaldo di Giovanni Lombardo 'habitator terrae Policii'," in Studi
medievali in onore diAntonino de Stefano (Palermo, 1956), pp. 429-506
344 Bibliography
Petino, Antonio. "Aspetti del commercio marittimo della Sicilia nelPeta
aragonese," ArchStSicOr [= Bollettino storico catanese] 11-12 (1946-7),
64-75
Piazza, Carlo. // parlamento siciliano dal secolo XII al secolo XIX (Palermo,
1974)
Pirri, Rocco. Sicilia sacra disquisitionibus et notitiis illustrata, ed. Vito Maria
Amico, 2 vols., 3rd edn. (Palermo, 1733)
Pispisa, Enrico. Messina nel Trecento: politica, economia, societa (Messina,
1980), Collana di testi e studi storici, vol. 1
"Stratificazione sociale e potere politico a Messina nel medioevo,"
Archivio storico messinese, 3rd ser., 32 (1981), 55-76
Pollaci Nuccio, Fedele. "I papi e la Sicilia nel Medio Evo," ArchStSic,
2nd ser., 25 (1900-1), 53-87
Pou y Marti, Jose Maria. Visionarios, beguinos y jraticelos catalanes: siglos
XIII-XV (Vich, 1930)
Pryor, John H. "Foreign Policy and Economic Policy: The Angevins of Sicily
and the Economic Decline of Southern Italy, 1266-1343," in
Principalities, Powers, and Estates: Studies in Medieval and Early Modern
Government and Society, ed. L. O. Frappell (Adelaide, 1980), pp. 43-55
Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the
Mediterranean, 649-1571 (Cambridge, 1988), Past and Present
Publications
"The Naval Battles of Roger of Lauria," Journal of Medieval History 9
(1983), 179-216
Puzzolo Sigillo, D. "Alcune considerazioni sopra la storia del notariato in
Sicilia,"Archiviostorico messinese 16-17 ( I 9 I 5 ~ I ^ ) J 43~75
Reeves, Marjorie. Joachim ofFiore and the Prophetic Future (London, 1976)
Romano, Andrea. Giuristi siciliani dell eta aragonese: Berardo Medico, Guglielmo
Perno, Gualtiero Paternb, Pietro Pitrolo (Milan, 1979), Universita di
Messina, Pubblicazioni delPIstituto di scienze giuridiche, eco-
nomiche, politiche e sociale, vol. cxvn
"Legum Doctores"e cultura giuridica nella Sicilia aragonese: tendenze, opere, ruoli
(Milan, 1984), Universita degli studi di Messina, Studi giuridici,
vol. iv
Romano, Salvatore. "Sulla battaglia della Falconaria e sulFassedio di
Trapani nel 1314," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 25 (1900-1), 380-95
Roth, Cecil. "Jewish Intellectual Life in Medieval Sicily,"Jewish Quarterly
Review 47 (1956-7), 317-35
Rubio i Lluch, Antoni. "La Grecia catalana des de la mort de Roger de
Lluria fins a la de Frederic III de Sicilia," Anuari de VInstitut d'Estudis
Catalans 5 (1913-14), 393-485
Lapoblacio de la Grecia catalana en elXWsegle (Barcelona, 1933)
Paquimeres i Muntaner (Barcelona, 1927)
Runciman, Steven. The Sicilian Vespers: A History ofthe Mediterranean World in
the Later Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1958)
Bibliography 345
Sablonier, Roger. Krieg und Kriegertum in der Cronaca des Ramon Muntaner:
Eine Studie zum spdtmittelalterlichen Kriegwesen aufgrund katalanischen
Quellen (Bern, 1971), Geist und Werk der Zeiten, Arbeiten aus dem
Historischen Seminar der Universitat Zurich, vol. xxxi
"The Aragonese Royal Family around 1300," in Interest and Emotion: Essays
on the Study of Family and Kinship, ed. H. Medick and David W. Sabean
(Cambridge, 1984), pp. 210-39
Salavert y Roca, Cerdehay la expansion mediterrdnea de la Corona de Aragon,
I2gy-iji4, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1956), GSIG estudios medievales,
vol. xxvii
"El Tratado de Anagni y la expansion mediterranea de la Corona de
Aragon," EEMCA 5 (1952), 209-360
"Jaime II de Aragon: inspirador de la paz de Caltabellotta," in Studi in
