spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer
for sale of products and services unless the
recipient affirmatively consents, or when
the purpose of the communication is for
service or administrative announcements
from the sender to its existing users, or
“when the following conditions are
present: (aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid,
and reliable way for the recipient to reject
receipt of further commercial electronic
messages (opt-out) from the same
source; (bb) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely disguise
the source of the electronic message;
and (cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recipients to
read the message.”
The government argued that unsolicited
commercial communications amount to
both nuisance and trespass because they
tend to interfere with the enjoyment of
using online services and that they enter
the recipient’s domain without prior
permission.
The Court first noted that spams are a
category of commercial speech, which does
not receive the same level of protection as
other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression ,”but is nonetheless entitled to
protection.” It ruled that the prohibition on
transmitting unsolicited
communications “would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him.”
Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)
(3) as unconstitutional.
Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law
enforcement without a court warrant “to
collect or record traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer
system.” Traffic data under this Section
includes the origin, destination, route, size,
date, and duration of the communication,
but not its content nor the identity of users.
The Petitioners argued that such
warrantless authority curtails their civil
liberties and set the stage for abuse of
discretion by the government. They also
claimed that this provision violates the right
to privacy and protection from the
Disini vs Exec Sec
Case Summary and Outcome
The Supreme Court of Philippines declared
Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as
unconstitutional. It held that Section 4(c)
(3) violated the right to freedom of
expression by prohibiting the electronic
transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications. It found Section 12 in
violation of the right to privacy because it
lacked sufficient specificity and definiteness
in collecting real-time computer data. It
struck down Section 19 of the Act for giving
the government the authority to restrict or
block access to computer data without any
judicial warrant.
Facts
The case arises out of consolidated
petitions to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on the constitutionality of
several provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175.
The Petitioners argued that even though
the Act is the government’s platform in
combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21
separate sections of the Act violate their
constitutional rights, particularly the right
to freedom of expression and access to
inforamtion.
In February 2013, the Supreme Court
extended the duration of a temporary
restraining order against the government to
halt enforcement of the Act until the
adjudication of the issues.
Decision Overview
Justice Abad delivered the Court’s opinion.
The government of Philippines adopted the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for the
purpose of regulating access to and use of
cyberspace. Several sections of the law
define relevant cyber crimes and enable the
government to track down and penalize
violators.
Among 21 challenged sections, the Court
declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the
Act as unconstitutional.
Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of
unsolicited commercial electronic
communications, commonly known as
expression, as well as the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The Court first recognized that computer
data constitutes a personal property,
entitled to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Also, the
Philippines’ Constitution requires the
government to secure a valid judicial
warrant when it seeks to seize a personal
property or to block a form of expression.
Because Section 19 precluded any judicial
intervention, the Court found it
unconstitutional.
World Wide Web Corp vs People
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION v.
PEOPLE, GR No. 161106, 2014-01-13
Facts:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of
the Regional Intelligence Special Operations
Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National
Police filed applications for warrants[3]
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78,
to search the office premises of... petitioner
Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)[4]
located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza
Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis,
Quezon City,... applications alleged that
petitioners were conducting illegal toll
bypass operations, which amounted to theft
and violation of Presidential Decree No.
401... the trial court conducted a hearing on
the applications for search warrants. The
applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera)
and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative
Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT
testified as witnesse
Issues:
PLDT, without the conformity of the public
prosecutor, had no personality to question
the quashal of the search warrants;
Ruling:
at the conformity of the... public prosecutor
is not necessary before an aggrieved party
moves for reconsideration of an order
granting a motion to quash search warrants
When the search warrants issued were
subsequently quashed by the
RTC, there was nothing left to be done by
the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the
search warrants were final orders, not
interlocutory, and an appeal may be
properly taken therefrom.
Principles:
government’s intrusion into online
communications.
According to the Court, since Section 12
may lead to disclosure of private
communications, it must survive the
rational basis standard of whether it is
narrowly tailored towards serving a
government’s compelling interest. The
Court found that the government did have a
compelling interest in preventing cyber
crimes by monitoring real-time traffic data.
As to whether Section 12 violated the right
to privacy, the Court first recognized that
the right at stake concerned informational
privacy, defined as “the right not to have
private information disclosed, and the right
to live freely without surveillance and
intrusion.” In determining whether a
communication is entitled to the right of
privacy, the Court applied a two-part test:
(1) Whether the person claiming the right
has a legitimate expectation of privacy over
the communication, and (2) whether his
expectation of privacy can be regarded as
objectively reasonable in the society.
The Court noted that internet users have
subjective reasonable expectation of
privacy over their communications
transmitted online. However, it did not find
the expectation as objectively reasonable
because traffic data sent through internet
“does not disclose the actual names and
addresses (residential or office) of the
sender and the recipient, only their coded
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.”
Even though the Court ruled that real-time
traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy
the objective reasonable expectation of
privacy, the existence of enough data may
reveal the personal information of its
sender or recipient, against which the
Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard.
The Court viewed the law as “virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in “fishing
expedition,” choosing whatever specified
communication they want.”
Accordingly, the Court struck down Section
12 for lack of specificity and definiteness as
to ensure respect for the right to privacy.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of
Justice to restrict or block access to a
computer data found to be in violation of
the Act. The Petitioners argued that this
section also violated the right to freedom of
An application for a search warrant is a
judicial process conducted either as an
incident in a main criminal case already
filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to
be filed.[40] Whether the criminal case (of
which the search warrant is an incident)...
has already been filed before the trial court
is significant for the purpose of determining
the proper remedy from a grant or denial of
a motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an
incident in a pending criminal case, as it
was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search
warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still
"something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the
guilt of the... accused therein."