onore di Riccardo Filangieri, 3 vols. (Naples, 1959), 1, pp. 361-8
"La pretendida traicion de Jaime II de Aragon contra Sicilia y los
sicilianos,"EEMCA 7 (1962), 599-622
"Notas sobre la politica italiana de Clemente y sus repercusiones en
Aragon," in Miscellanea in onore di Roberto Cessi, 3 vols. (Rome, 1958),
Storia e letteratura, vols. LXXI-LXXIII, I, pp. 255-98
Sambito Piombo, S. "Una famiglia lucchese a Palermo nei primi decenni
del secolo XIV," Rivista di archeologia, storia e costume 9 (1981), 37-44
San Martino de Spucches, Francesco. La storia deifeudi e dei titoli nobiliari di
Sicilia dalle low origini ai nostri giorni: Lavoro compilato su documenti et atti
ufficiali e legali, 10 vols. (Palermo, 1924-41)
Scaduto, Mario. // monachesimo basiliano nella Sicilia medievale: rinascita e
decadenza, secoli XI-XIV (Rome, 1982)
Scarlata, Marina. "I Ghiaromonte a Palermo nel secolo XTV: uso della
citta e gestione economica," Bullettino delVIstituto storico italiano per il
Medio Evo e Archivio muratoriano 90 (1982—3), 303—29
"Mercati e flere nella Sicilia aragonese," in Mercati e consumi:
Organizzazione e qualificazione del commercio in Italia dal XII al XX secolo,
2 vols. (Bologna, 1986), 1, pp. 477-94
"Strutture urbane ed habitat a Palermo fra XIII e XTV secolo: un
approccio al tema attraverso la lettura documentaria," Schedi
medievali 8 (1985), 80-110
"Ufiici e appalti publici in Sicilia fra XIII e XTV secolo," in XI Congresso
rv, pp. 241-62
"Una famiglia della nobilta siciliana nello spazio urbano e nel territorio
tra XIII e XTV secolo," Quaderni medievali 11 (1981), 67-83
Schadek, Hans. "Die Familiaren der sizilischen und aragonischen Konige
im 12 und 13 Jahrhundert," GAKS 26 (1971), 201-348
"Tunis oder Sizilien? Die Ziele der aragonischen Mittelmeerpolitik
unter Peter III von Aragon," GAKS 28 (1975), 335-49
Schiro, Achille. // monastero di S. Maria del Bosco di Calatamauro in Sicilia
(Palermo, 1894)
346 Bibliography
Sciacca, Giovan Crisostomo. Patti e Uamminstrazione del Comune nelMedio Evo
(Palermo, 1907), DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. vi
Sciascia, Laura. "I cammelle e le rose: gli Abbate di Trapani da Federico
II a Martino il Vecchio," in MM in, pp. 1171-1230
"Nascita di una famiglia: i Rosso di Messina (sec. XTV)," Clio 20 (1984),
389-418
"Scene da un matrimonio: Eleonora d'Aragona e Giovanni
Chiaromonte," Quaderni medievali 31-2 (1991), 121-9
Sciascia, Leonardo. "II mito dei Vespri siciliani da Amari a Verdi,"
ArchStSicOr 69 (1973), 183-92
Sella, Pietro. Rationes decimarum Italiae nei secoli XIIIe XIV: Sicilia (Vatican
City, 1944), Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, Studi e testi, vol. cxn
Setton, Kenneth M. Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311—1388 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1948), Mediaeval Academy of America Publications, vol. L
"The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380," in A History of the Crusades, ed.
Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols. (Wisconsin, 1969-89), in, pp. 167-224
The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1976-84),
Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, vols. cxrv, cxxvii,
GLXI-GLXII
Simonsohn, Shlomo. "Gli ebrei a Siracusa ed il loro cimitero," Archivio
storico siracusano 9 (1963), 8-20
Sipione, Enzo. "La smobilitazione del servizio militare della feudalita
siciliana," Archivio storico siracusano, 2nd ser., 1 (1974 for 1971), 31-8
Siragusa, Giambattista. Relazionijra il regno di Napoli e la Sicilia durante il
regno di Roberto d'Angib (Palermo, 1887)
Soldevila, Ferran. Els almogavers (Barcelona, 1952), Colleccio popular
barcino, vol. CXLIX
Historia de Catalunya, 4 vols., 2nd edn. (Barcelona, 1963)
Spatrisano, Giuseppe. Lo Steri di Palermo e Varchitettura siciliana del Trecento
(Palermo, 1972)
Spremic, Momcilo. "La migrazione degli Slavi nelPItalia meridionale e
in Sicilia alia fine del Medioevo," Archivio storico italiano 138 (1980),
3-15
Starrabba, Raffaele. "Di un codice vaticano contenente i privilegi
delFarchimandrito di Messina," ArchStSic 12 (1887), 465-9
"Un nuovo codice di taluni capitoli de re Federigo, 1310," ArchStSic 2
(1877-8), 212-18
Storia della Sicilia, ed. Rosario Romeo, 10 vols. (Naples, 1977-84)
Thier, Ludger. Kreuzzugsbemuhungen unter Papst Clemens V, 1305-1314 (Werl,
1973), Franziskanische Forschungen, vol. xxrv
Tramontana, Salvatore. Gli anni del Vespro: Vimmaginario, la cronaca, la storia
(Bari, 1989), Storia e civilta, vol. xxv
"La Spagna catalana nel Mediterraneo e in Sicilia," Nuova rivista storica
5 O966), 545-79
Michele da Piazza e ilpotere baroniale in Sicilia (Messina, 1963)
Bibliography 347
"Scuola e cultura nella Sicilia trecentesca," ArchStSicOr 60-1 (1964-5),
5-28
Trasselli, Carmelo. "Aspetti della vita materiale," in SDS 111, pp. 601-21
"Banchieri, armatori, assicuratori," in SDS 111, pp. 485-500
"Gli ebrei di Sicilia," in his collected papers Siciliani Jra Quattrocento e
Cinquecento (Messina, 1981), pp. 135-57
"L'Amiraute de Sicile, XTVe-XVe siecles," Revue d'histoire economique et
sociale 47 (1969), 193-214
Mediterraneo e Sicilia alVinizio delVepoca moderna: Ricerche quattrocentesche
(Gosenza, 1977), Fonti e ricerche per la storia della Calabria e del
Mezzogiorno, Problemi del sottosviluppo, vol. 11
"Nuovi documenti sui Peruzzi, Bardi e Acciaiuoli in Sicilia," Economia e
storia 3 (1956), 188-9
"Ricerche su la popolazione di Sicilia nel secolo XV," Atti delVAccademia
di scienze, lettere, e arti di Palermo, 4th ser., 15 (1954-5), 213-71
Storia dello zucchero siciliano (Caltanissetta, 1982), Storia economica di
Sicilia, Testi e ricerche, vol. xxv
Unali, Anna. Marinai, pirati e corsari catalani nel basso medioevo (Bologna,
1983), Studi e testi di storia medievale, vol. vi
Varvaro, Alberto. Le chiavi del castello delle Gerbe: fedelta e tradimento nella
Sicilia trecentesca (Palermo, 1984), Biblioteca siciliana di storia e
letteratura, Quaderni, vol. 11
Ventura, D. "Aspetti economico-sociali della schiavitu nella Sicilia
medievale, 1260-1498," Annali della Facoltd di Economia e Commercio
deirUniversita di Catania 24 (1978), 77-130
Verlinden, Charles. Uesclavage dans VEurope medievale, 2 vols. (Bruges,
1955-77), Werken uitgegeven door de Faculteit van de Letteren en
Wijsbegeerte, vols. cxix and CLXII
"L'esclavage en Sicile sous Frederic II d'Aragon, 1296-1337," in Homenaje
a Jaime Vicens Vives, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1965-7), 1, pp. 675-90
Vincke, Johannes. "Konigtum und Sklaverei im aragonischen
Staatenbund wahrend des i4jahrhunderts," GAKS 25 (1970), 19-112
"Los familiares de la Corona aragonesa alrededor del ano 1300," Anuario
de estudios medievales 1 (1964), 333-51
Willemsen, Carl Arnold. Kardinal Napoleon Orsini, 1263-1342 (Berlin, 1927;
rpnt. 1965), Historische Studien, vol. GLXXII
Yvers, Georges. Le commerce et les marchands dans Vltalie meridionale au XHIe et
au XJVe siecle (Paris, 1903)
Zachariadou, Elizabeth A. "The Catalans of Athens and the Beginnings of
the Turkish Expansion in the Aegean Area," Studi medievali, 3rd ser.,
21 (1980), 821-38
Index
Abbate family (lords of Trapani): Aragon-Catalonia, campaign against

D. Enrico, 181; D. Guglielmo, 181; Sardinia, 1-2, 48-50, 64,72, 120, 284;
D. Nicola, 16,11711 military alliance with, 4, 46, 47-8, 72-3,
d'Aceto, D. Giacomo (justiciar of Val 124; pseudo-war with, 45—6, 88;
Demone), 116 relations with, post-1295, 42-6;
Acireale, 14, 9411,190 relations with, post-1302, 46-8; trade
agriculture, xii—xiv, 45—6, 76-7, 93, 101—2; with, 10, 101,154—5,161, 304; see also,
crop failures, 2-3, 38, 70, 97,175-7; James II
decline of, 33,128; foreign exports of, armies, private, see comitive
64—5,154—5,161; freehold nature of, 17; arms, prohibition of, 92,118,144—6
grain production, 93,107,161,165; Athens, duchy of, 1, 30, 40,54—64, 68, 72,
indigo, 161; manorial organization of, 199, 282—3; as source of Greek slaves,
16; massarie, 170-1; trend toward grain 62—3, 251—2; governance of, 57;
monoculture, 30, 161; see also, sugar relations with Venice, 57, 60-1, 63;
production, wine production trade with Sicily, 59-60; see also,
Agrigento, 15, 98,101,103,106,108, 113,130, Alfonso-Frederick, Gatalan
131—2; bishop of, 37,161,174,191, 226, Company
241-2; diocese of, 190; migration to, 82, Augusta, 82, 94n, 190
100 Avola, 82,180-1
Aiello, D. Giovanni (justiciar of Val di
Mazara), 147-8, 262 barons, 4,5, 22-3, 77-80, 84, 86-7,161,163-4,
d'Alago, Blase, 2in, 46, ii4n 165-6, 173-5; attitudes towards urban
Alcamo, 2,189 society, 21—4, 80; control of mountain
Alfonso-Frederick (royal bastard), 56n, passes by, 14—15; counts, 22—3,164—5;
60-1, 63, 283; see also, Athens, duchy of extortion of upland traders, 178-80;
d'Algerio, D. Federico (baron-bailiff of outrage over Treaty of Anagni, 44—5;
Palermo), 23-4,117,151-2,154 relations with royal court, 73, 77-80,
alum manufacture, xiv, 3, 95,105; see also, 114,156-7,158-9; usurpation of lands
textiles by, 161—2,176-7,195-9; see ak°>laws,
Anagni, Treaty of, 44,134 feudal
Andronicus II Paleologus (Byzantine "Beato Guglielmo", 233-40
emperor), 54-5 Benedetto, Tommasso (Judex of Palermo),
animal husbandry, 17, 93, 131-2,171—3,184 25n-26n, 130
d'Ansalone, Franchino (judex of Messina), Benedict XI, Pope, 191—3, 200, 210, 21 in
132 Bivona, 106,113
anticlericalism, 20, 91-2,186,187-9, 2O9~I^i Black Death, xvi, 5, 22, 30,39,193
227-30; attacks on papal Bocca de Ordo, Manfredi, i24n
representatives, 213-15; ecclesiastical Boniface VIII, Pope, 27,40,42,48,191
lands sacked, 161-2,195-9; see also, Brucato, 32
evangelicalism, Franciscan Spirituals, Buccheri, 82
ripitu Butera, 106
348
Index 349
Caccamo, 95,106,113,165,190 into, 22-3; control of surrounding
Calabria, 58, 67-8; trade with, 93-4 countryside, 92-5, 99; ethnic violence
Calatafimi, 35, 3611 in, 19, 32—3, 272—3; municipal courts,
Caltabellotta, 8, 82, 86, 95,106,113; Treaty 118-19; municipal liberties, 51, 90, 96;
of, 4,29,41-2,46,58, 66-8,104-5, "5 outrage over Treaty of Anagni, 44—5;
Caltagirone, 82,115,181,190,196 public health dangers in, 38, 39, 128;
Caltanissetta, 15,36,106,117,151,154,190 regulation of labor markets, 99-100;
Caltavuturo, 106,117,158,190 resistance to parliament, 125—7; r * se °f
Caltavuturo, Ruggero di (judex of Palermo), urban magnates, 100,130-42; urban
no strife, 20-2,75, 83, 86, 91,127, 142-53
camera reginale, 85,116, 165, 286-8 Clement V, Pope, 52-3,193,197, 203, 204,
Cammarana, Giovanni di (consiliarius regis), 210, 213, 215, 216, 282
112 clergy, 91,186-7, I^9> 218—21; bishops,
Cammarana, Oberto di, 162 111-12; episcopal vacancies post-1302,
Cammarata, 106 42,191-3; organization of, 189-91; see
Canyelles, Bertran (consiliarius regis), 112 also, churches
Capo d'Orlando, battle of, 39,124,135 comitive (armed urban factions, or private
Carastono, Antonio (Judex of Palermo), 132 armies), 10, 5on, 83,113,127,136,138,
Carastono, Filippo, 262 141, 144,150, 230, 296
Caslar, Pone, Hug de (justiciar of Palermo), Corleone, 19,35, 36, 82,91,98,106,118,
26,116,144 137-42,143,151,189; see also,
Castellamare, 1,103 Pontecorono family
Castrogiovanni, 15,19, 35, 85, 87, 93, 95, 106, court, royal, see Magna Regia Curia
115,123,144,178,179,181,227 Croce, Benedetto, xii, 29-30, 303
Castronovo, 35, 106,190 Crown of Aragon, see Aragon-Catalonia
Catalan Company, 55-6, 68
Catania, 19, 22, 82, 9411,115,130,131-2,154, Demone, Val, 13,18, 35-6, 38, 41,54,107,
190; damaged by Mount Etna eruption, 161,172,182, 222, 294
14, 75—7; diocese of, 190,191 Doria, Corrado (Sicilian admiral), 33n, 48
Cattolica, 82 Doria, Raflaele (Sicilian admiral), 71,182
Cefalu, 15, 35, 94n, 103,106,114,115,130;
bishop of, 37,52,176-7; diocese of, 190 economic dualism, xii-xiv
Charles I of Anjou, king of Sicily, 4,12,133, Egypt, trade with, 94
142 Eleanor, queen of Sicily, 76, i n , H7n, 180,
Charles II of Anjou, king of Sicily, 12, 67,142 181, 197, 286-8; as evangelical
Chiaromonte family (counts of Modica and reformer, 205—6, 288-9; personality of,
Mohac), 10; Giovanni I, 72, 161,164—5, 41—2; see also, camera reginale
196,198; Giovanni II, i6n, 77-80, 97, d'Empuries, Berenguer Estanyol (vicar-
146,154, 180,181, 206, 298, 307; general of Athenian duchy), 56
Manfredi, 78,131 d'Empuries, Pong Hug (royal marshal), 47,
churches, 5,42, 73; construction of, 52, 282
197-8; economic problems of, 240-6; d'Entenga, Berenguer (consiliarius regis),
papal control of local canonries, 211-13; 112
see also, clergy d'Entenga, Guillem, 46
Ciminna, 106,152 Epstein, Stephan, xiv, 6n, 304—5
Cisario family (magnates of Palermo), 22, Eraclea, 106
26n; Giovanni di, 127,147-8, 262; evangelicalism, xv—xvi, 20—1,52—4,146—7,
Perrello di, 125 187, 215, 217-18, 231-2; see also,
Citella, Bartolomeo di (notary of Palermo), anticlericalism, Franciscan Spirituals,
106, 253 ripitu, Vilanova, Arnau de
cities, 19-21, 83, 85-155; administration of,
129-32; anti-Catalan sentiment in, 144, fairs, 98-9,168, 286
147-8; attitudes toward baronial familiares regis, see Magna Regia Curia
society, 21—4; attitudes towards royal Ferla, 82
court, 85-7, 96-7,119; baronial entry Ferro, Berardo, 113
35° Index
Filangieri, D. Riccardo (stratigoto of land, desertion of, 37-8, 73-4, 156, 159;
Messina), 116 ecclesiastical holdings, 91—2, 113—14,
Florence, xiv, 64—5 194-7; feudal dues owed for, 180-3;
Francavilla, 85 prohibition of alienation of baronial
Franciscan Spirituals, 27,53,74,138,175, fiefs, 160; reorganization of, under
187, 216-32; inquest of, by royal court, Frederick, 168-70; rise ofterre, 159,
219-21; condemned by John XXII, 169-70,182,184
222—4; granted safe-hiding post-1317, Lauria, Roger de (admiral of Aragon—
226-7; emerge from hiding post-1321, Gatalonia), 45, 88,120, 272
227; ordered to leave for Tunis, 224; see laws, feudal, 21—2, 157, 160
also, anticlericalism, evangelicalism, laws, royal, 89-92,184, 290-2; Cap. alia, 89;
Vilanova, Arnau de Const. Castrogiovanni, 89,144—5; Const.
Frederick III, king of Sicily, xv—xvi, 2—3, Palermo, 89; Const, reg., 89-91, 165-7;
24-6, 32, 39, 44-6,51, 62, 69, 80, 86-7, Ord. gen., 89, 206-9, 258-65, 289, 296-8;
109, 120,134, 152-3,193, 196, 216-17; as Strat. Messina, 89; Volentes, 166-70; see
evangelical reformer, 20, 52, 200, 201, also, arms, women
202-9, 216-17; confiscation of church Lentini, 82, 85, 87, 95, 99,173,190
lands by, 73-4; financial debts of, 113; Licata, 15, 82, 95,106,113,115,190
land-tenure policies of, 162-70; Licodia, S. Maria di, 14
marriage to Eleanor, 41; personality of, Llull, Ramon, 201, 217—19
11—12, 27; popularity of, 24; restoration Louis IV the Bavarian (German emperor),
of churches post—1302,52, 197—8; royal 4<>> 74-5> 7&-9> 80,84,88,125, 231-2
title of, 4, i2n, 41, 66-7; support for
Basilian monasteries by, 199-200; see MagnaRegia Curia, 110-19,132; annual
also, barons, cities, laws vetting of its officials, 90, no;
composition of, in—13; familiares regis,
Gangi, 24, 35,106,162 112; popular disdain for, 118-19
Garsia, D. Roderigo (captain of Trapani), 116 Maida, D. Senatore di (baron-bailiff of
Genoa, xiv, 41; piratical raids from, 32, Palermo), 125-6
278-9; trade with, 10, 33, 46, 64-5,101 Malta, 36, 41,56n, 77,164, 256
Geraci, 106 Maniscalco, Guglielmo, 162, 245
Ghibellines, Sicilian alliance with, 6, 30, 40, marriage, 39-40, 78,150, 296-8; changing
70-2, 74-5,124, 279, 283 patterns of, 100-1; customs, 2 9 5 - 8 ; ^
Golisano, 114 also, women
Gratteri, 114 Marsala, 82, 95, 97,103,154,189, 225n
Marseilles, trade with, 10
Henry VII of Luxembourg, 1-2,12, 40, 64-5, Mazara, 32, 73, 82, 90, 97,98,103,151,156,
68-9, 84, 88,124, 307; see also, 159; diocese of, 189-90, 191; Val di, 18,
Ghibellines 35-6, 64, 81, 99, no, 172,182, 222
d'Hixar, Pere Ferrandis, 34 Mazzarino, 115,190
Melyadius (bastard royal half-brother),
d'Incisa, Leonardo (royal treasurer), 26, inn—i2n
142,194, 307 Messina, 2,19, 38n, 39,51, 87, 97, 98,106,
107, 108,123,131—2,151; archdiocese of,
James II of Aragon-Gatalonia, 40, 47-9,54, 190; economic strategies of, 92-5; see
272, 276; as King of Sicily, xv, 4, 23, 43, also, Rosso family
120,134; see also, Aragon-Catalonia Milazzo, 13, 93,133,136,190
Jews, 19, 148-53* 207, 254, 255, 257-8, 274; Milite, Rinaldo di (baron-bailiff of
legislation against, 150-1; under Palermo), 116,12411,125,130
protection of urban magnates, 152—3 Milite, Vitale di (judex of Palermo), 106,190
John XXII, Pope, 12,53, 62, 200, 212, 222-4, Mineo, 85,95
225 Mistretta, 106,190
Modica, 36, 82,190
Lancia, Corrado (royal chancellor), 117,164 Monreale, 106,162,190; archbishop of, 73—4;
Lancia, Manfredi, 162,196 archdiocese of, 190
Index 351
Monte S. Giuliano (Erice), 2, 97,106,151, 189 population, 18, 85, 97, 138,159, 169-70;
Montpellier, trade with, 102 decline of, 5, 34-6, 82-3; mobility of, 10,
Mosca, Federico (judex of Agrigento), 131 16-17, 37-8> 93> 99-IOO> Io6> n 5- l 6 > 273;
Mount Etna, 14, 75—7 see also, marriage
Muntaner, Ramon, 7, 12,13, 272 Porto, Ginuisio (judex of Messina), 132
Pucci, Simone (judex of Catania), 23
Naro, 82,85, IQ6> "7
Naso, 99 Ragusa, 82,190
Nicholas V (anti-pope), 74, 231—2 Randazzo, 15, 35, 97,154,190, 196
Nicosia, 36, 95,115,190, 196 Rassach, Arnau de (archbishop of
night-watch companies, see xurterii Monreale), 193, 213—14, 219-20
Notar Michele, Simone di (xurterius of Ravennusa, 73-4
Palermo), 150-1 Riciputo, D. Francesco (justiciar of Val
Noto, 36, 82,154, 162; Val di, 18, 35-6, 54, d'Agrigento), 116
107,172, 182, 222, 294 ripitu, 227-30, 248, 293-4, 302
rivers, 15—16; r. Ammiraglio, 125; r. Belice,
Palazzolo, 82 189; r. Ferro, 190; r. Iato, 189; r. Salso,
Palermo, 14,15, 19, 32-3, 36, 51, 72, 95, 97, 15, 18, 114,115, 190
98,108,123, 144,151, 152,154; roads, 15
archdiocese of, 190, 242-3; economic Robert I, king in Naples, 1-3, 30, 34, 68, 79,
strategies of, 102-4; local officials of, 80; invasion of 1325-6, 30-1, 32
130—2; migration to, 59, 82, 106, 140; Rosso family (urban magnates of Messina),
urban strife, 74—5, 149 Berengario, 113; Cataldo, 135; Enrico,
n
Palizzi, Vinciguerra da (royal chancellor), 3> !33~7> l3&> J42> *62; Federico, 134—5,
22, 68, 293 293n; Perrone, 134—5; Russo, 113, 135,
parliament, 10,47, 65, 71, 89, 90-1,119-27, 140, i52n, 183
224; foundation of, 120-2; meetings of,
!23-5 S. Mauro, 106
Passaneto, Riccardo di (consiliarius regis and S. Stefano, D. Enrico di (justiciar of Val di
count of Garsiliato), 22,112, 164 Noto), 116
Paterno, 14 Salemi, 82
Patti, 94n, 100, 190 saltworks, 95
Pellegrino, Salerno di (notary), 83 Salvo, Santoro (judex of Messina), 132
Peralta, Ramon de, 73 Saporito, Guglielmo (judex of Messina), 132
Perpignan, trade with, 102, 177 Sardinia, 1-2, 31,40,48-50, 54, 64, 69, 72,
Peter I of Aragon—Catalonia, king of Sicily, 120,177, 284
4, 42-3,54, 88,120, 272 Sarria, Bernat de (admiral of Crown of
Petralia Soprana, 17, 95,106, 165 Aragon), 68, 274-6, 280-1, 300
Petralia Sottana, 106,165 Scarpa, D. Francesco (justiciar of Val di
Piazza, 85, 98,106,115 Mazara), 116
piracy, 72, 269-85; as distinct from Sciacca, 35, 51, 82, 90, 95, 96, 97, 101, 103,
corsairing, 271—4; by the Athenian 106, 113, 130,152, 154, 190, 227, 257
duchy, 60—1; Catalan promotion of, Scicli, 82, 115
272-3; compensation paid for, 274-6; Sclafani, 106,190
exceptional violence in, 278-81; Sclafani family, 22,5on, 198, 227
Frederick's role in, 273; Genoese, ships and shipping, 13, 49-50, 65, 93, 106-7,
278-9; targets of Sicilian attack, 280—4; 225, 270-1
Tunisian, 13,15, 61 Sicily, xi-xii, 12-13, 29-30, 40-1, 42-4, 73,
Pisa, xiv, 41, 74; piratical raids from, 32; 81-4, 104, 270-3; aid for Sardinian
trade with, 10, 64—5, 101 campaign, 48-50; alliance with
Polizzi, 85,130,131—2, 165,190 Aragon-Catalonia, 4,46, 47-8, 72-3,
Pontecorono family (urban magnates of 124; census owed to Holy See by, 42, 52,
Corleone), Bertolino, 138-40; 209; geography of, 13—19; mountains of,
Bernardo, 118,138-40; Guglielmo, 140; 13—15; pseudo-war with Aragon—
Pietro, 118, 140 Catalonia, 45-6, 88; regional
352 Index
Sicily (cont.) districts, 114-16; see also, Val Demone,
characteristics of, 17-19,172-3; see also, Val di Mazara, Val di Noto
valli Venice, 41,57, 59, 272; relations with duchy
Siracusa, 19, 36,51, 82, 85, 87, 9411,95, 97, of Athens, 60-1, 63; Sicilian trade with,
108,115,151, 275, 286-7; diocese of, 3811, 10,101
115,190,191,244-5 Ventimiglia, Francesco di (count of Geraci
slaves, the slave trade, 3, 62,150, 207, 208, and Golisano), 10, 38n, 77-80, n6n, 136,
249-68, 282; changes in, during 146,164-5, l69> !74» I77~8> !98> 238~4OJ
thirteenth century, 249-51; domestic 298
uses of, 252-3; evangelical reform of, Vergua, Pedro Fernandez de, 117
258-65; factors determining the value Vespers rebellion (1282—1302), xii, 4, 6-8,
of, 253-6; increased use of Greek 54, 88,132,133, 149,161,180,187-9
slaves, 251—2; racial distribution of, Vicari, 113,152,190
254—5; societates, 257-8; use of labor- Vienne, Council of, 213, 216, 217, 219, 221; see
leases, 265—7 also, Clement V
Solanto, 103 Vilanova, Arnau de, xv—xvi, 12, 27, 52, 54, 66,
Speciale, Nicola, 3,5, 6, 34, 69, 75-7, 81, ii2n, 200-9, 215, 246, 302; Allocutio
3O3-4 christiani, 201—3; Informacio espiritual,
Spinola, Gerardo (royal marshal), 71 205, 259; Interpretatio de visionibus, 204;
sugar production, xiv, 95, g6n, 99,161 Raonament d'Avinyo, 204; interest in
converting Greeks, 251-2; see also,
Tagliavia, D. Bartolotto, 113 evangelicalism, Franciscan Spirituals
Tagliavia, D. Tommasso, i24n, 130 Vindicari, 95
Taormina, 136,190,197 Vizzini, 85
taxation, xv, 85, 91,103,106, 108-9,125> Volentes, see laws, royal
parliamentary role in, 124—5; partial
exemptions from, 96-8; toll franchises, water, 13, 22; aqueducts, 16,125-6;
51, 168, 287 irrigation, 16; rights to, 16; see also,
Termini, 18, 32, 98,103,106, 113,115, 190 rivers
Terranova, 35, 82, 95,108, 115,123 wills, 39-40,100-1
textiles, cotton, xiv, 3, 99, 161; silk, 3, 93, wine production, 3,15, 93, 94n, 107,132, 165
291; wool, 95,105,165 women, 285-302; laws governing, 290-2;
Trapani, 2-3,10,15,19, 36, 82, 95, 97, 98, reputatrices, 227—30, 248, 296, 298—300,
100,103,105,108,138, 149, 151, i52n, 302; widows and widowhood, 39-40, 134,
189; urban strife in, 32-3, 73,143, 227 135, 293-4, 301-2; see also, Eleanor,
Troina, 115,190 marriage, ripitu
Tunis, 58, 67-8, 101, 102, 304
xurterii (night-watch companies), 20, 26,129,
valli, xv, 18-19,103-4, 222 J a s discrete 131,143,147,150-1
economic units, 15,18; as juridical

Backman-The Decline and Fall of Medieval Sicily

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Backman-The Decline and Fall of Medieval Sicily

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

THE DECLINE AND FALL

© Cambridge University Press 1995

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

First published 1995

A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

ISBN 0 52149664 0 hardback

1 The kingdom at risk i

Table 1 Judices of Palermo 308

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries two schools of

cataclysmic Vespers struggle, for by losing its connections with

Portions of chapter 5 originated as articles: "The Papacy, the

The basic unit of currency in medieval Sicily, even though it was

(For full bibliographical citations, see Bibliography.)

ACA Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Barcelona

The kingdom at risk

In the spring of 1314 King Robert of Naples consulted a soothsayer.

Catalan regime in faraway Messina that so consistently failed to

in a tradition that stretches from the fourteenth to the early

The landscape is dominated by mountains. Rising in some places

of self-interest in career politicians; but few Sicilians were as

Given such firmly rooted geographic and human obstacles to

authority in Italy, but also ecclesiastical authority in Christendom

The international scene: war without

I ASSESSING THE DAMAGE

their possible consequences, accounts for the extraordinarily wide

10,000 to 5,000; but Noto, Caltanissetta, Siracusa, and Modica all

brought about ever fewer births in relation to the ever rising

II EARLY SUCCESSES AND HEIGHTENED HOPES, I 2 9 6 - 1 3 1 3

A series of alliances, both formal and informal, provided the basic

attractive, and susceptible to the same evangelical spirit that soon

Relations with Catalonia after 1302 did not so much improve as

dispel rumors that he intended to sacrifice Sicily, but keep it

example, was sold and shipped to Genoa, and the Genoese

With the war over in 1302, Catalan dissembling, transparent though

addition a direct loss of tax revenue (at 3 percent excise) of

equal to the estimated annual income of the papacy at Avignon or

against the Muslims in Granada, would surely prepare a purified

Demone likewise received a brief injection of popular support.71

At the moment the duchy was first established, however, none

Ill THINGS FALL APART!

This marks the turning point in Frederick's reign too, at least in

Sicily's sudden allegiance to the imperial ideology.83 There is

Mori, Scilla, and S. Niceto. A glance at a map shows their strategic

devote an ever higher portion of their revenues to their immediate

the revenues he needed.98 Worse than the expenses involved was

- to D. Filippo Curto in return for his continued military service.104

against class and of native against foreigner, which resulted in the

turba filiorum, quos idem Franciscus ex concubina susceperat, tanquam novelle

danger, that Frederick suddenly added a codicil to his will, stating

"Scene da un matrimonio: Eleonora d'Aragona e Giovanni Chiaramonte," Quaderni

It is easy to criticize Sicily's gross overextension of its power,

In sum, the international scene may not have caused Sicily's

A divided society I: the

Urban-demesnal Sicily comprised both the coastal commune-

ensure urban prosperity. Although he liked to claim otherwise, he

Pero el reson dels Catalans auzir

It is a bad poem, but it reflects the conceit he was capable of

"never seek, procure, or receive any absolution of this bond and

hope of putting a cap on ecclesiastical influence in the realm.

were available in sufficient quantity to trade for the grain produced

With fewer options at their disposal, therefore, most cities

resorted to the rather heavy-handed control of workers. This

between local merchants and the urban elites, and between